Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anthropic Principle | Kanitscheider | II 174 Supernatural/Embedding/Geometry/Dimension/Kanitscheider: a 4-dimensional curved Riemannian manifold can be embedded in a 10-dimensional flat Euclidean space. Def Embedding/Kanitscheider: the formal embedding into a more comprehensive structure.(1) >Space-time/Kanitscheider, >Space/Kanitscheider, >Space curvature/Kanitscheider. Embedding/Theology/Kanitscheider: Analogously, the theologian can say that natural science can explain in principle every inner-worldly connection, but cannot establish that the (observable) world is everything that exists. >Theology. Quantum mechanics/Kanitscheider: Quantum mechanics limits by its laws the number of dynamic variables which can be complementary to each other and thus also the kinds of the conceivable aspects in which matter can appear. >Quantum mechanics. For an analogy of the complementarity of nature and supernature, no comparable limitation of the ways of seeing or levels exists. >Levels of description, >Levels (order). II 174/175 Supernature/theology/embedding/Kanitscheider: for the relation of supernature to nature, therefore, embedding offers itself as a formal structure. Vs: problem: ontology "runs away": i.e. God is really the "last principle" of all being. To prevent this, the embedding must break off after the first step. For this the theologian has to find reasons! This difficulty is a consequence of the abandonment of the principle of parsimony, not to admit more entities than necessary for the explanation of the phenomena. >Conservativity, >Explanation. If one understands the universe as "thoughts of God", one needs a rational reason, why this process is not covered again by a further, higher numinous entity. (Regress). >Regress. The embedding, however, would have the advantage that world and superworld would be absolutely separated ontologically and causally. >Causality, >Ontology. II 177 Supernatural/Religion/Theory/Kanitscheider: also an only partially transcendent, hidden entity comes into conflict with the causal closure of the world. One cannot make several causes responsible for an event, if one is already enough. E.g. If a goblin exerted a real additional force on the falling stone, it would have to fall faster. >Hidden variable, >Hidden parameter. 1. J.C. Graves: The conceptual foundations of contemporary relativity theory. Cambridge: MIT-Press 1971, p. 192. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Determinism | Inwagen | Pauen I 273 Determinism/Peter van Inwagen/Pauen: determinism is not an implication of physicalism. The principle of causal closure refers to the fact that only physical explanations may be used. This does not mean that the cause/effect ratio must always be deterministic. The principle of physical determination does not make a statement about the necessity of certain causal chains but only requires that there is a physically describable change for every change that can be described in a higher level. van Inwagen: determinism thus stands for the thesis that the state of the world can be derived anytime later from a complete description and knowledge of the state of affair. >Initial conditions. Pauen: it is more than controversial that the determinism applies to our physical reality. --- Lewis V 296 Determinism/VsSoft determinism/VsCompatibilism/van InwagenVsLewis: (against the soft determinism which I pretend to represent): E.g. supposed to reductio that I could have lifted my hand, though determinism would be true. Then follows from four premises which I cannot deny that I could have produced a false conjunction HL from a proposition H over a time before my birth and a certain proposition about a law L. Premise 5: if so, then I could have falsified L. Premise 6: but I could not have falsified L (contradiction). LewisVsInwagen: 5 and 6 are not both true. Which one is true depends on what Inwagen means by "could have falsified". But not in the ordinary language but in Inwagen's artificial language. Even there it does not matter what Inwagen himself means! What is important is whether we can give a sense to this at all, which makes all premisses valid without circularity. Inwagen: (verbally) third meaning for "could have falsified": namely, and only if the acting person could have arranged things the way that his/her acting plus the whole truth about the prehistory together imply the nontruth of the proposition. Then, premise 6 says that I could not have arranged things the way that I was predestined not to arrange them like that. Lewis: but it is not at all instructive to see that soft determinism has to reject premise 6 that was interpreted in that way. V 297 Falsification/action/free will/Lewis: provisional definition: an event falsifies a proposition only if it is necessary that in the case that the event happens, then the proposition is false. But my act of throwing a rock would not itself falsify the proposition that the window in the course remains intact. Everything that is true, is that my act invokes another event that would falsify the proposition. The act itself does not falsify any law. It would falsify only a conjunction of prehistory and law. Everything that is true, is that my act precedes another act - the miracle - and this falsifies the law. Weak: let us state that I would be able to falsify a proposition in the weak sense if and only if I do something, the proposition would be falsified (but not necessarily by my act and not necessarily by any event evoked by my act). (Lewis pro "weak thesis" (soft determinism)). Strong: if the proposition is falsified either by my act itself or by an event which has been evoked by my act. Inwagen/Lewis: the first part of his thesis stands, no matter whether we represent the strong or weak thesis: If I could lift my hand although determinism is true and I have not lifted it then it is true in the weak and strong sense that I could have falsified the conjunction HL (propositions on the prehistory and the natural laws). But I could have falsified the proposition L in the weak sense although I could not have falsified it in the strong sense. Lewis: if we represent the weak sense, I deny premise 6. If we represent the strong sense, I deny premise 5. Inwagen: represents both premises by considering analogous cases. LewisVsInwagen: I believe that the cases are not analogous: they are cases in which the strong case and the weak case do not diverge at all: Premise 6/Inwagen: he asks us to reject the idea that a physicist could accelerate a particle faster than the light. LewisVsInwagen: but that does not help to support premise 6 in the weak sense,... V 298 ...because the rejected presumption is that the physicist could falsify a natural law in the strong sense. Premise 5/Inwagen: here we are to reject the assumption that a traveler might falsify a conjunction of propositions about the prehistory and one about his/her future journey differently than by falsifying the nonhistorical part. LewisVsInwagen: you can reject the assumption completely which does nothing to support premise 5 in the strong sense. What would follow if one could falsify the conjunction in the strong sense? That one could falsify the non-historical part in the strong sense? This is what premise 5 would support in the strong sense. Or would only follow (what I think) that the non-historical part could be rejected in the weak sense? The example of the traveler does not help here because a proposition about future journeys could be falsified in the weak as well as the strong sense! Cf. >Strength of theories. |
Inwagen I Peter van Inwagen Metaphysics Fourth Edition Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Determinism | Pauen | Pauen I 274 Determinism/Van Inwagen/Pauen: the principle of the causal closure says that only physical explanation may be used. - It is not about a need for certain causal chains. Only requirement: that for any higher order describable change there is a physically describable change. Thesis: from full description later states can be derived. >Initial conditions, >Levels/order, >Levels of description, >Description, >Causality, >Causal explanation, >Causal dependence, >P. van Inwagen. Pauen: determinism is more than controversial. I 275 Determinism/freedom/Moore: determinism does not entitle us to the conclusion that nothing else could have happened. >Freedom, >Freedom of will, >Actions, cf. >Anomalous monism. Ambiguity of "can": a) possible actions b) physical impossibility. G.E. Moore: For the purposes of a) it is possible to say "I could have decided otherwise" - ("conditional analysis"). VsMoore: Example he would falsely call psychological coercion "free". >Coercion. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Interactionism | Chalmers | I 156 Dualism/Definition Interactionist Dualism/Definition Interactionism/Chalmers: here, experience fills the causal gaps in the physical process. ChalmersVs: that creates more problems than it solves. It does not solve the problems with epiphenomenalism. >Dualism, cf. >Property dualism, >Epiphenomenalism. Pro: the only argument for interactionist dualism are some properties of quantum mechanics that could be better explained. (> Eccles 1986)(1) I 157 ChalmersVsEccles: the effects would be much too small to effect any eventual behavioral changes. Other counter arguments: VsInteractionist dualism/Interactionism/Chalmers: 1. it contradicts the quantum mechanical postulate that the microscopic "decisions" are random. >Quantum mechanics. 2. a behavior that was triggered by these microscopic influences would have to differ from behavior triggered differently. ChalmersVsEccles: such theories are also silent on what should happen in the brain when the wave function collapses. >Wave function. ChalmersVsInteractionist dualism: this makes the phenomenal irrelevant: I 158 ChalmersVsEccles: if there are his psychons, then they can do without purely causal interactions, without assumed phenomenal properties. >Phenomena, >Experience. VsChalmers: one might object that psychons (or ectoplasm, or whatever) are constituted by phenomenal properties. ChalmersVsVs: even then their phenomenal properties are irrelevant to the explanation of the behavior: in the history of causation, it is only the relational properties that count. Thus it adheres to the causal unity of the physical. ChalmersVsInteractionism/ChalmersVsEccles: Even if one were to assume psychons, one could tell a story about zombies, which involved psychons. One would then again have to assume additional phenomenal properties of psychons without being able to prove them. >Zombies. I 162 Definition Interactionist Dualism/Chalmers: Chalmers accepts that consciousness is not physical (VsMaterialism) but he denies that the physical world is causally closed so that consciousness can play an autonomous causal role. >Causal closure, >Consciousness/Chalmers, cf. >Materialism. 1. Eccles, J.C. (1986) Do Mental Events Cause Neural Events Analogously to the Probability Fields of Quantum Mechanics? Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological Sciences, 227, 411-428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1986.0031 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Supernatural | Kanitscheider | II 174 Supernatural/embedding/geometry/dimension/Kanitscheider: a 4-dimensional curved Riemannian manifold can be embedded in a 10-dimensional flat Euclidean space. Def Embedding/Kanitscheider: the formal classification into a more comprehensive structure.(1) >Space time/Kanitscheider, >Space/Kanitscheider, >Space curvature/Kanitscheider. Embedding/Theology/Kanitscheider: Analogously, the theologian can say that natural science can in principle explain every inner-worldly context, but cannot establish that the (observable) world is all that exists. >Theology. Quantum mechanics/Kanitscheider: Quantum mechanics limits by its laws the number of dynamic variables which can be complementary to each other and thus also the kinds of the conceivable aspects in which matter can appear. >Quantum mechanics. For an analogy of the complementarity of nature and supernature, no comparable limitation of the ways of seeing or levels exists. >Levels of description, >Levels (order). II 174/175 Supernature/theology/embedding/Kanitscheider: for the relation of supernature to nature, therefore, embedding offers itself as a formal structure. Vs: problem: ontology "runs away": i.e. God is really the "last principle" of all being. To prevent this, the embedding must break off after the first step. For this the theologian has to find reasons! This difficulty is a consequence of the abandonment of the principle of parsimony, not to admit more entities than necessary for the explanation of the phenomena. >Conservativity, >Explanation. If one conceives the universe as "thought of God", one needs a rational justification why this process is not comprised again by a further, higher numinous entity. (Regress). >Regress. The embedding, however, would have the advantage that world and superworld would be absolutely separated ontologically and causally. >Causality, >Ontology. II 177 Supernatural/religion/theory/Kanitscheider: even a partially transcendent, hidden entity comes into conflict with the causal closure of the world. One cannot blame several causes for an event when one is enough. For example, if a goblin exerted a real additional force on the falling stone, it would have to fall faster. >Hidden variables, >Hidden parameters. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Dualism | Pauen Vs Dualism | Pauen I 56 VsDualismus: it appears to explain the consistency of experiences and the free will better indeed, but it still remains absolutely unclear how consciousness was able accomplish this integration feat. What non-physical regularities govern it? The dualist does not have any concrete research subject! If this integration takes place completely unconsciously, it is not an activity of the consciousness! MonismVsDualism: has a research object in contrast whose mode of operation is known in principle and which can be checked for evidence of integration feats. I 57 VsDualism: merely shifts the problem of free will by autonomous mind. The autonomous mind can hardly have created itself. Therefore, it is also dependent on the properties and characteristics that go back to the act of creation, or were acquired after this act. I 58 VsDualism: is it not at least superior in the question of the origin of consciousness? Again, only shift of the problem: the dualist cannot rely on theories of neuronal processes here, but has to rely on something beyond that. However, it is absolutely unclear where it should start here. The assumption that immaterial substance possessed the ability to produce consciousness is as mysterious as the assumption that material processes possessed it. Nor can you define the mind as a "capacity to create consciousness". That would be as circular as reducing playing chess to the "ability to play chess". MonismVsDualism: has a concrete object of study here, even though it is pondering the same question. I 59 VsInteractionalistic Dualism: if it assumes an interaction, it violates the principle of the causal closure and the principle of physical determination. E.g. brick: the flight cannot rely on consistently physically described events, after all, the reaction would depend on an act of will. The principle of physical determination is also violated: the act of will had no equivalent in physically describable events, after all, it is supposed to be independent of neuronal activity. I 60 Property Dualism: ignores these problems and represents consciousness as an autonomous property that is simultaneously a new kind of physical properties. For this, one would have to encounter events that cannot be explained by neural processes. This would force us to enhance the natural sciences methodically. MonismVsDualism: contrary to the principle of ontological austerity. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
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