Disputed term/author/ism | Author![]() |
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Animism | Monod | I 40 Definition Animism/Monod: Animism is the assumption of a universal teleonomic principle according to which evolution should end in mankind. I 41 The human projects the consciousness, which he/she has from the strongly teleonomic mode of action of the central nervous system (CNS), to the inanimate nature. Cf. >Anthropic principle, >Teleonomy. |
Mon I J. Monod Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970 German Edition: Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982 |
Evolution | Putnam | III 34 Evolution/Putnam: evolution does not require that each ability is the result of selection. --- V 61 Evolution/language: today, a theory is modern according to which evolution itself has produced a correspondence between our words and spiritual representation and the external things. It is said that we would not have survived without such correspondence. >Language evolution, >Word meaning/Deacon V 62 Putnam: but we must ask what do "correspondence" and "reference" have to do with survival? What has truth anything to do with survival? >Correspondence. --- III 42 Teleology/evolution/Ernst Mayr: Ernst Mayer suggests to speak in evolution theory not of teleology, but of teleology simulation, or "teleonomy". To escape the lion is only the function of the genetic trait in question, as this trait would not have been selected if the high speed had not given the gazelles the opportunity to escape the lion. >Teleology. III 49 Intentionality/evolution/Putnam: evolution will not give us more intentionality than we put into it. >Intentionality. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Goals | Mayr | Putnam III 42 Teleology/evolution/Ernst Mayr: "teleonomy" is only simulation of teleology. - The speed of gazelles makes the selection of even greater speed possible in the first. - For the behavior of the lion, both the meat as well as other data play a role, so that you do not need teleology. >Teleology, >Behavior, >Benefit. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Life | Monod | I 9 Coincidence/necessity/life/individual/Monod/own: the individual owes his life to a chain of conserved coincidences. Only the mechanism of the macroscopic expression of these "microscopic" coincidences is necessary. I 27 Life/Monod: Teleonomy (superordinate purpose) is necessary for a definition, but not sufficient. >Teleonomy. One needed a program that explores not only the present object, but also its origin, history and structure. Life owes almost nothing to the influence of external forces! Its structure proves a clear self-determination, which includes a quasi "total freedom" opposed to external forces and conditions. On the basis of this criterion, however, the crystals would have to be classified among the living creatures! I 31 Life/Monod: up to now there are three criteria: 1. Teleonomy (proteins) 2. Autonomous morphogenesis 3. reproductive invariance. (Nucleic acids) I 32 But the three do not have the same status: While teleonomy and invariability are actually characteristic "properties" of the living beings, the spontaneous construction must be regarded as a mechanism. I 98 Life/Monod: 1. All living beings consist without exception of the same two main classes of macromolecules, made up of proteins and nucleic acids. Proteins: are made up of twenty amino acids Nucleic acids: made up of four types of nucleotides. 2. The same reaction sequences are used in all living beings for the same essential chemical operations. Mobilization and reserve formation of the chemical potential and biosynthesis of the cell components. Differences: Nitrogen excretion happens in mammals via urea, in birds via uric acid. |
Mon I J. Monod Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970 German Edition: Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982 |
Objectivity | Monod | I 23 Object/Objectivity/Monod: there are two criteria for artefacts: 1. Regularity 2. Repeatability >Artifacts. For example, according to these criteria, one could decide that pebbles are natural and quartz crystals (falsely) artificial. The crystal reflects macroscopically the microscopic molecular structure. Therefore the regularity. (Natural origin). >Regularities. Our conclusions are ambiguous: one could find all the criteria of an artificial origin in a hive of wild bees. I 36 Objectivity/Monod: objectivity of nature: means the cancellation of the submission of a final cause, a "project". >Teleology, >Teleonomy, cf. >Purposes/Aristotle. |
Mon I J. Monod Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970 German Edition: Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982 |
Order | Monod | I 11 Order/Structure/Organization/Monod: two terms are subordinated to it. 1. Teleonomy (a property dictated by a superordinate purpose) of the "apparatus" organization. 2. Invariance of the information underlying the teleonomic structures. Proteins: are bearers of teleonomic performance Nucleic Acids: is an information storage thanks to complementarity as an exclusive interaction. >Teleonomy. Reproduction: is almost invariant through organized protein nucleic acid systems. (With a certain blur). Mutation occurs through translation errors. >Mutation. I 13 Nucleic acids: divide into DNA: memory and RNA: messenger. Due to the non-reversibility of this division, the teleonomic program, although it is the subject of the mutation, cannot itself contribute to its change. --- I 14 Selection/own: It is based on a physically clearly formulated evaluation concept. If it were purely arbitrary, it would be "survival of the survivor". Selection, however, means restriction of the coincidence. In large numbers the selection of necessity obeys. ((s) But surely not on a goal!). Manfred Eigen: selection is done according to strict criteria. >Selection. Coincidence/necessity/Manfred Eigen: the necessity occurs equally next to chance, as soon as a probability distribution exists. >Probability distribution. I 25 Order/Organization/Criteria/Monod: an even more disappointing criterion would be the function: For example, compare horses on a field with cars on the road. >Functions, >Functional explanation, >Criteria. E.g. the eye and camera can be compared according to structure and performance. |
Mon I J. Monod Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970 German Edition: Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982 |
Selection | Monod | I 39 Selection/Monod: selection theory makes teleonomy a secondary property and derives it from the invariance. Monod thesis: the invariance precedes the teleonomy. >Invariants, >Teleonomy. |
Mon I J. Monod Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970 German Edition: Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982 |
Terminology | Monod | I 30 Teleonomy/Monod: teleonomy is ambiguous as it includes the idea of a "project". All achievements that contribute to the success are called teleonomic. I 31 Definition teleonomic information (set)/Monod: all structures and services correspond to a certain amount of information which must be transferred in order for these structures to be realized. >Order/Monod, >Selection/Monod, >Structures/Monod. |
Mon I J. Monod Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970 German Edition: Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982 |
Vitalism | Monod | I 39 Definition Vitalism/Monod: theories that adopt a teleonomic principle that is to be effective within the "living matter". There is a radical difference between living and non-living matter. >Teleonomy. I 40 Henri Bergson: Life as an "urge", "stream", but this is not finalistic in Bergson. >Henri Bergson. |
Mon I J. Monod Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970 German Edition: Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982 |
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