Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Commercial Mass Media | Benkler | Benkler I 185 Commercial Mass Media/Mass Media/Advertiser-supported media/Benkler: Throughout the twentieth century, the mass media have played a fundamental constitutive role in the construction of the public sphere in liberal democracies. Over this period, first in the United States and later throughout the world, the commercial, advertising-supported form of mass media has become dominant in both print and electronic media. I 186 The mass-media model has been the dominant model of communications in both democracies and their authoritarian rivals throughout the period when democracy established itself, first against monarchies, and later against communism and fascism. To say that mass media were dominant is not to say that only technical systems of remote communications form the platform of the public sphere. I 205 (…) advertiser-supported media need to achieve the largest audience possible, not the most engaged or satisfied audience possible. This leads such media to focus on lowest-common denominator programming and materials that have broad second-best appeal, rather than trying to tailor their programming to the true first-best preferences of well-defined segments of the audience. (…) issues of genuine public concern and potential political contention are toned down and structured as a performance between iconic representations of large bodies of opinion, in order to avoid alienating too much of the audience. This is the reemergence of spectacle that Habermas identified in “The Transformation of the Public Sphere”. >Public Sphere/Habermas. [In commercial mass media] business logic often stands in contradiction to journalistic ethic. While there are niche markets for high-end journalism and strong opinion, outlets that serve those markets are specialized. Those that cater to broader markets need to subject journalistic ethic to business necessity, emphasizing celebrities or local crime over distant famines or a careful analysis of economic policy. I 201 Media Concentration: The power of the commercial mass media depends on the degree of concentration in mass-media markets. A million equally watched channels do not exercise power. Concentration is a common word used to describe the power media exercise when there are only few outlets, but a tricky one because it implies two very distinct phenomena. The first is a lack of competition in a market, to a degree sufficient to allow a firm to exercise power over its pricing. This is the antitrust sense. The second, very different concern might be called “mindshare.” That is, media is “concentrated” when a small number of media firms play a large role as the channel from and to a substantial majority of readers, viewers, and listeners in a given politically relevant social unit. >Mass Media/Benkler. |
Benkler I Yochai Benkler The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom New Haven 2007 |
| Content | Peacocke | I 144 Content/Peacocke: evidence-based approach: about constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states" = I. >Belief content, >Thought, >Self-identification, >Self-knowledge, >Constitutive role, >Roles, >Conceptual role, >Empirical content, >I, Ego, Self, >I think, >cogito, >Thinking, >Person. I 187 Description/Thought Content/Peacocke: Triple from way of givenness, object, point in time: no solution: a thought component could remain the same, while the object changes. >Descriptions, >Localization, >Identification, >Individuation, >Way of givenness. As with descriptive thoughts: it is possible that the content remains the same, while the "reference" changes. >Reference, cf. >Demonstratives, >Index Words, >Indexicality, >Objects of Belief, >Objects of Thought. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| First Person | Peacocke | I ~ 165 constitutive role: "the person with these conscious states" no idea of the first person. >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Attribution, >Foreign attribution, >Predication, >Person, >Other minds, >Authority, >Incorrectability. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Indexicality | Peacocke | I 106f Demonstrative way of givenness/Peacocke: here, now, this is also non-linguistically possible. >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Way of givenness. Demonstraviely: "Today", descriptively: "the day after today". Instead of phrase and language only capacity for different reaction. cf. >RDRDs/Brandom, >Capability, >Concepts, >Language use. I 118 Summary/Peacocke: what is determinative of a given demonstrative type, is the pattern of evidence or prior conditions so that judgments that contain tokens of this type, must be sensitive for it. The constitutive role that is associated with this type, must capture this complex pattern of evidential sensitivity. >Evidence, >Type/Token, >Roles, >Conceptual Role, >Causal Role. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Postmodernist Feminism | Braidotti | Braidotti I 27 Postmodernist Feminism/Braidotti: Feminist anti-Humanism, also known as postmodernist feminism, rejected the unitary identities indexed on that Eurocentric and normative humanist ideal of ‘Man’ (Braidotti, 2002)(1). >About Feminism, >Feminism as author. It went further, however, and argued that it is impossible to speak in one unified voice about women, natives and other marginal subjects. The emphasis falls instead on issues of diversity and differences among them and on the internal fractures of each category. In this respect, antihumanism rejects the dialectical scheme of thought, where difference or otherness played a constitutive role, marking off the sexualized other (woman), the racialized other (the native) and the naturalized other (animals, the environment or earth). These others were constitutive in that they fulfilled a mirror function that confirmed the Same in His superior position (Braidotti, 2006)(2). Braidotti I 28 This political economy of difference resulted in passing off entire categories of human beings as devalued and therefore disposable others: to be ‘different from’ came to mean to be ‘less than’. The dominant norm of the subject as positioned at the pinnacle of a hierarchical scale that rewarded the ideal of zero-degree of difference.* This is the former ‘Man’ of classical Humanism. >Anti-Humanism, >Humanism, cf. >Existence/Foucault. 1. Braidotti, Rosi. 2002. Metamorphoses. Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming. Cambridge: Polity Press. 2. Braidotti, Rosi. 2006. Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics. Cambridge: Polity Press. |
Braidotti I Rosie Braidotti The Posthuman Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 2013 |
| Principles | Peacocke | I 34 Significance/Principle of significance/Peacocke: if we can imagine that an evidence supports a hypothesis, then this is not sufficient to show that the hypothesis is significant. >Evidence, >Confirmation, >Verification, >Verifiability. It could be that either the hypothesis or the evidence is independent of the other. >Dependence, >Independence. I 113 Principle of sensitivity: it is a priori and necessary that the thinker can on evidence* think for x the thought that x (shortened). I 114 Constitutive Role: everything what meets the requirements of the principle of sensitivity. >Constitutive role. I 154 Demonstrative/Peacocke: strong principle: ability to experience judgment is necessary for the possession of the term. Weak Principle: Identity/Regress/Peacocke: not all beliefs 'a is b' may be based on identification of a, otherwise regress. - But also not on sufficient conditions for b - also regress. >Regress, >Conditions. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Roles | Peacocke | I 109ff Constitutive role: 1st sortal, 2nd psychic state, 3rd relation between 1 and 2. >Sortals, >Psychological states, >Roles, >Constitutive role. Evidence: Sensitivity for evidence is dependend on terms developed for them. >Concepts, >Language use, >Reference. Of two descriptions the constitutive role is the uninformative one. >Description. Constitutive role: "the person who has these perceptions" explains immunity to misidentification. >Incorrigibility, >Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. Constitutive role of" now": "the time when this attitude (belief, idea, etc.) occurred". >Localisation. Instead of trivial identity "I am I ": Constitutive role: "I am the person with these states". >Predication. I 122 Constitutive role/I/Peacocke: the constitutive role brings just the difference to the trivial identity: "I am the person with these states" instead of "I am I". >Identity, >Self-identification. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Significance | Peacocke | I 34 Significance/Principle of significance/Peacocke: if we can imagine that an evidence supports a hypothesis, then this is not sufficient to show that the hypothesis is significant. >Evidence, >Confirmation, >Verification, >Verifiability. It could be that either the hypothesis or the evidence is independent of the other. >Dependence, >Independence. I 113 Principle of sensitivity: it is a priori and necessary that the thinker can on evidence* think for x the thought that x (shortened). I 114 Constitutive Role: everything what meets the requirements of the principle of sensitivity. >Constitutive role. Significance/Principle of Significance/Peacocke: if we can imagine that a proof (evidence) supports a hypothesis, then that is not sufficient for to show that the hypothesis is significant - it could be that either the hypothesis or the evidence is independent of the other. I 141 Cognitive Significance/Frege/Peacocke: identity a = b (not a = a) - ("informative"). I 165 Cognitive Significance/Peacocke: only if it is epistemically possible that a thing that as known to me as [you] and so-and-so, perhaps might not be so-and-so - i.e. the identity is informative. (> Identity/Frege). |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Chisholm, R.M. | Peacocke Vs Chisholm, R.M. | I 119 Constitutive Role: E.g. of "the person who and has such and such experiences and thoughts": here there are two possible misunderstandings: 1) E.g. in Chisholm: PeacockeVsChisholm: confusion of general and particular. Anscombe: "I am this thing here": i.e. the person of whose action this idea of an action is an idea, etc." ChisholmVsAnscombe: that explains their use of the first person, but not my use! Peacocke: a distinction general/particular is implicit in our constitutive role. Particular: The particular constitutive role is specified by the conscious states of a person at a given time. General: the general constitutive role can be viewed as the function of thinking people and times on the associated individual constitutive roles. PeacockeVsChisholm: E.g. so there is a general recipe for the various particular constitutive roles of [self] (notation) for the two thinkers Anscombe and Chisholm. This defines the general constitutive role. And the same also goes for two thoughts by Chisholm at two different times. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Evans, G. | Peacocke Vs Evans, G. | I 169/170 Demonstratives/Evans: perceptually demonstrative ways of givenness are possible, because these conditions are fulfilled: in a normal perception situation, there is an information link between subject and object, and also the subject knows or is able to find out where the object is. If the subject has the general ability to know what propositions makes of the form "π = p" true for any π (where π is an identification of a public place without index words (in a non-indexical frame of reference)) if p is the notion of a place in its egocentric space. If it is also able to locate the object in its egocentric space, we can say that it has an idea of the object. Idea/Notion/Evans/Terminology/Intension/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: Evans "Idea" (notion) corresponds to my way of givenness "mode of presentation". Idea/Evans: Thesis: we can conceive the idea of an object a as consisting in its knowledge of what it is to be true for an arbitrary sentence of the form "δ = a". Peacocke: where "δ" is the area of the basic ideas of an object. Fundamental Idea/Evans: is what you have if you think of an object as the possessor of the fundamental ground of difference that it actually has. Peacocke: i.e. what distinguishes an object from all others. I.e. for material objects type and location. PeacockeVsEvans: we have already seen cases where the thinker was unable to locate the object in his egocentric space: E.g. the craters on the moon. I 171 E.g. apple in the mirror cabinet. But it still seems possible to think about it, for example, wonder where it is! It is true that it is possible to at least provide a rough direction in egocentric space, but that is hardly sufficient for the knowledge condition of Evans. In the case of the memory image, it is clearer that no localization in the current egocentric space is needed. pro Evans: there must be additional imaginable evidence, e.g. experience or tools for localization (if necessary, even space travel!). If that were not imaginable, we would have to assume that the subject was not able to think of the object in public space! pro Evans: an information link is not sufficient to think demonstratively about the object. VsEvans: but that is less than to demand that the thinker can locate the object at present. Weaker Requirement: Instead, a general ability of the subject can locate the object, if necessary, is sufficient. Evans: if you cannot locate an object, you can still think of it in the mixed demonstrative descriptive way of givenness: "that which causes my experience". But in normal cases this is a wrong description! Peacocke: it also seems to be wrong in the examples of the lunar craters, the apple in the mirror cabinet. PeacockeVsEvans: trange asymmetry: Idea/Evans: an idea a of a place in a self-centered space is an adequate idea of a place in the public space. Holistic/Evans: if an arbitrarily fundamental identification of a location is possible, it is holistic. (Varieties of reference, p. 162). Peacocke: this knowledge is grounded in a general ability to put a cognitive map of the objective spatial world over our own egocentric space. I 172 E.g. in some cases this will not be possible, for example, when you are kidnapped, or ended up in an unknown area, etc. Point: even in such cases, you can still use the demonstrative pronoun "here" (in reference to objects). I.e. the thoughts are still thoughts about public space! ((s) and the self-centered space). Idea/Demonstrative Way of Givenness/PeacockeVsEvans: so his theory does not demand any ability to give a public, non-egocentric individuation our thoughts to have thoughts about a place in the public space at all. Analogy/Peacocke: exactly analogous objections can be made in the case of demonstrative ways of givenness: E.g. Suppose a subject perceives an object of type F in the manner H. Then F is the token way of givenness. Then we can introduce: [W, Fs] for the perceptual "this F". Then there is exactly one proposition of the form "p = localization of [W, Fs] now", which is true, and the subject knows what it is for it that it is true for it. PeacockeVsEvans: why should we demand here, but not in the earlier example, that the subject also knows which p (or which in the earlier case) is mentioned in this one true proposition? This is particularly absurd in the case of the lost subject. PeacockeVsEvans: his theory allows that [W, Fs] is an adequate idea here, although the subject has no fundamental idea of the object. Peacocke: but if we insisted that it could have a fundamental idea if he had more evidence, then why is an analogous possibility not also sufficient for adequacy in terms of the egocentric space? I 173 There seem to be only two uniform positions: 1) Identification/Localization/Idea/Demonstratives/Liberal Position: sufficient for a genuine way of givenness or adequate ideas are the general ability of localization plus uniqueness of the current localization in the relevant space. 2) Strict position: this is neither sufficient for genuine ways of givenness nor for adequate ideas. PeacockeVs: this can hardly be represented as a unified theory: it means that, if you are lost, you cannot think about the objects that you see around you. That would also mean to preclude a priori that you as a kidnapped person can ask the question "Which city is this?". Demonstratives/Peacocke: Thesis: I represent the uniformly liberal position Demonstratives/Evans: Thesis: is liberal in terms of public space and strictly in terms of egocentric space! ad 1): does not deny the importance of fundamental ideas. If a subject is neither able to locate an object in the public nor in egocentric space ((s) E.g. he wakes up from anesthesia and hears a monaural sound), then it must still believe that this object has a fundamental identification. Otherwise it would have to assume that there is no object there. Anscombe: E.g. a subject sees two matchboxes through two holes which (are manipulated) so arranged that it sees only one box, then the subject does not know what it means for the sentence "this matchbox is F" to be true. The uniformly liberal view allows the subject to use demonstratives which depend on mental images, even if it has no idea where in the public space and when it has encountered the object. EvansVs: representatives of this position will say that the knowledge of the subject is at least partial, I 174 because this idea causally results from an encounter with the object. But that makes their position worse instead of better: for it completely twists the grammar and logic of the concept of knowing what it is for the subject that p is true. Ability/PeacockeVsEvans: but a capability can also consist in the experience of finding out the right causal chains in a given environment: the same goes for the localization of an object point seen in the mirror in egocentric space. PeacockeVsEvans: his distinction seems unreal: it may be simultaneously true that someone has a relation R to the object due to causal relations, and be true that the possibility of being in this relation R is a question of the abilities of the subject. E.g. (Evans) to recognize the ball: Peacocke: this is not a sensory motor skill, but rather the ability to draw certain conclusions, which however require an earlier encounter. This also applies to e.g. the cognitive map, which is placed over the egocentric space: PeacockeVsEvans: in both cases it does not follow that the presented object, remembered or perceived, is thought of explicitly in causal terms: the way of givenness is truly demonstrative. First Person/PeacockeVsEvans: the second major objection concerns thoughts of the first person: the different examples of immunity to misidentification, which contain the first person, roughly break down into two groups: a) here, immunity seems absolute: E.g. "I am in pain". I 175 b) Here, the immunity seems to depend on presuppositions about the world: if these assumptions are wrong, they open the possibility of picking out something wrong without stopping to use the word "I". These include: E.g. "I was on the ocean liner": memory image. E.g. "I sit at the desk": visual, kinesthetic, tactile perceptions. The distinction between a) and b) may be made by the constitutive role: "The person with these conscious states." Infallibility/Tradition/Evans: (absolutely immune judgments): the judgment to be a judgment of a specific content can be constituted by the fact that this judgement responds to this state. Peacocke pro. PeacockeVsEvans: Problem: can this infallibility be connected to the rest of Evans' theory? Because: I/Evans: Thesis: the reference of "I" may fail! Peacocke: how is that compatible with the absolute immunity of "I am in pain"? Conditionalisation: does not help: E.g. "if I exist, I am in pain" that cannot fulfill the purpose: the existence of the idea still needs the reference of "I". Similarly: E.g. "If my use of "I" refers, I am in pain": because "my use" must be explained in terms of the first person. Question: Can we use memory demonstratives which refer to previous use of first-person ways of givenness? E.g. "If those earlier uses of "I" speak, I am in pain." (Point: not "my uses"). PeacockeVs: that does not help: Descartes' evil demon could have suggested you the memories of someone else. (>Shoemaker: q-memories.) I 176 Constitutive Role/Brains in the Vat/BIV/EvansVsPeacocke: the constitutive role of [self] would not explain why the brains in the vat would be able to speak in a demonstrative way about their own experiences: Mental States/Evans: differ from all other states and objects in that they refer demonstratively to their owners. Pain is identified as an element of the objective order. Then someone can have no adequate idea of these mental states if he does not know to which person they happen. Peacocke: we can even concede thoughts about its pain to the brain in a vat, provided that it can give a fundamental identification of the person who has the pain. Peacocke: No, the nerves must be wired correctly. I.e. this is not true for the brains in the vat. So we can stick to the liberal point of view and at the constitutive role and the idea of a person. Also to the fact that the mental states are individuated on the person who has them. Individuation/Mental States/PeacockeVsEvans: not through localization (like with material objects), but through the person. I 177 E.g. Split-Brain Patient/Peacocke: here we can speak of different, but qualitatively equivalent experiences. From this could follow two centers of consciousness in a single brain. But: after the surgery we should not say that one of the two was the original and the other one was added later. E.g. olfactory sensation of the left and right nostril separate. Then there are actually separate causes for both experiences. ((s), but the same source.) Peacocke: it does not follow that in normal brains two consciousnesses work in harmony. Here, the sense of smell is caused by simultaneous input through both nostrils and is thus overdetermined. |
Chr. Peacocke I Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 |
| Husserl, E. | Peacocke Vs Husserl, E. | I 119 PeacockeVsHusserl: even here there is a confusion between the general and the particular: I/Husserl: (Logical studies, English 1970, p. 315f, retranslation) the word "I" identifies a number of people from case to case by changing meaning. I 120 Everyone has their own I presentation. That is what changes from person to person. Constitutive Role/Peacocke: 2) possible misunderstanding: the considerations regarding the constitutive role could suggest a "bundle theory of the self". But what I say is neutral with respect to a bundle theory. It is neutral, because it is part of a theory of thinking in a certain way about people and not about people as such or their nature and their individuation principles. Our approach to the constitutive role may explain why Cartesian thoughts that are arguably infallible definitely have a first person character. E.g. "I am in pain", "I have a perception of a tree", etc. Principle of Sensitivity/Peacocke: together with the individuated constitutive role: someone x is predisposed to judge that φ [x itself] in the presence of evidence that the person is with these conscious states . E.g. pain x is predisposed to judge that [x itself] is j in the presence of evidence* that the person with these conscious states, including pain, is φ. ((s) evidence* the second time) Peacocke: then you can also insert pain for φ. Point: the important thing here is the particularized constitutive role: I 121 We cannot say that a person who is in pain must be able to identify themselves through a description. The person does not have any evidence* in their state. Teh possession of the first person way of givenness of the constitutive role "the person who has these perceptions" can thus explain that you do not need a test for your own identity. Now/Peacocke: it applies again that you do not have to identify the time previously. |
Chr. Peacocke I Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 |
| Nagel, Th. | Peacocke Vs Nagel, Th. | I 167 Nagel/Peacocke: (first Tanner Lecture, 1980) E.g. "I am TN" seems to express a real fact on the one hand, which cannot be described from a certain perspective of the world, ((s) to be more true than from another perspective.) I 168 on the other hand it seems to be impossible that irreducible facts of the first person exist. Nagel:~ "TN, like the rest of you, it turns out, not only as a single creature with a special perspective on the world from the position in its interior. Every other human being contains a very special kind of subject in the same way. The "additional fact" that I am TN is the fact that this impersonal conception of the world can close over itself? Through localization of the subject that forms it in a certain point of the world by perceiving it. This fact is linked to the perspective of TN. And because it is not an irreducible fact of the first person, it can be part of the real world! " PeacockeVsNagel: does he really state a fact of the real world here? There is an implicit indexicality in the sentence "locate the subject that forms it (the world)". It comes out more clearly here: Nagel: ~"when I have the philosophical thought: "I am TN", then I realize that the objective individual self, which is the subject of this centerless idea of a world, is located in the TN and at the same time sees the world through the perspective of TN. Idea/PeacockeVsNagel: ideas can be a) public types that can be shared by different people. Or they may b) correspond to the principle of "one thinker, one idea" (token), even if the same idea can come up on several occasions. Nagel: must use the latter concept, because nothing that could correspond to a subject is in the sense of the type. Peacocke: but in the sense of the token it seems to be true that the content is indexical. Namely, the person with this particular idea of TN (Peacocke: constitutive role). Admittedly, this is not a thought of the first person. Peacocke: but the motivation of Nagel that there can be no irreducible thoughts of the first person in the world seems to apply to all demonstrative ways of givenness. I 169 E.g. Suppose Nagel contemplates his objective idea of the world at a moment about and thinks "I am TN" Peacocke: that is potentially informative if it is epistemically possible that the person who is thinking is not TN. Nagel: the problem with "I'm TN" is not a pseudo-problem associated with a misunderstanding of the logic of index words. Def Character/Kaplan: ("On the Logic of Demonstratives"): the character of an expression is a function of contexts on contents and these include no indexical ways of givenness. PeacockeVsNagel: if we take this as the basis, it is not so surprising that the way of givenness of a fact - in contrast to the fact itself - should be irreducibly indexical. Nagel's point that we are able to step back from our standpoint and to form a more objective idea in which the position in turn is located, is of great philosophical interest. Nevertheless, it should be formulated with reference to the different ways in which we think about ourselves when we make such a separation. So if we rather have a different way of giveness than a different type of object, then we can give up the question: "Is this objective self mine?" For Nagel this question is only meaningless if were a mere facon de parler for "the person with this objective idea". |
Chr. Peacocke I Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 |
| Nozick, R. | Peacocke Vs Nozick, R. | I 133 Way of Givenness/Object/Peacocke: I have separated the theory of the way of givenness of an object from the theory about the nature of objects. This is in contrast to the approach of Robert Nozick: Philosophical Explanations, 1981, p 87th I 133/134 I/NozickVsPeacocke: Thesis: the I is designed and synthesized around the act of reflexive self-reference. This is the only way to explain why we when reflexively referring to ourselves, know that it is we ourselves who we refer to. Declaration/Peacocke: Nozick refers here to the fact that an epistemic fact can only be explained by appealing to a certain approach to nature of this object, and not to the way of givenness how we perceive the object. Or how the subject is reflected upon. Object/Intension/Explanation/Peacocke: Question: It is for every person a) a conditional that they know or is it b) a conditional which is only a consequence of its knowledge? The first case would be: a) I know: when I say "I", then the utterance of "I" refers to me b) When I say "I", then: I know that the utterance of "I" refers to me Peacocke: ad b): is not a real date that requires an explanation. It is not always true! E.g. I am in the same room with my twin brother and for one of us the vocal cords do not work without both of us knowing for whom... ad a): this seems to be based on two different beliefs: I 135 1) the originator of the statement u of 'I' = myself 2) Every utterance of "I" refers to its originator. Nozick/Problem: E.g. Oedipus: he knows: The originator of the utterance u of "the murderer of Laius" = I and he also knows: Every utterance of "the murderer of Laius" refers to the murderer of Laius. but he does not believe in the identity of "the murderer..." = I. So he is not in the position to judge: The originator of the utterance u of "the murderer of Laius" refers to me. I/PeacockVsNozick: so we have the contrast between first person and third person cases without having a theory of the "synthesized self" (Nozick), if we can explain the availability and the content of the premises in the first-person case without this theory. Nozick: what is it like for me to know that it was I who produced a particular statement? Peacocke: but that involves two different interpretations: 1) What is it like to know that and not only to believe it? This is no more problematic than the question whether it was I who blew out the candle. 2) What is the content of the thought: "I have made this statement"? I 136 This is again about evidence*: that "the person with such and such states" made the statement. Nozick: it is not sufficient that I know a token of the utterance "I made this statement" and speak German! Peacocke: it can be compared with the time problem: The time of the utterance of u "now" = now Every utterance of "now" refers to the time of the utterance PeacockeVsNozick: it does not seem that we need a theory of time, as "synthesized around acts of reference" in any (every?) language. Nozick's theory cannot explain what it claims to be explaining: because a his subject matter concerns that which can be known, while his theory is not a theory of ways of givenness. We cannot simply think of any object without thinking about it a certain way. Nozick's synthesized selves are simply construed as objects, though. Peacocke: can we reformulate Nozick's theory as approach to ways of givenness? Is "the originator of this statement" to be thought somehow in a first person way? (reflexive self-reference). 1) What is this act like in a complex way of givenness. It cannot be perceptual. Because that could be an informative (!) self-identification ((s) empirically, after confusion with the twin brother, and then not necessarily). Instead: Action-based: "the act, which was brought about by the attempt to speak". That is not informative indeed. But that brings Nozick's theory close to our theory of the constitutive role. I 137 Because such attempts are among the conscious states of the subject. |
Chr. Peacocke I Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 |
| Russell, B. | Peacocke Vs Russell, B. | I 131 Acquaintance/Russell: objects of acquaintance: E.g. sense data. They are obvious to the subject. Sense Data/Russell: correspond to the positions of singular terms in a sentence. They are at the same time real constituents of the sentence. And without givenness at that! (Without intension). Purely extensional occurrence of objects in the sentence. PeacockeVsRussell: 1) that may mollify FregeVsRussell's criticism of his concept of proposition. But it does not justify Russell: because he did not refer to obviousness for the thinker. 2) physical objects that, according to Russell, "cause the sense data" are therefore demonstrative and descriptive in a mix. PeacockeVs: our approach, on the other hand, assumes that demonstrative ways of givenness are not descriptive. But Russell's mixed approach is not entirely irrelevant: if we replace "sense data" by "experience": PeacockeVsRussell: he confused a plausible determination of the the constitutive role with "content". I 180 Acquaintance/Russell: (B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, 1973, p. 32) "Each understandable sentence must be composed of constituents with which we are familiar." PeacockeVs: that got bad press. Problem: Excessive proximity to Humean empiricism. SainsburyVs: Russells ideas should be defended without the principle of acquaintance if possible. Peacocke: but if you free the principle of non-essential epistemological attachments, it is a correct and fundamental condition for the attribution of contents. Acquaintance/Russell: we are familiar with the sense data, some objects of immediate memory and with universals and complexes. Earlier: the thinker is also familiar with himself. Later: Vs. Complex/Russell: aRb. Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: he had a correct basic notion of acquaintance, but a false one of its extension (from the things that fall under it). The salient feature is the idea of relation. One is dealing with the object itself and not its deputy. I 182 Def Principle of Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: Thesis: Reconstruction, reformulated principle of acquaintance: The thinker is familiar with an object if there is a way of givenness (within its repertoire of concepts) that is ruled by the principle of sensitivity and he is in an appropriate current mental state, which he needs to think of the object under this way of givenness. For this, we need a three-digit relation between subject, object and type of the way of givenness The type of the way of givenness (as visual or aural perception) singles out the object. "Singling out" here is neutral in terms of whether the object is to be a "constituent of thoughts" or not. This preserves two features of Russell's concept: 1) acquaintance enables the subject to think about the object in a certain way because of the relationship that it has with it. 2) The concept of the mental state may preserve what Russell meant when he spoke of acquaintance as a relation of presentation. Constituent/Thoughts/Russell: he thought that objects occurred downright as parts of the thought. PeacockeVsRussell: we will interpret this as an object that indicates a type of a way of givenness (indexing). We do not allow an object to occur as part of a thought, just because it is the only component of the thought that corresponds to a singular term position in a sentence that expresses a thought. I 183 This is a Neo-Fregean theory, because an object can only exist as part of the thought by the particular way of its givenness (intension). (VsRussell: not literally part of the thought or sentence). I 195 Colors/Explanation/Peacocke: to avoid circularity, colors themselves are not included in the explanation of a response action, but only their physical bases. Different: E.g. 'John's favorite color': which objects have it, depends on what concepts φ are such that φ judges the subject, 'John's favorite color is φ' together with thoughts of the form 't is φ'. Analog: defined description: E.g. the 'richest man'. He is identified by the relational way of givenness in context with additional information: Complex/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: E.g. a subject has an experience token with two properties: 1) It may have been mentioned in the context with sensitivity for a specific demonstrative way of givenness of an object (e.g. audible tone). 2) At the same time it may be an experience token of a certain type. Then, to be recognized the two must coincide in the context I 196 with a sensitivity for a specific concept φ in the repertoire of the subject. VsAcquaintance/VsRussell/Peacocke: one can argue: E.g. Cicero died long ago E.g. arthritis is painful. We can attribute such beliefs when the subject understands the meanings of the concepts. Nevertheless, the readiness to judge that Cicero died long ago depends on a mental state, with regard to which there must be an evidence. What kind of a mental state should that be? It need not remember the occasion when it first heard the name 'Cicero'. But neither: 'F died long ago', where 'F' is a defined description. Name/Peacocke: semantic function: simply singling out a particular object. Understanding: if you can identify the reference of the name in one way or another. There is no specific way in which you have to think of the Roman orator to understand the name. VsAcquaintance/VsPeacocke: that may even endanger the reformulated principle: if the name only singles out the object, then the subject must have a relation to a thought which contains the object as a constituent. PeacockeVs: I dispute the last conditional. We must distinguish sharply between a) beliefs, where the that-sentence contains a name, and b) the presence of the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought. The latter corresponds to the relation 'Bel'. I 196/197 Def Relation 'Bel'/Terminology/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/Peacocke: a belief which contains the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought: E.g. not only 'NN died a long time ago', but propositional attitude. ((s) not only belief about someone or something, but about a particular object.) Relation Bel/Belief/Peacocke: three reasons for distinguishing beliefs: a) we want to exclude that someone can acquire a new belief simply by introducing a new name. (Only a description could do that). E.g. if we wanted to call the inventor of the wheel 'Helle': Trivialization: 1) it would be trivial that such a stipulation should be enough for the reference in a community. 2) Nor is it a question of us being able to give outsiders a theoretical description of the community language. You cannot bring about a relation Bel by linguistic stipulation. I 198 b) Pierre Example/Kripke/Peacocke: this type of problem arises in cases where the language is too poor for a theory of beliefs in this sense: if someone understands a sentence, it is not clear what thoughts he expresses with it. (>Understanding/Peacocke). Because the semantics only singles out the object, not the way of thinking about the object (intension). This is different with pure index words and certain descriptions. E.g. a person who says 'I'm hot now' expresses the thought: ^[self x]^[now t]. But that involves nothing that would be 'thinking of something under a name'! Pierre Example/Kripke/Solution: a complete description of Pierre's situation is possible (for outsiders) without embedding 'London' in belief contexts. Peacocke: at the level of 'Bel' (where the speaker himself is part of the belief) beliefs can be formulated so that proper names are used: 'He believes that NN is so and so'. c) Perception/Demonstratives/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: here, the way of givenness seems to have a wealth that does not need to be grasped completely, if someone uses demonstratives. The wealth of experience is covered by the relation Bel, however. But this way we are not making certain commitments: E.g. we do not need to regarded 'Cicero died long ago' as metalinguistic, but rather as meant quite literally. I 201 Logical Operators/Quantification/Logic/Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: our reconstructed principle of acquaintance implicitly includes the obligation to recognize entities that can only be preserved inferentially: E.g. uniqueness operators, other quantifiers, connections, also derived ones. This can even apply to logical constants and some truth functions and not only for ways of givenness of these functions. RussellVs: the principle of acquaintance is not applicable to logical constituents of thoughts. |
Chr. Peacocke I Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 |
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