Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Aura Durkheim Habermas IV 79
Aura/Durkheim/Habermas: The holy awakens the same ambivalent attitude as moral authority, for the holy is surrounded by an aura that simultaneously frightens and attracts, terrorizes and enchants. (1) In the aura itself, the untouchability of what is desired at the same time is expressed, the closeness in distance. (2)
From this structural analogy Durkheim concludes on a sacral basis of morality.


1.E. Durkheim, Sociologie et philosophie, Paris 1951, German Frankfurt 1967, p.86.
2.In ähnlicher Weise beschreibt W. Benjamin die Aura des Kunstwerkes als „einmalige Erscheinung einer Ferne“. W. Benjamin, Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit, in: Gesammelte Schriften, Vol. I, part 2. p. 431f

Durkheim I
E. Durkheim
The Rules of Sociological Method - French: Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique, Paris 1895
German Edition:
Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode Frankfurt/M. 1984


Ha I
J. Habermas
Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988

Ha III
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981

Ha IV
Jürgen Habermas
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981

The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Endurantism Stalnaker Vs Endurantism I 135
Vague identity/time/possible world/poss.w./Stalnaker: I ask with some examples for temporal and for cross world identity whether Salmon refuted vague identity with his argument. E.g. in Philadelphia, there are two prominent fish restaurants named "Bookbinder's". They compete with each other.
B1: "Bookbinder’s classic fish restaurant"
B2: "The old original Bookbinder's".
B0: The original, only restaurant from 1865.
Today's two restaurants may go back to the old and have a entangled history.
Question: does Salmon's argument show,
I 136
that there must be a fact (about the history) that decides on which restaurant is the original? One thing is clear: B1 unequal B2.
Transitive identity/transitivity/Stalnaker: then due to the transitivity of the identity B0 = B1 and B0 = B2 cannot exist at the same time.
Semantic indeterminacy/Stalnaker: but one is tempted to say that there is a certain semantic indeterminacy here.
Question: can we reconcile this with Salmon's argument (SalmonVsVague identity)?
Stalnaker: I think we can do so.
Perdurantism/perduration/Stalnaker: e.g. if we say the name "B0" dates back to the time of 1865 when there was a certain restaurant "Bookbinder's" this is the most natural way.
Endurantism/enduration/Stalnaker: e.g. but we can also say B0 is one of the today existing two restaurants "Bookbinder’s".
StalnakerVsEndurantism.
Endurantism/Stalnaker: here it is similar to vague descriptions: example "B0" is ambiguous! It is unclear whether he refers to B1 or to B2. (Indefinite reference).
Perdurantism/Stalnaker: here the reference is clear. ((s) Because the original restaurant does not exist anymore. B0 therefore clearly means the original restaurant because it cannot be confused with one of the two today existing) Also, of course "B1" and "B2" are unambiguous.
Question: given Salmon's argument: how can it then be indefinite if B0 = B2?
Stalnaker: that just depends on if we understand continuants as endurant or perdurant.
continuant/perdurantism/endurantism/Stalnaker:
Perdurantism/Stalnaker: can understand continuants e.g. as four-dimensional objects (four dimensionalism) which are extended in time exactly as they are extended in space. Then the example of the restaurants corresponds to the example of buildings (see above).
Example buildings: the indeterminacy is there explained by the indeterminacy of the concept "building". One building is maybe a part of another.
Example restaurants: according to this view each has a temporal part in common with the original. It is indeterminate here which of the temporal parts is a restaurant and which is a composition of multiple temporal parts of different restaurants.
I 137
Therefore, it is indefinite to which of these different entities "B0" refers (indefinite reference). Perdurantism/continuant/Stalnaker: one might think, but we have a specific reference, like in the example of the building through a demonstrative with a ostension: when we say "this building". But that does not work with the perdurantistic conception of restaurants. ((s) As an institution, not as a building. This should be perdurant here that means not all temporal parts are simultaneously present and anyway not as material objects).
Four dimensionalism/Stalnaker: therefore has two possible interpretations: perdurantistic (here) and endurantistic (see below).
Endurantism/four dimensional/four dimensionalism/continuant/Stalnaker: some authors: thesis: continuants have no temporal parts like events. That means they are at any moment with all their (only spatial) parts present. Nevertheless, they exist in time.
LewisVsEndurantism: (Lewis 1986a, 203) this view uses the terms "part" and "whole" in a very limited sense.
StalnakerVsLewis: that may not be quite so because the representatives acknowledge that some things e.g. football matches, wars, centuries indeed have temporal parts.
Endurantism/Stalnaker: even if the whole thing is an obscure doctrine some intuitions speak for it. I will neither defend nor fight him.
Endurantism: example restaurants:
In 1865 there is only one restaurant "Bookbinder's" there are no other candidates for this description. Even if our criterion for "restaurant" is unclear.
It seems that we have a definite reference for an endurant thing B0.
Also for the today existing restaurant B1 we seem to have definite reference.
Salmon/Stalnaker: if we accept his argument again, there must then be a fact which decides whether B0 is identical to B1 or not?
StalnakerVs: here the semantic indeterminacy may be subtle but it still exists. We show this like that:
Identity in time/Stalnaker: example statue/clay: yesterday there was the pile, today the statue, so both can not be identical. They have different historical properties. This known argument does not require four dimensionalism.
Four dimensionalism/statue/clay/Stalnaker: statue and pile as four dimensional objects: here only parts of them exist today.
Endurantism/statue/clay/Stalnaker: if we say both - Statue and pile - are at today "fully present" (it would have to be explained how) Salmon's argument still shows that both are (now) different. The argument does not depend on the fact that they have different parts. It requires only that they have different historical properties.
Endurantism/Stalnaker: example restaurants: suppose the concept Restaurant is indefinite. After some arbitrary clarifications B0 = B1 will be, after others B0 = B2.
Disambiguation/Stalnaker: then B0 has after some disambiguations temporal properties it would not have after other disambiguations.
Semantic indeterminacy/reference/StalnakerVsSalmon, Nathan: the reference of "B0" is then dependent on the way of our arbitrary assumptions for disambiguation.
SalmonVsStalnaker/Stalnaker: accuses me of some inconsistencies but I have shown indeterminacy of reference while Salmon refers to indeterminacy of identity between certain objects.

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
Evans, G. Peacocke Vs Evans, G. I 169/170
Demonstratives/Evans: perceptually demonstrative ways of givenness are possible, because these conditions are fulfilled: in a normal perception situation, there is an information link between subject and object, and also the subject knows or is able to find out where the object is.
If the subject has the general ability to know what propositions makes of the form
"π = p" true for any π (where π is an identification of a public place without index words (in a non-indexical frame of reference)) if p is the notion of ​​a place in its egocentric space. If it is also able to locate the object in its egocentric space, we can say that it has an idea of the object.
Idea/Notion/Evans/Terminology/Intension/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: Evans "Idea" (notion) corresponds to my way of givenness "mode of presentation".
Idea/Evans: Thesis: we can conceive the idea of an object a as consisting in its knowledge of what it is to be true for an arbitrary sentence of the form "δ = a".
Peacocke: where "δ" is the area of ​​the basic ideas of an object.
Fundamental Idea/Evans: is what you have if you think of an object as the possessor of the fundamental ground of difference that it actually has.
Peacocke: i.e. what distinguishes an object from all others.
I.e. for material objects type and location.
PeacockeVsEvans: we have already seen cases where the thinker was unable to locate the object in his egocentric space: E.g. the craters on the moon.
I 171
E.g. apple in the mirror cabinet. But it still seems possible to think about it, for example, wonder where it is!
It is true that it is possible to at least provide a rough direction in egocentric space, but that is hardly sufficient for the knowledge condition of Evans.
In the case of the memory image, it is clearer that no localization in the current egocentric space is needed.
pro Evans: there must be additional imaginable evidence, e.g. experience or tools for localization (if necessary, even space travel!).
If that were not imaginable, we would have to assume that the subject was not able to think of the object in public space!
pro Evans: an information link is not sufficient to think demonstratively about the object.
VsEvans: but that is less than to demand that the thinker can locate the object at present.
Weaker Requirement: Instead, a general ability of the subject can locate the object, if necessary, is sufficient.
Evans: if you cannot locate an object, you can still think of it in the mixed demonstrative descriptive way of givenness: "that which causes my experience".
But in normal cases this is a wrong description!
Peacocke: it also seems to be wrong in the examples of the lunar craters, the apple in the mirror cabinet.
PeacockeVsEvans: trange asymmetry:
Idea/Evans: an idea a of ​​a place in a self-centered space is an adequate idea of ​​a place in the public space.
Holistic/Evans: if an arbitrarily fundamental identification of a location is possible, it is holistic. (Varieties of reference, p. 162).
Peacocke: this knowledge is grounded in a general ability to put a cognitive map of the objective spatial world over our own egocentric space.
I 172
E.g. in some cases this will not be possible, for example, when you are kidnapped, or ended up in an unknown area, etc. Point: even in such cases, you can still use the demonstrative pronoun "here" (in reference to objects). I.e. the thoughts are still thoughts about public space! ((s) and the self-centered space).
Idea/Demonstrative Way of Givenness/PeacockeVsEvans: so his theory does not demand any ability to give a public, non-egocentric individuation our thoughts to have thoughts about a place in the public space at all.
Analogy/Peacocke: exactly analogous objections can be made in the case of demonstrative ways of givenness: E.g. Suppose a subject perceives an object of type F in the manner H.
Then F is the token way of givenness.
Then we can introduce: [W, Fs] for the perceptual "this F".
Then there is exactly one proposition of the form "p = localization of [W, Fs] now", which is true, and the subject knows what it is for it that it is true for it.
PeacockeVsEvans: why should we demand here, but not in the earlier example, that the subject also knows which p (or which  in the earlier case) is mentioned in this one true proposition?
This is particularly absurd in the case of the lost subject.
PeacockeVsEvans: his theory allows that [W, Fs] is an adequate idea here, although the subject has no fundamental idea of the object.
Peacocke: but if we insisted that it could have a fundamental idea if he had more evidence, then why is an analogous possibility not also sufficient for adequacy in terms of the egocentric space?
I 173
There seem to be only two uniform positions: 1) Identification/Localization/Idea/Demonstratives/Liberal Position: sufficient for a genuine way of givenness or adequate ideas are the general ability of localization plus uniqueness of the current localization in the relevant space.
2) Strict position: this is neither sufficient for genuine ways of givenness nor for adequate ideas.
PeacockeVs: this can hardly be represented as a unified theory: it means that, if you are lost, you cannot think about the objects that you see around you. That would also mean to preclude a priori that you as a kidnapped person can ask the question "Which city is this?".
Demonstratives/Peacocke: Thesis: I represent the uniformly liberal position
Demonstratives/Evans: Thesis: is liberal in terms of public space and strictly in terms of egocentric space!
ad 1): does not deny the importance of fundamental ideas. If a subject is neither able to locate an object in the public nor in egocentric space ((s) E.g. he wakes up from anesthesia and hears a monaural sound), then it must still believe that this object has a fundamental identification. Otherwise it would have to assume that there is no object there.
Anscombe: E.g. a subject sees two matchboxes through two holes which (are manipulated) so arranged that it sees only one box, then the subject does not know what it means for the sentence "this matchbox is F" to be true.
The uniformly liberal view allows the subject to use demonstratives which depend on mental images, even if it has no idea where in the public space and when it has encountered the object.
EvansVs: representatives of this position will say that the knowledge of the subject is at least partial,
I 174
because this idea causally results from an encounter with the object. But that makes their position worse instead of better: for it completely twists the grammar and logic of the concept of knowing what it is for the subject that p is true. Ability/PeacockeVsEvans: but a capability can also consist in the experience of finding out the right causal chains in a given environment: the same goes for the localization of an object point seen in the mirror in egocentric space.
PeacockeVsEvans: his distinction seems unreal: it may be simultaneously true that someone has a relation R to the object due to causal relations, and be true that the possibility of being in this relation R is a question of the abilities of the subject.
E.g. (Evans) to recognize the ball:
Peacocke: this is not a sensory motor skill, but rather the ability to draw certain conclusions, which however require an earlier encounter.
This also applies to e.g. the cognitive map, which is placed over the egocentric space:
PeacockeVsEvans: in both cases it does not follow that the presented object, remembered or perceived, is thought of explicitly in causal terms: the way of givenness is truly demonstrative.
   
First Person/PeacockeVsEvans: the second major objection concerns thoughts of the first person: the different examples of immunity to misidentification, which contain the first person, roughly break down into two groups:
a) here, immunity seems absolute: E.g. "I am in pain".
I 175
b) Here, the immunity seems to depend on presuppositions about the world: if these assumptions are wrong, they open the possibility of picking out something wrong without stopping to use the word "I". These include: E.g. "I was on the ocean liner": memory image.
E.g. "I sit at the desk": visual, kinesthetic, tactile perceptions.
The distinction between a) and b) may be made by the constitutive role:
"The person with these conscious states."
Infallibility/Tradition/Evans: (absolutely immune judgments): the judgment to be a judgment of a specific content can be constituted by the fact that this judgement responds to this state.
Peacocke pro.
PeacockeVsEvans: Problem: can this infallibility be connected to the rest of Evans' theory? Because:
I/Evans: Thesis: the reference of "I" may fail!
Peacocke: how is that compatible with the absolute immunity of "I am in pain"?
Conditionalisation: does not help: E.g. "if I exist, I am in pain" that cannot fulfill the purpose: the existence of the idea still needs the reference of "I".
Similarly: E.g. "If my use of "I" refers, I am in pain":
because "my use" must be explained in terms of the first person.
Question: Can we use memory demonstratives which refer to previous use of first-person ways of givenness?
E.g. "If those earlier uses of "I" speak, I am in pain." (Point: not "my uses").
PeacockeVs: that does not help: Descartes' evil demon could have suggested you the memories of someone else. (>Shoemaker: q-memories.)
I 176
Constitutive Role/Brains in the Vat/BIV/EvansVsPeacocke: the constitutive role of [self] would not explain why the brains in the vat would be able to speak in a demonstrative way about their own experiences: Mental States/Evans: differ from all other states and objects in that they refer demonstratively to their owners.
Pain is identified as an element of the objective order.
Then someone can have no adequate idea of ​​these mental states if he does not know to which person they happen.
Peacocke: we can even concede thoughts about its pain to the brain in a vat, provided that it can give a fundamental identification of the person who has the pain.
Peacocke: No, the nerves must be wired correctly. I.e. this is not true for the brains in the vat. So we can stick to the liberal point of view and at the constitutive role and the idea of a person.
Also to the fact that the mental states are individuated on the person who has them.
Individuation/Mental States/PeacockeVsEvans: not through localization (like with material objects), but through the person.
I 177
E.g. Split-Brain Patient/Peacocke: here we can speak of different, but qualitatively equivalent experiences. From this could follow two centers of consciousness in a single brain. But: after the surgery we should not say that one of the two was the original and the other one was added later.
E.g. olfactory sensation of the left and right nostril separate. Then there are actually separate causes for both experiences. ((s), but the same source.)
Peacocke: it does not follow that in normal brains two consciousnesses work in harmony. Here, the sense of smell is caused by simultaneous input through both nostrils and is thus overdetermined.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Functionalism Dennett Vs Functionalism II 87
Functionalism/Dennett: widely spread in everyday life. Basic idea: E.g. "noble is who does nobly", "Not what it is made of makes a mind (or a belief, a pain, a fear), but what it can do."  In common linguistic use of functionalism, such entities defined by their function allow multiple realizations. Why can an artificial mind not be made like an artificial heart with almost any material?
II 88
DennettVsFunctionalism: he deliberately abstracts from the inscrutable details of performance and focuses on the work that is actually done. But he simplifies too much.
II 95
Information Processing/DennettVsFunctionalism: one thing was always clear: as soon as there are transducers and effectors in an information system, its "media neutrality" or multiple realization disappears. (VsPutnam, VsTuring). E.g. To receive light something light-sensitive is needed. E.g. Controls for ships or factories are media-neutral, as long as they fulfill their task in the time available.
But to the nervous system applies that much less time is available. The realization of the nervous system is not a media-neutral.
And that is not because it would need to have a certain aura of a particular material or of living being, but because it originated in evolution as the central control system of living beings who’ve been abundantly equipped with very decentralized control systems.
The new systems had to be set up above them, but in very close collaboration with them. There was an astronomical number of conversion points.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
In
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005
Goodman, N. Verschiedene Vs Goodman, N. Introduction Putnam II IV
Some PhilosophersVsGooodman: they do not appreciate his dependence on the actual history of past inductive projections in culture. They say: a valid inductive derivation must not contain disjunctive predicates. PutnamVs: this does not work: being disjunctive, from the standpoint of logic, is a relational attribute of predicates. Whether a predicate is disjunctive depends on the truth of a language.
Sainsbury V 129
Grue/SainsburyVsGoodman: To complain about a lack of anchoring would be too strong a blockade on future scientific innovation! Intuitively, the strongest lack of the predicate "grue" is that it is only true by virtue of the fact that the objects are already examined.
Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006
I 358
Perfect Forgery/Goodman: (Spr. d. KU, 105).): Thesis: that later I might be able to see a difference that I do not perceive yet, now states a significant aesthetic difference for me. It cannot be concluded that the original is better than the copy, but it is aesthetically valued higher.
((s) The original also contains the inventive achievement. But the copy could be more successful from a design point of view.)
I 359
Römer: The investigation of forgeries should therefore not begin with the question of the relationship to the original, but with the representation that we produce according to Goodman (i.e. we do not copy a construct or an interpretation). Def genuine scientific fiction/Vaihinger:
1. contradiction to reality up to self-contradiction
2. provisional nature
3. without claim to factuality
4. expediency.
RömerVsGoodman: his "scientific fiction" of a perfect forgery does not eliminate the hierarchy original/forgery. Nor does he draw any consequence from the aesthetic difference on the representation system. When a perfect forgery appears in the context of originals, its authenticity is rather confirmed.
I 360
Then the forgery is a product of the representation system just like the original, only that it violates the prevailing morality. Forgery/Klaus Döhmer: (late 70s): Thesis: Forgery makes use of legitimate artistic methods while changing its objective, thus it is not an objective-material, but a subjective-intentional category. (Zur Soz. d. Knst- Fälschung, Zeitschr. f. Ästh. .u. allg. Kunst-Wiss 21/1 (1978),S 76-95).
Römer: this is tantamount to a paradigm shift: forgery as a methodical problem.
Anne-Kathrin Reulecke (Hg) Fälschungen Frankfurt 2006
I 406ff
Def Forgery/Bolz: Forgery: deliberately represent something unreal for real. Question: Who will be harmed? Directly the collector/museum director, indirectly the art historian. Perfect Forgery/BolzVsGoodman: he does not succeed in making it clear that the concept of the original does not include any superiority over the forgery.
It is not about real quality but about authenticity shaped by the history of production.
407
Aura/Bolz: in order to explain why this is important for aesthetic enjoyment, Goodman would have to resort to Benjamin's concept of aura.
(Bolz pro Aura).
Aura/Bolz: does not lead to the opposition original/forgery, but to uniqueness/technical reproducibility.
Putnam I 256
Israel ShefflerVsGoodman: asks: "Does Goodman's philosophy result in us creating the stars?" Goodman/Putnam: G. answers: not like the brick is burning, but in a way they are already created by us. We did not create the big bear, but we made a constellation out of it.





Sai I
R.M. Sainsbury
Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995
German Edition:
Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Russell, B. Peacocke Vs Russell, B. I 131
Acquaintance/Russell: objects of acquaintance: E.g. sense data. They are obvious to the subject. Sense Data/Russell: correspond to the positions of singular terms in a sentence.
They are at the same time real constituents of the sentence.
And without givenness at that! (Without intension). Purely extensional occurrence of objects in the sentence.
PeacockeVsRussell: 1) that may mollify FregeVsRussell's criticism of his concept of proposition.
But it does not justify Russell: because he did not refer to obviousness for the thinker.
2) physical objects that, according to Russell, "cause the sense data" are therefore demonstrative and descriptive in a mix.
PeacockeVs: our approach, on the other hand, assumes that demonstrative ways of givenness are not descriptive.
But Russell's mixed approach is not entirely irrelevant: if we replace "sense data" by "experience":
PeacockeVsRussell: he confused a plausible determination of the the constitutive role with "content".

I 180
Acquaintance/Russell: (B. Russell, Problems of Philosophy, 1973, p. 32) "Each understandable sentence must be composed of constituents with which we are familiar." PeacockeVs: that got bad press. Problem: Excessive proximity to Humean empiricism.
SainsburyVs: Russells ideas should be defended without the principle of acquaintance if possible.
Peacocke: but if you free the principle of non-essential epistemological attachments, it is a correct and fundamental condition for the attribution of contents.
Acquaintance/Russell: we are familiar with the sense data, some objects of immediate memory and with universals and complexes.
Earlier: the thinker is also familiar with himself.
Later: Vs.
Complex/Russell: aRb. Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: he had a correct basic notion of acquaintance, but a false one of its extension (from the things that fall under it).
The salient feature is the idea of ​​relation. One is dealing with the object itself and not its deputy.
 I 182
Def Principle of Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: Thesis: Reconstruction, reformulated principle of acquaintance: The thinker is familiar with an object if there is a way of givenness (within its repertoire of concepts) that is ruled by the principle of sensitivity and he is in an appropriate current mental state, which he needs to think of the object under this way of givenness.
For this, we need a three-digit relation between subject, object and type of the way of givenness
The type of the way of givenness (as visual or aural perception) singles out the object.
"Singling out" here is neutral in terms of whether the object is to be a "constituent of thoughts" or not.
This preserves two features of Russell's concept:
1) acquaintance enables the subject to think about the object in a certain way because of the relationship that it has with it.
2) The concept of the mental state may preserve what Russell meant when he spoke of acquaintance as a relation of presentation.
Constituent/Thoughts/Russell: he thought that objects occurred downright as parts of the thought.
PeacockeVsRussell: we will interpret this as an object that indicates a type of a way of givenness (indexing).
We do not allow an object to occur as part of a thought, just because it is the only component of the thought that corresponds to a singular term position in a sentence that expresses a thought.
I 183
This is a Neo-Fregean theory, because an object can only exist as part of the thought by the particular way of its givenness (intension). (VsRussell: not literally part of the thought or sentence).

I 195
Colors/Explanation/Peacocke: to avoid circularity, colors themselves are not included in the explanation of a response action, but only their physical bases. Different: E.g. 'John's favorite color': which objects have it, depends on what concepts φ are such that φ judges the subject, 'John's favorite color is φ' together with thoughts of the form 't is φ'.
Analog: defined description: E.g. the 'richest man'. He is identified by the relational way of givenness in context with additional information:
Complex/Acquaintance/Russell/Peacocke: E.g. a subject has an experience token with two properties:
1) It may have been mentioned in the context with sensitivity for a specific demonstrative way of givenness of an object (e.g. audible tone).
2) At the same time it may be an experience token of a certain type. Then, to be recognized the two must coincide in the context
I 196
with a sensitivity for a specific concept φ in the repertoire of the subject. VsAcquaintance/VsRussell/Peacocke: one can argue:
E.g. Cicero died long ago
E.g. arthritis is painful.
We can attribute such beliefs when the subject understands the meanings of the concepts.
Nevertheless, the readiness to judge that Cicero died long ago depends on a mental state, with regard to which there must be an evidence.
What kind of a mental state should that be?
It need not remember the occasion when it first heard the name 'Cicero'.
But neither: 'F died long ago', where 'F' is a defined description.
Name/Peacocke: semantic function: simply singling out a particular object.
Understanding: if you can identify the reference of the name in one way or another.
There is no specific way in which you have to think of the Roman orator to understand the name.
VsAcquaintance/VsPeacocke: that may even endanger the reformulated principle: if the name only singles out the object, then the subject must have a relation to a thought which contains the object as a constituent.
PeacockeVs: I dispute the last conditional.
We must distinguish sharply between
a) beliefs, where the that-sentence contains a name, and
b) the presence of the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought. The latter corresponds to the relation 'Bel'.
I 196/197
Def Relation 'Bel'/Terminology/Belief/Propositional Attitudes/Peacocke: a belief which contains the reference of a name as constituent of a Neo-Fregean thought: E.g. not only 'NN died a long time ago', but propositional attitude.
((s) not only belief about someone or something, but about a particular object.)
Relation Bel/Belief/Peacocke: three reasons for distinguishing beliefs:
a) we want to exclude that someone can acquire a new belief simply by introducing a new name. (Only a description could do that).
E.g. if we wanted to call the inventor of the wheel 'Helle':
Trivialization: 1) it would be trivial that such a stipulation should be enough for the reference in a community.
2) Nor is it a question of us being able to give outsiders a theoretical description of the community language.
You cannot bring about a relation Bel by linguistic stipulation.
I 198
b) Pierre Example/Kripke/Peacocke: this type of problem arises in cases where the language is too poor for a theory of beliefs in this sense: if someone understands a sentence, it is not clear what thoughts he expresses with it. (>Understanding/Peacocke). Because the semantics only singles out the object, not the way of thinking about the object (intension). This is different with pure index words and certain descriptions.
E.g. a person who says 'I'm hot now' expresses the thought:
^[self x]^[now t].
But that involves nothing that would be 'thinking of something under a name'!
Pierre Example/Kripke/Solution: a complete description of Pierre's situation is possible (for outsiders) without embedding 'London' in belief contexts.
Peacocke: at the level of 'Bel' (where the speaker himself is part of the belief) beliefs can be formulated so that proper names are used: 'He believes that NN is so and so'.
c) Perception/Demonstratives/Way of Givenness/Peacocke: here, the way of givenness seems to have a wealth that does not need to be grasped completely, if someone uses demonstratives.
The wealth of experience is covered by the relation Bel, however.
But this way we are not making certain commitments: E.g. we do not need to regarded 'Cicero died long ago' as metalinguistic, but rather as meant quite literally.

I 201
Logical Operators/Quantification/Logic/Acquaintance/PeacockeVsRussell: our reconstructed principle of acquaintance implicitly includes the obligation to recognize entities that can only be preserved inferentially: E.g. uniqueness operators, other quantifiers, connections, also derived ones.
This can even apply to logical constants and some truth functions and not only for ways of givenness of these functions.
RussellVs: the principle of acquaintance is not applicable to logical constituents of thoughts.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976
Searle, J.R. Poundstone Vs Searle, J.R. I 350
Chinese Room/Searle/Poundstone: Variant: E.g. book: "What to do if a text in Chinese is slipped under your door." The room is exhibited at fairs. It is claimed that there was a pig in the room that speaks Chinese. People assume that in reality a Chinese is locked in the room (this variant also expresses the belief in the behavior).
I 351
PoundstoneVsSearle: Problem: feasibility of the thought experiment. The algorithm must include commmon knowledge.
I 352
It must be able to answer questions like those from the short story: e.g. a guest gets scorched food. Furious, he leaves the restaurant without paying. Question: did he eat the food? E.g. "What's the red stuff called that some people put on their fries?" Here, the answer is not included in the question. And perhaps there is no Chinese word for ketchup.
SearleVsTuring: the Turing test is not very insightful, therefore Chinese Room. A computer that behaved exactly like a human would be situation a sensation, no matter if he possessed consciousness or not.
I 353
Searle: Surprising position: the brain is indeed something like a computer, but consciousness has something to do with the biological and neurological structure. A computer made of wires would therefore not make the experience of his own consciousness. And yet, it could pass the Turing test!
Artificial Intelligence/AI/Searle: compares it with photosynthesis: a computer program could create a detailed realistic illustration of photosynthesis, but it would not produce sugar! It would only deliver images of chlorophyll molecules on the screen.
I 354
VsSearle/Chinese Room: a book with the algorithm "What to do if a text in Chinese is slipped under your door" cannot exist: it would have to be larger than the largest libraries in the world.       We could depart from Davis' office simulation. E.g. the brain contains about 100 billion neurons. If every human drew 20 strings, all of humanity could simulate a single brain.
I 355
But no one would know what thoughts are going on! Consciousness/Searle: his followers resort to the distinction "syntactic/semantic". Semantic understanding seems essential for consciousness.
I 356
Meaning/PoundstoneVsSearle: VsSemantic Understanding E.g. you were ill on the first day of school and missed the lesson in which numbers were introduced. Later you never dared to ask, what numbers are. In spite of that, you can do maths quite passably. At the bottom of your heart, you have the feeling of being an impostor. In fact, actually we all do not know what numbers are.
I 357
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: Ex Chinese Room: Suppose that, due to brain damage, the person does not know that they speak Chinese. We all have many skills of which we know virtually nothing. (Involuntary muscle movements, metabolism).
I 358
Chinese Room/"System Response": the person himself does not speak Chinese, but the overall system: Person, plus room, plus manual, plus time, plus paper and pencil fulfill the condition.
I 359
SearleVsSystem Response: We tear down the walls and let the person learn the manual by heart. Does he speak Chinese? PoundstoneVsSearle/Thought Experiments: the risk with thought experiments is their convenience. One must make reassure oneself that the reason of only imagining the experiment is no reason that makes the experiment altogether impossible. Here: the manual would be to extensive to be written at all, let alone to be learned by heart.
((S) VsPoundstone: could construct a simpler example which is about fewer rules.)
I 364
Chinese Room/Poundstone: the room is not only extremely enlarged spatially but also timely. The person could also be a robot, that does not matter.
I 365
Consciousness/Hofstadter: E.g. conversation with Einstein's brain: book with answers that simulate exactly what Einstein would have said. Two levels that must be separated: the book and the user! Of course, the book itself has no consciousness!
Here, some hair-splitting questions about the "mortality" of Searles room arise: suppose the user goes on a 5-weeks holiday, is the book called "Einstein" dead in meantime?
I 366
The book itself could not notice the interruption. Variant: if the pace of work was reduced to one question per year, would that be enough to keep the book "alive"?
Time/Poundstone: we could not find that time had stopped if it did.

Poundstone I
William Poundstone
Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988
German Edition:
Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995
substit. Quantific. Quine Vs substit. Quantific. V 158
VsSubstitutional Quantification/SQ/Quine: the SQ has been deemed unusable for the classic ML for a false reason: because of uncountability. The SQ does not accept nameless classes as values ​​of variables. ((s) E.g. irrational numbers, real numbers, etc. do not have names, i.e. they cannot be Gödel numbered). I.e. SQ allows only a countable number of classes.
Problem: Even the class of natural numbers has uncountably many sub-classes.
And at some point we need numbers!
KripkeVs: in reality there is no clear contradiction between SQ and hyper-countability! No function f lists all classes of natural numbers. Cantor shows this based on the class {n:~ (n e f(n))} which is not covered by the enumeration f.
refQ: demands it in contrast to a function f enumerating all classes of natural numbers? It seems so at first glance: it seems you could indicate f by numbering all abstract terms for classes lexicographically.
Vs: but the function that numbers the expressions is not quite the desired f. It is another function g. Its values ​​are abstract terms, while the f, which would contradict the Cantor theorem, would have classes as values...
V 159
Insertion character: does ultimately not mean that the classes are abstract terms! ((s) I.e. does not make the assumption of classes necessary). The cases of insertion are not names of abstract terms, but the abstract terms themselves! I.e. the alleged or simulated class names.
Function f: that would contradict Cantor's theorem is rather the function with the property that f(n) is the class which is denoted by the n-th abstract term g(n).
Problem: we cannot specify this function in the notation of the system. Otherwise we end up with Grelling's antinomy or that of Richard.
That's just the feared conflict with Cantor's theorem.
This can be refute more easily: by the finding that there is a class that is not denoted by any abstract term: namely the class
(1) {x.x is an abstract term and is not a member of the class it denotes}.
That leaves numbers and uncountability aside and relates directly to expressions and classes of expressions. (1) is obviously an abstract expression itself. The antinomy is trivial, because it clearly relies on the name relation. ((s) x is "a member of the class of abstract expressions and not a member of this class").

V 191
Substitutional Quantification/SQ/Nominalism/Quine: the nominalist might reply: alright, let us admit that the SQ does not clean the air ontologically, but still we win something with it: E.g. SQ about numbers is explained based on expressions and their insertion instead of abstract objects and reference. QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: the expressions to be inserted are just as abstract entities as the numbers themselves.
V 192
NominalismVsVs: the ontology of real numbers or set theory could be reduced to that of elementary number theory by establishing truth conditions for the sQ based on Gödel numbers. QuineVs: this is not nominalistic, but Pythagorean. This is not about the extrapolation of the concrete and abhorrence of the abstract, but about the acceptance of natural numbers and the refutal of the most transcendent nnumbers. As Kronecker says: "The natural numbers were created by God, the others are the work of man."
QuineVs: but even that does not work, we have seen above that the SQ about classes is, as a matter of principle, incompatible with the object quantification over objects.
V 193
VsVs: the quantification over objects could be seen like that as well. QuineVs: that was not possible because there are not enough names. Zar could be taught RZ coordination, but that does not explain language learning.
Ontology: but now that we are doing ontology, could the coordinates help us?
QuineVs: the motivation is, however, to re-interpret the SQ about objects to eliminate the obstacle of SQ about classes. And why do we want to have classes? The reason was quasi nominalistic, in the sense of relative empiricism.
Problem: if the relative empiricism SQ talks about classes, it also speaks for refQ about objects. This is because both views are closest to the genetic origins.
Coordinates: this trick will be a poor basis for SQ about objects, just like (see above) SQ about numbers.
Substitutional/Referential Quantification/Charles Parsons/Quine: Parsons has proposed a compromise between the two:
according to this, for the truth of an existential quantification it is no longer necessary to have a true insertion, there only needs to be an insertion that contains free object variables and is fulfilled by any values of the same. Universal quantification: Does accordingly no longer require only the truth of all insertions that do not contain free variables.
V 194
It further requires that all insertions that contain free object variables are fulfilled by all values. This restores the law of the single sub-classes and the interchangeability of quantifiers.
Problem: this still suffers from impredicative abstract terms.
Pro: But it has the nominalistic aura that the refQ completely lacks, and will satisfy the needs of set theory.

XI 48
SQ/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: the SQ does not make any ontological commitment in so far as the inserted names do not need to designate anything. I.e. we are not forced to assume values ​​of the variables.
XI 49
QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: we precisely obscure the ontology by that fact that we cannot get out of the linguistic.
XI 51
SQ/Abstract Entities/Quine/Lauener: precisely because the exchange of quantifiers is prohibited if one of the quantifiers referential, but the other one is substitutional, we end up with refQ and just with that we have to admit the assumption of abstract entities.
XI 130
Existence/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: with the saying "to be means to be the value of a bound variable" no language dependency of existence is presumed. The criterion of canonical notation does not suppose an arbitrary restriction, because differing languages - e.g. Schönfinkel's combinator logic containing no variables - are translatable into them.
Ontological Relativity/Lauener: then has to do with the indeterminacy of translation.

VsSubstitutional Quantification/Quine/Lauener: with it we remain on a purely linguistic level, and thus repeal the ontological dimension.
But for the variables not singular terms are used, but the object designated by the singular term. ((s) referential quantification).
Singular Term/Quine/Lauener: even after eliminating the singular terms the objects remain as the values ​​of variables.

XI 140
QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: is ontologically disingenuous.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 theses of the more related field of specialization.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Experience Peacocke, Chr. I 178
Def total experience tokens / Peacocke: her type specified as perfect as it is (visual, aural, etc.) for someone who has the sensation. Principle: Total experience token individuate consciousnesses or centers of consciousness.
  Various total ET at a given time must belong to different people or consciousnesses.
inversion: and there are no other differences between consciousnesses at a given time, than those that are determined directly or indirectly by this principle.
Vs Endurantism Stalnaker, R. I 136
(aus Lewis/Schwarz 30) Def Perdurantismus/Schwarz: These dass zeitlich ausgedehnte Dinge gewöhnlich aus zeitlichen Teilen bestehen - I 31 - Def Endurantismus/Schwarz: (Vs Perdurantismus): These Dinge sind zu jeder Zeit, zu der sie existieren, ganz (nicht nur zum Teil) anwesend (wie aristotelische Universalien) - Perdurantismus: kann Objekte als vierdimensional, zeitlich genauso wie räumlich erstreckt auffassen - Endurantismus: auch er kann annehmen, dass Objekte zeitliche Teile haben - Bsp Fußballspiel -
Perdurantismus/Perduration/Stalnaker: Bsp wenn wir sagen die Bezeichnung "B0" reicht zurück in die Zeit von 1865, wo es ein gewisses Restaurant "Bookbinders" gab, ist das die natürlichste Weise.
Endurantismus/Enduration/Stalnaker: Bsp wir können aber auch sagen, B0 ist eins der beiden heute existierenden Restaurants -žBookbinders-œ.
StalnakerVs Endurantismus.
Vague Identtity Stalnaker, R. I 135f
vague identity / Stalnaker: E.g. two seafood restaurants "Bookbinders" - only one can be the same as the original - endurantism: Problem: "B0" (the original) is then an ambiguous term - perdurantism: here it is unique.