Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Presentism Parfit Norgaard I 339
(Def) Presentism/Political philosophy: Presentism is a moral framework that is implicitly adopted by climate economists such as Manne (1995)(1), Nordhaus (1992(2), 2008)(3), and Anthoff et al. (2009b)(4). In this perspective, policy decisions should be based strictly on the preferences of the current generation with no explicit moral standing afforded to members of future generations. The rub is that presentism implies that the
Norgaard I 340
weight attached to the welfare of future generations should be based strictly on the degree of altruism that people exhibit through their private decisions (Arrow et al. 1996)(5). Advocates of presentism attach special importance to the market rate of return on capital investment, which they argue reveals people's willingness to give up present economic benefits for the sake of their children and grandchildren (Goulder and Stavins 2002)(6).
Pro Presentism/Nordhaus: Nordhaus (1992(7), 2008(3)), for example, has long advocated a presentist approach in which major reductions in greenhouse gas emissions should be deferred into the long‐run future. In Nordhaus's analysis, the future benefits provided by climate stabilization are too small to justify imposing significant short‐run costs given the degree of intergenerational altruism people reveal through their private decisions.
VsPresentism: One line of critique argues that the market return on capital investment reveals the preferences that people hold regarding their own present and future well‐being, not the conceptually distinct values they hold regarding the appropriate resolution of intergenerational conflicts (Burton 1993)(8). In the economic models employed by presentists, these two behavioral motives are typically reduced to a single parameter for the sake of tractability and simplicity.
VsVs: Authors such as Howarth and Norgaard (1992)(9), however, argue that this modeling approach is theoretically unsound and that fresh insights arise through the use of models that distinguish between personal time preference and intergenerational ethics.
VsPresentism: (…) critics also charge that presentism involves the unjust treatment of posterity because it denies the principle that all human beings—including members of future generations—should have full and equal moral standing (Broome 2008)(10). Along these lines, Singer (2002: 26)(11) argues that the moral salience of impacts such as ‘suffering and death, or the extinction of species’ does not diminish with the passage of time. In a similar vein, Ramsey (1928)(12) argues that favoring the interests of present over future generations is ‘a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination.’
PresentismVsVs: Advocates of presentism, however, counter that the strength of intergenerational altruism has been sufficient to ensure that the quality of life has steadily improved in the centuries following the industrial revolution. If one assumes that economic growth will
Norgaard I 341
continue for some time into the future, it follows that our descendants in future generations are likely to be substantially more wealthy than we are today. VsPresentism: (…) climatic impacts may be severe enough to threaten the sustainability and productivity of economic activity (Hoel and Sterner 2007)(13). This point of view is supported by the findings of Woodward and Bishop (1997)(14), Weitzman (2009)(15), and Gerst et al. (2010)(16).

Pro Presentism/Parfit: More radically, authors such as Parfit (1983a)(17) question the notion that present decision makers have any obligations to future generations aside from ensuring that future persons have lives that are minimally worth living. (…) suppose that wholly different sets of potential persons would live in: (a) a low‐income future characterized by a degraded natural environment; and (b) a high‐income future characterized by a flourishing environment. Parfit's argument is that the individuals living in the degraded state would be thankful for the fact that present decisions fostered the conditions necessary for them to come into being. Steps to stabilize climate would (…) lead to a different world in which they would never be born.
VsParfit: “Our obligations to future generations derive from a sense of a community that stretches and extends over generations and into the future…If one accepts the idea of a community in one generation, including the principle that this entails certain obligations to other members, then one should accept the idea of a transgenerational community extending into the future, hence recognizing obligations to future generations.” (De‐Shalit 1995: 14–15)(18).
VsParfit/VsPresentism: Alternatively, Gosseries (2008)(19) notes that Parfit's argument abstracts away from a key fact of human demographics: At each point in time, the current generation of adults overlaps with its children and grandchildren whose existence and identities are fully determined. If one accepts the plausible premise that each generation of adults holds binding duties to its flesh‐and‐blood progeny, a ‘chain of obligation’ is then established between present decision makers and the unborn members of more distant generations (Howarth 1992)(20).
>Generational Justice, >Climate Change/Utilitarianism.

1. Manne, A. S. 1995. The rate of time preference: Implications for the greenhouse debate. Energy Policy 23: 391–4.
2. Nordhaus, W. D. 1992. An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Science 258: 1315–19.
3. Nordhaus, W. 2008. A Question of Balance: Weighting the Options on Global Warming Policies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
4. Anthoff, D. Tol, R. S. J. and Yohe, G. W. 2009b. Risk aversion, time preference, and the social cost of carbon. Environmental Research Letters 4: 1–7.
5. Arrow, K. J., Cline, W. R., Mäler, K. G., Munasinghe, R., Squitieri, R., and Stiglitz, J. E. 1996. Intertemporal equity, discounting, and economic efficiency. In J. P. Bruce, H. Lee, and E. F. Haites (eds.), Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Goulder, L. H., and Stavins, R. N. 2002. An eye on the future. Nature 419: 673–4.
7. Nordhaus, W. D. 1992. An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Science 258: 1315–19.
8. Burton, P. S. 1993. Intertemporal preferences and intergenerational equity considerations in optimal resource harvesting. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24: 119–32.
9. Howarth, R.B. and Norgaard, R. B. 1992. Environmental valuation under sustainable development. American Economic Review 80: 473–7.
10. Broome, J. 2008. The ethics of climate change. Scientific American 298: 97–102.
11. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press.
12. Ramsey, F. 1928. A mathematical theory of saving. Economic Journal 38: 543–59.
13. Hoel, M., and Sterner, T. 2007. Discounting and relative prices. Climatic Change 84: 265–80.
14. Woodward, R. T., and Bishop, R. C. 1997. How to decide when experts disagree: Uncertainty‐based choice rules in environmental policy. Land Economics 73: 492–507.
15. Weitzman, M. L. 2009. On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change. Review of Economics and Statistics 91: 1–19.
16. Gerst, M., Howarth, R. B., and Borsuk, M. E. 2010. Accounting for the risk of extreme outcomes in an integrated assessment of climate change. Energy Policy 38: 4540–8.
17. Parfit, D. 1983a. Energy policy and the further future: The identity problem. In D. MacLean and P. G. Brown (eds.), Energy and the Future. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. Pp. 166–179.
18. De‐Shalit, A. 1995. Why Posterity Matters: Environmental Policies and Future Generations. London: Routledge.
19. Gosseries, A. 2008. On future generations' rights. Journal of Political Philosophy 16: 446–74.
20. Howarth, R. B. 1992. Intergenerational justice and the chain of obligation. Environmental Values 1: 133–40.

Howarth, Richard: “Intergenerational Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parf I
D. Parfit
Reasons and Persons Oxford 1986

Parf II
Derekt Parfit
On what matters Oxford 2011


Norgaard I
Richard Norgaard
John S. Dryzek
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Presentism Nordhaus Norgaard I 339
(Def) Presentism/Political philosophy: Presentism is a moral framework that is implicitly adopted by climate economists such as Manne (1995)(1), Nordhaus (1992(2), 2008)(3), and Anthoff et al. (2009b)(4). In this perspective, policy decisions should be based strictly on the preferences of the current generation with no explicit moral standing afforded to members of future generations. The rub is that presentism implies that the
Norgaard I 340
weight attached to the welfare of future generations should be based strictly on the degree of altruism that people exhibit through their private decisions (Arrow et al. 1996)(5). Advocates of presentism attach special importance to the market rate of return on capital investment, which they argue reveals people's willingness to give up present economic benefits for the sake of their children and grandchildren (Goulder and Stavins 2002)(6).
Pro Presentism/Nordhaus: Nordhaus (1992(7), 2008(3)), for example, has long advocated a presentist approach in which major reductions in greenhouse gas emissions should be deferred into the long‐run future. In Nordhaus's analysis, the future benefits provided by climate stabilization are too small to justify imposing significant short‐run costs given the degree of intergenerational altruism people reveal through their private decisions.
VsPresentism: One line of critique argues that the market return on capital investment reveals the preferences that people hold regarding their own present and future well‐being, not the conceptually distinct values they hold regarding the appropriate resolution of intergenerational conflicts (Burton 1993)(8). In the economic models employed by presentists, these two behavioral motives are typically reduced to a single parameter for the sake of tractability and simplicity.
VsVs: Authors such as Howarth and Norgaard (1992)(9), however, argue that this modeling approach is theoretically unsound and that fresh insights arise through the use of models that distinguish between personal time preference and intergenerational ethics.
VsPresentism: (…) critics also charge that presentism involves the unjust treatment of posterity because it denies the principle that all human beings—including members of future generations—should have full and equal moral standing (Broome 2008)(10). Along these lines, Singer (2002: 26)(11) argues that the moral salience of impacts such as ‘suffering and death, or the extinction of species’ does not diminish with the passage of time. In a similar vein, Ramsey (1928)(12) argues that favoring the interests of present over future generations is ‘a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination.’
PresentismVsVs: Advocates of presentism, however, counter that the strength of intergenerational altruism has been sufficient to ensure that the quality of life has steadily improved in the centuries following the industrial revolution. If one assumes that economic growth will
Norgaard I 341
continue for some time into the future, it follows that our descendants in future generations are likely to be substantially more wealthy than we are today. VsPresentism: (…) climatic impacts may be severe enough to threaten the sustainability and productivity of economic activity (Hoel and Sterner 2007)(13). This point of view is supported by the findings of Woodward and Bishop (1997)(14), Weitzman (2009)(15), and Gerst et al. (2010)(16).

Pro Presentism/Parfit: More radically, authors such as Parfit (1983a)(17) question the notion that present decision makers have any obligations to future generations aside from ensuring that future persons have lives that are minimally worth living. (…) suppose that wholly different sets of potential persons would live in: (a) a low‐income future characterized by a degraded natural environment; and (b) a high‐income future characterized by a flourishing environment. Parfit's argument is that the individuals living in the degraded state would be thankful for the fact that present decisions fostered the conditions necessary for them to come into being. Steps to stabilize climate would (…) lead to a different world in which they would never be born.
VsParfit: “Our obligations to future generations derive from a sense of a community that stretches and extends over generations and into the future…If one accepts the idea of a community in one generation, including the principle that this entails certain obligations to other members, then one should accept the idea of a transgenerational community extending into the future, hence recognizing obligations to future generations.” (De‐Shalit 1995: 14–15)(18).
VsParfit/VsPresentism: Alternatively, Gosseries (2008)(19) notes that Parfit's argument abstracts away from a key fact of human demographics: At each point in time, the current generation of adults overlaps with its children and grandchildren whose existence and identities are fully determined. If one accepts the plausible premise that each generation of adults holds binding duties to its flesh‐and‐blood progeny, a ‘chain of obligation’ is then established between present decision makers and the unborn members of more distant generations (Howarth 1992)(20).
>Generational Justice, >Climate Change/Utilitarianism.

1. Manne, A. S. 1995. The rate of time preference: Implications for the greenhouse debate. Energy Policy 23: 391–4.
2. Nordhaus, W. D. 1992. An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Science 258: 1315–19.
3. Nordhaus, W. 2008. A Question of Balance: Weighting the Options on Global Warming Policies. New Haven: Yale University Press.
4. Anthoff, D. Tol, R. S. J. and Yohe, G. W. 2009b. Risk aversion, time preference, and the social cost of carbon. Environmental Research Letters 4: 1–7.
5. Arrow, K. J., Cline, W. R., Mäler, K. G., Munasinghe, R., Squitieri, R., and Stiglitz, J. E. 1996. Intertemporal equity, discounting, and economic efficiency. In J. P. Bruce, H. Lee, and E. F. Haites (eds.), Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
6. Goulder, L. H., and Stavins, R. N. 2002. An eye on the future. Nature 419: 673–4.
7. Nordhaus, W. D. 1992. An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Science 258: 1315–19.
8. Burton, P. S. 1993. Intertemporal preferences and intergenerational equity considerations in optimal resource harvesting. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24: 119–32.
9. Howarth, R.B. and Norgaard, R. B. 1992. Environmental valuation under sustainable development. American Economic Review 80: 473–7.
10. Broome, J. 2008. The ethics of climate change. Scientific American 298: 97–102.
11. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press.
12. Ramsey, F. 1928. A mathematical theory of saving. Economic Journal 38: 543–59.
13. Hoel, M., and Sterner, T. 2007. Discounting and relative prices. Climatic Change 84: 265–80.
14. Woodward, R. T., and Bishop, R. C. 1997. How to decide when experts disagree: Uncertainty‐based choice rules in environmental policy. Land Economics 73: 492–507.
15. Weitzman, M. L. 2009. On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change. Review of Economics and Statistics 91: 1–19.
16. Gerst, M., Howarth, R. B., and Borsuk, M. E. 2010. Accounting for the risk of extreme outcomes in an integrated assessment of climate change. Energy Policy 38: 4540–8.
17. Parfit, D. 1983a. Energy policy and the further future: The identity problem. In D. MacLean and P. G. Brown (eds.), Energy and the Future. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. Pp. 166–179.
18. De‐Shalit, A. 1995. Why Posterity Matters: Environmental Policies and Future Generations. London: Routledge.
19. Gosseries, A. 2008. On future generations' rights. Journal of Political Philosophy 16: 446–74.
20. Howarth, R. B. 1992. Intergenerational justice and the chain of obligation. Environmental Values 1: 133–40.



Howarth, Richard: “Intergenerational Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

EconNordh I
William D. Nordhaus
The political business cycle 1975


Norgaard I
Richard Norgaard
John S. Dryzek
The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Endurantism Lewis Vs Endurantism Schwarz I 32
Def Endurantism/Schwarz: (Vs Perdurantism): Thesis: Things are present as a whole (and not in parts) at all times in which they exist (like Aristotelian universalia). LewisVsEnduantism (instead: Mosaic theory).
Mosaic/Lewis: Thesis: All truth about our world as well as the temporal expansion of things are based on characteristics and relations between spatial-temporal expanded points.
Endurantism VsLewis: This is not argument for him since he is not interested in mosaic theory.
LewisVsEndurantism: better argument: intrinsic change: If normal things do not have temporal parts, but exist at different times, they can be neither round nor big, but only round in t. And this would be absurd.
Characteristics/some authors: surely, not all characteristics are relational like "to be far away", but they can at least be relational in time, although we ignore this perpetual present dependence. (Haslanger 1989(1):123f, Jackson 1994b(2),142f, van Inwagen 1990a(3), 116).
Characteristics/Lewis: (2004(4),4) at least abstract geometric objects can simply be round, therefore "round" is not a general relation to time.
Characteristics/Endurantism/Johnston: Thesis: not only characteristics, but their instantiations should be relativized in the area of time. (Johnston, 1987(5),§5)
e.g. I am now sitting, and was sleeping last night.
Others: (Haslanger, 1989)(1): Thesis: Time designations (> time/Lewis) are adverbial modifications of propositions, e.g. I am now sitting this way, and was sleeping this way last night.
LewisVsJohnston/LewisVsHaslanger: This is not a great difference. These representatives deny as well that form characteristics arrive to the things in a direct, simple way and on their own.
Perdurantism/Endurantism/Schwarz: The debate has reached a dead end, both parties accuse the other of analyzing transformation away.
Endurantism: To instantiate incompatible characteristics has nothing to do with transformation.
Perdurantism: Temporal instantiation, e.g. straight for t1, bent for t0, shall not be a transformation.
Schwarz: Both goes against our intuition. Transformation is attributed too much importance.
Schwarz I 33
Perdurantism/Schwarz: pro: Intrinsic transformation is no problem for presentism since the past is now only fiction, but the following should make temporal parts attractive for the presentist as well: the surrogate four-dimensionalist needs to construct his ersatz times differently. Instead of primitive essences which surface in strictly identical different ersatz times, temporal ersatz parts could be introduced which will form the essences, and on their associated characteristics it will depend on whether it is an ersatz Socrates or not (as an example). Part/LewisVs Endurantism: can also be temporal in everyday's language, e.g. a part of a film or a soccer game. E.g. part of a plan, parts of mathematics: not spatial. It is not even important whether the language accepts such denotations. Temporal would also exist if we could not designate them.



1. Sally Haslanger [1989]: “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”. Analysis, 49: 119–125
2. Frank Jackson [1994a]: “Armchair Metaphysics”. In John O’Leary Hawthorne und Michaelis Michael
(ed.), Philosophy in Mind, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 23–42.
3. Peter van Inwagen [1990a]: “Four-Dimensional Objects”. Noˆus, 24: 245–256. In [van Inwagen 2001]
4. D. Lewis [2004a]: “Causation as Influence”. In [Collins et al. 2004], 75–107.
5. Mark Johnston [1987]: “Is There a Problem About Persistence?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, Suppl. Vol., 61: 107–135

Lewis I
David K. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

Lewis I (a)
David K. Lewis
An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (b)
David K. Lewis
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972)
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis I (c)
David K. Lewis
Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980
In
Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989

Lewis II
David K. Lewis
"Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979

Lewis IV
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

Lewis V
David K. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

Lewis VI
David K. Lewis
Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Konventionen Berlin 1975

LewisCl
Clarence Irving Lewis
Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005
Presentism Lewis Vs Presentism Schwarz I 19
Past/Future/LewisVsPresentism: it is common sense that the last moon landing was in 1972 and that certain species are long extinct. Presentism: but also refers to common sense and claims that these things are no longer real. To be past means to no longer exist. There will also be future species only when they are there. There is only what exists now (give/exist/"there is").
LewisVsPresentism: "there is": Lewis does not claim that "dinosaurs exist now". But they do exist (although not today). They only exist in the past. But the presentist also accepts this. Then what is the point of contention?
Schwarz I 20
Solution: has to do with the area of quantification. Quantification/Area/Schwarz: unlimited quantifiers are rare and are part of metaphysics. Example "there is no God" refers to the whole universe. Example: "There is no beer": refers to the refrigerator.
Existence/Lewis/Schwarz: so there are different "ways of existence". Numbers exist in a different way than tables.
Existence/Presentism: his statements about what exists are absolutely unlimited.
Four-dimensionalism/Existence: statements about what exist ignore from his point of view past and future. When we say that there are no dinosaurs ((s) then we (wrongly) extend the present into the past.) Schwarz: through the present tense we indicate that we are not talking about absolutely everything, but only about the present.
Quantification/Schwarz: can also be neutral in the present. But it doesn't depend on grammar.
Schwarz I 21
Solution: make true: what makes the sentences true, e.g. that Socrates drank the cup of hemlock? Four-dimensionalism truthmakers: the events in the past part of reality.
Presentism: does not believe in past parts of reality. But then the truthmaker must be a characteristic of the present!
VsPresentism: Problem: the present is logically not dependent on the past. It is possible that the world was only created five minutes ago.
Reality/Presentism: (some representatives) one does not grasp reality by just determining what things are present. That Socrates existed is not true because there are certain things now, but because they existed then. Statements about what has existed and will exist express basic facts that cannot be reduced to statements about what is. Then the sentence operators "it was a case that," and "it will be the case" are primitive and unanalytic. (Prior, 1969(1)).
Properties/LewisVsPrior/LewisVsPresentism: Vs these primitive operators: All truths must be based on what kind of things with what qualities there are. The two operators above would not be sufficient. Example "Socrates is still admired today" ((s) This does not distinguish the present from the past as desired here. Example "There were several English kings named Charles": Problem: there was no time when there were several. Then, among other things, plural past quantifiers must also be accepted.
Four dimensionalism/Lewis: Solution: Temporal operators simply move the range of quantifieres. Example "...1642" is like "...in Australia". Then: with "there were several English kings named Charles" we quantify about a larger part of the past, perhaps about all past things together.
Presentism: (some representatives) try to acquire it without sharing the metaphysics: Reference to "Socrates" or "1642" is then somehow abstract and of a completely different kind than that to concrete things (Bigelow 1996). Perhaps past times are linguistic fictions, sentences and their inhabitants contained in them (descriptions). Then, for example, "cup of hemlock" would not require that there is someone of flesh and blood who does anything. (!) It is enough if a fiction tells about it ((s) >Fiction/Field).
Schwarz I 22
Other solution/presentism: such sentences about past things as set-theoretical constructions of present things: the Socrates of the year 399 is then a set of now existing qualities, among them also the characteristic to drink the hemlock cup. VsPresentism: not all things that ever existed can be described in our language or constructed from current events. Besides, there are many fictions that have nothing to do with them. What distinguishes the "real" from the "false"?
Four dimensionalism: "Surrogate V" ("Replacement V"): interprets other times and their inhabitants as metaphysically fundamental entities. Example "Socrates" refers to an irreducible entity ("being") that is somehow linked to the qualities we assume from Socrates. (LewisVs)
Problem: the link must not be that the entity has these properties! Because that would be the true four dimensionalism.
LewisVs "ersatz world": no theory of substitute Socrats can be developed where these are really "abstract".
PresentismVsFour-dimensionalism: sweeps essential aspects of reality under the carpet: what will become of the flow of time, the change of things and the peculiarity of the present? The four-dimensional block universe never changes. His time dimension "does not flow". E.g. then I can't be happy that the visit to the dentist is over, because it is still just as real.
Four-dimensionalismVsPresentism: e.g. visit to the dentist: I am glad that it is no longer there, not that it has been erased from reality. Just as I'm glad the attack didn't happen here, but elsewhere.


1. Arthur N. Prior [1969]: Past, Present and Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press

LewisCl I
Clarence Irving Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

Schw I
W. Schwarz
David Lewis Bielefeld 2005

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Presentism Quine, W.V.O. Lewis/Schw I 228~
Def Präsentismus/Präsentist/Schwarz: Bsp könnte einfach behaupten, Freges vergangenes Schreiben der Begriffsschrift(1) sei eine fundamentale Eigenschaft der Gegenwart. Dann können wir nach dem Schema von Quine (1960a)(2) unsere Ontologie beliebig verkleinern.



1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964
Presentism Stalnaker, R. I 128
Presentism / Stalnaker: (see above) analogous to actualism in relation to possible worlds: we are extended in time as we are extending over worlds. Then we can have real time identity. (Stalnaker pro).   Fusion / fission / personal identity / Stalnaker: are then cases where separate persons were earlier identical or a person is divided into two.