Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
CES Production Function	Fisher	Harcourt I 174 Cobb-Douglas production function/CES production function/F. M. Fisher/Harcourt: [In] F. M. Fisher [1970]⁽¹⁾, (…) he reports the results of a simulation experiment. His main conclusion is that if the real world behaves in such a way as to throw up, say, a constant share of wages, or a linear relationship in the logarithms between productivity and wages, it is these findings which explain the 'apparent success' of the Cobb-Douglas and CES production functions respectively rather than the other way around. „. . . the view that the constancy of labour's share is due to the presence of an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function is mistaken. Causation runs the other way and the apparent success of aggregate Cobb-Douglas functions is due to the relative constancy of labour's share.“ (p. 4.) The present results suggest... that the explanation of that wageoutput per man relationship may not be in the existence of an aggregate CES but rather that the apparent existence of an aggregate CES may be explained by that relationship.“ (p. 32.) Econometrics/HarcourtVsFisher, F. M.: Fisher appears to have been too literal in his understanding of the nature of the econometric hypotheses involving the Cobb-Douglas and the CES functions. Their proponents have never believed that they actually existed, only that it may be useful to interpret trends in real world observations 'as if they were observations thrown up by a jelly world of either the Cobb-Douglas or CES variety. Harcourt I 175 Distribution/factor prices/Harcourt: If, then, a small (but, I like to think, significant) section of the trade is convinced that the distribution of income and factor prices cannot be explained either within the system of production alone or, relevantly, as the outcome of a general equilibrium system even when (because) we use marginal productivity notions and modern programming methods, factors and forces elsewhere in the economic system - and other than these - must be introduced. >Measurements/Sraffa. 1. Fisher, F. M. [1970] 'Aggregate Production Functions and the Explanation of Wages: A Simulation Experiment', Working Paper 61, Department of Economics, M.I.T.	F.M. Fisher I Franklin M. Fisher Disequilibrium Foundations of Equilibrium Economics (Econometric Society Monographs) Cambridge 1989 Harcourt I Geoffrey C. Harcourt Some Cambridge controversies in the theory of capital Cambridge 1972
Change	Lewis	V 261 Change/changing/event/Lewis: Not all events involve change. We cannot afford to count the constancies (Nonchanges) as non-events. They are needed in the causal explanation. E.g. atomic decay: abrupt change, consists of constancies. The causal story that explains the decay is without changes. Constancy: is needed to explain the memory, perception, existence in time ((s) co-existence). Lewis: the terminology is not critical again. >Causal explanation/Lewis, >Causality/Lewis, >Event/Lewis, >Cause/Lewis.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Classification	Mayr	I 133 Classification: Classification usually is done by logical division downwards: how many species are classified and what weight do the different characteristics have: "progressive" or "downwards classification". (Actually identification). >Identification, >Individuation, >Specification. Therefore later: "Upwards classification: hierarchical arrangement of ever-growing groups of related species into classes. >Species. Darwin's method confirmed the upward classification and thus triggered a scientific revolution. >Darwinism, >Evolution. I 134 Classification/20th Century (1950) two new schools: a) Numerical Phenetics b) Cladistics. Cladism: the cladist system is intended to reveal the history of the tribe only, while the evolutionary system strives to form taxa from the most similar and closely related species (useful for ecology and biology). >Ecology. Both species can continue to coexist, because they have very different objectives. I 173 Systematics: not only to describe but to contribute to understanding. I 175 Def Class/Biology/Mayr: Grouping of entities that are similar and related to each other. Classification: two important functions: a) recovery of information b) comparative research. Information storage. 1) Classes should be as homogeneous as possible 2) Attribution according to most common characteristics, 3) If the differences are too great, create a new class 4) The degree of difference between classes is ordered in a hierarchy. I 176 Taxonomy: two steps: 1) Differentiation of species (microtaxonomy). 2) Classification of species into related groups (macrotaxonomy). I 177 Microtaxonomy: The delineation of the species "Species Problem": Species usually means "organism type". Problem: Males and females are also different types of organisms, just like young and adult organisms. Def "Variety": (Linné, even Darwin): Deviations that are slightly smaller than those of a new species. ("typological" or "essential concept of species"). ("Common essence" ("Nature")). >Similarity. "Typological concept of species: four characteristics: 1) Common "nature". 2) Between the species sharp discontinuity 3) Each species is spatially and temporally constant. 4) Possible variation within the species is strictly limited. ("Natural kind"). >Species, >Natural kinds, >Essence, >Essentialism. I 178 MayrVsTypological Concept of Species: Darwin refutes the notion of the "constancy of species". Populations vary geographically, individuals vary within a population. In the animate nature there are no types or essences! Def twin species: (discovered only recently: spatially separated, but equally developed, discovered in almost all animal species), forces a new criterion for the delineatation of species: reproductive isolation of populations. I 178 Biological Concept of Species (VsTypological Concept of Species): derives from this criterion of the lack of reproduction among one another. I 183 Def Species Taxa: special populations or population groups that correspond to the species definition. They are entities ("individuals") and cannot be defined as such. Individuals cannot be defined, but are merely described and delineated. >Definitions, >Definability. I 185 Macrotaxonomy: The classification of species (in superordinate groups) Groups: Usually easily recognizable: birds, butterflies, beetles. Downward classification (actually identification). Dichotomy (Aristotelian), high time of medical botany. E.g. warm-blooded or not warm-blooded, with feathers or not. I 187 Upwards Classification/Mayr: Even Linné himself from 1770 onwards: better suited. Classes are distinguished and then grouped into superordinate groups. Unfortunately no strict methodology. There was no theoretical basis for the hierarchy. Functional Classification: Sub-form of the upwards classification. Only selected features. I 188 Two criteria: genealogy (common descent) and degree of similarity (extent of evolutionary change). Causal classification: E.g. diseases according to causes: pathogen, aging process, toxic substances, genes, malignant changes, harmful radiation, etc. >Causal explanation. Any classification that takes into account the causes is subject to severe restrictions and can never become a purely artificial system. I 189 "Taxon": Separate group of offspring. Each taxon consists of the descendants of the next common ancestor. "Monophyletic". Genealogy: Does not a classification make! Similarity cannot be neglected, because the diverging branches were subject to changes of varying extend. Result: Classification into families, genera, divisions, orders. >Systems, >Theories, >Explanation, >Causes, >Effects, >Single-case causation. Homology/Mayr: Relationship between species and higher taxa is shown by the occurrence of homologous features. I.e. a feature derived from the same feature of its next common ancestor. >Homology. I 373 You must always infer homology! There is a lot of evidence for homology, e.g. position of a structure in relation to other structures, also transitional forms with fossil ancestors. >Evidence.	Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998
Communication	Morris	Habermas IV 30 Communication/Morris/Habermas: Morris has introduced the semiotic basic concepts of signs, sign interpretation, sign meaning etc. with the help of the behavioral basic concepts in such a way that the structural relationship between intention and meaning can be described objectivistically, i.e. without anticipating the understanding of rule-guided behavior. (1) HabermasVsMorris: Morris refers to his teacher G.H. Mead, but misses his N.B.: Mead understands the meaning structure inherent to in animal behavior as a property of interaction systems that ensures a prior commonality between the organisms involved, initially established on an instinctive basis. The internalisation gradually replaces the instinct regulation by the cultural tradition running through linguistic communication. >Internalization, >Language, >Animals, >Animal language. MeadVsMorris: it is not enough to attribute consistent interpretations, Habermas IV 31 identical meanings must be required. The constancy of meaning of the symbols must not only be given by themselves, but must be recognizable for the symbol users themselves. >Interpretation, >Signals, >Signs, >Meaning, >Symbols. 1. Ch. Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Sings, Int. Found of the Unity of Sciences, Vol 1. Chicago, 1938; Ch. Morris, Sings, Language and Behavior, N.Y: 1946; Ch. Morris, Pragmatische Semiotik und Handlungstheorie, Frankfurt 1988.	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Correctness	Tugendhat	I 430 Correct/True/Truth/Correctness/Reference/Tugendhat: a speech event is only called a right (correct), when another one is called correct. - Then it has the sense of "true" - that constitutes the reference to objects. >Reference, >Truth. I 441 Correctness/Language/Tugendhat: E.g. signal language of animals or humans, rules causal or conventional, then the use is considered "right" - then classification expressions = quasi-predicates (only in presence of the object). >Predicates/Tugendhat, >Terminology/Tugendhat, >Animals, cf. >Animal language. I 442 Regardless of the situation: when the perceptual situation is specified by spatio-temporal localization and is thus objectified. I 444 If the observer speaks a situation-independent language, he can respond to a situation-dependent language (e.g. of measuring instruments) with the attribution of truth/falsehood. >Observation language, >Objectivity. I 445 Truth: if the speaker only has quasi-predicates, he would have to be able to distinguish between regulatory compliance and situation conformity - then correcting errors about verification rules. I 446 But by definition not if only quasi-predicate available - Solution: singular term, then constancy of an identifiable. I 519 "right"/Tugendhat: is a basic concept. >Basic concepts. I 448 Truth/Correctness/Tugendhat: the false use of a term (lie) presupposes that it is used in a rule-compliant way. >Truth. Therefore it is necessary to separate correctness and truth. - It must be possible to refer to other situations with singular terms and quantifiers. >Singular terms, >Quantifiers.	Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
Covariance	Nozick	II 54 Knowledge/Belief/Covariance/Nozick: the more a belief (co-)varies with the truth of what is believed, the better it is as knowledge. >Belief, >Truth. Def Knowledge/Nozick: knowledge is what we have when our belief varies subjunctively with the truth - but if there were beings with better knowledge (possible world), our attitude would not be in the best relation to what is believed, and would no longer be knowledge. ((s) Again this is depending on other things, extrinsic property). >Extrinsic, >Knowledge, >Possible worlds. II 175 Counterfactual condtional: shows covariance. II 175ff Covariance/Conditional/Counterfactual Conditional/Nozick: Conditional: provides only half of the covariance: if p were false, the person would not believe it - the conditional only varies with those cases where the antecedent is false. Problem: still missing: when p > S believes that p. II 220ff Knowledge/Connection/Covariance/Nozick: knowledge requires covariance with the facts; if they were different, I would believe other things - that is the connection (track). Covariance/(s): if yes, then yes, if no, then no. II 224f Method/Knowledge/Covariance/Nozick: I do not live in a world in which pain behavior e is given and must be kept constant! - Therefore, I can know h on the basis of e, which is variable! >Evidence, >Hypotheses. And because it does not vary, it shows me that h (he is in pain) is true. >Pain. VsSkepticism: in reality, it is not about the fact that h is not known, but non-(e and non-h). II 227 Openness of knowledge: means that knowledge varies with the facts, because it is in connection with them. >Covariance. II 283 Knowledge/Covariance/Nozick: there are different degrees of covariance of knowledge with the facts and degrees of sensitivity with respect to truth value. >Truth value. For evolution, it is not necessary that beings perceive all changes - let alone respond to them - our ability to develop beliefs is finer than the ability for perception - we can doubt perceptions. >Perception, >Belief, >World/thinking, >Sensory impressions, >Evolution. II 297 Constancy/Covariance/Nozick: E.g. suppose we want to recognize the content of preferences - Then preferences must at least sometimes be kept constant from situation to situation - form of thought, ((s) That is so, because otherwise you cannot be sure whether the preference belongs to the situation or the person.) >Preferences. Nozick: both people and situations must be able to share preferences - There must be independence. - Otherwise there is no trinity. >Situations, >Persons, >Independence.	No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994
Description Levels	Habermas	IV 25 Description levels/interaction/communication/Habermas: that interaction participants interpret the same stimulus in a consistent way is a fact that exists per se, but not for them ((s) the interaction participants). ((s) See Exterior/interior/Maturana, Descriptions/Maturana). Application example: IV 30 It is not enough to attribute consistent interpretations, IV 31 instead, identical meanings must be demanded. The constancy of meaning of the symbols must not only be given by themselves, but must be recognizable for the symbol users themselves. ((s) Only then can reactions not only be expected, but also misinterpretations be made recognizable.) >Meaning, >Signs, >Symbols. IV 229 Description levels/lifeworld/system/Habermas: from the participant's perspective of the members of the lifeworld, it must appear as if systems-theoretical sociology only refers to one of the three lifeworld components, namely the institutional system, to which culture and personality only form environments. From the systems-theoretical observer perspective, it is as if the analysis of the lifeworld is limited to that of the social subsystems that specializes in the conservation of structural patterns (pattern-maintenance). The components of the lifeworld are then only internal differentiations of this subsystem of the inventory definition. IV 232 The decoupling of system and world cannot be understood as a process of second-order differentiation, as long as we concentrate on only one of the two perspectives instead of transforming them into one another. Instead, we want to investigate the interrelationships between the two. Every new level of system differentiation requires a different institutional basis, and for this transformation the evolution of law and morality takes on pacemaker functions. >Law, >Morality. IV 246 Segmental differentiation through exchange relationships and the stratification of tribal societies through power relationships characterize two different levels of system differentiation. For the preservation of the system inventory, social integration (coordination of action orientations) is only necessary to the extent that it ensures the framework conditions for the functionally necessary allocation of action effects. But the various mechanisms are not a priori harmonised. IV 259 Description levels/Habermas: Moral and legal norms are second-order norms of action at which the forms of social integration can be studied. According to Durkheim, they become more abstract and more general, while simultaneously differentiating from each other. >Norms.	Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981
Distribution Theory	Piketty	Bofinger I 39 Distribution theory/distribution/Piketty/Krämer: With the exception of the explanation of top managers' incomes, Piketty considers the neoclassical marginal productivity theory of distribution to be “useful” and “natural” when explaining wages and profits (Piketty 2014: 283 ff.)⁽¹⁾. VsNeoclassics/VsPiketty: However, this theory of distribution has some serious logical deficiencies and shortcomings that make it unsuitable as a theoretical explanation for the distribution of income and wealth (...) Marginal productivity/neoclassical: The neoclassical marginal productivity theory of distribution is used to explain both the micro and macro level. The microeconomic version of marginal productivity theory does not focus on income distribution, which is explained en passant, so to speak. Bofinger I 40 Factors of production/microeconomics: This is primarily about determining the demand for the individual factors of production on the respective factor markets. At the same time as the factor demand is determined, the individual factor prices (wages, interest on capital, basic rent) are also determined. The basic principle of factor price determination is identical for all factors of production. Using various assumptions - including in particular perfect competition and constant returns to scale - each factor of production in market equilibrium is remunerated according to the marginal product of the last unit still employed. In this model framework, the theory of price formation on a factor market is simultaneously a theory of income distribution. >Factors of production, >Factor market, >Production structure. Macroeconomics: The macroeconomic version of the marginal productivity theory of distribution transfers the laws obtained at the microeconomic level to the economy as a whole. The incomes of the factors of production also correspond to their respective factor prices at the macroeconomic level. If, as is generally the case, a Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed, the income produced is distributed completely among the factors of production involved. The macroeconomic wage rate (profit rate) is equated with the production elasticity of labor (capital). Variations in the wage rate or profit rate have no influence on the proportional distribution of income, as these trigger a corresponding compensating factor substitution. Elasticity: The income ratios change at most if the production elasticities are changed by non-neutral technical progress. >Elasticity. Bofinger I 41 Capital theory/VsPiketty: As has become clear in the context of the so-called capital theory controversy, however, the assumption of the existence of a macroeconomic production function and the specification of a defined “quantity of capital” independent of the prices of the various capital goods and thus of the profit rate prove to be untenable for certain logical reasons (cf. Harcourt 1972)⁽²⁾⁽³⁾. >Capital/Piketty, >Cambridge Capital Controversy/Harcourt. Method: The problem here is that the prices of the individual, heterogeneous capital goods must be known in advance in order to be able to add them up to an overall economic capital stock. However, the prices of the individual capital goods cannot be determined without knowledge of the interest rate on capital (the profit rate) (cf. Kurz/Salvadori 1995)⁽⁴⁾. >Heinz D. Kurz, >Neri Salvadori. As Piero Sraffa demonstrated as early as 1960(5), the prices of capital goods and the rate of profit must be determined simultaneously (Sraffa 2014)⁽⁵⁾. >Piero Sraffa. Outside of a one-sector model, it is therefore not possible to aggregate the various capital goods into a single variable “capital”. Samuelson: Paul Samuelson and other neoclassicists also conceded this at the end of the long-standing dispute between the critics of neoclassical production and capital theory from Cambridge (England) and its defenders from Cambridge (USA), which Piketty, however, completely misunderstands. >Paul Samuelson. Bofinger I 42 Capital theory: Although the Cambridge-Cambridge controversy has clearly shown that the macroeconomic version of marginal productivity theory is based on a circular argument that calls its theoretical foundation into question, it is still the central building block for neoclassical distribution analysis, on which Piketty also builds. Market power: Another point of criticism of the distribution theory used by Piketty is that the standard approach of the marginal productivity theory of distribution leaves no room for market power, social factors of influence or the consideration of other distributional conflicts that constantly occur in reality. Some basics for Piketty: >Cambridge Capital Controversy, >Geoffrey C. Harcourt, >Capital reversing, >Capital/Joan Robinson, >Exploitation/Robinson, >Reswitching/Robinson, >Reswitching/Sraffa, >Reswitching/Economic Theories, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Neo-Neoclassical Theories. 1. Piketty, T. 2014. Das Kapital im 21. Jahrhundert. München: Beck. 2. Harcourt, G. (1972): Some Cambridge Controversies in the Theory of Capital. Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press. 3. Piketty (2014: 305 ff.) is mistaken when he argues that the Cambridge controversy was essentially about the question of the constancy of the capital coefficient. Unfortunately, he is clearly not familiar with this important topic. 4. Kurz, H. D./Salvadori, N. (1995): Theory of Production: a Long-Period Analysis. Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press. 5. Sraffa, P. (2014 [1960]): Warenproduktion mittels Waren. Einleitung zu einer Kritik der ökonomischen Theorie. Marburg: Metropolis. Hagen Krämer. 2015. „Make no mistake, Thomas! Verteilungstheorie und Ungleichheitsdynamik bei Piketty“. In: Thomas Piketty und die Verteilungsfrage. Ed. Peter Bofinger, Gustav A. Horn, Kai D. Schmid und Till van Treeck. 2015.	Piketty I Thomas Piketty Capital in the Twenty First Century Cambridge, MA 2014 Piketty II Thomas Piketty Capital and Ideology Cambridge, MA 2020 Piketty III Thomas Piketty The Economics of Inequality Cambridge, MA 2015 Bofinger II Peter Bofinger Monetary Policy: Goals, Institutions, Strategies, and Instruments Oxford 2001
Essentialism	Chisholm	Simons I 272 Mereological Essentialism/Chisholm/Simons: results from his commitment to mereological constancy - SimonsVsChisholm. >Mereology, >Parts. Chisholm: E.g. table stump + plate - a particular table can only be built from this stump and this plate. I 273 Superposition/Simons: superposition of the parts guarantees not the existence of the table (or the identity of the table with the sum - which also leads to interrupted existence. ChisholmVsSimons: this interrupted exististence sees Chisholm as a problem. But he is only committed to the adoption of essential parts - e.g. not to glue instead of nails, etc. Simons thesis: there must be an essential part. Cf. >Essence. For the terminology of mereology see >Peter Simons.	Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Events	Lewis	V 56 Event/Lewis: can consist of parts, so great violations of laws of nature can be distinguished from small ones by the number of parts of complex events, not by "many laws", because always an infinite number of laws are violated when a single one is trespassed - or only one fundamental law violated. V 166 Event: always correspond to >propositions. - Hence we can use propositions here - e.g. O(e) says that an event e exists (happens), which complies with the description - in a set of possible worlds - But the proposition is not identical to the event - Problem: if no other event than e could fulfil the description, you would need rigid descriptions - which almost never exist - E.g. "Death of Socrates" is non-rigid. Solution: it is not about a sentence F(e), which is true in all and only the worlds in which e happens - Solution: We just need propositions that may have expressions in our language, but not necessarily do - If two events do not occur in exactly the same worlds, this means that there are no absolutely necessary links between the individual events - but then we can have a 1:1 connection between the events and the propositions - counterfactual dependence between events is simply a D between propositions - the counterfactual dependence between propositions corresponds to the causal dependence between events. - Causal dependence/Lewis: we then conclude it from the counterfactual dependence of propositions. - The dependence lies in the truth of counterfactual conditionals. - (> Causality/Hume, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. V 196 Definition Event: bigger or smaller classes of possible spatiotemporal regions - more or less connected by similarity. >Similarity/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis. V 240 Event/Lewis: E.g. no event: rapidly converging mathematical consequence - is no quick entity - name ultimately uninteresting - probability theory; its events are propositions or sometimes properties - a theory that allows an unlimited number of Boolean operations can lead to unreal events. V 243 Definition Event: property of a spacetime region - always contingent - no event occurs in every possible world - an event happens in exactly one (whole) region - E.g. scattered region: sports championships. - E.g. annual event: not an event - an event does not repeat itself - and does not happen in different space-time regions. - The region of the event is the mereological sum of the regions where it happens - to each event corresponds a property of regions - such a property belongs to exactly one region of each possible world where the event happens - Property: is simply a class here. V 245 Event: two events can happen in the same region (space-time region) - E.g. presence of an electron in an electric field can cause its acceleration. It must be possible that one occurs without the other. Even if some of the laws of nature are violated. For every two events, there is a region in a possible world where one occurs, but not the other. ((s) independence) Two events never necessarily occur at the same time - there are hardly any conditions for eventness - maybe: 1) Regions are individuals that are parts of possible worlds 2) No region is part of various possible worlds - similar to > Montague. V 258 Event/mereology/part/partial event/Essence/Lewis: an event can be part of another. - E.g. movement of the left foot is part of walking. Def essential Part/Event: e is an essential part of f iff. f happens in a region, then also e necessarily in a sub-region that is enclosed in the region (implication of an event). But not necessary: events do not necessarily have their spatiotemporal parts. - E.g. walking could consist of fewer steps. V 259 Part/Whole/Event: Writing of "rry"/"Larry": counterfactual dependence, but not cause/Effect. - They are not causally dependent - nevertheless "rry" can be causally dependent on the writing of "La" - but not of "Larr" (overlapping). - The whole is not the cause of its parts. V 260 Event/mereology/Lewis: Thesis: events do not have a simpler mereology that, for example, chairs. A sum of chairs is not itself a chair, but a conference can be a sum of meetings. >Mereology. E.g. War is the mereological sum of battles - Event/Lewis: should serve as cause and effect - partial event: here the causality is sometimes difficult to determine - Problem: whether a subregion can be determined for a partial event in which it occurs - in simple cases yes. V 261 Non-event/Causal story/Lewis: Non-events cannot be determined as something isolated - they cannot be the cause. Constancy: is not always a non-event! Constancies are needed in causal explanation. >Causal explanation/Lewis.	Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991
Gender Identity	Developmental Psychology	Upton I 84 Gender Identity/Developmental psychology/Upton: Once children realise that there are two genders and that they belong to one of them, they begin to show a clear motivation to behave in the ways that a member of that gender ‘should’; they dress in the same way, and choose friends, activities and toys to suit this label. Bem (1989)⁽¹⁾ suggests that having labelled themselves as either male or female, the child begins to develop a gender schema. This mental model of what males and females ‘do’ – the gender role – is based upon observations of other members of the same group. Children pay more attention to the behaviour of same-gender peers so as to remember more about how their own group behaves and imitate that behaviour (Ruble and Martin, 1998)⁽²⁾. Children may even show hostility to the other gender (Ruble and Martin, 1998)⁽²⁾. Question: If childhood is preparation for adulthood, don’t children need to learn to cooperate with each other, and not segregate themselves by gender? 1. One explanation seems to be that it is only by committing wholeheartedly to a particular social group that the child can develop conceptual coherence – and this includes subscribing to an extreme version of gender-typed behaviour. 2. An alternative explanation is that the differences we see in male and female behaviour are biologically rather than socially determined. There is evidence to suggest that hormones play a role in behaviours such as aggression, play patterns and attitudes to gender roles (Reiner and Gearhart, 2004)⁽³⁾. It has also been found that children display preferences for gender-appropriate toys by six months, well before they have knowledge of gender roles (Alexander et al., 2008)⁽⁴⁾. There is (…) evidence that carers’ responses to their children depend in part Upton I 85 on whether their child is male or female (Maccoby, 2003)⁽⁵⁾, with fathers showing greater differential treatment than mothers (Leaper, 2002)⁽⁶⁾. >Gender, >Sex differences, >Gender roles. 1. Bem, S.L. (1989) Genital knowledge and gender constancy in preschool children. Child Development, 60: 649–62. 2. Ruble, D.N. and Martin, C.L. (1998) Gender development, in Eisenberg, N (eds) Handbook of Child Psychology, Vol. 3: Social, emotional, and personality development (6th edn). New York: Wiley. 3. Reiner, W.G. and Gearhart, J.P. (2004) discordant sexual identity in some genetic males with cloacal exstrophy assigned to female sex at birth. New England Journal of Medicine, 350: 333–41. 4. Alexander, G., Wilcox, T. and Woods, R. (2008) Sex differences in infants’ visual interest in toys. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 38(3): 427–33. 5. Maccoby, EE (2002) Gender and group processes. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11: 54–8. 6. Leaper, C (2002) Parenting girls and boys, in Bornstein, MH (ed.) Handbook of Parenting, Vol. 1: Children and parenting. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.	Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011
Information	Bigelow	I 68 Information/Movement/Causality/Speed of Light/Bigelow/Pargetter: an image can be transmitted faster than light: e.g. a laser cannon on earth can swing on the surface of the Jupiter moon Callisto and move an image from one point to another through the angular speed, which is faster than the speed of light. I 69 This is possible because there is no causal process under way here. The point at a time is not the same thing as the point at another time, the point is not an object. >Causality, >Causation. N.B.: then in the case of this point there is only one Ockhamistic speed, no vector. Saying "it" moved was misleading. It also has no identity in time. >Temporal identity. Cause: is the movement of the laser cannon on Earth. >Causes. N.B.: therefore, the existence of a pattern of 2nd level of positions does not imply the existence of a property of the 1st level of the instantaneous velocity. >Levels/order, >Description levels. Newton: shows again that instantaneous velocity (property of the 1st level) does not imply properties of the 2nd level (sequence of positions). Flux theory: this is what it needs, the logical independence of properties 1st and 2nd level. Nevertheless, it must accept an intimate connection between the two. >Flux/Bigelow. False solution: to say that the point of light receives its identity from the numerical identity. That would be a dubious combination of first and second level properties. I 70 Vs: if, for example, a world of Malebranche - God creates the moving objects at any time in any place - is a logical possibility, then there is no implication (entailment) between Ockhamistic speed and velocity according to the flux theory (2nd and 1st level of properties). >Malebranche, >Entailment, >Implication, >William of Ockham. Bigelow/Pargetter: That is why we say that the connection between Ockham speed and flux speed is not guaranteed by a metaphysically necessary connection, but by a contingent natural law. >Laws of nature, >Contingency. Motion/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Ockham's change of location is often explained by instantaneous speed. The reason is that there is no other possibility according to the laws of nature. >Motion, >Change. Moment/Bigelow/Pargetter: this vector understands velocity among itself. Moment is not an intrinsic property (or "invariant"), but is relativized to a frame of reference. >Reference systems. Vector/Natural Laws/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Vectors play an important role in natural laws. It is they who give the natural laws their explanatory power. Intrinsic property/Vector/Bigelow/Pargetter: each vector constitutes an intrinsic characteristic of an object at a time. ((s) No contradiction to above, if related to point of time). Velocity/acceleration/Bigelow/Pargetter: their connection is mediated by their role in natural laws. Gravitational Acceleration/Galilei/Bigelow/Pargetter: is actually not quite constant, because gravitation becomes stronger when approaching the center of gravity. And it is increasingly accelerating. Galilei, however, assumes constancy. I 71 Explanation/Quantity/Bigelow/Pargetter: not all quantities play an explanatory role such as acceleration and velocity. For example, the change in acceleration (see above gravitational acceleration) does not play an explanatory role. That is why we do not assume a vector for them. All we need here is "Ockham's" pattern of acceleration. No flux. However, we do need the flux for the underlying vectors of velocity and acceleration. >Intrinsic. Vector/Physics/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: there is no reason to assume vectors above the level of acceleration, neither flux vectors nor Ockhamist vectors. >Vectors. Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: this shows an explanatory link between flux vectors and patterns in time. >Explanations, >Causal explanation. This connection is not a close logical or metaphysical one, but a looser, a nomological one. >Metaphysics, >Metaphysical possibility, >Nomothetic/idiographic.	Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Interest Rates	Schumpeter	Rothbard III 449 Evenly Rotating economy/interest rates/Schumpeter/Rothbard: (…) Joseph Schumpeter pioneered a theory of interest which holds that the rate of interest will be zero in the evenly rotating economy. >Evenly Rotating Economy (ERE)/Rothbard. RothbardVsSchumpeter: It should be clear (…) why the rate of interest (the pure rate of interest in the ERE) could never be zero. It is determined by individual time preferences, which are all positive. To maintain his position, Schumpeter was forced to assert, as does Frank Knight, that capital maintains itself permanently in the ERE. >Frank H. Knight. If there is no problem of maintenance, then there appears to be no necessity for the payment of interest in order to maintain the capital structure. Rothbard III 450 This view (…) is apparently derived from the static state of J.B. Clark and seems to follow purely by definition, since the value of capital is maintained by definition in the ERE. But this, of course, is no answer whatever; the important question is: How is this constancy maintained? And the only answer can be that it is maintained by the decisions of capitalists induced by a rate of interest return. If the rate of interest paid were zero, complete capital consumption would ensue.⁽¹⁾ The conclusive Mises-Robbins critique of Schumpeter’s theory of the zero rate of interest, which we have tried to present above, has been attacked by two of Schumpeter’s disciples.⁽²⁾ SchumpeterVsVs: First, they deny that constancy of capital is assumed by definition in Schumpeter’s ERE; instead it is “deduced from the conditions of the system.” What are these conditions? There is, first, the absence of uncertainty concerning the future. This, indeed, would seem to be the condition for any ERE. But Clemence and Doody add: “Neither is there time preference unless we introduce it as a special assumption, in which case it may be either positive or negative as we prefer, and there is nothing further to discuss.” With such a view of time preference, there is indeed nothing to discuss. The whole basis for pure interest, requiring interest payments, is time preference, and if we casually assume that time preference is either nonexistent or has no discernible influence, then it follows very easily that the pure rate of interest is zero. The authors’ “proof” simply consists of ignoring the powerful, universal fact of time preference.⁽³⁾ 1. See Mises, Human Action, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949. Reprinted by the Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998. pp. 527–29. Also see Lionel Robbins, “On a Certain Ambiguity in the Conception of Stationary Equilibrium” in Richard V. Clemence, ed., Readings in Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley Press, 1950), I, 176 ff. 2. Richard V. Clemence and Francis S. Doody, The Schumpeterian System (Cambridge: Addison Wesley Press, 1950), pp. 28–30. 3. As has been the case with all theorists who have attempted to deny time preference, Clemence and Doody hastily brush consumers’ loans aside. As Frank A. Fetter pointed out years ago, only time preference can integrate interest on consumers’ as well as on producers’ loans into a single unified explanation. Consumers’ loans are clearly unrelated to “productivity” explanations of interest and are obviously due to time preference. Cf. Clemence and Doody, The Schumpeterian System, p. 29 n.	EconSchum I Joseph A. Schumpeter The Theory of Economic Development An Inquiry into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge/MA 1934 German Edition: Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Leipzig 1912 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977
Life	Mayr	I 21 Life/Mayr: in reality it is only the process of being-alive (as opposed to death) made to a thing, and does not exist as an independent entity! One can even attempt to explain that being-alive as a process can be the product of molecules that are not themselves alive. Life: what is "life", has been strongly controversial since the 16th century. A group always claims that living organisms did not really differ from non-living matter: the physicalists. Vitalists: living organisms have properties that inanimate matter lacks, which is why biological theories and concepts cannot be reduced to the laws of physics and chemistry. >Physicalism, >Vitalism. Today it is clear that both groups were, in a sense, right and wrong. Today: "Organism": unites the most useful from both and rejects the extremes. I 46 Life/Mayr: can be synthesized in the laboratory. Principally open systems, therefore subjected to the second main sentence of thermodynamics. Cf. >St. Kauffman, >Second Law of Thermodynamics. I 349 Def Life/Mayr: Activities of self-developed systems, controlled by a genetic program. >Self-organisation. Def Life/Rensch⁽¹⁾: Living beings are hierarchically ordered, open systems, predominantly organic compounds, which normally appear as circumscribed, cell-structured individuals of temporally limited constancy. Def Life/Sattler 1986⁽²⁾: an open system that replicates and regulates itself, shows individuality, and subsists on energy from the environment. MayrVs: all contain superfluous and do not go into the genetic program, which is perhaps the most important. More description than definition. 1. R. Sattler (1986). Biophilosophy. Berlin: Springer. S. 228. 2. B. Rensch (1968). Biophilosophie. Stuttgart: G. Fischer. S. 54.	Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998
Magical Thinking	Polanyi	Weizenbaum I 174 Magical Thinking/Science/Polanyi/Weizenbaum: As Polanyi notes, the imperturbability of scientific beliefs is defended with the same tricks that protect magical belief systems: (M. Polanyi 1966⁽¹⁾): Every contradiction between a certain scientific statement and the facts of experience is explained by a different scientific statement; the stock of possible scientific hypotheses, with which every conceivable event can be explained, is inexhaustible... Within the natural sciences themselves, the constancy of theories against experience is guaranteed by epicyclic auxiliary hypotheses that nip alternative approaches in the bud. >Explanation, >Causes, >Effect, >Science, >Additional hypotheses, >Auxiliary hypotheses, >Mysticism. 1. M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, NY, 1966, p. 292.	Pola I M. Polanyi Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy Eastford 2013 Pola II M. Polanyi The Tacit Dimension Chicago 2009 Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978
Measurements	Kanitscheider	I 220 Def Measure/Def Define/Kanitscheider: measuring is an empirical process supported by theories, while defining is a conceptual activity carried out within the framework of a theory. The meaning of a theoretical term can only be elucidated by semantic investigation. Measurement assigns numerical values to already metrized quantities with factual reference represented by a particular function. >Operationalism/Kanitscheider. I 229 Measurement/Kanitscheider: Problem: all astronomical distance determinations have always only certain range. So one must work with overlapping measuring chains. "Homogeneity extrapolation: e.g. period luminosity relation of Cepheids, diameter luminosity relation of H II regions and constancy of luminosity of Sc I galaxies. Bsp These models carry into the determination of H0 (age of the universe) a hypothetical element, which one can justify if not empirically, nevertheless rationally. Similarly: Ex Determination of today's acceleration parameter q0 (or brake parameter): is mostly tried to be determined from the dependence between the apparent brightness and the redshift of the galaxies. Problem: to find an object of known standard magnitude at a sufficient distance. Method: to pick the brightest galaxy in a known regular cluster of elliptical galaxies as a "standard candle". But again, the assumption is that the galaxies retain their luminosity over a long time.	Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Mechanism Design	Economic Theories	Parisi I 490 Mecanism design/economic theories/Güth: (…) there is a long tradition of using auctions (see Milgrom, 1989)⁽¹⁾, partly very delicate applications like auctions to “trade” slaves. For the German-speaking areas, (…) Gandenberger (1961)⁽²⁾ who documents an impressive constancy in relying on the lowest bid price procurement auction. Whether as procurement auctions by which a buyer wants to contract with one of the potential suppliers or as sales auctions where a seller wants to find a buyer, the literature now offers a lot of auction theory (Wilson, 1985)⁽³⁾, auction experiments (e.g. Kagel, 2016)⁽⁴⁾, and related field studies (Milgrom, 1989⁽¹⁾). The voluntary supply of public projects, most typically in the form of pure public goods (see, e.g., Ledyard, 1995) or common pool resources (Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner, 1992)(5), also has a long tradition of applications. Rather than as a problem of mechanism design, it is usually studied by social dilemma games where community members nevertheless manage to cooperate to some extent, for example, due to repeated interaction, or some other aspects of their social life like monitoring and punishing (those who “free-ride”). Especially, the group in Bloomington has done an immense amount of field research and has also run experiments to study voluntary provision of public projects (see Ostrom, 2015)⁽⁶⁾. Mechanism design, however, has a more recent, already very successful history (the Nobel laureates in 2007, L. Hurwicz, E. S. Mascin, and R. B. Myerson, were awarded for their achievements in the theory Parisi I 491 of mechanism design). Hurwicz (1960⁽⁷⁾, 1973⁽⁸⁾) introduced the notion of incentive compatible mechanisms which in the form of dominance solvability were applied by Groves and Ledyard (1977)⁽⁹⁾ to voluntary public good provision. The Revelation Principle had been propagated by Myerson (1979,⁽¹⁰⁾ 1981⁽¹¹⁾, 1982⁽¹²⁾); Baron and Myerson (1982)⁽¹³⁾; Maskin (1999)⁽¹⁴⁾; Dasgupta, Hammond, and Mascin (1979)⁽¹⁵⁾; Meyerson and Sattertwaithe (1983)⁽¹⁶⁾; and Wilson (1985)⁽³⁾, where we exclude the exercises for “large economies” (e.g. Bierbrauer and Hellwig, 2011)⁽¹⁷⁾. The Revelation Principle is now a standard tool of mechanism design theory (see the more recent contributions like Bergemann and Morris, 2005⁽¹⁸⁾ and Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001⁽¹⁹⁾). >Decision-making processes, >Auctions, >Cooperation. 1. Milgrom, P. (1989). “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3(3): 3–22. 2. Gandenberger, O. (1961). Die Ausschreibung. Heidelberg: Quelle and Meyer. 3. Wilson, R. (1985). “Incentive efficiency of double auctions.” Econometrica 53(5): 1101–1115. 4. Kagel, J. H. and Roth, A. E. (2016). The Handbook of Experimental Economics, Volume 2. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 5. Ostrom, E., J. Walker, and R. Gardner (1992). “Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible.” American Political Science Review 86(2): 404–417. 6. Ostrom, E. (2015). Governing the Commons. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 7. Hurwicz, L. (1960). “Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes,” in K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin, and P. Suppes, eds., Mathematical Methods in Social Sciences, 27–46. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 8. Hurwicz, L. (1973). “The design of mechanisms for resource allocation.” American Economic Review 63(2): 1–30. 9. Groves, T. and J. Ledyard (1977). “Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the ‘Free Rider’ Problem.” Econometrica 45(4): 783–809. 10. Myerson, R. B. (1979). “Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem.” Econometrica 47(1): 61–73. 11. Myerson, R. B. (1981). “Optimal Auction Design.” Mathematics of Operations Research 6(1): 58–73. 12. Myerson, R. B. (1982). “Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal–agent problems.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 10(1): 67–81. 13. Baron, D. P. and R. B. Myerson (1982). “Regulating a monopolist with unknown costs.” Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 4: 911–930. 14. Maskin, E. S. (1999). “Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality.” Review of Economic Studies 66(1): 23–38. 15. Dasgupta, P. S., P. J. Hammond, and E. S. Mascin (1979). “The implementation of social choice rules: some general results on incentive compatibility.” Review of Economic Studies 46: 185–216. 16. Myerson, R. B. and M. A. Satterthwaite (1983). “Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading.” Journal of Economic Theory 29(2): 265–281. 17. Bierbrauer, F. and M. Hellwig (2011). Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision. Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Bonn 2011/31. 18. Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2005). “Robust mechanism design.” Econometrica 73(6): 1771–1813. 19. Jehiel, P. and B. Moldovanu (2001). “Efficient design with interdependent valuations.” Econometrica 69(5): 1237–1259. Werner Güth. “Mechanism design and the law”. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University.	Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017
Mereology	Simons	I 23 Mereology/Simons: mereology has operators instead of quantifiers (of PL). Operators take a Term N and form a new term N (a noun), e.g "ov" overlapper of "pt" "part-of", "ex" outsider of-complex terms: e.g. instead PL: "binary product of () and ()", the following is easier: "(Bpr (,))". Mereology: "Sm" "sum-of", "Pr": "Product-of". Plural Designation/mereology: "Sum of the squares" instead PL: "Sum of x such that x is a square. >Parts, >Part-of-relation. I 176f Mereological Consistency: e.g. wine in a specific bottle stops being this when poured. Mereological variability: e.g. water in the river Salzach: is "the same water with differences in its entirety". Mass Terms: mass terms tend to consistency because we are referring with terms of constancy to change. Material things are mereological variable: they can gain and lose parts. Pro: Aristotle, Locke, >Aristotle, >J. Locke, Vs: Leibniz, Hume, Reid, Chisholm. >Th. Reid, >G.W. Leibniz, >D. Hume, >R. Chisholm. >Essentialism, >Essence. I 190 Mereological Consistency/succession/Chisholm: mereological variable objects are only logical structures made of mereological constant objects (entia per se). The relation of succession depends on the type of object (e.g. table or cat). I 209 Continuity/Simons: continuity is stricter than mereological consistency: the hair must exist continuously, so that the old hairstyle can be restored. >Continuity, >Consistency. I 278 Mereology/science/practice/Simons: most of the objects of the natural sciences e.g. stars, planets, organisms or volcanoes are such that they are both: natural objects or whole and at the same time mereological variable. This corresponds to a middle path between essentialism and arbitrary or conventional parts. >Essentialism, >Conventions, >Necessary part.	Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Metaphors	Deacon	I 120 Metaphors/Jackendoff/Deacon: Jackendoff (1992⁽¹⁾, 1994⁽²⁾) suggested that spatial metaphors such as "Higher Truth", "further developed", "remotely related" are the result of innate cognitive terms. I 121 DeaconVsJackendoff: if we assume an evolutionary process of the common evolution of language and brain, we have an explanation that can dispense with hard wiring in the brain. >Color Words/Deacon. That is what I call social universals or linguistic universals: for example, the same grouping and juxtaposition of colour contrasts in people all over the world. It is about tendencies in the grouping of perceptions, behaviour and feelings. >Emotion/Deacon, >Order, >Systems. These common tendencies are non-genetic! It is about social evolution. These linguistic universals are only statistical, but supported by millions of speakers over ten thousands of years. Deviations are only temporary. Innate/Deacon: one does not have to assume any innate structures in order to explain this constancy. >Analogies, cf.>Innateness. 1. Jackendoff, Ray (1992). Languages of the Mind: Essays on Mental Representation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 2. Jackendoff, Ray (1994). Patterns in the mind: Language and human nature. New York: Basic Books.	Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013
Method	Darwin	Gould I 189 Darwin took the view that the fossil finds were extremely incomplete. The history of most fossil species includes two characteristics which are especially difficult to reconcile with the theory of gradual change. I 190 1) Stasis: Most species show little change in one or another direction during their presence on Earth. 2) Sudden Appearance: In all spheres of life, species do not appear on the basis of incessant changes in their predecessors, but suddenly and "fully developed". --- Mayr I 160 How-Questions/Mayr: immediate function led to the discovery of most natural laws. Why-Questions/Darwin/Mayr: historical, evolutionary, indirect. Why-questions were only scientifically legitimized by Darwin. He thus introduced the entire natural history into science. --- Dennett I 293 "Why"-Questions/Dennett: Need to be asked. Darwin showed us how to answer them. Dennett I 421 Extrapolation/DennettVsGould: the extrapolationism is not represented as foolishly "pure" as Gould assumes. It was also represented by Darwin himself, but he was eager to distinguish himself from those kinds of catastrophic theories that were in the way of the theory of evolution e.g. flood. --- Gould II 122 Method/Darwin/Gould: How can we be scientific about the past? Darwin's book on worms makes that clear. >Individual causation, >Causal explanation. Gould II 123 Darwin made above all two statements about the worms ⁽¹⁾: 1. The impact on the design of the soil is directional. They crush the soil, which can then be better distributed by erosion. Therefore, gently undulated areas tend to be signs of worm activity. 2. They form the humus, the uppermost layer of the soil and thus form a constancy in the midst of other permanent changes. The humus layer does not become thicker and thicker because it is compressed by pressure downwards. This is about continuous change within apparent consistency: the humus always seems the same, but is constantly renewed. There's a cycle. Darwin: we don't notice how our own soil is pulled away from us under our feet. Gould II 129 Gould: What if the evidence is limited to the static object itself? If we cannot observe the process of formation, can we still find several stages of the process? Darwin's answer: we deduce the history of imperfections that capture the constraints of descent. If God had applied orchids to the purpose from the very beginning, which their complex organs now hold, he would certainly have made them much easier. 1. Charles Darwin: The formation of vegetable mould, through the action of worms, with observations on their habits. London: John Murray, 1881	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Mysticism	Darwin	Gould II 120 Mysticism/Darwin/Gould: Darwin's theory is materialistic in so far as it denies the causality of any spiritual forces, energies or powers. Example: Method/Darwin/Gould: How can we be scientific about the past? Darwin's book on worms makes that clear. Cf. >Individual causation, >Causal explanation. Gould II 123 Darwin made above all two statements about the worms ⁽¹⁾: 1. the impact on the design of the soil is dependent on direction. 2. they form the humus, the uppermost layer of the soil and thus form a constancy in the midst of other permanent changes. Gould II 129 Gould: What if the evidence is limited to the static object itself? If we cannot observe the process of formation, can we still find several stages of the process? Darwin's answer: we deduce the history of imperfections that capture the constraints of descent. If God had applied orchids to the purpose from the very beginning, which their complex organs now hold, he would certainly have made them much easier. 1. Charles Darwin: The formation of vegetable mould, through the action of worms, with observations on their habits. London: John Murray, 1881.	Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989
Objects (Material Things)	Chisholm	I 257 Res/Aquinas/Duns Scotus: "thing", transcendental, convertible with the beings (ens). Brentano: Reism (late): abstractions, universals, negations, facts, forms, fictions: are not things. >Ontology/Brentano. Hedwig, Klaus. Brentano und Kopernikus. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 --- Simons I 2 Chisholm: Thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) are logical constructions of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies. - Flux: Problem: changing objects cannot be regarded as identical with themselves according to the extensional mereology - Solution/Chisholm: thesis the actual are mereologically constant and the phenomena again logical constructions from immutable objects - VsChisholm: other solution: processes (with temporal parts ) instead of objects (continuants). >Continuants. Simons I 120 Object/Thing/Object/Chisholm: Thesis: "Mereological constancy": objects in the original sense: - entia per se: cannot change - in the derived sense: entia per alio: subject to the flux, but only by being consulted successively through different entia per se, which differ in their parts. >Mereology/Simons, >Terminology/Simons.	Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Piketty Formula	Sinn	Piketty formula/SinnVsPiketty/Sinn⁽¹⁾: Piketty’s formula states that interest in the form of the average return on capital, r, is persistently higher than the growth rate of the economy, g. The consequence, according to Piketty, is that the wealth of an economy accumulates faster than the growth in economic output. Neoclassics: In fact, the formula has been known for quite a long time now; it denotes a fundamental implication of the neoclassical theory of economic growth. Indeed, over the long run, the rate of return to capital usually lies above the growth rate of the economy, as Piketty asserts. If that were not the case, land prices would be infinite, there would be excessive consumption, and growth would eventually end. >Neoclassical Economics. Interest rates/Piketty formula/Sinn: But the formula does not imply that wealth grows faster than economic output. Such a conclusion would only be warranted if the savings of an economy could be set equal to the economy’s capital income, so that the rate of economic growth is the same as the interest rate. But that is not the case. >Interest rates. Savings: Rather, savings are consistently smaller than the sum of all capital income. The wealthy consume substantial parts of their income, and the savings from labor income usually is small. Thus, the growth rate of wealth lies significantly below the interest rate; the fact that the interest rate exceeds the rate of economic growth in no way implies that wealth grows faster than the economy. >Saving, >Savings rate. Economic growth/growth theories: Indeed, a central finding of economic growth theory states that the interest rate of an economy, dependent on the savings rate, settles over the long term at a level in which the growth of capital equals the growth rate of output. The consequence is the longterm persistence of the ratio of wealth to economic output. The long-term constancy of the ratio is a basic ingredient of all growth theories. Behind the long-term persistence of this ratio stands a simple mathematical law. Savings/national income: If an economy saves a given portion of its income, the wealth resulting from the accumulation of those savings will increase in the long run at the same rate at which national income grows. >Growth, >Growth theory. Ratio of wealth to income: Thus, the ratio of wealth to income cannot increase permanently. The law is based on the fact that every increasing quantity can grow over the long run only at the rate at which its accretion grows. Example: An example is the heaping of earth into a mound. Assume that in every period, a further spade of earth is added, and that the size of the spade itself grows at a given rate from one period to the next. The growth rate of the amount of earth in the mound converges toward tire growth rate of the spade size. If we substitute the current savings of an economy for the amount of earth in the spade and wealth for the size of the mound, we obtain the long-run constancy of the ratio of wealth to income when a fixed share of income is saved. H.-W. Sinn per Piketty: It must be stressed that this law applies over the long run, over several decades. Wealth can well grow faster than the economy at given times. Piketty could then have a point. Distribution/SinnVsPiketty: But even when such is the case, there is hardly any reason for apprehension. When it comes to distributional issues, the important element is less the ratio of wealth to national income than the ratio of capital income to wage income, that is, the proportion of capital and wages in national income. The distributional shares of national income, as first observed by the left-leaning economist Joan Robinson in her 1942 book⁽²⁾, An Essay on Marxian Economics, have remained fairly stable over time and follow no discernible trend. >Distribution theory. Wages/capital income: Much more important than Piketty’s theory of everything is the question of how many people share in the wage and capital income. If the number of wage earners increases faster than the number of wealth owners, a less desirable distributional pattern could emerge despite the constancy of the ratio of capital to wage income. That could be the case in the United States, with its large number of immigrants, and could be the reason for the current dissatisfaction among the populace. But there is no evidence to support this as a general law. >Piketty’s Laws, >Wages, >Income. Solution/Sinn: And if the risk should indeed exist that the number of people sharing the capital income grows too slowly compared with the number of people sharing the labor income, the best medicine is to improve the chances of upward mobility. The more people share the wealth and capital income, the smaller the distributional problem. It helps for this reason if the rich have more children than the poor, since their wealth will eventually become spread among their heirs, solving the distributional problem at a stroke. Policy measures: A family income splitting system such as France’s is one of the policy measures that a society might consider if it fears an undesirable concentration of wealth. Regardless, a progressive taxation system is needed to check the growth in net income among the upper income echelons. Inequality: Even in the absence of a fundamental trend toward greater inequality owing to the theory formulated by Piketty, inequality within the wealthy group can increase because some dynasties accumulate ever more wealth at the expense of other dynasties. Taxation: Whether action is needed in this regard in Europe is open to debate, since progressive taxation is already present it will be hard to make the case for even more of it. My conclusion is that Piketty, like Marx, caters to a longing, simmering among the people, but that he tries to underpin his policy proposals with a theory that does not substantiate what he asserts.⁽¹⁾ >Taxation. Some basics for Piketty: >Cambridge Capital Controversy, >Geoffrey C. Harcourt, >Capital reversing, >Capital/Joan Robinson, >Exploitation/Robinson, >Reswitching/Robinson, >Reswitching/Sraffa, >Reswitching/Economic Theories, >Neo-Keynesianism, >Neo-Neoclassical Theories. Hans-Werner Sinn. 2017. Piketty’s World Formula. https://www.hanswernersinn.de/en/AP_22062017 (30.01.2025) 2. Joan Robinson. 1942. An Essay on Marxian Economics. London. Macmillan.	Sinn I Hans-Werner Sinn The Green Paradox: A Supply-Side Approach to Global Warming (Mit Press) Cambridge, MA 2012
Proxy	Simons	I 191 Proxy/to stand for/vouch for/existence of/Chisholm/Simons: only mereologically constant objects can stand for others. >Mereology. Sum/Simons: without mereological constancy, there would be nothing to prevent sums from being variable. >Mereological sum. Total: a total has its parts necessarily - or any other sum, e.g. Tib + Tail but not Tibbles. >Tibbles-exaple, >Totality, >Wholes. Vs: sum of variable parts: e.g. the tail may again consist of different atoms. >Parts.	Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
States	Bigelow	I 275 Consistency/Invariance/Bigelow/Pargetter: must be considered as a possible cause e.g. for the existence of temples over thousands of years. >Change, >Constancy, >Motion. I 276 Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we should understand it as a relation between events (in the broad sense). >Causation, >Causes, >Events, >Causality.	Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990
Terminology	Mayr	I 45 Def genotype: nucleic acids, (total number of genes) Def phenotype: proteins, lipids, macromolecules, (total of characteristics, environmentally dependent). I 43 Def Integron/Mayr: An integron is a system created by integration of subordinate units on a higher level. Integrons evolve by natural selection. They are adapted systems at each level because they contribute to the fitness (suitability) of an individual. I 205 Def Parthenogenesis: Asexuality: in some organisms, individuals develop themselves from the eggs, fertilization is not necessary. E.g. Aphids, plankton crustaceans: here sexual and asexual generations alternate. I 324 Def Altruism: (Trivers, 1985)⁽¹⁾: action that benefits another organism at the expense of the actor, with the costs and benefits being defined as reproductive success. I 175 Def Class/Biology/Mayr: Grouping of entities that are similar and related to each other. Classification: two important functions: a) recovery of information. b) comparative research. Information storage. I 177 Def "Variety": (Linné, even Darwin): Deviations that are slightly smaller than those of a new species. ("typological" or "essential concept of species"). ("Common essence" ("Nature")). I 178 Def Twin species: (discovered only recently: spatially separated, but equally developed, discovered in almost all animal species), forces a new criterion for the delineatation of species: reproductive isolation of populations. I 179 Def Species/Mayr: device for protecting balanced, harmonic genotypes. "Biological concept of species" seeks biological reasons for the existence of species. Maybe there are other properties by chance. I 183 Def Species Taxa: special populations or population groups corresponding to the species definition. They are entities. I 373 Def Similarity: certain characteristics must occur together with other characteristics from which they are logically independent. I 49 Def knowledge/Mayr: facts and their interpretation. I 279 Def r-selection: strongly fluctuating, often catastrophically exposed population size, weak intraspecific competition, very fertile. K-Selection: constant population size, strong competition, stable life expectancy. I 41 Def Reductionism/Mayr: Reductionism considers the problem of explanation fundamentally as solved as soon as the reduction to the smallest components is completed. I 186 Def Feature/Biology/Mayr: a distinguishing feature or attribute. Is arbitrarily chosen by the taxonomists. Often led to very strange "unnatural" groups. At the end of the 18th century, attempts were made to replace the Linné system with a more natural one. I 211 Def Preformation: Eggs produce individuals of the same species. Therefore it was concluded that egg or sperm is already a miniature of the future organism. I 212 Def Epigenesis: Development during the life history of the individual, in contrast to ontogeny and phylogeny. I 219 Def Induction/Biology/Mayr: Influence of already existing tissues on the development of other tissues. By proteins. It is important for almost all organisms. I 349 Def Life/Mayr: Activities of self-developed systems, controlled by a genetic program. Def Life/Rensch⁽²⁾: Living beings are hierarchically ordered, open systems, predominantly organic compounds, which normally appear as circumscribed, cell-structured individuals of temporally limited constancy. Def Life/Sattler 1986⁽³⁾: an open system that replicates and regulates itself, shows individuality, and subsists on energy from the environment. MayrVs: all contain superfluous and do not go into the genetic program, which is perhaps the most important. More description than definition. 1. R. L. Trivers (1985). Social evolution. Menlo Park: Benjamin/Cummings. 2. B. Rensch (1968). Biophilosophie. Stuttgart: G. Fischer. S. 54. 3. R. Sattler (1986). Biophilosophy. Berlin: Springer. S. 228.	Mayr I Ernst Mayr This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997 German Edition: Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998
Theories	Morgenthau	Brocker I 285 Theory/Morgenthau: If political theory is to provide orientation and guide action over time and space, then elements of constancy must crystallize out of the constantly changing kaleidoscope of social events and be detached from ephemeral elements.⁽¹⁾ >Invariants, >Covariance, >Temporal identity. Theory is a coagulated experience in this perspective; it arises as an abstract summary of insights from history, which are compared with the here and now. The focus is first on the human being in his psychological constitution, then on the social arena in the broadest sense. >Abstraction, >Individuals. 1. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948. Dt.: Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik, Gütersloh 1963, S. 4. Christoph Frei, „Hans J. Morgenthau, Macht und Frieden (1948)“ in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018	Pol Morg I Hans Morgenthau Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York 1948 German Edition: Macht und Frieden. Grundlegung einer Theorie der internationalen Politik Gütersloh 1963 Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018
Theories	Nozick	II 121 Inegalitarian Theory/Nozick: an inegalitarian theory assumes that a state is privileged as a "natural". This needs no explanation and also does not allow one. - Other situations are then differences that need to be explained. E.g. For Newton rest or uniformity of movement was the natural state. For Aristotle: rest. - inegalitarian theory does not answer, 1. Why this state is the natural. 2. Why exactly these forces are making a difference. To accept something as a natural state is also to ascribe a specific content to him. II 122 R. Harris: the thesis that something remains the same, does not need to be explained. >Regularity, >Explanations, >Constancy. NozickVs: but we have to explain why a thing for the purposes of this principle counts as the same and not in other contexts. Existence: the question concerning it, is typical inegalitary. Punchline: here we presuppose the nothing as their natural state. Cf. >Existence/Leibniz. II 126 1. We do not know what the natural state is. 2. We do not know whether there is a fundamental natural state at all. That means whether the correct fundamental theory is inegalitary. Each inegalitarian theory leaves a bare fact as inexplicable back, a "natural state". II 127 Egalitarian Theory/Nozick: needs to see much more possible states as in need of explanation. - But it asks no longer the question "Why X instead of Y?" - But always "Why X?". II 127 Egalitarian Theory/existence/nothing/Nozick: "principle of indifference" (from probability theory). - For them, there are many ways, how things could be, but only one possibility how nothing exists. - Punchline: then is the chance that something exists much greater than that nothing exists. Vs: one has to make an appropriate division into states that are to be treated as equally likely. - Many ways how things exists can be summarized as one. Extreme case: only two ways: something exists or does not exist. II 128 Under the worst assumption if we assume a division, there is a 50%-chance that something exists. - Because all other divisions have to be at least three partitions then, the chance that something exists rises for the next alternative already to two-thirds. - At the end almost 1. - Problem: the probability theory is still assuming the non-existence as the natural state - because it assumes that if something exists, then randomly - The natural state of a way is the non-realization. Solution:> richness.	No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994
Visual Cliff	Psychological Theories	Slater I 38 Visual Cliff/psychological theories: early findings of Gibson and Walk concluded that visual experience is not Slater I 39 necessary for the development of depth discrimination (Walk et al., 1957)⁽¹⁾ and that animals are prepared to discriminate depth and avoid a drop-off as soon as they are independently mobile, even if locomotion begins at birth as in precocial chicks, kids, and lambs (Gibson & Walk, 1960)⁽²⁾. However, later studies revealed a more complicated story. Dark-reared rats avoided the deep side of the visual cliff upon emerging from the dark at 27 and 90 days, suggesting that perception of depth at an edge develops without visual experience. But at 140 or 300 days, depth discrimination was absent, suggesting that long-term deprivation caused permanent deficits (Nealey & Riley, 1964⁽³⁾; Walk, Trychin, & Karmel, 1965)⁽⁴⁾. For some species, the visual experience that comes with self-produced locomotion is necessary. Unlike rats, kittens dark-reared for 26 days showed no preference for the shallow side. But they caught up to their light-reared peers by the end of a week (Gibson & Walk, 1960⁽²⁾; Walk, 1966⁽⁵⁾; Walk & Gibson, 1961⁽⁶⁾). Dark-reared kittens with three hours of daily exposure to light while actively locomoting in a “kitty carousel” acquired normal depth perception after ten days of training (Held & Hein, 1963)⁽⁷⁾. Slater I 40 Kittens and rabbit pups require about a month of locomotor experience in the light before showing consistent avoidance of the deep side (Walk, 1966⁽⁵⁾; Walk & Gibson, 1961)⁽⁶⁾. Infant rhesus monkeys could be coaxed over the deep side before 2 weeks of age, but not a week or two later (Walk & Gibson, 1961)⁽⁶⁾. Rats showed smooth psychometric functions, with increased avoidance of the deep side as the drop-off increased in two-inch increments from 4 to 14 inches beneath the starting board (Walk & Gibson, 1961)(6). Similarly, avoidance increased in human infants as the drop-off increased from 10 to 40 inches (Walk, 1966)⁽⁵⁾. What information is used to specify the apparent drop-off? Visible texture is necessary. With textureless grey paper beneath both sides of the cliff, rats crossed indiscriminately (Walk & Gibson, 1961)(6) and 32% to 50% of human infants crossed the deep side regardless of whether the paper was 10 or 40 inches below the glass (Walk, 1966)⁽⁵⁾. Binocular disparity is not crucial. Monocular rats and chicks and infants wearing an eye patch avoided the deep side at the same rates as those that had both eyes available (Lore & Sawatski, 1969⁽⁸⁾; Schiffman & Walk, 1963⁽⁹⁾; Trychin & Walk, 1964⁽¹⁰⁾; Walk, 1968b(¹¹⁾; Walk & Dodge, 1962⁽¹²⁾). Depth perception/human infants: [The] use of the visual cliff as a means for studying depth perception in human infants was short-lived. As Gibson (1969)⁽¹³⁾ pointed out, many other behaviors develop earlier than locomotion (e.g., reaching and looking) and can be used to assess visual depth perception long before crawling onset (Yonas & Granrud, 1985)⁽¹⁴⁾. Indeed, looking time methods reveal that even newborns are sensitive to visual information for depth (Slater, Mattock, & Brown, 1990)⁽¹⁵⁾. >Risk perception/Gibson, >Innatenes, >Heritability. 1. Walk, R. D., Gibson, E. J., & Tighe, T. J. (1957). Behavior of light- and dark-reared rats on a visual cliff. Science, 126, 80–81. 2. Gibson, E. J., & Walk, R. D. (1960). The “visual cliff.” Scientific American, 202, 64–71. 3. Nealey, S. M., & Riley, D. A. (1964). Loss and recovery of discrimination of visual depth in dark-reared rats. The American Journal of Psychology, 76, 329–332. 4. Walk, R. D., Trychin, S., & Karmel, B. Z. (1965). Depth perception in the dark-reared rat as a function of time in the dark. Psychonomic Science, 3, 9–10. 5. Walk, R. D. (1966). The development of depth perception in animals and human infants. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 31, 5 (Serial No. 107). 6. Walk, R. D., & Gibson, E. J. (1961). A comparative and analytical study of visual depth perception. Psychological Monographs, 75, 15 (Whole No. 519). 7. Held, R., & Hein, A. (1963). Movement-produced stimulation in the development of visually guided behavior. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 56, 872–876. 8. Lore, R., & Sawatski, D. (1969). Performance of binocular and monocular infant rats on the visual cliff. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 67, 177–181. 9. Schiffman, H. R., & Walk, R. D. (1963). Behavior on the visual cliff of monocular as compared with binocular chicks. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 6, 1064–1068. 10. Trychin, S., & Walk, R. D. (1964). A study of the depth perception of monocular hooded rats on the visual cliff. Psychonomic Science, 1, 53–54. 11. Walk, R. D. (1968b). Monocular compared to binocular depth perception in human infants. Science, 162, 473–475. 12. Walk, R. D., & Dodge, S. H. (1962). Visual depth perception of a 10-month-old monocular human infant. Science, 137, 529–530. 13. Gibson, E. J. (1969). Principles of perceptual learning and development. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts. 14. Yonas, A., & Granrud, C. E. (1985). Reaching as a measure of infants’ spatial perception. In G. Gottlieb & N. A. Krasnegor (Eds), Measurement of audition and vision in the first year of postnatal life: A methodological overview (pp. 301–322). Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation. 15. Slater, A., Mattock, A., & Brown, E. (1990). Size constancy at birth: Newborn infants’ responses to retinal and real size. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 49,314–322. Karen E. Adolph and Kari S. Kretch, “Infants on the Edge. Beyond the Visual Cliff” in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications	Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012

The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 controversies.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author Vs Author	Entry	Reference
Chisholm, R.M.	Simons Vs Chisholm, R.M.	Chisholm II 166 SimonsVsChisholm/SimonsVsBrentano: thesis: Chisholm inherited a mereological essentialism by Brentano with which I do not agree. But I will use these ideas to give a slightly different interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Wittgenstein himself was not so clear with respect to facts as it seems. Self-Criticism: self-criticism is a mess of facts and complexes. There are worlds between the later Wittgenstein and Brentano, but there are contacts between Brentano and the Tractatus. --- Simons I 1 Extensional Mereology/Simons: extensional mereology is a classical theory. Spelling: CEM. Individuals Calculus/Leonard/Goodman: (40s): another name for the CEM is an individual calculus. This is intended to express that the objects of the part-whole relation belong to the lowest logical type (so they are all individuals, both a whole and a part are individuals). VsCEM: 1. The CEM claims the existence of sums as individuals for whose existence we have no evidence beyond the theory. Vs: 2. The whole theory is not applicable to most things in our lives. Vs: 3. The logic of the CEM has not the resources to deal with temporal and modal terms: e.g. temporal part, substantial part, etc. Simons: these are all external critiques but there is an internal critique: that comes from the extensional mereology. Extensional Mereology: thesis: objects with the same parts are identical (analogous to set theory). Problem: 1. Flux: e.g. people have different parts at different times. I 2 2. Modality/extensional mereology: problem: e.g. a man could have other parts than he actually has and still be the same person. (s) The extensionality would then demand together with the Leibniz identity that all parts are essential. This leads to mereological essentialism. Chisholm/mereological essentialism/Simons: Chisholm represents the mereological essentialism. Thesis: no object can have different parts than it actually has. Vs: it is a problem to explain why normal objects are not modally rigid (all parts are essential). Solution/Chisholm: thesis: (appearing) things (appearances) ((s) everyday things) are logical structures made of objects for which the mereological essentialism applies. Flux/mereology/Simons: problem/(s): according to the CEM changing objects may not be regarded as identical with themselves. 1. Solution/Chisholm: thesis: the actual objects are mereologically constant and the appearances again logical constructions of unchanging objects. SimonsVsChisholm: the price is too high. 2. Common solution: the common solution is to replace the normal things (continuants) through processes that themselves have temporal parts. SimonsVs: hence, the extensionality cannot be maintained. Such four-dimensional objects fail on the modal argument. CEM/event/Simons: in the case of events the extensional mereology is applicable. It is also applicable in classes and masses. Classes/masses/Simons: these are non-singular objects for which the extensionality applies. Part/Simons: a part is ambiguous, depending on whether used in connection with individuals, classes or masses. Extensionality/mereology/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, we are dealing with continuants. I 3 Continuants/Simons: continuants may be in flux. Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore several different objects can be at the same time in the same place. I 175 Temporal Part/continuants/mereology/SimonsVsAll/SimonsVsChisholm: thesis: continuants can also have temporal parts! That means that they are not mereologically constant but mereologically variable. Continuants/Simons: thesis: continuants do not have to exist continuously. This provides us with a surprising solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus. I 187 SimonsVsChisholm: if Chisholm is right, most everyday things, including our organism, are only logical constructions. I 188 Strict Connection/separateness/SimonsVsChisholm: the criterion for strict connection is unfortunately so that it implies that if x and y are strictly connected, but not in contact, they can be separated by the fact that a third object passes between them what per se is not a change, also not in their direct relations to each other. Problem: when this passing is only very short, the question is whether the separated sum of the two which was extinguished by the third object is the same that exists again when the third object has disappeared. If it is the same, we have a discontinued existing sum. Chisholm: Chisholm himself asks this question with the following example: a castle of toy bricks will be demolished and built again with the same bricks. I 189 Chisholm: thesis: it is a reason to be dissatisfied with the normal ontology, because it just allows such examples. SimonsVsChisholm: but Chisholm's own concepts just allowed us the previous example. Topology/Simons: yet there is no doubt that it is useful to add topological concepts such as touching or to be inside of something to the mereology. I 192 Def succession/Chisholm: 1. x is a direct a-successor of y to t ' = Def (i) t does not start before t’ (ii) x is an a to t and y is a y to t’ (iii) there is a z so that z is part of x to t and a part of y to t’ and in every moment between t’ and t including, z is itself an a. Simons: while there will be in general several such parts. We always choose the largest. w: is the common part in it, e.g. in altering a table. SimonsVsChisholm: problem: w is not always a table. ChisholmVsVs: claims that w is indeed a table: if we cut away a small part of the table, what remains is still a table. Problem: but if the thing that remains is a table because it was already previously there then it was a table that was a real part of a table! I 193 SimonsVsChisholm: the argument is not valid! E.g.: Shakespeare, Henry IV, Act IV Scene V: Prince Hal considers: if the king dies, we will still have a king, (namely myself, the heir). But if that person is a king, then, because he had previously been there, then he was a king who was the eldest son of a king. ((s) This is a contradiction because then there would have been two kings simultaneously.) Simons: this point is not new and was already highlighted by Wiggins and Quine (not VsChisholm). I 194 Change/transformation/part/succession/SimonsVsChisholm: it seems, however, that they are not compatible with the simple case where a at the same time wins and loses parts. E.g. then a+b should be an A-predecessor of a+c and a+c an A-successor of a+b. But that is not allowed by the definition, unless we know that a is an A all the time, so that it connects a+b and a+c in a chain. But this will not usually be the case. And if it is not the case, a will never ever be an A! SimonsVsChisholm: so Chisholm's definitions only work if he assumes a wrong principle! Succession/entia successiva/SimonsVsChisholm: problem: that each of the things that shall "stand in" (for a constant ens per se to explain the transformation) should themselves be an a in the original sense (e.g. table, cat, etc.) is counterintuitive. Solution/Simons: the "is" is here an "is" of predication and not of constitution (>Wiggins 1980, 30ff). Mereological Constancy/Simons: thesis: most things, of which we predict things like e.g. "is a man" or "is a table" are mereologically constant. The rest is easy loose speech and a play with identity. E.g. if we say that the man in front of us lost a lot of hair in the last year we use "man" very loosely. Chisholm: we should say, strictly speaking, that the man of today (stands for) who today stands for the same successive man has less hair than the man who stood for him last year. SimonsVsChisholm/WigginsVsChisholm: with that he is dangerously close to the four-dimensionalism. And especially because of the following thesis: I 195 To stand in for/stand for/entia successiva/Chisholm: thesis: "to stand in for" is not a relation of an aggregate to its parts. Sortal Concept/Simons: the question is whether sortal concepts that are subject to the conditions that determine what should count at one time or over time as a thing or several things of one kind are applicable rather to mereologically constant objects (Chisholm) or variable objects (Simons, Wiggins). SimonsVsChisholm: Chisholm's thesis has the consequence that most people mostly use their most used terms wrongly, if this is not always the case at all. I 208 Person/body/interrupted existence/identity/mereology/Chisholm/Simons: our theory is not so different in the end from Chisholm's, except that we do not accept matter-constancy as "strictly and philosophically" and oppose it to a everyday use of constancy. SimonsVsChisholm: advantage: we can show how the actual use of "ship" is related to hidden tendencies to use it in the sense of "matter-constant ship". Ship of Theseus/SimonsVsChisholm: we are not obligated to mereological essentialism. A matter-constant ship is ultimately a ship! That means that it is ready for use! Interrupted Existence/substrate/Simons: there must be a substrate that allows the identification across the gap. I 274 SimonsVsChisholm: according to Chisholm's principle, there is no real object, which is a table, because it can constantly change its microstructure ((s) win or lose atoms). Chisholm/Simons: but by this not the slightest contradiction for Chisholm is demonstrated.	Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
Dodwell, P.C.	Rorty Vs Dodwell, P.C.	I 258 Dodwell/Rorty: what would someone like Dodwell answer to this argument? Dodwell pro analogy brain/computer. >Computation, >Computer Model. I 259 VsAnalogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/VsAnalogies/Rorty: this analogy is trivial, because a program only codifies a set of operations and explains thinking as little as a set of logical formulas explain the laws of inference. F.o.th. a code adds nothing! (No additional insight). Dodwell: the analogy only becomes mandatory when different levels are distinguished. Hardware/Software. Conceptual level: "control process" - physiological level: hardware. The principle of operation of the subprograms cannot in turn be made understood by studying the hardware. Accordingly, the understanding how the subprograms themselves work does not help us to explain the principle of problem solving in the terminology of a sequence of steps. This requires consideration of the control process that embodies the overall organization of the machine. I 259 Analogy Brain/Computer/Computation/RortyVsDodwell/Rorty: trivial: a program may also be assumed for thinking - Dodwell: you have to assume different levels - (hardware/software) - the principle of subprograms cannot be understood by studying the hardware - solution: control process which embodies the overall organization of the machine - Analogy: in reality we do not recognize visual patterns not through selection of critical features, but by finding and comparing matching templates. This is neither a "conceptual" statement (about the "control process") nor a "physiological" statement (about the "hardware"), but nevertheless has a genuine explanatory value. I 260 The idea of a "subprogram" seems to give us precisely what psychology needs, an explanation that might be good for this tertium quid between common sense and physiology. Rorty: how does this help us against the regress arguments, though? Malcolm and Ryle would probably insist that the "templates" in turn bring up the same issues as the "consistency" which is to be explained by them. DodwellVsRyle: but that would only be the case if they were to serve to answer such general questions like "how is abstraction (recognition, constancy) possible?". But there are no answers to such questions apart from the pointless remark that nature had produced the appropriate material to such achievements! Wittgenstein similar: the fact that rules are implicit, and in any case not all the rules can be explicit, prevents recourse. (See Rules/Brandom). Recourse/Homunculus/Rorty: I think it is misleading to say the little man (homunculus) leads to regress, because I do not see how little machines are less "conscious" than small men. We cannot explore which of these bundles are "tinted with consciousness", in Quine's words, nor whether this tint is lacking. Familiarity with computers does not lead to such a discovery, but merely turns the intentional position into something common and casual. Inferring/Subconsciously/Helmholtz/Rorty: concept of "subconsciously inferring"! Perceptions as subconscious inferences. (RyleVs). I 261 Doubling/Rorty: the complaint that the templates like Lockean ideas led to a doubling of the explanandum is like the complaint that the particles of the Bohr atom doubled the billiard balls whose behavior they help to explain. ((s) 1) inversion, 2) analogies are not doubling anyway) Rorty: It turns out, however, that it is fruitful to postulate small billiard balls inside the big billiard balls. Model/Sellars: every model has its comment aside. Psychology/Rorty: we can assume the following comment for all anthropomorphic models of psychology: As long as we are at the level of subprograms, we are not set to attribute reason and character. I 262 No more than the talk of 'red sensations' determines the assumption of internal red-colored entities. However, if we ascend to the hardware level, then anthropomorphism is no longer appropriate. If we limited ourselves to the hardware level, sensations would play no role anymore. Then the computer analogy is no longer relevant, as little as with unicellular organisms. Complicated physiology arouses the need for psychology! Dodwell: subprograms cannot in turn be made understandable by studying the hardware, just as the purpose of multiplication tables cannot be seen by examining the brain. (Also Fodor: distinction between functions (program) and mechanics (hardware) in psychology is irreducible and not merely pragmatic.) RortyVsDodwell: that is seriously misleading: it contains a confusion of the evident idea: I 263 if we did not know what multiplication is, we could not even find it out by examination of the brain With the dubious statement: Even if we knew what multiplication is, we could not find out if someone has just multiplied by examining his brain. The latter is doubtful. RortyVsDodwell: the question of what can best be explained by hardware, and what better through the programs, depends on how ad hoc or manageable the hardware in question is. Whether something is ad hoc or manageable, clearly depends on the choice of vocabulary and attraction level. And that's precisely why this is also true for the hardware/software distinction itself. Rorty: Yes, you can imagine machines whose structure can be found out easier by opening them than by looking at the programs. Rorty: the brain is almost certainly no such machine. But that it is possible with some machines is an important philosophical principle. I 263/264 It shows that the difference between psychology and physiology is no stronger difference between two subject areas than, for example, the difference between chemistry and physics. Regress/Rorty: the argument of duplication is simply due to a poorly asked question. (VsMalcolm and VsRyle "How is movement possible?" "Why does nature follow laws?"). I 265 Dodwell/Rorty: models such as that of Dodwell are not brought forward for solving Cartesian pseudo-problems, nor as discoveries about any non-physical entities. Then the argument of recourse is not valid. I 266 For the prognostic success would make it sufficiently clear that these objects of psychological research really exist. Ryle: Dilemma between learned and innate skills: RortyVsRyle: Dodwell's models allow us to admit easily that nature must have installed some innate skills in us so that we can perform our higher mental operations. At least some of the homunculi must have existed there from birth. And why not? (SearleVs). Why should subprograms in the shape of chromosomes not be incorporated? The question as to which are added later is surely not important for understanding the human nature. Psychology/Rorty: postulates "intervening variables" as a mere placeholders for undiscovered neural processes. Psychology: if it was discovered that physiology will never explain everything, it would not make psychology something dubious. I 267 Abstract/Rorty: it will not surprise us that something "abstract" like the ability to detect similarities, was not obtained, nor was the so 'concrete' ability to respond to the note C sharp. Abstract/Concrete/RortyVsFodor: the entire distinction of abstract/concrete (also Kant) is questionable. No one can say where the line is to be drawn. (Similar to the idea of the "irreducibly psychical" in contrast to the "irreducibly physical".)	Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
Milne, E.A.	Kanitscheider Vs Milne, E.A.	I 345 Space/Space-Time/Geometry/Universe/Metric/Milne: this has the surprising result that Milne's space-time metric has the same shape as the line element of Robertson/Walker, if the function R(t) = ct and the curvature k = 1 is selected. However, the mathematical terms here have a different >meaning (meaning change) They determine the equivalent observers and not the time-dependent spatial structure. The properties of the three-dimensional equivalence are very different, depending on whether they are viewed from scale t or τ . The most important difference is that space and time in t measure are not common for all egos. There is no "public space"! But all "private" spaces have an Euclidean structure. In the τ measure space and time apply to all, but the space itself is hyperbolic. The preference of the t space forces Milne to indicate how the velocity distribution of the egos, which he then identifies with the nuclei of the galaxies, looks like if there are no preferred reference systems (cosmological principle). (I 346 +). Substrate/Milne: one demands that the velocities, which are dropped in the component intervals (u,u +du), v,(v + dv), (w, w + dw) shall be assessed equally by all observers. Universe/Milne: with increasing distance the escape velocity increases and the density goes towards infinity near the point r = ct. The edge, which flees from the observer at the speed of light, creates the impression of a horizon. It itself is not occupied by galaxies, the particles (observer = galaxy) thus represent an "open" set, whose boundary prevents the human from looking into the "outer" space. The world has no windows. The weakening of the light of very distant objects acts like a curtain. The limiting spherical shell can be seen as a counterpart to the initial singularity in a certain way, because here and there the particles lie arbitrarily dense and both are inaccessible. According to the Lorentz transformation, moving clocks go slower and so every observer, although the clocks are congruent, has the impression that all spatially distant events belong to an earlier epoch. I 348 Every fundamental observer therefore considers himself to be the "oldest inhabitant" of the universe, because his own clock will indicate a later point in time for an event that takes place at his own place than any clock of another fundamental observer. All distant galaxies will therefore appear younger to us, both because the clocks of these distant objects follow, and because of the time it takes for light to reach us. If t is the age of the universe, then the most distant galaxies today can have reached ct. But what we see of them, however, is at most ½ c t away. ("radar method"). The term "age of the universe" in Milne only makes sense for members of the substrate, i.e. for certain fundamental observers. Looked on from the outside, the term is meaningless. The world is just "appearance", in no sense is it "in itself". I 348 VsMilne: Hardly anyone has violated the rules of empirical knowledge acquisition as much as he has. KanitscheiderVsMilne: The main criticism must start with the use of the subjective time lapse as the foundation of physical time without establishing a basis for the additive properties of time intervals. Only because he restricts himself to a comparative conceptual form ("sooner/later") of time, he can claim that his classification of clocks does not require any convention. He uses a relational, but a subjective time and no relatively objective, physical time. KanitscheiderVsMilne: also his method is derived because it includes the constancy of the speed of light. I 351 In other theories, the reference to natural clocks (earth rotation) or the laws of mechanics (law of inertia) are applied. God/Milne: from the dependence between the dynamic time scale  and the atomic scale t one can see that the world could not have existed before the time t = 0 and therefore must have been created. GrünbaumVsMilne: the value of τ = minus infinite cannot be assigned real meaning in the same way as a finite value. It is only a "syncategorematic sign", like the transfinite cardinal number Aleph ₀ and therefore the singularity of the time scale does not exclude the existence of matter for t < 0. Nor can one deduce any divine intervention from it. I 353 Substrate/KanitscheiderVsMilne: Question: in which way the substrate in Milne, which provides local rest systems everywhere in the form of continuously distributed fundamental observers, can be identified with the real galaxies. I 354 Due to the discrete set of galaxies, only a part of the fundamental observers (observation points) can be materialized. Contradiction to its strict homogeneity requirement.	Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Steady State Theory	Verschiedene Vs Steady State Theory	Kanitscheider I 359 Steady State Theory/SST/Bondi/Kanitscheider: Thesis: Priority of cosmology over local physics. Bondi's Thesis: the unclear complexity of the phenomenon world is only one property of the mesocosm. I 360 VsSST: incompatible with our empiricism: a static universe has long been in thermodynamic equilibrium. All development would already have reached its final state. It would no longer be possible to determine the direction of the time flow. Of the two types of motion allowed by Perfect Cosmological Principle, expansion and contraction, contraction is already eliminated because the necessary excess of radiation in relation to matter is lacking. For expansion, however, the steady state theory now needs the assumption of constant additional generation of matter. But this overrides the important principle of hydrodynamic continuity! I 361 However, at the current values for density and recession constant (distance movement of galaxies from each other), the origin of matter would only be one H atom per litre every 5x10 exp 11 years. Conservation of Matter/BondiVsVs: he even believes he can save the conservation of matter. He says that in a certain, observable area, seen globally, the observable amount of matter does not change, i.e. that in a constant eigenvolume matter is preserved, in contrast to the relativistic models, where the conservation applies rather to the coordinate volume. The Def Eigenvolume is the part of space that is fixed by a fixed distance from the observer, while the Def coordinate volume is given by the constancy of the com mobile coordinates. I 362 Steady State Theory/SST: here there is always the same amount of matter within the range of a certain telescope, while here the relativity theory assumes a dilution, i.e. the matter remains the same in the expanding volume. At the SST, the new formation ensures that the total amount of all observable matter remains the same. Observer/SST: when investigating motion, each observer can perceive a preferred direction of motion apart from local deviations, whereby he determines the constant relationship between velocity and distance completely symmetrically within a small range. In relativistic cosmology this was the starting point for the Weyl principle. Def Weyl-Principle: Postulate: the particles of a substrate (galaxies) lie in spacetime on a bundle of geodesists that start from a point in the past (Big Bang) and never intersect except at this point. From this follows the existence of a family of hyperplanes (t = const) orthogonal to these geodesists and the only parameters possessing cosmic time. I 362/363 Bondi/SST/Steady State Theory: doubts now that in view of the scattering of the fog movement these hyperplanes exist secured. Because of its stationary character, SST does not need Weyl's postulate and can define homogeneity without cosmic time. Thermodynamic imbalance/universe/SST: Explanation: a photon emanating from a star has a very long free path and reaches areas with strongly changed local motion. This shifts its frequency to red. However, the thermal energy it gives off on its way to the surrounding matter is only a very small part of that lost by its original star. Thus the universe represents a kind of cosmic sink for radiant energy. According to the Perfect Cosmological Principle, sources must exist that make up for the loss. Perfect Cosmological Principle: is logically compatible with three types of universes: 1. Static, without new creation of matter, 2. Expanding, with new development I 364 3. Collapsing, with destruction of matter SST/Bondi: believes in the strict relationship between distance and speed R'(t)/R(t) = 1/T. This results in R as an exponential function and the metric of the SST takes the form of the line element of de Sitter. (see above). Already the self-similarity of the scale function shows the basic metric properties of this model. It is not possible for us to recognize at which point of the curve R = et/T we are. The universe has no beginning and no end. I 365 Age/Universe/SST: Advantage over relativistic theories where the inverse Hubble constant led to a too low age. Metric/SST: while the de Sitter metric is unusable in Einstein's representation because it can only be reconciled with vanishing matter, this problem does not occur in the SST: here there is no necessary connection between physical geometry and matter content of space! According to the de Sitter structure, the world has an event horizon, i.e. every clock on a distant galaxy follows in such a way that there is a point in its history after which the emitted light can no longer reach a distant observer. If, however, a particle has formed within the range that can in principle be reached with ideal instruments, then it can never disappear from its field of view. I 367 Perfect Cosmological Principle: Problem: lies in the statistical character, which applies strictly on a cosmic scale, but not locally, whereby the local environment only ends beyond the galaxy clusters. Steady State Theory/SST/Hoyle: starts from the classical field equations, but changes them so strongly that all Bondi and Gold results that they have drawn from the Perfect Cosmological Principle remain valid. Hoyle/SST: Thesis: In nature a class of preferred directions can obviously be observed in the large-scale movements, which makes a covariant treatment impossible! Only a preferred class of observers sees the universe in the same way. I 368 Weyl Principle/Postulate: defines a unique relationship of each event P to the origin O. It cannot be a strict law of nature, since it is constantly violated in the local area by its own movements! Hoyle: (formula, tensors, + I 368). Through multiple differentiation symmetric tensor field, energy conservation does not apply, matter must constantly arise anew. Matter emergence/SST/Hoyle: there is an interpretation of matter origin caused by negative pressure in the universe. It should then be interpreted as work that this pressure does during expansion! VsSST: the synchronisation of expansion and origin is just as incomprehensible from theory as the fact that it is always matter and not antimatter that arises. (...+ formula, other choice of the coupling constant I 371/72). I 373 Negative Energy: it has been shown to cause the formation rate of particle pairs to "run away": infinite number in finite region. VsSST/Empiricism: many data spoke against the SST: excess of distant and thus early radio sources, redshift of the quasars indicating a slowdown of expansion, background radiation.	Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996
Various Authors	Bunge Vs Various Authors	Kanitscheider I 358 Laws of Nature/BungeVsSST/BungeVsSteady State Theory: the alternative between an unchanging world and unchanging laws on the one hand, and a changing world and changing laws on the other does not exist at all. If an object does not change, the laws remain the same, but not vice versa! The constancy of the laws does not condition the immutability of the linked quantities themselves. Even if for thermodynamic reasons no process returns in the world, this is compatible with the hypothesis that the relations between events of the same class are unchangeable! Where change itself now takes place in a law-like form, it even makes sense to allow a changeability of laws. This is also compatible with actualism: Def Actualism: asserts the unlimited validity of our laws of nature in terms of time and space.	Bung I M. Bunge Causality and Modern Science: Third Revised Edition New York 1979 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996

The author or concept searched is found in the following disputes of scientific camps.

Disputed term/author/ism	Pro/Versus	Entry	Reference
mereol. Essentialism	Pro	Simons I 208 mereological essentialism: Pro: Chisholm - Vs: Simons: e.g. Ship of Theseus: initial coincidence of matter-constancy and functional constancy. I 275 mereological essentialism / Chisholm: all parts necessary - SimonsVsChisholm: some essential, others not.	Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Change	Chisholm, R.	Simons I 120 Object/Thing/Item/Chisholm: Thesis: "Mereological constancy" objects in the original sense: entia per se: cannot change. Objects in the derived sense: Entia per alio: are subject to flux, but only in the sense that they are successively constituted by different entia per se, which differ in their parts. Continuants/Chisholm: he does not deny them! Rather ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism. (with his ontology of temporal objects). Simons I 191 Flux/Change/Chisholm: Thesis: the apparent fact that continuants change parts is explained by the fact that different successive "stand-ins" (indented) parts in turn have other (permanent!) parts.	Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987
Essentialism	Simons, P.	I 253 mereological essentialism / Simons: each part of each object is essential for it. The reasoning is questionable, but they must apply to mereological constancy and extensionality. I 281 Simons per essentialism for events: - E.g. the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, by principle contains both essentially.	Link to abbreviations/authors
mereolog. Constance	Simons, P.	I 194 Mereological constancy/Simons: most of the things which we predicate of things like E.g. "is a person" or "is a table" are mereologically constant. The rest is just loose way of talking, and playing with identity.	Link to abbreviations/authors