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Deceptions | Davidson | Rorty VI 214 Deception/Davidson/Rorty: bring us through a causal process to represent true or false beliefs depending on the programming. >Beliefs/Davidson. Davidson I 38 Error/Belief/Davidson: that I do not deceive myself in the majority of cases is essential for the fact that I have a language - that makes "inner objects" superfluous. >Objects of Belief. Instead: history of language acquisition. >Language acquisition, >Causal theory of knowledge. Truth conditions for the speaker: sentence is true when e.g. the Kohinoor is a crown jewel. - ((s) conditional: non-empirical - for the listener: empirical.) --- Davidson I (e) 98 Third dogma/scheme/content/error/deception/Davidson: deception after abolition of the separation schema/content is no longer a problem, no question whether we are capable of the knowledge of the world and of the foreign-psychological - even more: how - but these are no longer epistemological questions, but rather questions about the nature of rationality. >Conceptual scheme. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Experience | Stalnaker | I 219 Inner experiences/Wittgenstein/Stalnaker: 1. Wittgenstein is skeptical about the inner experience. 2. VerificationismVsInternalism. >VerificationismVsinternalism. Cf. >Inner objects, >Mentalism, >Mental Objects. Example: Inverted Spectra/Stalnaker: If this were possible, how could we report about it? Both persons (one of whom would have reversed spectra) would call red things red. The only thing that would be different would be the inner experiences, experiences that we cannot even compare because we are not in the position to do so. Recently the problem is being taken more seriously again. This raises above all problems of VsFunctionalism and VsMaterialism. It has consequences for the notion of mind, or that of consciousness and intentionality. >Inverted spectra/Stalnaker, >Other Minds, >Functionalism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Introspection | Ryle | I 208f Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: introspection cannot be what the tradition expects of it as its object is a myth. Consciousness: what I can find out about me is of the same nature as what I can find out about others - the small differences just do not favor self-knowledge (RyleVsNagel). >Self-knowledge, >Authority of the First Person, >Priviledged access, >Incorrigibility, >Self-consciousness, >Consciousness. I 216 RyleVsTradition: we do not encounter any symptoms inside - such events do not exist. I 221 f Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: there are no ghostly objects but suppose there were, then there is a regress: one would perceive then at the same time, that one perceives them. >Regress. Bad solution: then one would have to admit that there are imperceptible inner objects - a knowledge about it could not be based on introspection. >Mental objects, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mentalism. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
Mentalism | Quine | ad V 57 Mentalism/Quine/(s): assumption of internal objects as a guarantor of the truth of propositions e.g. about ideas - e.g. word meaning. Quine: Mentalism has strong echoes of introspection. >Introspection. VI 105 Mentalism/Quine: (belief in inner objects). Origin: the perception that others perceive something. Analog: is the belief in final causes for the meaning of life. Purpose: psychological projection. IV 402 QuineVsBritish Empiricism: this is based on the acceptance of ideas (derived from Locke). Uncritical Mentalism: too simple an image of the experience reference of languages and theories. Reference/Quine: Such a reference cannot be defined idea for idea or term for term. >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought, >Mental objects. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Mentalism | Schiffer | I XIX SchifferVsMentalism: language-independent internal entities as objects of belief. Solution: nominalism: Vs internal language-independent entities and Vs facts. >Inner objects, >Mental objects, >Intensional objects, >Facts. Then we need no extra-linguistic irreducible psychological entities. No sentential dualism (belief sets as objects). >Dualism, >Beliefs. Schiffer: we tentatively accept a token-token physicalism. >Physicalism, cf. >Token-physicalism. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Models | Sellars | I XL Model/Sellars: always works in connection with a commentary. Model of sensations: requires internal objects. >Internal objects, >Sensation. I XXIX Theory of sensations: does not speak of inner objects. I 86 Sellars: the basic assumptions of a theory are usually not formed by an uninterpreted calculus, but by a model. Def model/Sellars: the description of a domain of known objects which behave in the usual way. >Domain, >Regularity, >Calculus. I 87 A model is characterized primarily by the fact that gets commentary alongside, which restricts or limits the analogies. The descriptions of the basic behaviors correspond to the postulates of the logistic image of theorizing. >Analogies. Rorty I 261 Sellars: each model has its comment. >Models, >Model theory. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Morals | Schiffer | I 153 Moral/physicalism/positivism pro Moore: moral properties cannot be identified with natural aptitude - But, VsMoore: it does not follow that there was a realm of non-natural (moral) properties. >Mentalism, >Inner objects, >Intensional objects. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Object | Davidson | I (b) 16 ff Thought/Knowledge/DavidsonVsHume: there are infinitely many properties, so ignorance of the imagined objects is possible Hume/Descartes: ... it is necessary to find objects for which mistakes are impossible. As objects that are necessary what they seem to be. DavidsonVsDescartes: Such objects simply do not exist. Not even appearances are all what they seem to be. Also, the aspects of sense data cannot be protected against misidentification, insofar as they are real objects. We must drop the idea that there are inner objects or mental images in the required sense. No "internal objects", no "uninterpreted given", "no stream" within a schema (VsSchema/content). >Scheme/Content, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mentalism. Frank I 678 Objects/Putnam/Fodor: a) "true inward", "in front of the mind", "conceived" by him - b) those who identify thoughts in the usual way. (external) - Davidson: I agree that there are no objects that serve both purposes - ((s) not an excellent class). - Putnam: the two cannot coincide, because otherwise the mind could not be deceived. Ideas/impressions/Hume: "are as it seems and seem as it is" - DavidsonVsHume: such objects do not exist - neither abstract nor concrete, neither public nor private. Even propositions do not exist - there is no object that would satisfy the dual function to be in front of the mind and also to determine the content of the thought - otherwise one could not be deceived. - meaning depends on the types of objects and events which have caused the person acausally to take the words as applicable. But the agent cannot ask himself/herself whether he/she regularly applies them correctly, because his/her regularity gives them importance. - Thus, authority of the first person and social character go hand in hand. >First Person. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Phenomenalism | Ryle | I 322 ff PhenomenalismVsSubstance, Vs "higher unity" in the object -> sense-data theory. I 321ff We do not have a "pure" vocabulary of sensations. We can indicate our sensations only by mentioning ordinary objects, including people. I 322 A goalpost is permanent, while sensations are fleeting. It is a unity, while sensations are a multiplicity, so there is a tendency to say that "behind" the sensations there is a higher unity of the goalpost; important features, namely, that it is a continuing substance, a thing in itself a source of causality, an objective unity... Phenomenalism/Ryle: tries to get along without these useless secret means of theory but does not recognize the disease. RyleVsPhenomenalism: it springs from another, less laudable motive: he assumed that having a sensation is itself a determining of something, or that something is "revealed" in the sensation. >Sense data theory. It seemed to follow that we can't really observe things and therefore can't find out by observation those things that we know very well about goalposts. I 323 RyleVsPhenomenalism: The truth is that "sense objects" is a meaningless expression, so the expression "statement about sense objects" is also meaningless. >Inner objects, >Mental objects, >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought, >Mentalism. RyleVsPhenomenalism: it is false to see sensation as something to explore (Vs "sense objects"). "Indirect monitoring": sensation is not describable without reference to objects. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
Propositional Attitudes | Davidson | I (b) 20 A suggestion boils down to interpret the remainder of the sentence after "believes" as a complex adverb. >That-clauses. DavidsonVs: no human being has any idea how the meanings of the individual words could be derived from them. But we obviously understand the sentences because we understand the contained words. >Meaning (intending), >Meaning, >Sentence meaning, >Word meaning, >Propositions, >Idiolect. I (b) 22 If the "contents" of the propositional attitudes were the meanings, new, very long words would have to be learned, which often occur only once. Since, however, each statement can appear as a content sentence, its number is infinite and therefore cannot be learned. >Propositional content. I (e) 104 Fodor: inner "solipsist" states that determine what is meant. DavidsonVsFodor: But such conditions do not exist at all, which is obvious: the very general characteristics for porcupines, e.g. "Has four paws, and spines," etc. are as dependent on the natural history of the acquisition of these words as the words "porcupine" and "short-beaked echidna". >Other minds. Glüer II 127 Propositional Attitudes are individuated through public objects - beliefs have causes, no private objects (with privileged access, for example). - >Externalism, >Individuation. Avramides I 102f Rationality/Davidson: is what we need to understand propositional attitudes, not for physics - ((s) = reason). Davidson I (b) 22 Propositional Attitude/Content/Meaning/Davidson: if the "contents" of the propositional attitudes were the meanings, we would always have to learn new, very long words, which often occur only once. I (b) 23 Propositional Attitude/Belief/Reference/Content/Davidson: according to that there is no alternative to the concept of belief sentences as relational sentences. Thus, one must consider the content sentence "The diamond Kohinoor is one of the crown jewels" together with "that" as a singular term. >Singular terms. I (b) 39 Propositional Attitudes/Object/Content/Belief/Desire/Brentano: no internal object are different from the outer object - ((s) Davidson, actually, also Vs "inner objects" - but: DavidsonVsBrentano: Problem with objects that do not exist. Solution/Davidson/(s): Learning history secures word meaning without reference - Brentano Thesis: Intentionality is irreducible to brain states. >Intentionality/Brentano. I (e) 97 Propositional Attitudes/Davidson: are not subjective. - Access to other minds is guaranteed by the mechanism of language comprehension. - One must be able to come from the observed behavior to the attitudes, because language and thought are interpretable. Glüer II 127 Propositional Attitudes/Davidson: are individuated via public objects - beliefs have causes, no private objects - (externalism) - no representation - predicate "x believes that p": relation between speaker and an utterance of the interpreter. >Representation, >Speaker's meaning, >Utterances, >Interpretation. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
Relation-Theory | Prior | Relation-Theory/ Prior: the thesis that there is a relation to inner objects. >Thoughts/Prior, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mentalism. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Sense Data Theory | Broad | Sellars I XXXVI Classical sense data theory: (C.D.Broad): Sense data are inner objects of which someone who sees or seems to be seeing something is immediately conscious. Cf. >Objects of Thought, >Mental Objects, >Mentalism, >Qualia. |
Broad I C. D. Broad The Mind and its Place in Nature (Philosophy of Mind and Language) London 2008 |
Sensory Impressions | Sellars | McDowell I 168 Sensory Impressions/Sellars: distinguished from pieces of the given. No direct relationship with the knowledge. >Given/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Perception, >Perception/Sellars. Active receptivity. But the receptivity cannot cooperate itself in a rational manner with the spontaneity. (VsQuine). --- I IX Sellars: no renunciation of sensations in toto. (Unlike Quine). >Sensations/Quine. I XXIII Sensory Impressions/Quine: manifolds, which are to be structured through various theory drafts. (SellarsVs). I XXIII Sellars: Physical and mental are not in a causal relationship, but belong to different world views. >Physical/psychic. Only conveyed by structure of world views. (Vs above). The frames are related by their structure and not by content. It is simply a wrongly asked question how impressions and electromagnetic fields can tolerate each other. I XXIX The theory of sensory impressions does not speak of inner objects. >Inner objects. I XXXVII Sellars: sensory impressions only have causal consequences of external physical objects. A red sensation can also occur if the external object only seems to be red. Both concepts explain why the speaker always speaks of something red. Only, the sensation is according to Sellars no object of knowledge, and even the category of the object is questioned by Sellars. >Object/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Sensation/Sellars. I XL First, however, these states are states of a person. Not of a brain. In any case, they are imperceptible. Sensory Impressions: neither they have a color, nor do they have a shape. (> Perception/Sellars). Impressions: that these are theoretical entities, is shown to us by how to characterize them in an intrinsic way: not only as descriptions: "entity as such, that looking at a red and triangular object under such and such circumstances has the standard cause." But rather as predicates. These are no abbreviations for descriptions of properties. Example if one says that molecules have a mass, then the word "mass" is not an abbreviation of a description of the form "the property that ...". I 101 "Impression of a red triangle" does not only mean "impression like he ... through red and triangular objects ...." although it is a truth, namely a logical truth about impressions of red triangles. I 103 Impressions need to be inter-subjective, not completely dissolvable impressions in behavioral symptoms: states (but not physiological) - impressions are not objects. I 106 Sellars: Rylean Language: actual explanation, is more than just a code: conceptual framework public objects in space and time. >Rylean ancestors. Language of impressions: embodies the discovery that there are such things, but it is not specifically tailored to them (individual things no antecedent objects of thinking). SellarsVsHume: because he does not clearly distinguish between thoughts and impressions, he can assume that a natural derivative corresponds not only to a logical but also a temporal sequence. His theory must be extended so that it also includes cases such as the above or backwards: Thunder now, before a moment of lightning. --- II 328 Hume does not see that the perception of a configuration is also the configuration of perceptions. >Perception/Hume, >Impression/Hume, >Thinking/Hume, >David Hume. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
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Ambrose, A. | Stroud Vs Ambrose, A. | I 89 Skepticism/Ambrose/Malcolm/Stroud: both think that skepticism - correctly understood - cannot be refuted empirically - by the senses. Skepticism/Ambrose: Thesis: Skepticism cannot even describe what kind of thing could be proof of "There are things in the outside world". There are no describable circumstances in which one could say that someone could be described as knowing that. So the sentence "Nobody knows whether things exist" cannot be falsified (A. p. 402). Skepticism argues for a logical impossibility of knowing from the outside world and not for an empirical fact. Every sentence like "I don't know if there's a dollar in my pocket." I 90 is "necessarily true" for the skeptic. I 91 MalcolmVsMoore/AmbroseVsMoore/Stroud: they are directed against what Moore believes he is doing. He could not do it either! StroudVsAmbrose/StroudVsMalcolm: we will see that these two reviews fail, but for that we have to go a long way with Moore to see how he means his proof and that he even does what he believes, even if he achieves something else. I 92 AmbroseVsMoore: for her, Moore is not in a position to do what he wants to do, which is to give direct empirical evidence. N.B.: Moore wants to point to things that differ from other things in their properties" But he cannot do that because the only things he can point to and intends to point to are "external things" and they all have the same property to be "external". That is, it has no contrast at all to other things, which it would have to have to say at all about external things in general. He can only point to some external things as opposed to other external things to show differences between them, but with that he cannot provide proof of existence for external things in general. (Circular) Proof of Existence/Overview/General/Special/Solution: one can prove the existence of coins by pointing to a penny. MooreVsAmbrose: (Moore p. 672): insists that his proof is empirical and that he proves the sentence "There are no external things" wrong. I 93 For example, like pointing to a penny to prove that there is at least one outer thing. Moore admits that there are differences between the terms "outer thing" and "coin", but not with regard to the possibility of pointing to instances. Pointing/MooreVsMalcolm/MooreVsAmbrose: you can certainly only point to outer things, but you can draw attention to inner objects. So the term "outer thing" probably has a significant contrast to other things that do not fall under this class: they are things you can point to. "Outer Thing"/Moore: is like "coin" simply a more general term. But it is just as empirical as "coin. Moore: the only refutation could be in his eyes that one shows that he has not proved that there is one hand here and another there. Stroud: then the only objection would be that the premises are not really known. Wittgenstein seems to have this in mind in "On Certainty": Moore's Hands/Wittgenstein: "if you know there's a hand here, we will give you the rest". (On Certainty, 1969, §1). MooreVsAmbrose/Stroud: because Moore considers his evidence empirical, he ignores Ambrose's objection that he merely makes a recommendation for the use of language. I 94 He sees himself as proving with one fact - here is one hand - he is proving another: - that there are external things. Language Use/Proof of Existence/Language/MooreVsAmbrose: I cannot have assumed that the fact that I have a hand proves anything about how the term "outer things" should be used. (Moore, 674) Just as nothing is shown about the usage of e.g. "I know there are three misprints here" when I show that there are three misprints on this page. This is about nothing linguistic. Nothing about how words should be used follows from the premises. MooreVsMalcolm/Stroud: then Malcolm's interpretation must also be wrong. That there's a hand here does not prove anything about how any expressions should be used. MalcolmVsMoore: Malcolm believes that Moore did not reject him and actually agrees with him. StroudVsMalcolm: But that cannot be if Moore does what he says. MalcolmVsMoore: another argument: he could not have done what he wanted to do. Skepticism/Language/MooreVsAmbrose: the skeptic may think he has a priori reasons for denying external things or knowledge about them. I 96 But even then, that does not mean he cannot be empirically rejected. Suppose someone claims to have a priori reasons that there are no things in the outside world. Just then he can be refuted by simple empirical showing of such objects. Moore/StroudVsMalcolm/StroudVsAmbrose: the reaction of Ambrose and Malcolm is still that Moore does exactly what he believes he is doing. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
Brentano, Fr. | Davidson Vs Brentano, Fr. | I (b) 39 DummettVsBrentano: for him, the problem of thoughts remains (or pseudo-thoughts) about objects that do not exist. But this problem can be easily solved: we must drop the idea that there are internal objects or mental ideas in the required sense. This does not mean that only external objects remain by which we can identify the different states of consciousness. We have resources, even if these states of consciousness, as the saying goes, are directed to non-existent objects. Because we are able to determine them without presupposing that there are any objects at all that are "present to consciousness". Strand: DavidsonVs inner objects (DavidsonVsBrentano). Cf. >Objects of thought, >objects of belief, >mentalism. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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Sensory Impression | Sellars, W. | I XXXIX Sensory Impressions/impressions/sensory impression/Sellars: Thesis: sensory impressions convey the perception of external physical objects only in a causal way. Non-cognitive. (But see above. I XXIV Physical and mental are not in a causal relationship). The mediation is causal, not epistemic. Sensory impressions do not convey by being known! Sensory impressions are also not individual objects. They are states of the perceiver. The theory is based on a model with inner objects (images). Outer physical objects create images of themselves inside the perceiver. However, this does not mean that they become aware through an act of inner experience! |
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