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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Normality | Canguilhem | Krastev I 49 Normality/Canguilhem/Krastev: In The Normal and the Pathological (1966)(1), the French philosopher and physician Georges Canguilhem explains that the concept of ‘normality’ has a double meaning, one descriptive and the other normative. ‘Normal’ can refer to practices that are factually widespread or to practices that are morally ideal. >Normality/Politics/Krastev. 1. G. Canguilhem The Normal and the Pathological (1966) |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Normality | Krastev | Krastev I 24 Normality/post-communist era/Krastev: [Václav Havel] described the essential condition of communist Eastern Europe as the ‘absence of a normal political life’.(1) Under communism, nothing was rarer than ‘normality’. Havel also referred to Western-style ‘freedom and the rule of law’ as ‘the first preconditions of a normally and healthily functioning social organism’. And he depicted his country’s struggle to escape Krastev I 25 communist rule as ‘simply trying to do away with its own abnormality, to normalize’.(2) Krastev I 48 (...) we need to recall the primary meaning of the word ‘normalization’ (normalizace in Czech) in the two decades prior to 1989. It referred to the political purges, censorship, police brutality and ideological conformity imposed in Havel’s homeland after the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968. This was ‘normalization’ in the sense of a restoration of the status quo ante, a return to the situation in Czechoslovakia prior to the Dubček reforms. There would be no more attempts at giving communism a human face. And communist authorities, following the perverse logic of their upside-down societies, treated dissidents not as criminals Krastev I 49 but as mentally unstable persons with ‘reformist delusions’ (...). After 1989, this communist-era contrast between two images of normality, one Soviet and the other Western, became a thing of the past. But the warfare between conflicting ideas of normality was immediately rekindled in another form. And this second conflict is still with us today. It involves a pathological disconnect between what is considered normal in the West and what is considered normal in the region. >Normality/Canguilhem. Krastev I 50 Vocabulary: Once communist authority was overthrown, a vocabulary lesson was in order. Bribery, for example, must henceforth be labelled ‘abnormal’, just as law was declared, by definition, ‘impartial and fair’. But the fact that such Western assumptions could be easily parroted on command did not make them any more congruous with Eastern realities. If we examine the gap between Western expectations and Eastern realities after communism, we can discover an important source of the mental stress created in Central and Eastern Europe by a revolution that aimed at importing or imitating a foreign version of normality. >Imitation/Krastev. Center and Eastern European countries: To coordinate their behaviour with that of their proximate neighbours and kin, they had to defy the expectations of their Western mentors and colleagues. Thus, in order to be effective, post-communist elites had to accept bribery locally and, simultaneously, campaign against corruption globally. Revolution: (...)a revolution in the name of normality generated not only psychological disquiet but also its share of political trauma. Rapid changes afflicting the Western model itself have exacerbated the gnawing sense of self-betrayal among its would-be Eastern imitators. Should we be surprised that some Central and East Europeans felt ‘cheated’ when they found out that the conservative society they wanted to imitate had disappeared, washed away by the swift currents of modernization? 1. Václav Havel, The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe (M. E. Sharpe, 1985), p. 89. 2. Cited in Benjamin Herman, ‘The Debate That Won’t Die: Havel And Kundera on Whether Protest Is Worthwhile’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (11 January 2012). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
| Normality | Holmes | Krastev I 24 Normality/post-communist era/Krastev/Holmes: [Václav Havel] described the essential condition of communist Eastern Europe as the ‘absence of a normal political life’.(1) Under communism, nothing was rarer than ‘normality’. Havel also referred to Western-style ‘freedom and the rule of law’ as ‘the first preconditions of a normally and healthily functioning social organism’. And he depicted his country’s struggle to escape Krastev I 25 communist rule as ‘simply trying to do away with its own abnormality, to normalize’.(2) Krastev I 48 (...) we need to recall the primary meaning of the word ‘normalization’ (normalizace in Czech) in the two decades prior to 1989. It referred to the political purges, censorship, police brutality and ideological conformity imposed in Havel’s homeland after the crushing of the Prague Spring in 1968. This was ‘normalization’ in the sense of a restoration of the status quo ante, a return to the situation in Czechoslovakia prior to the Dubček reforms. There would be no more attempts at giving communism a human face. And communist authorities, following the perverse logic of their upside-down societies, treated dissidents not as criminals Krastev I 49 but as mentally unstable persons with ‘reformist delusions’ (...). After 1989, this communist-era contrast between two images of normality, one Soviet and the other Western, became a thing of the past. But the warfare between conflicting ideas of normality was immediately rekindled in another form. And this second conflict is still with us today. It involves a pathological disconnect between what is considered normal in the West and what is considered normal in the region. >Normality/Canguilhem. Krastev I 50 Vocabulary: Once communist authority was overthrown, a vocabulary lesson was in order. Bribery, for example, must henceforth be labelled ‘abnormal’, just as law was declared, by definition, ‘impartial and fair’. But the fact that such Western assumptions could be easily parroted on command did not make them any more congruous with Eastern realities. If we examine the gap between Western expectations and Eastern realities after communism, we can discover an important source of the mental stress created in Central and Eastern Europe by a revolution that aimed at importing or imitating a foreign version of normality. >Imitation/Krastev. Center and Eastern European countries: To coordinate their behaviour with that of their proximate neighbours and kin, they had to defy the expectations of their Western mentors and colleagues. Thus, in order to be effective, post-communist elites had to accept bribery locally and, simultaneously, campaign against corruption globally. Revolution: (...)a revolution in the name of normality generated not only psychological disquiet but also its share of political trauma. Rapid changes afflicting the Western model itself have exacerbated the gnawing sense of self-betrayal among its would-be Eastern imitators. Should we be surprised that some Central and East Europeans felt ‘cheated’ when they found out that the conservative society they wanted to imitate had disappeared, washed away by the swift currents of modernization? 1. Václav Havel, The Power of the Powerless: Citizens Against the State in Central-Eastern Europe (M. E. Sharpe, 1985), p. 89. 2. Cited in Benjamin Herman, ‘The Debate That Won’t Die: Havel And Kundera on Whether Protest Is Worthwhile’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (11 January 2012). |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Descartes, R. | Millikan Vs Descartes, R. | I 94 Error/falsehood/false/mistake/deception/naturalistic fallacy/Millikan: nothing can be described as faulty (broken) by considering only this single, isolated thing. Normality/Solution: It's always about how a thing "should be" ("supposed to be"). Problem: even false convictions and false sentences show do not by themselves that they are wrong. Also, meaningless sentences do not indicate themselves their meaninglessness. Rationalism/MillikanVsRationalism: must therefore be wrong in regard to intentionality. MillikanVsDescartes: Cartesian reflection alone does not even show the intentional character of our convictions and ideas. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Goodman, N. | Simons Vs Goodman, N. | I 108 Sum/extensional mereology/CEM/Simons: CEM, or extensional mereology, is based on a general existence of sums. This has found the most critics, including Rescher and Chisholm. ChisholmVsSum: it seems that it does not belong to the concept of part intrinsically or analytically, that there must be a sum that should otherwise contain all of these individuals and nothing else. I 109 Part: but somebody who refuses the sum-axioms does not refuse Lesniewski’s and Goodmans’ and others concept of "part". Individual: instead of it there is disagreement about the concept "individual". Individual/Goodman: an individual has a very technical sense for him: they must not be connected or causally connected as everyday things. They do not have to be "medium size dry". Any accumulation of individuals may be (subject to paradoxes) combined into an abstract quantity. Individual/Goodman: an individual is analogous to such abstract quantities and each cluster (collection) of individuals can be grouped to a sum-individual (here, however, without the threat of paradoxes!). The resulting thing does not have to be anything that can be found in the everyday world. SimonsVsGoodman: but that is only so far a good analogy as the existence of any desired composition is acceptable. We must distinguish: a) the existence of specific (not abstract) pluralities can be claimed, but not: b) the one of abstract pluralities which is just a mere reflection of the existence of a plural term, therefore merely a facon de parler. Goodman's sum-individuals seem merely correspond to the need for a reference for some arbitrary expressions. I 110 Sum/Goodman/Simons: Goodman could indicate that arbitrary sum individuals obey the extensional theory. They exist in which the identity in the equality of parts exists. Identity/SimonsVsGoodman: this general condition of the equality of all parts is itself questionable (see below). Sum/mereology/Simons: so far no one has been able to show that the acceptance of sums leads to contradictions (as Russell has shown it for certain sets). ((s) stronger/weaker/(s): stronger theories tend to lead to contradictions.) Simons: but even the strongest extensional mereology does not lead to contradictions. Theory/solution/Simons: not the theory is suspicious but its non-critical application to the world. Part relation/Simons: part relations may be different in different areas (for example, mathematics). One must not force them to a common denominator. Sum/Simons: what damage should they cause that does not already exist in the ontological assumption of corresponding "pluralisms"? I 111 Sum/mereology/Simons: suppose we looked at any portions of space-time as evidenced by any sums. Then it comes to the question whether the relevant predicates are cumulative. I 284 "Normal part"/mereology/Simons: philosophers often forget that there is a middle way between a simple part and an essential part: that something is a "normal part of a normal kind". There is no formal theory of "normal mereology". Here are some informal remarks: Normality/Simons: one could start from the idea of a well-shaped thing of a kind. Normality/Aristotle: Aristotle called an object mutilated when it is connected but a prominent part is missing. Shapeliness/music/Nicholas WolterstorffVsGoodman/Simons: (Wolterstorff 1980, 56): he applied the idea of a normal or shapely thing of a kind to music pieces: it is non-well-formed if one or more of the normal parts are missing or are in the wrong place. Thus, the term is a little wider than Aristotle defined it. It allows us to say that a performance with an incorrect note is still a performance of the same piece. GoodmanVsWolterstorff: (Goodman 1969, 186f): we must not allow this because of the transitivity of identity: if a performance with a wrong note is identical, then at the end all pieces identical. I 285 Metaphysics/Goodman/Simons: metaphysics represents here a hard metaphysical line and adheres to bivalence and strict identity conditions. SimonsVsGoodman: the price for it is a distance from the everyday language. Solution/Simons: musical performance has no strict identity conditions. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Rorty, R. | Millikan Vs Rorty, R. | I 88 Sentence/world/meaning/MillikanVsRorty/Millikan: 1. Let's assume that a sentence belongs to the world (at least, if it is true). Mathematical equation: here, it is perhaps different. Truth/Millikan: let's assume it has to do with some projective relation or projective rule. Pointe: this can not be a natural state (status within the natural world). Ex false sentence: projects nothing, but still has a meaning. But if it has a meaning, it must mean something. But not something actual. So, not something in the natural world. Pointe: then even what a true sentence means cannot be anything that is in the actual world. Solution: the relation of a true sentence to something undoubtedly actual in the world is mediated by a relation which is itself not in the world... This relation is the meaning. Meaning/Millikan: is not itself in the world, but the relation between a true statement and what is in the world. Therefore, this relationship is not causal. Truthmaker/Millikan: not to be found in the sentences. And we don't understand false sentences by simply saying that ithey are not true. Meaning/Millikan: must be something that true and false sentences have in common. Projection/meaning/Millikan: meaning seems to be irrelevant for the actual projective relation. Solution/Millikan: our concepts of "intrinsic ..." and "Normal". True and false sentences "should" ("are supposed to") to correspond to the facts in the world in accordance with specific projective rules. This can be explained with the concepts of normality and the eigenfunction. I 89 Falsehood/false sentence/Millikan: is then just as unproblematic as Ex a chameleon, which does not adopt the color of its surroundings. ((S) defect, error, mistake). Meaning/Millikan: 2. sounds turn into sentences with meaning if they are interpreted. Intentionality/language/tradition/Millikan: is therefore dependent intentionality (on interpretation). ((s) > derived intentionality). Sentence/object/world/Millikan: without intentionality a sentence would be an ordinary object. Thought/thinking/intentionality/Millikan: Pointe: then the intentionality of thoughts can not be interpreted as the one of sentences. Otherwise we would have a regress. Representation/Millikan: those who view sentences as internal representations forget that sentences and images are derived intentionally. |
Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Modification | Austin, J.L. | III 48 Austin/Thesis: "No modification without deviation": i.e. no modification of the language without deviation in behavior (to normality). One is of the opinion that there must always be at least one modifying expression. Austin: this is completely unjustified for most uses of most verbs! E.g. "eat", "push", "play football" here no modifying expression is necessary or even permissible. Probably also not with "murder". A modifying expression is only permissible in the case of a deviating design. Searle VII 86 Austin: Thesis: The terms used by us to modify descriptions of actions, such as "intentionally", "voluntarily", etc., are only used to modify an action if the action is somehow deviant or cross. "No modification without deviation". VII 93 .... Austin's thesis is not about words but about sentences. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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