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The author or concept searched is found in the following 34 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Action Theory | Weber | Habermas III 378 Action Theory/Communicative Action/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: since Weber assumes a monological model of action, "social action" cannot be explained by the concept of meaning. It is based on the concept of purposive action and must extend it by two provisions to explain social interaction: a) Orientation towards the behaviour of other subjects b) The reflective relationship between the orientations of several interaction participants. >Purposive action, >Purpose rationality, >Action, >Interaction, >Cooperation. Habermas III 379 Act/Action/Weber/Habermas: Weber distinguishes between procedural rational value rational emotional and traditional action. Weber therefore does not start with the social relationship. >Value rationality, >Rationality, cf. >Rationalization. Habermas III 380 Purpose rational action/Weber: the subjective sense here extends to: Means, purposes, values, consequences Value rational action: on means, purposes, values Emotional action: on means and purposes Traditional action: only on the means. Cf. >Purpose-means-rationality, >Purposes, >Goals, >Values, cf. >Consequentialism. Habermas III 381 Habermas: "Inofficial version" of Weber's theory of action ((s) this is a position not explicitly represented by Weber, which could, however, be deduced from his texts): here mechanisms of coordination of action are distinguished, depending on whether only interests or also social agreement are taken as a basis. (1) >Action Theory/Habermas. 1.Vgl. M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, hrsg. v. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, S.246f. |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Actions | Parsons | Habermas IV 306 Action/Parsons/Habermas: Like Weber, Parsons proceeds from the categories of "purpose" and "means". He focuses on the most general provisions of the smallest conceivable unit of possible action. (1) Habermas IV 307 HabermasVsParsons: his concept of action is subjective ("voluntaristic"), which follows from his concept of the situation. >Situation/Parsons. Thus, his theory of action excludes objectivism from concepts of action reformulated in behavioral science. Taking normative standards into account, according to Parsons, action bridges the gap between the regions of being and should, facts and values, between the conditions of a given situation Habermas IV 308 and the orientation of the actor determined by values and norms (the ontological dimension: conditions/norms). In doing so, the "effort" that requires an action loses the empirical sense of a striving for gratification: "effort" is here rather „a name for the relating factor between the normative and conditional elements of action. It is necessitated by the fact that norms do not realize themselves automatically but only through action, so far as they are realized at all.“(2) HabermasVsParsons: the concept of action as a basic unit does not explain what it means that an actor bases its decisions on values. Habermas IV 352 Actions/System/Parsons: Action/Luhmann: "The action is a system due to its internal analytical structure".(3) Habermas: this is about the relations between values, norms, goals and resources. Action system/Parsons: is composed of subsystems that specialize in the production and maintenance of one component of action at a time: Culture: on values Society: on norms Personality: on goals Behavioral system: on means or resources.(4) >Values, >Norms, >Goals. Habermas IV 353 HabermasVsParsons: with the concept of the action system, the actors disappear as acting subjects; they are abstracted into units to which decisions and thus effects of actions are ascribed. >Systems theory, >Action systems. Actors come into view as abstract placeholders, namely as aspects of the organism capable of learning, the motivational balance of a person, the roles and memberships of a social system and the action-determining traditions of a culture. >Cultural Tradition. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, p. 43f. 2. Ibid. p. 719. 3. N. Luhmann, T. Parsons: die Zukunft eines Theorieprogramms, Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung 9, 1980, p. 8 4. Talcott Parsons, Some Problems of General Theory in Sociology, in: McKinney, Tiryakan, (1970), p. 44 |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Ancient Philosophy | MacIntyre | Brocker I 656 Ancient Philosophy/Moral/Virtues/Ethics/MacIntyre: in the heroic societies of Homer's time, the community was given priority. There was neither a pronounced individualism nor a reflected ethics. MacIntyre's thesis: "Moral and social structure" were "one and the same" in heroic society.(1) >Morality/Ancient Philosophy. Brocker I 657 It was not reflection that was decisive, but a practice of social action. "A man is what he does in heroic society."(2) >Practise. Polis/MacIntyre: in the Athenian Polis, the "holism" of heroic societies was lost and a pluralism of virtues was played out. There was no consensus as to why friendship, bravery, self-control, wisdom, justice were virtues and what they demanded (3), even if they were generally accepted. The Homeric principle of kinship was replaced by political isonomy, i.e. equal rights for citizens. >Polis, >Virtues. Sophists/MacIntyre: The sophists took Homer's motive of the right of the strong as a moral determining moment. >Sophists. Plato: homogenized the concepts of virtue by arranging them and bringing them into a hierarchy. >Plato. State/Plato: should correspond to the ordered and rational soul. >State. Aristotle/MacIntyre: it was Aristotle who made ethical reflection a rational tradition. He deciphered the essence of human actions as the aspiration Brocker I 658 for a good. >Aristotle. Def Virtues/Aristotle: are the characteristics whose possessions enable the individual to attain eudaimonia. >Eudaemonia. Def Eudaimonia/Aristotele: the superior good of a successful life. Polis/Aristotle: The Polis provides the constitutive background against which Aristotle constructs his doctrine of virtue. The virtues develop their value only in relation to them, since they served not only the individual life, but the promotion of the community.(4) MacIntyre: "If a pre-modern view of moral and politics is to be defended against modernism, it must be done in a similar way to the Aristotelian one, or not at all".(5) >Polis/Ancient philosophy. 1. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, Ind. 1981. Dt: Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend. Zur moralischen Krise der Gegenwart. Erweiterte Neuausgabe, Frankfurt/M. 2006 (zuerst 1987) S. 166. 2. Ibid. p. 164 3. Ibid. p. 181 4. Ibid. p. 200f. 5. Ibid. p. 160. Jürgen Goldstein, „Alasdair MacIntyre, Der Verlust der Tugend“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Beauty | Quine | XIII 17 Beauty/Art/QuineVsKeats/Quine: Keats: (2nd law of aesthetics): "Beauty is truth, truth is beauty". QuineVsKeats: this is wrong, beauty and truth are opposite poles. (alethic/aesthetic) Keats himself proves this with his Ode. Alethic: concerns science (hard and soft) as well as history. Aesthetic/Aesthetics/Quine: concerns the fine arts (belles lettres). But this is a question of emphasis, not of borders. Scientists also seek the beauty of a theory. Yet they know where they belong. Truth/Art/Quine: to what degree does the artist pursue truth? >Truth/Quine. XIII 18 E.g. Impressionism: was on the trail of true seeing. E.g. perspective in earlier epochs Truth/Literature/Quine: to attribute truth to a novella is double-tongued. This is not about truth as perhaps in experimental painting (perception) or experimental music (also perception) but about an indirect communication of truth. Truth/Literature: a better example of a real search for truth in art is e.g. concrete poetry or e.g. Finnegan's Wake. Art/Quine: but has other goals than truth: e.g. social engagement (social action). Thus a third pole is added: the ethical pole. But these are poles in the broader sense. There is also rhetoric (>rhetoric). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Behavior | Mead | Habermas IV 13 Behaviour/Interaction/Sociology/Behaviorism/G. H. Mead/Habermas: Mead introduces his theory under the name "Social Behaviorism" to emphasize the distance to the philosophy of consciousness. MeadVsBehaviorism/Habermas: However, Mead's approach differs from behaviorism in that it does not address the behavior of individuals but the interaction of groups. >Behaviorism, >Interaction. Behaviour/Mead: should not be restricted to observable behavioural reactions, but should also include symbolically oriented behaviour. Sense/Mead: the sense embodied in a social action is not external to the aspect of behavior. Nevertheless, it is publicly accessible as something objective in symbolic expressions. >Sense. |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Causality | Parsons | Habermas IV 309 Causality/Action/Motives/Moral/Durkheim/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons considers Durkheim's distinction between moral and causal force the decisive breakthrough. >Empiricism, >E. Durkheim, >Morals/Durkheim, >VsEmpirism. Parsons: the fear of sanctions is always secondary, the sense of moral obligation is primary.(1) >Duties. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 709. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Communication Media | Habermas | III 458 Communication Media/Sociology/Action Theory/Communicative Action/Habermas: the liberation of communicative action from tradition-based institutions - i.e. from consensus commitments - leads to the replacement of institutions by organisations of a new type: they are formed on the basis of communication media that uncouple action from communication processes and coordinate them via generalised instrumental values such as money and power.(1) >Media, >Institutions, >Society. These control media replace language as a mechanism for coordinating action and move social action away from integration that goes via a consensus of values and convert it to a media-controlled procedural rationalization. >Social action, >Language/Habermas. HabermasVsWeber: he does not recognize money and power as the communication media that enable the differentiation of subsystems of procedural rational action. >M. Weber, >Procedural Rationality/Weber. IV 269 Communication Media/Habermas: In the course of differentiating between understanding and success-oriented action, two types of relief mechanisms are formed, namely in the form of communication media. IV 270 Which either bundle or replace verbal communication. >Agreement/Habermas. For example, reputation and power are primitive generators of readiness to follow (either rationally through trust in valid knowledge or empirically through incentive through expected reward). They are the starting point for media education. >Recognition >Power. The communication media can be generalized themselves and thus form control media. IV 387 Communication media/system theory/Habermas: the structural characteristics of a medium only become apparent to the extent that they are normatively anchored and enable the differentiation of a social subsystem. >Communication Media/Parsons. 1. ((s) See N. Luhmann's systems theory, in which money, power, truth, etc. are understood as symbolically generalized communication media. See in particular C. Baraldi, G. Corsi, E. Esposito GLU, Frankfurt 1997, S. 202ff. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Communicative Action | Habermas | III 128 Communicative action/Habermas: the concept refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who enter into an interpersonal relationship (by linguistic or non-linguistic means). The actors seek an understanding to coordinate their plans and thus their actions. Language is given a prominent status here. >Agreement, >Language/Habermas. III 143 Problem: there is a danger that social action will be reduced to the interpretive performance of the communication participants, action will be adapted to speech, interaction to conversation. In fact, however, linguistic communication is only the mechanism of action coordination, which brings together the action plans and activities of the ones involved. III 157 In communicative action, the outcome of the interaction itself is dependent on whether the participants can agree among themselves on an intersubjectively valid assessment of their world-relationships. >World/thinking, >Reality. III 158 Interpretation: Problem: for the understanding of communicative actions we have to separate questions of meaning and validity. The interpretation performance of an observer differs from the coordination efforts of the participants. The observer does not seek a consensus interpretation. But perhaps only the functions differed here, not the structures of interpretation. >Observation, >Method, >Interpretation, >Practice. III 385 Communicative Action/Habermas: here the participants are not primarily oriented towards their own success; they pursue their individual goals on the condition that they can coordinate their action plans on the basis of common situation definitions. In this respect, the negotiation of situation definitions is an essential component. >Situations. III 395 Communicative Action/Speech Acts/Perlocution/Illocution/Habermas: Strawson has shown that a speaker achieves his/her illocutionary goal that the listener understands what is being said without revealing his/her perlocutionary goal. This gives perlocutions the asymmetric character of covert strategic actions in which at least one of the participants behaves strategically, while deceiving other participants that he/she does not meet the conditions under which normally illocutionary goals can only be achieved. >Speech acts, >Illocutionary act, >Perlocutionary act Therefore, perlocutions are not suitable for the analysis of coordination of actions, which are to be explained by illocutionary binding effects. This problem is solved if we understand communicative action as interaction in which all participants coordinate their individual action plans and pursue their illocutionary goals without reservation. III 396 Only such interactions are communicative actions in which all participants pursue illocutionary goals. Otherwise they fall under strategic action. III 397 HabermasVsAustin: he has tended to identify speech acts with acts of communication, i.e. the linguistically mediated interactions. III 400 Definition Understanding/Communication/Habermas: in the context of our theory of communicative action we limit ourselves to acts of speech under standard conditions, i.e. we assume that a speaker means nothing else than the literal meaning of what he/she says. >Meaning/Intending. Understanding a sentence is then defined as knowing what makes that sentence acceptable. >Understanding. III 457 Communicative action/Rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only if we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. IV 223 Communicative Actions/HabermasVsSystem theory/Habermas: Communicative actions succeed only in the light of cultural traditions - this is what ensures the integration of society, and not systemic mechanisms that are deprived of the intuitive knowledge of their relatives. >Cultural tradition, >Culture. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Community | Parsons | Habermas IV 335 Community/Parsons/Habermas: "community" and "society" denote types of social structures that correspond to typical value orientations at the level of social action. The processes of social rationalization can therefore be understood as the progressive institutionalization of value orientations, which guarantee that the actors follow their own interests, adopt an emotionally neutral attitude, give preference to universalistic regulations, judge social opponents according to their functions and specify situations of action purpose-rationally according to means and conditions. What Weber had understood as the institutionalized purpose-rationality of economic and administrative action can be reformulated by Parsons with the help of pattern-variables. >Terminology/Parsons, >Decisions/Parsons). |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Democracy | Ortega y Gasset | Brocker I 195 Democracy/Ortega y Gasset: "It is characteristic of the present moment (...) that the ordinary soul is clear about its ordinariness, but has the audacity to stand up for the right of ordinariness and assert it everywhere" (1). Ortega calls such a "brutal rule" of the masses or the average person "over-democracy". Acting "over-democratic" means that the masses impose new and different preferences on the community without law and solely by the mere means of material pressure of their desires and tastes (2). >Preferences, >Desires, >Society, >Community, >Inequality, >Injustice, >People, >Mass/Ortega, >Cultural Industry, cf.>Civil Society, >Social Action. 1. José Ortega y Gasset, La Rebelión de las Masas (con un prólogo para franceses, un epílogo para ingleses y un apéndice: Dinámica del tiempo), Madrid 1937 (zuerst 1929). Dt.: José Ortega y Gasset, Der Aufstand der Massen, Reinbek 1956, p. 12 2. Ibid. p. 11f. Thomas Gil, „Ortega y Gasset, Der Aufstand der Massen (1929)“ In: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Emotions | Pareto | Brocker I 101 Emotions/Pareto: to scientifically explain social actions, Pareto sought no less than a comprehensive catalogue of human passions based on botanical taxonomy. He used a hermeneutic method to isolate the constant elements from traditional philosophical and political narratives. In these he assumed to find the semantic expression of the anthropological affect structures crystallised, which he called "residuals" according to his method. Pareto distinguished a total of more than 50 residuals, which he divided into six general classes and countless subclasses.(1) >Argumentation/Pareto. 1. Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generale, Florenz 1916. Vilfredo Pareto, Trattato di sociologia generale. Edizione critica a cura di Giovanni Busino, 4 Bände, Turin 1988. Dt.: Vilfredo Paretos System der allgemeinen Soziologie, herausgegeben und übersetzt von Gottfried Eisermann, Stuttgart 1962, § 888 Maurizio Bach, Vilfredo Pareto, Allgemeine Soziologie (1916) in: Manfred Brocker (Hg). Geschichte des Politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Generalization | Habermas | IV 268 Generalization/value generalization/Habermas: the trend towards value generalization triggers two opposing tendencies at the level of interaction. >Generalization/Parsons. A. The further the generalisation of motives and values continues, the more the communicative action detaches itself from concrete and traditional normative patterns of behaviour. >Motivation, >Values, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas With this decoupling, the burden of social integration is increasingly shifting from a religiously anchored consensus to linguistic consensus-building processes. This allows the general structures of communication-oriented action... IV 269 ...to become more and more prominent. >Religion/Habermas, >Cultural tradition. Thus value generalization is a necessary condition for the release of the rationality potential invested in communicative action. B. The release of communicative action from particular value orientations also means the separation of success- and communication-oriented action. >Success, >Agreement. The scope for subsystems of purpose-rational action arises. Demoralised coercive law forces a deferral of legitimacy that makes it possible to control social action via the media. >Communication Media/Habermas). |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Hoarding (Economics) | Rothbard | Rothbard III 775 Hoarding/money/Rothbard: The very word "hoarding" is a most inappropriate one to use in economics, since it is laden with connotations of vicious antisocial action. But there is nothing at all antisocial about either "hoarding" or "dishoarding." "Hoarding" is simply an increase in the demand for money, and the result of this change in valuations is that People get what they desire, i.e., an increase in the real value of their cash balances and of the monetary unit.(1) Conversely, if the People desire a Iowering of their real cash balances or in the value of the monetary unit, they may accomplish this through "dishoarding." No other significant economic relation - real income, capital structure, etc. - need be changed at all. Rothbard III 776 DefinabilityVsHoarding: (…) there is no theoretical way of defining "hoarding" beyond a simple addition to one's cash balance in a certain period of time. Yet most writers use the term in a normative fashion, implying that there is some vague standard below which a cash balance is legitimate and above which it is antisocial and vicious. But any quantitative limit set on the demand-for-money schedule would be completely arbitrary and unwarranted. >Keynesianism/Rothbard, >Keynesianism, >Quantity theory, >Consumption function. Rothbard III 778 KeynesianismVsHording: Keynesian law: The Keynesian law asserts social expenditures to be Iower than social income above point A, and higher than social income below point A, so that A will be the equilibrium point for social income to equal expenditure. For if social income is higher than A, social expenditures will be Iower than income, and income will therefore tend to decline from one day to the next until the equilibrium point A is reached. If social income is Iower than A, dishoarding will occur, expenditures will be higher than income, until finally A is reached again. RothbardVsKeynes/RothbardVsKeynesianism: (…) suppose that we now grant the validity of such a law; the only comment can be an impertinent: So what? What if there is a fall in the national income? Since the fall need only be in money terms, and real income, real capital, etc., may remain the same, Why any alarm? The only change is that the hoarders have accomplished their objective of increasing their real cash balances and increasing the real value of the monetary unit. It is true that the picture is rather more complex for the transition process until equilibrium is reached, (…) But the Keynesian system attempts to establish the perniciousness of the equilibrium position, and this it cannot do. 1. See the excellent article by W.H. Hutt, “The Significance of Price Flexibility” in Hazlitt, Critics of Keynseian Economics, pp. 383-406. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Honesty | Psychological Theories | Slater I 168 Honesty/psychological theories: Psychologists have tended to focus on the role of such dilemmas in everyday life, often in relation to “white lie” or “politeness” contexts. In a typical white lie context, an individual is given an undesirable gift and is asked if he or she likes it (Cole, 1986(1); Saarni, 1984(2)). The recipient must decide whether to tell the truth and risk hurting the feelings of the gift-giver, or lie to make the gift-giver happy. Children’s reasoning about such conflicts speaks to philosophical debates about the acceptability of telling a lie when the motive is prosocial (see Bok, 1978)(3). >Honesty/Kohlberg, >Morality/Kohlberg, >Honesty/developmental psychology, >Honesty/cultural psychology. Slater I 169 [Some] research has addressed lying and truth telling with reference to situations in which a speaker calls positive attention to himself or herself. One focus of this work has been to examine whether children consider it acceptable to falsely deny responsibility for one’s prosocial acts. This topic has been of particular interest due to a strong cultural emphasis on modesty in East Asia (e.g., Bond & Hwang, 1986)(4). For example, children in China are encouraged to be “unsung heroes” and to avoid acknowledging their achievements and prosocial actions (Lee, Cameron, Xu, Fu, & Board, 1997)(5). Evidence from research on the disclosure of one’s own prosocial acts supports the view that cultural influences play an important role in shaping the way children learn to assess the moral Slater I 170 implications of behavior. 1. Cole, P. M. (1986). Children’s spontaneous control of facial expression. Child Development, 57, 1309— 1321. 2. Saarni, C. (1984). An observational study of children’s attempts to monitor their expressive behavior. Child Development, 55, 1504—1513. 3. Bok, S. (1978). Lying: Moral choice in public and private life. New York: Random House. 4. Bond, M. H., & Hwang, K. K. (1986). The social psychology of Chinese people. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), The psychology of the Chinese people (pp. 213—266). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Lee, K., Cameron, C. A., Xu, F., Fu, G., & Board, J. (1997). Chinese and Canadian children’s evaluations of lying and truth-telling. Child Development. 64,924—934. Gail D. Heyman and Kang Lee, “Moral Development. Revisiting Kohlberg’s Stages“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Interaction | Parsons | Habermas IV 319 Interaction/Parsons/Habermas: Problem: if the concept of action is connected to the concept of order in such a way that both complement each other on the same analytical level to form the concept of social interaction, the focus would no longer be on the purpose-means structure, but on language-dependent consensus building as the mechanism that coordinates the action plans of different actors. >Order/Parsons, Order/Hobbes, Order/Locke. Habermas IV 320 Solution/Parsons: the starting point remains the singular action of a single actor. Parsons thinks that elementary interaction consists of two independently introduced actions of two actors. Values define the preferences of alternatives. >Double Contingency/Parsons. Habermas IV 321 Problem: how should Parsons link the monadic concept of action with an intersubjectivist concept of order? Solution/Habermas: one could make interpretations of the actors a core component of social action. The problem would be solved by orienting oneself towards the validity claims of norms that are based on intersubjective recognition. ParsonsVsHabermas: Parsons, on the other hand, sees action-oriented decisions first and foremost as a result of private arbitrariness of individual actors. (Habermas: This is so in Parsons early middle period). >Arbitrariness. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Law | Weber | Habermas III 231 Law/Weber/Habermas: Weber calls rationalization the cognitive independence of law and moral, i.e. the replacement of moral-practical insights of ethical and legal doctrines, principles, maxims and decision rules of world views in which they were initially embedded. Cosmological, religious and metaphysical worldviews are structured in such a way that the internal difference between theoretical and practical reason cannot yet come into effect. >Morality, >Ethics, >Worldviews, >Rationalization, >Rationality. Habermas III 232 The autonomisation of law and moral leads to formal law and to profane ethics of conviction and responsibility. >Ethics of conviction, >Responsibility. Of course, this autonomization is still in the making even within religious systems of interpretation. This leads to the dichotomization between a search for salvation, which is oriented towards inner salvation goods and means of salvation, and the realization of an outer, objectified world. Weber shows how ethics of conviction approaches develop from this religiousness of conviction. (1) >Religion. Habermas III 278 Law/Weber/Habermas: for the emergence of modern law, Weber must postulate a process that is assumed in parallel, even if not simultaneously by him for the rationalization of worldviews. >World View/Weber. The availability of post-traditional legal concepts is not yet identical with the enforcement of a modern legal system. Only on the basis of rational natural law can legal matters be reconstructed in basic concepts of formal law in such a way that legal institutions can be created that formally satisfy universalist principles. These must regulate private commercial transactions between the owners of goods and the complementary activities of the public administration. HabermasVsWeber: this does not show the parallelism of these two processes clearly enough. Habermas III 332 Law/Weber/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber's theoretical position of law in his theory of rationalization is ambiguous in that it simultaneously permits the institutionalization of procedural rational economic and administrative action and also seems to make the detachment of subsystems from their moral-practical foundations possible. Cf. >Natural Justice. The dialectical explanation of the conflicting developments of the development of science and religion cannot be applied to the development of law, since it appears from the outset in a secularized form. Habermas: Weber reinterprets modern law in such a way that it is separated from the evaluative value sphere. Habermas III 346 HabermasVsWeber: Weber empirically reinterprets the problem of legitimacy and decouples the political system from forms of moral-practical rationality; he also cuts the formation of political will back to processes of power acquisition and power competition. >Legitimacy, >Justification, >Ultimate justification. Law/Weber: as far as the normative agreement is based on tradition, Weber speaks of conventional community action. To the extent that this is replaced by success-oriented, purpose-oriented action, the problem arises as to how these new scopes can in turn be legitimate, i.e. normatively bindingly ordered. Rational social action takes the place of conventional community action. >Purpose rationality, >Conventions, >Community. Habermas III 347 Only the procedure of coming into being justifies the assumption that a normative agreement is rationally motivated. Only within normatively defined limits may legal entities act rationally without regard to conventions. HabermasVsWeber: Weber fluctuates here between discursive agreement and arbitrary statute. Habermas III 351 Modern civil private law/Weber/Habermas: is characterised by three formal features: positivity, legalism and formality. Def positivity/Habermas: positively set law is not generated by interpretation of recognized and sacred traditions, it rather expresses the will of a sovereign Habermas III 352 legislator, which uses legal organisational means to regulate social offences conventionally. Def Legalism/Habermas: legal entities are not subject to any moral motives other than general legal obedience. It protects their private inclinations within sanctioned boundaries. Not only bad convictions, but also actions that deviate from the norm are sanctioned, assuming accountability. Def Formality/Law/Habermas: Modern law defines areas of legitimate arbitrariness of private individuals. The arbitrary freedom of legal entities in a morally neutralized area of private actions with legal consequences is assumed. Private law transactions can therefore be regulated negatively by restricting authorisations that are recognised in principle (instead of a positive regulation of concrete obligations and material bids). Anything that is not prohibited by law is permitted in this area. Habermas: the system functionality corresponding to these characteristics results from legal structures in which procedural rational action can become general. It does not explain how these legal structures themselves are possible. Habermas III 353 Rather, the form of modern law is explained by the post-traditional structures of consciousness it embodies. HabermasVsWeber: Weber would have to understand the modern legal system as an order of life, which is assigned to the moral-practical way of life. But Weber's attempt to view the rationalization of law exclusively from the point of view of rationality of purpose contradicts this. Habermas: only at a post-conventional level does the idea of the fundamental critiqueability and need for justification of legal norms emerge. Habermas III 354 Modern Law/Weber/Habermas: separates morality and legality. This requires practical justification. The moral-free sphere of law refers to a moral based on principles. The achievement of making something positive is to shift justification problems, i.e. to relieve the technical handling of the law of justification problems, but not to eliminate these justification problems. This justification, which has become structurally necessary, is expressed in the catalogue of fundamental rights contained in the civil constitutions alongside the principle of popular sovereignty. Habermas III 357 Modern Law/Weber: For Weber, modern law in the positivist sense is to be understood as the law that is set by decision and completely detached from rational agreement, from concepts of justification, no matter how formal they may be. ((s) > Carl Schmitt's Decisionism/Weber). WeberVsNatural justice: Thesis: There can be no purely formal natural justice. Being-Should/Weber: The supposed to be valid is considered to be identical with that which in fact exists everywhere on average; the 'norms' obtained by logical processing of concepts of legal or ethical, belong in the same sense as the 'natural laws' to those generally binding rules which 'God himself cannot change' and against which a legal system must not attempt to rebel. (2) >Natural Justice. Habermas III 358 HabermasVsWeber: Weber confuses the formal characteristics of a post-traditional level of justification with particular material values. Nor does he sufficiently distinguish between structural and content-related aspects in rational natural justice and can therefore equate "nature" and "reason" with value contents, from which modern law, in the strict sense, is detached as an instrument for asserting any values and interests. >Foundation/Weber. Habermas III 362 Procedural legitimacy/procedural rationality/law/HabermasVsWeber: as soon as the rationalization of law is reinterpreted as a question of the procedural rational organization of procedural rational management and administration, questions of the institutional embodiment of moral-practical rationality cannot only be pushed aside, but downright turned into its opposite: These now appear as a source of irrationality, at least of "motives that weaken the formal rationalism of law".(3) Habermas: Weber confuses the recourse to the establishment of legal rule with a reference to particular values. Habermas IV 122 Law/Weber/Habermas: Question: How can a contract bind the parties if the sacred basis of the law has been removed? Solution/Hobbes/Weber/Habermas: the standard answer since Hobbes and up to Max Weber is that modern law is compulsory law. The internalization of moral corresponds to a complementary transformation of the law into an externally imposed, state-authorized power based on the state sanction apparatus. The quasi automatic enforceability of the fulfilment of legal claims Habermas IV 123 is to guarantee obedience. >Obedience. DurkheimVsHobbes/DurkheimVsWeber/Habermas: Durkheim is not satisfied with that. Obedience must also have a moral core. The legal system is in fact part of a political order with which it would fall if it could not claim legitimacy. >E. Durkheim. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I. 1963, p. 541. 2.M. Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Ed. J. Winckelmann, Tübingen 1964, p. 638 3.Ibid p. 654 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Modernism | Touraine | Gaus I 271 Modernism/Touraine/West: Touraine, like Habermas, emphasizes the reflexive, self-critical potential of modernity. Although human beings have always made history, they have previously done so only unconsciously. This is because in premodern societies, society's 'self-production' was restricted and obscured by 'meta-social guarantees' - metaphysical and religious systems that represented certain values as absolute limits on social action and development. Society: Modernity has eroded these limits and so enhanced society's 'historicity', which refers to society's 'capacity to produce its own social and cultural field, its own historical environment' (Touraine, 1977(1): 16). For Touraine the ultimate bearer of this potential is social movements: 'Men make their own history: social life is produced by cultural achievement and social conflicts, and at the heart of society burns the fire of social movements' (1981(2): l). Technology/Technocracy: But modernity's promise of autonomy and social creativity is, once again, threatened by the increasing pervasiveness of technical knowledge and bureaucratic structures of management within what Touraine calls 'postindustrial' or 'programmed' societies. >Postindustrial Society/Touraine. 1. Touraine, Alain (1977) The Self-Production of Society, trans. D. Coltman. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Touraine, Alain (1981) The Voice and the Eye: An Analysis of Social Movements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. West, David 2004. „New Social Movements“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Neoliberalism | Brown | Mause I 74f Neoliberalism/Brown: Brown does not use the term "neoliberalism" in the sense of economic theory. Brown thesis: the neoliberal rationality is expansive and "extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action".(1) The penetration of economic logic into all areas of life and politics is not unproblematic from the perspective of democracy theory. Democracy/Brown: this is contrary to basic democratic values. >Democracy/Brown. Neoliberalism (...) represents a paradigm that has a lasting influence on our thinking and reasoning by implicitly evaluating terms and concepts - behind the speakers' backs, so to speak - and thus distinguishing specific actions and justifications normatively and making them connectable and devaluing others. 1. W. Brown, Neoliberalism and the end of liberal democracy. Edgework. Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics, Princeton 2005, S. 39-40. |
BrownMurray I Murray Brown On the theory and measurement of technological change Cambridge 1968 PolBrown I Wendy Brown American Nightmare:Neoliberalism, neoconservativism, and de-democratization 2006 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
| Order | Hobbes | Habermas IV 314 Order/Hobbes/Habermas: as later Utilitarianism, so Hobbes also proceeds from isolated subjects endowed with the capacity for pupose-rational action. Rational skills should serve passions that dictate the purposes of action. The pursuit of one's own interests leads to a struggle for security and scarce goods. If one only considers the natural equipment of interested and purpose-oriented individuals, social relationships cannot take the form of peaceful competition. Habermas IV 315 The actions of other individuals can only be understood as a means or condition for the realization of their own purposes. Therefore, all artificial regulations are governed by the natural maxim that everyone seeks to exert influence on everyone and to gain generalised influence, i.e. power. See >Order/Parsons. Solution/Hobbes: a contract of power with the unconditional subjugation of everyone to the absolute power of one. However, this presupposes a situation in which the subjects acting in a rational manner are already prepared to fulfil the conditions necessary for the conclusion of a contract.(1) ParsonsVsHobbes. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 93f. Höffe I 228 Order/State/Society/Hobbes/Höffe: Hobbes formulates the characteristic challenge of his epoch as a generally valid basic problem: "Why at all and in what form do we need an institutional political order, why a state with powers of coercion? Since the answer also comes from general principles, from real principles, especially from the idea of the state of nature, both Hobbes' question and his proposed solution transcend the historical context, i.e., once again, the British Civil War and the early bourgeois market society. ((as) But, because of problems: see >Absolutism/Hobbes.) Cf. >State/Hobbes, >Governance/Hobbes. |
Hobbes I Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668 Cambridge 1994 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Order | Locke | Arndt II 198 Name/names/classes/order/Locke: subsumptions under names (general term) are only achievements of our minds - the mind is caused by the similarity to make abstract general ideas. >Idea/Locke, >Mind/Locke, >Similarity/Locke. Habermas IV 316 Order/Locke/LockeVsHobbes/Parsons/Habermas: Locke makes use of practical reason, which prohibits the rational pursuit of one's own interests obeying exclusively imperatives of purpose rationality. >Procedural rationality. Solution/Locke: even the natural state is conceived from the point of view of the intersubjective validity of a natural right to the purpose-rational representation of one's own interests. Rational action/Locke: the right to behave rationally in this sense is thus limited for everyone, since everyone else is entitled to it from the outset.(1) 1. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 96. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Order | Parsons | Habermas IV 306 Order/Parsons/Talcott ParsonsVsHobbes/Habermas: the question of how social order is possible cannot be solved under empirical conditions. (The Hobbesian problem). Problem: rationalistic and empirical concepts of action cannot grasp the autonomy of action any more than materialistic and idealistic concepts of order can grasp the legitimacy of a context of action based on interests. Solution/Parsons: Parsons develops a voluntaristic concept of action and a normativistic concept of order. Habermas IV 310 Order/Parsons: cannot be stabilized by interests alone. Thesis: Orders that are deprived of their normative force lead to anomic states.(1) Habermas IV 315 The Hobbesian Problemsee Order/Hobbes. If one starts from the concept of purpose-rational action, the actions of others are possible means for one's own purposes. Then it follows from the postulate of rationality that everyone should try to rule over each other. Then power becomes the central concept of the analysis of order. A purely utilitarian society would then be chaotic and unstable. (2) Solution/Hobbes: a contract of power with the unconditional subjugation of everyone to the absolute power of one. However, this presupposes a situation in which the subjects acting in a purposive-rational manner are already prepared to fulfil the conditions necessary for the conclusion of a contract. (3) ParsonsVsHobbes: A. The model of purpose-rational action cannot explain how actors can make an agreement that is reasonable, Habermas IV 316 i.e. so that the interests of all are taken into account. Solution/Parsons: The concept of purposive rationality must be extended. This leads to a distinction between technical and practical concepts of rationality. >Order/Locke. Conclusion: commitments must be based on a normative consensus, Habermas IV 317 which alone cannot result from rational considerations. B. Parson's thesis: (like Weber and Durkheim): Hobbes' artificial coercive order cannot be made permanent and is therefore not suitable as a model for an explanation of how social order is possible. Habermas IV 318 Problem: there is a lack of standardization and value orientation. Parsons/Habermas: Parsons constructs a symmetrical relationship between two contrary but equally wrong positions: 1) Sociological materialism reduces norms to externally imposed regulations and ignores the fact that the institutionalisation of expectations of behaviour is based on the orientation of the actor and binds it normatively and not merely de facto. Habermas IV 319 Sociological idealism underestimates the coercion that emanates from the non-normative components of the action situation, from the material substrate of the lifeworld in general. >Idealism, >Materialism. Solution/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons develops an institutional concept that follows the New Kantian model of value realization, i.e. Weber's concept of an order integrating values and interests.(3) >Institutions. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 404. 2. Ibid. p. 93f 3. Ibid. p. 732. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Paradox of Value | Menger | Coyne I 4 Value paradox/Carl Menger/Coyne/Boettke: Consumer valuations, and not the amount of effort, is what determines prices. But what determines consumer valuations? This is a question that had long perplexed social scientists. It is captured by what is known as the water-diamond paradox. At the core of this paradox is the following question: Why do consumers value diamonds, which are a luxury item, more than water, which is essential for life? By introducing the concept of marginal utility, Menger and his co-revolutionaries were able to resolve this paradox. Solution: In most contexts, people do not make either-or decisions. That is, people do not typically choose between having only water, and nothing else, or only diamonds. Instead, they are engaged in choosing among various quantities of water and diamonds. Instead of treating the choice as either-or, the proper way to frame the choice is as a marginal decision in which the individual chooses whether to consume an additional unit of water or an additional diamond. >Marginalism, >Marginal utility. Diamonds tend to be scarce, and their main use is ornamental. As such, the price that most people are willing to pay for a marginal diamond is high. Think about what would happen if diamonds were as plentiful as dirt: the use value of diamonds would be low as would the price of the marginal diamond. As illustrated by its power to resolve the water-diamond paradox, marginal utility became the foundation of a new approach to understanding social action. >Price, >Value. |
Meng I K. Menger Selected Papers in Logic and Foundations, Didactics, Economics (Vienna Circle Collection) 1979 Coyne I Christopher J. Coyne Peter J. Boettke The Essential Austrian Economics Vancouver 2020 |
| Preferences | Parsons | Habermas IV 336 Preferences/Parsons/Habermas: ParsonsVsWeber: Example: The "social action" of the entrepreneur represents only one of several types of purposive and value-rational action: The modern doctor typically acts as universally and functionally specified as the businessman of the capitalist economy, but at the same time he/she is subject to the rules of professional ethics that prevent him/her from pursuing his/her economic interests by all legally permitted means.(1) S ee Terminology/Parsons: pattern variables. Habermas: the pattern-variables are suitable for describing the fact that modern societies may consciously adopt contrary decision patterns for different areas of life and switch from a combination of preferences to the opposite. >Decisions/Parsons. Habermas IV 337 Preferences/Professions/Parsons: the instrumental activism from which Parsons reads the action orientation of American businessmen and doctors in the 1940s and 1950s and which he sees as being determined by basic decisions for an emotionally neutral attitude, universalism, performance orientation and a field-independent, cognitive style directed towards the specific, is simultaneously depicted on three levels, namely in structurally analog motives for action, professional roles and cultural values. (2) HabermasVsParsons: Problem: the scope of decision regulated by preference patterns is not filled by interpretation performances of the actor. The model does not permit any initiatives that could then be investigated in terms of how the various resources of the lifeworld, acquired competences, recognised norms and traditional cultural knowledge converge and form a reservoir for action orientations. >Preferences. 1. Talcott Parsons, The Professions and the Social Structure; The Motivation of Economic Activities, in: T. Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, Rev. ed. NY 1949. 2. Talcott Parsons, The Social System, NY 1951, S. 78 |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Public Sphere | Ortega y Gasset | Brocker I 195 Public Sphere/Ortega y Gasset: respective dimensions of public life concern all collective customs (the so-called "usos", which are so fundamental for Ortega's concept of culture!) of social being. The process of "Making Mass" (See Mass/Ortega) brings about an astonishing increase in the quality of life, which has led to the fact that life options and possibilities for action, which in earlier times were reserved exclusively for a few people, are now open to many (if not all people). There is talk of a "general rise in the historical water level" (1) and a "rise in the entire historical level" (2), which is a "time of Brocker I 196 compensation" (3), through which the assets allegedly balance each other out. Brocker I 199 Mass Human/Ortega: the mass human knows no connection to rules of politeness or truthfulness. Respect, regard or even admiration for the excellent actions and achievements of certain people are completely foreign to him. According to Ortega, the actions of the modern state promote Brocker I 200 such a standard-free mass behaviour. The security machinery of the state abolishes all spontaneity and creativity in social action. It bureaucratizes all social spheres and reservations. A society that had created the state as a tool to live better must see how the state takes itself above it and it must begin to live for the state. (4) >Norms, >State, >Society. 1. José Ortega y Gasset, La Rebelión de las Masas (con un prólogo para franceses, un epílogo para ingleses y un apéndice: Dinámica del tiempo), Madrid 1937 (zuerst 1929). Dt.: José Ortega y Gasset, Der Aufstand der Massen, Reinbek 1956, p. 17 2. Ibid. p 19 3. Ibid. p. 18. 4. Cf. Ibid. p. 140 Thomas Gil, „Ortega y Gasset, Der Aufstand der Massen (1929)“ In: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Purposive Action | Parsons | Habermas IV 336 Purposive Action/Parsons/Habermas: ParsonsVsWeber: Example: The "social action" of the entrepreneur represents only one of several types of purposive and value-rational action: The modern doctor typically acts as universally and functionally specified as the businessman of the capitalist economy, but at the same time he/she is subject to the rules of professional ethics that prevent him/her from pursuing his/her economic interests by all legally permitted means. (1) >Terminology/Parsons: pattern variables. Habermas: the pattern-variables are suitable for describing the fact that modern societies may consciously adopt contrary decision patterns for different areas of life and switch from a combination of preferences to the opposite. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Professions and the Social Structure; The Motivation of Economic Activities, in: T. Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, Rev. ed. NY 1949. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rationalism | Political Philosophy | Gaus I 101 Rationalism/Political philosophy/Gaus: Liberalism as secular humanism remains important today, though liberalism as a self-confident rationalism has been under attack by pluralists, relativists, postmodernists and pragmatists (see Gaus, 2003(1): ch. 1) >Liberalism, >Humanism. However, in an interesting and surprising sense, the pragmatist liberalism of Richard Rorty (1991)(2) and others, although it depicts itself as rejecting Enlightenment rationalism and epistemology, is nevertheless an inheritor of this conception of liberalism as an overall method for arriving at the truth. >Epistemology. To be sure, pragmatism is a reaction to rationalism and representational views of the mind and knowledge; as Rorty stresses, our minds do not mirror nature, and truth is not a correct representation of nature (1979(3): 176–9). >Pragmatism. Nonetheless, truth is still the result of convergence in individual reasoning: what is true is what a certain sort of community of inquirers would converge on (Misak, 2000)(4). So, while rejecting the specific view of reason and truth that characterized much Enlightenment thinking, twentieth-century pragmatist liberalism continues to identify liberal democracy with a certain mode of inquiry, and one which, when properly implemented, leads to a convergence of rational belief. >Enlightenment. Moreover, in the hands of liberals such as Dewey this mode of inquiry allowed society to obtain ‘conscious control’ – for example, in the form of economic planning – over its collective life (1980(5): 87). Thus liberalism is understood as a doctrine about the convergence of rational inquiry that provides for a rationally ordered society. >Liberalism/Hayek. 1. Gaus, Gerald F. (2003) Contemporary Theories of Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project. London: Sage. 2. Rorty, Richard (1991) Objectivity, Relativism and Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Rorty, Richard (1979) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 4. Misak, Cheryl (2000) Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation. London: Routledge. 5. Dewey, John (1980) Liberalism and Social Action. New York: Putnam’s Sons. Gaus, Gerald F. 2004. „The Diversity of Comprehensive Liberalisms.“ In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Rationalization | Habermas | III 22 Rationalization/Sociology/Habermas: Understanding rational action orientations becomes the point of reference for understanding all action orientations. For sociology, this means the following relationship between meta-theoretical and methodological level: a) At the metatheoretical level, it chooses basic concepts that are tailored to the increase in rationality of modern life. b) At the methodological level, the understanding of rational action orientations becomes a reference point for the understanding of all action orientations (>Theory of Meaningful Understanding). This is about internal relationships between meaning and validity. >Sociology, >Levels/order, >Levels of Description, >Theory, >Method. III 209 Rationalization/HabermasVsMarx/VsAdorno/VsHorkheimer/VsWeber/Habermas: the concept of rationality of these authors is too narrow to grasp the comprehensive social rationality they have in mind. >Rationality/Habermas, >Rationality/Adorno, >Rationality/Weber, >HabermasVsAdorno, >HabermasVsMarx, >HabermasVsWeber. The term would have to be used at the same level as the productive forces, the subsystems of functional rational action, the totalitarian bearers of instrumental reason. >Productive Forces/Habermas. That is not happening. The concept of action of these authors is not complex enough for this. >Actions/Habermas, >Action Systems/Habermas, >Action theory/Habermas. In addition, basic concepts of action and system theory must not be confused: LuhmannVsMarx, LuhmannVsWeber, LuhmannVsAdorno: the rationalization of action orientations and lifeworld structures is not the same as the increase in complexity of action systems.(1) >LuhmannVsWeber. III 457 Communicative action/rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only when we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday actions and the formation of subsystems for procedural rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas III 459 Rationalization/Habermas: the paradox of rationalization, of which Weber spoke, can be understood abstractly in such a way that the rationalization of the world allows a kind of system integration ((s) of subsystems with non-linguistic communication media such as money and power) that competes with the integration principle of ((s) linguistic) understanding and under certain conditions has a disintegrating effect on the world of life. >Lifeworld. IV 451 Rationalization/Modernism/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: Weber could not classify the problems of legitimacy that a positivistically undermined legal rule raises within the pattern of rationalization of modern societies, because he himself remained imprisoned by legal-positivist views. >Legitimicy/Habermas. Solution/Habermas: Thesis: (p) The emergence (...) of modern societies requires the institutional embodiment of moral and legal concepts of a post-traditional nature, but (q) capitalist modernization follows a pattern according to which cognitive-instrumental rationality penetrates beyond the realms of economy and state into other, communicatively structured areas of life and takes precedence there at the expense of moral-practical and aesthetic-practical rationality. (r) This causes disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld. IV 452 Problem: a progressively rationalised lifeworld is simultaneously decoupled and made dependent on increasingly complex, formally organised areas of action such as economics and state administration. This takes sociopathological forms of internal colonization. To the extent that critical imbalances can only be avoided at the cost of disturbances in the symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld (i.e. of "subjectively" experienced crises or pathologies threatening identity). IV 486 Paradoxically, rationalization releases both at the same time - the systemically induced reification and the utopian perspective from which capitalist modernization has always inherited the stigma that it dissolves traditional forms of life without saving their communicative substance. >Reification 1.N. Luhmann, Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität, Tübingen 1968. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Sense | Mead | Habermas IV 13 Sense/Mead/Habermas: the sense embodied in a social action is not external to the aspect of behavior. Nevertheless, it is publicly accessible as something objective in symbolic expressions. >Action, >Behavior. |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Society | Weber | Habermas III 356 Community/Society/Law/Weber/Habermas: as far as the normative agreement is based on tradition, Weber speaks of conventional community action. >Convention, >Tradition, >Cultural transmission. To the extent that this is replaced by success-oriented, procedural rational oriented action, the problem arises as to how these new scopes can in turn be legitimately, i.e. normatively bindingly ordered. Rational social action takes the place of conventional community action.(1) >Purpose rationality, >Rationality, >Rationality of action. 1. M. Weber, Methodologische Schriften, (Ed)J. Winckelmann, Tübingen, 1968, p. 201f |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Sociobiology | Mayr | I 266 Sociobiology/Edward O. Wilson "Sociobiology" (Wilson, 1975). Fired heated controversy about the importance of evolution for social behaviour. Social insects, for example. Uses the term "biological basis" somewhat ambiguously: a) biological basis for behavior (Wilson): genetic disposition contributes to the phenotype of behavior. b) for his politically motivated opponents, this meant "genetically determined". We should probably be degraded to mere machines. But everyone, including Wilson, knows that this is not the case. >E.O. Wilson. (Old system/environment controversy (nature vs nurture)). >Nature vs nurture. Sociobiology/Wilson(1)/Ruse(2): according to their definitions, it should be assumed that the area encompasses all social actions and interactions in animals. This would also include social migration. For example: African ungulates, social migratory birds, migration to spawning sites, etc. However, Wilson and Ruse don not deal with that. I 267 Sociobiology/Wilson/Ruse: Subject: Aggression, sexuality, reproduction strategies of females, altruism, relative selection, parental manipulation, reciprocal altruism. They all increase or decrease reproductive success. Reason for the controversial status of sociobiology: that humans are given little more space than animals. Wilson and Ruse do not call themselves sociobiologists. >Humans, >Animals, >Life, >Evolution. 1. E.O. Wilson (1975). Sociobiology. The new Synthesis. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2. M. Ruse (1987). Is sociobiology a new paradigm? Philosophy of Science 54 (1):98-104. |
Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 |
| State (Polity) | Böckenförde | Brocker I 773 State/Prerequisites/Böckenförde: the state must presuppose the moral judgement and the public spirit of the citizens in order to be able to act in a regulatory and liberal manner. However, he or she cannot meet these requirements using Brocker I 774 an authoritative injunction or prohibition. However, in view of the emphasis on these prerogative and pre-political prerequisites of the state, it would be shortened to place Böckenförde in a tradition line with Carl Schmitt, with whom, however, he had a close intellectual relationship. (1) Brocker I 775 Böckenförde understands the concept of state with Hobbes as a framework of enforcement based on law and the monopolisation of power to guarantee peace within society. With Hermann Heller he understands the state as a unit of effect and action. Böckenförde also adopts the view that the state is not merely a construct of thought and not a substance detached from people, but the epitome of a real, organized effort of coordinated social action by people who arrive at unity in this action. In the constitutional state, this socially coordinated action is legally shaped and even structured by law.(2) Brocker I 785 For the thesis that the constitutional state cannot guarantee its own conditions, see Citizens/Böckenförde. 1. Dieter Gosewinkel, „‘Beim Staat geht es nicht allein um Macht, sondern um die staatliche Ordnung als Freiheitsordnung‘, Biographisches Interview mit Ernst.-Wolfgang Böckenförde“, in: Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, Berlin 2011, p. 359-384 2. Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat – Verfassung – Demokratie. Studien zur Verfassungstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht, Frankfurt/M. 1992 (zuerst 1991), p. 11 Tine Stein, „Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Staat – Verfassung- Demokratie“, in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Böckenf I Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde State, Society and Liberty: Studies in Political Theory and Constitutional Law, London 1991 German Edition: Staat, Gesellschaft, Freiheit. Studien zur Staatstheorie und zum Verfassungsrecht Frankfurt 1976 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| State (Polity) | Ortega y Gasset | Brocker I 199 State/Ortega y Gasset: The security machinery of the state abolishes all spontaneity and creativity in social action. It bureaucratizes all social spheres and reservations. A society that had created the state as a tool to live better must see how the state takes itself above it and it must begin to live for the state.(1) A constantly intervening and all-occupying state represents the framework within which the mass human can emerge and maintain itself. >Bureaucracy, >Society. 1. Vgl. José Ortega y Gasset, La Rebelión de las Masas (con un prólogo para franceses, un epílogo para ingleses y un apéndice: Dinámica del tiempo), Madrid 1937 (zuerst 1929). Dt.: José Ortega y Gasset, Der Aufstand der Massen, Reinbek 1956, p. 140. Thomas Gil, „Ortega y Gasset, Der Aufstand der Massen (1929)“ In: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Subsystems | Habermas | III 457 Subsystems/Communicative Action/Rationalization/HabermasVsWeber/Habermas: only when we differentiate between communicative and success-oriented action in "social action" can the communicative rationalization of everyday action and the formation of subsystems for purpose-rational economic and administrative action be understood as complementary development. Although both reflect the institutional embodiment of rationality complexes, in another respect they are opposite tendencies. IV 247 Examples of subsystems are market economy and modern administration. IV 399 Subsystems/Habermas: are indicators of a successful formation of subsystems: - the crisis-like fluctuations in the quantitative ratio of the values embodied by the medium (here: money) and the real values represented by them (i.e. the dynamics of inflation and deflation) - The reflexive upgrading of the medium, which makes capital markets possible, for example. A subsystem such as the economy can only become more differentiated via the medium of money if markets and forms of organisation emerge that bring the system's inherent traffic with the relevant environments under monetary control. This regulation does not necessarily require a double relation in the sense of an exchange of pairs of factors and products, which runs over two different media. E.g. it is not foreseen that in the relationship between the economy and the private household sector, labour enters the economic system through a non-monetary medium such as value retention. >Marxism/Habermas, >Systems, >Systems theory. IV 400 Subsystems/Habermas: for the development of a media-controlled subsystem it seems sufficient that boundaries are created across through which a simple exchange with all environments can take place controlled by a (single) medium. This also triggers changes in the interaction areas that form environments for the subsystem. >Communication Media/Habermas, >Control Media. IV 418 Subsystems/Lifeworld/Media/Technocracy/Habermas: Subsystems that are differentiated via media such as power and money can become independent from a lifeworld forced into the system environment. From the perspective of the lifeworlds, the conversion of action to the media appears both as a relief of communication effort and risk and as a conditioning of decisions in extended contingency scope. In this sense, they appear as a mechanization of the lifeworld. On the other hand, a generalization of the inlfuence of the medium cannot have such an effect. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Utilitarianism | Parsons | Habermas IV 305 Utilitarianism/Parsons/ParsonsVsUtilitarism/Habermas: in "The Structure of Social Action" Parsons shows by the concept of purpose-rational action that utilitarianism cannot justify the subject's freedom of decision. >Procedural rationality, >Actions/Parsons. Habermas IV 311 The utilitarian dilemma: 1. The acotr faces exactly one objective world of existing facts and has a more or less exact empirical knowledge of this situation. Habermas IV 312 2. Success/Parsons: in this case is measured exclusively by whether the goal has been achieved. >Double Contingency/Parsons. Norms: are limited here to regulating the relationship between purposes, means and conditions. The choice of purposes is therefore left undetermined. "("randomness of ends").(1) 3. Purposive Rationality: does not provide for a mechanism through which the actions of different actors can be coordinated. This is what Parsons calls the "atomistic" concept of action. Stability can only result from coincidentally intertwined interests. Dilemma: how can freedom of decision as the core of freedom of action be developed from the utilitarian concept of action? Habermas IV 313 a) Purposes may vary regardless of means and conditions, this condition is necessary but not sufficient. As long as no values other than decision maxims are permitted, there is room for two opposing interpretations, both of which are incompatible with freedom of choice, both in a positivist and rationalist sense. b) the determination of purposes as a function of knowledge: Here the action is a process of rational adaptation to the conditions. The active role of the actor is reduced to understanding the situation. >Purposes. Problem: neither the rationalist nor the positivist interpretation of the utilitarian model of action Habermas IV 314 can explain why the actor can make mistakes in a not only cognitive sense. >Autonomy/Parsons. Habermas IV 321 Utilitarianism/Parsons/Habermas: Parsons sticks to the core of the utilitarian concept of action. Perhaps he believes he can only save voluntarism by conceiving freedom of choice as contingent freedom of choice, in the language of German idealism: as arbitrariness. >Voluntarism. Habermas IV 371 Utilitarianism/Parsons/ParsonsVsUtilitarianism/Habermas: from the criticism of utilitarianism, Parsons initially gained the idea of a selection of purposes regulated by values and maxims. Solution: cultural values should be related to action situations by means of institutionalisation and internalisation and be linked to sanctions; in this way they should gain the stability of substantial morality in the reality of life forms and life stories. >Cultural values, >Institutionalization, >Internalization, >Lifeworld. 1.Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, NY, 1949, S. 49. |
ParCh I Ch. Parsons Philosophy of Mathematics in the Twentieth Century: Selected Essays Cambridge 2014 ParTa I T. Parsons The Structure of Social Action, Vol. 1 1967 ParTe I Ter. Parsons Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics 2000 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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