Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 15 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Completeness | Poundstone | I 252 Puzzle/Poundstone: anticipate the basic problem of inference, namely the question of how to recognize a paradox - (NP-complete). >Conclusions, >Paradoxes, >Recognition. Right turn rule: is overcome by islands, therefore inefficient. Solution: Tremaux: thread, at a dead end return to the last node. Also mark dead ends. - Two breadcrumbs mark old dead ends. - At old node choose a path that was not chosen before. I 259 Results in first exploring remote areas. I 267 "Problem of the longest path": is there an easy way? Trying does not lead directly to the shortest one. - No intelligent algorithm is available. I 270 NP-Complete/Poundstone: the answers are easy to verify! E.g. puzzle: the right way may only be two nodes away, but you had to try out many combinations. >Review, >Verification, >Confirmation. I 282 Prove that NP problems cannot be solved with a computer. I 274 Combination/Permutation/Combinatorics: P: polynomial function: n² - E.g. puzzle with 5000 parts. solvable - NP: exponential function. 2n. E.g. Puzzle with 5000 paths - unsolvable. In general: difficult to solve. NP: "non-deterministically polynomial-temporally complete". I 276 So far no evidence that NP problems cannot be solved in polynomial time. - But no empirical evidence. - The process of logical inferences is itself an NP problem. - Our conclusions about the world are limited. I 281 The chain end, the very basis of our knowledge, can be recognized in polynomial time and checked for contradictions (lists; - but not walkable as a puzzle). >Knowledge, >Contradictions, >Consistency. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Forms of Thinking | Logic Texts | Read III 126 In fact, it seems that the two worlds are identical, except that there is a permutation of identities, that is, of counterparts. This, the anti-Haeccetist replies, is a distinction without distinction! >Haecceitism, >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory, >Possible world, >Identity. --- II 252 Description level: Now, here, all meaning of "truth" and "falsehood" is abstracted, except for their difference. --- Read III 59 "Too much"/"too little": The classical view with the substitution of Bolzano produces too much: it counts conclusions as valid, which are obviously invalid. But it also produces too little by citing arguments as invalid which should be recognized as valid in a plausible manner. III 78 It is disputed whether the production of such a counterexample is a necessary condition for the invalidity. That is, whether the inability to produce one is sufficient for validity. >Sufficiency. III 113 Stalnaker: includes an "impossible world" under his worlds, which he calls lambda, in which every statement is true! All such conditional sentences are found to be true here. ((s) Explanation: in such a world A and not-A would be true at the same time - contradiction.) III 212 If the boundary (interpretation or naming) between two things is indeterminate, one is the other in an undefined way. >Identification, >Individuation, >Specification, >Gaurisankar example. "ad hoc": III 232 But if we were to protest against the introduction of a new link with the sole reason that it leads to a paradox, this objection would be entirely ad hoc. There would be no diagnosis of the problem. III 232f Bluriness (fuzzy): does not help with Sorites - graduation distribution is no possibility distribution. >Sorites, >Vaguenes. --- I 54 Impermissible duplication: the mythical Crete, as different from Greek Crete, the historical Crete, the European Crete, the remembered Crete. >Ontology, >Qua objects. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Grammar | Chomsky | Searle VIII 414 ChomskyVsStructuralism: phrase structure rules alone cannot resolve ambiguities. E.g. >Active/Passive. Solution/Chomsky: transformation rules, transformation phrase markers by permutation, insertion, eradication of elements in other phrase markers - then the syntax consists of two components: base and transformation. VIII 418 Deep structure/Chomsky: determines the meaning. >Meaning. Surface structure: determines the phonetic form (late works: sometimes the meaning). Syntax/Chomsky: is to be separated from semantics - (according to Searle): man is a syntactic creature, the brain is syntactic. >Syntax. VIII 421 SearleVsChomsky: from this it would follow that if one day we had syntactically modified forms, we would have no language anymore, but something else. VIII 421 Generative grammar/NeogrammariansVsChomsky: semantics crucial for the formation of syntactic structures. >Young turks, >Neogrammarians. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Indeterminacy | Quine | Rorty I 227 McDowellVsQuine: If truth is underdetermined by the entirety of the observable, then it must be independent of it. This is absurd for verificationists, therefore one must not understand it realistically. This strategy would imply, however, that one includes biology, but excludes translation. ChomskyVsQuine: there is only one indeterminacy: the familiar underdeterminacy of each theory through all observations. ((s) You never know whether all the observations are taken into account, or are already done. Quine I 257 Indeterminate singular terms do not designate objects. An indefinite singular term must therefore stand in purely significant position: E.g. "The tax inspector is looking for someone" (position significant - "someone" is not significant). >Singular Terms/Quine. I 283 Indefinite singular term: disappears in quantification "something is an x such that", "everything is an x .." I 285 Beliefs and quotes can be understood as infinite different things (Indeterminacy). II 33 Inscrutability of reference: no difference: "x is a dog" or "x is the spatiotemporal strand, which is filled by a dog" - it is only one statement about the used terminology and its translation, not about physical objects (representative function). Inscrutability: occurs in translation or permutation. >Translation/Quine. VI 69 Indeterminacy of translation/syntax/Quine: the ambiguity does not extend to the syntax - but on the referential apparatus: plural endings, equal signs, quantifiers - but these are not part of syntax. XII 60 Indeterminacy of translation/Quine: E.g. numbers of Neumann, Frege, Zermelo: each definition is correct, but they are all incompatible with one another. Solution: we invent set-theoretic models which must comply with the laws that fulfill the numbers in non-explicit meaning - Problem: you do not know if you talk about the terms or about the Goedel numbers (>shifted ostension). XII 62 Indeterminacy of translation/Native language/Quine: the indeterminacy of translation is also valid in a language: E.g. we may translate the "hopefully" of a particular speaker differently - principle of indulgence: justifies deviations from the homophonic translation, reproduction by the same phoneme order - compensation: can be made by corrections to the predicates - problem: we cannot ask: "are you really referring to Goedel numbers?" - Because the answer: "to numbers" lost its right to homophonic translation - ((s) because of the principle of indulgence). XII 97 Indeterminacy/translation/Gavagai/linguistics/Quine: the linguist always comes to an accurate translation, but only because he/she unconsciously makes arbitrary decisions - decisive: the holism: statements cannot be isolated. ((S) any differences can be compensated in other partial-translations.) |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Inscrutability of reference | Quine | II 33 Inscrutability of reference: there is no difference between: x is a dog or: x is the space time portion that is filled by a dog. Only the Statement about the terminology is used and its translation, it is not about physical objects (representative function). Inscrutability: occurs in translation or permutation. VI 71 Analytical hypothesis/Translation manual/Quine: is done term by term translation. Problem: then meaningful sentences may arise which refer to something else. This is the inscrutability of reference. XII 58 Inscrutability/Reference/Quine: goes much deeper than indeterminacy of translation: even within a language, even if the apparatus of individuation (plural, pronoun, identity, quantification, etc.) is assumed to be fixed. - E.g. protosyntax: (only strings of signs of one type (1st stage) - in that case, expressions are always types, not tokens. >Translation/Quine, >Indeterminacy/Quine. ad XII 64 Non-factualism/(s): if something is indeterminate in principle, then there is no fact to explore. - Quine: e.g. if meaning is a property of the behavior, the inscrutability of reference cannot lie in the inscrutability of a fact - because there is nothing to investigate. But it probably makes a difference whether one refers to rabbits or parts, - or e.g. to the formulas or Goedel numbers. Because then there would be no difference between them. Reference would lose its meaning. But the difference is not tangible, neither through the behavior nor through ostension. -> Indeterminacy/Quine. - Formulas: have different properties than numbers. XII 65 Reversed spectra/Inscrutability/Quine: corresponds to the problem rabbit/part (Gavagai). Only that there is no frame of reference (apparatus of individuation). It can never be found out. Things are reversed, properties are retained. ((s) Things do not change sides, properties). XII 66 Pointing/Ontological relativity/Inscrutability/Quine: you cannot point to absolute location or speed. -Just as you cannot point to rabbits or parts. (> Gavagai/Quine). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Inverted Spectra | Fodor | IV 195 Exchanged spectra: nothing in the behavior can uncover the permutation (VsBehaviorism). >Behaviorism. Representation of the frequencies does not represent the sensation. The descriptions can be changed at will. Tradition: sensation is not a necessary property of color. If there is a "metaphysically necessary" connection between perception and neurophysiology, then still none between color concept and psychophysical concept. >Sensation, >Colour. IV 195 State space/Fodor/LeporeVsChurchland: the problem of identity will always return. Ultimately, there is no other criterion than observational concepts. >Observation lnguage, >Observation sentences, >Identity, >Criteria. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Negation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 150 Negation/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the negation is the same picture - the sense of which is, however, reversed - (polarized) - so that the sentence negation is eliminated. Negation/Frege/Russell/Hintikka: negations of the predicate eliminate them and instead add the sentence negation. II 51 Negation/Wittgenstein: its meaning can only be expressed through rules of use. II 51 Denial/negation/Wittgenstein: there must be an agreement: E.g. the red light is on its own not the instruction to stop. It must be explained with the help of language. The meaning of "no" can only be expressed in rules that apply to its manner of use. II 72 Negation/explanation/Russell: explained ~ p by saying that ~ p is true when p is false, and vice versa. II 73 Negation/WittgensteinVsRussell: but that is no explanation of negation, because it could also apply to other than the negative sentences. (> Truth table). II 74 Negation/fact/Wittgenstein: what corresponds to the sentence "the door is not open" if it is open? But here a mistaken analogy comes into play, because it is nothing that corresponds to p. And that, what corresponds to ~ p , is not being the case of p. II 75 Denial/negation/understanding/Wittgenstein: the understanding of "no" is like understanding a chess move. >Chess. II 113 Fact/negation/Wittgenstein: there are no positive or negative facts. "Positive" and "negative" refer to the form of the sentences and not to the facts. >Facts. II 114 A negative statement has not meaning in the same way as a positive statement; it cannot be described by positive terms and maintain its negative meaning. >Thoughts/Frege. II 221 Internal negation/Wittgenstein: the statement "this table is green" does not form part of the statement "this table is not green"? - ((s) claim, not sentence) - Wittgenstein: we rather draw a picture. >Picture theory. II 234 Generality/general things/general/negation/Wittgenstein: the grammars of the generality and the negation are ambiguous in incredible ways. >Generality. E.g. "This square is white" I could translate it as: "all the points of this square are white". Then we cannot say: "a point is not white" without introducing new conventions. Negation/"all"/Wittgenstein: both have different grammars. One has raised the question whether the negation of sentences implies the same as a disjunction of sentences. In certain cases, it is actually so: E.g. disjunction: "this is one of the primary colors, but not red", which means: "this is white or yellow or green or blue or black." However, there is no disjunction which corresponds to "Schmitz is not in this room". >Disjunction. Double Negation/Wittgenstein: is frequently used in the sense of a simple negation. E.g. "I like it and I do not like it". II 239 Who says we do not mean them in that sense, is saying that there are different types of double negation. Some say: "the application will be different." But how can one speak of a system of signs, without talking of the application. >Use, >Signs. E.g. I can lay my hands together so that they are covering each other. But one can ask: How would you like to explain "cover" with or without reference to something that is brought to cover? II 276 Double negation/Wittgenstein: double negation equals affirmation: it is not a determination about our habits, because then it would be a statement of natural history and not even a true one. It may be that the double negation means the negation in a symbol system. >Symbols. II 282 Negation/disjunction/Repertoire/Wittgenstein: if one has a distinct repertoire one can equate negation "not-p" with a disjunction e.g. "q v r v s" - that does not work, with e.g. "not this red here". - Delimited repertoire: E.g. permutations. Philosophy/Wittgenstein: the words "true" and "false" are two words, of which the philosophy was so far dependent. The philosophy is always based on questions without sense. We can completely abolish true and false. Instead, "sentence" and "negation". ((s)> referential quantification, > semantic ascent). II 288 Shadow/negation/world/reality/figure/Wittgenstein: we believe the sentences must correspond at least with something like a shadow. But nothing is thus obtained. After all, why in the world should there be a shadow of that reality? The confusing of the negation is in the thought, a symbol must correspond to something. >World, >Reality. How can you know what is meant when no equivalent is there? Nevertheless, you must know what you mean. >Meaning (Intending). II 289 Negation/Wittgenstein: E.g. "here is not a chair" corresponds to that here is the place and somewhere in the world are chairs. E.g. "I wish Schmitz may come" erroneous idea: that the sentence must consist of somehow jointed portions, like a box has a bottom and a lid. II 290 Negation/understanding/Wittgenstein: if one has understood "~ p", one must also have understood "p". But if p is false, there is nothing that corresponds to it. What does it mean to understand a command, if you do not follow him? By forming an image one does not get closer to the execution. >Understanding. --- IV 79 Negation/denial/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 5,513 one could say, two sentences are opposed to one another if they have nothing in common - and: every sentence has only one negative - ((s)> completeness,> maximum). |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Order | Carnap | VI 206 System/Reference/Transformation/Meaning/Relation/Permutation/Carnap: any other relations could be accepted arbitrarily, for which still exactly the same empirical propositions (according to the signs!) apply, which now mean something else, however. - E.g. we only need a harmonized transformation of the set of the basic elements in itself and as a new basic relation those relations whose inventory is the transformed inventory of the old basic relations. Then, the new relations are structurally equivalent (isomorphic) to the old ones. VI 213 Order/Carnap: E.g. dog in the zoological realm: point - as an individual different - temporal order unlike any other - the distinction singular term/general term corresponds to that between orders - qualities are ordered differently than by space and time - this is equivalent to the difference between identity of localization and sameness of color of view field points - reason: different equally located (with the same number of digits) quality classes can never belong to the same elementary experience, but those of the same color can. Only thus could we separate the two orders of field of view and color body (>dimensions). VI 215 Identity of location: is what allows the knowledge synthesis in the first place. - ((s) Two things can only be in the same place after one another - temporal dimension - not with sameness of color). >Similarity, >Quality, >Identity, >Space, >Time; cf. >Simultaneity. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Phrase Structure Grammar | Lyons | I 215 Constituent structural grammar/history/Lyons: three stages: 1. Bloomfield: introduced the term. Thesis: The analysis is appropriate if it takes the meanings into account. 2. Wells and Harris: Distribution, distributional criteria. >Distribution. 3. Chomsky: Investigation of the nature of the rules that generate sentences. >N. Chomsky, >L. Bloomfield, >Z.S. Harris. Ambiguity/Grammar/Lyons: Example a) beautiful (girls dress) or b) (beautiful girl's) dress: requires brackets (and therefore layers). Constituent: is made clear by brackets. On the other hand: 2. E.g. they can fish: there is no difference in the brackets, instead "fish" can be interpreted as a verb (they can fish) or a noun (they fill fish into cans). I 216 3. E.g. some more convincing evidence: Possible views: a) some evidence, which is more convincing: - some (more convincing) evidence b) some more evidence, which is convincing: - (some more) (convincing evidence). N.B.: here, however, there is a difference in the distributional classification of the elements beyond the difference in brackets. E.g. some less convincing evidence is no longer ambiguous. Nor, for example, some more good convincing evidence. Distribution: e.g. more belongs to at least two distributional classes: a) It combines like less with adjectives to adjective complexes (but its distribution is more limited than that of less, because here more is in complementary distribution with the suffix -er. Similar to e.g. nicer versus more nice), b) In contrast to less, it combines with a preceding some to a "closer definition" (modification) of nouns and nominal groups (cf. some more evidence to some less evidence). Ambiguity/Grammar/Lyons: can therefore 1. be a consequence of the constituent structure or 2. the distributional classification of the final or intermediate constituents. This applies to many languages. Solution: Naming the nodes (or bracket structures) of the family tree. E.g. ∑{ NP ( A [poor] + N[John]) + VP(V [ran] + Adv [away] ) } Brackets: there is no ranking between the two types of brackets used here. The different brackets are for readability only. I 217 Modification/Tradition/Lyons: in traditional theory "poor John" would be classified as a nominal complex because he "assumes the function of a noun" in sentences. Distribution: this can be interpreted in such a way that expressions of the form adjective + noun have the same distribution in the sentences generated by the grammar as nouns. The corresponding node is characterized by "NP". Ambiguity/Grammar/Lyons: can be removed: instead of A + N1 + N2 we write brackets: (A+ N1) + N2 or A + (N1 + N2). For example fresh (fruit market) or (fresh fruit) market and new fruit market, but not (new fruit) market. For simplicity's sake, we assume that neither fresh fruit market nor new fruit market have more than one interpretation. Semantics: from their point of view we will say that they are clear. Grammar: Question, can they still be grammatically ambiguous? I 218 For example, is the constituent structure fresh (fruit market) and in the other case (new fruit) market grammatically permissible? Cf. >Acceptability. Problem: an explicit grammar must be able to answer this. It is a matter of subclassification with two limiting uncertainty factors and the question of "decreasing yield" - grammar must not become too complicated. Rules should not only apply to the creation of a few sentences. Constituents/Grammar/Lyons: Constituent grammar allows sentences to be understood as composed of layers of constituents. The main reason for this: more economical and intuitively more appropriate description. (as by "subject"/"predicate"). In addition, ambiguities can be eliminated (by brackets corresponding to the layers). I 218 Constituent Structure Grammar/Constituent Structure/Lyons: 1) It is about finding out where to put the brackets. 2) It is about constructing a system of rules that clearly assign correct constituent structures to these sentences. First of all: we will only look at the following systems, which were examined by Chomsky: Concatenating replacement systems/Chomsky/Grammar/Lyons: I 219 We call these Simple constituent structure grammars/phrase structure grammar/Chomsky: Replacement systems/Chomsky/Lyons: E.g. (1) ∑ > NP + Vp (2) VP > V + Adv (3) Np > A + N >Rules/Lyons, >Ambiguity/Lyons, >Unambiguity. I 226 Discontinuous constituents/Grammar/Lyons: Problem: Constituents of a construction do not have to stand next to each other. Example: Interrupted constituents: e.g. to call ...up a) John called up Bill b) John called Bill up c) John called him up Wrong: John called up him. Discontinuous constituents/grammar/Lyons: Problem: Constituents of a construction do not have to stand next to each other. Example Interrupted constituents: e.g. to call ...up Structure: called up is not only a common constituents of a) - c), but these three also have the same constituent structure. Solution: distinction optional/obligatory: the rule operates optionally in the case of a) and b), and in the case of c) obligatory ((s) i.e. in a) and b) the word position can be changed, but not in c)). Problem: this assumes that we can specify the conditions under which the rule is optional or obligatory. Word order: e.g. free word order: Latin. For example: Catullous Clodiam amabat, allows all permutations, because the accusative is marked by the ending. Solution: we need additional permutation rules. I 227 Problem: if the word order were really completely free, the permutation rules would be simple, but the order of certain words is subject to restrictions, which complicates the question. I 237 Distribution/constituent grammar/Lyons: the distributional basis for the replacement rules is clear here: Each rule of the form A > B + C is based on the distributional identity of A and B + C. The A disappears, except as the name of a higher node. I 238 Replacement Rules/Lyons: in a grammar with replacement rules, the terms "endocentric" and "exocentric" are not introduced at all! >Terminology/Lyons. Constituent Structural Grammar/Lyons: NP and VP could just as easily be called X and Y. The relationship between nominal complexes, nouns and pronouns ((s) categories) is not expressed by the nomenclature as in the "classificatory" approach, but by the fact that they are derived from a common node. I 238 Categorical Grammar/Tradition/Lyons: here the term dependency (dependency similar to subordination) is fundamental. >Categorial grammar. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Qualia | Stalnaker | I 222 Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: functionalism will explain qualia with a relational structure. >Functionalism. Problem: if we could have a permutation so that the relational general structure remained - then no functionalist theory could be right. >Inverted spectra, >Permutation. I 223 Vs: this can be disputed:the relations are more complex, for example, there are relations of colors among each other - that would mean denying symmetry. >Colour. Inverted spectra/Stalnaker: bad solution: a bad solution would be to introduce additional characteristics, e.g. blue is cool - we only need the possibility of symmetry for some creatures. >Symmetries. Functionalism: functionalism identifies qualia intra-personnally through distinguishability. Shoemaker: Shoemaker wants to reconcile interpersonal comparisons with qualia. >Sydney Shoemaker. Interpersonal/Wittgenstein: interpersonal arises from the possibility to change intra-personnally. Bad solution/swapped spectra: It is not a good solution to introduce additional characteristics like red is hot, blue is cool etc. >Metaphors. Stalnaker: I follow Shoemaker and put aside such objections. We need only the possibility of symmetry for some creatures. Qualia/Functionalism/Stalnaker: since functionalism identifies qualia intrapersonally via distinguishing capacities, one should expect it to accept the Frege/Schlick view, i.e., that there is no interpersonal counterpart to it. >Moritz Schlick. Shoemaker: That would be too simple. Thesis: Shoemaker wants to reconcile interpersonal comparisons of qualia with a functionalist approach. While we cannot define certain qualitative states in functionalist terms, we can define classes of qualitative states. Classes of qualitative states: We functionally define identity conditions for elements of this class, then we can define relations of phenomenal (qualitative) sameness and dissimilarity. >Identity conditions. Thus we obtain equivalence classes of physical states. Equivalent states will be those which are realizations of the same qualitative state. Then the qualitative states are identified with their physical realizations. >Equivalence classes. ShoemakerVsFrege/Stalnaker: the main reason he resists the Frege/Schlick view is... I 224 ...the view that one cannot deny the coherence of the hypothesis that there can be intrapersonally interchanged spectra. And he believes that from there there is an argument for interpersonal swapped spectra that cannot be resisted. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Reference | Quine | Rorty I 219f Quine: inscrutability of reference: not talking of what the objects of a theory are in an absolute sense is useful, but the question of how a theory of objects can be interpreted or re-interpreted in another one. E.g. How can you find out if someone sees everything upside down, or in complementary colors? It makes sense to talk about subordinate theories, but only relative to the theoretical framework with its own preliminarily appropriated and ultimately inscrutable ontology. >Inscrutability. Hartry FieldVsQuine: has shown that Quine’s talk of "relativization to a background language," and of "taking the reference literally" is not consistent with his general reasoning. RortyVsQuine: a real holism would consider the question "are we referring in reality to rabbit or rabbit parts? To formulas or to Goedel numbers" neither meaningless nor meaningful only relative to a background language, but in reality to be a question such as " Are we are really talking about nations or groups of individual persons?" "Are we talking about witches or hallucinations?" These questions make sense if we give them meaning. That means that something else depends on their answer. --- Quine I 273 Shared reference: Terms, not objects! - Nevertheless, it is water, which is spread - mass terms: cumulative reference, (grammatically like singular term) - singular term: shared reference. >Language acquisition, >Triangulation, >Mass terms. I 166 Opaque verb: "hunts lions" puts nothing in relation, does not refer to a lion - relative term police chasing a man. I 273 Theories and things: Prerequisite of an object is not the same as reference, but same motivation - Fido-Fido principle: individual chairs mostly nameless, "chair" refers to virtually any chair. Reference: comes out through the predication: it is the same in dogs and milk: Milk is white, Fifi is a dog - But: milk and dog cannot be. compare II 13f. --- II 33 Inscrutability of reference: there is no difference: "x is a dog" or "x is the space time portion, which is filled by a dog" - only statement about the terminology used and its translation, not physical object (proxy function). - inscrutability: in translation or permutation. Putnam II 194 Reference/Quine: there are definitely true and false sentences, but no specific reference relation - reason: the true sentences have an infinite number of models, and there is not the one designated model (Loewenheim) - in various true models, there are then various reference relations. --- Quine I 129 Translation: translatable: observation sentences, truth functions (conjunction, negation, alternation) - identifiable: stimulus analytic sentences, stimulus-synonymous occasion sentences of the natives - untranslatable: stimulus-synonymous occasion sentences. --- VII (g) 130f Reference/Theory of reference/th.o.r./Quine: name, truth, denotation (designating ("true-by")), extension, values of variables, ontological commitments - theory of reference includes the semantic paradoxes. --- Lauener XI 175 Reference/extensions/Singular term/general term/Follesdal/Lauener: singular term: have a reference - general term and sentences have an extension. >Singular terms, >Extension, >Intension. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
| Simulacrum | Baudrillard | Blask I 26 Simulacra = are artificial worlds of signs. Baudrillard: Order of the Simulacra: 1st order: (Renaissance) Imitation, pretense, automat 2nd order: (industrial revolution) production/reproduction, robot 3rd order: (Present) There is random permutation. Negation is integrated. There is total relativity. There is no choice. All answers are already there. Blask I 29 Def Simulation/Baudrillard: simulation is that irresistible process, in which things are linked together as if they had a meaning. It eliminates the principle of truth and thus the semantic equivalence between the signifier and the signified. >Simulation, >Robots, >Truth, >Synonymy, >Sign, >Symbol, >Renaissance, >Relativism. |
Baud I J. Baudrillard Simulacra and Simulation (Body, in Theory: Histories) Ann Arbor 1994 Baud II Jean Baudrillard Symbolic Exchange and Death, London 1993 German Edition: Der symbolische Tausch und der Tod Berlin 2009 Blask I Falko Blask Jean Baudrillard zur Einführung Hamburg 2013 |
| Spam | AI Research | Norvig I 865 Spam/AI Research/Norvig/Russell: Language identification and genre classification are examples of text classification, as is sentiment analysis (classifying a movie or product review as positive or negative) and spam detection (classifying an email message as spam or not-spam). Since “not-spam” is awkward, researchers have coined the term ham for not-spam. We can treat spam detection as a problem in >Supervised learning. Norvig I 866 In the machine-learning approach we represent the message as a set of feature/value pairs and apply a classification algorithm h to the feature vector X. We can make the language-modeling and machine-learning approaches compatible by thinking of the n-grams as features. This is easiest to see with a unigram model. The features are the words in the vocabulary (…) and the values are the number of times each word appears in the message. That makes the feature vector large and sparse. If there are 100,000 words in the language model, then the feature vector has length 100,000, but for a short email message almost all the features will have count zero. This unigram representation has been called the bag of words model. You can think of the model as putting the words of the training corpus in a bag and then selecting words one at a time. The notion of order of the words is lost; a unigram model gives the same probability to any permutation of a text. Higher-order n-gram models maintain some local notion of word order. With bigrams and trigrams the number of features is squared or cubed, and we can add in other, non-n-gram features: the time the message was sent, whether a URL or an image is part of the message, an ID number for the sender of the message, the sender’s number of previous spam and ham messages, and so on. >Language Models/Norvig, >Data compression/Norvig. Norvig I 867 Data compression: To do classification by compression, we first lump together all the spam training messages and compress them as Norvig I 867 a unit. We do the same for the ham. Then when given a new message to classify, we append it to the spam messages and compress the result. We also append it to the ham and compress that. Whichever class compresses better—adds the fewer number of additional bytes for the new message—is the predicted class. The idea is that a spam message will tend to share dictionary entries with other spam messages and thus will compress better when appended to a collection that already contains the spam dictionary. Experiments with compression-based classification on some of the standard corpora for >Text classification. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
| Structures | Carnap | VI 206 System / Reference / Transformation / Meaning / Relation / Permutation / Carnap: one could arbitrarily take any other relations, for which empirical statements still are exactly the same - the apply, but now mean something else - E.g. We need only a one-to-one transformation of the set of basic elements in themselves and as a new basic relation those relations whose existence is the transformed inventory of the old basic relations. - ((s)> Löwenheim). - Then the new relations are the structurally the same as the old ones (isomorphic). |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Translation | Quine | Rorty I 217 Quine: indeterminacy of translation: we look at the totality of truths about nature, also unknown and unobservable as well as future truths. My thesis is that the indeterminacy of translation even resists all of these truths, the whole truth about nature. There is not really a question of making the right choice. Also within the allotted choices under determination any theory about nature has no objective fact. >Indeterminacy, >Facts, >Objectivity, >Theories. VsQuine: Many critics believe this is a remnant of traditional empiricism (Chomsky). PutnamVsQuine: why should we not just say: translation in accordance with those manuals that have this property? This is a variant of essentialism: according to which we know from the outset that something that cannot be packed into the vocabulary of the physics of the day is so insignificant that it merely exists "in the eyes of the affected person". (subjective convenience). Quine I 90 Stimulus meaning/SM: objective reality that the linguist needs - translation, not identity but approaching stimulus meaning. I 81 Translation: is independent of stimulus meaning. E. g. "soltero" = "Bachelor" not because of a particular face. - But words are learned first through stimulus meaning, later through abstraction. I 117 Truth of categorical sentences depends on the object. - Our special denoting apparatus. - But stimulus meaning is similar for natives. - Goodman’s individuals calculus is translatable as syllogistic. I 129ff Translation: translatable: observation sentences, truth functions (conjunctions, negatives, alterations) - Identifiable: stimulus analytical sentences, stimulus synonymous occasion sentences of natives - untranslatable: stimulus synonymous occasion sentences. I 368 Animal: for them fear is equivalent to an English sentence. - Church: but this sentence has many different possible translations. I 431 Paraphrase (no synonymy): Newton could be reformulated relativistically. - That is like some sentences used in Church: "true in a higher sense". - Quine: Sometimes that is acceptable. --- II 34 Permutation: is possible if sentence-by-sentence structure is maintained. II 37 Actual: radical translation: no fact decides which of the two translation manuals is right - Actual ontologically, naturalistically - neither transcendental nor epistemological. - Physical conditions, not empirical skills are decisive. - Reinterpretation is possible only for others, not for ourselves. - Factuality like gravity, inherent to our nature. >Radical interpretation. II 61 ff Cognitive synonymy: various points in time, individual > Community > substitutability of words - same verdicts. - But this does not hold for translation. >Synonymy. --- VII (c) 60f Translation/Quine: (early): a) link a sound sequence to the circumstances - b) a synonymy of this sound sequence with English sound sequence that is associated with similar circumstances, assume - problem: the relevant properties of the circumstances are hidden in the person of the speaker (>Gavagai). Cassirer/Whorf/Quine: language inseparable from the rest of the world - differences correspond with circumstances of the form of life - Morning Star can still be a good translation of the Evening Star. - We confuse meaning and reference, because we are used to pointing to things - problem: during work alienation from direct reports, thus the clarity of potential conflicts decreases. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Frege, G. | Shoemaker Vs Frege, G. | Stalnaker I 222 Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: this one will explain it with a relational structure. We have distinctive skills and are disposed to make certain judgments about similarity and difference. That means that we can combine certain kinds of experiences with others. Discernment: is the intrapersonal criterion for the identity of qualia. Inverted spectra/inverted qualia//symmetry/Stalnaker: Assuming (as does the thesis of the inverted spectra) that the relational structure is symmetrical (in some way). Suppose we could permute types of qualitative experiences systematically, so that all I 223 judgments about equality and diversity survived and thus generally the whole relational structure. Functionalism: will then determine the functional identity (because of the symmetry), with a qualitative contrast (because qualia were depicted with other qualia, which are distinguishable from them). Pointe: if that is correct then no functionalist description of qualia could be correct. Vs: you can deny this 1. by denying the symmetry. One can say that even if there is a certain symmetry in the structure of color experiences - in the distinctive skills and judgments about equality and diversity - the whole relational structure is much more complex. There are interactions of colors with others who are not preserved during permutations. bad solution/inverted spectra: to introduce additional characteristics such as e.g. red is hot, blue is cool, etc. Stalnaker: I follow Shoemaker and put those objections aside. We need only the possibility of symmetry for some creatures. Qualia/functionalism/Stalnaker: since functionalism identifies qualia intra personnel through distinctive capabilities, you should expect that he accepts the Frege/Schlick-view that means that there is no intra personnel counterpart. Shoemaker: that would be too simple. Thesis: He wants to reconcile intra personnel comparisons of qualia with a functionalist approach. Although we cannot define certain qualitative states functionalistically but rather classes of qualitative states. Classes of qualitative states: we define functionally the identity conditions for elements of this class, then we can define relations of phenomenal (qualitative) equality and diversity. Thus we get equivalence classes of physical states. Equivalent states will be those that are realizations of the same qualitative state. Then the qualitative states are identified with their physical realizations. ShoemakerVsFrege/Stalnaker: the main reason why he resists the Frege/Schlick-view, I 224 that he thinks that one cannot deny the coherence of the hypothesis that there may be intra personnel inverted spectra. And he believes that through this there is an argument for intra personnel exchanged spectra that you cannot resist. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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