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The author or concept searched is found in the following 16 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Comparisons | Lewis | V 5f Comparison/possible world/similarity/similarity metrics/difference/Lewis: Two possible worlds never differ in only a fact; if at all, then there is immediately an infinite number of differences. Analysis 1: only one most similar world. LewisVs: E.g. Bizet/Verdi: two equally similar worlds: both French/Italian - the next (closest) world does not exist! - Analysis 2: several similar possible worlds. Solution: van Fraassen: Supervaluation: arbitrarily chosen next world. V 21 Comparison/Counter comparison/counterfactual conditional/triple indexing/Lewis: If my yacht had been longer, I would have been happier. - 2nd World j: my yacht is longer than in i (1st World) - 3) every additional world where both is true is closer than one where the yacht is longer, but I am still not happier. - (Always in relation to the 1st World i). >Possible world/Lewis, >Similarity/Lewis, >Similarity metrics/Lewis, >Comparability. Explanation/(s): E.g., The Bizet/Verdi case: They could have been compatriots if a) Bizet had been Italian or b) Verdi had been French. Problem: Which world is closer to our world? Therefore a similarity metric for possible worlds is not achievable. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Conditional | Logic Texts | II 112 Conditional/Hoyningen-Huene: belongs to the object language Conclusion: (logical implication): belongs to the meta level Conditional: is also called (material) implication. - It is a linking of statements. >>Conclusion, >Implication, >Meta language, >Object language. Read III 79 Given that Edmund is a coward, it follows that he is either a coward or - whatever you want. But just from the fact that he is a coward it does not follow that if he is not a coward - whatever you want. III 86f Conditional Clause/Conditional/Truth-Functional/Read: if a conditional clause is treated as truth-functional, there are problems. >paradox of implication. Then the whole sentence is true if the antecedent is false. Conversationalist Defense: such a sentence should not be asserted. >Assertibility. III 92 Jackson: in conditional clauses, the modus ponens comes into play. >modus ponens. III 93 Conditional clauses are not robust (insensitive to additional knowledge) with regard to the falsity of their rear parts. III 94 Assertibility: is applied to the sub-sentences, not only to the whole conditional clause! - If assertibility counts, conditional clauses are no longer truth functional. III 103 The analysis of the possible world deviates from the truth-functional one when the if-clause is false. The fact that Edmund is a coward did not automatically mean that the conditional clause is true. III 105 Similarity analysis: a number of logical principles that are classically valid fails here. E.g., the (Def) Counter-position: that "If B, then not-A" follows from "if A, then not-B". (inter alia IV 41) The similar world in which it rains may very well be one in which it rains only slightly. But the most similar world where it rains heavily cannot be one in which it does not rain. III 220 Conditional clauses: are statements. (Grice) No statements: Stalnaker's question: conditional clause truth-functional? Def truth-functional: 1 counter-example invalidates. >Truth function. Grice: Conditional clauses are statements. StalnakerVsGrice: conditional clauses are not statements. (Pretty radical). - The camps are about equally strong. III 220/21 Conditional Clauses/Conditional/Read: the assertion that they are truth-functional says that a counter-example for the falsity of the conditional clause is not only sufficient but also necessary. - If there is no counter-example, then it is true. - This leads us to believe in sharp cuts in Sorites. >Sorites. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Consciousness | Nozick | II 245 Knowledge/Consciousness/Nozick: most authors: Thesis: you always know that you know. Cf. >Beliefs/Davidson, >Reference. NozickVs: it may be that you know something, but do not believe that you know it, because you do not believe that you fulfill conditions (3) and (4). (3) If p were not true, S would not believe p. (4) If p >S believes that p. Problem: if you are connected to a fact, but not with the fact that you are in connection with this fact. - It may be that the belief varies with the truth, but not with the fact that you really are in connection with it. >Truth, >Facts, >Belief, >Knowledge. 2nd order skepticism 2nd stage: that you do not know that you know something. >Skepticism. NozickVsSkepticism: only if the vat world were the next possible world, could skepticism show that a particular conditional relation does not exist, i.e. if the vat world had to exist as soon as we believed something wrong. >Brains in a vat, >Similar World, >Possible Worlds, >Similarity Metrics. Nozick: and that is not the case. II 247 Knowing that you know/Nozick: you often do not know exactly at what level you are. - E.g. if you know that you are on the 3rd level, you are already on the 4th level. >Description levels, >Levels/order. II 347 Consciousness/Explanation/Evolution Theory/Nozick: consciousness allows other types of behavior: namely, to letting yourself be guided by principles. >Principles, >Behavior, >Rules. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Cresswell | Counterfactual Conditional/Co.Co./Possible Worlds/Cresswell: If we know of a given world whetehr X and Y together are true there, we also know of any possible world whether the composite counterfactual conditional "If X, then would be Y" is true there. I 60 Def Counterfactual Conditional Operator/Stalnaker/Cresswell: a >> b is true in a possible world w iff in the next possible world in which a is true, b is also true. >Counterfactual conditional. Lewis (1973)(1): more sophisticated version: without the assumption that there is an unambiguously next possible world (most similar world). Most similar world: the "selection function" that picks out the next possible world is specified in all of these theories by the model - still, the canonical intensional model should represent how the physical world works and has the structure that is imposed on it by T. For problems, see >Similarity metrics, >Possible worlds. 1.David Lewis 1973c. “Counterfactuals and Comparative Possibility,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 2: 418–446. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Fraassen | I 13 Counterfactual conditional/Fraassen: objectively neither true nor false. I 115f Counterfactual conditionals/Fraassen: truth conditions use similarities between possible worlds: "If A, then B" is true in possible world w iff B is true in most similar world to w in which A is also true. - Similarity: is again context-dependent E.g. "Three Barbers"/Carroll: one in three must always be there: 1) if A is ill, B must accompany him, but 2) if C is gone as well, B has to stay there. Contradiction: if A is ill, B must be there and gone. VsCarroll: 1) and 2) are not in contradiction. Material conditional: "either B or not A". Solution/Fraassen: everyday language: not material conditional. >Everyday language. Solution/Fraassen: Context Dependency: 1) is true if we only consider the illness, 2) is true if we only consider the shop - general: what situation is more like ours? -> Lewis: E. g. Bizet/Verdi, Similarity Metrics. I 118 FraassenVsCounterfactual conditionals: but they are no solution here: scientific statements are not context-dependent. Therefore science implies no counterfactual conditionals (if they, as I believe, are context-dependent. Counterfactual Conditionals/Laws of Nature/Reichenbach/E. Goodman: only laws, not general statements imply counterfactual conditionals. - Therefore they are a criterion for laws. FraassenVsGoodman, E.: conversely: if laws imply counterfactual conditionals, it is because they are context-dependent. >Context. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Sobel | Lewis V 320 Counterfactual conditional/Sobel/Lewis: what could be the case: is valid in the next A-worlds. >Possible worlds, >Most similar world, >Similarity metrics, >Cross-world identity, >Similarity, >Counterfactuals. Contrary to that: what would be: what is vali>Dependencyd in all A-worlds. >Dependency. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Counterfactuals | Lewis | V 32 Alternatives/Counterfactual/Lewis: E.g. Assuming I would do something else today, then tomorrow would be a little different - but I cannot say anything about it in a clear sense. V 63f Counterfactual possibility/Possible worlds/Lewis: E.g. quasi-miracle (highly unlikely, but no violation of laws of nature) Ambiguity: Rear part: be a) could have been (CHB): all most similar worlds are those where it is possible. b) would not (NWN) - some of the most similar worlds are those where it happens. Then: 1) If Nixon had pressed the button, no QW would have happenend - and 2) "... there would have been a slim chance" they are true together. - But 1 conflicts with NWN and 2 implies CHB. >Possible world/Lewis, >Causality/Lewis, >Determinism/Lewis, >Counterfactual dependence/Lewis, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. --- I (c) 42 The winner could have lost (true). But: It could have been that the winner loses ((s) wrong). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Descriptions | Peacocke | I 19 Name/Identification/Necessary/Metaphysically possible /Epistemic/Kripke/Peacocke: E.g. assumed one could fix the reference of the name Bright by the fact that it intended to refer to the man who invented the wheel. Kripke: then still the statement is true: "it is possible that Bright has never invented the wheel". Cf. >Julius example, >Reference, >Possibility, >Necessity, >Indeterminacy, >Names. I 188/189 Possible world/Description/Peacocke: there is no specific individual relation between the use of the expression "the F" and the thing which is F. >Possible worlds, >Descriptions, >Predication. ((s) Otherwise certain aspects would be a priori). Identity between worlds/Peacocke: even in quite similar worlds identity is a relation for itself. >Cross world identity, >Identity. Identity between relations to the perceiving subject in various worlds: pointless to claim. >Unabmiguity, >Identification, >Perception. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Excluded Middle | Logic Texts | Read III 108 Similarity metrics/the conditionally excluded middle/Read: the conditionally excluded middle: one or the other member of a pair of conditional sentences must be true. - That equals the assumption that there is always a single most similar world. - Stalnaker pro - LewisVsStalnaker: e.g. Bizet/Verdi: all combinations are wrong - Stalnaker: instead of the only similar one at least one similar - LewisVs: The amount of the possible worlds in the Lewis 2 m + e is large, whereby e decreases suitably; it has no limit. - Solution/Lewis: instead of the selection function: similarity relation: he proposes that "if A, then B" is then true in w if there is either no "A or non-B" world, or some "A" and "B" world that is more similar than any "A and non-B" world. >Similarity metrics. --- III 110 Verdi-Example: where there is no unique, most similar world, the "would" condition sentences are false because there is no similar world for any of the most appropriate similar worlds in which they are fellow country men, in which Bizet has a different nationality. - Example: if you get an A, you will receive a scholarship: will be true if there is a more similar world in which you get both for each world in which you get an A and not a scholarship. - ((s) without conditional sentence of the excluded middle). >Similarity. --- III 263 Law of the excluded middle/constructivism/Read: Constructivists often present so-called "weak counterexamples" against the excluded middle - if a is a real number, "a = 0" is not decidable. Consequently, the constructivist cannot claim that all real numbers are either identical to zero or not. - But this is more of a question of representation. >Constructivism, >Presentation. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Possible Worlds | Logic Texts | Read III 106 The most similar A-world does not need to be the most similar B-world and thus also no C-world. To ensure that the most similar A- and C-world is the most similar A-world, we must know that C is true everywhere. >Similarity metrics, >Identity across worlds. III 113 E.g. If root 2 is irrational, it can be expressed as a fraction in abridged representation. √2 is not rational and cannot be. Nevertheless, this conditional sentence is true! But there is no possible world in which √2 is rational, and thus, in particular, no most similar world to this one. Solution/Stalnaker: includes an "impossible world" among his worlds, which he calls lambda, in which every statement is true! All such conditional sentences are found to be true. >Impossible world. III 123 It is the question whether it is about objects here in our world ("actual") (Quine) - or about possible counterparts that are more or less similar ("real") (Lewis). >Actuality, cf. >Actualism; >Counterpart, >Counterpart theory, >Counterpart relation, >Modal realism. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Similarity | Bigelow | I 228 Accessibility/Lewis: Accessibility between possible worlds: their degrees should be understood as degrees of similarity. >Accessibility, >Possible worlds. Similarity/possible worlds/Lewis: here we have to recognize the relevant similarity. More important is the one concerning certain laws! This presupposes laws in the explanation. (Lewis 1979(1),1986a(2) - JacksonVsLewis: Jackson 1977a(3): Causality instead of similarity) >Relevance. Accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: Example 3 worlds 1. World u: Darwin asks his father for permission to sail away, receives it and writes his book, of which we have all heard 2. World w: Darwin does not get permission, does not sail away and does not write his book. 3. World e v: Darwin does not get permission to sail away, but still sails off... and his father forgot what he said. Accessibility/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: according to our semantics (and that of Lewis) the corresponding counterfactual conditional is only true in w, if possible worlds like u are the most accessible of w (next world most similar possible world). >Similarity metrics. Lewis: so u has to be more similar than w v is similar. u and w must be closer to each other. If v and w were closer together, the following counterfactual conditional would be true: If Darwin's father had not given permission, Darwin would not have obeyed and his father would have forgotten. And that is not true in w. So u w is closer than v u is close. >Counterfactual conditional. I 229 Similarity/possible worlds/relevance/Bigelow/Pargetter: what kind of similarity is the relevant one? It cannot be about certain facts (as in this story). That would not be enough. Solution/Lewis: Def Similarity/similarity metrics/possible world/Lewis: by fewer exceptions in a possible world with laws that apply in the other possible world. > Miracles. For example, Darwin: "Miracles" would be the false acoustic transmission of the father's statement and the forgetting through the father. >Miracles. Miracles/Lewis: but also world u could contain miracles: the prehistory is the same as in v, but the father's decision is different, but the causal situation would be the same and the miracle of the other decision would perhaps be just as great as that of erasure of memory and mishearing. I 230 Natural Laws/Worlds/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: so it could be that other laws apply there as well. Obey/Laws/Possible Worlds/Bigelow/Pargetter: we can also say that a world obeys the laws of another possible world to a certain extent. For example, there might be a possible world z that obeys the laws of w better than u? z: assuming there are laws here that make the refuse of the permission probable. Suppose the father has heard of a conflict with France in the sea area. This does not require any change in the laws. Then we would be forced to assume that the following counterfactual conditional is true in w: (according to our semantics and that of Lewis): If Darwin's father had refused, war would have broken out between England and France or there would have been another factor that would have led to rejection. However, it is wrong in w in at least one way of reading. Similarity metrics/relevance/similarity/Lewis: this shows that similarity of laws is not the only relevant factor. Solution/Lewis: Similarity between worlds must be explained a) by similarity in terms of laws, b) by similarity in relation to certain facts. Weighting/Lewis: For example, the same facts over a long period of time have more weight than obeying the same certain laws. But compliance with laws has more weight than certain consistent facts. I 231 LewisVsBigelow: VsModal theory. Bigelow/Pargetter: we explain laws by accessibility Lewis: explains accessibility by law. Bigelow/Pargetter: if Lewis is right, our theory is circular. >Circular reasoning. Solution/Lewis: see above. BigelowVsVs/BigelowVsLewis: we deny that accessibility must be explained by similarity. The easiest accessible world does not have to be the most similar world! This is shown by the above examples (Darwin's father). But even if it were not the case, it would not refute the modal theory of the laws of nature. Similarity/Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: we are challenged to construct a better theory than Lewis. 1. Lewis, D. K. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76 2. Lewis, D. K. (1986a) On the plurality of worlds,. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 3. Jackson, F. (1977a) A causal theory of counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosphy 55, pp.3-21 |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Similarity | Logic Texts | II 60 Similarity/form/content/logic/Hoyningen-Huene: equality and diversity are part of the logical form, not of the content. --- Read III 105 Similarity analysis: a number of logical principles that are classically valid, fails here. For example, the Def Contraposition: that "If B, then not-A" from "if A, then not-B" follows. The similar world in which it rains can very well be one in which it rains only lightly. But the most similar world, in which it rains violently, cannot be one in which it does not rain at all. III 105f Similarity: But worlds in which Lewis is 2.02, 2.01, 2.005 meters tall are progressively similar to the real world, yet this sequence has no limit. >Similarity metrics/Lewis. III 111 Vs Similarity Theory: It makes all conditional sets with true if-and then-sentences true. But in this respect it is in error: many such conditional sentences are false. >Conditional, >Truth condition, >Truth-conditional semantics. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Similarity Metrics | Logic Texts | Read III 104ff Similarity Metrics/Stalnaker: smallest possible revision - i.e. the most similar world. Selection function: f(A, w) - "If you get a one, you will receive a scholarship" is true if the world in which you receive a scholarship is most similar to the world in which you are getting a one. Possible world view: deviates from the probability function if the fore-link is wrong". - Because all combinations can be realized in a possible world. >Possible world, >Similarity. III 105 Similarity Metrics/possible world/conditional sentence/Read: some classical logical principles fail here: e.g. contraposition that "if B, then not-A" follows from "if A, then not B" - the similar world in which it rains, can be very well one in which it rains only lightly. But the most similar world in which it rains violently cannot be one in which it does not rain at all. >Conditional. III 106 Another principle that fails: the reinforcement of the if-sentence: "If A, then B. So if A and C, then B." - For example, when I put sugar in my tea, it will taste good. So when I put sugar and diesel oil in my tea, it will taste good. In the most similar world in which I put diesel oil like sugar in my tea, it tastes horrible - further: the results of the conditionality principle are invalid: - If A, then B. So if A and C, then B - and if A, then B. If B, then C. So if A, then C - Reason: the conditional sentence has become a modal connection. We must know that these statements are strong enough in any appropriate modal sense - to ensure that the most similar A and C world is the most similar A-world, we must know that C is true everywhere. III 108 Similarity metrics/the conditionally excluded middle/Read: the sentence of the conditionally excluded middle: one or other member of a pair of conditional sentences must be true. This corresponds to the assumption that there is always a single most similar world. - (Stalnaker pro). >Conditionally excluded middle. LewisVsStalnaker: e.g. Bizet/Verdi - All combinations are false. Stalnaker: instead of the only similar one at least one similar world. LewisVs: the set of possible world in which Lewis is 2 m + e tall, whereby e decreases appropriately, this has no boundary. Solution/Lewis: instead of the selection function: similarity relation: Lewis proposes, that "if A then B" is true in w if there is either no "A or non-B"-world, or any "A and B"-world that is more similar than any "A and not-B"-World. III 110 Bizet/Verdi-example: where there is no unique most similar world, the "would" conditional sentences are wrong because there is no most similar world for any of the most appropriate similar worlds in which they are compartiots, where Bizet has a different nationality. >Bizet/Verdi case. E.g. If you get a one, you will receive a scholarship: will be true, if there is for every world in which you get a one and do not receive scholarship, is a more similar world in which you get both (without conditional sentence of the excluded middle). III 115 Similarity metrics/similarity analysis/possible world/ReadVsLewis: problem: e.g. (assuming John is in Alaska) If John is not in Turkey, then he is not in Paris. - This conditional sentence is true according to the "similarity statement", because it only asks, whether the then-sentence is true in the most similar world. >Conditional, >Counterfactual conditional. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Skepticism | Nozick | II 168 Skepticism/Nozick: depends on that we acquire our knowledge indirectly. II 198 Skepticism/Nozick: common form: claiming that someone could believe something even though it is wrong. II 199 Punchline: the truth of Condition (3) "If p would be false, S would not believe it" is compatible with the fact that a person believes p, although p is false. - Justification: condition (3) is not an entailment (Nozick: = formal implication). >Entailment. Condition (3) does not mean that in all situations, where not-p is applied, S does not believe that p. Condition (3) can be true even if there is a possible situation where non-p and S believes that p. >Situations, >Possible worlds. Condition (3) speaks of the situation in which p is false. Not every situation where p is false, is the situation that would prevail if p is wrong. Possible World: condition (3) speaks of the next ~ p-world to our actual world. - It speaks of the not-p-neighborhood. >Actual world, >Most similar world, >Similarity metrics. E.g. Dream, E.g. demon E.g. brains in the tank - but only if p is false: - So only in the next non-p-worlds. Even if we were in the tank, condition (3) could not apply. >Brains in a vat. II 204 Punchline: I do not know that I am not in the vat. - But I know that I write this. Because for this we have a connection, a trace. II 209 Skepticism/NozickVsSkepticism: The skepticism is right that we have no connection to some facts, but it is wrong, that we could not connect to many other facts - including those that imply that we are not brains in a vat, so facts which we believe but do not know. >Belief, >Knowledge. II 242f Skepticism/NozickVsSkepticism/(s): Conclusion: 1. I know that skepticism is wrong. 2. If the skepticism were true, I would not believe that I know much. 3. Because the assertion of skepticism that I do not know much, does not consist in the possibility of confusion with an illusory world, but simply in a world where you do not know much. 4. That I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat, is an isolated special case. 5. Even if I knew very little, I would still know that I am sitting on a chair 6. Even if that would be wrong, it would not follow that I am a brain a vat. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Subjunctive Conditionals | Logic Texts | Read III 86f Subjunctive conditionals/counterfactual conditionals/Read: e.g. assuming the pound is devalued, but the recession still continues. >Counterfactual conditional. Is this sufficient to confirm the claim that the recession will continue when the pound is not devalued? This should be the case according to the truth-functional representation. But the conditional sentence suggests a closer connection between the front and rear links. But we now see that such a connection may not exist at all. Therefore, there is doubt as to whether the truth-functional representation is correct. >Truth-functional semantics. III 94 Conditional sentences are not truth-functional. >Conditional. III 108 ff E.g. by David Lewis: If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would be Italian and If Bizet and Verdi had been compatriots, Bizet would not be Italian. Stalnaker: one or the other must be true. Lewis: Both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth-functional). The indicative sentences would be quite acceptable in the mouths of those whose nationality is unknown. Besides, there is no most similar world here. >Similarity metrics, >Bizet-Verdi case. III 109 Stalnaker: Sstalnakers's semantics installs a different assumption, namely, that there is always at least one most similar world. >Possible world/Stalnaker. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Twodimensional Semantics | Lewis | V 16 Double indexing/double index/possible worlds/counterfactual conditional/Lewis: Counterfactual conditionals are contingent in general. So we need double indexing - i.e. that certain phrases are not absolutely true/false. But in relation to a world j - Let F be a special sentence which is true in j relative to i iff j f (A, i) (similar world) . - then F A > C is true in j relative to i, if j belongs to f (A, i), C is true in j ( If..., if...). >Possible world/Lewis, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. Def operator $/spelling: dollar for death Cross/Lewis: $ B is true in i relative to j iff B is true in i relative to i itself. Def counterfactual conditional/Lewis: - A >> C = def $ N (F A > C) - so that we have a choice function brought into the object language. >Selection function/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fine, Kit | Lewis Vs Fine, Kit | V 41 Analysis 2: a counterfactual conditional "If it were the case that A, then it would be the case that C" is true then and only when a (accessible) world where A and C are true is everywhere more similar to our actual world than a world where A is true and C is false. V 43 Kit FineVsLewis/VsAnalysis 2: e.g. the counterfactual conditional "If Richard Nixon had pushed the button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust" is true or can be imagined as being true. According to Lewis' analysis the co.co. is then probably wrong because by imagining just a slight change in reality, the effects will not exist. >Counterfactual conditional. LewisVsFine: Surely the event or not of an atomic holocaust will strongly contribute to a basing relation or not. But the similarity relation (s.r.) which rules over the counterfactual conditionals is not one of those! Still, s.r. can be a relation for similarity everywhere, but not because it determines explicit judgments, rather because it is a result of many single similarity relations according to particular priorities of evaluation. V 44 w0: e.g. Nixon pushed the button at the time t. w0. This can but does not need to be in our actual world. This world could have deterministic laws, and the world is sufficient for our darkest visions of buttons that are pushed. A nuclear holocaust happens because all connections of the button do work. There are now all possible worlds where Nixon pushes the button, but those worlds are different from our actual world. Which world resembles our the most? Some are simply squib loads or the missile is simply filled with confetti. e.g. w1: w1 is exactly like w0 until shortly before t. In the last moment both worlds diverge: In w1 the deterministic laws of w0 are violated. Lewis: Supposing a minuscule little miracle happens: Maybe some extra neurons in Nixon's brain. As a result, Nixon pushes these extra neurons. The holocaust happens. As such, both worlds are quite different from each other, at least regarding the surface of the planet. ((s) It was only counterfactual in w0 : If he pushes, the holocaust would happen.) Lewis: so w1 is sufficient for analysis 1 (asymetry by postulate.) (We assume that we are in w0.) It should appear that worlds, like w1 in the basing relation, have more resemblance than all the other worlds in which Nixon would have pushed the button. Miracle/Lewis: I simply mean the violation of laws of nature. But the violated laws are not in the same world! This would be impossible! V 45 Miracle: Relation between possible worlds because the laws of a single world are not violated! w2: A second class of candidates of worlds that resemble w0 the most: without any miracle, the deterministic laws of w0 are followed exactly. Difference to w0: Nixon pushes the button. Determinism: After this, both worlds are either always or never the same. This is why both are never exactly the same for any period of time. They are even different in the past of a long time ago. Problem: It cannot be stated what can be done in order to make the difference in recent past disappear. It is difficult to imagine how two deterministic worlds an actually be only slightly different over a long period of time. There is too much probability for small differences, which become a big sum. Naturally, worlds like w2 are not the most similar world for a world w0 in which Nixon pushes the button. This would lead to infinite backwards arguments. Bennett: counterfactual conditionals would also be rendered senseless. We do not know enough to know which of them would be true. To conclude: what we learn by comparing w1 to w2: in the basing relations, a small miracle is needed in order to have a perfect concordance of single facts. w3: begins like w1: w3 is exactly like w0 until shortly before t. Then a small miracle happens, Nixon pushes the button, but there is no war! This is because a second small miracle happens immediately after the push. It can as localized as the first one. The fatal signal is erased. Still, Nixon's action has left its marks: his fingerprints on the button, an empty bottle of gin, etc. V 46 There are numerous differences between w3 and w0, but no one is particularly important. w3: There is more than only small differences, e.g. Nixon's memoirs have no influence on later generations, etc. But even if it is unclear whether the differences will have strong repercussions it is not important. Schwarz I 51 Counterfactual Conditional/co.co./FineVsLewis: His analysis clearly gives wrong results even with our vague intuitive similarity standards, e.g. "If Richard Nixon had pushed the button, there would have been a nuclear war". Problem: A possible world, in which Nixon pushed the button and an atomic war was started, must then resemble our actual world more than a world, in which he pushed the button, the mechanism failed and nothing happened. But an undestroyed world should surely have more similarities with our world? LewisVsFine: Here wrong resemblance criteria were used. The important categories are those in which his analysis is proven correct. We need to find out what we now about truth and wrongness of the co.co. in order to ascertain whether we can find a sort of basing relation.[ (1979b(1),43, 1986f(2),211). Lewis/Schwarz: this is why his theory of counterfactual conditionals is more a frame for such theories. Analysis tells us which sort of facts make co.co. true, but it does not tell us for which specific conditionals in specific contexts they are. 1. D. Lewis [1979b]: “Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow”. Nous, 13: 455–476. 2. D. Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Lewis, D. | Wessel Vs Lewis, D. | I 304/305 Unreal conditional sentences/Counterfactual Conditionals/Wessel: the claim to be a general condition theory is generally not fulfilled. Example (1) If Peter had not come, Paul and Peter would not have come. (2) If now a current would flow through the coil... (3) Even if the shaman danced the rain dance, it wouldn't rain. (4) If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, someone else did. (5) If .....hadn't shot, ... would have... (6) If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. (7) ...Verdi would be French. (1) Is dependent on the system of the logical subsequent relationship (here FK). (2) Hypothetical state of affairs: Such statements are used to explicate the term "empirical law". Def Natural Law/Wessel: here it is claimed that a true general conditional statement expresses a law if it corresponds to true unreal conditional statements. (>Natural Laws/Lewis, >Counterfactual Conditionals/Lewis, >Natural Laws/Armstrong, >Counterfactual Conditionals/Armstrong). In contrast, a mere legal statement does not apply to all possible objects. Laws like that of the coil also apply to copies brought to earth from extraterrestrials during the Stone Age. I 306 It is assumed that the truth of the unreal conditional sentences can be established independently of the law statement. However, this is usually difficult for unreal conditional sentences. WesselVsArmstrong/WesselVsLewis: Thesis: the unreal conditional sentence depends on the real statement. Law statements support and guarantee the validity of corresponding unreal conditionals and not vice versa! ad (3) "even if": such statements are considered true, because the consequence is "anyway true". Everyday translation: Example: "It is not the case that it rains when the shaman dances and he does not dance and it does not rain". I 307 Unreal conditional sentences/Wessel: E.g. Oswald/Kennedy (4) is undoubtedly true and (5) undoubtedly false. How can this be explained? Possible worlds/many authors: one must put oneself in a context that is as close as possible to the current course of history. The similar context (next possible world) is the one in which another one shot Kennedy. ad (5): here the most similar world is the one in which, if Oswald didn't shoot, nobody shot and Kennedy is still alive. Therefore, (5) be wrong. WesselVsPossible World/WesselVsLewis: Disadvantage: the choice of the most similar world must be justified! I 307 Unreal Conditional Sentences/Counterfactual Conditional/CoCo/Similarity Metrics/Wessel: (5) is a hidden "even if" statement: "Even if Oswald hadn't shot Kennedy, Kennedy would have been shot. The truth of such statements, which are common in political and historical contexts, is difficult to establish. (6)/(7): Bizet/Verdi-Example/Wessel: Solution: the reason for the emergence of the paradox lies in the uncontrolled use of the predicate "compatriots", and not in conditional logic. If both were compatriots, nothing would follow about the concrete nationality of both, except: it is the same. With the same right both could be Japanese! Instead of the two-digit predicate "compatriots" one should use the one-digit predicates "compatriot of Verdi" and "compatriot of Bizet". ((s) Then unambiguous: Bizet as a compatriot of Verdi should be Italian.) I 308 "Whenever someone is compatriot of Bizet, he is French." That is no longer a problem. Unreal conditional sentences/conditional/conjunction/Wessel: every occurrence of an unreal conditional sentence can be replaced by conjunctions in which real conditionals occur. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Plantinga, A. | Lewis Vs Plantinga, A. | Bigelow I 181 Representation/Proposition/Structure/LewisVsPlantinga: his (unstructured) propositions make representation something magical. Solution/PlantingaVsLewis: Representation is taken as a basic term and is completely understandable and not magical. Bigelow I 228 Accessibility/Lewis: their degrees should be understood as degrees of similarity. Similarity/Lewis: here we have to recognize the relevant similarity. More important is that in relation to certain laws! Thus laws are already presupposed with the explanation. (Lewis 1979(1), 1986a(2) - JacksonVsLewis: Jackson 1977a(1): Causality instead of Similarity) I 231 BigelowVsVs/BigelowVsLewis: we deny that accessibility must be explained by similarity. The most accessible world needs not to be the most similar world. Schwarz I 68 Def Possible world/Plantinga: as maximum possible facts (st.o.a.). ("magic substituteism") Schwarz I 69 Maximum possible facts as abstract entities, about whose structure there is not much to say. In any case, they are not real universes or constructions of real things. Existence/"exist"/Plantinga: (>"there is"): is a basic property that cannot be further analyzed. Other maximum possible facts do not exist, but could exist. Def maximum/maximum possible facts/Plantinga: a maximum possible fact is at its maximum if its existence for any other maximum possible fact implies either its existence or non-existence. Possible World/Plantinga: are maximum possible facts. Example: that "in" a possible world donkeys can speak means that donkeys could speak if the maximum possible fact had the quality of existence. VsPlantinga: this connection between a primitive property of abstract entities and the existence of speaking donkeys must be accepted as inexplicable. In particular, it has nothing to do with the internal structure or composition of the abstract entity: it contains neither a talking donkey nor an image or model of a donkey, nor a sentence or sign that somehow represents talking donkeys. LewisVsPlantinga: 1. Why can't this abstract entity have that primitive quality, although there are no talking donkeys? Why this necessary relationship between distinct entities? 2. Plantingas maximum possible facts make a reduction of modal truths to truth about what things with what characteristics there are, impossible. Plantinga thus requires modality in the characterization of the possible world. (1986e(2),§3,4) 3. We also want to talk not only about possible worlds, but also about their inhabitants. Plantinga must accept Sherlock Holmes as an irreducible abstract entity. (Plantinga 1976(3),262 272). This is a non qualitative (haecceitistic) property that is necessarily instantiated by an object x exactly when x is Holmes. So if we have countless merely possible things in modal realism, then in Plantinga we have countless entities of merely possible things. 1. Frank Jackson [1977]: “Statements about Universals”. Mind, 86: 427–429 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. Alvin Plantinga 1976]: “Actualism and Possible Worlds”. Theoria, 42: 139–160. In [Loux 1979] |
LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Read Vs Stalnaker, R. | Re III 109 Similarity metric / Stalnaker: his semantics makes another assumption, namely, that there is always at least one most similar world. III 109/110 ReadVsStalnaker: just as well as there are connections for the proximity as in the Verdi example, it is conceivable that there is not always a world at all that is the most similar. Example of Lewis: If Lewis is about 2 meters tall, he can join the basketball team. Similarity: Problem: worlds where Lewis is 2.02, 2.01, 2.005 meters tall are progressively similar to the real world, but this result has no limit. |
Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Various Authors | Stalnaker Vs Various Authors | II 48 Presupposition/Stalnaker: 1. as semantic relation (StalnakerVs) between sentences or propositions. Here we have to distinguish between presupposition and assertion in concepts of content or truth conditions ((s) truth-conditional semantics). Def presupposition/semantic/logical form/Stalnaker: a proposition that P presupposes that Q iff Q must be true so that P has a truth value (tr.v.) at all. That means presuppositions are made necessary by the truth and falsity of the proposition. If any presupposition is wrong the assertion has no tr.v.. StalnakerVsSemantic presupposition: although suitable for theoretical explanations, but requires complicated ad hoc hypotheses about the semantics of individual words and constructions. II 49 Def pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: (provisional version): a proposition A is a pragmatic presupposition of a speaker in a given context precisely in the case that the speaker assumes or believes that P, accepts or believes that the listeners assumes or believes that P and accepts or believes that the listener realizes that he makes these assumptions or has these convictions. II 50 So it are the speakers, not the sentences that make the presuppositions ((s) unlike the semantic approach). logical form: there are three possible definitions of pragmatic presupposition: a) proposition x presupposes that Q exactly in the event that the use of x appropriate (normal, acceptable) is only in contexts where Q is presupposed by the speaker. b) a statement that P (in a particular context) presupposes that Q just in case that one can reasonably conclude that the speaker presupposes Q from the fact that he made the statement. c) ... when it is necessary to assume that the speaker presupposes that Q to properly understand or interpret the statement. Important argument: we do not need an intermediate step of an assumed relation that should exist between propositions (StalnakerVsSemantic approach). II 58 Pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: here the restrictions on the presuppositions can change without the truth conditions changing so we can see differences between statements of the first and second person or between such a third person and ask questions without postulating different semantic types of propositions. That means despite the differences we can say that the statements have the same semantic content. StalnakerVsSemantic approach: here we cannot say that. II 69 Similarity metrics/similarity/next poss.w./most similar world/Stalnaker: it will always be true that something is more similar to itself than to anything else. Therefore, the selection function must be one which picks out the real world, whenever possible. (poss.w. = possible world). StalnakerVsSemantic approach: nothing can further be said here about what are the relevant aspects of similarity. Solution/Stalnaker: pragmatic approach: here we can explain how the context determines the truth conditions at least for indicative conditionals. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Analyticity | Lewis, D. | II 239 blurred analyticity / Lewis: our language is selected from a bundle of similar languages, which contain randomly more or less the same sentences. - They have more or less the samt truth values similar worlds. - Then we have a space of languages. - Analyticity is then sharp in each language. - If different languages with respect to analyticity do not match, the record is just not analytical. |
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