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The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cartesianism | Cartesianism: (goes back to René Descartes): the thesis that we must distinguish between extended entities (bodies, matter, res extensa) and unextended entities (spirit, soul). See also Dualism. |
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| Dualism | Pauen | Pauen I 35 Dualism/Pauen: two types of states that can also occur independently - interactionist dualism: mutual influence: Descartes. >Dualism/Descartes, >Eccles/Popper, >Property dualism: certain neural processes have not only their physical characteristics but additionally also mental characteristics that are theoretically independent of the neural - Typical theory: computer analogy. >Computation), >Martians, >Computer model. I 60 Consciousness as an autonomous property. >Consciousness, cf. >Monism. I 38 Dualism/Pauen: 1. explanation for the uniformity of our experiences in light of the diversity of physical realizations >Multiple realization. Integration performance of the free mind. >Mind, >Thinking. 2. Explanation of >Free will. I 39 3. Pro dualism: VsMonism: Problem of qualitative varied experience by uniform activity of nerve cells. I 56 VsDualism: Dualism has no concrete research subject. I 44 Descartes/Pauen: the distinction of substances can be justified by the imaginability of such a distinction. >R. Descartes, >res extensa, >res cogitans. The argument still plays an important role today: - Kripke uses it as the basis for its objection VsIdentifikation of mental and neural processes. >Identity Theory. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| Empiricism | Adorno | XIII 85 Experience/Empiricism/Adorno: In Locke, Berkeley, and Hume one finds a great deal about the experience, but the experience itself will hardly be encountered in this philosophy. >Experience/Locke, >Sensations/Berkeley, >Sensory impressions/Berkeley. >Experience/Hume. XIII 86 Philosophy has the problem that, as soon as it attempts to make its experiences valid, it always has only a concept of experience and not the content of experience. From this, it has made a virtue and derived from it that experience, because it can be expressed only in the concept of experience, is in itself only a concept, only a being. >Concepts/Adorno, >Concepts, >Essence. Content/Adorno: Paradoxically, the content of idealist philosophies such as in Hegel, but also Schelling, is much more effective than in empirical philosophies. >Content, >Content of truth/Adorno, >F.W.J. Schelling, >G.W.F. Hegel. XIII 155 Empiricism/Adorno: in contrast to rationalism, thinking, as it were, adds something. By adding itself from the outside to the given, the two pinciples (res cogitans and res extensa) are again immediate. >res cogitans, >R. Descartes, >Rationalism. Then all thinking without sense is just a mere idea. However, this approach also develops further and further from its own consequence in the sense of a progressive subjectivization. From Bacon's naively realistic empiricism, over Locke, as well as over Berkeley and Hume, a consistent empiricism gradually developed, in which, by a consistent recourse to the senses, nothing else is left to be valid as a legal source of knowledge than the immediate circumstances of my consciousness. From Bacon's naively realistic empiricism, Locke, as well as Berkeley and Hume, gradually developed into empiricism, in which, by consistently appealing to the senses, nothing else is left to be regarded as a source of knowledge than the immediate realities of my consciousness. >F. Bacon, >J. Locke, >G. Berkeley, >D. Hume. XIII 156 RationalismVsEmpiricism/EmpiricismVsRationalism/Adorno: the opposition between empiricism and rationalism is not so radically remote as is often imagined. Both are based on the scientific model of evidence. They are both residual theories of the truth, and thus always interrelate. >Truth/Locke. The moment of mastery of nature and finally self-control is the basis of both schools. >Nature/Locke, >Nature/Hume. XIII 157 Experience/Empiricism/Adorno: empiricism also treats experience always only as a principle, according to its most general categories, not at all according to its content. >Experience. XIII 158 Only the creator of empiricism, idealism, and in the most comprehensive measure Hegel have attempted to get the full mental experience under control. >Idealism, >Experience/Kant, >Experience/Hegel. KantVsEmpiricism/Adorno: There is absolutely no experience without thinking, otherwise it would stop by the mere discontinuity of the individual moments. The unity principle ((s) of subjectivity, reason, and mind) would then be completely omitted. >Empiricism/Kant, >Thinking/Kant. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Order | Leibniz | Holz I 76 Order/structure/world/Leibniz: the assumption of an invariable lawfulness of the material world presents us with the task of a priori establishing the being of nature as a whole before a single natural being. The whole must be certain before the formulation of its partial course rules, so that the intelligibility of the individual is guaranteed. Thus the axiom "Only one being is necessary" gains its importance. >Necessity/Leibniz, >Reality/Leibniz, >World/Leibniz, >Axiom/Leibniz, >Unity/Leibniz, >Identity/Leibniz. I 77 For it follows from it: "The necessary being contains in itself all the conditions of things." A finite being cannot be understood from within itself. But the whole is absolutely necessary because there is nothing else besides it. I 95 World/Order/Leibniz/HolzVsLeibniz: precisely the specificity of the context of the world remains unclear in Leibniz, since the "unmoved mover" must be thought of as located outside. Leibniz/Holz: they develop a unity of metaphysics and physics. I 96 Order/World/God/Leibniz: God does nothing except order. It is not even possible to devise events that are not according to the rule! The mechanism is sufficient to explain the emergence of all animals. Organic preformation in the seed. Mechanism, however, must be presupposed, and this can only be determined a priori by means of metaphysical reasoning. >Metaphysics/Leibniz, >Reason/Leibniz. I 97 The world is from the beginning a system of interactions. The principle of the particularity of each individual is at the same time the principle of the universality of the connection of all beings. Universal Harmony/Leibniz: universal harmony is the structural title for the system of substances. Not later, but from the nature and concept of the monads. Pre-stabilized harmony/Leibniz: pre-stabilized harmony is in contrast to a widespread misunderstanding the special case of consistency between physical and mental aspects of substantial being. I 98 Thus between "body" and "soul", between material processes in the res extensa and representations in the res cogitans. Holz: one could also speak of pre-stabilized harmony between extensional and intensional aspects of the logical mapping of ontological relationships. For the world concept, the more general version of the universal harmony is decisive. >Intension, >Extension. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Properties | Danto | I 219f Newton: the "world" is featureless >World, >World/Thinking. I 220 Subject/Descartes: material things are simply extended, empty geometry. >Objects, >Matter, >Geometry. Newton: They act in colors and sounds and others, but they are not characterized or imbued with this! Therefore, there are only two substances, the thinking and the extensive. >res extensa, >res cogitans. I 220 Features/Descartes: A thing can not have properties which it wins or loses when these properties are meant to be its own properties. (E.g. beeswax). Instead, we should talk about the changing of properties. >Change, >Process, >R. Descartes. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Rationalism | Adorno | XIII 53 Rationalism/Adorno: in the comparison with empiricism, it is essential that rationalism distinguishes the objectivity of reason from the inquiry into the possibility of knowledge. Cf. >Empiricism/Adorno, >Empiricism, >Objectivity. XIII 148 Rationalism/Adorno: in him there is a different problem of mediation than in idealism. >Mediation. In rationalism as well as in empiricism, the moments of thought and experience are essentially antithetically opposed. >Thinking, >Experience. In other words, mediation, in contrast to idealism, means mediation between two opposites, between the world of the spatial and the world of the mental, simply between the body and the soul. >World/thinking. The principles on the one hand of facts and on the other side of thought are simply thought to be independent of each other. Therefore, rationalism assumes two substances,... XIII 150 ...the res cogitans, the thinking, and the res extensa, the extended. >res cogitans, >Dualism. Substances/rationalism/Descartes: he has attempted to explain the combination of these two substances with the assumption of an influxus physicus in the pineal gland. >R. Descartes. Substances/rationalism/Spinoza: the latter has assumed, instead of the different substances res extensa and res cogitans, only one, which is called God or nature. It is said to have innumerable attributes, that is to say phenomena, of which only two, namely, thinking and extension, are to be known to us. Their unity in the concept of nature is supposed to guarantee their unity. Spinoza deduces this from the thesis that the order of ideas and the order of things are identical. >B. Spinoza. XIII 151 Dualism/Substance/Mind/Body/Soul/Leibniz/Adorno: Leibniz tries to dissolve the dualism between res extensa and res cogitans by the infinitesimal calculus by setting a continuum that finally the dead matter proves to be a mere limit value of the body substance. At the same time, the thinking substance is already presented as a force center and already also as something individuated, as is the case with the concept of the monad. >G.W. Leibniz. XIII 153 Rationalism/Adorno: because it is based on reason and not on reason contents, it is essentially a method and not a theory of knowledge. On the other hand, it is always also metaphysics. His model of truth is always mathematics, which is certainly conceived as the organon of beings. >Reason, >Content. The rationalist thinkers are all characterized by the fact that in them moments of enlightenment connect with a certain traditionalist attitude towards theology. >Pascal, >Enlightenment, >Theology. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Res cogitans | Holz | I 25 res cogitans/Holz: The reflexive existence of man, who ideally reproduces the real world, which makes the determination of the relation to reality necessary. >R. Descartes, >res extensa. |
Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Totality | Leibniz | Holz I 73 Totality/whole/outer/outside/Leibniz: because it is one and all (hen kei pan) as such, this supreme general must be conceived outside the series rerum. The world is not a link, but the series itself. ((s) Therefore not outside). >Interior/exterior/Leibniz, >Reality/Leibniz, >Order/Leibniz, >Terminology/Leibniz. Aristotle: thus the whole series is "being itself" (on hê on). Holz: the absolutely irreducible sentence, the first axiom at all: "The world is all that what is the case". The connection of all bodies, however, is not itself a body, that is, not extensional (res extensa, Descartes) but intensional, the structure. >Intension/Leibniz, >Extension. This is the "complete concept". >Hegel: "absolute concept". Complete concept/Leibniz: the complete concept contains all possible conditions and determinations for the existence of a particular being, it is thus identical with the concept of the world as a whole. >Concept/Leibniz. It is only perceptible to an infinite mind. >Perception/Leibniz, >Knowledge/Leibniz. I 74 Identity/Leibniz/Holz: the identity of the finite with itself is formally not to be distinguished from the identity of the infinite whole with itself. Outer/outside/whole/Leibniz: If there was an infinite mind, it would have to be outside the whole to be able to grasp it at the same time. But with this the whole would not be the whole anymore. It is a priori true that the whole cannot be mapped isotropically. Hence, the boundary concept of the infinite mind remains a heuristic fiction, a heuristic analogy to the finite mind. I 113 Single/whole/identity/Leibniz/Holz: the identity of the individual with the whole and vice versa is based on the distinction between the two. (> Hegel: Reason: the >unity of identity and difference). Leibniz: the immanence of substance in the world and the inherence of the world in the individual substance. Logical form/Holz: the "overarching general":´ I 114 The whole has two types: A) the whole itself and B) the individual, which on the one hand is a kind of whole ((s) by demarcation), and yet its opposite, namely, a part. >Order/Leibniz. The ontological correspondence of this logical structure: Twofold way of being in: (A) "in the world" (B) Substance itself as something comprehensive, in which the totality of all other substances, that is, the world, is "contained" as a condition of its own. >Substance/Leibniz. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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| Descartes, R. | Locke Vs Descartes, R. | I 27 Innate ideas/LockeVsScholastics/LockeVsDescartes: there are no innate ideas! Neither in speculative nor in practical (moral, theological) thinking, not even in the form of "maxims", i.e. immediately plausible principles. 1. Speculative principles: if they were innate, they would have to be demonstrable in people not yet spoiled by prejudices, as, for example, in children or mentally weak people, and they are not! 2. If truths were innate in the form of sentences, then these would also have to be the associated terms, even the conclusions from these sentences! Such assumptions, however, extend the range of innate concepts and sentences into the impossible. 3. Maxims: the spontaneous consent to them means that they were not known before! But innate must always be present. ChomskyVsLocke/(s): would object that grammar rules also come into consciousness first. This is about the ease of learning). Innate ideas/Curls: the assumption that thinking begins with the application of innate laws of thought or first principles that are more than mere instrumental thinking is a deception. I 45 Body/Stretch/res extensa/LockeVsDescartes: stretch and body are therefore not identical! It is also not at all clear that the mind must let them be distinguished from the body. (Risked the dangerous accusation of materialism). The idea of expansion and the idea of the body are different. Expansion: does not include strength or resistance to movement (>inertia). Space: cannot be divided, otherwise surfaces would come up! VsCartesians: they have to admit that they either think of bodies as infinite in view of the infinity of space, or they have to admit that space cannot be identified with bodies. I 52 Res cogitans/LockeVsDescartes: Descartes: to strictly separate the world of bodies from the world of thought. Locke: mentions to consider whether there could not be extended things, thus bodies that think, something flowing matter particles. In any case, it cannot be ruled out that God in his omnipotence "matter systems" may have I 53 given or "overturned" the power of perception and thought. Contemporary theologies felt provoked by this, especially his Kontrahend Stillingfleet. LockeVsDescartes: also leads to problems with human identity (see below). I 54 Identity/LockeVsDescartes: Problem: the relationship between substance and person when the ability to think is attributed solely to an immaterial substance. For example, it would be conceivable that someone could be convinced that he was the same person as Nestor. If one now presupposes the correctness of the Cartesian thesis, I 55 it is conceivable that a contemporary human being is actually the person Nestor. But he is not the human being Nestor, precisely because the idea of the human cannot be detached from his physical form. That is abstruse for us today. (> Person/Geach). Locke relativizes the thesis by saying that it is not the nature of the substance that matters to consciousness, which is why he wants to leave this question open - he conveys the impression that he is inclined towards the materialistic point of view. II 189 Clarity/LockeVsDesacrtes: no truth criterion, but further meaning: also in the area of merely probable knowledge. II 190 Clarity/LockeVsLeibniz/LockeVsDescartes: linked to its namability. Assumes the possibility of a unique designation. (>Language/Locke). II 195 Knowledge/Locke: according to Locke, intuitive and demonstrative knowledge form a complete disjunction of possible certain knowledge. VsDescartes: this does not consist in a recognition of given conceptual contents, which takes place in their perception, but constitutes itself only on the empirical basis of simple ideas in the activity of understanding. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding |
| Spinoza, B. | Strawson Vs Spinoza, B. | Rorty I 28 Wittgenstein/Strawson/Rorty: thesis: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes: Vs splitting in res cogitans and res extensa. Aspect/VsSpinoza: "Two aspects". That is okay as long as you do not ask: "Are organisms something physical?" |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
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| Mind | Rorty, R. | I 28 Wittgenstein / Strawson / Rorty thesis: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes: Vs splitting into res cogitans and res extensa. Aspect / VsSpinoza "two aspects". That s okay as long as you do not ask: "Are organisms something physical?" |
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