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The author or concept searched is found in the following 6 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Communitarianism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 170 Communitarianism/Political Philosophy/Dagger: [Longing for community] did not find expression in the word 'communitarian' until the 1840s, when it and communautaire appeared almost simultaneously in the writings of English and French socialists. French dictionaries point to Etienne Cabet and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon as the first to use communautaire, but the Oxford English Dictionary gives the credit for 'communitarian' to one Goodwyn Barmby, who founded the Universal Communitarian Association in 1841 and edited a magazine he called The Promethean, or Communitarian Apostle. According to Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay on 'English reformers', Barmby Gaus I 171 advertised his publication as 'the cheapest of all magazines, and the paper most devoted of any to the cause of the people; consecrated to Pantheism in Religion, and Communism in Politics' (1842(1): 239). In the beginning, then, 'communitarian' seems to have been a rough synonym of 'socialist' and 'communist'. To be a communitarian was simply to believe that community is somehow vital to a worthwhile life and is therefore to be protected against various threats. Socialists and communists were leftists, but a communitarian could as easily be to the right as the left of centre politically (Miller, 2000c)(2) (...) people who moved from the settled, family-focused life of villages and small towns to the unsettled, individualistic life of commerce and cities might gain affluence and personal free- dom, but they paid the price of alienation, isolation, and rootlessness. Ferdinand Tönnies (2001)(3), with his distinction between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (association or civil society), has been especially influential in this regard. As Tönnies defines the terms, Gemeinschaft is an intimate, organic, and traditional form of human association; Gesellschaft is impersonal, mechanical, and rational. To exchange the former for the latter then, is to trade warmth and support for coldness and calculation. Concern for community took another direction in the twentieth century as some writers began to see the centripetal force of the modern state as the principal threat to community. This turn is evident, for instance, in José Ortega y Gasset's warnings in The Revolt of the Masses against 'the gravest danger that today threatens civilisation: State intervention; the absorption of all spontaneous social effort by the State' (1932(4): 120). Nisbet: Robert Nisbet's The Quest for Community (1953)(5) provides an especially clear statement of this position, which draws more on Tocqueville's insistence on the importance of voluntary associations ofcitizens than on a longing for Gemeinschaft. >Community/Tönnies. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in short, the longing for community took the form of a reaction against both the atomizing, anomic tendencies of modern, urban society and the use of the centripetal force of the modern state to check these tendencies. Moreover, modernity was often linked with liberalism, a theory that many took to rest on and encourage atomistic and even 'possessive' individualism (Macpherson, 1962)(6). Against this background, communitarianism developed in the late twentieth century in the course of a debate with - or perhaps within - liberalism. >Liberalism/Gaus. Philosophical communitarianism: Four books published in rapid succession in the 1980s - Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981)(7), Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982)(8), Michael Walzer's Spheres of.Justice (1983)(9), and Charles Taylor's Philosophical Papers (1985)(10) - marked the emergence of this philosophical form of communitarianism.FN7 Different as they are from one another, all of these books express dissatisfaction with liberalism, especially in the form of theories of justice and rights. The main target here was John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971)(11), but Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)(12), Ronald Dworkin's Taking Rights Seriously (1977)(13), and Bruce Ackerman's Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980)(14) also came in for criticism. (CommunitarianismVsRawls, CommunitarianismVsNozick, CommunitarianismVsAckerman, Bruce, CommunitarianismVsDworkin). CommunitarianismVsLiberalism: a typical complaint was, and is, that these theories are too abstract and universalistic. Walzer: In opposing them, Walzer proposes a 'radically particularist' approach that attends to 'history, culture, and membership' by asking not what 'rational individuals under universalizing conditions of such-and-such a sort' would choose, but what would 'individuals like us choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are determined to go on sharing it?' (1983(9): xiv, 5). >M. Walzer. Walzer thus calls attention to the importance of community, which he and others writing in the early 1980s took to be suffering from both philosophical and political neglect. For a valuable, full-length survey of this debate, see Mulhall and Swift, 1996(15) Gaus I 172 Communitarian responesVsCriticisms: responses: 1) the first is that the communitarians' criticisms are misplaced because they have misconceived liberalism (Caney, 1992)(16). In particular, the communitarians have misunderstood the abstractness of the theories they criticize. Thus Rawls maintains (1993(17): Lecture I) that his 'political' conception of the self as prior to its ends is not a metaphysical claim about the nature of the self, as Sandel believes, but simply a way of representing the parties who are choosing principles of justice from behind the 'veil of ignorance'. Nor does this conception of the individual as a self capable of choosing its ends require liberals to deny that individual identity is in many ways the product of unchosen attachments and social circumstances. 2) 'What is central to the liberal view,' according to Will Kymlicka, 'is not that we can perceive a self prior to its ends, but that we understand ourselves to be prior to our ends, in the sense that no end or goal is exempt from possible re-examination' (1989(18) : 52). With this understood, a second response is to grant, as Kymlicka, Dworkin (1986(19); 1992(20)), Gewirth (1996)(21), and Mason (2000)(22) do, that liberals should pay more attention to belonging, identity, and community, but to insist that they can do this perfectly well within their existing theories. 3) the third response, finally, is to point to the dangers of the critics' appeal to community norms. Communities have their virtues, but they have their vices, too - smugness, intolerance, and various forms of oppression and exploitation among them. The fact that communitarians do not embrace these vices simply reveals the perversity of their criticism: they 'want us to live in Salem, but not to believe in witches' (Gutmann 1992(23): 133; Friedman, 1992(24)). 1. Emerson, R. W. (1842) 'English reformers'. The Dial, 3(2). 2. Miller, David (2000c) 'Communitarianism: left, right and centre'. In his Citizenship and National Identity. Cambridge: Polity. 3. Tönnies, Ferdinand (2001 118871) Community and Civil Society, trans. J. Harris and M. Hollis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4. Ortega y Gasset, José (1932) The Revolt of the Masses. New York: Norton. 5. Nisbet, Robert (1953) The Quest for Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. Macpherson, C. B. (1962) The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Clarendon. 7. MacIntyre, Alasdair (1981 ) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 8. Sandel, Michael (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 9. Walzer, Michael (1983) Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic. 10. Taylor, Charles (1985) Philosophical Papers, 2 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 11. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 12. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic. 13. Dworkin, Ronald (1977) Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 14. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale Umversity Press. 15. Mulhall, Stephen and Adam Swift (1996) Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd edn. Oxford: Blackwell. 16. Caney, Simon (1992) 'Liberalism and communitarianism: a misconceived debate'. Political Studies, 40 (June): 273-89. 17. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 18. Kymlicka, Will (1989) Liberalism, Community, and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon. 19. Dworkin, Ronald (1986) Law's Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 20. Dworkin, Ronald (1992) 'Liberal community'. In S. Avinerl and A. de-Shalit, eds, ommunitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 21. Gewirth, Alan (1996) The Community of Rights. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 22. Mason, Andrew (2000) Community, Solidarity, and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 23. Gutmann, Amy (1992) 'Communitarian critics of liberalism'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 24. Friedman, Marilyn (1992) 'Feminism and modern friendship: dislocating the community'. In S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit, eds, Communitarianism and Individualism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dagger, Richard 2004. „Communitarianism and Republicanism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| God | Spinoza | Höffe I 232 God/Spinoza/Höffe: The only substance that exists, God, is cause of itself (causa sui); the different basic forms of reality are nothing else but attributes of God. This indwelling (immanence) of all things in God and God in all things amounts to a pantheism (All-God doctrine: God is everything and in everything). >Pantheism. It excludes a transcendental concept of God that transcends the world and, although Spinoza's system is based on a concept of God, it introduces the then almost fatal accusation of atheism(1). 1. Spinoza. Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, 1677 Genz II 312 Purpose/God/Spinoza: God does not act for purposes, because he does not lack anything. |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Humboldt, Wilhelm von | Gadamer | I 347 Humboldt/Historism/Gadamer: In the final analysis, it is Hegel's position that [19th-century historism] finds its legitimation, even if the historians who inspired the pathos of experience preferred to refer to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt instead. >Historism, >G.W.F. Hegel. GadamerVsSchleiermacher/GadamerVsHumboldt: Neither Schleiermacher nor Humboldt really thought their position through to the end. They may emphasize individuality, the barrier of strangeness that our understanding has to overcome, but in the end, understanding is only completed in an infinite consciousness and the idea of individuality finds its justification. Hegel/Gadamer: It is the pantheistic enclosure of all individuality into the Absolute that makes the miracle of understanding possible. So here, too, being and knowledge permeate each other in I 348 the Absolute. Neither Schleiermacher's nor Humboldt's Kantianism is thus an independent systematic affirmation of the speculative completion of idealism in Hegel's absolute dialectic. >Humboldt as an author, >Absoluteness/Hegel, >Pantheism. 1. The expression philosophy of reflection has been coined by Hegel against Jacobi, Kant and Fichte. Already in the title of "Glaube und Wissen" but as a "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity". Hegel himself counters it with the reflection of reason. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Monism | Spinoza | Höffe I 231 Monism/Spinoza/Höffe: God is neither, as with Descartes, the guarantor of truth, nor, as with Pascal, as "God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob", the object of religious belief (1). Not part of Höffe I 232 philosophy of consciousness, but at the same time a philosophy of being, a philosophy of nature and a moral philosophy, God is considered the perfect and at the same time the only (Greek monos) substance. >Substance/Spinoza, >R. Descartes, >B. Pascal. This monism is supposed to solve the problems of Descartes' dichotomy, the dualism of two created substances, matter and spirit, or tripartite (in addition there is the uncreated God), by a systematic surprise attack: The only substance that exists, God, is cause of itself (causa sui); the various basic forms of reality are nothing but attributes of God. This indwelling (immanence) of all things in God and God in all things amounts to a pantheism (All-God doctrine: God is everything and in everything). It excludes a transcendental concept of God that transcends the world and, although its system starts with a concept of God, it brings Spinoza the then almost fatal accusation of atheism. 1. Spinoza. Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, 1677 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Parmenides | Hegel | Bubner I 66 Parmenides/Hegel/Bubner: Hegel attributes to Parmenides an almost Spinozistic pantheism. Everything be one and the differences void. >Pantheism, >Parmenides, cf. >Spinoza. Hegel: this is due to the denial of the negative, which he has made in the separation of spheres into truth and opinions of man. Then all the negatives belong to the erroneous opinions. These erroneous opinions are constantly shifting back and forth between being and nothing. ParmenidesVs: "Which form the negative can also take, it is not." >Nothingness, >Nonexistence. Hegel: this putting the negative aside leaves only a single truth, namely that being is. Being/Parmenides/Hegel: "Thinking produces itself, what is produced is the thought, so thinking is identical with its being, for there is nothing but being, this great affirmation". This is, however, an abstraction from any determinateness which is attributed to the kingdom of Doxa (erroneous opinions). >Thinking/Hegel. It makes no sense to speak of yet another being than that which is produced by thought. Thinking/being/Hegel/Bubner: the strange thing in the production thesis, into which Hegel dissolves the unity of being and thinking (in Parmenides), is questioned in other translations. In this case one can reverse the primary identity of being with itself as a reason for the existence of thought-content, while Hegel traced back the being to the spawning thinking itself. Being/Parmenides/Hegel: Beginning of Logic: Second Parmenides Exegesis: I 69 Definition being/Parmenides/Hegel: Being is the indefinite immediacy. Bubner: this is not simply a matter of heaven, but the absence of any quality (determinateness) is generated by radical abstraction from all that is defined, which means a denial of all mediation. >Abstractness/Hegel. Thus the immediate is the absolute emptiness in the beginning. This coincides with nothingness. Since there is nothing to permanently refer to, in order to characterize being in its peculiarity, the limit to nothingness has always been blurred. >Beginning. However, a reflection on the origin would show that the indeterminacy has arisen only by moving away all determinateness. In reality, therefore, the beginning is not at all the indifference of being and nothing, but in the "movement of the immediate disappearance of the one in the other. End/beginning/Parmenides/Hegel: the static developmental beginning would be the end. It is therefore necessary to go beyond the position of the absolute, and such a process itself constitutes a "second new beginning." Finite/infinite/idealism/Hegel/Bubner: the transition from the infinite to the finite (in the early idealistic construction) must then be accomplished in such a way that the infinite does not become finite. >Infinity/Hegel, >Finiteness/Hegel. I 72 There must be no boundary between the two, because then the infinite is no longer itself, but limited. This boils down to the principle that there is nowhere in heaven and on earth something that does not contain both being and nothing in itself. " Finite/infinite/boundary/Hegel/Bubner: it has always been passed over. Thus the fixing of one position against another, which made the transition necessary, is already faulty. Abstraction always comes too late, the process of passing over is always going on. This is the triumph of the "profound Heraclitus" over eleatism. Cf. >Heraclitus, >Eleatics. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Substance | Spinoza | Holz I 31 Substance/Spinoza: is with him unique according to its nature, infinite, and indivisible. Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: whoever starts from the thought prerequisite of the substantial unity of the world and the experience prerequisite of the qualitative difference of beings (of manifoldness) can conceive this manifoldness only as manifestations or aspects of the one substance, in which "all that one had taken for true, has perished." >Unity/Spinoza, >Appearance, >World, >Order, >World/Thinking. This, however, reveals the actual presupposition of thinking, the difference in the content of thought. Leibniz saw the danger. Holz I 32 Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in the unity". >Unity and multiplicity. If deduction is only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought. >Reduction, >Reductionism. Holz I 62 Identity Principle/objective cognition/Leibniz: The objective unity of the world can also be shown independently of my perception, it is evident in the way of givenness of every consciousness content in itself. (Everything appears as what it appears). >Identity, >Self-identity, >Whole, >Totality. Adequacy does not matter here. >Adequacy. "Tantum est quantum est, tale est quale est". Pre-predictive being a priori. Problem: then the phenomena are still mere moments of the one and only substance, as in Spinoza. Substance/Spinoza: no being is to be justified against the universe in its own being. Rather, the reduction of identical sentences would lead to an "ens absolute infinitum" in Spinoza, from which "it follows that there is only one substance and that it is infinite." However, this reduction can only come to a beginning with a waiver of the substantial existence of the many individuals. Holz I 63 VsSpinoza: if one accepts the existence of the individual, the problem is insoluble for Spinoza. He solves the problem, or it does not come into his field of view, because he conceives the essence of the human only as formed from certain modifications of the attributes of God. With this, the Cartesian doubt is covered up. The ego cogitans becomes the mere appearance, the annexation of the self-assured unity of God. Thus Spinoza returns to medieval realism. Thus the rationality of the factual cannot be justified. >Rationality, >Rationalism, >Ultimate justification, >Foundation, >Realism. Höffe I 232 Substance/Spinoza/Höffe: The only substance that exists, God, is cause of itself (causa sui); the different basic forms of reality are nothing else but attributes of God. This indwelling (immanence) of all things in God and God in all things amounts to a pantheism (All-God doctrine: God is everything and in everything). It excludes a transcendent concept of God that transcends the world and, although its system starts from a concept of God, it brings Spinoza the then almost fatal accusation of atheism(1). >Pantheism, >God. 1. Spinoza. Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, 1677 |
Spinoza I B. Spinoza Spinoza: Complete Works Indianapolis 2002 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
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