Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Behavior | Sterelny | I 371 Behavior/prediction/control/mind/representation: a) simple case: the attribution and prediction of the behavior of other animals is initially more efficient if instead of an explicit representation only a "hidden variable" is assumed. b) complex case: if the behavior becomes more complex however, the representation of foreign mental states is more efficient! >Theory of mind, >Explanation. If one can trace the inner state, one no longer needs to trace every single connection between stimulus and behavior. I 372 Attention/Animal/Sterelny: it seems that the representation of attention is not very demanding. However, it turns out that chimpanzees in the experiment do not differ significantly between attentive and inattentive coaches. E.g. coach with bucket over his head, or constantly turned away, etc. The chimpanzees solved all the tasks by chance. I 374 Sterelny: you should not just explain this with input/output behavior, you have to ask whether sounds or gestures were involved. I 375 Overall, the whole problem will be a knowledge rather than a knowledge of acting. Attention happens on many channels. >Experiments, >Method. Reaction range/Behavior/Sterelny: I doubt that any behavior is absolutely necessary, because the motivational state of a mind reader also plays a role. The reaction range depends on: 1. Spectrum of the other characteristics of the actor which are pursued by the mind reader. 2. The extent to which the reaction is also dependent on the other environment. 3. Under certain circumstances, the ability to imitate. >Reaction range. Environment/Animal/Sterelny: how does an animal categorize its environment? Are the categories concrete, sensuous or functional? >Environment/Psychology. |
Sterelny I Kim Sterelny "Primate Worlds", in: The Evolution of Cognition, C. Heyes/L. Huber (Eds.) Cambridge/MA 2000 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Sterelny II Kim Sterelny Dawkins vs. Gould: Survival of the Fittest Cambridge/UK 2007 |
| Computation | Deacon | I 443 Computation/DeaconVsComputation: some authors use symbolic "computations" or "codes" instead of mental processes. >Code, >Information Processing, >Cognition. DeaconVs: however, these are not representative processes at the same level. >Levels/order, >Description Levels. The error can be assumed that sets of electronic tokens themselves are symbols in their own right. >Symbols/Deacon. Computation/Deacon: Computation is only given to the extent as people are able to interpret inputs and outputs as such. >Input/Output, cf. >Computer model. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Consciousness | Quine | II 58 Consciousness/Quine: I do not presuppose an awareness of excitation of the receptors. For me, it is all about stimulus and reaction. The place where empirical discipline persists is the relative strength of the connection between a respectable supply of occasional sentences and simultaneous irritation. Stroud I 223f Consciousness/Quine: you can bypass consciousness: the relation of input/output allows two types of events in the observable world. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Exterior/interior | Maturana | I 98 Recursion/within/without/Maturana: through recursive distinctions the observer can operate as if he moves outside his circumstances. (Self-reference, application of operations an operations). >Recursion, >Self-reference. I 113f Unity/closed system/Maturana: within/without is only for the observer not by Input/Output describable, otherwise open system. >Systems, >Input/Output. I 121 Distinction from hallucination for nervous system not possible, part of the cognitive domain of the observer. >Observation/Maturana, >Nervous system. I 183 Definition Life/Maturana: in ontogenetic drift push through a range of interference, while a constantly changing niche is realized. >Life, >Niche. Living System/: operates only in the present. - It is open for the passage of molecules (parts of autopoietic systems). Purpose: is part of the observer. >Purposes. Living systems have no within/without - they are in the process of autopoiesis or disintegrated. >Autopoiesis. Environment: is not "used" by the system. - Instead living systems they bring their own niche out. I 194 Life is knowledge - living systems are cognitive systems. >Knowledge, >Cognition. |
Maturana I Umberto Maturana Biologie der Realität Frankfurt 2000 |
| Functional Role | Schiffer | I 21 Functional Property/Schiffer: the concept of the functional property is derived from the notion of a functional role. Def functional role/Schiffer: simply any property 2nd order, of a state-type 2nd order. Its possession means that the possession of this state-type is causal or counterfactual to other state-types, namely, to output, input, distal objects and their properties. 1. A given physical state-type has an indeterminate number of functional roles. 2. Two different physical state-types may have the same functional role. Def functional property/Schiffer: each functional role uniquely determines a functional property-If F is an f role, then the functional property is expressed by the open sentence: x is a token of a state-type which has F. ((s) The functional property is a token of the physical state-type which has this and the role. In short: property = to be token of the type with the role.) Schiffer: Type here is always "physically"). >Type/Token. Properties belong to tokens - roles belong to types. E.g. the neural state-type H (hunger) has different functional roles in different people, because it is not triggered for all by pizza smell (various inputs.) >Input/output. I 23 Then you can correlate propositions with functional roles and a belief-property with a functional property. - For every proposition p, there is a functional role F so that a belief that p = to be a state token of the state-type that has the role F. >Propositions. I 26 The criterion that a state-token n is a belief that p that n is a token of a state-type which has the functional role, which is correlated with the definition of Bel T p. I 29 Verbs for propositional attitudes get their meaning through their functional role. ((s) e.g. "believes..."). >Propositional attitudes. I 30 Folk Psychology: 3 types of generalization: 1. functional roles for influencing beliefs among themselves 2. input conditions for perception (cannot be part of the common knowledge) 3. output conditions for actions. Problem: E.g. blind people can have our belief, but not our folk psychology. >Generalization. I 33f SchifferVsFolk Psychology: problem: the theory will often provide the same functional role for different beliefs (belief) simultaneously. >Folk psychology. SchifferVsLoar: according to him from Bel T follows # (that snow is = Bel T#(that grass is green) - then both have the same T-correlated functional role. >Brian Loar. I 276 N.b.: although the uniqueness condition is a very weak condition. - It is not sufficient for: that one is in a particular belief-state that is linked to them: E.g. "if p is true, one believes that p." N.B.: "p" occurs inside and outside of the belief context - therefore, the theory will say something unique about p. Problem: in the uniqueness condition the variables for propositions only occur within belief contexts. >Uniqueness condition. Then all beliefs of the same logical form have the same functional role. I 34 All that does not differentiate the belief that dinosaurs are extinct, from that, that fleas are mortal. ((s) Related problem: equivalence in the disquotation scheme: "Snow is white" is true iff grass is green.) >Equivalence, >Disquotation scheme. Problem: there is a lack of input: "rules that do not relate to perception". I 35 Twin Earth/SchifferVsFolk Psychology: folk psychology must be false because in the twin earth, a different belief has the same functional role. >Twin earth. E.g. Ralph believes there are cats - twin earth-Ralph believes - "there are cats" (but there are twin earth cats). Therefore twin earth-Ralph does not believe that there are cats - i.e. so two different beliefs but same functional role. Twin earth-Ralph is in the same neural state-type N - the specification of belief might require reference to cats, but the counterfactual nature of the condition would ensure that N is satisfied for twin earth-Ralph. N.B.: that does not follow from a truth about functional roles in general, but with respect to the theory T* (folk psychology). Outside the folk psychology: "every token of "cat" is triggered by the sight of a cat". Wrong solution: platitude: "typically triggered by cats". Thhis cannot be a necessary condition - in addition there are twin earth-examples, where typical belief is unreliable for one's own truth. VsDescription: no solution: "The thing in front of me". >Acquaintance. I 38 f Tyler Burge: no functional role can determine what one believes (this is not about the twin earth, but wrongly used terms). I 286f Belief/SchifferVsLoar: problem: his realization of a theory of belief/desires - (as a function of propositions on physical states) whose functional roles are determined by the theory. Problem: to find a theory that correlates each proposition with a single functional role instead of a lot of roles. Schiffer: thesis: that will not work, therefore the Quine/Field argument is settled. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
| Functionalism | Avramides | I 146 Functionalism/Avramidis: functionalism allows to refer to behavior with propositional attitudes, not on linguistic behavior. - It allows a subjective image of the mind. >Propositional attitudes, >Behavior, >Understanding, >Language behavior. I 147 Problem: this requires an indefinite number of further propositional attitudes. I 149 Functionalism/Lewis: we take mental concepts as theoretical terms (TT) and define our mental-theoretical terms by reference to the platitudes (commonplaces) of folk psychology. >Theoretical terms, >Folk psychology, >Everyday language, >Observation. These shall contain both, theoretical terms and the rest. - Then we transform every theoretical term into a name, replace the names with free variables. - then existential closure (of the open formulas ((s) Ramsey sentence). >Ramsey sentence, >Open formula. With that we achieve the original theory with the claim that it has a single implementation. - Then the theory has input/output concepts, but no specifically mental terminology. >Input/output. Problem/Avramides: how do we characterize input and output? BlockVsFunctionalism: either characterizes them chauvinistically or liberally. ((s) Because a purely physical characterization of the inputs and outputs would include or exclude the wrong ones.) >Philosophical chauvinism. I 153f AvramidesVsFunctionalism: if he is set to non-mentalistic characterization of the inputs and outputs, then he has to say what distinguishes mental from non-mental systems that have the same functional organization. Avramides: we always start with mentalistically characterized behavior. - Even with the marsians we say that his behavior must have an interpretation. So if normal evidence (Ned Block: not only linguistic, but mainly linguistic behavior) is part of our theory of propositional attitudes, we are committed to a symmetry between the semantic and the psychological. >Language behavior, >Ned Block. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Neural Networks | Deacon | I 130 Neural networks/learning/Deacon: the basic structure consists of three layers: input units, output units and hidden units (hidden units, middle layer) as well as their connections. The states of the nodes of the middle layer (0 or 1) are initially influenced by the input nodes. It is crucial that the strength of the compounds only emerges as a result of more frequent use. The connections are trained by comparing the success of the output signal (correct or wrong association) with the input. Cf. >Learning, >Learning/Hebb, >Input/Output. I 131 This training corresponds to adapting to a stock of external forms of behaviour and is an analogy to learning. Such systems are much more capable of recognizing patterns than conventional programmed computers. When neural networks are trained to categorize stimuli, they can easily continue this when new stimuli occur. When it comes to incidental interference, they are superior to conventional computers... I 132 ... in reacting and not to reinforce problematic connections. I.e. they do not react in an all-or-nothing way. This is similar to the reaction of the nervous systems to damage. >Machine learning. Information processing within neural networks has been compared with holograms that have information available from several perspectives at the same time. Short-term memory: can be simulated with recurrent networks (see J. Elman)(1). Incremental learning, or the importance of starting small. In 13th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, NJ, L. Erlbaum, 443-448). Former states of the hidden layer are entered and processed as new input. Language acquisition/Elman: with this, language learning could be simulated: the problem of syntax learning was translated into the problem of mapping previous sequences to future input sequences. Incomplete sequences were completed by the system with the most likely additions. Initially, this involved the occurrence of 0 and 1, i.e. meanings were neglected. Problem: Neural networks sometimes converge into suboptimal solutions because they only take local patterns into account. Solution: in order to prevent the nets from being trapped in such "learning potholes", it is possible to install "noises" (random disturbances) that force the system to search for possible solutions in another area. I 133 Language acquisition/Elman/Deacon: Elman kept different stages of learning more complex structures apart, so they could not interfere with each other. >Language Acquisition. I 134 Deacon: the production of grammatically correct forms was learned inductively without any grammar, let alone to presuppose a universal grammar. >Universal grammar, >Grammar, >N. Chomsky. I 135 N.B.: it was shown that the structure of the learning process has to do with what can and cannot be learned. More importantly, it suggests that the structure of the language and the way in which it has to be learned are related. >Language/Deacon, >Brain/Deacon. 1. Elman, J. (1991): Incremental learning, or the importance of starting small. In: 13th Annual Conference oft he Cognitive Science Society, NJ, L. Erlbaum, 443-448. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Skepticism | Frith | I 68 Objectivity/dream/skepticism/Frith: one can prove that someone is dreaming by recording his/her brain activity. >Dream, >Neuroimaging, >About neuroimaging. I 69 Dream/knowledge/Frith: E.g. Zhuangzi dreamed: "I was a butterfly who knew nothing about Zhuangzi." When he woke up, he thought he did not know if he was a man who had dreamed to be a butterfly, or a butterfly who dreamed to be a man. Sleeping/dream/Frith: especially when you fall asleep, the brain often reenacts what we have done in the course of the day. I 246 Control/control body/brain/Frith: there is no last control body of the brain that watches over everything, since there is no brain region that only delivers output signals but does not receive any input signals. >Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith, >Thinking, >Input/Output, >Cognition. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| Systems | Chalmers | I 247 System/Function/Functional Organization/Consciousness/Chalmers: which functional organization may be necessary for consciousness? And what is functional organization? Definition Functional Organization/Chalmers: 1. A number of abstract components 2. For each component, a number of different possible states 3. A system of dependency relations that determine how the state of each component depends on previous states of all components and inputs in the system, and how outputs of the system depend on previous states of the components. The nature of the components and the states remain open. >Input/Output, >Relations, >Dependency, >States. I 248 Artificial Intelligence/Chalmers: Such an organization can be realized not only by the brain, but also by electronic systems. >Artificial Intelligence, >Strong AI, >Neural Networks. Levels: such a system will have different levels, depending on how finely we distinguish the elements. >Levels/Order. If we want to assess cognition, we need at least a system that is able to change its own behavior. >Cognition. I 249 Def Principle of organizational invariance/Chalmers: a system with the ability of conscious experiences will have qualitatively identical experiences if the fine-grained organizational structure remains the same. >Invariance, >Experience. Chalmers: that's what I call my non-reductive functionalism. It can be viewed as a kind of combination of functionalism and property dualism. >Functionalism, >Property dualism. VsChalmers: 1. Some authors believe that there must be a certain biochemical equipment to make consciousness possible so that there will be no conscious electronic systems. >Artificial consciousness. 2. Other authors believe that robots may have consciousness but that their experiences will not be comparable to ours. >Missing Qualia. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Theories | Wright | I 205f The purpose of the idea of theoreticity of observation should not be to question the contrast between data and theory. >Input/Output, >Data, >Theory-ladenness. Theoreticity of observation/theory/Wright: the type if theory ladenness that it needs to bring the distinction data/theory in trouble is a lot more (see above): It must be shown that the conditions for legitimate assertion (assertibility) is necessarily a function not only of the content of the report and the quality of the input experience, but also a function of collateral empirical beliefs. >Assertibility, >Assertibility conditions, >Content, >Experience, >Perception. I 207 WrightVsTheoreticity of observation/theory ladenness: if all observation is theory-laden, there are no statements, to which any subject is obliged to agree to. (So no "synthetic" statements in the sense of Two Dogmas, final section). >Analyticity, >Two Dogmas. Wright: the legitimate assertibility is rather a four-digit relation between: Statement - subject - experience development - background assumptions. >Background. Evidence: Whether a theory is erroneous or properly, must now (see above) be visible in principle at least. However, such confirmation may ultimately only be provided with independent credible data. (VsTheory-ladenness of observation). >Confirmation. The Example can show the possibility that this remains undecidable. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Verification | Frith | I 246 Control/control body/brain/Frith: there is no last control body of the brain that watches over everything, since there is no brain region that only delivers output signals but does not receive any input signals. >Input/Output, >Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith, >Behavior, >Review, >Feedback. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gadamer, G. | Block Vs Gadamer, G. | Avra I 149 Input/Output/BlockVsFunctionalism/BlockVsLewis: no matter how functionalism characterizes input and output, it leads into the dilemma of being either chauvinistic or liberal. ((s) liberal: attributing mind to too many systems (e.g. vending machines)/chauvinistic: too few: E.g.: deny animals mind). I 150 Input/Output/BlockVsFunctionalism/VsLewis any physical characterization of inputs and outputs is inevitably chauvinist or liberal: E.g. assuming you were seriously injured and your only way to communicate with the outside world is through electroencephalogram patterns. If you find something exciting, it produces a pattern that the others interpret as a point, if it is a bit boring, a line. Now let us imagine, on the other hand, others communicate with you by creating electronic activity that leaves long or short afterimages in you. In this case, we could say that the brain itself has become a part of the inputs and outputs! (at the top we had determined variable realization as an essential progress, however). But: Block: if this point (of variable implementation) is correct VsMaterialism, it also applies to inputs and outputs, because the physical realization itself may be an essential part of the inputs and outputs. ((s) input output devices: receptors?). I.e. there is no physical characterization which refers on inputs and output of all and only mental systems. (Block 1980b, p.295). Conclusion/Block: any physical characterization of Inputs/Outputs is either chauvinistic or liberal. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Materialism | Functionalism Vs Materialism | Danto2 I 272 FunctionalismVsMaterialism: functionalism has created serious problems for materialist theories of the mind. One cannot say that the mind is nothing other than the brain, and consequently nothing more than this material system, when the mind itself can be defined functionally, when something is given that supports all its features, but otherwise is different from the brain. How can the mind be equated with the brain and with the computer, if on the other hand the computer and the brain cannot be equated with each other? Identity is transitive. That would not be fulfilled here. Avra I 148 Holism/Avramides: therefore one sometimes says that behaviorism does not manage to find an access to the holism of the mental. Solution: Functionalism: was specially designed to take this holism into account. FunctionalismVsMaterialism: has in relation to holism an advantage over the old materialism, which is sometimes called "central state materialism". (e.g. Smart 1969, Place 1969). Def Central State Materialism/Avramides: (is a type of physicalism). Mental states and mental events can be reduced to physical states and events. Problem: then certain beings cannot have a mind because of the certain form of their inner structure. Solution: Functionalism: now allows "variable realization" of states of mind. Thus it identifies mentality not with a property of the 1st level, but with a property of the 2nd level (property of property). Property 2nd level of systems. Functional property: is a property of a property. I.e. even beings without grey matter in their skulls can still be characterized as sensitive, cognitive beings. (Variable Realization). Variable Realization/Functionalism: can assume variable realization, because it does not refer to certain structure or matter, but to inputs and outputs. Thus he can avoid the problems of reductionism and Cartesianism. He still refers to behavior. AvramidesVsFunctionalism: but it is still independent of "normal evidence" (normal behavior). At first the attribution must not refer to the irreducible mental (otherwise circular). But this is not yet certain with the reference to input/output. I 149 Solution/Lewis: his version of functionalism (1972,83a,83d)). |
|
| Parsons, Ta. | Luhmann Vs Parsons, Ta. | Au Kass 11 Interpenetration/Parsons: different subsystems are coupled: E.g. Culture penetrates the social system (interpenetrates with it). E.g. A social system affects the individuals through socialization. E.g. Individuals domesticate their own organisms through learning processes. Parsons thus marks overlaps. But after the whole theoretical construction this did not happen on an operative level! Rather, Parsons thinks that the various subsystems contribute to the emergence of action. They are not themselves already operative! If they are differentiated out as action systems, then again only on the level of action. These systems must then in turn fulfil all the requirements of systems. ((s) So the levels remain separate). LuhmannVsParsons: but the term that would have to say what actually affects the other system or how culture is actually a part of the social system could never be explained by the division into four of Parson's box (see above). I.e. several system relations would have to be internalised and identified as internal subsystems and then the whole system would be defined by the interpenetrative relations. This was not possible and therefore remained unclear. AU Kass 1 LuhmannVsParsons: terminology limited by structural functionalism: one could not ask about the function of structures, or examine terms such as inventory or inventory prerequisite, variable or the whole methodological area. Limitation by the fact that a certain object was assumed to be given. No criteria for the inventory of the item. Instead, the theory must be able to include all deviance and dysfunction. (Not possible with Parsons). Question: in which period of time and which bandwidths is a system identifiable? (Example Revolution: is society still the same society afterwards?) Inventory Criteria Biology: definition by death. The living reproduces itself by its own means. AU Kass 2 LuhmannVsParsons: assignments are not always mandatory. LuhmannVsParsons: certain hermeticism of the conceptual scheme, the compulsion to always fill out the 4 boxes, leads the theoretical decisions. Is thereby more and more occupied by self-posed problems. One cannot recognize any direct mistakes, but nevertheless a dead end. LuhmannVsParsons: he has already integrated a lot: Cybernetics, Input/Output Language, Linguistics. But self-reference (important in modern systems theory) is not possible within the framework of Parson's model. Therefore we need interdisciplinary solutions. |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 |
| Various Authors | Peacocke Vs Various Authors | I 59 Representational Content/Peacocke: the acoustic experience itself could have a representational content, ((s) namely, the that-sentence that a sound comes from the left.) weaker: in conjunction with the other attitudes of the subject. But for that the subject needs spatial concepts. Bower: his problem is, what it means to have spatial concepts. Stimulus-Response Scheme/S-R System/SR Psychology/Peacocke: a distinction is made between mental states with content and those that can only be explained by the stimulus-response scheme. But stimulus-response systems have complex internal information processing. Nor os it about the distinction conscious/unconscious. A stimulus-response psychology can reduce reactions not only to physical stimuli, but also to sensations! And these can also have a primitive form of consciousness. This is about the problem of the attribution of propositional content. Not all sensations do indeed have representational content. Bower: appropriate spatial response confirms the attribution of spatial content. Peacocke: is that correct? Causality/Psychology: Problem: There are several levels of incoming causal chains and also several levels of outgoing causal chains (input/output). I 60 Some of these levels, apart from the external objects, have the ability to involve objects that can play a role in both inbound and outbound in causal chains. E.g. the retina. Proposition/Propositional Content/SR System/Peacocke: we must first assume propositional attitudes about objects and places in the vicinity of the subject, which do not yet constitute an stimulus-response scheme, and motor instructions that actually consist in spatial reactions acting over a distance to be able to ascribe spatial terms. PeacockeVsBower: of course it goes without saying that if the child intentionally puts out its hand, it then there sees the object. The problem is what constitutes the intention with the content: "reach out to the object"? A spatial response that is supposed to be caused by the spatial properties of the object is not an explanation for an intention. Nor is it an explanation for the intention that the subject is disappointed if the object is not located there. (!) Whether there are innate, half-wired or acquired connections, you just need not assume any spatial concepts to explain the disappointment . I 61 Content/Attribution/PeacockeVsBower: if you want to attribute content, you should always ask: could a stimulus-response system do that as well? If so, we do not need content. Or the conditions are not sufficient to attribute content. Def Registering/Bennett/Peacocke: ("Linguistic Behavior", Cambridge, 1976): Def "a registers that p": if a is in an environment that is similar in relevant respects with an environment where p is clearly the case, then a registers that p. Def Relevantly Similar: an environment that does not differ in any respect in which a is sensitive (of an environment in which p is present). There is also room for learning and curiosity: Trainable: such an organism will respond quickly. Curious: such an organism will try many different reactions. Perspective/Peacocke: there are also complementary characteristics to investigate in perspective sensitivity: E.g. when the subject as is familiar, e.g. with the types of objects in its environment, it requires less efferent information. Def Efferent: from inside, from the central nervous system. In our oversimplified model here we assume subjects with perfect memory and a single goal. I 70 But there is independent evidence for memory errors and assumed obstacles or multiple goals. Such assumptions do not empty the thesis of perspective sensitivity. Perspective sensitivity is necessary to attribute attitudes in the basic case. But that is a weaker necessity than we need. E.g. (see above) the animal that eats fruits: the food could be covered and after a period of training the animal manages to solve this problem. Namely, by the shortest route, regardless of the angle at which it had originally perceived the food. That would be a case of perspective sensitivity. Nevertheless, it is possible that this is merely a stimulus-response system! Therefore, we do not know fully what the requirement of perspective sensitivity is. We cannot exclude this possibility by referring to past experiences or beliefs of the subject. Proposal: that the behavior of the animal is not causally sensitive to past spatial experiences that are currently not perceived, Vs: but this condition would also be met if the animal turned its head on its way to the food without interrupting its way. So this cannot be the crucial difference for the attribution of spatial Concepts. I 71 We would like to say that a person's behavior with attitudes about objects depends on how these objects are arranged around him. PeacockeVsBower: but we have already seen above that this leads to nothing. I 76 Mental Map/Perspective/Peacocke: initially it is harmless to attribute spatial behavior to the existence of an "internal map". But from this do not follow two stronger assumptions that want to derive perspective sensitivity from this: 1) Ulrich Neisser: every living being that can anticipate an environment has cognitive maps. PeacockeVsNeisser: it is not plausible that "cognitive maps" should be a particular type of image. 2) even if someone has a real, physical, external map, it cannot be a general explanation of the perspective sensitivity of his behavior. To use the map, you have to be able to trace the trail of your own movements. But then you already have the perspective sensitivity that should be explained first. (Circular). |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Wright, Cr. | Rorty Vs Wright, Cr. | VI 40 WrightVsTarski/Rorty: he has not succeeded to specify a standard. Wright: two standards: legitimate assertibility and truth. Difference: the pursuit of one is necessarily also the pursuit of the other, but success with one is not necessarily a success with the other. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: "metaphysical activism". Wants to keep correspondence and representation alive. RortyVsWright: from the fact that beliefs can be justified without being true (admittedly) it does not follow that two standards are followed. Nor that we have two obligations. 1) to justify actions, and 2) another obligation to do the right thing. It simply shows that what is justified with one audience is not necessarily so in front of another. Disquotation/Deflationism/Wright: the deflationist thinks that by the disquotation principle the content of the truth predicate is completely fixed. Wright: There is a "biconditional connection between the claim a proposition is true, and the appropriate use of this sentence produced by the disquotation principle, which serves and the purpose of explanation." VI 41 "Any genuine assertion practice is just the same as it would be if truth were the goal consciously set." Rorty: Wright believes that two choices can be distinguished by asking whether they are "de facto" not "guided" by one but by other consideration. RortyVsWright: is it sufficient for the actual existence of such a power, however, if the player believes the relevant fact is given? E.g. I believe I fulfill the will of the gods by a certain behavior. My critic - Atheist - says there is no will of the gods, so it could not be my standard. VI 42 I reply that this is reductionist and that my own belief of what standard I fulfill makes the difference. RortyVsWright: he should not be happy about this defense strategy of atheists. An imaginative player will always have more and more control systems in function than you can tell apart. VI 42/43 Wright: must either admit that his goal is then normative in a descriptive sense when the player believes this, or specify another criterion (recourse). Wright: the thesis that possession of truth consists in the "fulfillment of a normative condition distinct from the claim authorization" is equal to the thesis that "truth is a real property". Truth/Wright: thesis: truth is an independent standard. (Sic, VI 42/43) WrightVsDeflationism, Wright pro type of minimalism with truth as an independent standard in addition to a mere property of sentences. VI 45 Representation/Convergence/RortyVsWright: but his example is highly revealing: he thinks, e.g. what the "intuitive" linking of representationality with convergence is based on is the following "truism" about "convergence/representation": "If two devices for representation fulfill the same function, a different output is generated in favorable conditions when there is a different input." VI 46 Wright: must distinguish here between different discourses (for example, about physics or the comical), in which the cognitive is appropriate or not. The humor (the "base") could be different, although people could not be blamed for that. Metaphysics/Wright/Rorty: such questions can only be decided a priori. Namely: e.g. the question of the cognitive status of a discourse! VI 46/47 Crispin Wright/RortyVsWright: he defines a cognitive commandment according to which a speaker is to function like a well oiled representation machine. This follows the pattern of all epistemologists by whom prejudice and superstition are like sand in the gears. Ultimately, for them humans are machines! Rorty: right Input/Output function is fulfilled by countless functions in an uninteresting manner. What Wright needs: we should recognize a priori: What are the proper functions (through knowledge of the content). VI 48 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: Pragmatism doubts that cognitivity is more than a historically contingent consensus about the appropriate rationale. VI 48/49 Content/RortyVsWright: he believes philosophers could consider the "content" of a discourse and then say whether it complied with the cognitive commandment. Representation/RortyVsWright: fundamentally different outputs can be considered a representation of the same inputs. Basically anything can be a representation of anything. You only have to previously agree on it. Cognitivity/Rorty: the content is of minor importance when it comes to the determination of cognitivity. It is almost exclusively about approval of conventions. Therefore, it is a historical sociological term. VI 50 WrightVsWittgenstein/Rorty: (Following a rule) "in metaphysic perspective a killjoy" (Evans also). Only concession to the "Qietisten": that truth and falsehood are even possible where realism is not up for debate. (Comedy, morality). Two varieties of Wittgenstein's spoilsport: Kripke and McDowell. McDowellVsNoncognitivism/Rorty: the moral non-cognitivist is "driven by an erroneous interpretation of ethical facts and ethical objectivity". The same applies for him as for his Platonic opponents, the moral realists: VI 51 struggles with the quest for an independent position. That is impossible. (McDowellVsRealism of moral). Wright/Rorty: Wright is against this attempt "to undermine the debate between realism and anti-realism in general". Advantage of his concept of the cognitive commandment: does not include an overly objectified fact concept" (as would be criticized by Wittgenstein and McDowell). We refer to what we can understand as the range of possible causes of these differences of opinion. Representation/Relevance/Cognition/Function/RortyVsWright: this is not enough to rebut McDowell: to arrive at a concept of the range of possible causes we must first specify an Input Output function, otherwise we cannot distinguish the smooth functioning of a representative machine from a malfunction. Wittgenstein has shown that the "relevant object area" is never in the relevant sense "there". Therefore question: whether there is a way to isolate the input without reference to the "evaluative standpoint". World/Thinking/Davidson/DeweyVs: we do not have the ability to separate the contribution by "the world" to the process of judgment from our own contribution. VI 52 True Making/Wright/Rorty: does not doubt the existence of isolated "truth-makers". (WrightVsDavidson). VI 56 PragmatismVsWright/Rorty: here there are only historical sociologically variable differences between patterns of justifications. These patterns should not be introduced into the concept of truth. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| |||