Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Actions	Parsons	Habermas IV 306 Action/Parsons/Habermas: Like Weber, Parsons proceeds from the categories of "purpose" and "means". He focuses on the most general provisions of the smallest conceivable unit of possible action. ⁽¹⁾ Habermas IV 307 HabermasVsParsons: his concept of action is subjective ("voluntaristic"), which follows from his concept of the situation. >Situation/Parsons. Thus, his theory of action excludes objectivism from concepts of action reformulated in behavioral science. Taking normative standards into account, according to Parsons, action bridges the gap between the regions of being and should, facts and values, between the conditions of a given situation Habermas IV 308 and the orientation of the actor determined by values and norms (the ontological dimension: conditions/norms). In doing so, the "effort" that requires an action loses the empirical sense of a striving for gratification: "effort" is here rather „a name for the relating factor between the normative and conditional elements of action. It is necessitated by the fact that norms do not realize themselves automatically but only through action, so far as they are realized at all.“⁽²⁾ HabermasVsParsons: the concept of action as a basic unit does not explain what it means that an actor bases its decisions on values. Habermas IV 352 Actions/System/Parsons: Action/Luhmann: "The action is a system due to its internal analytical structure".⁽³⁾ Habermas: this is about the relations between values, norms, goals and resources. Action system/Parsons: is composed of subsystems that specialize in the production and maintenance of one component of action at a time: Culture: on values Society: on norms Personality: on goals Behavioral system: on means or resources.⁽⁴⁾ >Values, >Norms, >Goals. Habermas IV 353 HabermasVsParsons: with the concept of the action system, the actors disappear as acting subjects; they are abstracted into units to which decisions and thus effects of actions are ascribed. >Systems theory, >Action systems. Actors come into view as abstract placeholders, namely as aspects of the organism capable of learning, the motivational balance of a person, the roles and memberships of a social system and the action-determining traditions of a culture. >Cultural Tradition. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, p. 43f. 2. Ibid. p. 719. 3. N. Luhmann, T. Parsons: die Zukunft eines Theorieprogramms, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 9, 1980, p. 8 4. Talcott Parsons, Some Problems of General Theory in Sociology, in: McKinney, Tiryakan, (1970), p. 44	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Adam Smith Problem	Economic Theories	Otteson I 24 Adam Smith Problem/economic theories/Otteson: [There is a] historical and scholarly issue known as the “Adam Smith Problem,” which alleges a rift between the account of morality Smith gives in TMS⁽¹⁾, on the one hand, and the seemingly different account of political economy Smith gives in his Wealth of Nations⁽²⁾, on the other. Can the two accounts be reconciled? Otteson: (….) both accounts could be reconciled by a proper understanding of Smith’s “political economy” project. >Political economy/Smith, >Morality/Adam Smith, >Stages of Development/Adam Smith, >Justice/Adam Smith. Spontaneous order: The explanation Smith offers for the development of moral standards holds the process to create what we today might call "spontaneous order." A spontaneous order is a system that arises, as Smith's contemporary Adam Ferguson put it, as "the result ofhuman action, but not the execution of any human design" (Ferguson, 1996⁽³⁾ [1767]: 119). As this theory was developed by twentieth-century thinkers like Michael Polanyi and Friedrich Hayek, it referred to the development of an orderly system that arose from the decentralized actions of individuals but without their intending to design any overall system. Language is a good example. The English language is a relatively orderly system: it contains rules of grammar, definitions of words, and accepted or acceptable pronunciations, but there was no single person or group of persons who invented or designed it. It lives and changes according to the purposes and desires of the users of the language, and its rules are generated and enforced by the users themselves. Another prime example of spontaneous order is ecosystems. Otteson I 25 One more example of spontaneous order: an economic market. As Smith would go on to describe in his Wealth of Nations⁽²⁾, the individual actors in economic markets certainly have intentions - they all want, in his words, to "better their own condition" (WN⁽¹⁾ 345) - but they nevertheless typically do not have any larger intentions in mind regarding an overall system of market order. They just want to achieve their localized purposes in cooperation with other willing individuals. Yet individuals' decentralized attempts to achieve their purposes lead to the development of patterns and even principles of behavior that can look as if some wise person designed it all. Adam Smith Problem/Solution/Spontaneous order/Smith:. Smith's argument is that human morality is a social system that arises – (…) like markets - on the basis of countless individual decisions, actions, and interactions but without any overall plan and with no overall designer. >Rules/Adam Smith. 1. Smith, Adam (1982) [1759]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie, eds. Liberty Fund. 2. Smith, Adam. (1776) The Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan and T. Cadell. 3 Ferguson, Adam (1996) [1767]. An Essay on the History of Civil Society. Edited by Fania Oz-Salzberger. Cambridge University Press.	Otteson I James R. Otteson The Essential Adam Smith Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2018
Altruism	Gould	II 56 Altruism/behavior/evolution/Gould: definition Haplodiploid: the males develop from unfertilized eggs and have no father. Fertilized eggs, on the other hand, produce diploid females. This can be used to control the number of females. II 57 This fascinating system can help explain the origin of social systems in ants. Or also, for example, that a male mite dies before its own birth after fertilising its sisters in the womb. At least 10% of all known animal species are haplodiploid. This leads to problems from the Darwinian point of view: in a world where every individual works for personal reproductive success, why should a large number of females give up their own reproduction in order to help their mother (the queen) to bring in more sisters? The ingenious explanation is based on the asymmetric relationship between the sexes of haplodiploid animals. In both diploid and haplodiploids, the mother gives half of her genetic material to her offspring (other half the father). Therefore, she is related to her sons and daughters in equal measure. A diplo female also shares half of its genes with its brothers and sisters. A haplo female, on the other hand, shares three quarters of the genes with the sisters but only one quarter with the brothers. If the Darwinian imperative causes organisms to maximize the number of their own genes in future generations, then the females of haplodiploids would do better to help their mothers raise their sisters than to produce their own offspring. In fact, such developments have occurred several times independently of each other. II 59 Causality: the biologists were so fascinated by these observations that a subtle reversal of causality has crept into many descriptions: the very existence of haplodiploidism is elegantly associated with the decision "for" a better social system such as ants. >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Explanations. II 61 GouldVs: haplodiploid ancestors were certainly not completely social, this has only developed as a "phylogenetic additional thought" in some independent tribes. Environment of such tribes: the environment of such tribes is created by every single female! Even a non-full-grown one becomes a possible founder of new colonies, as it is able to produce a generation of males, with which it can mate to create a new generation of females.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Causality	Gould	II 59 Causality/Gould: definition haplodiploid: the males develop from unfertilized eggs and have no father. Fertilized eggs, on the other hand, produce diploid females. This can be used to control the number of females. II 57 This fascinating system can help explain the origin of social systems in ants. Or that a male mite dies before its own birth, for example, after fertilising its sisters in the womb. The biologists were so fascinated by these observations that a subtle reversal of causality has crept into many descriptions: the very existence of haplodiploidism is elegantly associated with the decision "for" a better social system such as in ants. II 61 GouldVs: haplodiploid ancestors were certainly not completely social, this has only developed as a "phylogenetic additional thought" in some independent tribes. Environment of such tribes: the environment of such tribes is created by every single female! Even a not full-grown one becomes a possible founder of new colonies, as it is able to produce a generation of males, with which it can mate to create a new generation of females. Frequent error: it is a frequent error to assume that the instantaneous usefulness of a property would allow to deduce the reasons for its origin. Origin and current usefulness, however, are two very different subjects. Complex properties are full of possibilities: their conceivable uses are not limited to their original functions. For example, the fish's fins of equilibrium became the driving elements. >Properties, >Benefit, >Explanation, >Evolution.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Classes	Marx	Rothbard II 381 Classes/society/Marx/Rothbard: There is a grave inner contradiction at the heart of the Marxian system, in Marx's crucial concept of class. In the Marxian dialectic, two mighty social classes face each other in inherent conflict, the ruling and the ruled. In the first two ofhistory's major conflicts: 'oriental despotism', and 'feudalism', the social classes are defined by Marx (…) as classes privileged or burdened by the state. Thus, in 'oriental despotism', or the 'Asiatic mode ofproduction', the emperor and his technocratic bureaucracy run the state, and constitute its 'ruling class'. Problem/RothbardVsMarx: But then, suddenly, when Marx gets to capitalism, the class categories change, without acknowledgement. Now the ruling class is Rothbard II 382 not simply defined as the class that runs the state apparatus. Now, suddenly, the original act of rule or 'exploitation' is the voluntary market wage contract, the very act of a capitalist hiring a worker and a worker agreeing to be hired. This in itself, to Marx, establishes a common 'class-interest' among capitalists, exploiting a 'common class' of workers. It is true that Marx also believed that this 'capitalist class' runs the state, but only as 'the executive committee of the ruling class', that is, of a ruling class that previously existed on the free market, because of the wage system. So that what Marx, as analyst of oriental despotism or feudalism, would consider ruling-class exploitation still exists under capitalism, but only as an addendum to the preexisting capitalist exploitation of the workers through the wage system. Ruling-class exploitation under capitalism is unique in exercising a double exploitation: first, on the market as part of the wage contract, and second, the alleged exploitation by the state as executive committee of the ruling class. RothbardVsMarx: It should be evident that Marx's analysis of class is by this point a mishmash, in total disarray; two contradictory definitions of class are jammed together, unfused and unacknowledged. Why should capitalism, of all systems, be able to levy a 'double' exploitation that no other ruling class in Marx's historical schema can ever enjoy? Problems: How can 'capitalists', even in the same industry let alone in the entire social system, have any thing crucial in common? Similarly, there can be no 'working class' With common class-interests on the free market. Workers compete with each other, just as capitalists or entrepreneurs compete with each other. Once again, if groups of workers can Rothbard II 383 use the state to exclude other groups, they can become a ruling class as against the excluded groups. Thus, if government immigration restrictions keep out new workers, the native workers can benefit (at least in the short run) at the expense of incomes of immigrants; or if white workers can keep black workers out of skilled jobs by state coercion (as was done in South Africa), the former becomes a privileged or ruling class at the expense of the latter. Rothbard:(…) any group that can manage to control, or gain privileges from, the state can take its place among the exploiters: this can be specific groups of workers, or businessmen, or Communist Party members, or whatever. There is no reason to assume that only 'capitalists' can acquire such privileges. >Class conflict/Marx. Rothbard II 384 Definition of classes/def class/Marx/Rothbard: (…) in Marx's theoretical magnum opus, Capital, there is no attempt at a definition of class. Only an incomplete Volume I was published in Marx's lifetime (1867), at which point he had substantially finished working on the book. After Marx's death in 1883, Engels worked up, edited and published the remaining manuscript in two further volumes (1885 , 1894).⁽¹⁾ Only in the famous very last chapter of the third volume does Marx finally arrive at an attempt to define what he and Engels had been talking and writing about for four decades. It is an unfinished chapter of startling brevity - five short paragraphs. In this chapter, 'Classes', Marx begins with the classical Ricardian triad: that the sources of income in the market economy are wages, profits and rents, and that the receivers of such income constitute the 'three big classes of modern society' - labourers, capitalists and landlords. Rothbard II 385 Marx: (…) [there is an] infinite fragmentation of interest and rank into which the division of social labour splits labourers as well as capitalists and landlords -the latter, e.g. into owners of vineyards, farm owners, owners of forests, mine owners and owners of fisheries.⁽¹⁾ Rothbard: Precisely. Marx has said it very well; his cherished two-class monolith (…) lies totally in ruins. >Classes/Mises. Rothbard II 392 Ricardo/Marx: As Karl Marx plunged into the economics of capitalism (…) he found ready at hand a marvellous weapon: Ricardian economics. In contrast to J.B. Say and the French tradition, Ricardo concentrated not on market exchange and its inevitable focus on individual actors and enchangers benefiting from exchange, but on 'production' followed by 'distribution' of income as a distinct and separate process. Ricardo's main focus was on how this social income from production is 'distributed'. Whereas Say or Turgot looked at individual factors of production and how their income emerges from production and exchange, Ricardo focused only on entire, allegedly homogeneous, 'classes' of producers: workers earning wages, capitalists earning 'profits' and landlords acquiring rent. For counter arguments against Marx see >Classes/Mises. 1. During the 1870s, Marx led Engels to believe that he was working hard and steadily on Volumes II and III of Capital, at Marx's death, Engels was astonished to find that Marx had done virtually no work on the manuscript since 1867, in short, that Marx had lied shamelessly to his friend and patron. See W.O. Henderson, The Life of Friedrich Engels (London: Frank Cass, 1976), 11, p. 563.	Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Climate Impact Assessment	Economic Theories	Norgaard I 206 Climate Impact Assessment/Economic theories/social sciences: Early global climate change impact assessments focused principally on climate‐society interactions drawing heavily from the tradition of natural hazards research (e.g. Burton et al. 1978)⁽¹⁾. As outlined in a now‐classic book edited by Kates et al. (1985)⁽²⁾, the key challenge of climate impact assessment is to isolate climate sensitivities in biophysical and social systems. The influence of any given climate stress is therefore traceable through direct influences on biophysical attributes, to sequential (and more indirect) impacts on social activities and attributes (Kates et al. 1985⁾⁽²⁾. This approach formed the basis of much of the research in the 1980s and 1990s by the climate change research community, and eventually evolved into a framework of ‘vulnerability’ assessment adopted by the IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] (Carter et al. 199⁴⁾⁽³⁾. Climate impact assessment was designed to be compatible with climate change modeling and simulation experiments, emphasizing the mechanisms and processes by which a specific climate signal translates into a measurable impact on the biophysical environment (e.g. crop yields, streamflow, forest growth) and, through the material and economic ties of society to a resource, into (second‐ or third‐order) social and economic impacts (Carter et al. 1994)⁽³⁾. Integrated modeling of climate change impacts typically focused on specific geographic regions, scaled to a spatial resolution where climate parameters could be well understood and modeled, and often focused on a specific suite of biophysical or economic measures where the mechanism of climate influence could be directly argued (e.g. Rosenberg 1982⁽⁴⁾; Rosenzweig 1985⁽⁵⁾; Liverman et al. 1986⁽⁶⁾). Norgaard I 207 Estimates of proxies for social processes such as demographic change and technological innovation were incorporated into these models to parameterize projections of greenhouse gas emissions and anticipate changes in the sensitivities of key system drivers. Serious critiques of this modeling approach emerged surrounding the realism of the underlying assumptions of human behavior (Dowlatabadi 1995⁽⁷⁾; Berkhout and Hertin 2000⁽⁸⁾; Kandlikar and Risbey 2000⁽⁹⁾). >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Burton, I., Kates, R. W., and White, G. F. (eds.) 1978. The Environment as Hazard. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Kates, R. W., Ausubel, J. H., and Berberian, M. (eds.) 1985. Climate Impact Assessment: Studies of the Interaction of Climate and Society. SCOPE 27. Chichester: Wiley. 3. Carter, T. R., Parry, M. L., Harasawa, H., and Nishioka, S. 1994. IPCC Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations, 59. Department of Geography, University College London and Center for Global Environmental Research, National Institute for Environmental Studies, London, UK, and Tsukuba, Japan. 4. Rosenberg, N. J. 1982. The increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and its implication on agricultural productivity, Part II: Effects through CO2‐induced climatic change. Climatic Change 4: 239–54. 5. Rosenzweig, C. 1985. Potential CO2‐induced climate effects on North American wheat‐producing regions. Climatic Change 7: 367–89. 6. Liverman, D., Terjung, W. H., Hayes, J. T., and Mearns, L. O. 1986. Climatic Change and Grain Corn Yields in the North American Great Plains. Climatic Change 9: 327–47. 7. Dowlatabadi, H. 1995. Integrated assessment models of climate change. Energy Policy 23(4/5): 289–96. 8. Berkhout, F., and Hertin, J. 2000. Socio‐economic scenarios for climate impact assessment. Global Environmental Change 10: 165–8. 9. Kandlikar, M., and Risbey, J. 2000. Agricultural Impacts of Climate Change: If Adaptation is the Answer, What is the Question? An Editorial Comment. Climatic Change 45: 529–39. Polsky, Collin and Hallie Eakin: “Global Change Vulnerability Assessments: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.	Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Climate Impact Assessment	Social Sciences	Norgaard I 206 Climate Impact Assessment/Economic theories/social sciences: Early global climate change impact assessments focused principally on climate‐society interactions drawing heavily from the tradition of natural hazards research (e.g. Burton et al. 1978)⁽¹⁾. As outlined in a now‐classic book edited by Kates et al. (1985)⁽²⁾, the key challenge of climate impact assessment is to isolate climate sensitivities in biophysical and social systems. The influence of any given climate stress is therefore traceable through direct influences on biophysical attributes, to sequential (and more indirect) impacts on social activities and attributes (Kates et al. 1985)⁽²⁾. This approach formed the basis of much of the research in the 1980s and 1990s by the climate change research community, and eventually evolved into a framework of ‘vulnerability’ assessment adopted by the IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] (Carter et al. 1994)⁽³⁾. Climate impact assessment was designed to be compatible with climate change modeling and simulation experiments, emphasizing the mechanisms and processes by which a specific climate signal translates into a measurable impact on the biophysical environment (e.g. crop yields, streamflow, forest growth) and, through the material and economic ties of society to a resource, into (second‐ or third‐order) social and economic impacts (Carter et al. 1994)⁽³⁾. Integrated modeling of climate change impacts typically focused on specific geographic regions, scaled to a spatial resolution where climate parameters could be well understood and modeled, and often focused on a specific suite of biophysical or economic measures where the mechanism of climate influence could be directly argued (e.g. Rosenberg 1982⁽⁴⁾; Rosenzweig 1985⁽⁵⁾; Liverman et al. 1986⁽⁶⁾). Norgaard I 207 Estimates of proxies for social processes such as demographic change and technological innovation were incorporated into these models to parameterize projections of greenhouse gas emissions and anticipate changes in the sensitivities of key system drivers. Serious critiques of this modeling approach emerged surrounding the realism of the underlying assumptions of human behavior (Dowlatabadi 1995⁽⁷⁾; Berkhout and Hertin 2000⁽⁸⁾; Kandlikar and Risbey 2000⁽⁹⁾). Cf. >Emission permits, >Emission reduction credits, >Emission targets, >Emissions, >Emissions trading, >Climate change, >Climate damage, >Energy policy, >Clean Energy Standards, >Climate data, >Climate history, >Climate justice, >Climate periods, >Climate targets, >Climate impact research, >Carbon price, >Carbon price coordination, >Carbon price strategies, >Carbon tax, >Carbon tax strategies. 1. Burton, I., Kates, R. W., and White, G. F. (eds.) 1978. The Environment as Hazard. New York: Oxford University Press. 2. Kates, R. W., Ausubel, J. H., and Berberian, M. (eds.) 1985. Climate Impact Assessment: Studies of the Interaction of Climate and Society. SCOPE 27. Chichester: Wiley. 3. Carter, T. R., Parry, M. L., Harasawa, H., and Nishioka, S. 1994. IPCC Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations, 59. Department of Geography, University College London and Center for Global Environmental Research, National Institute for Environmental Studies, London, UK, and Tsukuba, Japan. 4. Rosenberg, N. J. 1982. The increasing CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and its implication on agricultural productivity, Part II: Effects through CO2‐induced climatic change. Climatic Change 4: 239–54. 5. Rosenzweig, C. 1985. Potential CO2‐induced climate effects on North American wheat‐producing regions. Climatic Change 7: 367–89. 6. Liverman, D., Terjung, W. H., Hayes, J. T., and Mearns, L. O. 1986. Climatic Change and Grain Corn Yields in the North American Great Plains. Climatic Change 9: 327–47. 7. Dowlatabadi, H. 1995. Integrated assessment models of climate change. Energy Policy 23(4/5): 289–96. 8. Berkhout, F., and Hertin, J. 2000. Socio‐economic scenarios for climate impact assessment. Global Environmental Change 10: 165–8. 9. Kandlikar, M., and Risbey, J. 2000. Agricultural Impacts of Climate Change: If Adaptation is the Answer, What is the Question? An Editorial Comment. Climatic Change 45: 529–39. Polsky, Collin and Hallie Eakin: “Global Change Vulnerability Assessments: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.	Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011
Communication	Luhmann	Baraldi I 89 Communication/Luhmann/GLU: specific operation of social systems: 1) Communication 2) Information 3) Understanding the difference between communication and information. Communication is not the same as information, it only happens when information is understood - information is a selection between what is said and unsaid. Understanding is selection between communication and information. >Understanding/Luhmann, >Information/Luhmann. Reese-Schäfer II 47 Society/Communication/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: Special case: only society operates with communication. - There is no communication outside of society. - Therefore, it is necessary closed. - This is the only system for which this is true. - Then no observer can take an outside standpoint. >Society/Luhmann, >Observation/Luhmann. AU Cass 13 Communication/Language/Karl Bühler/Luhmann: instead of "transmission model": - unity of three components 1) Information, what it is about 2) Communication 3) Understanding Communication already existed in antiquity. LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: is the idea that this triad could be dismantled into acts. - Karl Bühler: all of them are only functions. ((s) Function/(s): Is not an act.) >Speech act theory/Luhmann. AU Cass 13 Communication/LuhmannVsHabermas: communication does not serve the creation of consensus. - If that does not work, it is simply declared the norm and claimed "it was supposed to be like that." But we should not turn an impossibility into a standard. >Communication/Habermas. SchelskyVsHabermas: Does communication stop when this goal is reached? Solution/Luhmann: communication is not an act which would have to be brought under a standard - only communicating is action. Communication is open when viewed without additions like truth. - We can also say "no". - On the other hand, we do not have the opportunity to start all over again. Without any authority it is impossible.. - "No" does not terminate communication. Communication could only be terminated by misunderstanding. Communication ensues when"yes" and "no" are not yet decided. AU Cass 12 Speech act Theory/Language/Communication/LuhmannVsSpeech Act Theory: Language use is not an act. - You always need understanding, so it goes on. Action: would only be a release without understanding. LuhmannVsHabermas: therefore, no theory of communicative action is possible. >Communicative action, >Communication theory. Speech: here the receiver is initially excluded. He comes only later as a disciplining moment in the theory. - And as a subject. >Language/Luhmann, >Subject/Luhmann.	AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001
Communication Media	Parsons	Habermas IV 385 Communication media/Parsons/Habermas: Question: 1. What is the conceptual status of money as a medium that occupies the internal systemic exchange between real variables such as labour and consumer goods? 2. Do the other social subsystems also regulate the exchange in their environments via similar media?⁽¹⁾ Parsons later regarded his attempt to see power as a control medium anchored in the political system with structural analogies to money as a successful test for the generalizability of the media concept.⁽²⁾ Habermas IV 386 In the order of money, power, influence and value retention, Parsons has analyzed four media in broad lines, each of which is assigned to one of the social subsystems: Money: the economic, Power: the political system, Influence: the system of social integration Value retention: the system for the preservation of structural patterns. Habermas: in another round of generalization, Parsons introduced four more media: Intelligence, performance, affect and interpretation.⁽³⁾ >Communication media, >Money, >Power, >Values. HabermasVsParsons: the analogies to the medium of money become less clear and even metaphorical during the course of theory formation. This applies all the more to the media that Parsons recently assigned to the subsystems of the all-encompassing system of the human condition: transcendental order, symbolic meaning, health and empirical order. ⁽⁴⁾ Habermas IV 387 In the end, money is for Parsons only one of 64 socio-theoretically remarkable media. Problem: then one cannot know which of the structural characteristics read off the money medium are characteristic of media at all. Habermas IV 388 Problem: are we dealing here with an overgeneralization, i.e. with the thesis that there is something like a system of control media? Double Contingency/Parsons. Habermas IV 393 Media/Parsons/Habermas: serve not only to save information and time, and thus to reduce the effort of interpretation, but also to cope with the risk that the action sequences will break off. Media such as power and money can largely save the costs of dissent because they uncouple the coordination of action from the formation of linguistic consensus and neutralize it against the alternative of agreement and failed understanding. They are not specifications of language, they replace special language functions. Habermas IV 394 Lifeworld/Parsons/Habermas: the conversion of the coordination of actions from language to control media means a decoupling of the interaction from lifeworld contexts. >Communicative action/Parsons, >Communication theory/Habermas. 1. T.Parsons, Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory, NY 1977, S. 128 2. T. Parsons, On the Concept of Power, in: Social Theory and Modern Society, NY 1967 3. Talcott Parsons, Some Problems of General Theory, in: J.C. McKinney, E. A. Tiryakian (Eds.), Theoretical Sociology, NY 1970 S. 27ff. 4. T. Parsons, Action, Theory and the Human Condition, NY 1978, S. 393.	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Complexes/Complexity	Habermas	IV 259 Complexity/social systems/Habermas: the level of possible increases in complexity can only be raised if a new system mechanism is introduced; however, any new mechanism of system differentiation that takes the lead must be anchored in the lifeworld, institutionalised via status, official authority or private civil law. The social formations ultimately differ according to the institutional complexes that define the basis of society in the Marxist sense. >Systems theory, >Systems, >Life world.	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Contingency	Luhmann	Reese-Schäfer II 100 "Double Contingency"/Parsons/Reese-Schäfer: no action can ensue if Alter makes his action dependent on how Ego acts and Ego wants to connect its behavior to Alter. Solution: time dimension. Double contingency inevitably leads to the formation of social systems. >Time/Luhmann, >Action/Luhmann, >Action system/Luhmann. AU Cass 10 Double Contingency/Luhmann: I have to think about what I'm doing, so that you do what I want you to do. AU Cass 14 Double Contingency/Parsons: the social order already exists before the contracts, family before family law, church before dogmatism, etc. Cf. >Beginning. Luhmann: question: how is an optimal way found if everybody can contribute their effort, but also their denial? - Two actors are assumed - Alter/Ego. Contingency: two dimensions: 1) Dependency on something 2) It might be different. Common values are secondary. The common values are not even recognized in the beginning. - Pure temporality - One acts first - thus he breaks through a circle. - ("I do what you want if you ..."). cf. >Circular reasoning. Question: what was first, the double contingency or the system? >System/Luhmann. AU Cass 14 Double Contingency/Luhmann: conflict resolution - existence only in execution, no history, no initial conditions.	AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001
Crises	Habermas	IV 434 Crises/Society/HabermasVsPasons/Habermas: Talcott Parsons Thesis: Social pathological phenomena are due to systemic imbalances. >Systems/T. Parsons, >Systems Theory. HabermasVsParsons: with this reduction, the specific of social crises is lost. For self-regulated systems, which must permanently secure their risky existence by adapting to conditions of a contingent and over-complex environment, IV 434 internal imbalances are the normal state. Whether these imbalances assume a "critical dimension" can only be assessed by the systems analyst from an external perspective if, as with organisms, he/she can refer to clearly identifiable limits of superiority. A comparably clear-cut problem of death does not arise for social systems.⁽¹⁾ Crises/Habermas: only when relevant social groups experience structural changes that are systemically reduced as critical to their existence and feel their identity threatened, may the social scientist speak of crises.⁽²⁾ Solution/Weber/Habermas: By understanding modernization as social rationalization, Weber establishes a connection with identity-vouching worldviews and with structures of the lifeworld that determine the conditions of consistency of social experiences. >Worldviews, >Modernization, >M. Weber. IV 565 Crises/Habermas: system imbalances only have an effect as crises if the achievements of economy and state remain manifestly below an established aspirational level and impair the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld by causing conflicts and reactions of resistance there. IV 566 Before such conflicts endanger core areas of social integration, they are moved to the periphery: before anomic states occur, phenomena of withdrawal of legitimacy or motivation occur. However, if we succeed in intercepting control crises, i.e. perceived disturbances of material reproduction through recourse to resources of the lifeworld, pathologies of the lifeworld will arise. This can be imagined as an overexploitation of the remaining resources: culture and personality are being attacked in favour of a crisis-managing stabilisation of society. Phenomena of alienation and uncertainty of collective identities arise. See Colonization of the Lifeworld (Terminology/Habermas) and Reification/Lukács. 1. R. Döbert, Systemtheorie und die Entwicklung religiöser Deutungssysteme, Frankfurt, 1973 2. J. Habermas, Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus, Frankfurt 1973, S. 9ff.	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Cultural Values	Parsons	Habermas IV 339 Cultural values/Parsons/Habermas: Parson's strict concept of the "system" does not apply to cultural tradition. He understands this rather in the sense of a "grammatically" regulated context. For him, this is at best a "system" in the sense of structuralism from Saussure to Lévi-Strauss: it is about the order of internal relationships between components of meaning, not about the functional relationships between empirical components of an organized whole and the associated problem of border preservation. ⁽¹⁾ Habermas IV 340 As soon as cultural values are linked to interests or motives through incorporation into action systems, they change their status: they become functioning components of empirically identifiable action systems. Values belong to the sphere of validity and acquire an empirical status by relating them to facts. Parsons equips socio-cultural reality with systemic characteristics.⁽²⁾ >Culture, >Cultural transmission. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Social System, NY 1951, p. 15 2. Ibid. p. 17.	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Decisions	Parsons	Habermas IV 333 Decisions/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons thesis: for any situation of action there are five problems which inevitably face each actor in the form of binary schematized general and abstract decision alternatives.⁽¹⁾ 1. Should the actor follow his/her interests directly or allow for normative considerations? 2. Should he/she immediately follow his/her emotions and desires or suppress impulses? 3. Should he/she analyse the situation in a detached way, or should he/she get involved as a participant? Habermas IV 334 4. Should he/she judge other actors according to their performance or contributions? 5. Should he/she consider concrete objects and actors in their complexity or limit himself/herself to analytically described circumstances? Parsons gains from this the following table: 1. The private vs. collective interest dilemma: self vs. collectivity orientation. 2. The gratification-discipline dilemma: affectivity vs. affective neutrality. 3. The dilemma of transcendence vs. immanence: universalism vs. particularism. 4. The choice between object modalities: performance vs. quality (achievement vs. diffuseness). 5. The definition of the scope of interest in the object: specitiy vs. diffuseness. HabermasVsParsons: he has not fulfilled the claim that this table constitutes a system. >Systems. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Social System, NY 1951, S. 76	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Distributive Justice	Rawls	I 274 Distributive Justice/Rawls: thesis: only by shaping markets can the problem of fair distribution be solved as a case of pure procedural justice. In this way, we also maintain efficiency and the important freedom of individual career choice. >Justice, >Markets. I 275 Institutions: We need a suitable social system to ensure distributive justice, no matter how historical coincidences turn out. The basic institutions required for this purpose include a constitution guaranteeing equal civil rights, freedom of thought and consciousness, political freedom, a fair electoral system and fair legislation, fair equal opportunities and free choice of profession. >Freedom, >Liberty/Rawls, >Institutions, >Equal Opportunities. The government must also ensure support for the socially disadvantaged and in the event of illness. The institutions that are supposed to guarantee this can be divided into four branches⁽¹⁾. I 276 1. Assignment: the pricing system must be kept competitive. Problem: Efficiency. The allocation system is concerned with taxes and subsidies in order to be able to correct deviations from the market. 2. Stabilization: this branch is concerned with full employment in the sense that everyone can take up the profession he/she wants and that economic development is effective. The first two branches together ensure the efficiency of the market economy. >Efficiency/Rawls. 3. Transfer: this is about social security (social minimum). Here needs have to be considered and classified. >Social minimum. Problem: A competitive system of market prices does not provide any orientation here. This leads to a division of labour between parts of the social system. I 277 4. distribution: The institutions that enable distributive justice are tax legislation and property law. 1. An equal distribution of property appears to be a necessary condition for maintaining equal freedoms. I 278 Inequality: the inequality of inherited goods is not inherently worse than that of intelligence. The point is that all inequalities are dealt with by the difference principle, so that they ultimately benefit the weakest. (See Difference Principle/Rawls). 2. Tax legislation that provides the state with revenue to guarantee public goods. I 279 The details of the design are a matter of political theory and not of the theory of justice. >Taxation. 1. See R. A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, New York, 1959, ch. I.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Division of Labour	Durkheim	Habermas IV 173 Division of Labour/Durkheim/Habermas: Durkheim uses the term division of labour in the sense of a structural differentiation of social systems. The functional differentiation of professional groups is also of exemplary importance for Durkheim. But he has a tendency to reduce the complexity of a society Habermas IV 174 by demographic indicators. Social division of Labour/Durkheim: a) segmental, b) functionally differentiated societies. Analogy: e.g. biological organisms. From this, Durkheim derives a biological model for functionally differentiated societies, which he calls "organic". Different organs play special roles. Durkheim identifies the state as the central organ. ⁽¹⁾ Habermas IV 175 Taking the biological model as a basis, Durkheim does not have to adopt more norms than conditions for the formation of these structures. Luhmann calls this "norm-free sociality". ⁽²⁾ Society/Durkheim: Thesis: for archaic societies, collective consciousness is constitutive, for modern societies, however, it is the division of labour. ⁽³⁾ Durkheim/Habermas: while primitive societies are integrated via a basic normative understanding, integration in developed societies takes place via the systemic context of functionally specified areas of action. >Division of labour/Spencer. Habermas IV 178 Division of Labour/Durkheim: Durkheim's thesis: industrial capitalist societies are driving towards an anomie. Durkheim attributes this anomie to the same processes of differentiation from which a new moral "natural law" was to emerge. Durkheim's example of anomic division of labour is the "enmity between labour and capital"⁽⁴⁾ HabermasVsDurkheim: his analyses are circular: on the one hand, he claims that the moral rules that make organic solidarity possible "flow out of the division of labor by themselves in the normal state". ⁽⁵⁾ On the other hand, he explains the dysfunctional nature of certain forms of division of labour with the lack of such normative regulations. ⁽⁶⁾ Habermas IV 179 Solution/Habermas: we have to distinguish between the system (from the observer's perspective) and the life world (from the social group's perspective). At the same time, we should conceive of societies as a system and a living environment. 1. E. Durkheim, De la division du travail social, Paris 1930, German Frankfurt 1977, p. 222f. 2.N. Luhmann, Einleitung zu Durkheim (1977). 3. Durkheim (1977) p. 266 4. Ibid p. 396 5. Ibid p. 408 6. Ibid p. 410	Durkheim I E. Durkheim The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895 German Edition: Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Double Contingency	Parsons	Habermas IV 320 Double contingency/Parsons/Habermas: (1) Since the regulating power of cultural values does not affect the contingency of decisions, any interaction between two actors who enter into a relationship is subject to the condition of "double contingency": this has the role of a problem-causing fact: it makes regulatory services functionally necessary. In the logical structure of interaction, the double contingency of the freedom of choice of ego and alter takes precedence over the order mechanisms that coordinate action. At the analytical level of the unit of action, the value standards of individual actors are attributed as subjective possession: Habermas IV 321 They therefore require inter-subjective coordination. The element of value orientation is merely intended to exclude the assumption of contingent processes of purpose setting and prevent the autonomy of determining purpose being withdrawn in favour of a rationalist or positivist alignment of action orientations to determinants of the situation. Habermas IV 392 Double Contingency/Parsons/Habermas: in communicative action, double contingency results from the fact that each interaction participant can both raise (and refrain) and accept (and reject) fundamentally criticizable claims; he/she makes his/her decisions on condition that this also applies to the other interaction participants. Double contingent understanding is based on the interpretation of actors who, as long as they are not self-centred towards their own success, but oriented towards understanding, and want to achieve their respective goals through communicative agreement, must strive to reach a common definition of the situation. >Validity claims. Habermas: Actions can only be coordinated through linguistic consensus formation if everyday communicative practice is embedded in a context of everyday life that is determined by cultural traditions, institutional orders and competencies. The performance of interpretation draws on these resources of the world. Habermas IV 393 Problem: The effort of communication and the risk of dissent are awake to the extent that the actors can no longer fall back on such an advance of consensus in the lifeworld. The more they have to rely on their own interpretation, consent will depend on the intersubjective recognition of criticizable claims to validity. Solution/Parsons: Language as an information medium, especially as a coordination mechanism for well-written contexts.⁽²⁾ >Intersubjectivity, >Communication theory, >Communicative action. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Social System, Glencoe 1951, S. 36 2. R.C. Baum, On Societal Media Dynamics in: ders. “Introduction to Generalized Media in Action, in: Festschrift Parsons (1976), Vol. II S. 448ff.	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Economics	Parsons	Habermas IV 384 Economics/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons had the problem of integrating the most methodologically advanced social science discipline, economics, into the theory of society.⁽¹⁾ At first he tried to present the exchange relationships between the four social subsystems (society, culture, personality system, behavioral system) via "markets".⁽²⁾ >Markets/Parsons, >System/Parsons. Habermas IV 385 Neoclassical Economics/Habermas: had conceived the economy as a system with permeable borders, which exchanges inputs from the system environment for its own outputs; it had preferably concentrated on the case of exchange between private households and companies and had analysed the relations between capital and labour from the point of view of a systemic exchange between the real variables of labour and consumer goods on the one hand, and the corresponding monetary variables, wages and private expenditure on the other. Parsons is not interested, like economists, in the internal dynamics of the economic system, but in the relations between the economy and the other subsystems and wants to explain the non-economic parameters of the economic process. >Systems theory. Question: 1. What is the conceptual status of money as a medium that facilitates the internal systemic exchange between real variables such as labour and consumer goods? 2. Do the other social subsystems also regulate the exchange in their environments via similar media? ⁽³⁾ >Control media, >Communication media. 1. T. Parsons/N. J. Smelser, Economy and Society, London, NY, 1956, 2. T. Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society, NY 1967, S. 347ff. 3. T.Parsons, Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory, NY 1977, S. 128	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Elite	Fanon	Brocker I 387 Elite/colonization/postcolonialism/Fanon: Fanon, he primarily goes to court with the national bourgeoisies ((s) in the colonized countries), the native "university and business elites" of the capital⁽¹⁾. Fanon accuses this class of not being interested in building a new, fairer social system, but only being interested in mediation and in replacing the former European population⁽²⁾. It has "the psychology of small businessmen, not of captains of industry"⁽³⁾, and in its luxury consumption follows "the Western bourgeoisie in its negative and decadent stage"⁽⁴⁾. 1. Frantz Fanon, Les damnés de la terre, Paris 1961. Dt.: Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Frankfurt/M. 1981, S. 128 2. Ibid. p. 130 3. Ibid. p. 128 4. Ibid. p. 131. Ina Kerner „Frantz Fanon, Die Verdammten dieser Erde“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	PolFanon I Frantz Fanon Les Damnés de la Terre, Paris 1963 - Engl Transl. The Wretched of the Earth, New York 1963 German Edition: Die Verdammten dieser Erde Reinbek 1969 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Environment	Easton	Brocker I 492 Environment/Political System/Easton: as environments of the political system, Easton distinguishes between internal and external social environments. Inner Society Environment/Easton: other social systems such as the economic system, but also personality systems and the ecological and biological system. Outer Society Environment: political systems of other countries, the international economic system, international organizations such as the NATO and the United Nations ⁽¹⁾. 1. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York 1965, S. 23. Dieter Fuchs, “David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	PolEast I David Easton A Systems Analysis of Political Life New York 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Environment	Parsons	Habermas IV 342 Environment/System/Parsons/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: Problem: Parsons uses the term ambiguously: a) for the status of an environment superior to the action systems and at the same time b) for the action systems internal environment, which is nevertheless deprived of empirical properties of a system environment. >Action system. Habermas IV 371 Parsons establishes a hierarchy between behavioral system, personality, social system, and culture in such a way that the lower one corresponds to the respective Habermas IV 372 higher system in used energy, which is superior to the lower system in terms of information and control performance. This gives the cultural system the position of a sovereign of control. >Behavioral system, >Personality, >Social system, >Culture. Habermas: Parsons not only sets the course for a cultural determinism, but differentiates between two categories of environments: a) at the lower pole the natural or empirical environment, b) at the opposite pole an environment of a non-empirical, supernatural nature.⁽¹⁾ 1.T. Parsons, “Social Systems”, in: Parsons, Social Systems, 1977, S. 181.	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Gender Roles	Rawls	I 99 Gender Roles/Rawls: Justice as Fairness evaluates a social system from the position of equal civil rights and the different levels of prosperity and income. >Roles/Rawls. However, there are natural properties that lead to the unequal distribution of relevant positions and which cannot be changed, e. g. gender roles. Inequality/solution/Rawls: here the difference principle helps (See Difference Principle/Rawls) to mitigate inequalities: disadvantaged groups must always benefit from inequality. However, such inequalities rarely occur. >Inequality. In cases of conflict, the interests of a more general viewpoint outweigh the interests of a more individual position. >Conflicts.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Hierarchies	Parsons	Habermas IV 371 Hierarchies/Systems/System Theory/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons adopts a control mechanism for systems that in turn requires energy, but little compared to the consumption of the overall system. Parsons equates cultural values with controlling control values and treats the organic foundations of the action system as a source of energy. Then he establishes a hierarchy between behavioral system, personality, social system and culture in such a way that the lower level is in line with the respectively Habermas IV 372 higher system of energy used, which is superior to the lower system in terms of information and control performance. This gives the cultural system the position of a sovereign of control. Habermas: Parsons not only sets the course for a cultural determinism, but differentiates between two categories of environments: a) at the lower pole the natural or empirical environment, b) at the opposite pole an environment of a non-empirical, supernatural nature.⁽¹⁾ >Levels/order, >Description Levels. 1. T. Parsons, “Social Systems”, in: Parsons, Social Systems, 1977, p. 181.	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Holism	Esfeld	I 16 ~ Holism/Esfeld: e.g. social community: a social community is more than the dependence of the thinking of others. Social: the social is not rigidly dependent: members die, new members come. A social role as a business man only is a part of the community. Generic: any other, but not a certain thing must exist. Not holistic: purely functional characterized systems are not holistic: e.g. traffic lights exist and function also without traffic and vice versa. I 29 Holism/characteristics/Esfeld: holism is not "this individual", not a disjoint (e.g. "round or angular"). It could be intrinsic or relational (more than causal). It is not correct to say: "the property to be a system (holistic system)". An Arrangement (that is causal itself) is not enough, but an interaction. Relational: there must be at least one thing with which it has no common parts. Also, to be alone is a relational property/Lewis: holistic properties form family. They do not have to be the same for every part of the system: e.g. heart/kidney. Holistic properties are relational (the arrangement is already assumed). They do not have to be intrinsic (e.g. natural numbers). I 28 Causation: causation is not enough, even properties which are the cause of things, can be intrinsic. They are ontological and not description dependent. Parts: e.g. bones are not holistic, but humans for social system are. Bones do not make up a part for a community. The holistic part is not transitive - the part is more narrow than in mereology. >Mereology, >Part-of-relation, >Parts. I 36 Arrangement property: an arrangement property is not enough: to be a heart is an arrangement property, e.g. a heart which the butcher sells, otherwise it is no heart anymore. Therefore the functional definition is not a holistic criterion. A holistic property cannot be detected in a description which can have the parts in isolation. I 42 Type A bottom-up: every constituent must have a few holistic properties: every belief is, as far as it has conceptual content dependent on other beliefs (e.g. social holism). Type B: holistic properties primarily belong to the system as a whole: e.g. conceptual content, confirmation, justification (e.g. quantum holism). Semantic holism: A or B is possible. I 50 Confirmation holism leads to semantic holism. Two dogmas: two dogmas represent both. >Two Dogmas, >Confirmation. I 366ff Holism/Esfeld: can we merge holism of physics and holism of philosophy of the mind? No, we can only follow them in one area and exclude the other. Belief-holism: can only take into account the conceptual area (quasi everyday language), not the quantum mechanical. Quantum holism is fixed on epistemic self-sufficiency and representationalism. >Quantum mechanics. Epistemic self-sufficiency equals internalism: belief states are independent of physical nature (intentional states can be the same in other environments) I 383 Holism/tradition: in the tradition of holism stand Parmenides, Spinoza and Bradley. >B. Spinoza, >Parmenides, >F.H. Bradley. Esfeld: Esfeld retains a revised Cartesianism. >Cartesianism, >R. Descartes.	Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002
Ideal Observer	Hume	Rawls I 184 Ideal observer/society/order/justice/Hume/Rawls: something, e. g. a social system, is fair, if an ideal impartial observer from outside would judge this from a general point of view, if he had all relevant information about the circumstances. >Impartiality, >Idealization, >Observation, >Justice, >Circumstances. (See Roderick Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 12, 1952; F. C. Sharp, Good and Ill Wll, Chicago, 1950, pp. 156-162; D. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1888, esp. Bk III, pt. III, sec I, esp. Pp574-584. More general discussion: C. D. Broad, "Some Reflections on Moral-Sense Theories in Ethics". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 45 (1944-45); W. K. Kneale "Objectivity in Morals", Philosophy, vol. 25 (1950).)	D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Ideal Observer	Smith	Rawls I 184 Ideal observer/society/order/justice/dam Smith/Rawls: something, e. g. a social system, is fair, if an ideal impartial observer from outside would judge this from a general point of view, if he/she had all relevant information about the circumstances. (See Roderick Firth,"Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 12,1952; F. C. Sharp, Good and Ill Wll, Chicago, 1950, pp. 156-162; A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in L. A. Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, vol. I Oxford, 1897, pp. 257-277. >Observation, >Method, >Idealization, >Knowledge, >Impartiality, >Circumstances, >Economy, >Society, >Systems. For a more general discussion: C. D. Broad,"Some Reflections on Moral-Sense Theories in Ethics". Proceedings oft he he Aristotelian Society, vol. 45 (1944-45). W. K. Kneale "Objectivity in Morals", Philosophy, vol. 25 (1950).) Otteson I 18 Ideal observer/Adam Smith/Otteson: (…) the patterns of behavior that we discover, and that get positively reinforced by achievement of mutual sympathy of sentiments, become a set of real moral standards. They are created by human beings, but they are not arbitrary or subjective: they must meet with others' approval as well and are thus subject to external, social correction. And given that we have similar psychological and material needs that can be met only in society With others, there is bound to be some commonality across cultures, even if some details vary. >Cultural values, >Cultural tradition, >Objectivity, >Culture, >Relativism. The impartial spectator standard would then allow some variability with matters that are less central to human survival, and be more fixed regarding other matters that are more central. >Morality/Adam Smith, >Community/Adam Smith.	EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Otteson I James R. Otteson The Essential Adam Smith Vancouver: Fraser Institute. 2018
Ideology	Marx	Rothbard II 378 Ideology/Marx/Rothbard: Even Marx must dimly recognize that not 'material productive forces', not even 'classes', act in the real world, but only individual consciousness and individual choice. Even in the Marxian analysis, each Class, or the individuals within it, must become conscious of its 'true' class interests in order to act upon pursuing or achieving them. To Marx, each individual's thinking, his values and theories, are all determined, not by his personal self-interest, but by the interest of the class to which he supposedly belongs. This is the first fatal flaw in the argument; Why in the world should each individual ever hold his class higher than himself? Second, according to Marx, this class interest determines his thoughts and viewpoints, and must do so, because each person is only capable of 'ideology' or false consciousness in the interest ofhis class. He is not capable of a disinterested, objective search for truth, nor of pursuit of his own interest or of that of all mankind. MisesVsMarx/Rothbard: But, as von Mises has pointed out, Marx's doctrine pretends to be pure, non-ideological science, and yet written expressly to advance the class interest of the proletariat. But, while all 'bourgeois' economics and all other disciplines of thought were interpreted by Marx as false by definition, as 'ideological' rationalizations of bourgeois class interest, the Marxists were not consistent enough to assign to their own doctrines merely ideological character. The Marxian tenets, they implied, are not ideologies. They are a foretaste Rothbard II 379 of the knowledge of the future classless society which, freed from the fetters of class conflicts, will be in a position to conceive pure knowledge, untainted by ideological blemishes.⁽¹⁾ >Class conflict/Marx, >Historical materialism/Marx. David GordonVsMarx/Rothbard: If all thought about social and economic matters is determined by class position, what about the Marxist system itself? If, as Marx proudly proclaimed, he aimed at providing a science for the working Class, why should any of his views be accepted as true? Mises rightly notes that Marx's View is self-refuting: if all social thought is ideological, then this proposition is itself ideological and the grounds for believing it have been undercut. In his Theories of Surplus Value, Marx cannot contain his sneering at the 'apologetics' ofvarious bourgeois econo- mists. He did not realize that in his constant jibes at the class bias of his fellow economists, he was but digging the grave ofhis own giant work of propaganda on behalf of the proletariat.⁽²⁾ >Surplus Value. MisesVsMarx/Rothbard: Von Mises also raises the point that it is absurd to believe that the interests of any class, including the capitalits, could ever be served better by a false than by a correct doctrine.⁽³⁾ Capitalist ideology/MisesVsMarx/Rothbard: If the Marxian answer holds, as it has, that false theory is necessary to justify the existence of capitalist rule, then, as von Mises points out, from the Marxian point of View itself the theory should not be necessary. Since each class ruthlessly pursues its own interest, there is no need for the capitalists to justify their rule and their alleged exploitation to themselves. There is also no need to use these false doctrines to keep the proletariat subservient, since, to Marxists, the rule or the overthrow of a given social system depends on the material productive forces, and there is no way by which consciousness can delay this development or speed it up. Or, if there are such ways, and the Marxists often implicitly concede this fact, then there is a grave and self-defeating flaw in the heart of Marxian theory itself. Rothbard II 380 Higher classes/intellectuals/Mannheim/Rothbard: that way self-contradictory and self-refuting. In the twentieth century, Marxists such as the German sociologist Karl Mannheim attempted to elevate this escape-hatch into High Theory: that somehow, 'intellectuals' are able to 'float free', to levitate above the laws that determine all other classes. >Classes/Marx, >Class conflict/Marx. 1. Ludwig von Mises, Theory and History (1957, Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1985), p. 126. 2. David Gordon, 'Mises Contra Marx', The Free Market, 5 (July 1987), pp.2-3. 3. For the refutation of another, allied point in Marx's ideology doctrine, that each economic class has a different logical structure of mind ['polylogism'], see Ludwig von Mises, Human Action (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949), pp. 72-91. Habermas IV 303 Ideology/Marx/HabermasVsMarx/Habermas: critical instruments such as the concept of ideology become blunt because a metatheoretical framework of sufficient complexity cannot be developed within one of the disintegrated paradigms (of action and systems theory). Solution/Parsons/Habermas: in Talcott Parsons these two lines of theoretical history (approach via action and system) converge again. >Talcott Parsons, >Systems theory, >Action theory.	Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Institutionalisation	Habermas	IV 407 Institutionalisation/Money/Power/Media/Habermas: Thesis: Conditions for an optimal institutionalisation of media (here: money and power): Real values and coverage reserves must be such that they have an empirically motivating force. The physical control of cover reserves must be possible. It must be possible to measure, relinquished and deposit the media. The normative anchoring of the media must not create any new communication effort and must not cause any further risks of dissent. >Media/Habermas. Problem: this reaches its limits at the level of the social system: new names for media can always be found, but these are initially only postulates that must prove useful. IV 410 Another condition for the institutionalisation of media is their calculability: in the case of value retention and influence as media (as proposed by Talcott Parsons) this is not or hardly given. Neither is depositing possible. The scientific system with a recognisable gradation of reputation is an exception. >Science, >Reputation, >Recognition.	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Institutions	Rawls	I 55 Def Institution/Institutions/Rawls: an institution is a public regulatory system that defines administrative bodies and roles together with their rights and obligations, powers of attorney and inviolabilities, etc. The rules include certain penalties and defensive measures, etc. As examples of institutions or, more generally, social practices, we can consider games and rituals, court proceedings and parliaments, markets and property systems. An institution can be considered in two different ways: a) as an abstract control system b) as realization in thinking and acting of certain persons at certain times and places. When it comes to finding out whether an institution is in law or not, it is best to look at the concrete action. I 56 We assume that those who act within an institution are aware of the rules and results of their practice and assume that other participants have this awareness as well. Although not always true, this is a plausible generalization. There is then a common basis for determining common expectations. For contract theory, it is important to assume that the principles are public and known. >Principle/Rawls. Rules/strategies: we need to distinguish between the rules of an institution and the strategies that the institution may use to achieve its objectives⁽¹⁾. Strategies: Strategies based on mutual assumptions about each other are not part of the institution. Rather, they belong to the theory of the institution, e. g. Parliament. Theory: adopts the valid rules as given and analyzes the way power is distributed in the system... I 57 ...and how the parties involved use their opportunities. Behavior: the behaviour of individuals should be coordinated as far as possible so that the results are the best from the point of view of social justice, even if the individuals may not be aware of them. J. Bentham: sees this as an artificial identification of interests⁽²⁾. >J. Bentham. Adam Smith: understands this as the work of the Invisible Hand⁽³⁾. >A. Smith. We must distinguish the institution from the rules and these rules from the social system, because each of them can be unfair without the others being unfair. Inequalities can also only arise from the combination of these elements. I 58 Rituals/Rawls: however, are not called unfair. Formal law/Rawls: let us assume that there is a valid system of rules that are reliably applied by the institution, even if we ourselves do not accept the rules. Then we can speak of a formal right. The law and the institution are then inseparable from each other. >Law. 1. See also J. R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge, 1969, pp.33-42. 2. See E. Halévy, La Formation du radicalisme philosophique, vol. 1, Paris 1901, pp.2-24. 3. See A. Smith The Wealth of the Nations, (Ed. Edwin Cannan) New York, 1937.	Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Instrumental Reason	Habermas	IV 490 Instrumental Reason/Habermas: the term suggests that the rationality of recognizing and acting subjects systematically expands into a higher-order purpose rationality. >Rationality, >Procedural rationality. Thus the rationality of self-regulated systems, whose imperatives override the consciousness of their integrated members, appears in the form of a totalized purpose rationality. HabermasVsAdorno/HabermasVsHorkheimer: thus, the two authors confuse system and action rationality. Therefore, they cannot sufficiently differentiate between the rationalization of action orientation IV 491 in the context of a (...) lifeworld on the one hand and the expansion of the control capacities of (...) social systems on the other. >System rationality, >Lifeworld. Autonomy/Spontanity: Therefore, they can only locate spontaneity, which is not yet captured by the reifying power of system rationalization, in irrational forces - in the charismatic force of leaders or the mimetic of art and love. >Spontaneity, >Art, >Mimesis.	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Interest	Weber	Habermas III 264 Interest/Weber/Habermas: Weber imagines the transposition of culturally stored knowledge into the lifestyle of individuals and groups, into social forms of life as a transfer between ideas and interests. Material and immaterial interests correspond to needs and contexts of meaning in which the"cultural people" stand. >Ideas, >Culture, >Cultural tradition, >Culture shift, >Society, >Community. III 265 Talcott Parsons/Habermas: Parsons continues this later: social systems of action or "life orders" integrate both ideas and interests in such a way that they order legitimate chances of satisfying material and immaterial interests. >Action systems. Habermas: the penetration of ideas and interests serves to regulate the appropriation of material and immaterial goods and to anchor this regulation in the motives and value orientations of those concerned in such a way that there is a sufficient chance of average compliance with the relevant standards. >Norms.	Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Interpenetration	Parsons	Habermas IV 337 Interpenetration/Parsons/Habermas: the term "interpenetration" appears simultaneously in Parsons⁽¹⁾ and Parsons⁽²⁾. This is about how the three "systems" culture, society and personality (initially understood from the early Parsons in pre-theoretical terms) overlap and penetrate each other (interpenetrate). Habermas IV 338 Parsons/Habermas: places the mutual penetration of the systems in the foreground, after he could not clarify the institutionalization and internalization of cultural values in action theory. >Systems, >System theory. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Social System, NY 1951, 2. Talcott Parsons, Toward a General Theory of Action, NY 1951.	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Land (Economics)	Marx	Rothbard II 394 Land/Marx/Rothbard: (…) how has Marx managed to dispose of the land question that so agitated Ricardo and Mill? First of all, Marx was the great prophet of man as labourer; in his version of Hegelianism, man created nature, indeed the entire universe. Since land is man's creature, there is no room for worry about land or land-created value. Labour is all. Second, land as the basis for technology, the economy, and the social system, was the key to the feudal system, but feudalism was part of the dying 'pre-capitalist' pre-industrial order, a reactionary remnant unworthy of attention. Basically, then, Marx simply assimilated land into 'capital', and returns on land into profits. Thus land - the annoying superfluous third class of factors — can drop out and make way for the mighty two-class polarization and final struggle between the capitalists and the proletariat. >Classes/Marx, >Class conflict/Marx.	Marx I Karl Marx Das Kapital, Kritik der politische Ökonomie Berlin 1957 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Language	Luhmann	AU Cas 6 Language/Luhmann: language excludes much to include little. Through this it may get complex itself. - Most sounds are not eligible. - Relatively few simple characters in complex linkage. >Form/Luhmann, >Order/Luhmann, >Structure/Luhmann. --- AU Cass 12 Language/structural coupling/psychological/social systems/Luhmann: language is here the mechanism of structural coupling. >Structural coupling. Language: twice: a) mentally b) communicative 1. Also, foreign languages, are easily distinguishable from meaningless noise. Language draws attention to itself - and not to the meaning! 2. Language fixes meaning. - (> Storage, transport). Because language is structural coupling, it is not a system. >System/Luhmann, >Communication/Luhmann. Language does not have an own operational way. >Operation/Luhmann. So no linguistic operation which would not be communication or non-linguistic thinking. - language itself is not communication. - One needs a few participants and an understanding. --- AU Cass 12 Language/Luhmann: that it also has aspects of action (e.g. trigger opposition), is a secondary phenomenon. Operation: The appropriate language operation is communication or comprehending sense.	AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Language	Parsons	Habermas IV 388 Language/Parsons/System Theory/Habermas: Parsons initially adopted the concept of language in the sense of a medium used by cultural anthropology, which enables intersubjectivity and carries the consensus of values relevant to normative orders. With this, he explained what it means that actors share value orientations. These participations served as a model for the common possession of cultural values and for the collective commitment to a normative order.⁽¹⁾ Habermas IV 389 Problem: if money and power as control media are to represent a generalization of language, the culturalist concept of language is inadequate: 1. It is then no longer about the kind of common ground that represents the inter-subjectivity of linguistic communication, but rather about a structure of code and message. 2. The question of systematic localisation of linguistic communication is not solved. >Control media, >Communication media. For Parsons, language initially seemed to belong to the cultural system: as the medium through which traditions propagate. However, the cross-system mechanisms of institutionalisation and internalisation had already suggested the question of whether language is not generally central to the action system and must be analysed at the same level as the concept of action. IV 390 Two strategies are possible: A. Analysis of language at the level of communicative action: this can be linked to linguistics and language philosophy. >Communicative action. However, this is not possible if you follow the second strategy: B. One undermines the level of language and action theory investigations and analyses the mechanism of linguistic communication only from the functionalist point of view of system formation. Luhmann follows this strategy: one would not construct a theory of the action system from an analysis of action with the addition of general system-theoretical aspects...; one would use general system-theoretical construction considerations to derive from them how...systems constitute actions.⁽²⁾ >Action Theory. 1. T. Parsons, Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory, NY 1977, S.168 2. N. Luhmann, Handlungstheorie und Systemtheorie, Ms Bielefeld 1977.	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Law	Hume	Deleuze I 35 Law/Hume: law is not a natural principle. This is an artificial rule. Morality is integrated by a political agreement. >Principles/Hume, >Morals/Hume. HumeVsHobbes: VsSocial Contract: the social contract draws a false picture of society, only a negative one. Positive: lust is the driving force of all action. It is in my best interest to leave someone to his or her property, provided he/she does the same for me. Ownership is the essential political phenomenon. --- Rawls I 184 Def Law/observation/order/justice/Hume/Rawls: something, e.g. a social system, is fair, if an ideal impartial observer from outside would judge this from a general point of view, if he had all relevant information about the circumstances. (See Roderick Firth, "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 12, 1952; F. C. Sharp, Good and Ill Wll, Chicago, 1950, pp. 156-162; D. Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1888, esp. Bk III, pt. III, sec I, esp. Pp574-584. More general discussion: C. D. Broad,"Some Reflections on Moral-Sense Theories in Ethics". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 45 (1944-45); W. K. Kneale, "Objectivity in Morals", Philosophy, vol. 25 (1950).)	D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Deleuze I Gilles Deleuze Felix Guattari Qu’est-ce que la philosophie, Paris 1991 German Edition: Was ist Philosophie? Frankfurt/M. 2000 Hum I G. Deleuze David Hume , Frankfurt 1997 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Law	Smith	Rawls I 184 Definition Law/observation/order/justice/dam Smith/Rawls: something, e. g. a social system, is fair, if an ideal impartial observer from outside would judge this from a general point of view, if he/she had all relevant information about the circumstances. >Justice, >Impartiality, >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Relevance, >Circumstances, >Society. Further reading: Roderick Firth,"Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 12,1952; F. C. Sharp, Good and Ill Wll, Chicago, 1950, pp. 156-162; A. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in L. A. Selby-Bigge, British Moralists, vol. I Oxford, 1897, pp. 257-277. More general discussion: C. D. Broad,"Some Reflections on Moral-Sense Theories in Ethics". Proceedings oft he he Aristotelian Society, vol. 45 (1944-45). W. K. Kneale "Objectivity in Morals", Philosophy, vol. 25 (1950).)	EconSmith I Adam Smith The Theory of Moral Sentiments London 2010 EconSmithV I Vernon L. Smith Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms Cambridge 2009 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
Legal Entrepreneurship	Austrian School	Parisi I 283 Legal Entrepreneurship/ Austrian school: Whitman (2002)⁽¹⁾ (…) extends the idea of entrepreneurship to the role played by lawyers and litigants. He examines how legal entrepreneurs discover and exploit opportunities to change legal rules—either the creation of new rules or the reinterpretation of existing ones to benefit themselves and their clients. Harper: Harper (2013)⁽²⁾ believes that the entrepreneurial approach lays the groundwork for explaining the open-ended and evolving nature of the legal process—it shows how the structure of property rights can undergo continuous endogenous change as a result of entrepreneurial actions within the legal system itself. The most important differentiating factor separating the entrepreneurship of the market process from legal entrepreneurship is the absence of the discipline of monetary profit and loss in the latter case. Although money may change hands in the process of legal entrepreneurship, its outputs may not be valued according to market prices, especially when there is a public-goods quality to the rule at issue. Whether effective feedback mechanisms exist in the contexts is therefore an open question. Martin: Martin argues that, in such structures, the feedback mechanism in polities is not as tight as feedback in the market mechanism, and therefore ideology plays a greater role in such decision-making (Martin, 2010)⁽³⁾. Legal entrepreneurship can be coordinating and yet also increase uncertainty and conflicts in society. It all depends on the kind of legal order in operation and the mechanism by which it is generated and maintained. Rubin/Priest: Rubin (1977)⁽⁴⁾ and Priest (1977)⁽⁵⁾ originally analyzed how the openly competitive legal process tends to promote economic efficiency. They more recently point out that the common law system has succumbed to interest group pressures and has deviated from producing efficient rules (Tullock, 2005/1980(6); Tullock, 2005/1997⁽⁷⁾; Priest, 1991)⁽⁸⁾. They argue that litigation efforts by private parties can explain both the common law’s historic tendency to produce efficient rules as well as its more recent evolution away from efficiency in favor of wealth redistribution through the intrusion of strong interest groups into political and legal processes. Zywicki: Zywicki (2003)⁽⁹⁾ describes the common law system in the Middle Ages as polycentric. He focuses on three institutional features of the formative years of the common law system. First, courts competed in overlapping jurisdictions and judges competed for litigants. Second, there was a weak rule of precedent instead of the present-day stare decisis rule. And third, legal rules were more default rules, which parties could contract around, instead of mandatory rules. These features are missing in the present-day common law system, which is non-competitive, has strong rules of precedent, Parisi I 284 precedent, and is dominated by mandatory rules. The efficiency claims pertain to a social system grounded in private ordering where those who are subject to those legal rules select the rules in open competition. Rajagopalan/Wagner : Rajagopalan and Wagner (2013)⁽⁹⁾ argue that the inefficiency claims pertaining to the current system of common law rules are a result of the entrepreneurial action within the contemporary system of the “entangled political economy.” The entangled political economy is essentially a “hybrid” of a monocentric state structure interacting with polycentric or private ordering, encouraging “parasitical” entrepreneurship within the legal system (Podemska-Mikluch and Wagner, 2010)⁽¹⁰⁾. Rajagopalan (2015)⁽¹¹⁾ provides India as a case study to discuss a system of rules incongruent to the economy consequently giving rise to “parasitical” entrepreneurial action and entanglement of economic and legal orders. There is also “political entrepreneurship” within a given constitutional or governance structure that seeks to create coalitions to effect specific legislation or transfers of wealth (rent seeking). Martin and Thomas (2013⁾⁽²⁾ describe such political entrepreneurship at different levels of the institutional structure, at the policy level, legislative level, or the constitutional level. These non-market orders determine the precise form that entrepreneurship takes (Boettke and Coyne, 2009⁽¹³⁾; and Boettke and Leeson, 2009)⁽¹⁴⁾. Political entrepreneurship may also attempt to change higher-level rules—like property rights systems, constitutional constraints, and so forth—as a means to gain rents and transfers within an economy (Rajagopalan, 2016)⁽¹⁵⁾. 1. Whitman, D. G. (2002). “Legal Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change.” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 12(2): 1–11. 2. Harper, D. A. (2013). “Property rights, entrepreneurship and coordination.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 88: 62–77. 3. Martin, A. (2010). “Emergent Politics and the Power of Ideas.” Studies in Emergent Order 3: 212–245. 4. Rubin, P. H. (1977). “Why is the Common Law Efficient?” Journal of Legal Studies 6(1): 51–63. 5. Priest, G. L. (1977). “The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules.” Journal of Legal Studies 6(1): 65–77. 6. Tullock, G. (2005/1980). “Trials on Trial: The Pure Theory of Legal Procedure,” in C. Rowley, ed., The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Vol. IX. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 7. Tullock, G. (2005/1997). “The Case Against the Common Law,” in C. Rowley, ed., The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock, Vol. IX. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. 8. Zywicki, T. J. (2003). “The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply Side Analysis.” Northwestern University Law Review 97(4): 1551–1633. 9. Rajagopalan, S. and R. Wagner (2013). “Legal Entrepreneurship within Alternative Systems of Political Economy.” American Journal of Entrepreneurship 6(1): 24–36. 10. Podemska-Mikluch, M. and R. W. Wagner (2010). “Entangled Political Economy and the Two Faces of Entrepreneurship.” Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 28(2–3): 99–114. 11. Rajagopalan, S. (2015). “Incompatible institutions: socialism versus constitutionalism in India.” Constitutional Political Economy 26(3): 328–355. 12. Martin, A. and D. Thomas (2013). “Two-tiered political entrepreneurship and the congressional committee system.” Public Choice 154(1): 21–37. 13. Boettke, P. J. and Coyne, C. J. (2009). Context matters: Institutions and entrepreneurship. Hanover: MA, Now Publishers Inc. 14. Boettke, P. J., C. J. Coyne, and P. T. Leeson (2008). “Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 67(2): 331–358. 15. Rajagopalan, S. (2016). “Constitutional Change: A public choice analysis,” in Sujit Choudhary, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and Madhav Khosla, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Indian Constitution. New York: Oxford University Press, pp 127–142. Rajagopalan, Shruti and Mario J. Rizzo “Austrian Perspectives on Law and Economics.” In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Luhmann	Reckwitz	Luhmann/Reckwitz: I have always found Luhmann's system theory with its built-in lack of surprises problematic. For Luhmann, modern society is functionally differentiated. From 1800 until today, period. This is an invariable grid for all social developments, which ultimately says: It can actually go on like this for an infinite period of time ... Reckwitz: Basically, Luhmann's theory conceals a normative system: it would be reassuring if society were nothing more than an addition of subsystems. But it is not. There are profound transformations, conflicts, and ruptures that do not fit into this grid⁽¹⁾. >Systems theory, >Systems, >Social systems, >Society, >Sociology, >Economics, >Communication media. 1. Interview with Andreas Reckwitz, Die Zeit Nr. 34. 13.08. 2020	Link to abbreviations/authors
Markets	Habermas	IV 226 Markets/Habermas: the market ensures a norm-free regulation of cooperation relationships. It belongs to the systemic mechanisms that stabilize unintended contexts of action via the functional networking of action sequences, while the mechanism of communication coordinates the action orientations of the participants. >Communication Media/Habermas, >Money/Habermas, >Control Media/Habermas. Habermas thesis: this is the reason for proposing a distinction between social and system integration. The one starts with the orientations for action through which the other passes. In one case the action system is integrated by a normatively secured or communicatively achieved consensus, in the other case by the non-normative control of subjectively uncoordinated individual decisions. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. IV 247 Within the framework of state-organised societies, goods markets are created which are controlled via symbolically generalised exchange relationships, i.e. via the money medium. But this medium only creates a structure-forming effect for the social system as a whole with the separation of the economy from the state order. The result is a subsystem differentiated by the money medium, which in turn forces the state to reorganize. >Society. In the interrelated subsystems of the market economy and modern administration, the mechanism of the control medium, which Parsons gave the name of the symbolically generalized communication medium, finds its appropriate social structure. >T. Parsons, >Communication media/T. Parsons.	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Media	Habermas	IV 190 Medium/Language/Habermas: the communication participants move so much within their language by performing or understanding a speech act that they cannot bring forward a current utterance as "something inter-subjective" in the way that they experience an event as something objective (...). >Intersubjectivity, >Language/Habermas, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. The medium of communication remains in a peculiar semi-transcendence. As long as the participants retain their performative attitude, the currently used language remains in their backs. The speakers cannot take an extra-mundane position towards it. >Agreement, >Perspective. IV 209 Medium/Habermas: the interactions interwoven into the network of everyday communicative practice form the medium through which culture, society and person reproduce themselves. These reproductive processes extend to the symbolic structures of the lifeworld. We must differentiate between the preservation of the material substrate of the lifeworld. >Culture, >Society, >Person, >Lifeworld, >Substrate. IV 273 Media/control media/communication media/language/Habermas: the conversion from language to control media (money, power (influence, reputation)) means a decoupling of the interaction from lifeworld contexts. >Lifeworld/Habermas, >Control media, >Communication media. Media such as money and power begin with the empirically motivated ties; they code a purpose-rational handling of calculable amounts of value and enable a generalized strategic influence on the decisions of other interaction participants, bypassing linguistic consensus-building processes. >Money/Habermas, >Power. N.B.: thus, the lifeworld is no longer needed for the coordination of actions. IV 407 Media/Habermas: Thesis: Conditions for an optimal institutionalisation of media (here: money and power): Real values and coverage reserves must be such that they have an empirically motivating force. The physical control of cover reserves must be possible. It must be possible to measure, relinquish and deposit the media. The normative anchoring of media must not lead to new communication efforts and no further risks of dissent. Problem: this reaches its limits at the level of the social system: new names for media can always be found, but these are initially only postulates that must prove useful.⁽¹⁾ IV 410 For example, placing value retention and influence on the same level as media with money and power as media is not particularly plausible. The former are not as calculable as money and power. It is therefore not possible to deal with them strategically. >Recognition. IV 412 Influence and value retention are so little neutral to the alternative of agreement and failed understanding that, rather, with solidarity and integrity, they raise two cases of agreement to generalized value. Unlike the media, they cannot replace money and power with language in their coordination function, but merely relieve the complexity of the lifeworld through abstraction. Media of this kind cannot mechanize the lifeworld. >Agreement/Habermas, >Language/Habermas. 1.Vgl. St. Jensen, J. Naumann, Commitments, in: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaft, Jg. 9, 1980, S. 79f.	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Modernism	Habermas	III 297 Modernism/Habermas: Modernism has no reserves in ethics or science that would be exempt from the critical force of hypothetical thought. First, however, a generalization of the level of learning, which has been achieved with the terminology of religious-metaphysical worldviews, is required. >Worldviews, >Worldviews/Weber, >Method, >Discourses, >Rationale, >Ultimate Rationale. Based on Weber's analysis, two problems are encountered on the threshold of modernity: 1. Religious asceticism must first penetrate the non-religious areas of life in order to subject profane actions to the maxims of ethics of conviction. >Religion, >Society, >Morality. Weber identifies this process with the emergence of Protestant professional ethics. >Ethics/Weber. 2. In the emergence of modern science, the decoupling of the theory from practical experience must be overcome. This happened in the form of experimental natural sciences.⁽¹⁾ >Practise. III 299 Protestant Ethics/Weber/Habermas: in traditional society, the cognitive potential created by the rationalized worldviews within which the demystification process takes place cannot yet become effective. It is only delivered in modern societies. This process means the modernisation of society.⁽²⁾ >Protestant ethics. IV 433 Modernism/HabermasVsParsons/Habermas: ParsonsVsWeber: Parsons describes the same phenomena that Weber can interpret as signs of social pathologies as further evidence of the formation of a form of solidarity appropriate to the complexity of modern societies. >T. Parsons. Parsons/Habermas: through his division of the basic concepts, he creates a synchronization of the rationalization of the lifeworld with increases in the complexity of the social system. In this way, he prevents exactly the distinctions that we have to make if we want to grasp the pathologies occurring in modernism. >Bureaucracy/Parsons. 1.W. Krohn, Die neue Wissenschaft der Renaissance, in: G. Böhme, W. v.d. Daele, W. Krohn, Experimentelle Philosophie, Frankfurt, 1977, S. 13ff. 2.Vgl. H.V. Gumbrecht, R. Reichardt, Th.Schleich (Hrg), Sozialgeschichte der Französischen Aufklärung, 2 Bde, München, 1981	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Obedience	Psychological Theories	Haslam I 120 Obedience/Milgram experiment/psychological theories: (…) three new approaches to the experimental study of obedience have been developed that allow us to address real harm-doing without harming participants in the process. Cf. >Milgram experiment/psychological theories, >Vs Milgram. Haslam I 121 A. The first employs virtual reality simulations of the Milgram paradigm. In these it has been shown that behaviour in these simulations corresponds closely to that which is observed in the original paradigm (Slater et al., 2006)(1). B. The second involves using a technique called Immersive Digital Realism to train actors to play the role of normal participants in the Milgram paradigm (Haslam, Reicher and Millard, 2015)⁽²⁾. C. The third is based on the observation that what people do at 150 volts is a very accurate predictor of whether they will obey up to 450 volts. So why not stop the studies at the 150-volt mark where one can see if people will obey without getting them to actually do something harmful? This was the strategy adopted by Jerry Burger (2009a)⁽³⁾ in his replication of the Milgram paradigm. Haslam I 121 1. Several authors point to the need to consider the importance of disobedience as well as obedience (Bocchario and Zimbardo, 2010⁽⁴⁾; Dimow, 2004⁽⁵⁾; Jetten and Mols, 2014⁽⁶⁾; Passini and Morselli, 2009⁽⁷⁾; Rochat and Modigliani, 1995⁽⁸⁾). 2. A number of analyses point to features of the various relationships in the obedience paradigm that might help explain whether people obey or disobey authority. Wim Meeus and Quinten Raaijmakers (1995)⁽⁹⁾, for instance, argue that obedience does not result from an inability to resist scientific authority but rather from a cultural tendency to identify with the social system, combined with a tendency not to identify with our fellow citizens but to see them in terms of specific role positions – an analysis which suggests that in the Milgram studies participants relate to the learner in terms of the different roles that the two of them occupy rather than in terms of their common citizenship. 3. Rochat and Modigliani (1995)⁽⁸⁾: note that the villagers of Chambon were descendants of the persecuted Protestant minority in France (the Huguenots) and this meant that they likened the collaborationist Vichy Government to their own persecutors, and saw commonality between themselves and those who were persecuted. Their analysis concludes that once the persecutors became ‘them’ and the persecuted became ‘us’, the choice of whom to side with – of whether to obey or defy authority – became easy. See also >Goldhagen (1996)⁽¹⁰⁾. Haslam I 123 Reicher/Haslam: Thesis: We harm others to the extent that we listen to the appeals of malicious authorities above those of its victims. At the same time, there is now converging evidence that this has something to do with the extent to which we identify with one over the other (Haslam et al., 2014⁽¹¹⁾, 2015⁽²⁾; Reicher and Haslam, 2011a⁽¹²⁾; Reicher et al., 2012⁽¹³⁾). There are three areas in particular that need to be addressed in the future 1) We need to investigate the way in which different situational arrangements affect group formation and identification between the participant and the different parties within the obedience paradigm (Reicher and Haslam, 2011a⁽¹²⁾, 2011b⁽¹⁴⁾). Haslam I 124 2) We need to understand what sort of appeals make people side with the experimenter rather than with the learner, as well as the impact that participants’ own discourse has on their ability to disengage from these parties. 3) The aspect of language: only one of the exhortations, prods and prompts used be the experimenter in the studies is a direct order. In their replication study Burger and colleagues found that every time the experimenter gave this final prod, participants refused to continue (Burger, Girgis and Manning, 2011⁽¹⁵⁾), and in controlled studies of our own we observe that prod 4 (‘You have no other choice, you must go on’). is singularly ineffective in securing compliance (Haslam et al., 2014⁽¹¹⁾, 2015⁽¹⁶⁾). This is powerful evidence against the notion that participants in Milgram’s studies are simply following orders. 1. Slater, M., Antley, A., Davison, A., Swapp, D., Guger, C., Barker, C., et al. (2006) ‘A virtual reprise of the Stanley Milgram obedience experiments’, PLoS ONE, 1: e39. 2 Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. and Millard, K. (2015) Shock treatment: Using immersive digital realism to restage and re-examine Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ research. PLoS ONE, 1O(3):e109015. 3. Burger, J. (2009a) ‘In their own words: Explaining obedience through an examination of participants’ comments’. Paper presented at the Meeting of the Society of Experimental Social Psychology, Portland, ME, 15—17 October. 4. Bocchiaro, P. and Zimbardo, P.G. (2010) ‘Defying unjust authority: An exploratory study, Current Psychology, 29: 155—70. 5. Dimow, J. (2004) ‘Resisting authority: A personal account of the Milgram obedience experiments’, Jewish Currents, January. 6. Jetten,J. and Mols, F. (2014) 5O:5O hindsight: Appreciating anew the contributions of Mi1grams obedience experiments, Journal of Social Issues, 70: 587—602. 7. Passini, S. and Morselli, D. (2009) 1Authority relationships between obedience and disobedience &, New Ideas in Psychology, 27: 9 6—106. 8. Rochat, F. and Modigliani, A. (1995) 4The ordinary quality of resistance: From Milgram’s laboratory to the village of Le Chambon’, Journal of Social Issues, 51: 195—210. 9. Meeus, W.H.J. and Raaijmakers, Q.A. (1995) ‘Obedience in modem society: The Utrecht studies’, Journal of Social Issues, 5 1: 155—75. 10. Goidhagen, D. (1996) Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust. London: Little, Brown. 11. Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. and Birney, M. (2014) ‘Nothing by mere authority: Evidence that in an experimental analogue of the Miigram paradigm participants are motivated not by orders but by appeals to science’, Journal of Social Issues, 70:473—88. 12. Reicher, S. and Haslam, S.A. (201 la) 4After shock? Towards a social identity explanation of the Milgram “obedience” studies’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 50: 163—9. 13. Reicher, S.D., Haslam, S.A. and Smith, J.R. (2012) 1Working towards the experimenter: Reconceptualizing obedience within the Milgram paradigm as identification-based followership’, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7: 315—24. 14. Reicher, S.D. and Haslam, S.A. (201 lb) ‘Culture of shock: Milgram’s obedience studies fifty years on’, Scientific American Mind, 2 2(6): 3 0—5. 15. Burger, J.M., Girgis, Z.M., and Manning, C.C. (2011) ðln their own words: Explaining obedience to authority through an examination of participants’ comments’, Social Psychological and Personality Science, 2:460—6. 16. Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D. Millard, K. and McDonald, R. (2015) “Happy to have been of service”: The Yale archive as a window into the engaged followership of participants in Milgram’s “obedience” experiments’, British Journal of Social Psychology, 54: 55—83. Stephen Reicher and S. Alexander Haslam, „Obedience. Revisiting Milgram’s shock experiments”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017
Organisation	Luhmann	Habermas IV 257 Def Organisation/Luhmann/Habermas: Luhmann: "Social systems that make the recognition of certain expectations of behaviour a condition of membership of the system (...) should be described as formally organised. Only those who accept certain, particularly excellent expectations can become members and remain members of formally organised social systems".⁽¹⁾ >Systems, >Systems theory. Habermas: while the traditional state is an organization that structures society as a whole, the capitalist enterprise and modern administration are systemically independent units within norm-free subsystems. The organizations that became independent are characterized by the fact that they can make themselves independent of over-all accepted membership conditions of communicatively structured lifeworld contexts, of the conflict-prone concrete value orientations and action dispositions of the persons deported into the organizational environment.⁽²⁾ 1. N. Luhmann, Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität, Tübingen 1968, S. 339 2. N. Luhmann Allgemeine Theorie organisierter Sozialsysteme, in: ders. Soziologische Aufklärung, Bd. I, Opladen 1975.	AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Organisation	Weber	Habermas IV 453 Organisation/Weber/Habermas: Weber still imagined the activities of organisations as a kind of purpose-rational action on a large scale. >Institutions, >Institutionalization, >Purpose rationality. Rationality/Weber: an organization is measured by the extent to which a company or institution enables or ensures purpose-rational action by its members. HabermasVsWeber: this purpose model has been abandoned because it cannot explain why organisations cannot solve their conservation problems only through the purpose-rational behaviour of their members. >Purposes, >Action, >Teleology. Habermas IV 454 Solution/Habermas: Nowadays, the reference point of system rationality is chosen: the rationalisable "knowledge" expresses itself in the ability of social systems to control themselves. >System rationaly. As a result, purpose-rational behavior loses importance. Instead, it is about the functional contributions of places, programs and decisions that any states and elements can make to solve system problems.⁽¹⁾ >Freedom/Weber. 1. N. Luhmann, Zweck – Herrschaft –System, Der Staat, 1964, S. 129ff.	Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Political System	Easton	Brocker I 491 Political System/Easton: The political system is a social system among others, and social systems consist of interactions between people. The political system differs from the other social systems through such interactions, which refer to an authoritative allocation of values for society. ⁽¹⁾ Brocker I 492 VsEaston: later, instead of the concept of the authoritative allocation of values, the formulation of the production and enforcement of collectively binding decisions prevailed. Individual members are not part of the political system as individuals, but by assuming political roles, acting in these roles and interacting with others. The political system is open and adaptive in order to fulfil its functions for society. ⁽²⁾ The openness to influences (see Environment/Easton) can lead to disturbances that change the system. Brocker I 493 Def Stress/Easton: is when disturbances of the system exceed a critical limit and threaten its existence. System variables/Easton: the allocation of values for the company and the acceptance of this allocation by the company. ⁽³⁾ Persistence/continuance/system: from the possibility of disturbances endangering the existence of the inventory, it follows that conservation is the fundamental problem for political systems. Persistence differs from stability by a certain dynamic: Persistence can be guaranteed by the change of peripheral structural elements. The concept of persistence allows all other political issues to be integrated: For example, electoral behavior, behavior of interest groups, coalition behavior, production of various policies. The individual theories on these terms have in common that they are directly related to the allocative consequences of political interaction. ⁽⁴⁾ Brocker I 494 Environment/System Environment/Easton: the environment affects the political system through inputs such as claims or external support. The system in turn has an impact on the environment through outputs: in the form of collectively binding decisions and actions. ⁽⁵⁾ Brocker I 495 Claims: are a selection from the set of ((s) individual) wishes. They are defined as an explicitly formulated expectation to the decision-makers of the political system. ⁽⁶⁾ Interest Groups/Easton: are essential for the conversion of wishes into claims, including political parties and mass media. Decisions: the claims on the political system have the potential to drive the system variables beyond a critical limit, i.e. to undermine collectively binding decisions. ⁽⁷⁾ Brocker I 496 Objects of the Political System/Easton: "Authorities" - "Regime" - "Political Community. See Authority/Easton, Community/Easton. Def Regime/Easton: the set of restrictions on political interactions. This set also contains three components: 1. values, goals and principles, 2. Norms Brocker I 497 3. the structure of authority ⁽⁸⁾. 1. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York 1965, S. 21-23. 2. Ibid. p. 17 3. Ibid. p. 24 4. Ibid. p. 474 5. Ibid. p. 74 6. Ibid. p. 38f 7. Ibid. p. 57 8. Ibid. p. 193 Dieter Fuchs, “David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life” in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	PolEast I David Easton A Systems Analysis of Political Life New York 1965 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Preferences	Parsons	Habermas IV 336 Preferences/Parsons/Habermas: ParsonsVsWeber: Example: The "social action" of the entrepreneur represents only one of several types of purposive and value-rational action: The modern doctor typically acts as universally and functionally specified as the businessman of the capitalist economy, but at the same time he/she is subject to the rules of professional ethics that prevent him/her from pursuing his/her economic interests by all legally permitted means.⁽¹⁾ S ee Terminology/Parsons: pattern variables. Habermas: the pattern-variables are suitable for describing the fact that modern societies may consciously adopt contrary decision patterns for different areas of life and switch from a combination of preferences to the opposite. >Decisions/Parsons. Habermas IV 337 Preferences/Professions/Parsons: the instrumental activism from which Parsons reads the action orientation of American businessmen and doctors in the 1940s and 1950s and which he sees as being determined by basic decisions for an emotionally neutral attitude, universalism, performance orientation and a field-independent, cognitive style directed towards the specific, is simultaneously depicted on three levels, namely in structurally analog motives for action, professional roles and cultural values. ⁽²⁾ HabermasVsParsons: Problem: the scope of decision regulated by preference patterns is not filled by interpretation performances of the actor. The model does not permit any initiatives that could then be investigated in terms of how the various resources of the lifeworld, acquired competences, recognised norms and traditional cultural knowledge converge and form a reservoir for action orientations. >Preferences. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Professions and the Social Structure; The Motivation of Economic Activities, in: T. Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, Rev. ed. NY 1949. 2. Talcott Parsons, The Social System, NY 1951, S. 78	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Public Sphere	Benkler	Benkler I 176 Public Sphere/Networked Public Sphere/Benkler: Modern democracies and mass media have coevolved throughout the twentieth century. The first modern national republics - the early American Republic, the French Republic from the Revolution to the Terror, the Dutch Republic, and the early British parliamentary monarchy - preexisted mass media. They provide us with some model of the shape of the public sphere in a republic without mass media, what Jürgen Habermas called the bourgeois public sphere. However, the expansion of democracies in complex modern societies has largely been a phenomenon of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries - in particular, the post–World War II years. During this period, the platform of the public sphere was dominated by mass media - print, radio, and television. In authoritarian regimes, these means of mass communication were controlled by the state. In democracies, they operated either under state ownership, with varying degrees of independence from the sitting government, or under private ownership financially dependent on advertising markets. I 177 Networked Public Sphere: The Internet as a technology, and the networked information economy as an organizational and social model of information and cultural production, promise the emergence of a substantial alternative platform for the public sphere. The networked public sphere, as it is currently developing, suggests that it will have no obvious points of control or exertion of influence — either by fiat or by purchase. Def Public Sphere/Benkler: For purposes of considering political freedom, I adopt a very limited definition of “public sphere.” The term is used in reference to the set of practices that members of a society use to communicate about matters they understand to be of public concern and that potentially require collective action or recognition. [However], not even all communications about matters of potential public concern can be said to be part of the public sphere. I 178 The public sphere is, then, a sociologically descriptive category. It is a term for signifying how, if at all, people in a given society speak to each other in their relationship as constituents about what their condition is and what they ought or ought not to do as a political unit. I 181 Def Public Sphere/Habermas: Habermas defines the public sphere as “a network for communicating information and points of view (i.e., opinions expressing affirmative or negative attitudes)”; which, in the process of communicating this information and these points of view, filters and synthesizes them “in such a way that they coalesce into bundles of topically specified public opinions”.⁽¹⁾ >Habermas/Public Sphere. Taken in this descriptive sense, the public sphere does not relate to a particular form of public discourse that is normatively attractive from some perspective or another. It defines a particular set of social practices that are necessary for the functioning of any complex social system that includes elements of governing human beings. There are authoritarian public spheres, where communications are regimented and controlled by the government in order to achieve acquiescence and to mobilize support, rather than relying solely on force to suppress dissent and opposition. There are various forms of liberal public spheres, constituted by differences in the political and communications systems scattered around liberal democracies throughout the world. I 178 Mass Media/Public Sphere: Mass media structured the public sphere of the twentieth century in all I 179 advanced modern societies. They combined a particular technical architecture, a particular economic cost structure, a limited range of organizational forms, two or three primary institutional models, and a set of cultural practices typified by consumption of finished media goods. The structure of the mass media resulted in a relatively controlled public sphere—although the degree of control was vastly different depending on whether the institutional model was liberal or authoritarian—with influence over the debate in the public sphere heavily tilted toward those who controlled the means of mass communications. >Mass Media/Benkler, >Public Sphere/Schmitt. 1. Jürgen Habermas: Between Facts and Norms, Contributions to Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996).	Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007
Revolution	Parsons	Habermas IV 423 Revolutions/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons understands these three revolutions as structural differentiations of the community system from the economic, political and cultural subsystems: The industrial revolution that began in England in the late 18th century The French Revolution of 1789 The revolution in education, i.e. the expansion of formal education, which already began in the 18th century but was not radically implemented until the middle of the 20th century. ⁽¹⁾ Habermas IV 424 These separated early from developed modernity and fulfil the starting conditions for an international system of highly complex societies, to which Parson's standard description of social systems with four subsystems each applies. >Subsystems/Parsons. "Precursor revolutions" are for Parson's Reformation and Renaissance, which make the transition to modernity possible by releasing the cognitive potentials contained in the tradition of Christianity and Roman-Greek antiquity, until then only worked on by cultural elites, monastic orders and universities, and Habermas IV 425 to let these potentials have an effect at the institutional level. The institutions of legal rule based on religious tolerance and agricultural production based on wage labour are the basis for the three "revolutions" with which the husks of a stratified, professionally still fixed class society are blown up. >Class society, >Religion, >Tolerance. 1. T.Parsons, The System of Modern Societies, Englewood Cliffs 1971, p. 101.	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Social Policy	Esping-Andersen	Mause I 577f Social Policy/Esping-Andersen: Terminology: Def Decommodification factor/Decommodification index: indicates the degree to which individuals or families can maintain a socially acceptable standard of living, regardless of market participation. (Esping-Andersen 1990, p.37 ⁽¹⁾. See also Esping-Andersen 1999⁽²⁾. It is therefore a question of protection against dependency. The application of this indicator by Clare Bambra in 1998/99 showed a stronger protection against market forces in Northern Europe than in English speaking countries.⁽³⁾ Esping-Andersen's model is characterised by an expanded social services sector. The aim of state social policy is to ensure that all citizens, regardless of their employment status, receive the highest possible level of basic social security. Mause I 579 VsEsping-Andersen: The three-part structure of social systems in different countries is criticized by Esping-Andersen. See Smith 2005.⁽⁴⁾ 1. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1990. The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton 1990. 2. Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. Social foundations of postindustrial economies. Oxford 1999. 3. Bambra, Clare. 2006. Research note: Decommodification and the worlds of welfare revisited. Journal of European Social Policy 16 (1): 73– 80. 4. Manfred G. Schmidt, Sozialpolitik in Deutschland. Historische Entwicklung und internationaler Vergleich, 3. Aufl. Wiesbaden 2005	EconEsp I Gøsta Esping-Andersen The three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton Princeton 1990 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018
Society	Spencer	Habermas III 218 Society/Progress/Spencer/Habermas: In the 19th century (...) the development theories culminating in H. Spencer interpret the progress of civilization darwinistically as the development of organic systems.⁽¹⁾ Habermas III 219 Thus Spencer was able to establish a theory of social evolution that cleared up the unclear idealism of philosophy of history and regarded the progress of civilization as a continuation of natural evolution and thus subsumed it under the laws of nature without all ambiguities. >Philosophy of history, >Evolution, >Laws of nature, >History, >Historiography. Trends such as scientific development; the capitalist growth, the establishment of constitutional states, the emergence of modern administrations, etc. could thus be treated directly as empirical phenomena and understood as consequences of the structural differentiation of social systems. They no longer needed to be interpreted as empirical indicators for an internal history of the mind, traced back to learning processes and accumulation of knowledge, no longer as signs of rationalisation in the sense of philosophy of history. 1. L. Sklair, The Sociology of Progress, London 1970, p. 56ff.	Spencer I Herbert Spencer The Man versus the State Indianapolis 2009 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Sociology	Pareto	Brocker I 97 Sociology/Pareto: Leading French sociology in the Romanic-speaking world since Auguste Comte at the beginning of the 20th century Brocker I 98 (Gabriel Tarde, Émile Durkheim, Ernest Renan) was too literary and essayistic for Pareto, but above all too moralizing to live up to his expectations trained in science. (ParetoVsDurkheim, ParetoVsRenan, ParetoVsTarde). >E. Durkheim. His research program included the study of human actions and the corresponding emotional states in order to recognize the social forms. ⁽¹⁾ Brocker I 99 From his economical scientific works, which were influenced by the categories of theoretical mechanics and physicalism, Pareto adopted the terms "system" and "equilibrium" and transferred them to sociology as "social system" and "social equilibrium". Pareto's central sociological object of knowledge is society. The system concept emphasizes the interdependencies between the elements, while the equilibrium concept refers to the movements and forces of the respective social system (cf. Bach 2004, 63 ff.) ⁽²⁾. Brocker I 100 Pareto compared the actions of the social actors with the molecules in the mechanics of the solid and liquid bodies. At the same time, however, he assumed that the socially relevant actions were predominantly not rational. >Actions/Pareto. Pareto drew the limits of his field of research where the assessment of the purposes of action depends on value assumptions about which no scientifically sound statements are possible according to the logical-experimental method. 1. Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generale, Florenz 1916. Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generale. Edizione critica a cura di Giovanni Busino, 4 Bände, Turin 1988. Dt.: Vilfredo Paretos System der allgemeinen Soziologie, herausgegeben und übersetzt von Gottfried Eisermann, Stuttgart 1962, § 145. 2. Maurizio Bach, Jenseits des rationalen Handelns. Zur Soziologie Vilfredo Paretos, Wiesbaden 2004. Maurizio Bach, Vilfredo Pareto, Allgemeine Soziologie (1916) in: Manfred Brocker (Hg). Geschichte des Politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018.	Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Structures	Habermas	IV 258 Structures/Structural Change/Habermas: The more complex the social systems, the more provincial the lifeworlds become. However, this should not be interpreted causally. On the contrary: Increases in complexity are in turn dependent on the structural differentiation of the lifeworld. This structural change in turn obeys IV 259 the stubbornness of a communicative rationalization. See Complexity/Habermas, >Rationalization/Habermas.	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Subjects	Luhmann	AU Cass 3 Subject/object/Luhmann: the distinction subject/object is unnecessary if it is considered that the observer must always be assumed within a system. >Subject/Object-Problem. Autologically: what applies to my property, applies to myself. AU Cass 7 Subject/Luhmann: VsTradition: the tradition had a wrong idea of continuity. Instead: continuity of self-reference. >Self-reference/Luhmann. New: System theory: Social systems are also subjects. >Systems theory. AU Cass 12 Subject/Luhmann: the subject is too complex. In two subjects, the coordination in a theory is too difficult. "We can leave the subject away." Instead: structural coupling. >Structural coupling. Difference rather than unity. Communication/Luhmann: runs only on consciousness, but not as consciousness. >Communication/Luhmann.	AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Sympathy	Hume	Rawls I 186 Sympathy/observation/order/society/Hume/Rawls: in Hume, an impartial observer can enjoy observing a social system, depending on how much pleasure he/she finds in those who are subject to the system¹. Rawls: if we regard this pleasure as fulfilment, the classical benefit principle is applied. According to Hume, however, sympathy is not a strong feeling. >Ideal observer. 1. D. H.: A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. II, pt. I, sec. XI, and bk. III, pt, I, sec. OI, and sec VI.	D. Hume I Gilles Delueze David Hume, Frankfurt 1997 (Frankreich 1953,1988) II Norbert Hoerster Hume: Existenz und Eigenschaften Gottes aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen der Neuzeit I Göttingen, 1997 Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005
System Theory	Weizenbaum	I 322 System theory/Forrester/Weizenbaum: J. W. Forrester from MIT, the spiritual father of "cybernetic system theory", noted in front of a US Congress Committee (J. W. Forrester⁽¹⁾): Thesis: the human thinking is not suitable to explain the behavior of social systems. >Cybernetics, >Behavior, >Explanation. WeizenbaumVsForrester: he claims that the way Plato, Spinoza, Hume, Mill, Gandi and many others have thought about social systems is inferior to the system analysis method. According to Forrester, the problem is that human thinking is based on thought models. Forrester: a model of thought is unclear. It is incomplete. It is inaccurately worded. In addition, a thought model in an individual changes with time and even in the course of a talk ... The goals are different and remain unspoken. I 324 Forrester/Weizenbaum: claims that computer systems, in contrast to social systems, eliminate insecurity completely. But there are some behaviors that are "more desirable" than others. How are they made possible? Forrester: they are probably only possible if we have a proper understanding of the theory of dynamic systems and are prepared to submit to self-discipline and endure the constraints that must accompany the desired behaviour. WeizenbaumVsForrester/WeizenbaumVsSkinner/WeizenbaumVsSimon: in the context in which Forrester uses the expressions "system" and "dynamic", the only way to gain an understanding that alone leads to "desirable behaviours" is the method of a "scientific analysis" according to Forrester (or Skinner or the >General Problem Solver, >A. >Newell, >H. A. Simon, >Behaviorism. I 325 WeizenbaumVsForrester: For Forrester, the world literally consists of back coupling loops. I 327 Meaning/System Theory/WeizenbaumVsForrester: the systems we have investigated, have been clearly shown that meaning has been completely transformed into function. >Behavior, >Society, >Actions, cf. >Anomalous monism. 1. J. W. Forrester Testimony before the Subcommitee on Urban Growth oft he Committe on Banking and Currency oft he United states House of representatives, given in Washington, D.C., Oct. 7, 1971, 91. Congress, 2nd Session, Part III, p 205-265.	Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978
Systems	Luhmann	Baraldi I 195 System/Environment/Luhmann/GLU/(s): System is the basic concept of system theory. Outside: is always more complex than the inside. >Outside/inside/Luhmann. System: helps to reduce complexity. No system can operate outside its borders. Each system is identified by its own operation. >Operation/Luhmann. Environment: is not surrounded by borders but by horizons. It itself is not a system. It has no own operations. But it is not passive. >Environment/Talcott Parsons. --- Reese-Schäfer II 47 System/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: autopoietic systems have no other form of environmental contact than self contact. >Autopoiesis. Take only environmental impacts by transforming them into their own frequency. - E.g. social system has no use for consciousness. --- AU Cass 3 System/closed systems/Luhmann: closed systems cannot be found in the world. - We only consider open systems: biology, social system etc. - So-called operational (closed) systems are only seemingly different. --- AU Cass 4 System/Luhmann: a system can distinguish itself from the environment. --- AU Cass 8 System/environment/complexity/Luhmann: the environment of a system is always more complex than the system. Therefore, the system cannot establish a point-to-point relationship with the environment. - Therefore complexity must be reduced or ignored . For example, call different things by the same name. >Complexity/Luhmann. --- AU Cass 8 System/Luhmann: a system has subdivisions - E.g. planning for the system. - Dor the subdividions, the system is environment itself. Loosely coupled systems are more stable. - E.g. employees can be exchanged. >Form/Luhmann. Fixed coupling is not found in nature. - In systems not everything is connected with everything! - Not like Newton. --- AU Cass 11 System/Luhmann: a system is not an object but a difference. I am in my environment. I am not in society, otherwise others would think my thoughts, etc. Individuals/Systems theory: In this way, system theory allows individualism. HabermasVsLuhmann: radical individualism is not sought. LuhmannVsHabermas: the society does not have to strive for a "human aim". - ((s) This is an aim for humans, society is not a human.) --- AU Cass 14 System/Luhmann: E.g. conflicts are systems. - Because it brings the other in a limited range of variation of responses. Conflicts have an organizing force. VsSystemtheory/VsLuhmann: critiques say, here conflicts are underexposed. LuhmannVsVs: not here. Conflict: can lead to a too strong integration. Conflicts are spreading more with a fixed coupling. >Form/Luhmann.	AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Baraldi I C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001
Systems	Pareto	Brocker I 99 System/Sociology/Pareto: The ((s) system concept introduced by Pareto, among others, combines (...) a groundbreaking method of knowledge for the social sciences of the time, that of functional understanding. This implies that social phenomena - such as norms, ideas, the economy or the system of government - not only stand for themselves and are therefore not only immanent but also to be understood as elements of the respective system. They take on specific tasks and services, such as the stabilisation of patterns of action or the solution of certain problems of social order formation. >Norms, >Ideas, >Economics, >Systems/Luhmann, >Systems/Parsons, >Systems theory. Pareto still had the corresponding theoretical language at his disposal, but according to today's understanding he already had a functionalist structural theory of society in mind. Brocker I 100 For Pareto, the constitutive elements of the social system are: a) "logical" and "non-logical action", b) "residuals", c) "derivatives" and d) "circulation of the elites". >Emotion/Pareto, >Argumentation/Pareto. Maurizio Bach, Vilfredo Pareto, Allgemeine Soziologie (1916) in: Manfred Brocker (Hg). Geschichte des Politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018.	Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Systems	Parsons	Habermas IV 229 System/Talcott Parsons/Habermas: the mature Parsons reinterprets the structural components of the lifeworld, i.e. culture, society and personality, into systems of action that form environments for each other. Parsons easily subsumes the concept of the lifeworld under system-theoretical terms, although it has a completely different origin. >Systems theory, >Culture, >Society, >Personality. Lifeworld/Parsons: He defines the physical substrate of the lifeworld under the term "behavioral system". HabermasVsParsons, Talcott: I would like to take into account the methodological difference between internal and external considerations. Habermas IV 338 Systems/Parsons/Habermas: after Parson understood early systems simply as ordered sets of elements, he later sees them from the point of view of conservation and demarcation against an over-complex environment.⁽¹⁾ Cf. >Systems/Luhmann. Habermas IV 339 (Cultural anthropological) structural functionalism is now being replaced by (biocybernetic) system functionalism. Then the terms "function" and "structure" are no longer on the same level. Structures and processes form functional equivalents for each other.⁽²⁾ Habermas IV 340 ParsonsVsLuhmann: the special position culture occupies in relation to empirical systems of action gives Parsons the possibility of introducing the Newkantian dualism between values and facts into system functionalism. This value-theoretical barrier separates his approach from that of Luhmann's. Habermas IV 341 Parsons distinguishes between the two tasks of preserving the integrity of the action system inwards and outwards: he treats the corresponding basic functions under the keywords "allocation" and "integration".⁽³⁾ >Terminology/Parsons, Environment/Parsons. Habermas IV 352 Action/Luhmann: "The plot is a system due to its internal analytical structure".⁽⁴⁾ 1. Talcott Parsons, Toward a General Theory of Action, NY 1951. S. 108. 2. Talcott Parsons, Some Problems of General Theory in Sociology, in: McKinney, Tiryakan, (1970), p. 27ff. 3. Talcott Parsons, The Social System, NY 1951, S 114ff. 4. N. Luhmann, T. Parsons: die Zukunft eines Theorieprogramms, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 9, 1980, S. 8	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Terminology	Gould	I 190 1. Stasis: most species show little change in one direction or another during their presence on Earth. 2. Sudden appearance: in all areas of life, species do not occur due to incessant changes in their predecessors, but suddenly and "fully developed". I 191 Evolution/Gould: evolution essentially proceeds in two ways: a) Definition phyletic transformation: an entire population changes from one state to another. If all evolutionary changes were to occur in this way, life would not last long. (See Evolution/Gould). b) Definition speciation: new species branch off from existing ones. All speciation theories assume that splits occur quickly in very small populations. Most theoreticians prefer the "allopatric" speciation (which happens in a different place). This is the orthodox view. With the "sympatric" speciation, new forms appear within the distribution area of the previous form. I 198 Definition preadaption: preadaption is derived from the thesis that other functions would be fulfilled in the initial stages, e.g. half a jaw could support the gills. Half a wing may have been used to catch prey, or to control body temperature. I 240 Definition Eozoon: an Eozoon is an early form of an animal. I 256 Definition protists: protists are single cell precursors. Definition Metazoen: a Metazoen is a multicellular offspring. I 258 Definition homologous similarity in common precursors: two organisms may have the same feature because they got it from a common ancestor. Definition analogous similarity: organisms with analogous similarity have no common precursors. The two organisms have a common feature that represents the result of a separate but similar evolutionary change in independent lines of development. I 281 Definition parallelism, Definition convergence: parallelism is a separate development of similar features in the course of evolution. This occurs very often. II 56 Definition diploid: animals with paired chromosomes in both sexes are diploid. Some animals use a different trait for sex determination: the females are diploid, but the males have instead of each female pair only one chromosome and are considered to be the first males. Definition haploid: organisms with only one chromosome (half of the diploid number) are haploid. In other words, the males develop ironically from unfertilized eggs and have no father. Fertilized eggs, on the other hand, produce diploid females. Animals using this system are called Definition Haplodiploid: the males develop from unfertilized eggs and have no father. Fertilized eggs, on the other hand, produce diploid females. This can be used to control the number of females. II 57 This fascinating system can help explain the origin of social systems in ants. Or also, for example, that a male mite dies before its own birth after fertilising its sisters in the womb. At least 10% of all known animal species are haplodiploid. II 186 Definition homeotic mutation: legs or parts of legs replace a variety of structures on the head mainly antennae and parts of the mouth. Not all incorrectly placed parts are homoeoses. William Bateson (not Gregory), who later invented the word genetics, called cases only homeotically in which organs that have the same development or evolutionary origin are replaced. II 192 Viable homoeostats that emulate the primordial forms are not really reborn ancestors. Double elements are formed, no old patterns are found. II 193 These things make it clear how few genes are responsible for regulating the basic order in the body of a fruit fly. II 240 Definition zoocentric: zoocentrism is a erspective that derives general principles from the behaviour of other animals and then completely subsumes the human being into this category, because we are undoubtedly also animals. Definition anthropocentric: a point of view is anthropocentric when it tries to subsume nature in us by considering our peculiarities as the goal of life from the very beginning. The zoocentric view can be extended to the caricature, which is often referred to as "nothing but error": the human is "nothing more than an animal" (reductionism). Popular science is flooding us with the excessively broad version of zoocentrism. II 331 Definition "genetic drift"/Gould: the genetic drift is the process of random increase or decrease of the gene frequency. II 352 Definition Clade: a clade is a branch on an evolutionary tree. Cladism tries to establish the branching pattern for a number of related species. II 353 Definition sister group: the sister group forms an upside-down Ypsilon: two tribes sharing a common ancestor from which no other tribe branches off. Gorillas and chimpanzees form a sister group. We can then consider the chimpanzee gorilla group as a unit and ask which primate forms the sister group with it. II 354 Definition derived feature: properties that only occur for members of a direct lineage are derived features. For example, all mammals have hair, which is not the case with any other vertebrate. II 355 Hair is a derived feature for the class of mammals, because it has developed only once in the common ancestors of mammals and therefore identifies a true branch in the family tree of vertebrates. Common derived characteristics are common to two or more strains and can be used to identify sister groups. II 356 GouldVsCladism: most derived features are ambiguous: they either tend to be too easily delimitable, or they are adaptive enough to be developed by several strains through natural selection independently of each other. II 360 Definition classification (cladism): classification was designed for the purpose of reflecting relative dimensions of similarity. Definition phenetism: phenetism is another theory of classification, it focuses solely on the overall similarity and tries to evade the reproach of subjectivity by referring to a large number of features, all of which are expressed numerically and processed by the computer. II 374 Definition "Telegony": Telegony means that features of long extinct ancestors reappear. They are also called "descendants from afar." Telegony refers to the idea that a producer could influence offspring that were not conceived by him. Definition "Pangenesis" (1868, provisionally developed by Darwin) thesis: all cells of the body produce small particles called "Gemmulae", which circulate throughout the body, accumulate in the gametes and eventually transfer the features to the offspring. GouldVsPangenesis: since the "Gemmulae" can change, acquired features can be inherited, which would be Lamarckism. II 377 Definition orthogenesis: orthogenesis is the assumption that a pre-drawn path is followed. IV 103 Doctrine of uniformity: (represented by Charles Lyell and James Hutton) the uppermost layers of the earth have remained unchanged for millions of years. IV 153 Definition Monogeny: (19th century): thesis: Monogeny is the assumption of a common ancestry of all humans from the ancestors Adam and Eve. (Lower races were later degenerated from original perfection.) Definition Polygeny: (19th century): thesis: Polygeny is the assumption that Adam and Eve are only the ancestors of the white peoples. IV 159 Definition subspecies: a subspecies is a population inhabiting a specific geographical area. IV 357 Definition sympatric: sympatric means being in the same place. Definition allopatric: allopatric means being in separate places (assuming that species can only develop separately). III 19 The "Full House": Gould's central argument: natural reality is an accumulation of individuals in populations. Variation is not reducible but "real" in the sense that "the world" consists of it. Error: it is wrong to always describe populations (according to Plato) as "average", which is then considered "typical". III 67 "Full House": "Full House" describes the need to focus not only on an abstract measure of an average or a central tendency, but on the variation within whole systems. Error: it is an error to consider the likely outcome for a single individual as a measure of a central tendency.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Terminology	Parsons	Habermas IV 333 Pattern variables/Terminology/Parsons: since Parsons neglects the mechanism of communication in building his theory of action, he must, under different premises, try to find an equivalent to the lifeworld with the three components culture, society and personality. >Life world, >Culture, >Society, >Personality He introduces the "pattern variables of value orientation"⁽¹⁾: Cultural values serve as a pattern for a choice between alternative courses of action: they determine the orientations of an actor by defining preferences without affecting the contingency of the decision. Habermas IV 334/335 The pattern variables lie on the dimensions in which older sociology had described the transition from traditional to modern societies, i.e. the processes of social rationalization. Habermas VI 336 Habermas: the pattern-variables are suitable for describing the fact that modern societies may consciously adopt contrary decision patterns for different areas of life and switch from a combination of preferences to the opposite. It should be possible to test how any cultural values structure the decision-making scope of actors through one of the a priori possible combinations of basic decisions. Habermas IV 341 Def Allocation/Parsons: covers adaptation and target achievement functions, procurement, mobilisation, distribution and the effective use of scarce resources. Def social integration/Parsons: extends to functions of preservation and integration of cultural values incorporated into the system of action. It is not measured by functional imperatives, but by consistency requirements. Habermas IV 361 AGIL Schema/Parsons/Terminology/Habermas: (Since 1953): Adaptation (behavioral system) Goal attainment (personality) Latency (Cultural System) Integration (Social System). HabermasVsParsons: in doing so, he disguised the interface that had been created by the merging of the two paradigms "action" and "system". Habermas IV 366 Problem: Parsons has to analyze the coping with the problems simultaneously in the dimensions space and time. A system must secure its existence in relation to the environment and to itself (internal/external) as well as in relation to the start/end state. >Space, >Time, >Systems, >Inside/Outside. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Social System NY 1951, S. 78ff	ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 controversies.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author Vs Author	Entry	Reference
Emergence	Luhmann Vs Emergence	AU Kass 11 Communication/Luhmann: if one really wanted to bring states of consciousness into communication, it would almost inevitably be destructive: For example, a doctor asks "how are you?" How embarrassing would it be to know what the doctor really thinks. Communication would collapse. For example, the autobiography of Tristram Shandy: who tries to write down everything, including the writing down of these states, but he does not get to do it anymore because he does not progress as fast as his life progresses. It is not a matter of the member-like concatenation of communication/consciousness, but only of the communicative attempt to give account of realities communicatively. Even if communication were entirely limited to its own means, it would not be able to communicate itself. It is too slow, time is running out. Luhmann: the argument can be repeated at all other levels. For example atomic energy does not get into chemistry. The levels are separated! Only in this way is a durable world possible, which in turn makes consciousness possible. LuhmannVsEmergence: these examples show that there is no emergence of social systems from mental systems.	AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Hegel, G.W.F.	Luhmann Vs Hegel, G.W.F.	Reese-Schäfer II 30 Reflection: no hierarchy of reflexivity. 2. order observation has no hierarchically higher position. Whoever observes an observer, however, uses a different distinction than himself. (LuhmannVsHegel).LuhmannVsSubject Theory. Subject/Object/Luhmann: difficult problem. First of all: who is the observer? He is the last figure, who in turn has a need for explication about certain distinctions. LuhmannVsSubject Tradition: here you have continuities and discontinuities that allow you to decide whether you want to apply the concept of the subject by location. ((s) Not actually Hegel is the opponent here). AU Cass. 7 Luhmann: Maybe we should better take off on differentiation. But there is no final decision in this matter. ...classical subject who always knew it was a subject. Against it speaks the fact that one easily loses sight of the fact that social systems are also subjects! For example, this lecture is its own subject! For example, society is a subject. But no analogy to consciousness! That would give known problems. Best of all, we do not use the concept of the subject. Another reason: our two-page distinction, in which the world is divided into two sides (S/U). Then the question is: Where does the observer actually occur? In the system or in the environment? Time/Hegel/(Encyclopedia): § 258: "Time as the negative unity of being outside is (also?) a bad ideal par excellence. It is being in that it is not, and in that it is, is not. Luhmann: Why is the distinction being/not being introduced here? AU Cass. 9 Movement/Luhmann: according to Hegel and Aristotle, this is something that connects non-being with being. Time/Movement/Luhmann: but movement is not sufficient for the definition of time, because time does not move past us. Aristotle also sees this. Time depends from the beginning on a distinction. Central question: who is the observer? This is immediately followed by the question: who asks this question?	N. Luhmann GLU C. Baraldi, G.Corsi. E. Esposito GLU: Glossar zu Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme, Frankfurt 1997 II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung, Junius,Hamburg 1992 Diew ZEIT 10/96 Zur Ästhetik Luhmanns AU Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Autobahn-Universität ISBN 3-927809-29-2 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001
Luhmann, N.	Habermas Vs Luhmann, N.	I 426 Luhmann stands less in the tradition of Comte to Parsons than in the problem history from Kant to Husserl. He inherits the basic concepts and problems of the philosophy of consciousness. HabermasVsLuhmann: He undertakes a change of perspective which makes the self-criticism of a modernity crumbling with itself obsolete. The system theory of society applied to itself cannot help responding affirmatively to the increasing complexity of modern societies. I 430 HabermasVsLuhmann: thought movements from metaphysics to metabiology! Departs from the "as such" of organic life, a basic phenomenon of self-assertion of self-referential systems facing an over-complex environment. I 431 Undefraudable: the difference to the environment. Self-preservation replaces reason. Reason/HabermasVsLuhmann: thus he also replaced the criticism of reason with system rationality: the ensemble of enabling conditions for system preservation. Reason shrinks to complexity reduction. It is not outbid like in the communicative reason. Reason once again becomes the superstructure of life. Meaning/System Theory: the functionalist concept of meaning dissolves the relationship between meaning and validity. (As in Foucault: when it comes to truth (and validity as such) we are only interested in the effects of the considering-as-true). I 434 HabermasVsLuhmann: no central perspective, no criticism of reason, no position anymore. HabermasVsLuhmann: but we lack a social subsystem for perceiving environmental interdependences. That cannot exist with functional differentiation, because that would mean that the society occurred again in society itself. I 435 Intersubjectivity/Luhmann: language-generated intersubjectivity is not available for Luhmann. Instead, inclusion model of the parts in the whole. He considers this figure of thought to be "humanist". And he distances himself from that! I 437 HabermasVsLuhmann: Contradiction: Social Systems: previously, persons or "consciousness carriers" have to be postulated which are capable of judgment before all participation in social systems. On the other hand, both system types (psycho/social) cannot stand on different steps of the ladder if they are to be distinguished as equally emergent achievements of sense processing against organic systems. So Luhmann speaks of co-evolution. I 438 HabermasVsLuhmann: suffers from the lack of appropriate basic concepts of linguistic theory: sense must be neutral with regard to consciousness and communication. - Language/HabermasVsLuhmann: a subordinate status is assigned to the linguistic expression against the phenomenologically introduced concept of sense. Language only serves the purpose of the symbolic generalization of previous sense events. I 441 LuhmannVsHumanism: "cardinal sin" amalgamation of social and material dimension. Luhmann II 136 Living Environment/Luhmann: Luhmann does not know a living environment! (HabermasVs). Thus, person, culture and society are no longer cramped. HabermasVsLuhmann: "unacknowledged commitment of the theory to rule-compliant issues", "the apology of the status quo for the sake of its preservation", and "uncritical submission of the theory of society under the constraints of the reproduction of society." "High form of a technocratic consciousness." II 141 HabermasVsLuhmann: contradiction: that systems have a kind of relief function, while at the same time, the environment of social systems is a more complex world. Lu II 137 - HabermasVsLuhmann: Vs Functionalization of the Concept of Truth. Even the system theory itself can make no special claim to the validity of its statements. It’s only one way of acting among others. Theory is action. This, in turn, can only be said if you ultimately assume a theoretical point of view outside of the practice. II 165 System Theory/HabermasVsLuhmann: its claim to universality encounters a limit at that point at which it would have to be more than mere observation, namely a scientifically based recommendation for action. AU Cass.12 HabermasVsLuh: (in correspondence): Luhmann did not consider linguistics! LuhmannVsHabermas: that is indeed the case! I do not use the terminology. E.g. the normative binding of actors. It would have to be re-introduced in some other way, but not in communication.	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Luhmann, N.	Maturana Vs Luhmann, N.	MaturanaVsLuhmann: refuses to describe communication systems as social systems. LuhmannVsMaturana: that is a strong emotional element on his side: he does not want to lose sight of the people. (Cass.5)	Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000
Luhmann, N.	Verschiedene Vs Luhmann, N.	II 48 System/closed/open: in system theory the comparison of closed and open systems is generally valid - with a certain preference for openness. Self-organisation/autopoiesis/openness: "Closedness of the self-referential mode of operation is rather a form of extension of possible environmental contact. VsLuhmann: here one could speak of two levels of description. Critics accuse Luhmann of blurriness here. II 119 SchäferVsLuhmann: morality has more to do with observance of norms than with respect, regardless of religious or other values. HabermasVsLuhmann: Vs Functionalization of the Concept of Truth. Even system theory itself cannot claim any particular validity for its statements. It is only one kind of action among others. Theory is action. But this can only be said again if one ultimately adopts a theoretical point of view outside of practice. II 142 SchäferVsLuhmann: this problem will be solved later by the not quite clean logically "re-entry". Kass.8 VsLuhmann: one always hears that this is terribly abstract. I did not want to deny abstractness either. VsLuhmann: his whole theory could never be proved empirically! VsLuhmann: it is logically inadmissible to handle paradoxes in this way. LuhmannVsVs: brings in the concept of "supervacuus": "superfluous" (actually "over-empty"). Question: if you cannot show with the terms how other things are connected and how not. If you start like this, then you cannot connect any more. The power of such a theory lies in inserting probes into an established theory to see if areas can be better covered. VsLuhmann: if you take the whole thing seriously, the system should also contain its own negation. Otherwise it is not perfectly autonomous. LuhmannVsVs: here I have to resort to my note box (with tens of thousands of notes): one note says that all other notes are wrong! Kass.11 Renate MeinsVsLuhmann: System Theory without action is like a lady without a lower abdomen. LuhmannVsMeins: in reality it is much worse, she has no body at all, it is not part of the social system. Meins: So what are you actually talking about? Luhmann: one only wants to dismiss the concept of action out of this gluing function between individual and society. AU Kass 5 Def Structures/Luhmann: are therefore expectations with regard to the connectivity of operations, be it of mere experience, be it of action and not in a sense that must be meant subjectively. VsLuhmann: a critique of this concept of expectation amounts to subjectivation. Subject/Object/System/Luhmann: for a theory that defines the structural concept of expectations, the subject/object distinction is insignificant at all. Johannes BergerVsLuhmann: expectation is subjective, and therefore useless for the more objective sociology. Luhmann: you will certainly also have experienced that one can statistically examine structures as objective facts. Without considering the thoughts of individual persons. Luhmann: but I try to get out of this System/Object distinction and replace it with the concept of the operation that a system actually performs when it performs it or the observation of this operation by the system or an external observer. Then expectation is no longer subjective, but it is only the question: how do structures reduce complexity?
Parsons, Ta.	Luhmann Vs Parsons, Ta.	Au Kass 11 Interpenetration/Parsons: different subsystems are coupled: E.g. Culture penetrates the social system (interpenetrates with it). E.g. A social system affects the individuals through socialization. E.g. Individuals domesticate their own organisms through learning processes. Parsons thus marks overlaps. But after the whole theoretical construction this did not happen on an operative level! Rather, Parsons thinks that the various subsystems contribute to the emergence of action. They are not themselves already operative! If they are differentiated out as action systems, then again only on the level of action. These systems must then in turn fulfil all the requirements of systems. ((s) So the levels remain separate). LuhmannVsParsons: but the term that would have to say what actually affects the other system or how culture is actually a part of the social system could never be explained by the division into four of Parson's box (see above). I.e. several system relations would have to be internalised and identified as internal subsystems and then the whole system would be defined by the interpenetrative relations. This was not possible and therefore remained unclear. AU Kass 1 LuhmannVsParsons: terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed to be given. No criteria for the inventory of the item. Instead, the theory must be able to include all deviance and dysfunction. (Not possible with Parsons). Question: in which period of time and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (Example Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory Criteria Biology: definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. AU Kass 2 LuhmannVsParsons: assignments are not always mandatory. LuhmannVsParsons: certain hermeticism of the conceptual scheme, the compulsion to always fill out the 4 boxes, leads the theoretical decisions. Is thereby more and more occupied by self-posed problems. One cannot recognize any direct mistakes, but nevertheless a dead end. LuhmannVsParsons: he has already integrated a lot: Cybernetics, Input/Output Language, Linguistics. But self-reference (important in modern systems theory) is not possible within the framework of Parson's model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions.	Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Saussure, F. de	Luhmann Vs Saussure, F. de	AU Cass 12 Language/Luhmann: Language is structural coupling. That is their task, their function. This means: language is not a system! Language Theory/Tradition/Luhmann: traditional theories: Saussure: language is a system! Luhmann: but his concept of system is not related to operation! Rather on structures, differences etc. LuhmannVsSaussure: in his distinction between spoken word and language it remains empirically unclear what the basal operation actually is. Unless one refers to communication. But that would force us to distinguish more strongly between mental and social systems than is usual in linguistics. Language/Luhmann: 1. It is not a system. 2. Language does not have its own mode of operation. So no linguistic operation that is not communication or non-linguistic thinking. ((s) A genuinely linguistic operation would therefore have to be non-linguistic itself.) Luhmann: this has to do with the deep storage of the concept of the operation and with the precision with which one empirically asks what is to be excluded. Saussure/Luhmann: the sign means the meaning of the object. Saussure/Luhmann: or the sign means what the speaker thought. LuhmannVsSaussure: and thus his theory loses its uniqueness! Then the sign no longer denotes the object, but the inner state of the speaker. Double reference to subject and object of the sign.	Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Tradition	Luhmann Vs Tradition	AU Kass 7 Subject/Object/Luhmann: is a difficult problem. First of all: who is the observer? It is the last figure, which in turn has a need for explication about certain distinctions. LuhmannVsSubject Tradition: here you have continuities and discontinuities that allow you to decide whether you want to apply the concept of subject by location. Luhmann: perhaps it would be better to focus on differentiation. But there is no final decision in this matter. LuhmannVsTradition: I also continue to use the term "democracy", but it is about something else, not "rule of the people". For example, I sometimes decide for continuity. Sometimes for discontinuity. Continuity/Luhmann: Continuity to tradition is the concept of self-reference (SR). For example, Nous, the thinking of thinking can always have a reference to itself, or the classical subject that always knew it was a subject. On the other hand it is easy to lose sight of the fact that social systems are also subjects! Movement/Tradition/Luhmann: Distinction movement/non-movement: seems to be decisive for European history. Distinction Divine/Human. Imagination: the immobile bank of the river alone enables the perception of the river. LuhmannVsSellars: this whole picture could turn out to be a culturally shaped metaphor. Not all cultures still accessible today work with the schema movement/unmoved.	Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997
Various Authors	Luhmann Vs Various Authors	Habermas I 436 VsParsons: simply reproduces the classical model through systems. (Social system = action system). Luhmann instead: human as part of the environment of society. This changes the premises of all questions. Methodical anti-humanism. Habermas I 440 LuhmannVsHumanism: "Cardinal Error". A fusion of social and material dimensions. Reese-Schäfer II 28 LuhmannVsDualism: of observer and object. Universality/Vs: the total view, the universality had to be given up and was replaced by "critique", with which the subject's point of view on universality is rounded up again". Foundation/Luhmann: there is no last stop. (Like Quine, Sellars, Rorty). Reese-Schäfer II 42 VsMarx: rejects the speech of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly aspire to the same good. Contradiction/Luhmann: arises only from the self-reference of sense. Not as in Marx. Contradictions/Legal System: does not serve for the avoidance, but for the regulation of conflicts. Reese-Schäfer II 78 Freedom of Value: (Max Weber): the renunciation of valuations is, so to speak, the blind spot of a second level observation. Reese-Schäfer II 89 Vs Right Politics: here there is no theory at all that would be able to read other theories. There is only apercus or certain literary guiding ideas. Reese-Schäfer II 90/91 VsGehlen: we do not have to subordinate ourselves to the institutions. Reese-Schäfer II 102 VsAction Theory: a very vague concept of individuals that can only be defined by pointing at people. Thus language habits are presented as language knowledge: because language requires us to employ subjects. LL. Language. Reese-Schäfer II 103 Reason/VsAdorno: one should not resign oneself (dialectic of the Enlightenment) but ask whether it does not get better without reason! Reese-Schäfer II 112 Overstimulation/LuhmannVsTradition: cannot take place at all. For already the neurophysiological apparatus drastically shields the consciousness. The operative medium sense does the rest. Reese-Schäfer II 138 Human/Gehlen: tried to determine the human from its difference to the animal. (LuhmannVs). AU Cass. 3 VsParsons: Terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed as given. There were no criteria for the existence of the object - instead the theory must be able to contain all deviance and dysfunction. (not possible with Parsons) - Question: in which time period and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (e.g. Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory criteria Biology: Definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. Self-reference (important in modern system theory) is not possible within the framework of the Parsons' model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions. VsAction Theory: the concept of action is not suitable because an actor is assumed! But it also exists without an observer! In principle, an action can be presented as a solitary thing without social resonance! - Paradox/Luhmann: the procedure of the dissolution of the paradox is logically objectionable, but is constantly applied by the logicians themselves: they use a change of levels. The only question that must not be asked is: what is the unity of the difference of planes? (AU Cass. 4) VsEquilibrium Theories: questionable today; 1. from the point of view of natural science: it is precisely the imbalances which are stable, equilibrium is rather metaphor. (AU Cass. 6) Tradition: "Transmission of patterns from generation to generation". Stored value patterns that are offered again and again and adopted by the offspring. However, these patterns are still the same. VsTradition: Question: Where does identity come from in the first place? How could one talk about selfhood without an external observer? That will not be much different either with the assumptions of a reciprocal relationship with learning. Luhmann: instead: (Autopoiesis): Socialization is always self-socialization. AU Cass 6 Information/Luhmann: the term must now be adapted to it! In the 70s one spoke of "genetic information", treated structures as informative, the genetic code contained information. Luhmann: this is wrong, because genes only contain structures and no events! The semantic side of the term remained unexplained for a long time, i.e. the question of what information can choose from. Reese-Schäfer II 76 LuhmannVsMarx/Reese-Schäfer: rejects the talk of "social contradictions": it is simply about a conflict of interests. Competition is not a contradiction either: two people can certainly strive for the same good. AU Cass 11 Emergence/Reductionism/System Theory/Luhmann: this does not even pose the actual question: what actually distinguishes an emergent system? What is the characteristic for the distinction from the basal state? What is the criterion that enables emergence? Will Martens: (Issue 4, Kölner Zeitschrift f. Sozialforschung): Autopoiesis of social systems. It deals with the question following the concept of autopoiesis and communication. Communication/Luhmann: Tripartite structure: Information, Communication, Understanding (not action sequences). (Comes from linguistics, but also antiquity!). Martens: this tripartite division is the psychological foundation of communication. Communication must first be negotiated in the individual head, I must see what I assume to be unknown and what I want to choose, and my body must also be in good shape. Marten's thesis: sociality only comes about in the synthesis of these three components. Social things arise when information, communication and understanding are created as a unit with repercussions on the participating mental systems, which must behave accordingly. The unity is only the synthesis itself, while the elements still have to be described psychologically or biologically etc. Without this foundation it does not work. LuhmannVsMartens: I hope you fall for it! At first that sounds very plausible. But now comes the question: What is communicated in the text by Martens? Certainly not the blood circulation! There is also no blood in the text! The editors would already fight this off, there is also no state of consciousness in the text! So I cannot imagine what the author was thinking! I can well imagine that he was supplied with blood and sat in front of the computer. And that he wanted to take part in the discussion. Luhmann: these are all constructions which are suggested in communication, but which are not actually present in communication. (>Interpenetration). Communication/LuhmannVsMartens: Question: what is actually claimed in the text, and does it not actually refute it itself? Paradox: the text that tells of blood and thoughts claims to bring blood and thoughts, but it only brings letters and what a skilled reader can make of the text. That is communication. That is all I can actually see! Communication/Luhmann: if you think realistically and operatively, you cannot see more in the text. We have to put the words together from the letters ourselves. When psychic systems respond to communication, they change their internal states accordingly. Communication/Luhmann: if one has received this message (from Martens), one can say: everything is actually correct, one could describe a communication completely on the basis of physical or psychological facts. Nothing would be missing, with the exception of autopoiesis itself. Question: we have to explain how communication maintains itself without incorporating psychological and physical operations! Luhmann: this reproduction of communication through communication goes only through total exclusion from physical, psychological, etc. operations.	Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Double Contingency	Luhmann, N.	II 101 Double Contingency/Luhmann/Reese-Schäfer: Basic situation: two black boxes get to deal with each other. The problem is a self-solving one, it sets a process in motion and can even incorporate errors and coincidences. Thesis: double contingency inevitably leads to the formation of social systems. AU Kass 13 Double Contingency/Luhman: in societies there is always a high share of common norms and values, but this does not prevent parties from arguing. (Party programs almost identical). How do we get to the regulation of conflicts? Common values are only secondary; at the beginning we may not know which ones are common. The thesis is pure temporality, one acts first! In this way one puts the other before the alternative of accepting or rejecting.	Link to abbreviations/authors

The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Social Systems	Parsons, T.	Luhmann II 57 Parsons/Reese-Schäfer: These daß auch soziale Systeme über ähnlich zu denkende Medien funktionieren: Wirtschaftssystem - Geld. Politisches System - Macht.	Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997