Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 19 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Electron Example | Electron example: a representative for thought experiments related to unobservable entities and consequences of unobservability for the construction of theories. See also theories, observation terms, observation language, unobservable, theoretical terms, theoretical entities, theory language. |
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| Empirical Meaning | Hempel | II 137 "Empirical Sense"/Hempel: the empirical sense depends: 1) on the linguistic framework which determines what other conclusions can be inferred and 2) on the theoretical context of auxiliary hypotheses. Cf. >Conceptual schemes, >Hypotheses. II 138 The empirical meaning is only possible in ideal (formal) languages. >Ideal language, >Formal language. Problem: "isolated statements" can contain metaphysical things without relation to the perception and may be omitted due to the syntactic structure. Different: statements with theoretical terms are syntactically always linked to observation terms (theoretical terms: refer to the unobservable). >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables, >Observation sentences, >Observation language, >Observation, >Observability. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| Epistemology | Quine | XII 86/87 Epistemology/Quine: a) conceptual side: is explanation of terms by terms. b) applicability/validity: by truth. II 35 Epistemology is about the question of how we animals managed to produce this ((s) highly differentiated) science in view of the sketchy neural input. This study shows that shifts due to the representative function would not have done any less justice to this input. This does not mean rejecting ontology. We can refuse them! II 36 Truth must not be confused with evidence. Truth is intrinsic and there is nothing about it. See also >Naturalized Epistemology. V 15 Berkeley/Traditional Epistemology: Problem: how do we know that there are objects and that science is true? V 16 Quine: the introduction of the physical sense organs would have appeared to them as a circle. V 17 Epistemology/Quine: the emancipated epistemologist works as an empirical psychologist (with >stimuli instead of >sense data, but without >gestalt theory.) VsGestalt Theory: it is about the connection of stimuli with receptors, not with consciousness. V 38 Epistemology/Quine: main question: if our theory of the outside world is true, how could we ever come up with it? X 12 Inductive Logic/Quine: is indistinguishable from epistemology. X II 86 Epistemology/Quine: we can look at it here analogous to mathematics: just as mathematics should be reduced to logic or to logic + set theory, so should empirical knowledge be somehow based on sensory experience. XII 87 a) conceptual side: is there to explain the concept of the body from the sensory experience b) (validity, truth): is there to justify our knowledge of nature from the sensory experience. Epistemology/Hume: a) conceptual side: here he equated it immediately with sensory experiences. I.e. an apple is a new apple in every moment. b) Validity, truth: Hume failed here and we still have no solution. Problem: general statements as well as singular statements about the future gain nothing in certainty by being understood as if they were talking about sensory impressions. Quine: We are still facing the same problem as Hume. On the conceptual side, however, progress was made. Solution: Bentham: XII 88 Def Theory of Fiction/Context Definition/Entire Sentences/Word/holophrastic/Bentham/Quine: Bentham discovered the Def Context Definition/Bentham/Quine: (Vs normal definition): to explain a term we do not need to specify a reference object, not even a synonymous word or phrase, we just need to show how to translate all complete sentences containing the term. Epistemology/Quine: apart from context theory, epistemology was enriched by set theory. Then you do not have to equate bodies with sense data or context definitions: XII 89 Def Object/Quine: Solution: Objects as sets of sets of sensations; then there may be a category of objects that enjoy the very qualities that bodies are supposed to have. Vs: this is not as untouchable as the context definition. Because of the recourse to the problematic ontology of quantities. Epistemology/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements and statements about the future are uncertain if they are understood to be about sense data or sensory impressions) is still unsolved today. Carnap/Quine: his constructions would have made it possible to translate all sentences about the world into sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observation terms does not mean that it can be proven with logical and set-theoretical means from observation sentences. ((s) Means of expression are not evidence. (> exterior/interior, description levels, circularity). Epistemology/Quine: N.B.: to want to endow the truths about nature with the full authority of immediate experience is just as doomed to failure as the return of the truths of mathematics to the potential insight of elementary logic. >Epistemology/Carnap. XII 91 Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sensory stimuli are the only thing, why not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: this used to appear circular. No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we just have to refrain from deducting science from observations. If we only want to understand the connection between observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also those from science, which is investigating exactly this connection. See > Rational reconstruction. XII 98 Epistemology/Quine: still exists within psychology and thus within empirical sciences. It studies the human subject. Aim: to find out how observation is related to theory and to what extent theory goes beyond observation. XII 99 Epistemology/Quine: old: wanted to include empirical sciences, so to speak, to assemble them from sense data. New: now, conversely, epistemology is part of psychology. Quine: at the same time, the old relationship remains: epistemology is included in the empirical sciences and at the same time science is included in the epistemology. ((s) Epistemology studies the subject and the subject studies epistemology.) This is not a circle because we have given up the dream of deducing all science from sense data. This also solves the old mystery of seeing. See also Seeing/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Induction | Popper | I 110 Induction principle: trying to delete it from the science, would not be different from taking out the decision about truth and falsehood of the theories of science. The induction principle can only be a general proposition. If you try to regard it as an "empirically valid" proposition, so the same questions immediately occur again, which leaded to its introduction. We would have to use inductive reasoning to justify it: regress. --- I 115 Induction: We reject them because there is no suitable criterion of demarcation. No indicator of empirical, non-metaphysical character of a theoretical system. Demarcation criterion: it will be a proposal for a fixing. Solely responsibility of the decision. To be justified only by analyzing its logical consequences: fertility, >explanatory power, etc. --- Schurz I 15f Induction/PopperVsInduction/Schurz: Popper thesis: science can get along entirely without induction - many VsPopper - theoretical term (Popper: Problem: because observation statements are theory-laden, the border between >observation terms and >theoretical terms is not sharp). |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Interpretation | Putnam | V 162 Theory/Putnam: we interpret the spoken always as a whole. The interpretation of >"observation terms" is also dependent on the interpretation of >theoretical terms as vice versa. Different views presuppose common reference. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Introduction | Peacocke | I 98 Predicates/Understanding/Introduction/Peacocke: difference: 1. how the circumstances are introduced - 2. how the content of the predicate is introduced - E.g. Def "quadround" = square when observed and round when unobserved - 1st way of introduction: through defining what is the case with observation/non observation - 2nd way: it looks square - Conclusion: one applies "square" when one is ready, to apply it also tounobserved cases. I 99 To understand it, you have to identify independent terms and find out that they are observation independent terms. >Observation independence, >observation terms, >Properties, >Predicates, >Observation, >Observability, >Unobservables, >Observation terms, >Distinctions, >Seeing, >Knowledge, >Language use. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Natural Kinds | Peacocke | I 91f Natural kind/Peacocke: E.g. tomatoes look so and so Tomato: is no observation term. "Tomato-like": is an observation term. E.g. one can see a thing and know that x has the property without that x is observable. >Concepts, >Predicates, >Observation, >Observation terms, >Observation language, >Natural kinds. E.g. man/woman/chromosomes. Unstructured tomato-term ("tomato-like" does not have to be a term for a natural kind. ((s) but "tomato-like" may very well be naturally-term if, for example, based on gene structure.) |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Observability | Observability: this is about the question of the limits of the observability of objects of science. See also theoretical terms, observation language, observation terms, observation sentence, existence, reality. |
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| Observation | Popper | Schurz I 15 Theory-ladenness/Popper: observational propositions are not merely fallible, but also theory-laden. I 16 Pointe: Thus the border between observation terms and theory terms can no longer be sharply drawn. Problem: with this one moves towards a relativism. >Observation language, >Theoretical terms, >Theory language. |
Po I Karl Popper The Logic of Scientific Discovery, engl. trnsl. 1959 German Edition: Grundprobleme der Erkenntnislogik. Zum Problem der Methodenlehre In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Observation Language | Peacocke | I 88 PeacockVsInstrumentalism. Peacocke per separation observation terms/theoretical terms. >Instrumentalism, >Observation terms, >Theoretical terms. If X-ray tubes and Geiger counters are distinguished, then in the representational content - then we have observation terms instead of theoretical terms. >Content, >Representational Content, >Empirical Content. I 94 Observation Terms/Instruments/Peacocke: E.g. Square: if presented at different angles, it is epistemically impossible that it is not a square. E.g. a pair of particles: here it is still epistemically possible that it is not the result of a collision. That always requires faith in observability, therefore circular if the belief exists and ineffective if the belief does not exist. >Circularity, >Belief, >Observability, >Unobservables. In contrast, none of both if it comes to understanding instead of truth. >Understanding, >Truth. I 104 Theoretical Terms/TT/Observation term/concept/theory/instrument/experiment/Peacocke: improved tools give us no new concepts. >Concepts. Peacocke Thesis: theoretical terms are always connected to observation terms - e.g. a blind, to whom a device writes information about spatial environment on the back: how should the blind test the device? >Knowledge, >World/Thinking, >Perception, >Certainty, >Confirmation, >Verification. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Perception | Peacocke | passim Peacocke Thesis: experience, perception: does never exist without sensation. --- I 8 Perception Theory/tradition: Thesis: feelings are not part of the perception - Adequacy Thesis: all essential lie in 'appears to the subject ..' plus some complex conditions such as objects and circumstances. I 11 PeacockeVs: it is undecidable whether two trees are the same size and at the same distance, or at different distsances and different in size - and we assume that they are the same size, even if we see different sizes - (added knowledge: brings representation into the game). I 19 Perception/Peacocke: needs terms. I 91f Observation Terms/Theoretical Terms: Square: - must be experienced as such, an X-ray tube not. - For scientists, the X-ray tube may be constructed entirely differently, for a lay person not - in this case it is a different term. - Sensitivity for property: necessary but not sufficient condition: - E.g. 'tomato-like': appearance or taste, here is no theory required. - Square: a minimal theory of perspective is required. - There is nothing 'square-like' what corresponds to 'tomato-like'. - Without square term no sensation of square, (not only no representation). - A perspectively distorted square is perceived as a square, but not perceived as distorted. (> Higher order: >description levels). - Not so with tomato-like: cannot be known as a tomato. (> Forgery). - 'Tomato-like' is not a criterion, otherwise tomato would be an observation term! - Representation: tomato, not 'tomato-like'. I 154 'As'/seeing-as/perception/thinking/Peacocke: E.g. 'This acid burns the table': only liquid is seen, not 'as acid'. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Possibility | Peacocke | I 94 Epistemic Possibility/Peacocke: the naturally species term 'tomato' has not the same pattern of epistemic possibility as the observation term 'tomato-like'. >Concepts, >Predicates, >Observation, >Observation terms, >Observation language, >Natural kinds. It is epistemically possible that something that is tomato-like, is not a tomato. >Epistemic possibility. I 88 PeacockVsInstrumentalism. Peacocke per separation observation terms/theoretical terms. >Instrumentalism, >Observation terms, >Theoretical terms. If X-ray tubes and Geiger counters are distinguished, then in the representational content - then we have observation terms instead of theoretical terms. >Content, >Representational Content, >Empirical Content. I 94 Observation Terms/Instruments/Peacocke: E.g. Square: if presented at different angles, it is epistemically impossible that it is not a square. E.g. a pair of particles: here it is still epistemically possible that it is not the result of a collision. That always requires faith in observability, therefore circular if the belief exists and ineffective if the belief does not exist. >Circularity, >Belief, >Observability, >Unobservables. In contrast, none of both if it comes to understanding instead of truth. >Understanding, >Truth. I 104 Theoretical Terms/TT/Observation term/concept/theory/instrument/experiment/Peacocke: improved tools give us no new concepts. >Concepts. Peacocke Thesis: theoretical terms are always connected to observation terms - e.g. a blind, to whom a device writes information about spatial environment on the back: how should the blind test the device? >Knowledge, >World/Thinking, >Perception, >Certainty, >Confirmation, >Verification. Square: if presented at different angles, it is epistemically impossible that it is not a square. - E.g. Pair of particles: here it is epistemically still possible that it is not the result of a collision because the terms are differently linkable in the theory. - observation terms do not need a complex of epistemic possibilities. I 141 Weak Epistemic Possibility: that the man in front of someone is not the manager - but not that he is not the man who stands before someone. >Referential/attributive. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Reality | Quine | I 81 Stimulus meaning: is objective reality, needed by the linguist - Translation, not identity but approach to stimulus meaning. >Stimulus Meaning/Quine. XII 89 Reality/World/Russell/Quine: Russell's program was to present the outside world as a logical construct of sense data. Carnap's "construction" came closest to this. Epistemology/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements and statements about the future are uncertain if they are understood to be about sense data or sensory impressions) is still unsolved today. Carnap/Quine: his constructions would have made it possible to translate all sentences about the world into sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. >Sense Data/Quine. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observation terms does not mean that it can be proven with logical and set-theoretical means from observation sentences. >Observation Sentences/Quine ((s) Means of expression are not evidence. (> inside/outside, description levels, circularity). Epistemology/Quine: N.B.: to want to endow the truths about nature with the full authority of immediate experience is just as doomed to failure as the return of the truths of mathematics to the potential insight of elementary logic. See also >Theory of >Cognition, >Empiricism. VI 17 Theory/Reality/World/Quine: in philosophical theory we set demarcation lines where no really sharp boundaries can be drawn in practice. It still depends on whether a theory such as "All ravens are black" would actually be refuted by a white raven, that depends on how we would decide in view of the vague stimulus meaning of the word. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Science | Dawkins | I 154 Language/science/Dawkins: we always need to assure ourselves that we can re-translate our casual language. For example, "intentions" of genes. (By the way, its only intention is to multiply.) >Observation, >Observation language, >Theoretical terms, >Observation terms, >Theoretical language. I 170 Language/science/Dawkins: when we say "it's 90 % sure" (that this other animal is my half-sibling) to which "it" do we refer then? Do we mean that the zoologist is sure or that the animal is sure? Dawkins: with a little luck, both possibilities can lead to the same. I 364 Language/science/Dawkins: there is no reason not to label the bacteria according to Axelrod with predicates such as "forgiving", "not envious", etc. >Cooperation, >Altruism, >R. Axelrod. |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Syntax | Fraassen | I 54 Syntax/Theory/Fraassen: the syntactic approach distinguishes between observation terms and theoretical terms (TT). >Observation language, >Observation sentences, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theories. Later, between "old" and "new" vocabulary. >Vocabulary; cf. >Conservativity. FraassenVs: The empirical importance (of observational consequences) can not be isolated. - If they would be isolated, the extended theory would say the same thing about what is observable and how the observed behaves and nothing else. >Observability, >Unobservables. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Terminology | Hempel | I 103 Observational Sentence/Konstatierung/Schlick: an observational sentence is understood and verified in the same act - other than statements, it is only valid at that moment. --- II 120 Theoretical Construction/Hempel: e.g. "electric field", "absolute temperature". It is wrong to introduce observation conditions here. That would mean to describ ecomplex mathematical phenomena with observation terms and to make them thus decidable. II 143 Theoretical Construction/Hempel: theoretical constructions are used by formulating higher order laws, e.g. electric field, gravitational potential. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 |
| Theoretical Terms | Lewis | I (b) 27 Theoretical Terms/TT/Lewis: (T terms) are names, not predicates or functions. >Name/Lewis, >Predicate/Lewis, >Function. I (b) 31 They can always be eliminabted by being replaced by their definientia. >Elimination, >Observation language/Lewis. I (b) 34 Here: the T terms are names of mental states, the A terms are names for stimuli and responses and also for causal relationships. Theoretical terms: (T terms) are names, not predicates or functions. But that is not so important. It can easily be reshaped. ad I (b) 33 ff (Add: (s): We gain our theoretical terms from the use of observation terms (A terms) The theoretical terms get a their meaning from a good measure of folk psychology (stereotypes). >Stereotype, >Everyday language. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Theoretical Terms | Peacocke | I 91f Observational terms/Theoretical Terms/TT/Peacocke: Square: has to be experienced as such - an X-ray tube not. >Observation terms, >Observation language. For scientists, the X-ray tube can be constructed entirely different, for lay persons not - different term. Sensitivity for the property: necessary but not sufficient condition. E.g. "tomato-like": appearance or taste, no theory is required. Square: a minimal theory of perspective is required. There is nothing "square-like" what would correspond to "tomato-like". >Properties, >Predicates, >Perception, >Seeing, >Knowledge, >Categorization, >Perspective, >Terms. Without square term no sensation of square, (not only no representation). A perspectively distorted square is perceived as a square, but not perceived as distorted. Higher order; >description levels. Not so with "tomato-like": something that is tomato-like cannot be known as a tomato. >Forgeries. "Tomato-like" is not a criterion, otherwise tomato is an observation term. - Representation: tomato, not "tomato-like" >Representation, >Criteria, >Knowledge. I 94ff Theoretical Terms/Peacocke: every perception has representational content - e.g. "The particle collision produced the track". >Representational content, >Conceptual content, >Content, >Perception, >Causality, cf. >Measurement. Problem: then the causality is in the representational content, then we have a priori knowledge. Solution: observational terms and perception must be characterized simultaneously - applying only for observed content (not for theoretical terms). - The experience must also be made if the object is not covered by these theoretical terms. I 100 Particle pair/observation terms/theoretical terms/Peacocke: here, not the same conditions apply for changing angle, etc. - one can imagine here that the track of the particle pair in the cloud chamber does not result from a particle collision. - Unlike e.g. square - but that does not mean that squareness would be a secondary quality in the sense of power to evoke a feeling. I 101 Theoretical Term: when a perceived object falls below a theoretical concept, then there must be a level of representational content on which the experience could be made, even if the object does not fall under this theoretical term - just thereby "track caused by a particle collision" turns into a theoretical term. >Description levels, >Levels/order, >Symmetry/Peacocke. I 154 'As'/seeing-as/perception/thinking/Peacocke: E.g. 'This acid burns the table': only liquid is seen, not 'as acid'. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Vocabulary | Fraassen | I 54 Syntax/theory/Fraassen: the syntactic approach distinguishes between observation terms and theoretical terms. - Later, between "old" and "new" vocabulary. Cf. >Conservativity. FraassenVs: The empirical importance (of observational consequences) can not be isolated. If they would be isolated, the extended theory would say the same thing about what is observable and how the observed behaves and nothing else.>Everyday language, >Observation language, >Formal language, >Ideal language, >Science, >Observability, >Observation, >Theoretical terms. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Berkeley, G. | Quine Vs Berkeley, G. | Quine II 213 QuineVsBerkeley: there is more substantial similarity between the knowledges of two people than between person and thing (language, observation terms have inclination to consensus). V 15 Sensation/Quine: primarily structured entities (figures) not light flashes, etc. Space/Depth Dimension/QuineVsBerkeley: not reconstructed from inference, because the two-dimensional data for them are not conscious. Perception/Quine: this is about shape, not about stimulus (they are covered by reception). Berkeley/Traditional Epistemology: Problem: how do we know that objects exist at all and that science is true? V 16 Quine: the introduction of the physical senses would have appeared to them as circle. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Carnap, R. | Quine Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VII 151 Intensionalist Thesis of Pragmatics/CarnapVsQuine: determining the intention is an empirical hypothesis that can be checked by observing the linguistic habits. Extensionalist Thesis/QuineVsCarnap: determining the intention is ultimately a matter of taste, the linguist is free, because it can not be verified. But then the question of truth and falsehood does not arise. Quine: the completed lexicon is ex pede Herculem i.e. we risk an error if we start at the bottom. But we can gain an advantage from it! However, if in the case of the lexicon we delay a definition of synonymy no problem arises as nothing for lexicographers that would be true or false. Carnap VII 154 Intention/Carnap: essential task: to find out which variations of a given specimen in different ways (for example, size, shape, color) are allowed in the area of the predicate. Intention: can be defined as the range of the predicate. QuineVsCarnap: might answer that the man on the street would be unwilling to say anything about non-existent objects. Carnap VII 155 CarnapVsQuine: the tests concerning the intentions are independent of existential questions. The man on the street is very well able to understand questions related to assumed counterfactual situations. Lanz I 271 QuineVsCarnap: criticism of the distinction analytic/synthetic. This distinction was important for logical empiricism, because it allows an understanding of philosophy that assigns philosophy an independent task which is clearly distinct from that of empirical sciences! Quine undermines this assumption: the lot of concepts is not independent of their use in empirical theories! I 272 There are no conceptual truths that would be immune to the transformation of such theories. Philosophy and sciences are on one and the same continuum. --- Newen I 123 Quine/Newen: is like Carnap in the spirit of empiricism, but has modified it radically. I 124 Thought/Frege: irreducible. Thought/QuineVsFrege: seeks a reductive explanation of sentence content (like Carnap). Base/QuineVsCarnap: not individual sense data, but objectively describable stimuli. Sentence Meaning/Quine/Newen: is determined by two quantities: 1) the amount of stimuli leading to approval 2) the amount of the stimuli leading to rejection. This only applies for occasion sentences. I125 Def Cognitively Equivalent/Quine/Newen: = same meaning: two sentences if they trigger the same behavior of consent or reflection. For the entire language: if it applies to all speakers. QuineVsCarnap: sentences take precedence over words. Quine I 73 QuineVsCarnap: difference to Carnap's empirical semantics: Carnap proposes to explore meaning by asking the subject whether they would apply it under different, previously described circumstances. Advantage: opposites of terms such as "Goblin" and "Unicorn" are preserved, even if the world falls short of examples that could be so sharply distinct from each other in such a way. I 74 Quine: the stimulus meaning has the same advantage, because there are stimulus patterns that would cause consent to the question "unicorn?", but not for "Goblin?" QuineVsCarnap: Carnap's approach presumes decisions about which descriptions of imaginary states are permissible. So, e.g. "Unicorn", would be undesired in descriptions to explore the meaning of "Unicorn". Difference: Quine restricts the use of unfulfilled conditionals to the researchers, Carnap makes his researcher himself submit such judgments to the informant for evaluation. Stimulus meaning can be determined already in the first stages of radical translation, where Carnap's questionnaire is not even available yet. Quine: theory has primarily to do with records, Carnap: to do with terms. I 466 For a long time, Carnap advocated the view that the real problems of philosophy are linguistic ones. Pragmatic questions about our language behavior, not about objects. Why should this not apply to theoretical questions in general? I 467 This goes hand in hand with the analyticity concept. (§ 14) In the end, the theoretical sentences generally can only be justified pragmatically. QuineVsCarnap: How can Carnap draw a line there and claim that this does not apply for certain areas? However, we note that there is a transition from statements about objects to statements about words, for example, when we skip classes when moving from questions about the existence of unicorns to questions about the existence of points and kilometers. Through the much-used method of "semantic ascent": the transition from statements about kilometers to statements about "kilometers". From content-related to formal speech. It is the transition from speech in certain terms to talk about these concepts. It is precisely the transition of which Carnap said that it undressed philosophical questions of their deceptive appearance and made them step forward in their true form. QuineVsCarnap: this part, however, I do not accept. The semantic ascent of which I speak can be used anywhere. (Carnap: "content-related" can also be called "material".) Ex If it came down to it, the sentence "In Tasmania there are Wombats" could be paraphrased like this: ""Wombat" applies to some creatures in Tasmania." IV 404 Carnap/(Logical Particles): ("The logical structure of the world"): Thesis: it is possible in principle to reduce all concepts to the immediately given. QuineVsCarnap: that is too reductionist: Disposition concepts such as "soluble" cannot be defined like this. (Even later recognized by Carnap himself). IV 416 QuineVsCarnap: Why all these inventive reconstructions? Ultimately sense stimuli are the only thing we have. We have to determine how the image of the world is constructed from them. Why not be content with psychology? V 28 Disposition/Quine: Problem: the dependence on certain ceteris paribus clauses. Potential disturbances must be eliminated. Solution: some authors: (like Chomsky) retreat to probabilities. V 29 Carnap: instead of probability: reduction sentences seen as idealizations to which corrections are made. Carnap conceives these corrections as re-definitions, i.e. they lead to analytic sentences that are true from the meaning. QuineVsCarnap: I make no distinction between analytical and other sentences. V 30 Reflexes/Holt/Quine: those that are conditioned later are not fundamentally different from innate ones. They consist of nerve paths with reduced resistance. Quine: therefore, one can conceive disposition as this path itself! ((s) I.e. pratically physical. Precisely as physical state.) Disposition/GoodmanVsQuine: a disposition expression is a change to an eventually mechanical description and therefore circular. The mechanistic terms will ultimately be implicit disposition terms. QuineVsGoodman/QuineVsCarnap: I, unlike the two, am satisfied with a theoretical vocabulary, of which some fundamental physical predicates were initially learned with the help of dipositioned speech. (Heuristic role). VII (b) 40 But his work is still only a fragment of the whole program. His space-time-point quadruples presume a world with few movements ("laziest world"). Principle of least movement is to be the guide for the construction of a world from experience. QuineVsCarnap: he seemed not to notice that his treatment of physical objects lacked in reduction! The quadruples maximize and minimize certain overall features and with increasing experience the truth values are revised in the same sense. X 127 Logical Truth/Carnap: Thesis: only the language and not the structure of the world makes them true. Truth/Logical Truth/QuineVsCarnap: is not a purely linguistic matter. Logic/QuineVsCarnap: the two breakdowns that we have just seen are similar in form and effect: 1) The logic is true because of the language only insofar as it is trivially true because of everything. 2) The logic is inseparable from the translation only insofar as all evident is inseparable from the translation. Logic/Language/Quine: the semantic ascent seems to speak for linguistic theory. QuineVs: the predicate "true" (T predicate) already exists and helps precisely to separate logic from language by pointing to the world. Logic: While talks a lot about language, it is geared towards the world and not towards language. This is accomplished by the T predicate. X 133 We learn logic by learning language. VsCarnap: but that does not differentiate logic from other areas of everyday knowledge! XI 99 QuineVsProtocol Sentence/QuineVsCarnap/Lauener: describes private, non-public autopsychological experiences. XI 129 Intention/Carnap/Lauener: (Meaning and Necessity): attempts to introduce intentions without thereby entangling himself in metaphysics. QuineVsCarnap: you cannot take advantage of a theory without paying the ontological bill. Therefore, the assumed objects must be values of the variable. Another way would be to say that certain predicates must be true for the theory to be true. But that means that it is the objects that must be the values of variables. To every value applies a predicate or its negation. ((s) >continuous determination). XI 130 Conversely, everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable. Because a predicate is an open sentence. XI 138 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: Ex "x is a thing": at a higher level of universality existence assumptions no longer refer to the world, but only to the choice of a suitable linguistic framework. QuineVsCarnap: this is merely a gradual difference. XI 142 Ontology/Carnap/Lauener: (temporarily represented): Thesis: philosophical questions are always questions about the use of language. Semantic Ascent/QuineVsCarnap: it must not be misused for evasive ontological maneuvers. XI 150 Thing/Object/Carnap/Lauener: to accept things only means choosing a certain language. It does not mean believing in these things. XI 151 CarnapVsQuine: his existence criterion (being the value of a bound variable) has no deeper meaning in as far as it only expresses a linguistic choice. QuineVsCarnap: language and theory cannot be separated like that. Science is the continuation of our daily practice. XII 69 QuineVsCarnap/QuineVsUniversal Words: it is not said what exactly is the feature for the scope. Ontological Relativity/QuineVsCarnap: cannot be enlightened by internal/external questions, universal words or universal predicates. It has nothing to do with universal predicates. The question about an absolute ontology is pointless. The fact that they make sense in terms of a framework is not because the background theory has a wider scope. Absolute Ontology/Quine: what makes it pointless, is not its universality but its circularity. Ex "What is an F?" can only be answered by recourse to another term: "An F is a G." XII 89 Epistemology/Scope/Validity/QuineVsCarnap: Hume's problem (general statements + statements about the future are uncertain if understood as about sense data or sensations) is still unsolved. Carnap/Quine: his structures would have allowed translating all sentences about the world in sense data or observation terms plus logic and set theory. XII 90 QuineVsCarnap: the mere fact that a sentence is expressed with logical, set-theoretical and observational terms does not mean that it could be proved by means of logic and set theory from observation statements. ((s) means of expression are not evidence. (inside/outside, plain, circles).) Epistemology/Quine: Important argument: wanting to equip the truths about nature with the full authority of direct experience is just as much sentenced to failure as the reduction of truths in mathematics to the potential intelligibility of elementary logic. XII 91 Carnap/QuineVsCarnap: If Carnap had successfully carried out its construction, how could he have known if it is the right one? The question would have been empty! Any one would have appeared satisfactory if only it had represented the physical contents properly. This is the rational reconstruction. Def Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: construction of physicalistic statements from observation terms, logical and set-theoretical concepts. QuineVsCarnap: Problem: if that had been successful, there would have been many such constructions and each would have appeared equally satisfactory,if only it had represented the physicalistic statements properly. But each would have been a great achievement. XII 92 QuineVsCarnap: unfortunately, the "structure" provides no reduction qua translation that would make the physicalist concepts redundant. It would not even do that if his sketch was elaborated. Problem: the point where Carnap explains how points in physical space and time are attributed sensory qualities. But that does not provide a key for the translation of scientific sentences into such that are formed of logic, set-theoretical and observation concepts. CarnapVsCarnap: later: ("Testability and Meaning", 1936): reduction propositions instead of definitions. XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1) abandoned the attempt to deduce the truth about nature from sensory experience. With that he has made a substantial concession. 2) He has abandoned rational reconstruction, i.e. attempt to translate these truths in observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose we meant that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence in observation language any differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could also be trapped in an infinitely long axiomatization. Important argument: thus the empiricist abandons the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements about reality could be expressed. Quine: the problem is not too high a complexity for a finite axiomatization, but holism: XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference in the experience") only refers to theories as a whole, not to individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" would have to be one in which the texts, into which the logical mathematical observation terms are to be translated, are entire theories and not just terms or short sentences. Rational Reconstruction/QuineVsCarnap: would be a strange "translation": it would translate the whole (whole theories), but not the parts! Instead of "translation" we should just speak of observation bases of theories. pro Peirce: we can very well call this the meaning of empirical theories. ((s) Assigning whole theories to observations). |
W.V.O. Quine I Quine Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980, Reclam II Quine Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt/M 1985, Suhrkamp III Quine Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt/M 1978 IV Oliver R. Scholz "Quine" aus Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrh., Reinbek 1993 V Quine Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 VI Quine Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn (Schöningh) 1995 VII Quine Form al logical point of view Cambrinde 1953 IX Quine Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Vieweg 1967 X Quine Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 XI Henri Lauener Quine München 1982 XII Quine Ontologische Relativität Sprechen über Gegenstände, Naturalisierte Erkenntnistheorie Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Lanz I Peter Lanz Vom Begriff des Geistes zur Neurophilosophie In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Hume, D. | Quine Vs Hume, D. | Hume I 115 Time/Hume was structure of the mind, now the subject turns out to be a synthesis of the time. Memory/Hume: the re-emergence of an impression in the form of a still vivid imagination. ((s) QuineVsHume). Memory itself does not cause a synthesis of time. It does not overcome the structure. I 178 The achievement of memory does not consist in holding on to individual imaginations, but in retaining their order. Quine V 19 Cause/Regularity/QuineVsHume: Problem: you can just take the two single classes in regularity consisting of a and b. Then one succumbs to the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc. Dispositions: here there is the same problem. V 88 Identity/Identity Predicate/Language Learning/Quine: it seems as though we have recognized the emergence of the identity predicate: it is nothing but a common constituent of various relative observation terms for substances such as V 89 e.g. "the same dog as" or even less: a word for the temporal extension of referencing (pointing). Identity/Locke/Hume: only useful for appearances of the same object at different times. QuineVsLocke/QuineVsHume: that fits very well with our present purpose of the individuation of things. However, identity goes beyond that. V 177 Past/Observation/Quine: but there are also reports of earlier observations, where the term was learned by definition instead of by conditioning. Since you can replace a defined term by its definiendum this amounts to a composite observation term. Example "I have seen a black rabbit": Learning situation: one for black, one for rabbits, as well as attributive composition. Imagination/Memory/Quine: in the language of mental images we can say that these are caused, even if the corresponding object does not exist. But now we must go further and assume even more skills: the child has to distinguish between two types of mental images: a) Fantasies b) Memories. V 178 QuineVsHume: referred unconvincingly to liveliness as a differentiator. Def Memory/Hume: attenuated sensation Def Fantasy/Hume: attenuated memory. Def Mental Image/QuineVsHume: is an event in the nervous system that leads to a state of readiness for a corresponding stimulus. This ostensive nervous process is perceived by the subject, i.e. it must be able to react specifically to it in two different ways: a) Summary of previously learned items e.g. "black" and "rabbit" b) strengthened by acquaintance: i.e. real earlier encounter with a black rabbit. Basis for affirmation. V 179 Observation Sentence/Complete Thought/Reference/Quine: refers to the object and the calendar clock and, where appropriate, to a location. Complex observation term. >Protocol Sentence: timeless sentence (forever-lasting) if location and times complete. Quine VII (d) 65 Objects/Individual Things/Thing/Hume: the notion of physical objects arises from a mistake in identification. In reality, we invent a new item every minute! QuineVsHume: we do not need to share it. Quine XI 112 Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: E.g. to what type of events does the cry of the geese heard on Capitol Hill belong and to which the fact that Rome is saved? |
Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Peirce, Ch.S. | Quine Vs Peirce, Ch.S. | I 54 Method/Quine: The question of what exists is the question of proof. The final arbitration in this matter is the scientific method, as amorphous it may be. However it is defined in detail, the scientific method produces theories, whose connection with any surface stimulation is solely in the scientific method, without independent testing instance, by which they are supported. In this sense, it is the final arbitrator of truth. Peirce was trying to define the truth straight as a scientific method. Namely an ideal theory, which one approaches as a limit if one does not disist to apply the (supposedly canonical) rules of method to the constantly renewing experience. Definition Truth/Pierce: Ideal Theory QuineVsPeirce: there is a lot wrong with this analogy: Appointment of Organon for infinite process, limit, erroneous use of the analogy with numbers, because the concept of the limit is dependent on the term "closer than". And this is defined for numbers, but not for theories. --- I 55 Vs: but we have, after all, no reason to believe that the surface stimulation of people, even if one considers it in the eternity, allows a certain systematization, which is scientifically seen better or easier, than possible alternatives. Although the scientific method is the way to the truth, it does not even enable a definition of truth. Likewise, any so-called pragmatic truth-definition is doomed (QuineVsPragmatism) to fail. --- I 444 Definition ordered pair: provides the possibility to treat two objects as one. One can thus adjust relation classes by perceiving them as classes of ordered pairs. Footnote: we are interested in "relations-in-extension" here. They stand in a relationship to relations-in-intension like classes to properties (difference class/property.). E.g. The father-relation becomes the class of exactly those ordered pairs whose respective members - for example (Abraham, Isaac), are a man and one of his children. Peirce: Definition ordered pair: (terribly cumbersome with mental charts, etc.) QuineVsPeirce: simply a defective noun that is not used to be at home, where we are used to embed completely grown-up general terms. Mathematical --- I 445 Definition: (1) If (x, y) = (z, w), so x = z and y = w. If relations are classes of ordered pairs, then pairs on the same level as other objects as members of classes must be available. The ordered pair plays the role of an object, which performs the task of two. --- X 23 Verification Theory/Peirce/Quine: roughly: "tell me what difference the truth/falsehood of a sentence would make for the possible experience, and you have said everything about its meaning." QuineVsPeirce: also this equates the concept of proposition with the concept of objective information. Basic Rules: is here the whole of possible distinctions and combinations of sensory perceptions. Introspection: some epistemologists would catalog these alternatives by introspection of sense data, others (naturalists) would observe the nerve stimulation (at the nerve endings). Problem: you can not assign senses proof to unique individuals sentences. (Underdetermination of empiricism). --- XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1. abandoned to deduce the truth about the nature of the sensory experience. Thus, it has made a substantial concession. 2. it has abandoned the rational reconstruction, that is, the attempt to translate these truths into observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose, we think that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a page-long sentence of observation language all differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could then be trapped in an infinite long axiomatization. N.B.: thus, the empiricist gives up the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements can be expressed via the reality. Quine: the problem is a not too high complexity for a finite axiomatization, but the holism: --- XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference of opinions") only relates to theories as a whole, not individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" should be one in which the texts, in which logical mathematical observation terms will be translated into, are whole theories and not just terms or short sentences. |
Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Psychology | Quine Vs Psychology | XII 91 Epistemology/Psychology/Quine: if sense irritation (stimuli) are the only thing, why should we not just turn to psychology? TraditionVsPsychology/Quine: that used to look circular. No Circle/QuineVsVs: Solution: we must simply refrain from deducing science from observations. If we want to understand only the connection of observation and science, we need all the information we can get. Also from science which examines precisely this connection. XII 91/2 Rational Reconstruction/Epistemology/Quine: pro: creativity should be appreciated that lies in the possibility to translate science into logic, set-theoretical and observation terms. Important argument: this would show that all other scientific concepts are superfluous. Psychology/Quine: cannot preform such a translation into logical, set-theoretical and observational concepts, because we did not grow up with learning this. That is why we should insist on the rational reconstruction: Rational Reconstruction/Carnap/Quine: pro: it makes the physicalist concepts superfluous at the end. |
Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Sense Data | Verschiedene Vs Sense Data | Tetens IV 156 Observation Language/Tetens: it has been understood that so-called observation languages can never really be sharply separated from theoretical-explanatory languages. Terms, which originally designated theoretical entities, are finally used as observation terms. Tetens IV 71/72 So there is no "pure sense data" and so on. Tetens: the boundaries between observation language and theoretical terms are pragmatic at best. |
Tetens I H. Tetens Geist, Gehirn, Maschine Stuttgart 1994 W VII H. Tetens Tractatus - Ein Kommentar Stuttgart 2009 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Observability | Peacocke, Chr. | I 89 Observability / Peacocke: is a property of certain terms and not others! Because words have to do with thinking, there is no obligation to assume that theoretical terms contribute less to the constitution of reality than observation terms. |
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