Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 33 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Consciousness | Brentano | Chisholm I 130 Unity of Consciousness/Brentano(1): if a person imagines something, or at the same time imagines several objects, he also recognizes at the same time the simultaneity of both. For example, if one hears a melody, he hears the one tone as present while he perceives the other as past. ... in which of the experiences is the idea of their simultaneity? In none! >Imagination. On the contrary, it is clear that the inner cognition of the one with the other belongs to the same real unity. I 131 Consciousness/Chisholm/Unity/Brentano/Chisholm: suggests the following principle: if it is certain for x that it is F and also that it is G, then it is also certain that it is F and G. Cf. >Perception/Kant. This seems unquestionable on the basis of Kant's transcendental unity of apperception. ChisholmVs: it seems to be too strict, however. Kant: the subject, does not need to unite the ideas, it only needs to appear that it could. If it is true for x that it is F, and also that it is G, and it is considering the question whether it is both F and G, then it is certain for it. I 132 This also applies to proposed premises. 1. F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Hamburg, 1973, p. 227f --- Chisholm II 269 Consciousness/Brentano/Hedwig: Brentano has never admitted the psychological abyss of consciousness, but always insisted on the uniqueness of thinking. Chisholm II = Klaus Hedwig Brentano und Kopernikus in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Ed.), Amsterdam 1986 |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Consciousness | Deacon | I 438 Consciousness/Brain/Deacon: in the relationship between brain and consciousness, three problems are often treated separately: I 439 The educational problem: how can the separate activities of millions of brain cells produce a coherent subjective experience of the self? >Self, cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. 2. Problem of foundation: how is it ensured that our thoughts and words have a connection to the outside world? >World/Thinking, >Foundation. 3. Problem of agency: How do we explain the experience we have in creating and controlling our thoughts and behavior? Cf. >D. Chalmers, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Brain/Deacon, >Brain States, >Thinking. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Consciousness | McDowell | I 113 ff Confidence/Kant: "I think" that must be able to accompany all my ideas. Temporal continuity. But only formally, otherwise Cartesian. >I think/Kant, >cogito, >Cartesianism, >Dualism, cf. >Skepticism. I 113 ff Definition Person/Locke: "a thinking intelligent being in possession of reason and consideration, and able to consider itself as itself. Even in different places and times. >Person. I 126/27 Consciousness/Apperception/Criterion/KantVsLocke: his point (chapter on paralogism): the self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity. The subject does not need to make an effort to focus its attention on one and the same thing. >Experience/McDowell, >Awareness/Chalmers. I 127 Consciousness/McDowell: to avoid Cartesianism we should not speak of the "flow of consciousness" (stream of consciousness), but of a lasting perspective on something that is itself outside of consciousness. I 128 "I think"/Kant/McDowell: is also a third person whose path through the objective world results in a substantial continuity. (Evans, Strawson, paralogisms). >Given, >Reality, >Stream of consciousness/Husserl. I 129f McDowellVsKant: it is unsatisfactory if consciousness is to be only the continuity of one aspect, one perspective without a body. The notion of continuity cannot be conceived without the notion of the living thing - as little as digestion. But that is not to say that physical presence is always connected with a self-consciousness. Consciousness/Kant: only creatures with conceptual skills have self-consciousness. McDowell pro. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Consciousness | Strawson | I 114 Consciousness/Strawson: why do we attribute it to a subject at all? - Why do we always atribute our experiences to the same subject? Descartes: body plays a unique role for everyone. Cf. >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. I 115 Strawson: face experiences depend on three things: 1) whether eyes opened, 2) where directed, 3) position of the body E.g. subject with three bodies: whether eyelids of A and B open irrelevant for whether C can see something. I 119 Possession of my body does not explain my concept of a self. >Body, >Self. I 120f Consciousness/Strawson: Descartes/Wittgenstein: both: attribution to body is a linguistic deception. 1) Descartes: "Person" refers to two very different substances, with types of states which are mutually exclusive. >Descartes, >Person. 2) Wittgenstein: "It thinks". (Strawson: ditto) >Consciousness/Wittgenstein, >Thinking/Wittgenstein. I 127 Consciousness/Self/I/Strawson: attributing states of consciousness and experiences to ourselves is a necessary condition for attributing them also to others. >Intersubjectivity, >Recognition, >Other minds >Community. Basis: notion of a class of predicates which require distinct individuals to whom they can be attributed. >Predicates/Strawson. I 129 Other individuals must be identified +through body, not merely as carriers of consciousness. - But this is not a simple refutation of Descartes, because s already presupposes that I have found a simple relation between my experiences and body M, which I'm still looking for. I 147 Consciousness/Strawson: pointless to speak of a single consciousness. I 171 Consciousness/Strawson: only possible as a secondary, non-basic particular. >Particulars/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Experience | Kant | I 93 Experience/Kant: "the conditions of possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience - and therefore have objective validity in synthetic a priori judgments". >Apperception, >apprehension, >subject/Kant. --- Strawson V 19 Objects/Kant: objects are essentially spatial - experience: is essentially temporal. Strawson V 78 Experience/Kant: cannot be completely deviating due to the tautology that experiences and ideas, to belong to a single consciousness, must satisfy the conditions that belong to a single consciousness. Strawson V 90 Experience/Kant/Strawson: must leave room for the idea of the experience itself. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Experience | Natorp | Gadamer I 73 Experience/Consciousness/Critical Psychology/Natorp/Gadamer: [To the] fundamental meaning which Kant's critique of all substantive soul teachings and the transcendental unity of self-consciousness distinguished from the latter, which possesses the synthetic unity of apperception, (...) [t]o this critique of rationalist psychology, the idea of a psychology according to a critical method could be connected, as Paul Natorp had already done in 1888(1) and on which later Richard Hönigswald founded the concept of the psychology of thought(2). Natorp, through the concept of consciousness, which expresses the immediacy of experience, has designated the object of critical psychology and developed the method of universal subjectivation as the research method of reconstructive psychology. Later, Natorp has supported and further developed his basic approach by a detailed criticism of the concept formation Gadamer I 74 of contemporary psychological research. But already in 1888 the basic idea was established that the concretion of the primordial experience, i.e. the totality of consciousness, represents an undivided unit, which is only differentiated and determined by the objectifying method of recognition. Consciousness/Natorp: "Consciousness, however, means life, i.e. continuous correlation". This is particularly evident in the relationship between consciousness and time: "Given is not consciousness as a process in time, but time as a form of consciousness"(3). >Durée/Bergson. 1. P. Natorp, Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode 1888; Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode 1912 (Neubearbeitung). 2. R. Hönigswald, Die Grundlagen der Denkpsychologie, 1921, 2. Aufl. 1925. 3. Natorp a.a. O. S 32. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| I Think (Ich denke) | I think: the expression by I. Kant for his (narrower) conception of the "Cogito" by Descartes. “The “I think" must be able to accompany all my ideas" (KrV B 131f). This "I think" guarantees that these ideas are my ideas and creates, as a transcendental apperception, a unity in the manifoldness of ideas. See also cogito, subjects. |
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| I Think (Ich denke) | Castaneda | Frank I 171 "I think," / Castaneda: "I think" has no content, only a relation of identity. >Cogito, cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| I Think (Ich denke) | Rorty | IV 66 "I think"/"ich denke"/Kant/Rorty: the "i think" is merely a process - it means to have a belief or a desire automatically means to have many. >I think/Kant. IV 67 No "synthesis", but simply the fact that they belong to the same network. >Cogito, >Synthesis, >Apprehension/Kant, >Apperception/Kant. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| I Think (Ich denke) | Strawson | I 104 I think/Kant/Strawson: Kant was anxious that the analytic unity of apperception itself has no power of identity and. StrawsonVsKant: Kant could have left it out, "something is thought." >cogito, >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| I, Ego, Self | Frith | I 101 I/consciousness/Frith: Problem: we are good at grasping, but we know very little about the distribution of our body parts in space. Knowing what we know about it is sometimes wrong: >false knowledge. Higher level: here, knowledge is stored about the time and type of change. Next level: is the knowledge that I am the acting person. Even here I can be wrong. >Self, >Subject, >Actions, >Authorship, >Intentionality, cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. I 224 I/self/Frith: I experience myself as an island of stability in a constantly changing world. I 246 I/self/Frith: thesis: the "I" is created by my brain. >Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith. |
Frith I Chris Frith Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007 German Edition: Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013 |
| I, Ego, Self | Nozick | II 79 I/use/Nozick: all semantic facts about what the use of "I" refers to, state necessity de dicto, not de re. Cf. >de re, >Semantic facts, >Use, >Mention, >I, Ego, Self, >Reference, >Index words, >Indexicality. II 91 I/synthesis/Nozick: Problem: how do we know that not in any moment a new I is synthesized? Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. II 104 I/unit/self/Nozick: unit is not about the act, which could have produced something else - but as a unified whole the I constitutes itself as capable of having other bodily parts or to lose memories (perhaps all). >I/Kant, >I/Fichte, >Memory, >Subject, >Self. II 105 I/self: is projected into the future, as comprising certain stages - after the scheme of the next successor the self-concept will be a listing and weighting of dimensions - but no metric (more Next are possible). >Nearest Successor/Nozick, >Terminology/Nozick, >Similarity Metrics. Nozick: Thesis: we are choosing partially by ourselves. II 112 I/Nozick: physical descriptions exclude me, because they are not reflexive. >Description. II 113 Self/I/Part/Whole/Nozick: a) self as the next successor of each act of synthesis, or b) rather an underlying, enduring self: then rather a whole, less limitations, more unit. >Castaneda: volatile egos. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| I, Ego, Self | Pauen | Pauen I 239 ff I, Ego, Self/empirical I/Pauen: entity of the self-attribution, not homogeneous. I/Kenny: is a "philosophical nonsense", misunderstanding of the reflexive pronoun. I/Minsky: variety of agents, "only useful for the attribution of actions ". >M. Minsky, >A. Kenny, >I, Ego Self/Kant. I 242 Dennett: apparently direct everyday perception in reality complex interpretation and building of hypotheses. - "I is not independent" opinions and wishes are complexes of memes. >Memes, >I, Ego, Self/Dennett, >D. Dennett, >Beliefs, >Intentions, >Intentionality. I/Susan Blackmore: no origin of wishes, but a function of the bundling. Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception, cf. >I, Ego, Self/Kant. I 246 I/Metzinger/Pauen: (following Johnson-Laird): mental models as the basis of our representation of reality. - Top model of the hierarchy: the "reality model". Subjectivity is attributed to the self-model, embedded in the model of reality. - The model is transparent in terms of content, but not its mechanisms. "Self"/Metzinger: the self is a fiction. >Th. Metzinger, >Self, >Reality, >Models, >Representation. I 248 I/Fichte/Pauen: ... perpetual change - just pictures, no sense. >I/Fichte, >J.G. Fichte. |
Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 |
| I, Ego, Self | Russell | McGinn I 86f Russell: characterizes "I as a number of classes of mental particulars" (as opposed to "needlepoint-I"). The temporal identity then boils down to saying that there are certain relationships between the mental qualities of the ego. The individual states of a person are so connected by something like memory, causal continuity, psychological similarity. >Temporal identity, >Memory, >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| I, Ego, Self | Strawson | I 123 Doctrine of non-possessing/I/self/consciousness/Strawson: (probably not Wittgenstein's position/StrawsonVs) Representative of this doctrine: "OP" (our philosopher). Descartes: thesis: the uniqueness of a body should be sufficient to evoke the idea that the experience is attributed to it. Strason: it was just unfortunatly expressed in terms of possessing. Our PhilosopherVsDescartes: then it would be inadmissible, to assume an "ego" additionally, whose sole function of this is "possessing". Difference: body has experience causally, contingently. I 124 "Ego" has them necessarily, conceptually (wrong). Solution/Our Philosopher: only things whose possession is logically transferable, can ever be possessed - experiences are then no ownership of the subject. StrawsonVsOur Philosopher: is using himself the false possession term. I 125 Actually our experience in this particular sense are our own, and only identifiable by that. StrawsonVsDescartes/VsOur Philosopher: there are not two uses of "I". >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. I 126 From particular experience of the subject arises not the necessity of a self-concept. Cf. >Self-consciousness/Strawson, >self-identification/Strawson, >self-ascription/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Identity | Locke | McDowell I 126/7 Consciousness/apperception/criterion/KantVsLocke: important for him (paralogism-chapter) is precisely that self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity. >Apperception. Euchner I 53f Identity/person/personal identity/Locke: thesis: There is a difference between an arbitrary mass and a structured matter that makes life. We have to distinguish between substance and person, because these are different ideas. >Idea/Locke, >Substance/Locke, >Person/Locke. Def life/Locke: the substance of this trias. Def person/Locke: thinking, intelligent beings with reason, who may consider themselves e - (at different times). >Personal identity. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
| Person | Nagel | III 105 Identity/person/personal identity/temporal/objectivity/subjectivity/Nagel: underlying problem: even if any set of conditions is met, the question arises again whether we are still dealing with the same subject. >Personal identity, >Identity/Henrich, >Subject. Even a metaphysical ego raises the question again - when temporal identity is only to be guaranteed by my metaphysical ego, this cannot not be the individual that guarantees my personal identity. >Temporal identity, >Individual, >Metaphysical I, cf. >Apprehension/Kant, >Apperception/Kant. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 |
| Person | Russell | Geach I 314 Definition thing/Definition person/Russell: (logical atomism): is a set of classes of particulars, and therefore a logical fiction - "Real things only last a very short time" - GeachVs: here he tried to apply two theories of classes at once: 1. the "no-classes-theory" that classes are only fictions - 2. the "composition theory": that classes are composed of their elements. >Identity, >Memory, cf. >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Reason | Idealism | Adorno XIII 130 Reason/idealism/Adorno: the first transformation of the concept of reason in idealism had meant that the contents of consciousness were taken into reason, but reflected in the sense that they should be... XIII 131 ...moments of consciousness themselves. That is, that the contents are mediated in themselves through subjectivity. >Content, >Consciousness, >Identity/Idealism, >Subjectivity, >Subject/Idealism. Reason/mind/Kant/Adorno: reason is then the ability to create unity in the manifoldness - according to laws. >Laws, >Unity and multiplicity, >Unification, >Order, >Unity, >Apprehension, >Apperception. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Recognition | Kant | Strawson V 86 Recognition/Kant: is possible only because of the possibility to relate different experiences to a subject. >Apperception, >apprehension, >Subject/Kant, >Experience/Kant. Strawson: then there are also objects (accusatives) that are not independent of experiences - E.g. titillation. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Reductionism | Damasio | Churchland II 486 KantVsReductionism: The self will never be investigated, it is only to be thought of in the highly abstract conceptualization of "transcendental apperception." >Apperception. DamasioVsKant: we have a much safer foundation in our body with its skin, bones, muscles, joints, internal organs, etc. >Representation, >Body, >Consciousness, >Self-consciousness, >Perception, >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification, >Knowing how, >Experiencing, >World/thinking, >Sensation, >Sensory impressions. |
Damasio I Antonio R. Damasio Descartes ’ Irrtum: Fühlen, Denken und das menschliche Gehirn München 2004 Churla I Paul M. Churchland Matter and Consciousness Cambridge 2013 Churli I Patricia S. Churchland Touching a Nerve: Our Brains, Our Brains New York 2014 Churli II Patricia S. Churchland "Can Neurobiology Teach Us Anything about Consciousness?" in: The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates ed. Block, Flanagan, Güzeldere pp. 127-140 In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 |
| Roles | Peacocke | I 109ff Constitutive role: 1st sortal, 2nd psychic state, 3rd relation between 1 and 2. >Sortals, >Psychological states, >Roles, >Constitutive role. Evidence: Sensitivity for evidence is dependend on terms developed for them. >Concepts, >Language use, >Reference. Of two descriptions the constitutive role is the uninformative one. >Description. Constitutive role: "the person who has these perceptions" explains immunity to misidentification. >Incorrigibility, >Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception. Constitutive role of" now": "the time when this attitude (belief, idea, etc.) occurred". >Localisation. Instead of trivial identity "I am I ": Constitutive role: "I am the person with these states". >Predication. I 122 Constitutive role/I/Peacocke: the constitutive role brings just the difference to the trivial identity: "I am the person with these states" instead of "I am I". >Identity, >Self-identification. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Self | Sartre | Rorty VI 155 Self/UI /Sartre/Rorty: For Sartre the self has no lasting, intrinsic core. - It is changing. - There is no "real self" no "en soi" - (Rorty pro). >I, Ego, >Self, >Subject, cf. >Apprehension/Kant, >Apperception/Kant, >Subject/Foucault. |
Sart I J.-P. Sartre Being and Nothingness 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Self- Consciousness | Castaneda | Frank I 211ff Self-consciousness/Fichte: all consciousness includes self-consciousness. >J.G. Fichte, >Consciousness/Fichte. CastanedaVsFichte: mixing of external reflexivity (in relation to others) and internal reflexivity (the fleeting egos among themselves). >I, Ego, Self/Castaneda. CastanedaVsKant: not apperception, but conversely! >Apperception. No I is a naked isolated individual, but a collective point of connections. False problem: how to be subject and object of self-reflection at the same time: starts from a false assumption of amonolithic self. >Subject-Object-Problem, >Subject, >Object. I 231f Self-consciousness/ Castaneda: is based on the basis of beliefs, that consist of a hierarchy of powers, dispositions and inclinations. Lowest levels: metaphysical, self-evident. - This postulates an infinite number of aspects. >Aspects, >Background. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Consciousness | Hegel | Gadamer I 256 Self-Consciousness/Hegel/Gadamer: [Hegel had already developed] the structural correspondence between life and self-consciousness in the "Phenomenology" (...). Gadamer I 257 The fundamental fact of being alive is assimilation. The distinction is therefore at the same time a non-distinction. The foreign is appropriated. This structure of the liveliness has (...) its counterpart in the essence of self-consciousness. Its being consists in the fact that it knows how to make everything and anything the object of its knowledge and yet knows itself in everything and everyone that knows it. Thus, as knowledge, it is a "differentiation from itself" and, as self-consciousness, it is at the same time an overlapping, in that it unites itself with itself. >Dialectic/Hegel, >Method/Hegel, >Thinking/Hegel, >Reflection/Hegel. Gadamer: Obviously it is more than a mere structural correspondence between life and self-consciousness. Hegel is quite right when he derives self-consciousness dialectically from life. What is alive is in fact never really recognizable to the objective consciousness, the effort of the mind that strives to penetrate the law of phenomena. Life/Hegel: Living things are not of the kind that one could ever come from outside to see them in their liveliness. The only way to grasp liveliness is rather to become aware of it. Hegel alludes to the story of the veiled image of Sais when he describes the inner self-objectivation of life and self-consciousness: "Here the inner sees the inner"(1). Gadamer: It is the way of self-feeling, the inner being of one's own vitality, in which life is experienced alone. Hegel shows how this experience flares up and goes out in the form of desire and satisfaction of desire. This self-consciousness of vitality, in which the liveliness becomes conscious of itself, is admittedly an untrue preform, a lowest form of self-consciousness, provided that the becoming conscious of oneself in desire simultaneously destroys itself through the satisfaction of desire. As untrue as it is to the objective truth, the consciousness of something foreign, it is nevertheless, as the vital feeling, the first truth of self-consciousness. >Subject/Hegel, Cf. >Apperception, >Apprehension. 1. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Hoffmeister, S. 128 Grenz I 38 Self-Consciousness/Hegel/Gadamer/Grenz: Gadamer draws attention to Hegel's emphasis on the universality of self-consciousness (Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p.19, Hegel Phänomenologie, p. 148). Comparability/Gadamer: comparability of the consciousness is ensured by the universality of the produced things. >Generality, >Consciousness. Höffe I 329 Self-Consciousness/Phenomenology/Hegel/Höffe: In competition with his or her peers, the human does not first depend on self-assertion, but already on the constitution of a self. Hegel extends the debate, which is often conducted in a purely social, legal or state theoretical manner, by three further topics: a) confrontation of humans with themselves, b) confrontation with nature and c) the three dimensions belonging to the concept of work. At first, people are not finished subjects, but must first acquire the necessary self-consciousness in a dynamic process. In the complex course (...) of a veritable "fight for recognition", three dimensions interlock: - the personal confrontation of the individual with him- or herself, - the social with his or her peers and - the economic with nature. Self-Consciousness/Fight for Recognition: Self-confidence appears at first as a simple striving for self-preservation, but encounters the competing striving of another (...) and leads, since one self-preservation contradicts the other, to a "fight for life and death". >Master/Slave/Hegel, >Recognition/Hegel. 1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1807 |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 A X Friedemann Grenz Adornos Philosophie in Grundbegriffen. Auflösung einiger Deutungsprobleme Frankfurt/M. 1984 Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
| Subjects | Idealism | Adorno XIII 83 Subject/idealism/Adorno: that, what is not a subject itself has, in principle, a character of incompleteness. Only the subject, which as a thinker of itself believes to be quite certain of an identical, can at all converge. >Whole, >Thinking, >Order, >World/Thinking. Adorno XIII 141 Subject/idealism/dialectics/Adorno: precisely in the radicalized analysis of the concept of the subject itself one encounters its correlative, what it demands according to its own meaning, a non-I which is different from pure unity. This, however, is not a something added from the outside, but the concept of the subject in itself has only one... XIII 142 ...meaning, insofar as it refers to a different meaning from his principle. This is an inner mediation. The two moments are not mutually related to each other, but the analysis of each one in itself points to its opposite as an imitation of a sense. >Mediation. Transcendental subject: therefore, the transcendental subject implies the Kantian "I think that must be able to accompany all my ideas", thus it implies the most formal determination of egoism, a real. >I think, >I think/Kant, >cogito, >Apprehension, >Apperception. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Subjects | Nietzsche | Ries II 75 Subject/Predicate/Beyond Good and Evil/Nietzsche: create the agitation of "offender" and "doing".(1) Ries II 97 Subject/NietzscheVsKant: Fear that the subject will prove to be something primarily multifaceted. Ries II 98 Subject/Nietzsche: Expression of our belief in unity. Fiction. (NietzscheVsKant). >Apprehension/Kant, >Apperception/Kant. Ries II 108 Subject/Nietzsche: "I'm early." 1. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, VI. 2. --- Danto III 133 Subject/Nietzsche/Danto: Nietzsche's idea of an object is under suspicion, and thus also the idea of a thinking object or subject. Danto III 134 Self/Nietzsche/Danto: The psychological and the grammatical subject are two sides of the same coin. Finally, we believe in our own invention and establish a "self" that is different from "one's" activities and has a causal relationship to them. Because the Ural-Altaic language family possesses a weakly developed subject form, everyone who grew up with such a language will most likely look differently into the world and can be found on other paths than Indo-Germanic or Muslim men.(1) >World/Nietzsche, >World/Thinking/Nietzsche. Danto III 134 I/Nietzsche/Danto: (The Reason) believes in the "I", in the I as being, in the I as substance and projects the belief in the I-substance on all things - it creates the term 'thing'... Being is thought of everywhere as cause, pushed underneath; from the concept 'I' only follows, as derived, the term 'being'... (2) >Psychology/Nietzsche, >Self/Nietzsche. 1. F. Nietzsche Jenseits von Gut und Böse, KGW VI.,2 S. 29. 2. F. Nietzsche, Götzen-Dämmerung, KGW VI,3 S. 71. |
Nie I Friedrich Nietzsche Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe Berlin 2009 Nie V F. Nietzsche Beyond Good and Evil 2014 Ries II Wiebrecht Ries Nietzsche zur Einführung Hamburg 1990 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Synthesis | Kant | Danto I 133 Synthetic a priori/Kant: before any exploration of the world recognizable - on this he builds the mere possibility of doing philosophy at all. - Because it is non-empirical- Analytically/Kant: E.g. "Every cause has an effect." - Not analytically: "All events have causes." - It does not belong to the meaning of "event" that it has a cause. - But still synthetically a priori: - E.g. "Every event has a cause". - (Variation of Leibniz's law). - It defines what it means for the universe to be intellectually understandable. >Apperception, >apprehension, >Subject/Kant, >Experience/Kant. --- Danto I 211 Experience/representation/continuity/internalism/Danto: continuity is not given in experience. - Otherwise, there would not be the question of whether existence is continuous. Solution/Kant: mental synthesis. --- Strawson V 26 Synthesis/Kant: the process of production of the unity of experience - there cannot be empirical knowledge of the synthesis - is only obtained through it. V 81 Synthesis/Kant: aware, but not how I appear to myself, but only that I am. - Thinking, not watching. - Kant/Strawson: Kant Synthesis is based on differentiation of the capabilities of sensibility and understanding. - StrawsonVs: We try without them. --- Bubner I 100 Judgment/Synthesis/Kant: the unity of the synthetically summarized gives the questionable relationship of concepts the necessary determinateness. This determinateness also bears the reference to the object, which is always included in the judgment as a knowledge claim. "Synthesis alone is what actually collects the elements into knowledge and unites them to a certain content." This is achieved by the fact that Kant equals (definition) terms with conceptual contents. >Judgment/Kant. --- I 103 Synthesis/Kant: it is originally unified and equally valid for all connections. The reference to the action also seems to answer the question of unity. ((s) because it comes from activity, not from the objects). It contains three moments: 1. the given manifold 2. the connecting 3. the unit There is no independent "unit pole", which, so to speak, appears as one of the many elements next to the connecting elements. The unity is not opposed to the many as an isolated principle. Therefore idealism speaks of the identity of identity and non-identity. --- I 104 Unity/Synthesis/Idealism/Kant: the place of unity can now be designated, it is the pure action-character of the synthesis. This action-character goes beyond all individual connections, preceds all actual combinations, and is never to be exhausted by so many synthetic acts. >Unity/Kant. --- I 108 Synthesis/Vs Kant: his successors have revealed the weakness that there is no evidence for the highest point of this thought chain. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Terminology | Husserl | Chisholm II 153 Noema/Husserl: the act itself constitutes the object. We separate files and transcendental objects. II 154 ChisholmVsHusserl: the noema explains nothing. --- Husserl I 19/57 Husserl: research strategy: scheme part-whole. General thesis: the existence of the world is not questioned, only our statements about it. The scheme true/false cannot be recognized by mere observation. I 37 Real/Husserl: the real is not intentional, but also: the color quality experiences an "objectifying view" and the "perception complexion" is also real. Meaning/Husserl: meaning is constituted by what is meant by a sign, the speaker gives the sound a sense. We refer to an object by meaning. Meaning/Husserl: meaning is the power of consciousness. Phenomenological pre-understanding: all objects exist only as intentional units. I 39 Noema(thought)/Husserl: noema has a a) a relational sense: as intension and b) a subject core as a carrier. Noesis: is performance or the nature of the conception sense (Greek: noesis = perception). I 53 "Principle of all principles"/Husserl: "the principle of all principles" is the requirement that only one "originally given view" may be the reason of knowledge, e.g. mathematical axioms. Husserl excludes here any reference to empirical statements and creates the relation of consciousness to itself as a suitable method, a "way of givennes to oneself". I 58 Bracketing (era): prior knowledge is enclosed in parentheses. I 42 f Def Noesis: is a performance or the nature of the conception sense (Greek: the perception, comprehension). I 43 Def Noema: Greek: noema means the idea. There are two aspects of the intentional object: a) noematic meaning (content): it is the "how" of the determinations. And b) it is a coherent sense unit in the abundance of various provisions. I 44 b) Noematic object (objectively) "core": is the linking point and support of various predicates. That, with what an identical "something" is being held. I 65 ff A horizon of possibilities is given by any act of consciousness. I 67 Interior Horizon/Husserl: the interior horizon is the anticipation of the dimension of meaning. Outside horizon: means that perception is not limited to one object, but to the entire space of possible objects. I 68 Appresentation: is co-meaning. I 69 Apperception: rethinks contents of sensation into attributes of objectivity. Truth/Husserl: truth is tied to the process of closer definition. Eidetic variation/Husserl: the eidetic variation is activated by contingencies. Constitution/Husserl: constitution is a performance of consciousness when an object is given to us to look at. I 45 Thought/Husserl: if one understands thinking as a process, you can see that predicates can convert. I 72 Def Kinesthesia/Husserl: kinesthesia is the conscious moving during perception i.e. >body awareness. The body is turned into the organ of perception. The sensations can no longer be regarded as single, completed, last units, depending on the way of thinking. They are in a sequence. I 85 Transcendental Ego/Husserl: the transcendental ego has a primordial sphere: initially there are only own things in the private sphere. We assume others to be a transcendental ego as we are. (> Empathy). Intersubjectivity/Husserl: intersubjective are a) objects, b) social. Objectivity/Husserl: objectivity arises through a variety of perspectives. Environment/Husserl: environment is a) set by the intentional consciousness and b) set by a communicating association of people. The communicative environment is previous to any selfish. I 89 Def primordiality/Husserl: this includes all experiences of experience, including the introductory experiences of consciousness that are fundamental to the foreign experience. The consequence of this would be that experiences of consciousness can be experienced by the other in their original condition. Such a conception would encompass different modes of consciousness as original: both objective and personal. --- Tugendhat I 167 "Syncategorematic"/Husserl: sycategorematic expressions are not representing an object. Tugendhat I 177 Husserl: main term "species": "species" comes from the Greek "eidos", which means "sight" or "appearance" (common feature in Kant, term). |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Terminology | Kant | I 33 Supersensible/Supernatural/Kant: E.g. the moral law. I 38 The Unconditional/Kant: even unconditional condition ("Condition totality"). The system of all possibilities. Justification of a sentence by subsumption of something slightly below rules. I 39 1. The unconditioned of the categorical condition unit of presentation relation belongs to the representational subject. 2. The unconditioned of the hypothetical condition unit of presentation relation relates to the objects of perception. 3. The unconditioned of the disjunctive synthesis applies to objects of thought. I 41 Soul/Kant: the soul idea belongs to the idea of death. With it, the ego distances itself from its body - wrong: one cannot conclude from the I to the soul. - The logically underlying (subject) is made into a being-like (ontologically) underlying (substance). I 42 Pure apperception/Kant: actually comes only to God. - Direct, intellectual intuition. - Intelligible objects (for example, "I") - through mere apperception - human: in actions and internal determinations, which the human does not perceive through the senses. I 98 Apperception/KantVsHume: unity of apperception: I am making all ideas aware as my ideas. - So I stay in the unity of consciousness which can accompany all my ideas. - In addition, I have to keep in mind, how I add an idea to the other! Otherwise I will scatter myself. I 129/130 The Sublime/Kant: the sublime is moral beauty - it resembles moral obligation, that it initially inhibits the life forces and accumulates, in order to let them pour even stronger in a kind of emotion and to lead to moral action. - But I should exceed the nature morally, so it is about my superiority to nature. - Sublime/Burke: "in the sublime we encounter the harbingers of this king of the horrors of death". --- Adorno XII 177 Pure/Kant/Adorno: 1. all that is pure in the subject, is that which is thought of without admixture of empirical, without admixture of a sensual. 2. The pure will is that which is pure in the sense of the principle of reason, without getting dependent on any being which is itself not rationally understandingly. --- Adorno XIII 66 Constitution/Idealism/Kant/Adorno: the concept of constitution (...) is characterized in Kant by the fact that this mind or consciousness is not conceived as a part of the world, as a piece of existence, like every other existence. They should differ as a constituent from everything else. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Thinking | Danto | I 179 KantVsDescartes: cogito does not penetrate, but accompanies thinking. >I think/Kant. It would completely miss the structure of thinking to say that the various assumptions are purely coincidentally associated in his mind. Cf. >Apperception, >Apprehension, >Thinking, >Subject, >I, Ego, Self. I 307 Pavlov: associations are only external, ideas are not necessarily comboined. >Association, >Ideas, >Representation. Consequently, there are the logical links in addition to what can be causally associated with it. >Logical connectives, >Causal relation. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Thinking | Foucault | I 389ff Thinking/Modernity/Foucault: no possible morality, thinking is already a "step out", no more theory. Thinking is a dangerous act, even before it sounds the alarm. (De Sade, Nietzsche, Artaud, Bataille). >Sade, >Nietzsche, >World/thinking, cf. >Laws of thinking. I 396ff Thinking/Modernity/Foucault: in modern thinking an origin can no longer be determined, work, life and language have assumed their own historicity. Man discovers himself only as connected with an already created historicity. He is never a contemporary of the origin that conceals himself. Thinking/Modernity: It closes the great square, by rediscovering the finiteness in the question of the origin: the connection of the positivities with the finiteness, the doubling of the empirical in the transcendental, the constant relation of the cogito to the unthought, the retreat and the return of the origin. I 404ff Thinking/Modernity: It no longer runs alongside the never-ending formation of the difference, but rather to the unveiling of the same which is always to be accomplished. Thought image: in modern thought, the reasons of the history of things and of man's own historicality is the distance that is kept which undermines the same, the deviation that streams it, and collects at the ends of itself. Deep spatiality. This space always allows thinking to think of time and to recognize it as a sequence. >Cf. >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Time | Peacocke | I 162 Time / Peacocke: ordering of thoughts of basic for the understanding of time - not vice versa - no underlying date system. Cf. >Apprehension, >Apperception, >Thinking, >World/Thinking. E.g. when I remember, that yesterday the interest rates have fallen, then this does not apply because of a property or identity that is about "yesterday". >Time, >Past, >Present, >Future |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fichte, J.G. | Castaneda Vs Fichte, J.G. | Frank I 211 Experience/CastanedaVsFichte: do not need to belong to Is (plural of I) But if they do, so the integration in the I requires unity of the experiences in its possession. Likewise CastanedaVsKant: against the role of apperception, instead: vice versa! Fichte: demands that the unity of consciousness contents transmits itself top down, from the self that experiences itself through experiencing, on the contents, which belong to the non-self. Castaneda: that contradicts the facts of experience and prevents an explanation of animal consciousness. VsFichte: unwarranted mixing of external and internal reflexivity! I 239 Consciousness/Accumulation/Subsumption/Castaneda: assuming the subsumtiven nature of consciousness, lower levels can exist irrespective of the higher levels. CastanedaVsFichte: not every consciousness is self-consciousness. This is the anti-idealistic naturalization of consciousness. The unity of consciousness episode cannot be explained, because this consciousness belongs to a self or I. In fact, the unity of experience in an I requires the unity of any consciousness content! That means if a consciousness episode internally belongs to an I, then the unity of that consciousness is an element in the constitution of this affiliation, i.e. it is an internal requirement of the existence of that I. Castaneda: nevertheless Fichte’s view is still widely spread, even among anti-Cartesian philosophers of our time. Consciousness/Fichte: "Wissenschaftslehre nova methoda, 1798, 1982, p 34" "All consciousness is accompanied by an immediate self-consciousness"... I 244 Perception/Physiology/Castaneda: in complex cases, a kind of blind physical monitoring arises from finely tuned adaptation. This includes such things as the presentation of stimulus levels. This works even without the emergence of visualizations of the monitoring itself. VsFichte: Then consciousness without self-consciousness would exist (s.c.). Of course there can be recording systems. However, this recording is not identical with s.c. Fra I 331 Consciousness/CastanedaVsChisholm: everybody first refers to their own world (as per Chisholm), but from that does not follow the necessity that every consciousness and every thought are explicitly self-conscious. (CastanedaVsFichte). The first-person perspective is only implicitly contained in a non-reflexive consciousness. An explicit self-consciousness differs from this consciousness, however, if it refers to conscious explicit self-reference. Consciousness/CastanedaVsFichte: is only a special case of consciousness, it is not present in every consciousness episode. E.g. purely sensitive consciousness, e.g. cognitive, but not self-conscious (>E.g. Friedrich watches the bees). Not only evolutionarily differentiated, but also in adults. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Hume, D. | Kant Vs Hume, D. | Kant I 27 KantVsHume: Causality: Limited to the range of experience. It does not apply to the domain of things themselves. Kant I 98 Hume: Imagination compounds are principally created by association. KantVsHume: Unity of apperception. I’m being conscious that all ideas are my ideas. Therefore, I stick to the unity of consciousness that accompany all my ideas. In addition, I need to bear in mind how I am adding an idea to another one, otherwise I will scatter myself. McDowell I 123 McDowell: Laws of nature/natural/understanding/KantVsHume: wins the intelligibility of natural laws again, but not the clarity of meaning. Nature is the realm of natural laws, and therefore of no importance. However, the empirical world is not outside the terms. Hume I 37 Moral/action/ethics/Hume: A in this way (avoiding wrong) created obligation is artificial however, contrary to the natural obligation arising from the natural interest as the driving force of every action. Moral obligation. It’s in my best interest to let the other have his property, provided that the other acts in the same vein towards me. (KantVsHume:> Categorical imperative). Hume I 122 KantVsHume: The latter erroneously presented mathematics as a system of analytic judgments. DeleuzeVsKant. Relation / HumeVsKant: Every relationship is external in its terms: the equality is not a property of the characters themselves, but only comes through comparison. Hume I 133 Associations / KantVsHume: Although it is merely an empirical law, according to which ideas, which often followed each other, thereby produce a link. This law of reproduction requires that the appearances themselves are indeed subjected to such a rule. Because without this our empirical imagination would never get to do something it is able to, so would lay like dead unknown wealth within us. If a word would be applied one time to this thing, another time to another one, no empirical synthesis of reproduction could happen. So there must be something that makes even this reproduction of phenomenons possible because it is the fact that it is the a priori reason of a necessary synthetic unity of itself. I 138 If we can now show that even our a priori purest intuitions do not provide knowledge, except if they contain such a connection that makes a continuous synthesis possible, this synthesis of imagination is also established on a priori principles prior to all experience. KantVsHume: His dualism forces him to understand the relationship between what is given and the subject as a match of the subject with nature. I 139 But if the given would not align itself and a priori, in accordance with those same principles, which the link of ideas also aligns itself, the subject would only notice this concordance by chance. Therefore, it must be reversed: The given is to refer to the subject, as a concordance of given and subject. Why? Because what is given is not a thing in itself, but an overall context of phenomena that can be only represented by an a priori synthesis. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Locke, J. | Kant Vs Locke, J. | McDowell I 126/127 Consciousness/apperception/criterion/KantVsLocke: wit with him (paralogism-chapter): it is precisely that self-consciousness has nothing to do with a criterion of identity! The subject does not need to make an effort to focus attention on one and the same thing! Putnam I 168 Kant Locke/Putnam: we should read Kant in such a way that he proposes what Locke said about the secondary qualities is valid for all objects, even for primary and simple objects. There is no reason to distinguish between them. All are secondary, that is, the object is such that its effect affects us in a particular way. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Redundancy Theory | Kant Vs Redundancy Theory | Metz II 486 KantVsReductionism: The self will never be explored, it can only be thought of in the most abstract concepts of "transcendental apperception". DamasioVsKant: We have a more secure foundation in our body with its skin, its bones, its muscles, the joints, the internal organs, etc. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 |
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