Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definitions | Kripke | III 342 Definition/Kripke: a definition is a "great fundamental principle". Definitions must be formulated in a language already understood - then there is little room for alternative interpretations of a metalanguage (even if the syntactic and semantic structure can be interpreted differently). >Loewenheim, >Meta language, >Object language. III 390 Implicit Definition/Kripke: an implicit definition is given by rule - otherwise no generalizations in finite systems can be derived from (infinite) instances. III 392 Definition/Kripke: no inductive definition is possible if it does not start with a general characterization of the atomic (basic) case. III 393 Direct definition: a direct definition is not recursive. Recursive definition: is indirect. In Tarski the definition of truth is given via a recursive definition of fulfillment. Question: could he also have defined truth directly? If so, would fulfillment be definable in terms of truth? >Satisfaction, >Satifiability. III 399 Implicit Definition: depends on axioms. These imply (for example) truth implicit in the sense that truth is the only interpretation of the predicate T(x) which makes all the axioms true. Explicit definition: does not depend on axioms, but on expressive power of the language (not theory). Sat1(x,y) is explicitly definable in terms of T(x) - it is an explicit definition by introducing a new variable (II 402). --- Kripke I 66ff Definition/reference/standard meter/Kripke: Kripke does not use this definition to specify the meaning, but to define the reference. There is a certain length which he would like to denote. He denotes it through an accidental property. Someone else may refer to the same reference by another accidental property. He can still definitely say: if heat had been in the game, the length would have changed. Rigid: the meter is rigid. Not rigid: the length of S at time t is not rigid. >Standard meter, >Rigidity/Kripke, >Reference/Kripke. I 136f The "definition" does not say that the two terms are synonymous, but that we have determined the reference of the term "one meter" by establishing that it should be a rigid designation expression that actually has the length S. So not a necessary truth! We must distinguish between definitions that specify a reference, and definitions that specify a synonym. >Synonymy/Kripke. Definition: is not necessary: e.g. tiger: large, carnivorous, four legged cat, etc. Suppose someone says: "This is the meaning of tiger in German". ZiffVs: this is wrong. E.g. a tiger with three legs is not a contradiction in itself. I 153 In the case of proper names the reference can be defined in various ways. Determination of reference: is a priori (contingent) and not synonymous. Meaning: is analytical (required). Definition: specifies reference and expresses a priori truth. >Meaning/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Lexicon | Quine | VI 81 Dictionary/Lexicon/Quine: does not describe objects, but use of words - is not about synonymy of terms - is not about cognitive equivalence of sentences. VII (c) 49 Lexicon/Quine: shows couples of synonymous sequences (no monopoly on meaning). II 65 Lexicon: the lexicographer will often use a so-called "meaning distinction": he will call several partial synonyms, some of which fit into subcontexts, others into others. The contexts must then be kept apart with reference to the topic. II 99 Lexicon: the definition of words in the lexicon is nothing more than a recursive definition of sentence meanings. Russell's examination of incomplete symbols continues and extends to classes. II 139 Lexicon of Predicates: You can define an identity in any theory, even in one without classes and elements. This is the method of exhaustion of the Lexicon of Predicates. Trivial example: Suppose we have only two undefined single-digit predicates. F and G as well as a two-digit predicate H and no constant singular terms or functors, only quantifiers and truth functions. Then we can define "x = y" as Fx bik Fy.Gx bik GY.(z)(Hxz bik Hyz.Hzx bik Hzy) which ensures substitutivity in atomic contexts. Now the entire logic of identity can be derived. The method can be applied to any finite lexicon of undefined predicates and it defines real identity or an afterimage indistinguishable from it every time. Undistinguishable in terms of the corresponding theory. >Predicates/Quine. II 139/140 How will it work if our approach to explain identity by exhaustion of the predicates is generalized? Let us assume a rich lexicon of predicates. Certain predicates will be desired in terms of properties, in particular "has". Others will be superfluous (e.g. property "be pink" or property "divisible by four"). Ryle branded such predications as category confusion. Russell and Carnap the same. QuineVsRyle/QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsRussell: for years I have represented a minority of philosophers who prefer the opposite direction: we can simplify grammar and logic by minimizing our grammatical categories and maximizing their scope instead. II 141/142 Are all cases actually due to "has"? If so, the exhaustion of our encyclopedia would be done in no time at all, which would result in all properties being identical if exactly the same things "have" them. In this case, properties are extensional. We might as well read this "has" as being-contained and call properties classes. But they are classes as multiplicities, not as a unit. Because we declare it "ungrammatical" to present them as elements of other classes. They occur only through their values. However, if there are desired contexts of property variables that are not due to "has", it should be possible to create a list and thus individualize properties. >Properties/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Recursion | Evans | II 203 Recursive definition/Evans: not only for logical constants, and attributive adjectives. Example: "big": satisfaction conditions: for all (possibly complex) predicates f, a fulfilled "big-f" if and only if a is a big fulfiller of f. This is the conclusion of "big man" to "man" formally valid. II 209 Problem: from "x is big" and "y is bigger than x " one can not deduce "Y is big"- because the meaning of "big" as part of "bigger" remains to be shown, or the meaning theory would have to recognize "big" in "is bigger than". >Meaning theory, >Logical constants, >Predicates, >Satisfaction. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Recursion | Quine | IX 58 Recursive definition/recursion/sum/product/potency/arithmetic/Quine: recursion scheme: x + 0 = x - x + S°y = S°(x + y); - x times 0 = 0; - x times (S°y) = x + x times y - (s) difference to the successor for x u y equal)›; - x0 = S°0 (=1) ; - x S°y = x times x y. - "Plus"/plus sign/Quine: so we can eliminate "+" completely from "x + 3": "S°(S°(S°x))" - but not from "x + y" (Because we do not know how often we need the successor of x) - multiplication: we can eliminate the "times" from "x 3 times": "x + (x + (x + 0))" but not from "x times y" - recursions are real definitions if we regard the characters as scheme letters for numbers, not as bound variables. --- IX 126 Transfinite recursion/sum/product/potency/Quine: x * 0 = 0. x * (S 'z) = x + x * z - transformed into a real or direct definition: x * y = (λv(x + v))Iy'0 - general divice: a'0 = k, a'(S'z) = b'(a'z) - a'y = b Iy'k - from the last element: a = U{w: w ε Seq u ‹k,0› ε w u w I S ^w ≤ b}. - Advanced, liberal recursion: not only from the last previous element. - instead totality of the previous elements a = U{w: w ε Seq u ∀y(y ε ^w''ϑ ›› ‹w'y, w re {z:z ‹ y}› ε g)}. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Recursion | Tarski | Skirbekk I 156 Recursion/recursive method/Tarski: starting from simple propositional calculus specifying the operations with which we construct composite functions. >Functions/Tarski, >Recursive rules. Skirbekk I 157 Recursion/Tarski: problem: composite statements are constructed from simpler propositional functions, but not always from simpler statements. >Propositional functions. Hence no general recursion is possible. Recursive definition of satisfaction is only possible in a much richer metalanguage (i.e. in metalanguage we have variables of a higher logical type than the in the object language.(1) >Expressivity, >Richness. 1. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
| Redundancy Theory | Quine | VII (i) 164 Redundancy Theory/Quine: it is doubtful whether the connection of "Fa" with "Fa is true" is analytic. XIII 214 Redundancy Theory/QuineVsRedundancy Theory/truth/Quine: the truth has been said to disappear, because the truth of the sentence is simply the sentence. ("Disapearance theory of truth") This is wrong: the quotation marks must not be taken lightly. We can only say that the adjective "true" is dispensable if it is applied to sentences that explicitly lie before us. Truth-predicate/true/generalization/Quine: is necessary to say that all sentences of a certain form are wrong. Or For example, a sentence that is not literal (not literally passed down) is true or false. Or E.g. that the slander paragraphs cannot be applied to true sentences or E.g. that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. N.B.: if you translate such sentences into the predicate logic, the subject of the truth- predicate is not a quotation, but a variable. These are the cases where the truth-predicate is not superfluous. Disquotation/truth/definition/Quine: the disquotational approach may still be useful when it comes to defining truth. Truth-Definition/truth/Quine: it identifies all discernible truths that the truth of the sentence is communicated by the sentence itself. But that is not a strict definition; it does not show us who could eliminate the adjective "true" XIII 215 from all contexts in which it can occur grammatically. It only shows us where we can eliminate it in contexts with quotations. Paradox/Quine: we have seen above (see liar paradox) that definability can contain a self-contradiction. It is remarkable how easily definable we found truth in the present context. How easy it can be and at the same time possibly fatal. Solution/Tarski: Separation object language/meta language. Recursion/Tarski/Quine: shows how the truth-term is first applied to atomic sentences and then to compositions of any complexity. Problem: Tarski could not yet define truth because of the variables. Sentences with variables can be true in some cases and false in others. (Open Sentences). Only closed sentences (where all variables are bound by quantifiers) can be true or false. Fulfillment/Recursion/Tarski/Quine: what Tarski recursively defines is fulfillment of a sentence by an object; is not truth. These objects are then the possible values of the free variables. After that, truth trivially results as a waste product. Def Truth/Fulfillment/Tarski: a closed sentence is true if it is fulfilled by the sequence of length 0, so to speak. Liar Paradox/Tarski/Quine: Tarski's construction is masterly and coherent, but why doesn't it ultimately solve the paradox? This is shown by the translation into symbolic logic when the sentence is formulated in object language (see paradoxes above, last section). Paradox/logical form/liar/Quine: the word "true" has the context "x is true" in the explicit reconstruction where "x" is the subject of quantifiers. Problem: the recursive definition of truth and fulfillment does not show how to "fulfill x". XIII 216 or "x is true" is eliminated. Solution: this only works if "x is true" or "fulfilled" is predicated by an explicitly given open or closed sentence. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Satisfaction | Tarski | Glüer II 24f Recursive method/recursion: fails with quantifiers. >Recursive Method, >Quantifiers. E.g. "No tree is large and small" cannot be analyzed as two complete elementary propositions. Most complex sentences formed with variables, connectives, predicates, must be interpreted as links of open sentences. But open sentences have no truth value. >Open sentence, >Truth value. Therefore, Tarski introduces the term "satisfaction": Def satisfaction: relation between (ordered) sequences of objects and open sentences. Here works the recursive method: for elementary sentences it is defined which objects 2 they satisfy, and there are rules specified for all compositions of open sentences by which can be determined which objects they satisfy. Statements are determined as a special case of open sentences. Either they do not contain free variables, or they have been closed by means of quantifiers. >Free variables, >Open sentence. For true statements satisfaction is simple: because whether an ordered sequence of objects satisfies a sentence depends only on the free variables it contains. >Sequences/Tarski. E.g. "The moon is round" contains no free variables. Thus, the nature of the objects of the respective sequence is irrelevant and it can be determined by definition, whether such a proposition is true when it is satisfied by all the consequences - or by none. It is slightly more complicated for quantified statements: E.g. "All stars are around" or "There is at least one star, which is round." Here, too, the fulfillment is defined such that either all sequences satisfy a sentence, or none. So it is clear that it would be absurd to associate truth of closed sentences with fulfillment by any sequence of objects. A sentence like "All stars are round" is true if there are certain objects that satisfy "X is round": all stars. Tarski: a statement is true if it is satisfied by all objects, otherwise false." --- Berka I 399 Part definition/satisfy/Tarski. E.g. Johann and Peter satisfy the propositional function "X and Y are brothers" if they are brothers.(1) 1. A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, Bd. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8 --- Horwich I 119 Fulfillment/Tarski: here we replace the free variables of propositional functions by the names of objects and see if we can get true statements - but that does not work when we use fulfillment to define truth. Solution: recursive procedure: rules for the conditions under which objects satisfy a composite propositional function. >Propositional functions. For whole sentences, there is also fulfillment: then a sentence is either satisfied by no object or by all. Satisfaction: has as a relation always one more spot - E.g. "is greater than": is a function between a relation and pairs of objects. Therefore, there are many fulfillment terms. Solution: "infinite sequence". Then satisfaction is a binary relation between functions and sequences of objects. The reason for this indirect truth definition is that compound sentences are composed of several propositional functions, not always of complete sentences. So there is no recursive definition. >Recursive definition, >Recursion. Horwich I 139 Satisfaction/antinomy/Tarski: for the fulfillment, we can also construct an antinomy: E.g. the statements function X does not satisfy X. - Now we look at the question of whether this term, which is surely a propositional function satisfied itself or not.(2) 2. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 --- Skirbekk I 146 Semantics: refers to statements, Satisfaction, designation: refers to objects. Skirbekk I 156 Truth/Tarski: we get the truth definition simply because of the definition of satisfaction: Def satisfaction/Tarski: satisfaction is a relationship between any object and propositional functions. An object satisfies a function when the function becomes a true statement, when the free variables replace with the name of object. Snow satisfies the propositional function "x is white". Vs: that is circular, because "true" occurs in the definition of fulfillment. Solution: satisfaction itself must be defined recursively. If we have the satisfaction, it relates by itself on the statements themselves. A statement is either satisfied by all objects, or by none.(3) 3. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in. G: Skirbekk (Hg.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Field, H. | Soames Vs Field, H. | I 467 Truth Theory/WT/Tarski/Soames: two statuses: a) as a mathematical theory with many rich results b) philosophically significant for the concept of truth. Truth Theory/Soames: there is controversy about what a truth theory should be; in general it should do one of the following three things: (i) give the meaning of the truth predicate for natural languages. (ii) replace these truth predicates reductionistically (iii) use a previously understood truth concept to explain meaning or for other metaphysical purposes. Proposition/Soames: for the following purposes you need propositions rather than sentences or utterances: Example (1) a. the proposition that the earth is moving is true. b. Church's theorem is true c. Everything he said is true. I 468 SoamesVsPropositions. Truth Predicate/Generalization/Quine/Soames: e.g. to characterize realism: (5) There is a doppelgänger of the sun in a distant region of space, but we will never find sufficient evidence that he exists. Soames: of course you can be a realist without believing (5). ((s) (5) is too special, it is only an example). Anti-Realism/Soames: what then distinguishes it from realism? One is tempted to say: (6) Either there is a doppelgänger of our sun.... or no doppelgänger.... and we will have no evidence at all.... I 470 SoamesVs: this leads to an infinite list that we should avoid. Solution: semantic rise: (7) There is at least one sentence S, so that S is true (in German) but we will never find (sufficient) evidence for S. I 472 Truth Definition/Field: consists of two parts: 1. "primitive denotation": e.g. (s) "Caesar" refers to Caesar. 2. the truth definition in terms of primitive denotation. The result is a sentence of the metalanguage: (8) For all sentences S of L, S is true iff T(S). FieldVsTarski/Soames: (Field: "Tarski's Truth Theory" (this journal, I XIX, 1972): this assumption (that truth, truth and reference are physically acceptable in Tarski) is wrong! Field: the proposed substitutions for the notions of primitive denotation are not physically acceptable reductions I 474 of our pre-theoretical concepts of reference and truth. Soames: this is only true if Field assumes that Tarski has reduced truth to primitive denotation. Truth-Def/Correctness/Tarski/Field/Soames: Field does not deny that the truth definition is extensionally correct. FieldVsTarski: but extensional correctness is not sufficient. "Cb" is a sentence and the semantic n facts about it are given in (9): (9) a. "b" refers (in L) to Boston b. "C" applies (in L) to cities (and cities only) c. "Cb" is true (in L) iff Boston is a city. (speaker dependent) Problem: you cannot just identify the facts from (10) with the facts from (9) now. Semantic Property/Field: expressions of a language have only force through the way they are used by speakers (usage). Problem: the facts from (9) would not have existed at all if the language behaviour (in the broadest sense) had been different! N.B.: the facts from (10) are not dependent on speakers. Therefore they are not semantic facts. Therefore Tarski cannot reduce them to physical facts. Truth Predicate/FieldVsTarski: it is both physicalistic and coextensive with "true in L", but it is still not a physicalistic truth concept. Problem: the inadequacy inherits the characterization of the truth from the pseudo reductions that constitute the "base clauses" ((s) recursive definitions?) ((s) among other things for and, or etc. base clauses). I 475 Solution/Field: we need to find real reductions for the concepts of primitive denotation or something like a model of the causal theory of reference. Field/Soames: these are again two stages: 1. Tarski's reduction from truth to primitive denotation ((s) as above) 2. an imagined reduction of the concepts of the reference of names and of the accuracy of predicates, similar to a causal theory. Language independence/Field/Soames: if the physical facts that determine the denotation in a language do so for all languages, then the denotation applies to all languages. If logical constants and syntax are kept constant, we get a truth concept that is language independent. Problem: 1. Reference to abstract objects ((s) for these there are no semantic facts). 2. Ontological relativity and undeterminedness of the reference. SoamesVsField: he even understated his criticism of Tarski (FieldVsTarski)! Tarski/Soames: because if Tarski did not reduce primitive denotation to physical facts, then he did not reduce truth to primitive denotation at all ((s) so he missed point 1). Example two languages L1 and L2 which are identical except: L1: here "R" applies to round things L2: here on red things. Truth conditional: are then different for some sentences in both languages: (11) a. "Re" is true in L1 iff the earth is round b. "Re" is true in L2 iff the earth is red. Tarski/Soames: in its truth definition, this difference will be traceable back to the base clauses of the two truth definitions for each language, because here the applications of the predicates are presented in a list. FieldVsTarski: its truth definition correctly reports that "R" applies to different things in the two languages, but it does not explain how the difference came about from the use of language by speakers. SoamesVsField/SoamesVsTarski: Field does not say that the same accusation can be made against VsTarski I 476 in relation to logical vocabulary and syntax in the recursive part of its definition. Example L1: could treat [(A v B)] as true if A or B is true, L2: ...if A and B are true. FieldVsTarski: then it is not sufficient for the characterization of truth to simply "communicate" that the truth conditions are different. It would have to be explained by the language behavior in the two different languages ((s) > speaker meaning). FieldVsTarski: because he says nothing about language behavior (speaker meaning in a community), he does not meet the demands of physicalism ((s) to explain physical facts of behavior). Soames: this means that Field's strategy of obtaining a real reduction of truth by supplementing Tarski with non-trivial definitions of primitive denotation cannot work. For according to Field, Tarski did not reduce truth to primitive denotation. He has reduced them at best to lists of semantic basic concepts: (13) the term of a name referring to an object The term of a predicate that applies to an object. The concept of a formula which is the application of an n digit predicate to an n tuple of terms ... I 477 Soames: but this requires a reformulation of each clause in Tarski's recursive definition. E.g. old: 14 a, new: 14.b: (14) a. if A = [~B] , then A is true in L (with respect to a sequence s) iff B is not true in L (with respect to s). b. If A is a negation of a formula B, then A is .... Soames: the resulting abstraction extends the generality of truth definition to classes of 1. Level languages: these languages differ arbitrarily in syntax, plus logical and non-logical vocabulary. SoamesVsField: Problem: this generality has its price. Old: the original definition simply stipulated that [~A) is a negation ((s) >symbol, definition). New: the new definition gives no indication which formulas fall into these categories. SoamesVsField: its physicist must now reduce each of the semantic terms. Logical Linkage/Constants/Logical Terms/Soames: we can either a) define about truth, or b) specify that certain symbols should be instances of these logical terms. SoamesVsField: neither of these two paths is open to him now! a) he cannot characterize negation as a symbol that is appended to a formula to form a new formula that is true if the original formula was false because that would be circular. b) he cannot simply take negation as a basic concept (primitive) and determine that [~s] is the negation of s. For then there would be no facts about speakers, ((s) Language behavior, physicalistic), that would explain the semantic properties of [~s]. Soames: there are alternatives, but none is convincing. Truth functional operator/Quine: (roots of the reference) are characterized as dispositions in a community for semantic ascent and descent. Problem/Quine: uncertainty between classical and intuitionist constructions of linkages are inevitable. SoamesVsField: Reduction from primitive denotation to physical facts is difficult enough. I 478 It becomes much more difficult for logical terms. SoamesVsField: this is because semantic facts on physical facts must supervene over speakers. ((s) >speaker meaning, language behavior). Problem: this limits adequate definitions to those that legitimize the use of semantic terms in contexts such as (15) and (16). ((s) (15) and (16) are fine, the later ones no longer). (15) If L speakers had behaved differently, "b" (in L) would not have referred to Boston and "C" to cities and .....((s) Counterfactual Conditionals). (16) The fact that L speakers behave the way they do explains why "b" (in L) refers to Boston, etc. ((s) Both times reference) Soames: FieldVsTarski is convinced that there is a way to decipher (15) and (16) that they become true when the semantic terms are replaced by physical ones and the initial clauses are constructed in such a way that they contain contingents to express physical possibilities. This is not the character of Tarski's truth definition. I 481 Primitive Reference/language independent/SoamesVsField: For example a name n refers to an object o in a language L iff FL(n) = o. FL: is a purely mathematical object: a set of pairs perhaps. I.e. it contains no undefined semantic terms. Truth Predicate/Truth/Theory/Soames: the resulting truth predicate is exactly what we need to metatheoretically study the nature, structure, and scope of a multiple number of theories. Truth Definition/Language/Soames: what the truth definition does not tell us is something about the speakers of the languages to which it is applied. According to this view, languages are abstract objects. ((s) All the time you have to distinguish between language independence and speaker independence). Language/primitive denotation/language independent/truth/SoamesVsField: according to this view languages are abstract objects, i.e. they can be understood in such a way that they essentially have their semantic properties ((s) not dependent on language behaviour or speakers, (speaker meaning), not physical. I.e. with other properties it would be another language). I.e. it could not have turned out that expressions of a language could have denoted something other than what they actually denote. Or that sentences of one language could have had other truth conditions. I 483 SoamesVsField: this too will hardly be able to avoid this division. Index Words/Ambiguity/Field: (p. 351ff) Solution: Contextually disambiguated statements are made unambiguous by the context. Semantic terms: should be applied to unambiguous entities. I.e. all clauses in a truth definition must be formulated so that they are applied to tokens. Example Negation/Field (21) A token of [~e] is true (with respect to a sequence) iff the token of e it includes is not true (with respect to that sequence). SoamesVsField: that does not work. Because Field cannot accept a truth definition in which any syntactic form is simply defined as a negation. ((s) Symbol, stipulates, then independent of physical facts). Soames: because this would not explain facts about speakers by virtue of whom negative constructions have the semantic properties they have. Semantic property(s): not negation itself, but that the negation of a certain expression is true or applies in a situation. Example "Caesar" refers to Caesar: Would be completely independent from circumstances, speakers, even if not from the language, the latter, however, actually only concerns the metalanguage. Solution/Soames: (22) A token of a formula A, which is a negation of a formula B, is true (with respect to a sequence) iff a designated token of B is not true (with respect to this sequence). "Designated"/(s): means here: explicitly provided with a truth value. |
Soames I Scott Soames "What is a Theory of Truth?", The Journal of Philosophy 81 (1984), pp. 411-29 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Soames II S. Soames Understanding Truth Oxford 1999 |
| Millikan, R. | Searle Vs Millikan, R. | III 27 Function/Ruth Millikan (SearleVs): new concept of "actual function" based on "reproduction" and causation. Recursive definition: So that an object A has a function F as its "proper function", it is necessary (and also adequately) that meets either one of the following conditions: 1. A emerged as a "reproduction" (copy or copy of a copy) of an earlier object that has actually performed partly due to the possession of reproduced characteristics, F in the past, and A exists (causal historical) due to this direction. 2. A has emerged as the product of any previous means that under the circumstances of this direction of F had a real function and that under these circumstances is usually the reason that F is performed by means of the production of objects such as A. (derived "actual functions"). Function/SearleVsMillikan: so one can introduce any new technical expression. However, such definitions do not take any certain essential characteristics of the ordinary concept of function into consideration. 1. For Millikan the definition of the function depends on a specific causal historical theory. II 28 Even if all previous, also Darwinian turn out to be wrong, my heart would continue to pump blood. 2. Furthermore, there are also stark counter-examples: E.g. according to Wright and Millikan we would have to say that it is the function of colds to spread cold germs. SearleVs: but colds do not have any function at all! 3. The normative component of functions remains unexplained. (Although Millikan's theory takes into account that some features in reality may not be exercised.) Normative: Millikan does not explain why we are talking about better and worse functioning hearts, heart failure, etc.. Old dilemma: either we talk about crude, blind, causal relations, or we believe that there really is something functional to functions, although Millikan omits the observer relative properties. III 29 Observer relative/Searle: functions, the fact that there are police officers and professors. (Intensional). Immanent: the fact that there are people at all. Blind, causal relations. Function: a) Use Function: screwdriver, drive shaft. b) Non-use functions: independent of practical intentions of the people: the function of the heart to pump blood. III 33 Use functions: within: special class: representative function, represent something, stand for something else: e.g. baseball icons. >Icons, >symbols, >function. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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