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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Existence Predicate | Wessel | I 158 Existence/Wessel: in our predication theory we can attribute for sentences with empty domain both s ‹ P and s. We can also reject them with the outer negation. >Negation, >Outer negation, >Existence. Axiom of an existential logic: A1. l ~(s A2. (s < P ) v (s) Reversed: A3. ~E(s) l ?P(s) (?) A4. (s < P) ∧ (~(s < P) l ~E(s). |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Lambda Calculus | Bigelow | I 98 Rules/composition/composition rules/syntax/Bigelow/Pargetter: one can also go the other way and want to simplify the rules. That is what the λ-categorical language/Lambda calculus/Lambda notation/Lambda abstraction/Bigelow/Pargetter does: (see also Cresswell I and II, as well as Montague). >Lambda-Abstraction/Cresswell, >R. Montague. For example: Negation: surprisingly, one can assign a referent to it and keep it thus out of the rules: I 99 Vs: we then have another referential layer in the theory. Example Negation: we can assign a set theoretical symbol that represents the value "true" or "false". ((s) Truth value/Frege/(s): assigns a referent to the negation, a "thing": "the false". >Truth values, >Existence, >Objects, >Reference, >Sets, >Set theory. Bigelow/Pargetter: then we have a judgement function that assigns the semantic value (or referent) V(a) to a symbol a. >Valuation. 1: be "true". 0: be "false". Def semantic value: (the negation V(a)) is then the function ω~, so that ω ~ (1) = 0 ω ~ (0) = 1 is appropriate for compound expressions (internal/external negation, conjunction, etc.) >Semantic value, >Outer negation, >Negation, >Conjunction. I 100 Lambda categorical language/λ/Lambda/Rules/Bigelow/Pargetter: such languages have extremely few composition rules. We have more referring symbols for this. >Rules, >Symbols. Realism: would describe this as ontologically honest. Semantics/Bigelow/Pargetter: but the realist does not have to commit himself to one semantics instead of another. >Realism. The semantics does not decide upon ontology. >Semantics, >Ontology. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Motion | Medlin | EMD II 295 inner / outer negation / Brian Medlin: e.g. paradox of motion - problem: to choose between the last moment of rest and the firstmoment of movement (two Dedekind cuts) - 1 "not in motion: or rrr rr (followed or led or both from rest) 2" it is not the case that x in motion, was not rbr - 3 x was in motion: only bb or bbb. This is a good example because there is no name without a bearer. cf. >Zeno, >About Zeno, >Negation, >Change, >Process/Flux, cf. >Process Philosophy, >Paradoxes. |
Medlin I Brian Medlin Iris Murdoch Never Mind about the Bourgeoisie: The Correspondence Between Iris Murdoch and Brian Medlin 1976-1995 2014 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Necessity | Wiggins | II 285 Necessity/QuineVsAristotle/QuineVsEssentialism: the essence not independent of our specification of the objects. >Essentialism, >Essence, >Necessity/Quine. II 292 Wiggins: An Operator "it is necessary that ..." creates opaque contexts: E.g. to be taken for Jekyll is not the same as to be taken for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde. >Opacity, >Beliefs, >Speaker intention. Also rigid designators in contexts with "it is possible that .." are not interchangeable (and probably not even in "necessary..."). >Operators, >Rigidity. II 301 Necessary/Wiggins: analog to inner/outer negation: Tradition: to blurr the difference after the first method: E.g. "necessarily Socrates is a human" and "Socrates is necessarily a human". Wiggins pro second method -> Definition satisfaction for sentences with "necessary": Wiggins pro existence as necessary feature -> Existence generalization. II 303 Necessary/de dicto/Wiggins: simply wrong: E.g. necessarily (x)(x = Cicero)> (x is a human). de dicto: is it true? If so, we get the wrong thing: necessarily (Ez)(x)(x = z > (x is a human). |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Negation | Negation, philosophy, logic: negation of a sentence. In logic, this is done by prefixing the negation symbol. Colloquially expressed by the word "not", which can be at different positions in the sentence. If the negation refers only to one sentence part, this must be made clear by the position, e.g. a predicate can be denied without negating the whole sentence. In logic, therefore, inner and outer negation is distinguished by the use of different symbols. |
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| Negation | Wiggins | II 295 Inner/outer negation/Brian Medlin: E.g. paradox of movement. Problem: to choose between the last moment of rest and the first movement (two Dedekind cuts) 1. "not moving rrr or rr (followed or led or both: of rest) 2. "it is not the case that x was moving: not rbr 3. x was moving: only bb or bbb This is a good example because it has no meaningless names. II 299 Inner/outer negation/Wiggins: the problem: (distinguishing between final rest/first movement) appears in a simple language elsewhere, even if one has avoided "is in motion". Instead formula with "satisfies": "at which point did it stopped being true that "not (x moved)" even though x itself still does not move?" No solution: intuitionistic, sentence of the excluded middle: then there is a problem in the meta language: between predicate negation and sentence negation. >Excluded middle. Standard solution for single negation in object language/meta language (+) - Problem: it does not explain why it is attractive to make the difference: a) it can be true that it is not the case, that El Dorado is located in Venezuela - and b) it is not true that El Dorado is not-in-Venezuela (dashes). This difference of predicate modification is not made clear in the modal logic. >Modal logic. II 300 Solution: uniform functor of predicates on predicates, long and short range, both forms derivable apart. Semantically different interpretations, to build syntactically distinguishable structures. Predicate negation: here the functor "no" leads from the predicate to its complement. II 301 Sentence negation: here the functor leads from the predicate to predicate, e.g. from the universal predicate "λx (Socrates is bald)" (assuming he was bald) to zero predicate "not[λx (Socrates is bald)])". II 301 Necessary/Wiggins: analog to inner/outer negation: Tradition: to blurr difference after the first method: E.g. "necessarily Socrates is a human" and "Socrates is necessarily a human". Wiggins pro second method >satisfaction for sentences with "necessary": Wiggins per existence as necessary property >existential generalization. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Predication | Wessel | I 154f Predication/Wessel: Difference: negation of the attribution of predicates requires distinguishing inner/outer negation. >Internal negation, >External negation, >Negation. Propositional logic: only external negation: the whole statement is negated. >Propositional logic. Internal negation: the predicate is denied. >Predicates, >Attribution. It must be possible to express "neither s ‹ P nor s ‹/ P": e.g. "The moon is neither honest nor not honest". This has nothing to do with the sentence about the law of the excluded middle. "The moon is not honest": the sentence is ambiguous on its own. >Excluded Middle, >Ambiguity, cf. >Sense, >Senseless. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Rules | Bigelow | I 98 Rules/composition/composition rules/syntax/Bigelow/Pargetter: you can also go the other way and want to simplify the rules. That is what makes the λ-categorical language/Lambda/Lambda Calculus/Lambda Notation/Lambda Abstraction/Bigelow/Pargetter: ((see also Cresswell I and II. and Montague). >Lambda abstraction, >Lambda calculus, >M.J. Cresswell, >R. Montague. For example: Negation: you can surprisingly assign a referent to it and keep it out of the rules. >Reference, >Negation, >Rules. I 99 Vs: we then have another referential layer in the theory. Example: Negation: we can assign a set theoretical symbol to it that represents the value "true" or "false". ((s) Truth values/s): assigns a referent to the negation, a "thing": "the False". >Truth values, >Truth values/Frege. Bigelow/Pargetter: then we have a judgement function that assigns the semantic value (or referent) V (a) to a symbol a. 1: be "true". 0: be "false". + Def semantic value: (of the negation V (a)) is then the function ω ~, so that ω ~ (1) = 0 ω ~ (0) = 1 correspondingly for compound expressions (internal/external negation, conjunction, etc.) >Outer Negation. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
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