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The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Magical Thinking | Flusser | I 121 Magic/Flusser: for people who are not aware of conventionality, the world is not structured as if it could be depicted in pictures, but is actually depictable in pictures. It is scenic. There is no difference between "real " and "imaginary" world. As soon as imagination or myth is spoken of, they are at risk. We should not forget that our own imagination is on a different level than that of children and primitives. >Imagination, >Thinking, >Images, >Myth. I 121 Whoever connects to the world through images, whoever experiences them as a scene, whoever lives imaginatively, for them the world is at the same time right and horrible. It is "holy." >World/thinking. There is nothing primitive about the worldview that regards Gods as "valuable", it is only historically behind the profane worldview of the explanatory texts, but not figuratively. I 122 If one believes that "earlier" is less good than "later" and "older" is less true than "younger", then one has read the relations of the information that the linear codes arrange incorrectly - i. e. figuratively. >Time, >Linear order, >Past, >Present, >Future, To say that every tree contains a God or every spring is a mermaid is basically nothing more than to say that every thing is "invisible" connected to all others. >Cf. >Pathetic fallacy, >Animism. And in such a way that these relations produce a picture. God, soul, mermaid are names for relationships between things within an absolute, timeless immortal because the orbiting time contains the whole. That is why gods, mermaids, etc. are immortal. The elements of the image may shift, but the ratios are constant. Living in such a world means constantly breaking the rules, because living means moving and moving means leaving one's right place in the picture. Life in magic is "horrible". >Imagination II. I 123 Imagination II/Flusser: Images are designed to recognize the world that has become unrecognizable: maps. >Images, >Map example. Then the world begins to be experienced as an image, i.e. to mirror the categories of the image. In it life becomes horrible, from now on the images must serve a strategy of escaping the horrible and function as magical tools. >Consciousness, >Thinking, >Reality, >Imagination, >Images, >Relations, >Association, >Myth, >Experience, >Life, >Causes, >Effect. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
| Magical Thinking | Lévi-Strauss | I 23 Magical Thinking/Lévi-Strauss: one could consider the rigour and precision of magical thinking and ritual practices as the expression of an unconscious notion of the truth of determinism. I 22 Magic/Witchcraft/Evans-Pritchard: seen as a system of natural philosophy, it contains a theory of causes: misfortune arises from the magic that cooperates with the forces of nature. (E.E. Evans-Pritchard 1955(1)) I 34 The mythical thinking, although trapped in images, is already generalizing, i.e. scientific, because it works with analogies and comparisons. .... However, reconstructions with the same materials are always related to past purposes and play in this the role of means. The signifiers become significants and vice versa. >Determinism, >Nature, >Causes, >Effect, >Generalization, >Analogies, >Purpose-means-rationality, >Pathetic fallacy. 1. E.E. Evans-Pritchard, "Witchcraft", Africa, vol. 8, Number 4, London 1955, S. 418f. |
LevSt I Claude Lévi-Strauss La pensée sauvage, Paris 1962 German Edition: Das Wilde Denken Frankfurt/M. 1973 LevSt II C. Levi-Strauss The Savage Mind (The Nature of Human Society Series) Chicago 1966 |
| Psychology | Churchland | Pauen I 94 Paul ChurchlandVsEveryday psychology/Pauen: 1. it fails with central problems: development and dynamics of mental illnesses, ability to creative imagination, causes of intelligence differences. 2. Everyday psychology will not resolve this in the foreseeable future. In primitive cultures, their reach was much greater: here, it is even applied to natural phenomena. (Pathetic fallacy: jealous moon, annoying wind). 3. Within the sciences, everyday psychology leads a wallflower existence. Pauen I 95 Churchland: Turning from the Neurobiological Approach to Neuroinformatics. Even the fight against crime could benefit from the elimination of everyday psychology. Pauen I 96 Churchland: the vocabulary of everyday psychology will disappear. >Folk psychology. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Carnap, R. | Verschiedene Vs Carnap, R. | Skirbekk I 16 Probation: correspondence between sentence and the reality NeurathVsCarnap: coherence rather than correspondence. Carnap VI 177 Attribution/Quality/Sensory Quality/Carnap: there is no sharp line between attributable and non-attributable sensory qualities. Organ sensations can hardly or not at all be attributed to certain world lines (i.e. visual things). Example "melancholic forest": This attribution is justified! VI 178 Because it arouses a sensation of corresponding quality. Like sugar the sweet one. (external) VsCarnap: "pathetic fallacy". VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (Theory of Colours): one should remain in the field of sensory perceptions themselves and determine the laws existing between them in the field of perceptions themselves. CarnapVsGoethe: so we would have to find the laws there (n of perception). But physical laws do not apply there, of course, but certain other laws do if the constitution of the physical world is to be possible at all. But these laws are of a much more complicated form. VI 71 Characteristics/characteristic/definition/constitution/Carnap: Problem: e.g. foreign psychic: the behavior is not the same as the foreign psychic itself! Realism: the angry behavior is not the anger itself. Solution/Carnap: but one can transform all scientific (not metaphysical) statements about F into statements about K while keeping the logical value (truth value). Then F and K are logically identical. (s) But not vice versa: the concept of behavior is not the concept of anger. VI 72 A meaning for K that did not agree with F could not be given scientifically! (many authors VsCarnap). Carnap: this has to do with Leibniz's identity. VI 78/79 Foreign Psychic/Carnap: every psychological process, if it occurs as foreign psychic, is in principle recognizable (by behavior) or questionable. So every statement can be transformed into a statement about the corresponding characteristics. It follows from this that all psychological objects can be traced back to physical objects (movements of expression, behaviour). (BergsonVsCarnap). |
Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Folk Psychology | Churchland Vs Folk Psychology | Lanz I 302 P. S. Churchland: Instead of "Neurophilosophy": it is noteworthy that due to folk psychology we do not have the faintest idea of what is the basis of the psychological phenomena that are quite familiar to us. Pauen I 94 Paul ChurchlandVsFolk Psychology/Pauen: 1. fails with central problems: origin and dynamics of mental illnesses, ability to creative imagination, causes of differences in intelligence. 2. Folk psychology will not solve this in the foreseeable future. In primitive cultures their reach was much greater: here they are even applied to natural phenomena. (>Pathetic fallacy: jealous moon, angry wind). 3. Within the sciences, folk psychology leads a wallflower existence. I 95 Churchland: change from neurobiological approach to neuroinformatics. Even the fight against crime could benefit from the elimination of everyday psychology. I 96 Churchland: the vocabulary of everyday psychology will disappear, other Vs. |
Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Materialism | Papineau Vs Materialism | David Papineau Literature II 309 Def Antipathetic Fallacy/Papineau: from the fact that we do not have the experiences we erroneously conclude that we could not refer to them either. Confusion of mention and use: we slide from a) to b) a) Third person thoughts do not use conscious experiences b) Third person thoughts do not mention conscious experiences. However, there is no reason why a third person could not relate (mention) thoughts to the experiences of others, but without using them. (Mention = Reference) II 310 Antipathetic False Conclusion/Papineau: What should he explain? He should explain why so many people have such strong intuitions according to which conscious states are not physical. (VsMaterialism, VsPhysicalism, Papineau pro.). II 312 PapineauVsAntipathetic Fallacy/Papineau: error that the experience is something additional to the brain state. (Category error, e.g. as if the university was something additional to the sum of its parts). Papineau: there is nothing to explain. I am not denying consciousness, but that there are additional inner lights. (McGinn uses this metaphor.) |
Papineau I David Papineau "The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning" in: D. Papineau: The Roots of Reason, Oxford 2003, pp. 83-129 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Papineau II David Papineau The antipathetic fallacy and the boundaries of consciousness In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Papineau III D. Papineau Thinking about Consciousness Oxford 2004 |
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