Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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Aboutness | Prior | Prior I 21 "About"/Prior: believing-that, thinking-that never goes about propositions, but rather, what propositions are about. >Propositions, >Facts. "About" is systematically ambiguous; what it means depends on what kind of a name or quasi-names (eg numbers) follows. >Systematic ambiguity. Prior I 57f "about"/Prior: instead of propositions about propositions (identity of propos E.g. "Bachelors ... "/" unmarried ... " better: "if someone expresses .."Bachelors...". expresses the same propossition as "..unmarried ..." this is not about propositions. >Levels/order, >Description levels. Prior I 155f "about"/Unicorn example: that a sentence is really about something (existent), cannot depend on the shape, because the shape is the same when the subject is fictional. >Unicorn-example, >Non-existence, >Fictions, >Logical form. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Abstraction | Frege | Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 49 Definition abstraction/Frege/St: abstraction is a process to identify each other in the various elements of a region, e.g. same color, same size, same shape. New objects are gained by abstraction of the partial identity. ((s) Such objects which are only about numerical equality or color identity are individuated.) If A is such an abstraction, then there is by definition a (base) object a, so that the following is true: A is the F of a. --- Thiel I 131 Abstraction/Mathematics/Frege/Thiel: abstraction is a purely logical process, an operation with statements, the logical character of which is revealed by the change from the structure of the complicated initial statement to the structure of the new statement. Frege understood this first. Tere are statements not only about numbers, but also about sets, functions, concepts, situations, meaning and truth value of a statement, about structures. I 133 Numbers/digits/number names/names/mathematics/Thiel: the philosophical punch line of the transition from general statements via digits to arithmetic statements is that although we have introduced the speech about numbers in addition to the speech about digits, it is still a form of speech, a facon de parler, whose possibility does not depend on the fact that there are still abstract objects beyond the concrete digits, which we call "numbers". >Numerals. I 134 We also had no reason to conceive the digits as "names" of numbers, so that 4, IV, and |||| would denote the same number four, as it was assumed in the traditional philosophy of numbers. >Numbers. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
Abstraction | Geach | I 223 Abstraction/FregeVsAbstraction: mere abstraction of differences does not create (identical) properties. Geach: E.g. Def "surmen" are identical if their surnames are identical. - So that is actually a subset of people, but the same set when abstracted from differences. Problem/Geach: that would not explain the word "surman". Solution/Quine: "Tangibility": properties had little sense when you used "red" etc. only as names of properties. GeachVsQuine: then we get all the problems with classes: E.g. "The property, to be a property that does not apply to itself" - would be parallel to Russell’s antinomy. >Russell's Paradox, >Properites, >Sets, >Subsets, >Set theory, >Distinctions, >Equality, >Predicates, >Predication. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
Abstraction-Operator | Cresswell | I 128/9 Abstraction operator/Cresswell: basic law for him: ((λx) F (x)) (t) ↔ F (t) - to be an x such that F (x) is true iff t. F(t). t: any Term. - This applies to neo-Russellian language, but fails if F is an intensional predicate, because then we would have O((λx) Oφx)(s) ↔ OOφs. and the distinction would collapse. Solution/Stalnaker: Do not use descriptions as names. But treat them as close as possible. CresswellVsStalnaker: this will not always work because not all are real names. >Names, >Descriptions, >Abstraction, >Operators, >Lambda-abstraction, >Intensionality, >Intensions. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Abstractness | Mill | Wolf I 49 Name/concrete/abstract/Mill: E.g. "White" is at the same time the name of an object and many objects (concrete). "Whiteness" is the name of an attribute. "Age": name of an attribute. (Abstract, generalization). Originates from Locke and Condillac. Wolf I 50 "Attribute" is itself the generic name of many attributes. Name/abstract/singular term/Mill: however, if an attribute does not allow degree differences or type differences, it is not a general term but a singular term: E.g. Visibility, tangibility, equality, rectitude, milk white. This is not a multiplicity of attributes, but a specific attribute. >Attribute, >Singular term, >General term, >Name. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
Abstractness | Quine | I 102 Abstract/Concrete/Quine: abstract and concrete are independent from stimulus meaning. I 212 ff Abstract terms: abstract terms are alleged names of properties. "Roundness": "F"/"round":"a" in "Fa" - should not be used unhesitatingly without metaphysical definition because this would be too non-binding. Every abstract singular term provides an abstract general term. I 219 Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometrical figures, ideas, possibilities - some of these categories can be abandoned or reduced. - One can faithfully distinguish them from concrete ones by use of "-ness". I 238 Plural: the plural is an abstract singular term: "lions are dying out". The disposition is "eats mice" (31). I 286 Intensional abstraction: intensional abstraction is "the act of being a dog", "the act of baking a cake", "the act of erring". I 289 Class abstraction is attributed to singular descriptions: (iy)(x)(x from y iff ..x..) instead of: x^(..x..). This is not possible for intensional abstraction. Difference classes/Properties: classes with the same elements are identical. Properties are not quite identical if they are attributed to the same things. I 361f Abstraction of relations, propositions and properties are opaque (>Planets-example/Quine). I 295 Class abstraction is transparent, whereas intensional abstraction is opaque. V 167 Abstract general term: is a relative clause: "Y is a class X such that FX". New is that these are classes of classes. A normal relative clause equals a general term: "y is a thing x such that Fx". VII (d) 75 Concrete/abstract/Quine: by pointing to a square we do not assume identity with others. "Squareness" is shared by other objects, but we do not need to insinuate entities like "attributes". We do not point to the "attributes" (as an entity) nor do we need it in reference to the word "square". VII (d) 77 Abstract Singular Term/Quine: the abstract singular term functions like names. Philosophically revolutionary is setting abstract entities (unlike general term). VII (f) 113 Abstract Entities/Quine: classes and truth values may be accepted as abstract entities. Only statements and predicates should not be regarded as names of these and other entities, i.e. "p", "q"p,"F" etc. These should not be bindable (quantifiable) variables (>2nd order logic) - (E.g.)(x is a dog. x is white.) does not commit X to "dogness" or to the class of white things as universals. The solution is using the explicit form: belonging to two classes: (Ex)(xεy.xεz). Of course, there are names for abstract entities like the singular term "dogness", "class of white things" (as names ((s) it does not imply existence)). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Abstractness | Wright | I 226 f Abstract/Purely Abstract Objects/Dummett: (Frege:" logical objects "): Dummett: nothing more than reflections of certain linguistic expressions, analogous to the proper names of objects whose meaning, however, cannot be presented as being our ability to identify objects as their carriers. >Identification. Wright: could be read as nominalism (i.e. that there are no abstract objects). >Nominalism. But that is not Dummett's view. Dummett precisely does not deny that there are singular terms that ostensibly refer to abstract objects, but have reference indeed. They even play a semantic role! >Singular terms, >Reference, >Conceptual role, >Inferential role. Example "largest prime number": empty singular term, but the mere meaning ensures that it plays a semantic role! >Meaning, >Semantics, >Non-existence. Dummett: seems to think here that there is no question about whether Platonism or Nominalism provides the better approach according to which the question is decided whether abstract objects exist. >Numbers, >Platonism. I 227f Abstract/Morality/Ethics/Wright: that matches our approach to discourse of morality well: the cause of moral realism is not really confined to the question whether moral discourse is evaluable in relation to truth, or not. >Truth-evaluableness, >Morals, Discourse. If the "capacity for truth" (truth evaluability) is affirmed, there are still a number of realism-relevant questions. >Realism. I 223 ff It is also not in dispute that we use abstract singular terms in an intelligent manner. Wright: There is no linguistically unmediated cognitive contact with abstract objects. Frege (Platonist) asserts quite correctly, that doubts about the reality of the reference to abstract objects do not contain any rational sense. (Wright: This is minimalism regarding reference). >Minimalism. I 242 Abstract Singular Terms/Wright: it is impossible that they influence the thinking of someone who does not know what they are. >Objects of thought. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
Acquaintance | Hintikka | II 22 Description/recognition/identification/individuation/Hintikka: the difference is often represented as: A) assign a name to a face, B) assign a face to a name, A) answer a what-question & B) answer a where-question. Model Theory/Hintikka: the model-theoretical situation is, however, not completely reproduced with this. Therefore, "acquaintance" and "description" should only be taken with some limitations. >Identification, >Individuation, >Model theory, >Description. II 23 Acquaintance/description/Hintikka: acquaintance corresponds to psychology/psychological: a) semantic memory and b) episodic memory. II 144 Acquaintance/reduction/reducibility/Russell/Hintikka: Russell only regarded the quantum of acquaintance as irreducible. This corresponds to the fact that he only regards logical names "this", etc. as real names. II 149 Acquaintance/description/cross-world identification/cross-world identity/Hintikka: (7) Acquaintance can thus be paraphrased: (7) I know who the man is over there. (11) (Ex) Kl (the man there = x) (12) (∃x) Kl (Sir Norman Brook = x) The unexpected parallelism between the everyday translations for (11) and (12) shows that the uniqueness conditions mutatis mutandis work in the same way for both ways of identification (acquaintance/description). World lines: world lines must not change during the course. Cf. >Four-dimensionalism. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
Actualism | Stalnaker | I 12 Actualism/Stalnaker: the actualism does not take possible worlds literally as worlds but as ways of how the world might have been. N.B.: contingent identity is not allowed but probably contingent dissimilarity. ((s) According to Kripke, identity is always necessary identity insofar as descriptions are not involved, but names are). >Identity/Kripke, >Rigidity, >Descriptions. I 120 Actualism/Stalnaker: actualism is not a restrictive metaphysical theory as materialism or nominalism - it is just a trivial consequence of the meaning of "actual". >Materialism, >Nominalism. I 128 Presentism/Stalnaker: presentism is analogous to actualism regarding worlds: thesis: we are extended in time just as we are spread over possible worlds. >Presentism. Then we can have real temporal identity. (Stalnaker pro). Fusion/fission/personal identity: cases of fusion and fission are then cases where persons who were separated earlier become identical or a person is divided into two. >Personal identity, >Fusion, >Split. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
All | Millikan | I 235 All/"all"/figure/representation/fact/Millikan: Problem: if "All A are φ" is supposed to be a representation, according to what rule does it map the world? What is its real value, if it is true, and how is the real value determined according to the rule? Suppose "All A's" is a description, as is "the A". Specific description: this description always has a referential function. That is, there is something to be mapped. And this is determined before the sentence was formed. "All a": If there are any at all, this is then like a certain description, i.e. it has an indexical adapter and thus a certain sense. Referent/Problem: in the case of a specific description it is assumed that the listener is able to identify the referent. However, "all" does not assume that the listener is capable of doing so. In this regard, "All As!" works like an undetermined description. "All"/Millikan: "all" therefore escapes the distinction determined/undetermined. Or the distinction "determined-and-referential" against "undetermined-and-non-referential". Figure/"all"/Millikan: it is assumed that there is something specific on which it is mapped in every applicable case,... I 236 ...but at the same time it is assumed that this "something" is not individually identified. Necessarily identifying description/necessarily identifying/Millikan: works purely descriptive (non-referential) and escapes the distinction. All/"all"/real value/Millikan: E.g. "all A's are φ" maps the world as it should if each single A is a real value of "A" in the sentence. That is, the real value of the sentence is the fact that a (sic) is φ plus the fact that b is φ plus the fact that c ... etc. ((s) infinite conjunction). Millikan: at the end you have to add: "And these are all A's that exist". ((s) list, of names). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Analogies | Gould | II 241 Analogies/science/Gould: GouldVsSociobiology: zoocentrism is the primary fallacy of sociobiology: if animals develop with primary mechanisms and structures as products of natural selection, then human behaviour must have a similar basis! Sociobiology is about the idea that a behaviour in humans must also be "natural" if it looks similar in animals. These are misleading similarities. For example, sociobioligists associate human names with the actions of other beings and speak of enslavement in the ants, rape in the wild ducks and adultery in the mountain bluethroat. Since these "character traits" exist in the "lower" animals, they can be derived as "natural" genetic and adaptive for humans. GouldVsSociobiology: but these traits never existed outside a human context of meaning. No one can claim that two behaviours are really homologous: that is, are based on the same genes! (> Behavior). If the similarity is significant, it can only be analogous, i. e. it reflects different phylogenetic (phylogenetic: concerning the phylogeny) origins, but serves the same biological function. Different origins - the same function. GouldVsZoocentrism: zoocentric systems fail mainly because they are never what they pretend to be. The "objective" animal behaviour is from the very beginning an imposition of human preferences. >Explanation, >Similarities. |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
Anaphora | Brandom | I 438 Anaphora/Brandom: you do not describe a cat if you refer to it with "it". >Pronouns. I 438 Truth/Brandom Thesis: "true" functions I 423 Pronoun/Brandom: old: only linguistic, like bound variables (Co-Reference) - new: anaphora is more basal than Deixis! - Deixis assumes anaphora. - Anaphora without index words is possible, but not vice versa. >Pointing, >Ostension. I 627 Anaphora/Reference/Uniqueness/Unrepeatability/Brandom: substitution is of course not definable for unrepeatable tokenings - therefore it has to be referred to anaphorically. I 638 Deixis requires anaphora! No language can indicate if it does not have asymmetric, anaphoric constructions - the predecessor can even be a mere possible tokening: "refers to". I 639 Two possibilities: a) Type Recurrence: symmetrically acquired significance (e.g. proper names of certain descriptions) - 2. indexical, asymmetrical I 954 Anaphora/Rigidity/Brandom: anaphoric chains are rigid - but not "impure chains": Leibniz could have been called differently, so it is possible that the one referred to by "Leibniz" is not Leibniz - N.B.: in counterfactual situations expressions would belong to other token recurrence structures than actual. >Rigidity. I 684 Anaphoric chains/Evans/Brandom. Problem: if the predecessor is quantified: Example Hans has bought some donkeys and Heinz has vaccinated them (all or some of the some?) - Example few politicians came to the party but they had a good time (few of the few?).Cf. >Donkey sentences. I 686 Evans: Proposal: Note I 956 "An expression a c dominates an expression b exactly if the first branching node that dominates a also dominates b (and a and b do not dominate each other). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
Animal Language | Deacon | I 34 Animal language/Deacon: the communication of other species is never a "simpler form" of human language. It is not language at all. >Communication. Biological explanation/Deacon: is always evolutionary and tries to show continuity. However, there are no animal precursors to the emergence of human language, let alone an ascending scale of complexity. (See Robin Dunbar, Grooming, Gossip and the Evolution of Language, 1997(1); and Dunbar 1992 a(2), b(3)). I 54 Animal language/animals/Deacon: the misconception that animal calls and gestures are like words or phrases can be traced back to misunderstandings about the concept of reference. >Reference, >Gestures. Behaviorism: some behaviorists have suggested that animal cries are just external expressions of internal states and therefore have nothing to do with reference. >Behaviorism. Cognitive behaviorists saw calls as equivalent to words. One study played a central role in this. Seyfarth/Cheney: Thesis: Warning calls of guenons are like names for predators in the distance. (See Seyfarth, Cheney and Marler 1980(4)). I 56 In response to various calls, the monkeys left the trees (warning of eagles) or jumped on trees (leopards) or peeked into bushes (snake). Deacon: this is evolutionary easy to explain. Since the saving behaviour cannot always look the same and is even mutually exclusive, different calls have to be distinguished. (See also Hauser, 1996(5)). Animal calls/Cheney/Seyfarth/Deacon: Cheney and Seyfarth initially assumed that the animal calls were names for the predators. These were accepted instead of a complete sentence, i.e. as "holophrastic" utterances. Holophrastic utterances/Deacon: it is disputed how much syntactic potential lies in them. >Wittgenstein language game "Platte", cf. >Subsententials. Animal communication: the thesis was put forward that warning cries were different from cries of pain or grimaces by referring to something else... I 57 ...than the inner state of the animal. Reference/DeaconVsCheney/DeaconVsSeyfarth: it was implicitly assumed that pain cries, for example, could not be referring. Such assumptions give rise to the idea of a "proto-language" with calls as "vocabulary". >Vocabulary, >Words, >Signs, >Signals. Then you could imagine an animal language evolution with grammar and syntax that emerged later. This whole house of cards is falling apart however. (See also Cheney and Seyfarth, 1990(6)). Reference/Deacon: is not limited to language. Symptoms can refer to something other than themselves. For example, laughter: is congenital in humans. It does not have to be produced intentionally and can be simulated in social contexts. But laughter can also refer to things, even to absent ones. In this way alarm calls also refer. >Innateness. I 58 Language/DeaconVsSeyfarth/DeaconVsCheney: e.g. laughter differs from speech by the fact that it is contagious. In a room full of laughing people, it is hard to be serious. The idea of a room full of people repeating just one sentence is absurd. Intentionality/Intention/animal calls/Deacon: Animal calls do not fulfil the Grice criterion for messages either: "I think you believe that I believe x". Animal calls are involuntary and contagious. >Language, >P. Grice. I 59 Solution/Deacon: it is more about spreading excitement than sharing information. Reference/Deacon: therefore, reference is not the distinguishing feature between animal calls and words. Both can refer to inner states and things in the outer world. We must therefore distinguish between different types of reference rather than distinguish between referring and allegedly non-referring signals. >Reference/Deacon. I 65 Animal language/Herrnstein/Deacon: (Herrnstein 1980(7)): Experiments with pigeons who had successfully learned an arbitrary sign language and cooperation. I 66 Symbolic reference/Deacon: this simple form of reference with the characteristic learned association, randomness of characters, transmission of information between individuals are not sufficient to define symbolic reference. A symbolic reference system does not simply consist of words without syntax. >Symbolic reference, >Syntax. I 67 Animal calls: in one sense their understanding is innate, on the other hand the connection to the referent is not necessary. The reference is somewhat flexible. Some connections are built in prenatal, others are learned. I 68 Symbolic competence: is that which goes beyond parrot-like expressions. For this purpose, one has to distinguish between contextually determined causes of expression and memorized dictations. >Symbolic communication, >Symbolic learning, >Symbolic representation. 1. Dunbar, R. (1997). Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Dunbar, R. (1992a). Co-evolution of neocortex size, group size and language in humans. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 3. Dunbar, R. (1992b). Neocortex size as a constraint on group sizes in primates. Journal of Human Evolution 20, 469-493. 4. Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Marler, P. (1980): Vervet monkey alarm calls: Semantic communication in a free-ranging primate. Animal Behaviour, 28(4), 1070–1094. 5. Hauser, M. D. (1996): The evolution of communication. The MIT Press. 6. Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990): How monkeys see the world: Inside the mind of another species. University of Chicago Press. 7. Herrnstein, R. (1980). Symbolic communication between two pigeons (Columba domestica). Science 210. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
Anti-Liberalism | Holmes | Krastev I 5 Anti-Liberalism/Krastev/Holmes: no single factor can explain the simultaneous emergence of authoritarian anti-liberalisms in so many differently situated countries in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Krastev 6 It is a story, among other things, of liberalism abandoning pluralism for hegemony. The striving of ex-communist countries to emulate the West after 1989 has been given an assortment of names – Americanization, Europeanization, democratization, liberalization, enlargement, integration, harmonization, globalization, and so forth – but it has always signified modernization by imitation and integration by assimilation. Krastev I 42 Anti-Liberalism/Krastev: Contrary to many contemporary theorists,(1) populist rage is directed less at multiculturalism Krastev I 43 than at post-national individualism and cosmopolitanism. (...)it implies that populism cannot be combatted by abandoning identity politics in the name of liberal individualism. For the illiberal democrats of Eastern and Central Europe, the gravest threat to the survival of the white Christian majority in Europe is the incapacity of Western societies to defend themselves. They cannot defend themselves because liberalism’s bias against communitarianism allegedly blinds its adherents to the threats they face. (...) the anti-liberal consensus today is that the rights of the threatened white Christian majority are in mortal danger. To protect this besieged majority’s fragile dominance (...) Europeans need to replace the watery post-nationalism foisted on them by cosmopolitan liberals with a muscular identity politics or group particularism of their own. This is the logic with which Orbán and Kaczyński have tried to inflame the inner xenophobic nationalism of their countrymen, creating an anti-liberal R2P (Right to Protect) targeting exclusively white Christian populations allegedly at risk of extinction. 1. Mark Lilla, The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics (Harper, 2017). |
LawHolm I Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. The Common Law Mineola, NY 1991 Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
Anti-Liberalism | Krastev | Krastev I 5 Anti-Liberalism/Krastev: no single factor can explain the simultaneous emergence of authoritarian anti-liberalisms in so many differently situated countries in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Krastev 6 It is a story, among other things, of liberalism abandoning pluralism for hegemony. The striving of ex-communist countries to emulate the West after 1989 has been given an assortment of names – Americanization, Europeanization, democratization, liberalization, enlargement, integration, harmonization, globalization, and so forth – but it has always signified modernization by imitation and integration by assimilation. Krastev I 42 Anti-Liberalism/Krastev: Contrary to many contemporary theorists,(1) populist rage is directed less at multiculturalism Krastev I 43 than at post-national individualism and cosmopolitanism. (...)it implies that populism cannot be combatted by abandoning identity politics in the name of liberal individualism. For the illiberal democrats of Eastern and Central Europe, the gravest threat to the survival of the white Christian majority in Europe is the incapacity of Western societies to defend themselves. They cannot defend themselves because liberalism’s bias against communitarianism allegedly blinds its adherents to the threats they face. (...) the anti-liberal consensus today is that the rights of the threatened white Christian majority are in mortal danger. To protect this besieged majority’s fragile dominance (...) Europeans need to replace the watery post-nationalism foisted on them by cosmopolitan liberals with a muscular identity politics or group particularism of their own. This is the logic with which Orbán and Kaczyński have tried to inflame the inner xenophobic nationalism of their countrymen, creating an anti-liberal R2P (Right to Protect) targeting exclusively white Christian populations allegedly at risk of extinction. 1. Mark Lilla, The Once and Future Liberal: After Identity Politics (Harper, 2017). |
Krastev I Ivan Krastev Stephen Holmes The Light that Failed: A Reckoning London 2019 |
Articles | Russell | Cresswell I 179 Definite Article/theory of descriptions/Russell: requiring that a sentence e.g. "the φ is ψ" provided that "the φ" has a wide range, entails that there exists a unique φ. >Scope, >Narrow scope, >Wide Scope. Russell I X Russell/Gödel: (K.Gödel, Preface to Principia Mathematica) Russell avoids any axioms about the particular articles "the", "the", "that". - Frege, on the other hand, must make an axiom about it! The advantage for Russell, however, remains only as long as he interprets definitions as mere typographical abbreviations, not as the introduction of names. >Proxy, >Names, >Logical proper names, >Axioms, Typographical abbreviation: >"blackening of the paper", >Formalism. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Attributes | Mill | I 48f Attribute/Mill: E.g. "whitness", "age": these are names of attributes - "attribute" itself is a generic name of many attributes. I 51 Names/Mill: names always include some attribute in itself, but they are not the name of this attribute! The attribute itself has its own, abstract name (singular term), for example, "The Whiteness". >Attribute, >Singular term, >General term, >Name, >Abstractness. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 |
Attribution | Boer | I XVI Attribution of believe/Boer: known problem: that the logical equivalence fails here. Problem: if the words in P are replaced by others. Notation/Terminology/Boer: "≡" is the truth-functional analog of "if and only if" (iff). "Bel (A, p)": "A believes that p". --- I 21 Attribution of believe/Intentionality/Boer: Question: A) is believe intentional? B) is attribution of believe intentional? Quine/Boer: his semantic rise has caused the second question to conceal the first. Definition Intensionality/(sic, with s)/Boer: is nowadays negative, defined as non-intensionality. So we need a definition of "extensional sentence". Denotation/denoting/Boer: Assuming, denotating terms are: names, indices, demonstrativa and mass terms. Definition English +/Boer: be an extension of English by zero or more denotating expressions and predicates. --- I 22 Definition extensional reading/Boer: (provisional): E.g.: "A thing x is such that ... x ..." is unambiguous, then it is an extensional reading S iff it fulfills the following extensional principles: Definition: a strong principle of existential generalization/extensibility/Boer: for a denotating term D and variable v which does not belong to S if S has the form [... D ...], then one can conclude from S validly [an existing thing v is such that ... v ...]. Definition: replacement princinple for co-extensive predicates/Boer: ... from [for objects x1, ... xn, either P (x1, ... xn) or Q(x1, ... xn) or neither P nor Q] we can exclude any theorem which is obtained by replacing one or more occurrences of P in S by Q. Definition replacement princinple for materialistic equivalent sentences/Boer: for every sentence P and Q in English +, if P is present in S, one can deduce from S and [Either P and Q, or neither P nor Q] every sentence which is formed by the replacement of one or several occurrences of P in S by Q. Definition of the substitutionality of the identity/Boer: for each denotating term D and E of English +: if S has the form [... D ...], one can deduce from S and an equation of the form [D = E] (or [E = D] every sentence which is formed by replacing one or more occurrences of D by E in S. --- I 22 Validity/everyday language/Boer: can only be asserted relatively to a particular reading. English +/Boer: we need that to exclude the fact that the four principles are not trivially fulfilled by there being no counterexamples to the inferences in question simply because there are not enough names or predicates to formulate one. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
Attribution | Prior | I 135 Attribution/Prior: an attribution really constitutes a relationship. But not: to believe that ... : This is no relation! >Relations theory, >Relations. Otherwise to believe something of Cicero would simultaneously have to be to also believe something of Tullius! >Beliefs, >Intensions, >"About", >Reference, >Names, >Intentionality. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Attributive/referential | Chisholm | I 89 Attributive Meaning/Chisholm: the property of being-F is the attributive meaning of the expression T in a language L if it is true for every object that 1) it is only designated with it if it has that property, 2) every speaker then assumes the property. I 90 Name: Important Argument: not valid for names. >Proper names, >Reference, >Meaning. I 108 Annemary has no attributive meaning, therefore there is no property of "loving Annemary." >Ontology/Chisholm. II 112 Referential/Attributive/Brandl: based on reports: only attributive - in addition, there are still the cases of "whoever it is" - according to this, both, ref and att, are based on a de-re belief - i.e. we cannot say that att only covers one area that is only possible with de-dicto use. II 112 Attributive/Brandl: works only with de dicto-use, not if the speaker knows the object - whoever it is: "area" does not work: neither seen object nor from report - distinction ref/att is to be made within de-re statements - but we must always know what role the reference plays in the concrete case. II 120 Referential/Donnellan/Brandl: here, the speaker must not only know what the object designated by him is, but he must also know it - only then belief de-re "of the smallest spy" possible. II 123 Contradiction to the above: only ref. if the speaker can take from reports of others who it is about. II 126 Referential is the basic form of every reference - BrandlVs: this is the reductionist variant. II 125 Attributive/Brandl: here, the "directedness" of the description function depends on the expressions - (borderline case) - with that, the speaker refers to an object, because he knows that he is also the only one to fulfill another description - ( "epistemically close": "epistemic familiarity": even without acquaintance, by source of information - then knowledge possible that it is one and the same, from acquaintance and from description.) >Description. II Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Attributive/referential | Donnellan | I 183 Def Referential/Donnellan: is supposed to enable the listener to single out the person the speaker is talking about. - E.g. "The killer of Schmidt is insane": in any case, the person who rioted in court, even if he is not the killer. - Here, empty descriptions do not fail. - ((s) The description may also be wrong, and still identify the person.) Attributive/Donnellan: "whoever it is": E.g. An absent murderer can be anyone, but definitely the murderer - ((s), the description must be apply). >Descriptions. I 191 Referential/Donnellan: Here it is probable that the speaker believes that the reference is satisfied. An incorrect description would mislead the listeners. Attributive/Donnellan: the same possibility of incorrect description does not exist here: "Whoever it is" cannot be described incorrectly, the speaker believes a disjunction: "him or him or him..." - attributively used descriptions may fail and yet express something true. E.g. "The House of Deputies (correctly House of Representatives) includes representatives of two parties" - No problem, if it is clear what the speaker means, you can correct him. >Meaning (Intending). I 195 Intent/Intention/Meaning/Donnellan: it's not about what someone wanted to say - otherwise you could take any description - nevertheless, the intention decides about referential or attributive use. I 199 Champagne Example/Donnellan: attributively no problem. I ~ 202 Referential/Donnellan: could also be called a weak reference: whatever - real reference: attributive. >Champagne example. I 202 Problem of the Statement/Donnellan: E.g. (Linsky): her husband is kind to her (in the café, but he is not her husband) - referentially true - attributive: if phi, then psi, but there is no phi, then it's not correct to say: he says of him... (de re) - but referential: he said correctly of the so described that he ... ((s) also de re!) - Kripke: precisely not like distinction de re/de dicto - E.g. If the described person is also the president of the college, it is true of the president that he is kind - referential: here the speaker does not even have to agree. Wolf I 18 Name/Description/Donnellan: a) referential use: the reference can succeed, even if the description is not true: E.g. The man in court is not the murderer, but he is correctly determined as the one who behaves wildly. b) attributive use: "whoever it was" applies if we have no specific person in mind. ((s)> role functional role: what ever it is.) >Roles, >Functional role. Chisholm II 109 Donnellan/referential/attributive/Brandl: can the distinction not be explained by the fact that in one instance reference is made by signs and in another instance by speakers? No, then the referential use would only have drawn attention to a problem of pragmatics. Then Russell could have simply expanded his theory pragmatically. Brandl: one can make the distinction referential/attributive even more pronounced if one applies it to precisely those signs with which the speaker makes it clear from the outset that he/she is not referring to a whole range of objects. Newen I 94 Referential/Predicative/Singular Terms/Identification/Name/Strawson: Thesis: Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referentially - descriptions: have at most predicative, i.e. descriptive, meaning (but can also refer simultaneously) Ad Newen I 94 Referential/(s): selecting an object - attributive/(s): attributing properties. Newen I 95 Attributive/Donnellan/(s): in the absence of the subject matter in question - referential/(s): in the presence of the subject matter in question Newen I 95 DonnellanVsRussell: he has overlooked the referential use. He only considers the attributive use, because... Descriptions/Russell: ...are syncategorematic expressions for him, which themselves cannot refer. >Syncategorematic. Newen I 96 Referential/description/KripkeVsDonnellan: the referential use of descriptions has absolutely nothing to do with the semantics of descriptions. Referential use is possible and communication can succeed with it, but it belongs to pragmatics. Pragmatics: examines what is meant (contextual). It does not examine the context-independent semantics. Solution/Kripke: to make a distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference. >Speaker reference, >Reference. Semantic meaning: is given by Russell's truth conditions: the murderer of Schmidt is insane iff the murderer of Schmidt is insane. >Truth conditions. |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
Axioms | Hilbert | Berka I 294 Definition/Axiom/Hilbert: the established axioms are at the same time the definitions of the elementary concepts whose relations they regulate. ((s) Hilbert speaks of relationships, not of the use of concepts). >Definitions, >Definability, >Basic concepts. Independence/Axiom/Hilbert: the question is whether certain statements of individual axioms are mutually dependent, and whether the axioms do not contain common components which must be removed so that the axioms are independent of each other(1). >Independence. 1. D. Hilbert: Mathematische Probleme, in: Ders. Gesammelte Abhandlungen (1935), Vol. III, pp. 290-329 (gekürzter Nachdruck v. S 299-301). --- Thiel I 262 We consider the first three axioms of Hilbert: 1. There are exactly two straight lines at each of two distinct points P, Q, which indicate(2) with P and Q. 2. For every line g and to any point P, which does not indicate with it, there is exactly one line that is indicated with P, but with no point of g. 3. There are three points which do not indicate with one and the same straight line. In Hilbert's original text, instead of points one speaks of "objects of the first kind" instead of straight lines of "objects of the second kind" and instead of the incidence of "basic relation". Thus, the first axiom is now: For each of two different objects of the first kind, there is precisely one object of the second kind, which is in a basic relation with the first two. Thiel I 263 If the axioms are transformed quantifier-logically, then only the schematic sign "π" (for the basic relation) is free for substitutions, the others are bound by quantifiers, and can no longer be replaced by individual names of points or lines. >Quantification, >Quantifiers. They are thus "forms of statements" with "π" as an empty space. >Propositional functions. They are not statements like those before Hilbert's axioms, whose truth or falsehood is fixed by the meanings of their constituents. >Truth values. In the Hilbert axiom concept (usually used today), axioms are forms of statements or propositional schemata, the components of which must be given a meaning only by interpretation by specifying the variability domains and the basic relation. The fact that this can happen in various ways, shows that the axioms cannot determine the meaning of their components (not their characteristics, as Hilbert sometimes says) themselves by their co-operation in an axiom system. Thiel I 264 Multiple interpretations are possible: e.g. points lying on a straight line, e.g. the occurrence of characters in character strings, e.g. numbers. Thiel I 265 All three interpretations are true statements. The formed triples of education regulations are models of our axiom system. The first is an infinite, the two other finite models. >Models, >Infinity. Thiel I 266 The axioms can be combined by conjunction to form an axiom system. >Conjunction. Through the relationships, the objects lying in the subject areas are interwoven with each other in the manner determined by the combined axioms. The regions V .. are thereby "structured" (concrete and abstract structures). >Domains, >Structures (Mathematics). One and the same structure can be described by different axiom systems. Not only are logically equivalent axiom systems used, but also those whose basic concepts and relations differ, but which can be defined on the basis of two systems of explicit definitions. Thiel I 267 Already the two original axiom systems are equivalent without the assumption of reciprocal definitions, i.e. they are logically equivalent. This equivalence relation allows an abstraction step to the fine structures. In the previous sense the same structures, are now differentiated: the axiom systems describing them are not immediately logically equivalent, but their concepts prove to be mutually definable. For example, "vector space" "group" and "body" are designations not for fine structures, but for general abstract structures. However, we cannot say now that an axiom system makes a structure unambiguous. A structure has several structures, not anymore "the" structure. Thiel I 268 E.g. body: the structure Q has a body structure described by axioms in terms of addition and multiplication. E.g. group: the previous statement also implies that Q is also e.g. a group with respect to the addition. Because the group axioms for addition form part of the body axioms. Modern mathematics is more interested in the statements about structures than in their carriers. From this point of view, structures which are of the same structure are completely equivalent. >Indistinguishability. Thiel: in algebra it is probably the most common to talk of structures. Here, there is often a single set of carriers with several links, which can be regarded as a relation. Thiel I 269 E.g. relation: sum formation: x + y = z relation: s (x, y, z). In addition to link structures, the subject areas often still carry order structures or topological structures. Thiel I 270 Bourbaki speaks of a reordering of the total area of mathematics according to "mother structures". In modern mathematics, abstractions, especially structures, are understood as equivalence classes and thus as sets. >N. Bourbaki, >Equivalence classes. 2. Indicate = belong together, i.e. intersect, pass through the point, lie on it. |
Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
Bayesian Networks | Norvig | Norvig I 510 Bayesian Networks/belief networks/probabilistic networks/knowledge map/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Bayesian networks can represent essentially any full joint probability distribution and in many cases can do so very concisely. Norvig I 511 A Bayesian network is a directed graph in which each node is annotated with quantitative probability information. The full specification is as follows: 1. Each node corresponds to a random variable, which may be discrete or continuous. 2. A set of directed links or arrows connects pairs of nodes. If there is an arrow from node X to node Y,X is said to be a parent of Y. The graph has no directed cycles (and hence is a directed acyclic graph, or DAG. 3. Each node Xi has a conditional probability distribution P(Xi |Parents(Xi)) that quantifies the effect of the parents on the node. The topology of the network - the set of nodes and links - specifies the conditional independence relationships that hold in the domain (…). >Probability theory/Norvig, >Uncertainty/AI research. The intuitive meaning of an arrow is typically that X has a direct influence on Y, which suggests that causes should be parents of effects. Once the topology of the Bayesian network is laid out, we need only specify a conditional probability distribution for each variable, given its parents. Norvig I 512 Circumstances: The probabilities actually summarize a potentially Norvig I 513 Infinite set of circumstances. Norvig I 515 Inconsistency: If there is no redundancy, then there is no chance for inconsistency: it is impossible for the knowledge engineer or domain expert to create a Bayesian network that violates the axioms of probability. Norvig I 517 Diagnostic models: If we try to build a diagnostic model with links from symptoms to causes (…) we end up having to specify additional dependencies between otherwise independent causes (and often between separately occurring symptoms as well). Causal models: If we stick to a causal model, we end up having to specify fewer numbers, and the numbers will often be easier to come up with. In the domain of medicine, for example, it has been shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1982)(1) that expert physicians prefer to give probability judgments for causal rules rather than for diagnostic ones. Norvig I 529 Inference: because it includes inference in propositional logic as a special case, inference in Bayesian networks is NP-hard. >NP-Problems/Norvig. There is a close connection between the complexity of Bayesian network inference and the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). > Constraint satisfaction problems/Norvig. Clustering algirithms: Using clustering algorithms (also known as join tree algorithms), the time can be reduced to O(n). For this reason, these algorithms are widely used in commercial Bayesian network tools. The basic idea of clustering is to join individual nodes of the network to form cluster nodes in such a way that the resulting network is a polytree. Norvig I 539 (…) Bayesian networks are essentially propositional: the set of random variables is fixed and finite, and each has a fixed domain of possible values. This fact limits the applicability of Bayesian networks. If we can find a way to combine probability theory with the expressive power of first-order representations, we expect to be able to increase dramatically the range of problems that can be handled. Norvig I 540 Possible worlds/probabilities: for Bayesian networks, the possible worlds are assignments of values to variables; for the Boolean case in particular, the possible worlds are identical to those of propositional logic. For a first-order probability model, then, it seems we need the possible worlds to be those of first-order logic—that is, a set of objects with relations among them and an interpretation that maps constant symbols to objects, predicate symbols to relations, and function symbols to functions on those objects. Problem: the set of first-order models is infinite. Solution: The database semantics makes the unique names assumption—here, we adopt it for the constant symbols. It also assumes domain closure - there are no more objects than those that are named. We can then guarantee a finite set of possible worlds by making the set of objects in each world be exactly the set of constant Norvig I 541 Symbols that are used. There is no uncertainty about the mapping from symbols to objects or about the objects that exist. Relational probability models: We will call models defined in this way relational probability models, or RPMs. The name relational probability model was given by Pfeffer (2000)(2) to a slightly different representation, but the underlying ideas are the same. >Uncertainty/AI research. Norvig I 552 Judea Pearl developed the message-passing method for carrying out inference in tree networks (Pearl, 1982a)(3) and polytree networks (Kim and Pearl, 1983)(4) and explained the importance of causal rather than diagnostic probability models, in contrast to the certainty-factor systems then in vogue. The first expert system using Bayesian networks was CONVINCE (Kim, 1983)(5). Early applications in medicine included the MUNIN system for diagnosing neuromuscular disorders (Andersen et al., 1989)(6) and the PATHFINDER system for pathology (Heckerman, 1991)(7). Norvig I 553 Perhaps the most widely used Bayesian network systems have been the diagnosis and- repair modules (e.g., the PrinterWizard) in Microsoft Windows (Breese and Heckerman, 1996)(8) and the Office Assistant in Microsoft Office (Horvitz et al., 1998)(9). Another important application area is biology: Bayesian networks have been used for identifying human genes by reference to mouse genes (Zhang et al., 2003)(10), inferring cellular networks Friedman (2004)(11), and many other tasks in bioinformatics. We could go on, but instead we’ll refer you to Pourret et al. (2008)(12), a 400-page guide to applications of Bayesian networks. Ross Shachter (1986)(13), working in the influence diagram community, developed the first complete algorithm for general Bayesian networks. His method was based on goal-directed reduction of the network using posterior-preserving transformations. Pearl (1986)(14) developed a clustering algorithm for exact inference in general Bayesian networks, utilizing a conversion to a directed polytree of clusters in which message passing was used to achieve consistency over variables shared between clusters. A similar approach, developed by the statisticians David Spiegelhalter and Steffen Lauritzen (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988)(15), is based on conversion to an undirected form of graphical model called a Markov network. This approach is implemented in the HUGIN system, an efficient and widely used tool for uncertain reasoning (Andersen et al., 1989)(6). Boutilier et al. (1996)(16) show how to exploit context-specific independence in clustering algorithms. Norvig I 604 Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs): can be viewed as a sparse encoding of a Markov process and were first used in AI by Dean and Kanazawa (1989b)(17), Nicholson and Brady (1992)(18), and Kjaerulff (1992)(19). The last work extends the HUGIN Bayes net system to accommodate dynamic Bayesian networks. The book by Dean and Wellman (1991)(20) helped popularize DBNs and the probabilistic approach to planning and control within AI. Murphy (2002)(21) provides a thorough analysis of DBNs. Dynamic Bayesian networks have become popular for modeling a variety of complex motion processes in computer vision (Huang et al., 1994(22); Intille and Bobick, 1999)(23). Like HMMs, they have found applications in speech recognition (Zweig and Russell, 1998(24); Richardson et al., 2000(25); Stephenson et al., 2000(26); Nefian et al., 2002(27); Livescu et al., 2003(28)), Norvig I 605 genomics (Murphy and Mian, 1999(29); Perrin et al., 2003(30); Husmeier, 2003(31)) and robot localization (Theocharous et al., 2004)(32). The link between HMMs and DBNs, and between the forward–backward algorithm and Bayesian network propagation, was made explicitly by Smyth et al. (1997)(33). A further unification with Kalman filters (and other statistical models) appears in Roweis and Ghahramani (1999)(34). Procedures exist for learning the parameters (Binder et al., 1997a(35); Ghahramani, 1998(36)) and structures (Friedman et al., 1998)(37) of DBNs. 1. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982). Causal schemata in judgements under uncertainty. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 2. Pfeffer, A. (2000). Probabilistic Reasoning for Complex Systems. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University 3. Pearl, J. (1982a). Reverend Bayes on inference engines: A distributed hierarchical approach. In AAAI- 82, pp. 133–136 4. Kim, J. H. and Pearl, J. (1983). A computational model for combined causal and diagnostic reasoning in inference systems. In IJCAI-83, pp. 190–193. 5. Kim, J. H. (1983). CONVINCE: A Conversational Inference Consolidation Engine. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of California at Los Angeles. 6. Andersen, S. K., Olesen, K. G., Jensen, F. V., and Jensen, F. (1989). HUGIN—A shell for building Bayesian belief universes for expert systems. In IJCAI-89, Vol. 2, pp. 1080–1085. 7. Heckerman, D. (1991). Probabilistic Similarity Networks. MIT Press. 8. Breese, J. S. and Heckerman, D. (1996). Decisiontheoretic troubleshooting: A framework for repair and experiment. In UAI-96, pp. 124–132. 9. Horvitz, E. J., Breese, J. S., Heckerman, D., and Hovel, D. (1998). The Lumiere project: Bayesian user modeling for inferring the goals and needs of software users. In UAI-98, pp. 256–265. 10. Zhang, L., Pavlovic, V., Cantor, C. R., and Kasif, S. (2003). Human-mouse gene identification by comparative evidence integration and evolutionary analysis. Genome Research, pp. 1–13. 11. Friedman, N. (2004). Inferring cellular networks using probabilistic graphical models. Science, 303(5659), 799–805. 12. Pourret, O., Naım, P., and Marcot, B. (2008). Bayesian Networks: A practical guide to applications. Wiley. 13. Shachter, R. D. (1986). Evaluating influence diagrams. Operations Research, 34, 871–882. 14. Pearl, J. (1986). Fusion, propagation, and structuring in belief networks. AIJ, 29, 241–288. 15. Lauritzen, S. and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (1988). Local computations with probabilities on graphical structures and their application to expert systems. J. Royal Statistical Society, B 50(2), 157–224. 16. Boutilier, C., Friedman, N., Goldszmidt, M., and Koller, D. (1996). Context-specific independence in Bayesian networks. In UAI-96, pp. 115–123. 17. Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. (1989b). A model for reasoning about persistence and causation. Computational Intelligence, 5(3), 142–150. 18. Nicholson, A. and Brady, J. M. (1992). The data association problem when monitoring robot vehicles using dynamic belief networks. In ECAI-92, pp. 689–693. 19. Kjaerulff, U. (1992). A computational scheme for reasoning in dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-92, pp. 121–129. 20. Dean, T. and Wellman, M. P. (1991). Planning and Control. Morgan Kaufmann. 21. Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic Bayesian Networks: Representation, Inference and Learning. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley 22. Huang, T., Koller, D., Malik, J., Ogasawara, G., Rao, B., Russell, S. J., and Weber, J. (1994). Automatic symbolic traffic scene analysis using belief networks. In AAAI-94, pp. 966–972 23. Intille, S. and Bobick, A. (1999). A framework for recognizing multi-agent action from visual evidence. In AAAI-99, pp. 518–525. 24. Zweig, G. and Russell, S. J. (1998). Speech recognition with dynamic Bayesian networks. In AAAI-98, pp. 173–180. 25. Richardson, M., Bilmes, J., and Diorio, C. (2000). Hidden-articulator Markov models: Performance improvements and robustness to noise. In ICASSP-00. 26. Stephenson, T., Bourlard, H., Bengio, S., and Morris, A. (2000). Automatic speech recognition using dynamic bayesian networks with both acoustic and articulatory features. In ICSLP-00, pp. 951-954. 27. Nefian, A., Liang, L., Pi, X., Liu, X., and Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic bayesian networks for audiovisual speech recognition. EURASIP, Journal of Applied Signal Processing, 11, 1–15. 28. Livescu, K., Glass, J., and Bilmes, J. (2003). Hidden feature modeling for speech recognition using dynamic Bayesian networks. In EUROSPEECH-2003, pp. 2529–2532 29. Murphy, K. and Mian, I. S. (1999). Modelling gene expression data using Bayesian networks. people.cs.ubc.ca/˜murphyk/Papers/ismb99.pdf. 30. Perrin, B. E., Ralaivola, L., and Mazurie, A. (2003). Gene networks inference using dynamic Bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19, II 138-II 148. 31. Husmeier, D. (2003). Sensitivity and specificity of inferring genetic regulatory interactions from microarray experiments with dynamic bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19(17), 2271-2282. 32. Theocharous, G., Murphy, K., and Kaelbling, L. P. (2004). Representing hierarchical POMDPs as DBNs for multi-scale robot localization. In ICRA-04. 33. Smyth, P., Heckerman, D., and Jordan, M. I. (1997). Probabilistic independence networks for hidden Markov probability models. Neural Computation, 9(2), 227–269. 34. Roweis, S. T. and Ghahramani, Z. (1999). A unifying review of Linear GaussianModels. Neural Computation, 11(2), 305–345. 35. Binder, J., Koller, D., Russell, S. J., and Kanazawa, K. (1997a). Adaptive probabilistic networks with hidden variables. Machine Learning, 29, 213–244. 36. Ghahramani, Z. (1998). Learning dynamic bayesian networks. In Adaptive Processing of Sequences and Data Structures, pp. 168–197. 37. Friedman, N., Murphy, K., and Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning the structure of dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-98. |
Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
Bayesian Networks | Russell | Norvig I 510 Bayesian Networks/belief networks/probabilistic networks/knowledge map/AI research/Norvig/Russell: Bayesian networks can represent essentially any full joint probability distribution and in many cases can do so very concisely. Norvig I 511 A Bayesian network is a directed graph in which each node is annotated with quantitative probability information. The full specification is as follows: 1. Each node corresponds to a random variable, which may be discrete or continuous. 2. A set of directed links or arrows connects pairs of nodes. If there is an arrow from node X to node Y,X is said to be a parent of Y. The graph has no directed cycles (and hence is a directed acyclic graph, or DAG. 3. Each node Xi has a conditional probability distribution P(Xi |Parents(Xi)) that quantifies the effect of the parents on the node. The topology of the network - the set of nodes and links - specifies the conditional independence relationships that hold in the domain (…). >Probability theory/Norvig, >Uncertainty/AI research. The intuitive meaning of an arrow is typically that X has a direct influence on Y, which suggests that causes should be parents of effects. Once the topology of the Bayesian network is laid out, we need only specify a conditional probability distribution for each variable, given its parents. Norvig I 512 Circumstances: The probabilities actually summarize a potentially Norvig I 513 Infinite set of circumstances. Norvig I 515 Inconsistency: If there is no redundancy, then there is no chance for inconsistency: it is impossible for the knowledge engineer or domain expert to create a Bayesian network that violates the axioms of probability. Norvig I 517 Diagnostic models: If we try to build a diagnostic model with links from symptoms to causes (…) we end up having to specify additional dependencies between otherwise independent causes (and often between separately occurring symptoms as well). Causal models: If we stick to a causal model, we end up having to specify fewer numbers, and the numbers will often be easier to come up with. In the domain of medicine, for example, it has been shown by Tversky and Kahneman (1982)(1) that expert physicians prefer to give probability judgments for causal rules rather than for diagnostic ones. Norvig I 529 Inference: because it includes inference in propositional logic as a special case, inference in Bayesian networks is NP-hard. >NP-Problems/Norvig. There is a close connection between the complexity of Bayesian network inference and the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). >Constraint satisfaction problems/Norvig. Clustering algirithms: Using clustering algorithms (also known as join tree algorithms), the time can be reduced to O(n). For this reason, these algorithms are widely used in commercial Bayesian network tools. The basic idea of clustering is to join individual nodes of the network to form cluster nodes in such a way that the resulting network is a polytree. Norvig I 539 (…) Bayesian networks are essentially propositional: the set of random variables is fixed and finite, and each has a fixed domain of possible values. This fact limits the applicability of Bayesian networks. If we can find a way to combine probability theory with the expressive power of first-order representations, we expect to be able to increase dramatically the range of problems that can be handled. Norvig I 540 Possible worlds/probabilities: for Bayesian networks, the possible worlds are assignments of values to variables; for the Boolean case in particular, the possible worlds are identical to those of propositional logic. For a first-order probability model, then, it seems we need the possible worlds to be those of first-order logic—that is, a set of objects with relations among them and an interpretation that maps constant symbols to objects, predicate symbols to relations, and function symbols to functions on those objects. Problem: the set of first-order models is infinite. Solution: The database semantics makes the unique names assumption—here, we adopt it for the constant symbols. It also assumes domain closure - there are no more objects than those that are named. We can then guarantee a finite set of possible worlds by making the set of objects in each world be exactly the set of constant Norvig I 541 Symbols that are used. There is no uncertainty about the mapping from symbols to objects or about the objects that exist. Relational probability models: We will call models defined in this way relational probability models, or RPMs. The name relational probability model was given by Pfeffer (2000)(2) to a slightly different representation, but the underlying ideas are the same. >Uncertainty/AI research. Norvig I 552 Judea Pearl developed the message-passing method for carrying out inference in tree networks (Pearl, 1982a)(3) and polytree networks (Kim and Pearl, 1983)(4) and explained the importance of causal rather than diagnostic probability models, in contrast to the certainty-factor systems then in vogue. The first expert system using Bayesian networks was CONVINCE (Kim, 1983)(5). Early applications in medicine included the MUNIN system for diagnosing neuromuscular disorders (Andersen et al., 1989)(6) and the PATHFINDER system for pathology (Heckerman, 1991)(7). Norvig I 553 Perhaps the most widely used Bayesian network systems have been the diagnosis and- repair modules (e.g., the PrinterWizard) in Microsoft Windows (Breese and Heckerman, 1996)(8) and the Office Assistant in Microsoft Office (Horvitz et al., 1998)(9). Another important application area is biology: Bayesian networks have been used for identifying human genes by reference to mouse genes (Zhang et al., 2003)(10), inferring cellular networks Friedman (2004)(11), and many other tasks in bioinformatics. We could go on, but instead we’ll refer you to Pourret et al. (2008)(12), a 400-page guide to applications of Bayesian networks. Ross Shachter (1986)(13), working in the influence diagram community, developed the first complete algorithm for general Bayesian networks. His method was based on goal-directed reduction of the network using posterior-preserving transformations. Pearl (1986)(14) developed a clustering algorithm for exact inference in general Bayesian networks, utilizing a conversion to a directed polytree of clusters in which message passing was used to achieve consistency over variables shared between clusters. A similar approach, developed by the statisticians David Spiegelhalter and Steffen Lauritzen (Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter, 1988)(15), is based on conversion to an undirected form of graphical model called a Markov network. This approach is implemented in the HUGIN system, an efficient and widely used tool for uncertain reasoning (Andersen et al., 1989)(6). Boutilier et al. (1996)(16) show how to exploit context-specific independence in clustering algorithms. Norvig I 604 Dynamic Bayesian networks (DBNs): can be viewed as a sparse encoding of a Markov process and were first used in AI by Dean and Kanazawa (1989b)(17), Nicholson and Brady (1992)(18), and Kjaerulff (1992)(19). The last work extends the HUGIN Bayes net system to accommodate dynamic Bayesian networks. The book by Dean and Wellman (1991)(20) helped popularize DBNs and the probabilistic approach to planning and control within AI. Murphy (2002)(21) provides a thorough analysis of DBNs. Dynamic Bayesian networks have become popular for modeling a variety of complex motion processes in computer vision (Huang et al., 1994(22); Intille and Bobick, 1999)(23). Like HMMs, they have found applications in speech recognition (Zweig and Russell, 1998(24); Richardson et al., 2000(25); Stephenson et al., 2000(26); Nefian et al., 2002(27); Livescu et al., 2003(28)), Norvig I 605 genomics (Murphy and Mian, 1999(29); Perrin et al., 2003(30); Husmeier, 2003(31)) and robot localization (Theocharous et al., 2004)(32). The link between HMMs and DBNs, and between the forward–backward algorithm and Bayesian network propagation, was made explicitly by Smyth et al. (1997)(33). A further unification with Kalman filters (and other statistical models) appears in Roweis and Ghahramani (1999)(34). Procedures exist for learning the parameters (Binder et al., 1997a(35); Ghahramani, 1998(36)) and structures (Friedman et al., 1998)(37) of DBNs. 1. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982). Causal schemata in judgements under uncertainty. In Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., and Tversky, A. (Eds.), Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge University Press. 2. Pfeffer, A. (2000). Probabilistic Reasoning for Complex Systems. Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University 3. Pearl, J. (1982a). Reverend Bayes on inference engines: A distributed hierarchical approach. In AAAI- 82, pp. 133–136 4. Kim, J. H. and Pearl, J. (1983). A computational model for combined causal and diagnostic reasoning in inference systems. In IJCAI-83, pp. 190–193. 5. Kim, J. H. (1983). CONVINCE: A Conversational Inference Consolidation Engine. Ph.D. thesis, Department of Computer Science, University of California at Los Angeles. 6. Andersen, S. K., Olesen, K. G., Jensen, F. V., and Jensen, F. (1989). HUGIN—A shell for building Bayesian belief universes for expert systems. In IJCAI-89, Vol. 2, pp. 1080–1085. 7. Heckerman, D. (1991). Probabilistic Similarity Networks. MIT Press. 8. Breese, J. S. and Heckerman, D. (1996). Decisiontheoretic troubleshooting: A framework for repair and experiment. In UAI-96, pp. 124–132. 9. Horvitz, E. J., Breese, J. S., Heckerman, D., and Hovel, D. (1998). The Lumiere project: Bayesian user modeling for inferring the goals and needs of software users. In UAI-98, pp. 256–265. 10. Zhang, L., Pavlovic, V., Cantor, C. R., and Kasif, S. (2003). Human-mouse gene identification by comparative evidence integration and evolutionary analysis. Genome Research, pp. 1–13. 11. Friedman, N. (2004). Inferring cellular networks using probabilistic graphical models. Science, 303(5659), 799–805. 12. Pourret, O., Naım, P., and Marcot, B. (2008). Bayesian Networks: A practical guide to applications. Wiley. 13. Shachter, R. D. (1986). Evaluating influence diagrams. Operations Research, 34, 871–882. 14. Pearl, J. (1986). Fusion, propagation, and structuring in belief networks. AIJ, 29, 241–288. 15. Lauritzen, S. and Spiegelhalter, D. J. (1988). Local computations with probabilities on graphical structures and their application to expert systems. J. Royal Statistical Society, B 50(2), 157–224. 16. Boutilier, C., Friedman, N., Goldszmidt, M., and Koller, D. (1996). Context-specific independence in Bayesian networks. In UAI-96, pp. 115–123. 17. Dean, T. and Kanazawa, K. (1989b). A model for reasoning about persistence and causation. Computational Intelligence, 5(3), 142–150. 18. Nicholson, A. and Brady, J. M. (1992). The data association problem when monitoring robot vehicles using dynamic belief networks. In ECAI-92, pp. 689–693. 19. Kjaerulff, U. (1992). A computational scheme for reasoning in dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-92, pp. 121–129. 20. Dean, T. and Wellman, M. P. (1991). Planning and Control. Morgan Kaufmann. 21. Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic Bayesian Networks: Representation, Inference and Learning. Ph.D. thesis, UC Berkeley 22. Huang, T., Koller, D., Malik, J., Ogasawara, G., Rao, B., Russell, S. J., and Weber, J. (1994). Automatic symbolic traffic scene analysis using belief networks. In AAAI-94, pp. 966–972 23. Intille, S. and Bobick, A. (1999). A framework for recognizing multi-agent action from visual evidence. In AAAI-99, pp. 518–525. 24. Zweig, G. and Russell, S. J. (1998). Speech recognition with dynamic Bayesian networks. In AAAI-98, pp. 173–180. 25. Richardson, M., Bilmes, J., and Diorio, C. (2000). Hidden-articulator Markov models: Performance improvements and robustness to noise. In ICASSP-00. 26. Stephenson, T., Bourlard, H., Bengio, S., and Morris, A. (2000). Automatic speech recognition using dynamic bayesian networks with both acoustic and articulatory features. In ICSLP-00, pp. 951-954. 27. Nefian, A., Liang, L., Pi, X., Liu, X., and Murphy, K. (2002). Dynamic bayesian networks for audiovisual speech recognition. EURASIP, Journal of Applied Signal Processing, 11, 1–15. 28. Livescu, K., Glass, J., and Bilmes, J. (2003). Hidden feature modeling for speech recognition using dynamic Bayesian networks. In EUROSPEECH-2003, pp. 2529–2532 29. Murphy, K. and Mian, I. S. (1999). Modelling gene expression data using Bayesian networks. people.cs.ubc.ca/˜murphyk/Papers/ismb99.pdf. 30. Perrin, B. E., Ralaivola, L., and Mazurie, A. (2003). Gene networks inference using dynamic Bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19, II 138-II 148. 31. Husmeier, D. (2003). Sensitivity and specificity of inferring genetic regulatory interactions from microarray experiments with dynamic bayesian networks. Bioinformatics, 19(17), 2271-2282. 32. Theocharous, G., Murphy, K., and Kaelbling, L. P. (2004). Representing hierarchical POMDPs as DBNs for multi-scale robot localization. In ICRA-04. 33. Smyth, P., Heckerman, D., and Jordan, M. I. (1997). Probabilistic independence networks for hidden Markov probability models. Neural Computation, 9(2), 227–269. 34. Roweis, S. T. and Ghahramani, Z. (1999). A unifying review of Linear GaussianModels. Neural Computation, 11(2), 305–345. 35. Binder, J., Koller, D., Russell, S. J., and Kanazawa, K. (1997a). Adaptive probabilistic networks with hidden variables. Machine Learning, 29, 213–244. 36. Ghahramani, Z. (1998). Learning dynamic bayesian networks. In Adaptive Processing of Sequences and Data Structures, pp. 168–197. 37. Friedman, N., Murphy, K., and Russell, S. J. (1998). Learning the structure of dynamic probabilistic networks. In UAI-98. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Norvig I Peter Norvig Stuart J. Russell Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010 |
Beauty | Ancient Philosophy | Gadamer I 481 Beauty/Ancient Philosophy/Gadamer: The Greek word for the German "schön" (engl. beautiful) is kalon. There are no complete equivalents in German, not even when we use the mediating pulchrum but Greek thinking has exerted a certain determination on the history of meaning of the German word, so that essential moments of meaning are common to both words. With the addition "beautiful" we distinguish from what we call technology, i.e. from "mechanical" arts that produce useful things. It is similar with words such as: beautiful morality, beautiful literature, beautiful spirit/belletristic (German: "schöngeistig") and so on. In all these uses the word is in a similar contrast to the Greek kalon to the term chresimon ((s) useful). Everything that does not belong to the necessities of life, but the "how" of life that concerns eu zen, i.e. everything that the Greeks understood by Paideia, is called kalon. Practicality: The beautiful things are those whose value for themselves is obvious. You cannot ask what purpose they serve. They are excellent for their own sake (di' hauto haireton) and not like the useful for the sake of something else. Already the use of language thus reveals the elevated rank of being of what is called kalon. Ugly: But also the ordinary contrast that defines the concept of the beautiful, the contrast to the ugly (aischron), points in the same direction. Aischron (ugly) is that which cannot stand the sight. Beautiful: Beautiful is that which can be seen, the handsome in the broadest sense of the word. "Handsome" is also a German term for greatness. And indeed, the use of the word "beautiful" - in Greek as in German - always requires a certain stately greatness. Morality: By pointing the direction of meaning to the respectable in the whole sphere of the outwardly pleasing, the custom approaches at the same time the conceptual Gadamer I 482 articulation that was given by the contrast to the useful (chresimon). The good: The concept of the beautiful therefore enters into the closest relationship with that of the good (agathon), in so far as it subordinates itself as an end to be chosen for its own sake, as an end that is anything but useful. For what is beautiful is not seen as a means to something else. >Beauty/Plato. Measure/Order/Proportion: The basis of the close connection between the idea of beauty and the teleological order of being is the Pythagorean-Platonic concept of measure. Plato determines the beautiful by measure, appropriateness and proportion; Aristotle names as the moments (eide) of the beautiful order Gadamer I 483 (taxis), well-proportionedness (symmetria) and determination (horismenon) and finds the same given in mathematics in an exemplary way. >Beauty/Aristotle. Nature/Beauty/Gadamer: As one can see, such a determination of beauty is a universal ontological one. Nature and art do not form any contrast here, which means of course that especially with regard to beauty the primacy of nature is undisputed. Art may perceive within the "gestalt" whole of the natural order recessed possibilities of artistic design and in this way makes the beautiful nature of the order of being perfect. But that does not mean at all that "beauty" is primarily to be found in art. As long as the order of being is understood as being divine itself or as God's creation - and the latter is valid up to the 18th century - also the exceptional case of art can only be understood within the horizon of this order of being. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Beauty | Aristotle | Gadamer I 482 Beauty/Aristotle/Gadamer: The basis of the close connection between the idea of beauty and the teleological order of being is the Pythagorean-Platonic concept of measure. Plato determines the beautiful by measure, appropriateness and proportion; Aristotle(1) names as the moments (eide) of the beautiful order Gadamer I 483 (taxis), well-proportionedness (symmetria) and determination (horismenon) and finds the same given in mathematics in an exemplary way. The close connection between the mathematical orders of essence of the beautiful and the celestial order further means that the cosmos, the model of all visible well-being, is also the highest example of beauty in the visible. Dimensional adequacy, symmetry is the decisive condition of all being beautiful. >Beauty/Plato, >Beauty/Ancient Philosophy. 1. Arist. Met. M 4, 1078 a 3—6. Cf. Grabmann's introduction to Ulrich of Strasbourg De pulchro, p. 31 (Jbø bayer. Akad. d. Wiss. 1926), as well as the valuable introduction by G. Santinello to Nicolai de Cusa, Tota pulchra es, Atti e Mem. della Academia Patavina LXXI. Nicolaus goes back to Ps. Dionysios and Albert, who determined medieval thinking about beauty. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Beauty | Plato | Gadamer I 482 Beauty/Plato/Gadamer: In Platonic philosophy [we] (...) find (...) a close connection and not seldom an interchange of the idea of the good with the idea of the beautiful. Cf. >Beauty/Ancient Philosophy. Both are beyond all that is conditioned and many: the beautiful in itself meets the loving soul at the end of a path leading through the manifold beauty as the one, unifying, exuberant ("Symposion"), just as the idea of the good is beyond all that is conditioned and many, which is only good in certain respects ("Politeia"). The beautiful in itself shows itself to be beyond all that exists as well as the good in itself (epekeina). Order/Being: The order of being, which consists in the order of the one good, thus agrees with the order of the beautiful. The path of love that Diotima teaches leads via the beautiful bodies to the beautiful souls and from there to the beautiful institutions, customs and laws, finally to the sciences (e.g. to the beautiful numerical relations of which the theory of numbers knows), to this "wide sea of beautiful speeches"(1) - and leads beyond all this. Gadamer: One can ask oneself whether the transgression of the sphere of the sensually visible into the real means a differentiation and enhancement of the beauty of the beautiful and not merely that of the existing, which is beautiful. But Plato obviously means that the teleological order of being is also an order of beauty, that beauty appears more pure and clearer in the intelligible realm than in the visible, which is clouded by the immoderate and imperfect. Middle Ages: In the same way, medieval philosophy closely connected the concept of beauty with that of good, bonum, so closely that a classical Aristotle passage about kalon was not understandable in the Middle Ages because the translation here simply rendered the word kalon with bonum.(2) Measure/Proportion: The basis of the close connection between the idea of the beautiful and the teleological order of being is the Pythagorean-Platonic concept of measure. Plato defines the beautiful by measure, appropriateness and proportion; Aristotle names as the moments (eide) of the beautiful order. >Beauty/Aristotle. Gadamer I 484 The Good/Beauty/Plato: As closely Plato (...) linked the idea of the beautiful with that of the good he also has in mind a difference between the two, and this difference contains a peculiar advantage of the beautiful. (...) the inconceivability of the good [finds] a correspondence in the beautiful, i.e. in the moderation of the existing and the revelation that belongs to it (aletheia) (...), inasmuch as a final exuberance also belongs to it. However, Plato can also say that in the attempt to grasp the good itself, the same flees into the beautiful(1). Thus, the beautiful differs from the absolutely intangible good in that it is more easily grasped. It has to be something appearing in its own essence. In the search for goodness, beauty is manifested. This is first Gadamer I 485 a distinction of the same for the human soul. Virtue/Appearance: That which shows itself in perfect form attracts the desire for love. The beautiful immediately takes on a life of its own, whereas the models of human virtue are otherwise only darkly recognizable in the murky medium of appearances, because they possess, as it were, no light of their own, so that we often fall into the impure imitations and illusory forms of virtue. This is different with beauty. Beautiful/Plato: It has its own brightness, so that we are not seduced here by distorted images. For "beauty alone has been granted this, that it is the most luminous (ekphanestaton) and lovable thing"(3). Ontology/Rank/Order: Obviously, it is the distinction of the beautiful from the good that it presents itself from itself, makes itself immediately obvious in its being. Thus it has the most important ontological function that can exist, namely that of mediating between idea and appearance. Appearance/Idea/Mediation: There is the metaphysical crux of Platonism. It is condensed in the concept of participation (methexis) and concerns both the relationship of appearance to the idea as well as the relationship of the ideas to each other. As "Phaidros" teaches, it is no coincidence that Plato particularly likes to illustrate this controversial relationship of "participation" by the example of the beautiful. >Methexis/Plato. Beauty does not only appear in what is sensually visible, but in such a way that it is actually there, i.e. that it stands out as one out of all. The beautiful is really "most luminous" in itself (to ekphanestaton). ((s) see above ontological rank). Thus "emergence" is not only one of the qualities of what is beautiful, but constitutes its very essence. The distinction of what is beautiful, that it directly attracts the desire of the human soul, is rooted in its way of being. It is the moderation of being that does not only let it be what it is, but also lets it emerge as a harmonious whole that is measured in itself. Alethia: This is the revelation (alétheia) that Plato speaks of, which belongs to the essence of the beautiful.(4) Shine/Appearance/appear: Beauty is not simply symmetry, but the appearance itself, which is based on it. It is of the nature of appearance. Appearance, however, means: to shine on something and thus to make an appearance of that on which the appearance falls. Gadamer I 491 Aletheia/Plato: [Plato] first of all, in the beautiful, has shown the alétheia as its essential moment, and it is clear what he means by this: the beautiful, the way in which the good appears, makes itself manifest in its being, presents itself. Cf. >Beauty/Thomas Aquinas. Representation/Presentation: What presents itself in this way is not distinguished from itself in that it presents itself. It is not something for itself and something else for others. It is also not something different. It is not the glamour poured out over a figure that falls on it from outside. Rather, it is the very condition of being of the figure itself, to shine in this way, to present itself in this way. It follows from this that, with regard to being beautiful, the beautiful must always be understood ontologically as an "image". Idea and appearance: It makes no difference whether "it itself" or its image appears. As we had seen, the metaphysical distinction of beauty was that it closed the hiatus between idea and appearance. It is "idea" for sure, that is, it belongs to an order of being. 1. Symp. 210 d: Reden Verhältnisse. I Vol. „Unterwegs zur Schrift“, Ges. Werke 7.1 2. Arist. Mead. M 4, 1078 a 3-6. Cf. Grabmann's introduction to Ulrich von Straßburg De pulchro, p. 31 (Jbø bayer. Akad. d. Wiss. 1926), as well as the valuable introduction by G. Santinello to Nicolai de Cusa, Tota pulchra es, Atti e Mem. della Academia Patavina LXXI. Nicolaus goes back to Ps. Dionysios and Albert, who determined medieval thinking about beauty. 3. Phaidr. 250 d 7. 4. Phil. 51 d. Bubner I 35 Beauty/Good/Plato/Bubner: in the beautiful, we are content to have the illusion. In the good, we cannot be content with the illusion. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
Beliefs | Quine | I 365 Beliefs and quotes can be understood as all sorts of different things (vagueness). I 372 Paul and Elmer: belief does not produce sentences like legends. The following cannot be decided: that Paul believes true and Elmer does not. If the truth value does not matter, believing is no relative term. W believes x is no predicate - w believes p: p is not a term. >Truth Value/Quine. VII (h) 142 Belief/Quine: there is no relation. Belief is related to the false sentence. Instead Church argues that belief and knowledge just resemble quotes - (>Opaque contexts, >Opacity). XII 34 Belief/Quine: E.g. Thomas believes that Tullius wrote the Ars Magna - in fact, he confuses Tullius with Lullus. There are two options: a) Tom does not believe that Cicero (Tullius) wrote the Ars Magna, he just confuses the names, i.e. he knows who wrote the Ars Magna - here Tullius does not purely appear in a referential way. b) He believes something wrong: then Tullius is purely indicative. Stroud I 228 Belief/Knowledge/Quine: knowledge is not part of belief - nothing we believe about the external world is knowledge. >Knowledge/Quine. Brandom I 790/791 Relational Belief/Quine: relational belief brings along a special epistemic access to or contact with objects and de re-attributions which include existence stipulations. Quine I 146 To the same extent that radical translation is underdetermined by the totality of dispositions to linguistic behavior, our theories and beleifs are underdetermined forever and ever. II 55 Stimulus/Quine: a stimulus does not make statements true, but leads to documented beliefs. IV 413 Quine Two Dogmas: Thesis: "The totality of our so-called knowledge and/or our beliefs - from the most incidental things of geography to the most fundamental laws even of mathematics and logic - is a material knitted by humans, which meets experience only at its edges. The totality of science is like a force field whose boundary conditions are experiences." VI 20 Change/Theory Change/Quine: If we change our beliefs, many sentences must be spared, also because they are simply irrelevant! But if we reject beliefs, we have to track down all sentences that contain them. "Maxime of Minimal Mutilation". VI 92 Belief/Quine: Example "x believes that p" is itself a permanent sentence, because a belief is a state. VI 94 Belief/Quine: can always be common to a plurality of subjects. Moreover, perceptions are always perceived veritatively, beliefs are not perceived this way. ((s) One cannot perceive something wrong.) VI 100 Perception/Belief/Quine: Every perception is in principle completely describable using strictly neurological terms. However, this does not apply to beliefs. >Perception/Quine. XIII 18 Belief/Quine: believing is thinking in a certain limited sense. To believe something is to think it. "Think like this" and "believe like this" are interchangeable and also "think that" and "believe that". But they differ elsewhere. Thinking/Quine: for example we can think intensely, but we cannot believe intensely. For example we can believe something, but not think something. Grammar forbids this. Belief/Thinking/Action/Disposition/Quine: Belief is a disposition - thinking is an activity. Thinking can make us tired, belief cannot. XIII 19 We also do not sit there and believe something. Only the White Queen from Alice in Wonderland does that: before breakfast she believes 6 impossible things. Wrong: e.g. a young man in love believes what his lover believes - Example William James' "Will to believe": Example Pascal's bet, Example Tertullian: credo quia absurdum: these are distortions of the concept of belief. Belief/Disposition/Quine: what then is the believer disposed for? A good test is to ask someone to use money for what he/she is pleading for. XIII 20 Problem: this is only possible with decidable questions, not with the question whether beauty is truth. Beauty/Truth/Belief/Keats/Quine: one also wonders whether Keats really believed that. Maybe he just wanted to create a bit of beauty himself, like e.g. Morning Star: "just for the rhyme". >Beauty/Quine. Belief/Quine: belief comes mostly in bundles of dispositions. It is remarkable that this can lead to such different actions as, for example, booking a cruise, or tidying up the room. Thesis: these extremely different mental states (mental state, internal state) have nothing in common. XIII 21 The only thing in common is linguistically: the "that". ((s) > propositional attitudes). Problem: the constant form of "x believes that p" lets us assume that the rest of the sentence is also in order. But this changes from case to case, so that it is difficult to draw a line here. Belief/Paradox/Quine: to believe something is to believe that it is true. So a person believes that all his/her beliefs are true. But experience shows that some beliefs are wrong, as this person knows very well. Problem: So a rational person believes that every one of his/her beliefs are true and yet some are false. I would have expected something better from rational people. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
Biconditional | Tarski | Horwich I 124 Biconditional/iff/if and only if/Tarski: no relation between sentences. - No names of sentences emerge. Contrary to that: Equivalence relation between sentences: combination of names of sentences. (1) >Names of sentences, >Equivalence, >Sentences. 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Bundle Theory | Kripke | I 78 Relevance of theory-dependent properties (VsBundle Theory). >Relevance, >Theory dependence. Bundle theory/(s): the bundle theory states that the meaning of names consists of a certain set of properties associated with a name, e.g. Moses. Then the meaning of the name Moses would be, among other things, "the one who led the people out of Egypt". Kripke: so this means that some properties are more important than others. However, a theory must specify how this weighting is to proceed. All bundle theories are ill at times because they do not specify exactly what a sufficient number of properties must be met. I 79 What are the relevant properties? If you say, "Moses did not exist", this can mean many things: it can mean: "the Israelites did not have a leader" or "their leader was not called Moses" or "there was no man who accomplished all this". >Properties/Kripke. Kripke: the essential point is that we know a priori that Moses, if the biblical story is essentially wrong, did not exist. The biblical story does not indicate any necessary qualities of Moses, so he could have lived without accomplishing any of these things. >Necessary/Kripke, >Necessary de re/Kripke. I 80 One could say "the Jonah of the Book never existed", as one could say "the Hitler of Nazi propaganda never existed". Existence is independent of representation. >Existence/Kripke, >Presentation, >Description dependence/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
Canonicalness | Quine | I 380ff Canonical notation: a canonical notation is only direct speech, observable behavior and physical constitution. It is not irreal conditional sentences. Lauener XI 35 Canonical notation/Quine/Lauener: the notation contains no names or descriptions - a casual sentence must be made timeless. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
Causal Theory of Knowledge | Schiffer | I 282 Causal theory/Schiffer: a causal theory is used when you have no premises. Cf. >Causal theory of knowledge, >Causal theory of reference, >Causal theory of names, >Premises, >Theories, >Explanation. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Causal Theory of Names | Cresswell | II 152 Causal theory/Names: Devitt pro: Devitt is one of the toughest representatives of the causal theory. - Yet he proposes the concept of a "D-chain": "Description chain". ((s) The causal chain is to go back to the naming of an object, while a descriptive chain can deviate from it. A description can contain misunderstandings and misidentifications.) >Michael Devitt, >Causal chain, >Descriptions. II 153 Devitt Thesis: In opaque belief contexts, a name refers to the appropriate description chain. >Opacity, >Beliefs. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Causal Theory of Names | Devitt | II 152 Causal theory/Names: Devitt pro: Devitt is one of the toughest representatives of the causal theory. - Yet he assumes "D-chains": "Description chains": II 153 Devitt Thesis: In opaque belief contexts, a name refers to the appropriate description chain. We have to distinguish between a chain of descriptions and a >causal chain. >Names, >Causality, >Causal theory of reference, >Reference, >Opacity, >Opaque contexts, >Identification. |
Devi I M. Devitt Realism and Truth Princeton 1996 |
Causal Theory of Names | Evans | I 316 EvansVsCausal Theory (of names): the theory cannot exclude that the speaker who listened to the name Louis in the pub, will always refer to Louis XIV in the future. Kripke's causal theory involves the intention of the speaker to preserve the causal chain. Cf. >Speaker meaning. I 317 Name/EvansVsCausal Theory/EvansVsKripke: Kripke is ambivalent: if the link is useful for him, he uses it. The criteria for "About whom does he believe something?" deviate dramatically from those of "Who is the original namegiver?" The causal theory ignores the important context. E.g. if names are assigned according to rules, a speaker could make up names without causal connection by simply applying the rules. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
Causal Theory of Names | Stalnaker | I 211 Causal Chain/Stalnaker: when the causal chain is part of the descriptive semantics (part of the semantic content), then it is said how - given this descriptive semantics - the referents are set out by the facts. >Causal chain, >Causality, >Proper names, >Facts. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Circumstances | Kripke | I 119 Circumstances/conditions: are there really circumstances under which Hesperus would not have been Phosphorus? E.g. suppose someone comes along, and he/she names two different stars Hesperus. >Morning star/Evening star. That could even happen if the same conditions prevail as when both names were introduced by us. But are they conditions under which Hesperus is not Phosphorus or would not have been Phosphorus? That does not seem to be the case. >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Speaker reference. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
Classes | Mill | I 48 Class names/Mill: sometimes one tries to explain general terms as "class names". MillVs: better reverse: Definiton Class/Mill: an undefined set of particulars, which is denoted by a generic name (general term). Difference to "collectives" (> distribution): collectives only belong to wholenesses E.g. "76th regiment". This is not a general term but a singular term for a whole. E.g "a regiment": is at the same time a singular term and a general term. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 |
Classes | Quine | I 289 Class abstraction is attributed to singular descriptions: (iy)(x)(x from y iff ..x..). Instead: x^(..x..). This does not work for intensional abstraction. Difference classes/properties: classes are identical with the same elements. Properties are not yet identical if they are assigned to the same things. >Properties/Quine. II 29 Classes: one could reinterpret all classes in their complement: "no element of .." and you would never notice anything. At the bottom layer every relative clause, every general term determines a class. II 100 Russell (Principia Mathematica(1)) classes are things: they must not be confused with the concept of classes. However: paradoxes also apply to class terms and propositional functions are not only for classes. Incomplete symbols (explanation by use) are used to explain away classes. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. VII (a) 18 Classes/Quine: simplify our access to physics but are still a myth. VII (f) 114 Classes/Quine: classes are no accumulations or collections! E.g. the class of stones in a pile cannot be identified with the pile: otherwise another class could also be identified with the same pile: e.g. the class of stone molecules in the pile. The validity theory applies to classes, but not to the individual sentences - predicates are not names of classes, classes are the extension of predicates - classes are assumed to be pre-existent. IX 21 Classes/Relations/Quine: classes are real objects if values of bound variables. IX 23 Class/Individuals/Quine: everything is class! If we understand individuals to be identical to their class of one (i.e. not elementless). IX 223 Classes/Quine: quantification through classes allows for terms that would otherwise be beyond our reach. XIII 24 Class/Quantity/Quine: we humans are stingy and so predisposed that we never use two words for the same thing, or we demand a distinction that should underlie it. XIII 25 Example ape/monkey: we distinguish them by size, while French and Germans have only one word for them. Problem: how is the dictionary supposed to explain the difference between "beer, which is rightly called so" and "ale, which is rightly called so"? Example Sets/Classes/Quine: here this behaves similarly. Class/Mathematics: some mathematicians treat classes as something of the same kind as properties (Quine pro, see above): sets as something more robust, though still abstract. >Properties/Quine. Classes: can contain sets as elements, but not other classes. (see impredicativity). Paradox/Paradoxes/Quine: lead to some element relationships not being able to define sets. Nevertheless, they can still define classes! von Neumann: established such a system in 1925. It simplifies evidence and strengthens the system, albeit at the risk of paradoxes. >Paradoxes/Quine. Problem: it requires imaginative distinctions and doublings, e.g. for every set there must be a coextensive class. Solution/Quine. (Quine 1940): simply identify the sets with the coextensive classes. XIII 26 Def Classes/Def Sets/QuineVsNeuman: new: sets are then classes of a certain type: a class is a set if it is an element of a class. A class is a Def outermost class/Quine: if it is not an element of a class. Russell's Paradox/Quine: some authors thought that by distinguishing between classes and sets, it showed that Russell's antinomy was mere confusion. Solution/some authors: classes themselves are not such substantial objects that they would come into question as candidates for elements according to a condition of containment. But sets can be. On the other hand: Sets: had never been understood as defined by conditions of abstinence. And from the beginning they had been governed by principles that Zermelo later made explicit. QuineVs: these are very perishable assumptions! In reality, sets were classes from the beginning, no matter what they were called. Vagueness of one word was also vagueness of the other word. Sets/Cantor/Quine: sure, the first sets at Cantor were point sets, but that does not change anything. QuineVsTradition/Quine: it is a myth to claim that sets were conceived independently of classes, and were later confused with them by Russell. That again is the mistake of seeing a difference in a difference between words. Solution/Quine: we only need sets and outermost classes to enjoy the advantages of von Neumann. >Sets/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Classes | Russell | I XIV Classes/Concepts/Gödel: can be construed as real objects, namely as "multiplicities of things" and concepts as properties or relations of things that exist independently of our definitions and constructions - which is just as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies - they are as necessary for mathematics as they are for physics. >Platonism, >Universals, >Mathematical entities, cf. >Hartry Field's Antiplatonism. I XVIII Set/Gödel: realistic: classes exist, circle fault no fault, not even if it is seen constructivistically. But Gödel is a non-constructivist. Russell: classes are only facon de parler, only class names, term, no real classes. I XVIII Class names/Russell: eliminate through translation rules. I XVIII Classes/Principia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Gödel: Principia do without classes, but only if one assumes the existence of a concept whenever one wants to construct a class - E.g. "red" or "colder" must be regarded as real objects. I 37 Class/Principia Mathematica/Russell: The class formed by the function jx^ is to be represented by z^ (φ z) - E.g. if φ x is an equation, z^ (φ z) will be the class of its roots - Example if φ x means: "x has two legs and no feathers", z^ (φ z) will be the class of the humans. I 120 Class/Principia Mathematica/Russell: incomplete symbol. >Incomplete symbols. Function: Complete Symbol - therefore no transitivity when classes are inserted for variables - E.g. x = y . x = z . > . y = z (transitivity) is a propositional function which always applies. But not if we insert a class for x and functions for y and z. - E.g. "z^ (φ z) = y ! z^" is not a value of "x = y" - because classes are incomplete symbols. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Flor III 117 Classes/sets/things/objects/Russell/Flor: sets must not be seen as things - otherwise, we would always have also 2n things at n things (combinations - i.e. we would have more things than we already have - Solution: Eliminate class symbols from expressions - instead designations for propositional functions. >Quine: Class Abstraction. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
Clauses | Frege | Dummett III 7 Subsentence/indirect speech/question: in the subsentence, singular terms do not stand for the object, but for its sense - this is the only case in which a (sub-)sentence stands for the proposition. Tradition: subsentences are not truth-functional. FregeVs. >Singular terms, >Objects, >Sense, >Thought, >Truth functions, >Propositions, >That-clauses. Frege II 54 Description/Subordinate Clause: the discoverer of the planetary orbits = object: Kepler. (Meaning (reference): has no truth value. The meaning of the subordinate clause is not a complete thought (it cannot be the main clause). II 62 Subordinate Clause/Subsentence/Meaning/Truth Value/tr.val./Frege: e.g. Bebel beleived that the return of Alsace-Lorraine will appease the feeling of vengeance of France. Here, two ideas are implicit: 1) That Bebel believes that. 2) That it is wrong. The first meaning: is a thought. The second meaning: is a truth value. Therefore, the subordinate clause is actually to be taken twice. Since the truth value is not the whole meaning, we cannot just replace it. Similar: e.g. knowledge, recognition, "it is known". II 63 Subordinate Clauses/Subordinate Clause/Frege: e.g. false belief implies two meanings: a thought and a truth value. Propositional attitudes are similar. >Propositional attitudes. IV 69 Description/Subordinate Clause/Subsentence/Name/Frege: e.g. "The negation of the idea that 3 is greater than 5". Here, this term refers to a specific individual thing. This individual thing is a thought. The definite article turns the whole expression into a single name, a representative of a proper name. >Proper names. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Clauses | Searle | V 120 Clause/subordinate sentence/SearleVsFrege/SearleVsTarski/Tarski: subordinate clauses are not names of sentences. Words in quotation marks are not names of words. Otherwise there is "regress". >Names of sentences, >Regress, >Clause/Frege, >Clause/Schiffer. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Code | Flusser | I 82 Codes/Flusser: The rules that arrange the symbols within a code form the network on which the info becomes information in the first place. >Information, >Meaning, >Symbol, >Sign, >Order. In English, this network is formed inter alia by the rule subject predicate. Therefore, all the information in this code becomes information about the relation subject predicate. >Grammar, >Syntax, >Predication, >Sentences, >Language, >Convention. Chinese or Eskimo languages are different "universes". >Translation, >Meaning. In an extreme example of "Fire!" they seem to be falling apart. The information "There's a fire!" is another, depending on whether it is called or transmitted by ringing bells. I 84 ff Codes/Flusser: a) Pre-alphabet b) Alphabet c) Post-alphabet Code functionality: a) Texts b) Images c) Technical pictures >Terminology/Flusser, >Techno-images/Flusser, >Images, >Texts. Pre-alphabet: Since every spoken language consists of far more tones than letters, the relationship between letters and tone is not unambiguous: a letter can mean more than one tone. >Phonemes, >Morphemes. For example, the "e" in "prayer" means two different sounds. On the other hand,"k" and "c" can be the same sound. I 85 The symbols § $ "2" are ideograms which have been transferred from other codes (arithmetic, legal, monetary) into the alphabet. For these and many other reasons, the alphabet must be considered an erroneous, hybrid code that is difficult to use for communication. >Communication. Letters: had formerly names: "Alpha": Aramaic,"ox" "Beta":"house". I 86 Such names indicate that the letters must have meant objects rather than sounds. I 105 Codes/Flusser: are dangerous: they program us without being seen through in their essence and threaten us as opaque walls instead of connecting us to reality as visible bridges. |
Fl I V. Flusser Kommunikologie Mannheim 1996 |
Colour | Lewis | I (b) 35 Colors/Lewis: my myth says: names of color sensations are theoretical terms which were introduced as used names by A-terms (traditional way of speaking) of colours. Example 1: Definition "red": "the one condition that is caused by preference by the presence of something red." Another myth says the opposite: color names were T-terms that were introduced by names of color sensations used as A terms. Example 2: Def "red" (second myth): "the property of things that prefer to evoke red sensations". The two myths cannot be true together, because what should have been there first, the color or the color sensation? But they can both be good! We might be dealing with a circle. But, so what? Two myths, which cannot be true together, can be good together! >Theoretical Terms, >color words. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
Colour | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 117 Color/Color Words/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: red cannot be defined. >Definitions. I 165 Color/Color Words/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: if colors were only represented by different names, that would be all the incompatibility - (no contradiction, no logical incompatibility) - on the other hand: if it is real functions that the points in the field of vision project on the color space (Wittgenstein pro), then there is real logical incompatibility .- "Red" and "green" as mere names are not contradictory - but they are when it comes to one single point - "(form of thought: Third) - (Hintikka: not explicit in Wittgenstein). >Contradictions, >Names. I 191/192 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: "The "colors" are not things that have certain properties so that you could easily look for colors or imagine colors that we do not know yet." I 323 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Wittgenstein does not want to let the differences between the individual experience of colors disappear. - On the contrary: public language must adapt to the nature of these experiences. I 324 It is not about "publicly used", but about "accessible for the public" - E.g. Robinson: must behave in a certain way for us to say that he plays a language game with himself. >Language Game. I 349 Color/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: it is impossible to drive a wedge between physical and phenomenological color attribution... I 343 ...nor between pain and pain behavior. >Behavior. I 276ff Color/Color Words/Color Concepts/Color Theory/Experience/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: at the end, we may delete the color experiences from our statements. I 377 The experiences, however, can be deleted just as little as pain - Color experience is, however, not about spontaneous expressions like sensations - WittgensteinVsPsychological Color Theories - VsEffect Theories of color - color tables are neither linguistically nor behavioristically bound. I 378 But our color words are not based on tables - (that would be like trying to put the rules above the language game)... I 379 ...nor on memories. I 380 Because of their privacy, our notions cannot be used in public language games. I 381 Solution: people simply follow certain language games - this is conceptual, not psychological - in the case of "red" we choose the image that comes to us while listening - (Philosophical Investigations/PI). I 383f Color/Color Words/Impression/Expression/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: We live in a world of impressions - (E.g. color impressions) - but we can only speak of them with reference to physical colors - Representation (Philosophical Investigations/PI § 280): if the painter gives a representation in addition to the image, by what right do we call both a representation? >Sensory impressions, >Representation. I 385 Although colors have a clearer structure than feelings, there is no essential difference between sensation concepts and color concepts. >Concepts. --- II 30 Colors/Color Words/Psychology/Wittgenstein: the fact that we can speak of greenish blue, but not of greenish red, is part of grammar - not psychology - Therefore, the entire color octahedron is not part of psychology. >Grammar. II 60 We need something additional to the color word "green". II 114 Color/Color Words/Grammar/Rule/Idea/Wittgenstein: it would be useless even to try to imagine red and green at the same time at the same place - on the other hand: useful: imagining to lift a man with one hand. II 118 MooreVsWittgenstein e.g. (see above) ...red and green... is a rule for "and". >Rules. II 212 Color/Notion/Wittgenstein: in color words it is essential that we envision a mental image - but this is not a mental act that animates a symbol. >Symbols. II 269 Color/General/Wittgenstein: the many instances of red have nothing in common - there is no thing that is common to all numbers. >Numbers. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
Commands | Millikan | I 53 Imperative/Indicative/Millikan: imperatices are not names of reproductively determined families, but rather categories of eigenfunction. I 100 Command/Millikan: If it is not executed, it has no real value. Def real value/intentional icon/Millikan: the "of what" is an intentional icon; it is the real value. >Terminology/Millikan. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Concepts | Aristotle | Gadamer I 436 Concepts/Aristotle/Gadamer: [in the] Epagoge-Analysis(1) (...) Aristotle (...) had left open in the most ingenious way how general concepts are actually formed. (...) he thus [takes] into account (...) the fact that the natural formation of concepts in language has always been in progress. In this respect, also according to Aristotle, the formation of linguistic concepts possesses a completely undogmatic freedom, in that what is seen as common in experience and thus leads to the general, has the character of a mere preliminary work, which stands at the beginning of science, but is not yet science. Proof/Science/AristotleVsSpeusippus/AristotleVsPlato: If science sets up the compelling ideal of proof, it must go beyond such procedures. Thus Aristotle criticized Speusipp's doctrine of the common as well as Plato's dihairetic dialectic from his ideal of proof. See >Analogies/Speusippus; >Language/Aristotle. 1. An. Post. B 19. --- Adorno XII 50 Concept/Aristotle/Diogenes Laertius/Adorno: according to Diogenes Laertiues Aristotle uses different names for the same thing: in this way, he calls ideas also form (eidos), genus (genos), pattern (paradigm) and beginning (principle, ark). |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
Concepts | Geach | I 26ff Concept/Frege/Geach: the meaning of "people" is not "many people", but the concept. I 220 Concept/GeachVsFrege: Frege: "The concept horse is not a concept" - i.e. it must be an object: this is a fallacy! - Not objects are realized, but concepts. - (The former is not falsehood, but nonsense). >Description level, >Level/Order, >Senseless, >Object. >Correct: E.g. "The concept human being is realized" is divided into "human being" and "the concept ... is realized" - the latter = "something is a...". What cannot be divided like this, is meaningless: E.g. "the concept human being is timeless". I 226 Concept/Frege/Geach: Frege has a purely extensional view - therefore he deals not with the "sense of the name", but the reference of the predicate. ((s) reference/(s): set of designated objects = extension.) >Extension. But: Extension/Frege/Geach: = object Concept/Frege: not an object! Reason: the concept is unsaturated, the object is saturated. >Saturated/unsaturated/Frege. "Red" does not stand for a concept, otherwise the concept would be a name. >Name/Frege. I 228f Concept/Geach: "The concept horse" is not a concept, because otherwise concepts would have names - (...+...) - Nor is a concept a logical unit. - No more than e.g. "Napoleon was a great general and the conqueror of Napoleon was a great general". - E.g. "A man is wise" is not an instance of "___ is wise" ("a man" is not a name), but of a derived predicate "a ... is wise". Sentence/Geach: sentences from which "the concept of human being" cannot be eliminated are pointless! - E.g. "The concept human being is an abstract entity". - Sentences about concepts need a quantifier. >Quantifier, >Quantification, >Sentence/Geach. I 230 Concept/Geach: a concept cannot have a proper name. - Instead, we refer the concept with the predicate. >Predicate/Geach, >Predicate/Frege. VsFrege: he uses pseudo-proper names for concepts: "The extension of the concept x cut the throat of x'." Pseudo-name: "the concept x cut x". >Names/Geach. Geach: correct: the name of the extension is "the range of x for x cut the throat of x'." I 234 Concept/Object/Quine: the distinction between concept and object is unnecessary! >Concept/Quine, >Object/Quine. GeachVsQuine: it is necessary! - Quine's disguised distinction between class and element corresponds to it. >Element relation/Quine, >Class/Quine. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
Concepts | McCrae | Corr I 153 Concepts/language/personality traits/McCrae: The people of two different cultures might have identical traits, but a factor that is richly represented in the vocabulary of the first culture might be missing from the vocabulary of the second. McCrae (1990)(1) noted that there are relatively few English-language adjectives that reflect O (>Openness). For example, there is no single term that designates sensitivity to aesthetic experience; ‘artistic’ comes closest, and it refers to the producer rather than the consumer of art. Yet surely English speakers are capable of responding to beauty (McCrae 2007)(2). Other researchers have argued that entirely new factors are needed. Cheung and her colleagues (Cheung, Cheung, Leung et al. 2003(3); Cheung, Leung, Fan et al. 1996)(4) developed an inventory based on indigenous Chinese personality characteristics, which was subsequently translated into English. 1. McCrae, R. R. 1990. Traits and trait names: how well is Openness represented in natural languages?, European Journal of Personality 4: 119–29 2. McCrae, R. R. 2007. Aesthetic chills as a universal marker of Openness to Experience, Motivation and Emotion 31: 5–11 3. Cheung, F., Cheung, S. F., Leung, K., Ward, C. and Leong, F. 2003. The English version of the Chinese Personality Assessment Inventory, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 34: 433–52 4. Cheung, F. M., Leung, K., Fan, R. M., Song, W. Z., Zhang, J. X. and Zhang, J. P. 1996. Development of the Chinese Personality Assessment Inventory, Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 27: 181–99 Robert R. McCrae, “The Five-Factor Model of personality traits: consensus and controversy”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
Concepts | Meixner | I 153 Name of a term/Meixner: the very term (the name cannot be owned as property). >Names of sentences, >Names of expressions, >Clauses, >Names, >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Properties. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
Concepts | Millikan | I 253 Def Concept/Millikan: a concept denotes a set of intensions that regulate the repetition of an inner concept. Definition Concept/new/Millikan: (further definition): a concept is the ability to identify a thing. N.B.: then concepts show other dimensions beyond beliefs and intensions. >Identification, >Intension, >Belief. I 255 Concept of higher level/Millikan: a concept of higher level is no ability to identify an object, but correspondingly a higher ability: e.g. to recognize a rotated figure as the same figure. Thus, mental names for forms can be created. >Description level. I 256 For example, the ability to recognize people by their faces. >Recognition. I 272 Concept/property/predicate/Millikan: the relation between a concept and world lies between the head and the world and cannot be internalized. Cf. >Reference. I 273 Therefore, there is not even a one-to-one relationship between concepts and properties. Two concepts could correspond to one property and one concept (if it has ambiguous Fregean sense) can correspond to two properties. Even if we know of a concept that a property corresponds to it, this is never a priori knowledge. Properties/a priori/knowledge/Millikan: there is also no a priori knowledge about the incompatibility or compatibility or identity of properties. At most there is natural necessity (natural necessity). "Competition" between properties/MillikanVsStrawson: competition is just another type of "natural necessity" besides causality and identity. It is not a "logical competition". Logic/Concept/Necessity/Millikan: also "logical possibility" and "logical necessity" between concepts are ultimately natural necessities between concepts. Logic/Millikan: one should better consider logic as an empirical science. For example, "S cannot be at the same time P and not P" is either meaningless, because "S" and "P" have no meaning, or something like true because it is a statement about the nature of the world. I 315 Concept/Millikan: Concepts are abilities. Their adequacy is not destroyed by the appearance of a contradiction. I 323 Concept/Knowledge/Millikan: Concepts are abilities, but in an important respect unlike other abilities: e.g. the ability to start a car is so that we immediately know whether we succeed or not, when applying concepts we do not know immediately whether we succeed. Success/Validity/Concept/Millikan: to know the validity of our concepts, they must be able to occur more than once in the same judgment. This is sufficient to be as secure as we can that the concept is really from something real. >Knowledge, >Judgment. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Concepts | Psychological Theories | Corr I 96 Concepts/psychological theories/Allport/Carr/Kingsbury/Deary: Allport’s (Allport 1931)(1) was not a lone voice in the inter-war years’ thinking about the conceptual nature of traits. >Concepts/Allport, >Lexical studies, >Lexical hypothesis. Carr and Kingsbury (1938)(2) recognized that there were trait names in everyday life, that we knew what we meant by them in practical terms, and that they had been introduced to psychology. They opened up by attempting a definition (p. 497): ‘A trait is a conceptual attribute or definition of the reactive nature of the individual. The nature of the individual is defined on the basis of certain observable behaviour characteristics.’ These characteristics, lexically, were nicely described: how an adverbial description of a response (acting persistently), can become a characteristic adjective if it is observed consistently (a persistent person), and how these can become abstracted from people as trait nouns (persistence). Conceptual nature of traits/Carr/Kingsbury: If we knew the ‘organic conditions’ underlying traits we should probably define traits in those terms; but we don’t, so we use ‘behavioural correlates’.(3) Deary: Carr and Kingsbury understood that some trait terms were universal, nomothetic. They saw that people could be located on a dimension made up from antagonistic trait names. They saw similarities in groups of trait words that would allow for groups of similar trait names. >nomothetic/idiographic. For the philosophical discussion cf. >projectivistic/detectivistic, >Euthyphro. 1. Allport, G. W. 1931. What is a trait of personality?. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 25: 368–72 2. Carr, H. A. and Kingsbury, F. A. 1938. The concept of traits, Psychological Review 45: 497–524 3. Ibid. p. 510 Ian J. Deary, “The trait approach to personality”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
Connectives | Mill | Dummett III 66 Name/Mill/Dummett: there is a direct link to the object. Not explainable. >Name, >Name/Mill, cf. >Reference, >Meaning. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Connotation | Eco | I 70 Connotation/Eco: e.g. "This man comes from Basra" (connotative): this awakens a lot in us. >Association. I 76 E.g. Phaedra (Racine) creates a complete genealogy and prehistory by stating mere names. I 116 Connotation/Eco: e.g. "cane" in Italian has the connotation "bad tenor". I 117 This connotation is not known by all users, and only becomes clear from the context. Connotations depend on lexicons that are not common to all users. >Lexicon, >Semantics, >Convention, >Meaning, >Vocabulary. |
Eco I U. Eco Opera aperta, Milano 1962, 1967 German Edition: Das offene Kunstwerk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Eco II U, Eco La struttura assente, Milano 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die Semiotik München 1972 |
Connotation | Mill | I 51 Distinguishing connotation/denotation (co-denoting/non-co-denoting). Definition co-denotating/connotative/Mill: co-denotating/connotative are expressions that denotate a subject and include an attribute in itself. Single Subject: e.g. London, John, England. (Denotation). Single attribute: e.g. White, length, virtue. (Denotation). Co-denotating/connotation: e.g. white, long, virtuous. The word "white" denotes all white things such as snow, paper, etc., and in itself includes the attribute whiteness. >Denotation, >Naming, >Designation, >Predication, >Predicates, >Attribution, >Attributes, >Singular term, >General term, >Proper name. All concrete general names are connotative (co-denotating): e.g. human denotes Peter, Marie, John, etc. as the name of a class. It is applied to them because they possess certain attributes and to express that they possess them, e.g. physicality, a certain form, etc. The word human therefore means all these attributes and all the subjects they possess. The name means the subjects directly, the attributes indirectly.I 53 Even abstract names, although they are only the names of attributes, can be viewed as co-denotating in some cases: because attributes can also be attached to the attributes themselves. E.g. "error" of slowness in a horse: not the actual movement in place is the error, but the slow way of movement I 53 Names/Mill: names are not co-denotating, not connotative: they denote the individuals without any attribute. I 54 E.g. originally, Dartmouth may be located at the mouth of the Dart, but John is not named like this because it formed a part of the meaning that the father might have had the same name. In addition, the mouth of the river may have shifted without changing the name of the city. Proper names adhere to the things themselves (labels) and do not fall away when attributes of the object fall away. Although only God may have the appropriate attributes, it is still a general name and does not belong here anyway. I 55 Co-denotating names/Mill: are identifications: e.g. "the only son of Johann Müller". Also identifies attributes. I 56 So whenever names have any meaning, the meaning is, in what they co-denotate and not in what they denote (the bearer). Non-denotating (normal) names have no meaning. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 |
Consistency | Henkin | Quine IX 224 Henkin: shows the consistency of a ω-contradictory (omega-contradictory) system. (Also Goedel and Tarski). Just interpret "F" as true for all but those objects x that fulfill (7). (7) x ε N, x ≠ 0, x ≠ 1, x ≠ 2... ad infinitum >Sets/Henkin. A theory that is ω-contradictory seems unacceptable even if it is consistent. But according to Henkin, it is easy to see that the term and its definition are misleading. If a system is consistent and yet allows "Ex(x e N u ~Fx)" and "F0", "F1"...all as theorems, and if we guarantee the interpretation of "0" , "1" etc. as names of numbers, then the problem seems to be to interpret "N" as "number" and not more comprehensive. Henkin: shows that "N" can be interpreted as N containing extras even under the most favorable circumstances. (See Sets/Henkin) If the system is ω-contradictory, N must even be interpreted that way. ((s) "Extras": e.g. "...and their successors"). Sometimes it is then possible to limit "N" so that it avoids the extras, and sometimes this is not possible. For example, for every formifiable condition that is verifiably met by 0,1,2... ad infinitum, there is another condition that we can prove is also met by 0,1,2... and yet not by all things that meet the first condition. This is the chronic form of ω-contradictoriness that cannot be cured by an improved version of "N". (Quine: "numerically insegregative"). >Löwenheim. Def Omega-contradictory/(w)/Goedel: (Goedel 1931) is a system when there is a formula "Fx" such that any one of the statements "F0", "F1", "F2",... can be proved ad infinitum in the system, but also "Ex(x ε N and ~Fx)". >Contradictions, >Proofs, >Provability. |
Henkin I Leon Henkin Retracing elementary mathematics New York 1962 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Constants | Mates | I 61 Predicates/Mates: predicates are constants. Cf. >Variables, >Predicates, >Predication, >Logic, >Logical Form, >Logical Formulas, >Individual Constants, >Nouns, >Singular Terms, >Names, >Objects. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
Constants | Tarski | Berka I 496 Names/variables/constants/Tarski: variables represent names constants are names. >Representation, > Proxy, >Variables. For each constant and each variable of the object language (except for the logical constants of the propositional calculus) we can constitute a fundamental feature that contains this sign. The statement variables enter into the fundamental functions neither as functors nor as arguments. Statement variable: any ((s) individual) of them is regarded as an independent fundamental function.(1) >Object language, >Metalanguage. 1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
Content | Frege | Berka I 85 Content/Frege: content is the function of an argument. A concept is formed in the following way: the subject is the argument and the predicate is the function. >Subject, >Predicate, >Function. Berka I 86 Not every content can be assessed: e.g. the idea/concept of a house. >Judgment, >Imagination, >Negation. Berka I 87 Affirmation/Frege: affirmation refers to the whole of content and judgment. Berka I 88 Against: negation/denial: negation is part of the content, not of the judgment. Berka I 87 Def Conceptual Content/Frege/(s): conceptual content is common to passive and active. ((s) From which the same set of conclusions can be drawn.) This has nothing to do with the distinction function/argument. Berka I 96 Content Identity/Frege: content identity differs from the contingency (implication) in that it refers to names, not to contents. Two names have the same content. >Proper names. Problem: characters can sometimes stand for themselves, sometimes they stand for a content. E.g. in geometry, the same point can have different meanings. Therefore, you must use two different names first to show this later. Different names are not a mere formality. Spelling: with a triple bar ≡. This refers to conceptual content. Also content identity needs its own character, because the same content can be determined differently.(1) 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 Content/Frege: content is intension, a way of givenness. >Intensions, >Way of givenness. II 57ff Content/sentence/Frege: content can be true or false. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
Content | Perry | Newen I 110 Multiple Statement Contents/Singular Terms/Names/Descriptions/Indicators/Perry/Newen/Schrenk: Name/Content/Perry: Thesis: the content is always the designated object. >Singular terms, >Objects, >Designation. Informative Identity Sentences/Perry: it need not be possible to fully deal with the problem within the semantics. Description/Perry: has an identifying condition as referential content that can be specified by the description. >Descriptions. Designatory Content: (of the description) is then the object. Semantics/Pragmatics/Perry/Newen/Schrenk: that way, even within the semantic pragmatic aspects become relevant (interpretation, use). >Language use, >Semantics, >Pragmatics. Perry: Thesis: there are multiple statement contents for descriptions and indicators. >Indexicality, >Index words. Frank I 395f Thought is not the same as content: it may be that I now believe that it is beautiful today, but tomorrow do not believe that it was nice yesterday. - Another thought, same content. Then the thought is not the informational content. >Thoughts, >Information. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Content | Searle | I 66f Wide Content: wide content encompasses the causal relations to the world beyond the words so that meanings are not in the head (Putnam pro, but not "wide content". (> Content/Fodor), >Meanings not "in the head", >wide/narrow content. II 26f The fulfillment of conditions is fixed by propositional content. There is not a desire or belief without fulfillment conditions (i.e. no regress). >Satisfaction condition/Searle, >Regress. II 80 Deception: e.g. the moon is bigger on the horizon - that is part of the content. Solution: if we had no beliefs, we would believe the moon had changed its size. II 87 Content/Searle: the content is not the same as the object. II 196 Hallucination/deception: brains in the vat have exactly the same intentional content. II 319 Intentional Content/Pierre Example/Searle: intentional content is sufficient, and that is different in "London is ugly" and "Londres est jolie". Kripke: intentional content is not rigid, because descriptions are not rigid either. Names: names are neither equivalent to descriptions nor to intentional contents. >Pierre-Example. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Content | Stalnaker | I 50 Content/modal realism/MR/Lewis/Stalnaker: according to Lewis, an advantage of the modal realism is that it provides us with access to the content of propositional attitude and speech acts. >Propositional attitudes, >Modal realism, >Possible worlds. The subset of the possible worlds is doxastically accessible: Def doxastically accessible/Lewis: "doxastically accessible" means that the possible world is compatible with the rest of the beliefs and knowledge. They should not be defined by beliefs, but the content of knowledge should be defined in terms of doxastically accessible possible worlds. >Accessibility. I 64 Content/Stalnaker: content of a thought: the content of a thought is the truth condition. >Truth conditions. I 209 Causal theory/content/Stalnaker: important argument: the facts about my connection to Cicero do not belong to the content. >Causal theory of reference, >Causal theory of names. I 215 Content possible world/Stalnaker: all our words, and even all our representational resources, stem from the real world. But that does not imply that the contents are inevitably dependent on the fact that our words have these contents. >Word meaning, >Sentence meaning. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Context/Context Dependence | Kaplan | Newen I 112 Context of utterance/evaluation world/Kaplan/Newen/Schrenk: this distinction is Kaplan's new logical representation of truth conditions for indicators. (> Two-dimensional semantics). - ((s) from Stalnaker used for diagonalized propositions). - Names: here, the content is determined in relation to the context of utterance (use)). - It is then determined for each evaluation world, whether the content is true. - Characteristics: here, on the other hand, only with respect to an evaluation world the object is set, and then the resulting content with this object in the same evaluation world is evaluated as true or false. |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
Contingency | Kripke | Stalnaker I 188 Contingent a priori/Kripke/Stalnaker: Evans: e.g. the inventor of the zipper (whoever he/she is) is assumed to be called Julius (by stipulation) - then the statement "Julius invented the zipper" can be known a priori. Reference/meaning/important argument: because the description was rather used to determine the reference than to give the meaning, the fact that Julius invented the zipper is a contingent fact. >Necessary/Kripke, >Reference/Kripke, >Meaning/Kripke, >necessary a posteriori, >Description/Kripke, >Names/Kripke, >Naming/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Convention T | Tarski | Berka I 476f Def Convention T/original place/Tarski: We will call a true definition of truth a formally correct definition of the symbol "Wr" ("class of all true statements") formulated in terms of the metalanguage if it leads to the following conclusions: I 477 α) all sentences that are gained from the expression "x ε Wr iff "p" by inserting for the symbol x a structurally descriptive name of an arbitrary statement in the considered language ((s) of the object language) and for the symbol "p" the expression that is the translation of this statement in the meta language; β) the statement "for an arbitrary x - if x ε Wr, then x ε AS" (or in other words ""Wr < AS"). New in relation to Chapter 1: introduction of the meta language.(1) >Object language, >Metalanguage. I 451 Definition structural-descriptive name/Tarski: ((s) different category than the quotation names): describe, of what words the expression, designated by the name, consists and of which characters each individual word consists and in what order they follow one another - goes without quotation marks. Method: introduce single names for all letters and other characters ((s) no quotation names). E.g. for letters f, j, P, etc.: Ef, Jay, Pee, E.g. to the quotation name ""snow"" ((s) quotation marks twice) corresponds the structural-descriptive name: the word that consists of the six consecutive letters Es, En, O, double-u - ((s) letter names without quotation marks). 1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
Conventions | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 192 Convention/Phenomenology/Physics/Language/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the only conventionalism Wittgenstein allows refers to the choice between different phenomenological entities and this is based on the thesis that both phenomenological entities he mentions are secondary in relation to the physical objects. I 264 How do you know someone has a toothache when they hold their cheek? Here we have reached the end of our wisdom, i.e. we have reached the conventions. These "conventions" are exactly what Wittgenstein calls "criteria" in other parts of this discussion. They are the "hard rock" of the semantics of the term "toothache". "To use a word without justification does not mean to use it wrongly. Of course, I do not identify my feeling by criteria, but I use the same expression. I 303 Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the name relationships are conventional, but the essence of the names is not. "In logic we do not express what we want, but the nature of natural signs expresses itself." The non-conventional element of language: "But if we transform all those signs (occurring in a sentence) into variables, there is still such a class. But this does not depend on any agreement, but only on the nature of the sentence. It corresponds to a logical form of a logical archetype." Symbol/Everyday Language/Convention/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in everyday language there are all kinds of senseless connections of symbols. In order to maintain the reflection concept, these must be excluded by conventional rules. The nature of our symbols alone does not eliminate them by itself. II 27 Learning/Wittgenstein: we learn/teach the language by using it. The language convention is communicated by combining the sentence and its verification. Def "Understanding"/Wittgenstein: means to be guided by language convention to the right expectation. II 35 Conventions/Wittgenstein: presuppose the applications of language - they say nothing about its applications. For example: that red differs from blue from red from chalk is verified formally, not experimentally. II 75 Convention/Wittgenstein: assessing belongs to (learning) history. And we are not interested in the story here if we are interested in the moves of the game. Learning, >Language Learning/Wittgenstein. II 181 Observation Concepts/Theory/Criterion/Wittgenstein: what is understood in a theory as the reason for a belief is a matter of convention. II 230 Arbitrary/Arbitrariness/Convention: Number systems are arbitrary - otherwise a different spelling would correspond to different facts. II 231 Of course you can give meaning to new sentences and symbols - that is why the conventions are arbitrary. II 238 Logic/Convention/Arbitrariness/Wittgenstein: the laws of logic, e.g. the sentences of the Excluded Third (SaD) and the Contradiction to be excluded (SvW) are arbitrary! To forbid this sentence means to adopt what may be a highly recommended system of expression. IV 26 Sentence/Tractatus: 3.317 the determination of the values is the variable. It is the specification of the sentence whose common characteristic is the variable. The fixing is a description of these sentences. The fixing will only deal with symbols, not their meaning. Convention: it is only essential that it does not say anything about what is described. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
Copula | Quine | I 175 The general term is a predicate. It can take on the position of the adjective or the verb just as well as that of a noun. One could even regard the verb as a basic form, because it gets along without "is". ((s) But not "wisdom socratized", see >Things/Strawson, >Names/Strawson). The copula "is" can therefore simply be explained as a prefix. I 211 Copula/Quine: the combination "is a", which we have treated as a copula, can now be treated as particles to form an indefinite singular term: Composition of "is" and "a". E.g. "Agnes is a lamb" is then no longer seen as "Fa" but as "a=b", whereby "b" stands for an indefinite singular term of the form "an F". "Agnes bleats" and "Agnes is docile" retain the form "Fa" and the "is" retains here the status of a copula for the conversion of adjectives into verbs. But the "is" in "is a lamb" becomes "=". The equation "x = a" is now actually analyzed as a predication "x = a", whereby "=a" forms the verb. The "F" of "Fx". What used to mean "x = Socrates" is still called the same now in words but now the "=" or "is" copula as in "is mortal" or "is a human" merely serves to give the verb form to the general term and adapts it to the predicative position. Socrates becomes a general term that applies exactly to an object, but is general in that from now on it is grammatically permitted for the predicative position, but not for positions that are suitable for variables; "Socrates" then plays the role of "F" in "Fa" and no longer that of "a". II 204 Copula: Plural "excl" ("none are"). These are not singular (two-digit general terms which connect pairs of classes). XIII 36 Copula/is/Quine: Example: avoidance of "is": "You green in winter". Color word/Color words/Sentence construction/Word order/Predicate/Japanese/Quine: in Japanese color words are always placed at the beginning. N.B.: this means that Japanese color words coincide in form and grammatical behavior with the multitude of Japanese words that we call verbs when we translate Japanese. (see above: example "greenest"). XIII 37 Adjective/Quine: even in English they do not differ from intransitive verbs, but we use them attributively, e.g. green tree. ((s) instead of "The tree is green"). Semitic languages/Quine: allow forms like "you green in winter": i.e. the predicate stands as a verb without the help of a copula. Copula/Quine: is often used to structure sentence parts clearly. Example: telegram: "How old Gary Grant - Old Gary Grant very well - how you? The copula then serves to distinguish "how old is" from "how is old". Predicative/attributive/predicate/attribute/Quine: the adjective is predicative here, in the other case attributive. In other languages this may be distinguished by the word forms or the sentence order. Predication/Copula/Quine: the "is" of predication has a converse: the ing-form: one transforms adjectives into verbs, the other vice versa. Example "you are reading" to "you read". >Predication/Quine; cf. >Equal sign. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Correctness | Dummett | II 83 Correctness: below truth conditions: simplest assertions: we can distinguish situations where they are correct or incorrect. No knowledge of the truth conditions required. - ((s) E.g. polite lie: you may not even know if it is a lie.) >Truth conditions, >Situations, >Assertions. II 124 Correctness/Dummett: is not a basic concept for assertions - Assertions are no answers. II 125 Instead: incorrectness as the basic concept: this includes undecidable cases - even for names without a bearer. >Proper names. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Correctness | Plato | Gadamer I 350 Correctness/Truth/Formalism/Sophistry/Plato/Gadamer: [Plato has] clearly seen (...) that there is no criterion that is sufficient for argumentation, by which truly philosophical use of speech can be distinguished from sophistic use. In particular, he shows in Letter 7 that the formal refutability of a thesis does not necessarily exclude its truth.(1) Cf. >Reflection/Gadamer, >Reflection/Hegel, >Sophists/Plato. Gadamer I 412 Correctness/Word/Language/Thinking/Plato/Gadamer: If one (...) sees (...) the dispute about the "correctness of names" as it is settled by "Cratylos"(2-4), then the theories under discussion there (>Word/Plato, >Names/Plato, >Language/Plato) suddenly gain an interest that goes beyond Plato and his own intention. For both theories, which the Platonic Socrates brings to failure, are not weighed in their full truth weight. A. Conventionalist theory attributes that of words to a naming, a baptism of things in a name, as it were. ((s) Cf. today's >Causal theory of names.) For this theory, the name apparently does not claim any objective knowledge - and now Socrates convicts the advocate of this sober view by allowing him or her, from the difference between the true and the false Logos, to admit the components of the Logos, the words (onomata), as true or false, and also the naming as a part of speaking to refer to the discovery of being (ousia) happening in speaking(4). Gadamer I 413 This is such an assertion that is so incompatible with the conventionalist thesis that it is easy to infer from there, conversely, that the true name and the correct naming is decisive. Socrates himself admits that the understanding of the name thus obtained leads to an etymological intoxication and to the most absurd consequences (...). B. Similarity Theory: (...) its discussion [adheres] entirely within the preconditions of "natural theory", namely to the principle of similarity, and resolves the same only by gradual restriction. For if the "correctness" of names should really be based on the correct, i.e. appropriate, naming of things, even then, as with every such measurement, there are still degrees and gradations of correctness. Now, if only that little bit of rightness still reflects the outline (typos) of the thing in itself, it may be good enough to be useful.(6) But you have to be even more far-reaching. A word can also be understood, obviously out of habit and agreement, if it contains sounds that are not at all similar to the thing - so that the whole principle of similarity is shaken and refuted by examples such as the words for numbers. There, no similarity can be allowed at all, because numbers do not belong to the visible and moving world, so that for them the principle of agreement obviously applies alone. Solution/Plato: The convention, which is presented in practical language and which alone determines the correctness of the words, may make use of the principle of similarity wherever possible, but it is not bound by it.(7) Recognition/Language/Words/Plato: This is a very moderate point of view, but it includes the fundamental premise that words have no real cognitive meaning - a result that points beyond the whole sphere of words and the question of their correctness to the recognition of the matter. Gadamer: This is obviously what Plato alone is concerned with. Gadamer I 414 The handling of the matter at issue here is the revelation of the thing meant. The word is correct when it brings the thing to the point of representation, that is, when it is a representation (mimesis). Now, it is certainly not an imitative representation in the sense of a direct depiction, so that the phonetic or visible appearance would be depicted, but it is the being (ousia), that which is appreciated by the designation to be (einai), which is to be made manifest by the word. Gadamer: But the question is whether the terms used in the conversation, the terms of mimema or deloma understood as mimema, are correct. It is certainly in the nature of mimema that something other than what it represents itself is also represented in it. Mere imitation, "to be like", therefore always contains the possibility for reflection on the distance of being between imitation and model. Neither true nor false/Cratylos: [Cratylos] is quite right when he says that as far as a word is a word, it must be "right", a correctly "lying" (here: to lie down) one. If it is not, that is, if it has no meaning, then it is a mere sounding ore(8). There is really no point in speaking of "wrong" in such a case. ((s) Cf. >Truth value gap). 1. This is the meaning of the difficult exposition of 343 c d, for which the deniers of the authenticity of the 7th letter must accept a second, nameless Plato. (Cf. my detailed presentation "Dialectic and Sophism" in the VII Platonic Letter (vol. 6 of the Ges. Werke, pp. 90-115).21. Krat. 384 d. 3. Krat. 388 c. 4. Krat. 438 d-439 b. 5. Krat. 385 b, 387 c. 6. Krat. 432 a ff. 7. Krat. 434 e. 8. Krat. 429 loc, 430 a. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
Counterfactuals | Frege | II 64 f Counterfactual/Frege: "If iron was lighter than water, it would float on water." Here, we have the two notions that iron is not lighter, and that something that is lighter floats on water. The subordinate clause again expresses the one notion and a part of the other notion. >Thought, >Clause, E.g. "After Schleswig-Holstein was cut off from Denmark, Prussia and Austria quarreled." Here, the subordinate clause expresses not only one notion, but also part of the other. Therefore, it cannot be replaced generally by another of the same truth value. >Truth value. II 64 Cases in which this simply does not work: 1) That the subordinate clause means no truth value because it only expresses part of a thought. 2) That it does mean a truth value, but does not limit itself to it, because its sense still comprises a portion of the other thought and not only one thought. The first case occurs: a) In the case of the odd meaning of the words. b) If a part of the sentence only vaguely suggests, instead of being a proper name. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Proper names, >Oblique sense, >Oblique meaning. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
Counterfactuals | Kripke | I 60 Kripke: In general, things about a counterfactual situation are not "found out", they are determined. Cf. >Telescope theory of possible worlds. I 63 It is often said that when we describe a counterfactual situation and it cannot result in a purely qualitative one, then mysterious "mere individual things" would be assumed, featureless substrates, on which the properties are based. This is, however, not the case. I 89 Let us assume we use the reference of the name "Hitler" due to the fact that it is the man who killed more Jews than anyone has ever done in history. But in a counterfactual situation in which someone else possessed this bad reputation we would not say that in this other situation the other man would have been Hitler. >Possible world/Kripke. I 93 Counterfactual: even if you say "suppose Hitler had never been born", then the name "Hitler" refers here, and still in a rigid manner, to something that would not exist in the described counterfactual situation. >Names/Kripke, >Reference/Kripke, >Causal theory of reference, >Nonexistence. I 126/27 Remember, though, that we describe the situation in our language, not in the language that people would have used in that situation. Hesperus = Phosphorus is necessarily true (but a situation is possible in which Venus does not exist). >Morning star/evening star, >Identity/Kripke, >Necessary/Kripke. I 130 ... But this would still not be a situation in which this woman which we call "Elizabeth II" was the child of Mr. and Mrs. Truman. It would be a situation in which there was another woman who had many of the features which actually apply to Elizabeth. The question is: was Elizabeth herself ever born in this possible world? Let us say no. Then Truman and his wife would have a child possessing many of the properties of Elizabeth, but in which Elizabeth herself never existed. >Properties/Kripke, >Designation/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
Cross World Identity | Wiggins | II 303 WigginsVsKripke: even if names are rigid designators: the question remains whether we can evaluate sets of names for all the worlds ("necessary existence"). Problem: cross world identity. >Rigidity, >Names, >Possible worlds, >Necessity, >Contingency, >Centered worlds. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
Data | Pariser | I 50 Data/Internet/Pariser: For example, when the authorities published the names of the assassins a few days after the 9/11 attack, the private Internet company Acxiom came out with data on eleven of the nineteen kidnappers, including their previous and current addresses and the names of their flatmates. That is more than all the security agencies put together were able to do. (1) 1. Richard Behar, »Never Heard of Acxiom? Chances Are It’s Heard of You«, Fortune, 23. 02. 2004, aufgerufen am 10.12. 2010, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2004/02/23/362182/index.htm. |
Pariser I Eli Pariser The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is Changing What We Read and How We Think London 2012 |
de dicto | Chisholm | I 65 de dicto/Chisholm: either "property, to be so that p" or "the fact that p is true" - attribution de dicto: does not need demonstratives, proper names or free variables. >Attribution, >Demonstratives, >Facts. II 118 Wrong: de dicto-belief would be enough for standing in a special relationship with the object alone by the fact that it exists. >Acquaintance. Vs: we need a more stringent notion of de re belief, objects must be able to be identified. de re: I cannot believe anything about the smallest spy before I know him personally. >Individuation, >Identification. ((s) But then also under another description - at least two relations to the object). >Description. Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
de dicto | Logic Texts | Read III 127 Initial problem: Only real names allow the substitution, which is found in the indistinguishability of the identical. The principle says that Fa as well as a=b may infer Fb from a statement. Cicero accused Catilina, and Cicero was Tullius, so Tullius accused Catilina. >Substitution, >Insertion. Improper names: descriptions: Example: "the greatest Roman orator" and Example: "the number of planets". It's not in the form of Fa, but a much more complex one: " among the Roman orators, there's a greatest, and he accused Catilina." "Exactly one number counts the planets and it is greater than seven". Re III 128 Russell analysed (groundbreaking for analytic philosophy) that these propositions do not contain real names (except 9 and 7). Therefore, they cannot be a permise and conclusion of the principle of indistinguishability of the identical. >Leibniz principle, >Identity, >Indistinguishability, >Logical proper names, >Numbers, >Planets example. Re III 129 QuineVsRussell: with this we only got out of the rain and into the fire. Problem: Range. The analysis consists in replacing an apparent form A (d) in which a description d occurs in a statement A with a statement B that does not contain any component to which d corresponds. >Range, >Scope, >Narrow/wide. Solution: Quine is willing (until further analysis) to accept the modality de dicto, the attribution of modal properties to statements. But true ascriptions de re are quite different. They mean that objects themselves necessarily have properties. And that is essentialism. >Essentialism. Re III 130 Quine: Modality de dicto: Quote - "7" and "9" is now embedded - so that they are protected from the indiscernibiliy principle - statements of the form "necessary A’ be construed as if they were of the form Fa, where a is the statement A and F the predicate ’is necessarily true " - the scope is limited. >de re. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
de re | Logic Texts | Read III 129/130 Quine is prepared (until further analysis) to accepting the modality de dicto: the attribution of modal properties to statements. Cf. >de dicto, >Modalities. III 130 But true attributions de re are something entirely different. They mean that objects themselves have necessary properties. And that’s essentialism. >Essentialism. III 129 de re/ascriptions/Read: attributions de re are always essentialist; they claim material properties. III 135 Real names create modal truths de re: »Cicero is necessaryly Tullius" is also true, for it refers to the same object. The simple truth is the modal truth de re. >Attribution, >Predication. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
Definitions | Kripke | III 342 Definition/Kripke: a definition is a "great fundamental principle". Definitions must be formulated in a language already understood - then there is little room for alternative interpretations of a metalanguage (even if the syntactic and semantic structure can be interpreted differently). >Loewenheim, >Meta language, >Object language. III 390 Implicit Definition/Kripke: an implicit definition is given by rule - otherwise no generalizations in finite systems can be derived from (infinite) instances. III 392 Definition/Kripke: no inductive definition is possible if it does not start with a general characterization of the atomic (basic) case. III 393 Direct definition: a direct definition is not recursive. Recursive definition: is indirect. In Tarski the definition of truth is given via a recursive definition of fulfillment. Question: could he also have defined truth directly? If so, would fulfillment be definable in terms of truth? >Satisfaction, >Satifiability. III 399 Implicit Definition: depends on axioms. These imply (for example) truth implicit in the sense that truth is the only interpretation of the predicate T(x) which makes all the axioms true. Explicit definition: does not depend on axioms, but on expressive power of the language (not theory). Sat1(x,y) is explicitly definable in terms of T(x) - it is an explicit definition by introducing a new variable (II 402). --- Kripke I 66ff Definition/reference/standard meter/Kripke: Kripke does not use this definition to specify the meaning, but to define the reference. There is a certain length which he would like to denote. He denotes it through an accidental property. Someone else may refer to the same reference by another accidental property. He can still definitely say: if heat had been in the game, the length would have changed. Rigid: the meter is rigid. Not rigid: the length of S at time t is not rigid. >Standard meter, >Rigidity/Kripke, >Reference/Kripke. I 136f The "definition" does not say that the two terms are synonymous, but that we have determined the reference of the term "one meter" by establishing that it should be a rigid designation expression that actually has the length S. So not a necessary truth! We must distinguish between definitions that specify a reference, and definitions that specify a synonym. >Synonymy/Kripke. Definition: is not necessary: e.g. tiger: large, carnivorous, four legged cat, etc. Suppose someone says: "This is the meaning of tiger in German". ZiffVs: this is wrong. E.g. a tiger with three legs is not a contradiction in itself. I 153 In the case of proper names the reference can be defined in various ways. Determination of reference: is a priori (contingent) and not synonymous. Meaning: is analytical (required). Definition: specifies reference and expresses a priori truth. >Meaning/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
Definitions | Schiffer | I 101 Functional definition/Schiffer: when the true-of-relation is a functional relation, it is "defined" in this way, and, indeed in tandem with the reference relation of names to objects. True-of: Satisfaction. >Satisfaction, >Truth, >Reference, >Names, >Objects. But this is no identity relative to a given functional relation and does not analyze the meaning. >Meaning, >Identity. I 159 Definition/Schiffer: does not work with open sentences. >Open sentence. I 213 Definition/Schiffer: is about equality of meaning, not meaning. - This holds also for the lexicon. Synonymy, >Lexicon. It has more to do with mention than with use. >Mention, >Use. Understanding: more with use than with mention. >Understanding. Problem: E.g. meaning equality does not help in case of e.g. "of" means ... e.g. "dog" means ... e.g. "she gave it to him" means.... >Index words, >Indexicality, >Anaphora. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
Demonstration | Wittgenstein | Rorty VI 147 Indicative Definition/demonstrate/language/Wittgenstein: indicative definition presupposes that in the language a lot has been prepared already, demonstrating is insufficient without language to single out something. (Dennett pro, SearleVs, NagelVs). --- Hintikka I 95 Tell/demonstrate/logical proper name/Russell/Hintikka: "this" cannot be pronounced, only mentioned. - ((s) >mention / >use) - ((s) not pronounced in absence.) - ((s) The object can therefore not be mentioned.). >Logical proper name. I 102 We can only point to the objects of acquaintance. I 102 Demonstrate/tell/Tractatus/acquaintance/Russell/Hintikka: we can only point at the objects of acquaintance - ((s) > Logical proper names; these have to be distinguished from >Demonstratives). I 193 Indicative demonstration/ostension/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: cannot provide a criterion of continuous identity. - This is why not anything that can be demonstrated is an object. I 228 Demonstrate/ostensive definition/ostension/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: sense data can only be defined by demonstrating. - Problem: must the demonstration itself be understood? - Hintikka: the listener must probably already know the logic state of the defined entity. - "there"/"this": if, at all, to introduce by ostension, then the demonstration must be quite different in this case. - Hintikka: Wittgenstein hesitates long before he drops the indicative definition. - An alternative to the concept of meaning and attribution of meaning is hard to find. - Demonstration/Wittgenstein: basic concept: binary relation of naming. (by a name) (WittgensteinVs). I 231 Middle period: successful indicative definition can provide rules for the use. >Rules --- II 34 Demonstrate/ostension/Wittgenstein: E.g. "this is green" does not provide information about a connection between green and reality. - "This" is used as an equal sign. II 88 Language/rule/indicative definition/Wittgenstein: E.g. This is gray can either a) be a sentence or - b) a rule or a definition of language use. II 256 Ostensive definition/demonstrate/ostension/Wittgenstein: E.g. one shows someone a red square with the words "that is red". - Then it may be that he calls squares red in future. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
Demonstratives | Demonstratives: E.g. this, that, that one. Problems in language use bcause of lack of clarity when referring back to prior description. - In logic missing expressibility of uniqueness. See also anaphora, deixis, relations, logical proper names, index words, indexicality, iota operator. |
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Demonstratives | Brandom | I 640 Demonstratives/Brandom: are unrepeatable per se, they are made usable by the anaphora for contexts in which they then repeat themselves. I 643 Demonstratives/Brandom: "this": must be at least implicitly connected to a sortal! The same physical gesture may indicate a book, an envelope, a color, a person, or only its external form - unrepeatable per se. >Sortals. I 648 Demonstratives/Brandom: you cannot describe a coherent language in which expressions are used demonstratively, but not pronominally. (it is possible vice versa) - various Tokenings of this, here, or now are generally no recurrences of each other, or even co-identifiable, but only as a repeatable element, i.e. as elements of recurrence classes, they are substitutable. >Substitution, >Pronouns. I 654 Demonstratives/Possible World/Kaplan: introduces the rigidizing operator "tthis" and determines that tthis (!xDx) is to be rigid - it picks out from every world what it really refers to in the real world, while !xDx is not a rigid designator in general, because its denotation varies from world to world - (same function as "precisely this cat") - Names/Kyplean: can be understood as rigidized (tthisissed) descriptions and demonstratives. >David Kaplan. I ~ 654 Demonstratives/Possible World/Brandom: demonstrative tokenings can only recur anaphorically and thus rigidly. >Anaphora, >Rigidity. I 807 This/Demonstratives/Brandom: not really directly referential, but require implicit sortals. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
Demonstratives | Carnap | II 203 This/demonstratives/Carnap: not readily determinable because the logical nature of the language elements must not be dependent on non-linguistic factors. Cf. >Logical proper names. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
Demonstratives | Castaneda | Frank I, 185f This/demonstrative/Castaneda: demonstratives are indicative, but not naming. - They are denotative. >Designation, >Naming, >Denotation, Cf. >Logical proper names. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 |
Demonstratives | Russell | I X "the", "this", "that"/Russell/Gödel: should be avoided. Frege: we need axioms about them. Cf. >Logical proper names, >Articles, >Axioms. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
Demonstratives | Tugendhat | Wolf II 21 Logical proper names/"this"/TugendhatVsRussell: "this" is not assigned to an object, but to changing objects in changing situations. >Logical proper names, >Logical proper names/Russell, >Index words, >Indexicality, >Situations. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
Denotation | Burge | Wolf I 266 Speaker’s reference/designating/proper names/Burge: the designation of a proper name should not be identified with the speaker’s reference: unlike the object to which a speaker refers, the object, the proper name referred to might be an object that only bears this name. >Speaker meaning, >Reference, >Intentions. Wolf Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 p. 266 |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
Denotation | Carnap | VI 97 Def designate(denote/Carnap: a thing is given a character, e.g. numbered, but not named with a quality name. Housed in a relation. >Signs, >Order. Def naming/Carnap: (unlike designation) provided with a quality name, (not merely placed in a sequence). >Proper names, >Quality, >Properties. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
Denotation | Chisholm | I 110 Non-descriptive/Chisholm: if neither the sentence nor its negation permits the existence generalization about the singular term. Names are non-dexcriptively used ssingular terms - even when descriptions are possible: e.g. "Senator Baker would be another Jimmy Carter"- Carter refers to Carter. >Reference, >Sentences, >Negation, >Existence generalization, >Singular terms, >Proper names. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Denotation | Evans | I 322 Designation/Evans: with names as with other expressions, what they designate (signify) depends on what we designate with their use. Nevertheless, in individual cases, saying may coincide with intending. ((s) How we designate things depends on our use of words.) >Use, >Meaning (>intending), >Reference. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
Denotation | Field | II 6 Primitive denotation/Field: a theory T1, based on primitive denotation, has compositionality - i.e. that the truth values of the sentences depend on the truth values of the non-logical parts. Primitive Denotation: Problem: E.g. - "He takes drugs": here only one token has a meaning, but not the type. ((s) Primitive denotation/(s): without descriptions) >Descriptions. II 6f T1/Field: with primitive denotation; each name denotes what it denotes, a predicate denotes what it applies to, etc. - No composite expression has a primitive denotation.Compositionality. Def truth/primitive denotation: when a speaker says something true - hence we have tokens on certain occasions, not types of expressions. Expressions like "John", "I", "You" are always only tokens. >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Indexicality. Advantage: diachronic theory of language. II 8 T1 uses semantic terms: "satisfy", "denote", "apply" (unlike Tarski). VsT1: "John", "I" or "You" - problems with expressions like T2: without semantic expressions (E.g. satisfy, denotate, apply). >Satisfaction, >true-of, >Tarski-scheme, >Truth/Tarski. II, 18f Denotation/T-Theory/Language/Field: for different languages at the same time: one could define "denote": E.g. E (English) to say the name N denotes an object a is the same as to demand that either a is France and N is "France" or "a" is Germany and "N" is "Germany" ... then for another language, e.g. German: corresponding "... a is France and N is "France"...". II 21 Problem: So one could define magic physically acceptable by simply setting up a list of pairs of magic/object. Names/Denotation/FieldVsTarski: Tarski's definition boils down to mere lists - and also lists for applying predicates and for satisfaction. >Lists, >Possible world semantics/Field, >Properties/Field. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Denotation | Geach | I 28 Denotating expression/Russell/Geach: the denotating expression is a general term after the prefix the, one, every, all, some, etc. >Articles, >Quantifiers, >Quantification, >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Predication, >Attribution, >Sentence/Geach. I 93f Denotating expression/Geach: E.g. Robinson made a lot of money by selling it This is no sentence - "it" without antecedent is no denotating expression. But if a word chain does not have a logical role in a particular context, it does not mean that it never has one. - E.g. Jones has a car and Jones daughter drives it. "has a car" is not denotating: "p and Jones' daughter drives it". > Anaphora. Also not: "there is a car ..." for "p" then: p and that is driven by Jones' daughter. Wrong solution: to look for criteria for "real incidents": these can also be of the wrong kind. E.g. "the only one who ever stole a book from Snead ..." I 190f Denotation of sentences/Carnap/Geach: E.g. DES(English) "red" is red, DES(French) "l'eau" is water etc. - for all x, x is true in L ⇔ DES(L) x. Geach: this offers a definition of "true in L" in terms of "denotation in L"- if it is grammatically not a complete sentence, it is nevertheless in the logical sense. It means roughly: "mon crayon est noir" is true in French". Because "DES(English)"Chicago is a large city" is a complete sentence, "DES(English)" is not a relation sign. We cannot ask "what is it what it denotates," as we cannot ask, "what is it that it rains?" >Translation, >Designation. I 204 Denotation/naming/names of expressions/mention/use/Geach: E.g. A. or is a junctor. If this sentence is to be true, then only when the first word is used to denotate that of which the sentence says something. "Or" is only a junctor (E.g. "but" is a junctor or a verb") in special contexts. >Junctor. Therefore "or" is not used autonym in A (it does not denotate itself). The first word in A is no example here. It is a logical subject, so in the sentence it is no junctor, so the sentence A is wrong. ((s) With and without quotation marks that were saved here) - (s) Or can only be used as a connection, when it is mentioned, it is no longer a connection.) >Mention, >Use, >Mention/use, >Description level, >Level/Order. Mention/use/Geach: Is it wrong to say or is a connection? - No. - Is it wrong to say "or" is a connection? - Yes. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
Denotation | Newell, A./Simon, H. | Münch III 60 Definition label/Newell/Simon: A term is used to describe an object, if the system can affect with given expression either the object itself, or its behavior is dependent on the object - so one wins through the term access to the object. >World/thinking, >Actions, >Knowledge, >Expressions, >Terms, >Objects. Def interpretation/Newell/Simon: the system can interpret an expression, if the expression refers to a process and if the system can run the process at given expression. >Processes, >Systems, >Interpretation. Münch III 64 Names/Newell/Simon: it is essential that the data are semantically inactive. At first glance there is no term of the symbol as something that signifies something - so that the machine can be operated by a description. >Symbols, >Meaning, >Signs, >Data, >Semantics, Daniel Dennett, “Intentional Systems in Cognitive Ethology: The ‘Panglossian Paradigm’ defended”, The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1983), 343-355 |
Mü III D. Münch (Hrsg.) Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992 |
Denotation | Prior | I 16f Designate/expression/Prior: sentences designate nothing. >Designation, >Denotation, >Sentences. Belief/fear: refers to what is expressed, not to the designated. >Expressions, >Beliefs, >Levels, >Description levels. I 51 Sentence/Prior: a sentence designates (denotates) nothing. - only names designate. >Names. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Denotation | Quine | I 257 Indefinite terms do not denote objects. An indefinite singular term must therefore be in a purely denoting position: E.g. "The tax auditor is looking for someone" (the position is denoting - "someone" is not denoting). "Purely denoting" unambiguous (substitutability of identity) is not: "Tullius was a Roman" is trochaic - E.g. Tax auditor is looking for the director: -> propositional attitudes. Expression in quotation marks is not purely denoting. It has an ambiguous reference. Every truth function is transparent for denotation. Words denote, sentences do not denote (no singular term). Nevertheless, a sentence has a meaning: the singular term formed by bracketing of the sentence (this is no proposition). A proposition here is: completion of correct sentence to a timeless one. A timeless sentence is "The door is open": which door? This does not denote anything. I 413f Object: that what is denoted by singular terms, names and accepted as values. (But singular term is eliminated!) - E.g. "glimmer", but not "glimmeriness". II 61 ff Naming: is a name or singular term. Denoting: is to predict - both are referencing, not meaning various descriptions can name the same thing but have a different meaning. VII (a) 10ff Singular Term/Quine: a singular term must not denote. It has a gap between meaning and denotation. VII (c) 48ff Singular Terms/Quine: singular terms designate ("name"). >Singular Terms/Quine. A general term: means (denotes). - (> Descriptions). VII (h) 140 Purely denoting position/Quine: E.g. "Giorgione was called so because of his size". "So" is not purely denoting. Correct would be: "Giorgione was called Giorgione because...". This is then usable: "Barbarelli was called Giorgione because...". Missing substitutability signals is not a purely denoting position. One might say: The following incidents were non-denoting: "9" and "Evening Star" or "number of planets" in (15) - (17) but it is not about that. The point is that the substitution makes true statements false. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Denotation | Tarski | Berka I 397 Designation/denotation/description/Tarski: Example: "the victor of Jena" refers to Napoleon. Satisfaction: Example: snow satisfies the condition "x is white" Definition: Example: x³ = 2 defined (uniquely determined), the cube root of the number 2.(1) >Descriptions, >Definitions, >Satisfaction. 1. A.Tarski, „Grundlegung der wissenschaftlichen Semantik“, in: Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique, Paris 1935, VOl. III, ASI 390, Paris 1936, pp. 1-8 Berka I 481 Def designating/Tarski: to say that the name x refers to an object a, is the same as to determine that the object a (or any sequence whose corresponding element is a) satisfies a propositional function of a particular type. >Propositional functions, >Proper names. In ordinary language: "x is a".(2) 2. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 Skirbekk I 186 Def denotnation / Tarski: a given term denotes a given object, if this object satifies the propositional function "x is identical with T", where "T" stands for the given term.(3) >Identity, cf. >Predication. 3. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt 1977 |
Denotation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 328 Denotation/Reference/Wittgenstein: language game: reference occurs only within a language game. - On the other hand: Denotation: runs without a language game. >Reference, >Language game. Hintikka: It is precisely the absence of a language game that Wittgenstein emphasizes with the expression "denotate". I 327 ff Denotation/Description/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: a simple relationship of the type "denotation" only has content if the corresponding object exists and is open to the public. "Naming is something like attaching a name tag to an object." (WittgensteinVs, QuineVs) I 328 Remarks on the philosophy of Psychology/Wittgenstein: e.g. names that have meaning only in company of their bearers. They serve only for the avoidance of the constant pointing/showing, example: lines, points, angles in geometric figures, with A, B, C, ..a, b. etc." Denotation/Wittgenstein/Beetle Example/Hintikka: as Wittgenstein puts it, it is quite possible that everyone has something different in the box. If that were the case, we would not use the word "beetle" to describe a thing. For the word beetle to make sense, a public language game is needed to support it semantically. But it is precisely the lack of a language game that Wittgenstein emphasizes with the expression "denotating". Color/Definition/Reference/Wittgenstein: Now we can understand what Wittgenstein means when he says: ""red" means the color that comes to my mind when I hear the word "red"" would be a definition. No explanation of the nature of the denotation by a word. >Colour. The point loses its essence if "denotation" is understood here in the sense of "name". Even a completely successful definition does not indicate what it means that the definition refers directly - i.e. without language play - to its subject. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
Description Levels | Bigelow | I 43 Levels/Universals/Hierarchy/Bigelow/Pargetter: N.B.: we do not consider universals of a "higher-level" as objects of a quantification of a higher level or second-level logic, but as entities that can be named, that is, first level logic (1st level language). >Universals, >Logic, >2nd Order Logic, >Naming, >Designation, >Names, >Denotation, >Objects, >Order/Levels. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
Description Theory | Cresswell | II 47 Definition Description theory/Cresswell: (here): the description theory asserts that a name is synonymous with an equivalent specific description. This still allows for a wide range of interpretation. >Descriptions, >Names, >Synonymy. For example, "the planet called phosphorus" is such a description. - Vs: "Phosphorus" is the planet called Phosphorus" is not a necessary truth. ((s) de re). II 150 Discription Theory/Loar/Bach/Cresswell: Loar (1976(1), 370-373) and Bach (1981)(2) defend the kind of description theory, which makes "Phosphorus" to something, which means something like "is called "Phosphorus". II 150 VsDescription theory/Cresswell: the description theory is circular, because the use of a name to refer to someone is involved. - (Also Kripke 1972(3), 283, 286.) LoarVsVs: (1976(1) p.371): it is not at all that we are referring to something, by saying, "the referent of this expression "..." The reference is rather intrinsic. Cresswell ditto. >Reference, >Intrinsicness. II 153 Description theory/de re/Cresswell: Example (Partee) Loar believes that semantics is a branch of psychology, while Thomason believes that it is a branch of mathematics - that cannot be de re, because then both cannot be right. >de re, >de dicto. Solution: Description theory: Loar believes that the thing that is called "semantics" is a branch of psychology, while Thomason believes it is a branch of mathematics. - "It" then does not stand for a thing, but for the property of being called "semantics". >Semantics, >Properties. 1.Loar, B. The semantics of singular terms. Philos Stud 30, 353–377 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372537 2.Bach, Emmon. 1981. On Time, Tense, and Aspects: An Essay in English Metaphysics. inPeter Cole (ed.), Radical Pragmatics , New York: Academic Press, 63-8 3. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), 253-355 |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Description Theory | Dummett | III (b) 68 Def " Theory of descriptions"/Kripke: According to Kripke the wrong theory that every name has the same meaning as a particular description. Dummett: In fact, Frege's view that it is essential that a name can have the same meaning as a particular description. >Recognition. III (c) 135 Attribution/Frege: Attribution of pure object knowledge without further identification of the meaning is incomprehensible. An object must somehow be given. There can be no "mere knowledge of reference". Description theory/Kripke/RussellVsFrege/Dummett: This theory is tendentiously attributed to Frege. ((s) Ultimately the view that names are "hidden descriptions", but this is not explicitely claimed by Frege). Frege is concerned with the fact that reference without meaning (meaning) is not possible. III (c) 151 Description Theory/Names/Dummett: The theory derives its considerable plausibility from the fact that someone who does not know a proper name can be made familiar with it by a verbal explanation. Modified version of the theory of descriptions: two characteristics: 1st: There is usually more than one legitimate introduction of a proper noun. The ways of givenness together offer more than is necessary for introduction. 2nd: Several solutions are available in advance for each conflict. This can be expressed in such a way that a weighted majority of sentences containing the name must prove to be true. >Way of givenness. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Description Theory | Evans | I 313f Description theory/Names: ~ "x is the only phi-ist, and everything elsethat phi-es is identical with x" - EvansVs: the situation for propositional attitudes is falsely portrayed as equal to the situation in which the object does not exist. >Proper names, >Descriptions, >Non-existence. I 313 Reference/Meaning/Generic Term/EvansVsDescription Theory: we are constantly using generic terms of whose fulfillment of conditions we have only the darkest ideas. E.g. chlorine, microbiology, etc. However, it is wrong to say that we do not say anything when we utter sentences that this generic term I 315 Name/Causal Theory/Kripke/Evans: Kripke’s causal theory looks something like this: the chain of causality only retains the reference if the speaker intends to use the name for the same thing for which it was used by the person from whom he has learned the name. Evans: Question: Is it sufficient that such use is a so described causal consequence? E.g. (Evans) a group of people talk in the bar about a certain Louis, of whom S has never heard. He asks "What has Louis done?" It’s clear that he refers to a certain man with that!. I 316 He might even continue to refer to him on a later occasion. VsDescription Theory: This is difficult to reconcile with it, because the chunk of information that S overheard could include any attitude and could match someone else much better. She has no explanation for why it is impossible that other descriptions outweigh this one. VsCausal Theory: It can probably ensure the right answer in this case. But it cannot rule out that S denotes a certain Frenchman - maybe Louis XIII - at any time in the future, as alien to the subject matter and as confused the speaker may seem, as long as there is a causal link to that conversation in the bar. I 321 EvansVsDescription Theory: If we thought at the same time that the name refers to the person who was killed by Elhannan, then it shows that the conditions of the description theory are not necessary and not sufficient. >Conditions, >Sufficiency. I 321/322 EvansVsKripke: this is the view for which Kripke should have argued, but did not argue. EvansVsDescription Theory: does not distinguish between the notions: a) that the described thing is determined by the intention of the speaker, and b) that the object fulfils the descriptions. EvansVsDescription Theory: point b) is the weakness: the "fitting in with" is absurd if, in the case of a speaker who is isolated from his community, it only fits this thing better than anything else because of a bunch of descriptions which the speaker associates. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
Description Theory | Stalnaker | I 15 KripkeVsDescription Theory/Stalnaker: the description theory arises from a confusion between semantics and meta-semantics. >Semantics. Anti-Essentialism/Kripke/Stalnaker: the anti-essentialism arises from a confusion between semantics and metaphysics. >Essentialism, >Metaphysics. I 212 Purely descriptive language/Stalnaker: if we had a purely descriptive language, we would have no reference definition of general terms. >General terms, >Reference. On the other hand: Reference/causal theory of reference: (as a counter-position to descriptivism): the reference tells us how reference is acquired in general. - For names as for predicates. The knowledge about reference definition is then part of the language skills. >Causal theory of reference. I 212 Def Local Descriptivism/Lewis/Stalnaker: local descriptivism is simply a way to explain one part of the language by another ((s) according to Lewis and Stalnaker the only way). Global Descriptivism/LewisVs: global descriptivism makes it impossible to explain how statements can be wrong at all - this is Putnam’s Paradox ((s) then the expressions refer to "which things ever"). Then the properties and relations are always that what best makes the theory true. >Centered worlds. Additional Condition/Lewis: the simple terms have to split the world "at the joints". VsGlobal Descriptivism: 1) Global descriptivism would be holistic, i.e. what I think dependends on everything else that I think; 2) and it would be solipsistic, because depending on my causal relations: in that case "Tullius" means something else for me than for you. >Solipsism, >Holism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Description-Dependence | Kripke | I 50 Necessary/description dependent/Ryle: description decides whether a property is necessary or contingent. (Kripke: but not all are accidental properties, some are essential.) >Properties/Kripke, >Essence/Kripke, >Description/Kripke, >Names/Kripke, >necessary a posteriori, >necessary/Kripke, >Essentialism/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
Descriptions | Description: A. Characterization of singular objects or events instead of giving a name. As opposed to names descriptions are not rigid, i.e. they may refer to different objects in different worlds. - B. Linguistic form for attributing predicates according to the perceptions of objects. See also rigidity, theory of descriptions. |
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Descriptions | Carnap | VI 16 Descriptions/Carnap: there is the possibility of a unique system of descriptions within a subject area, without ostension. Problem: one cannot decide a priori whether it is possible in the concrete case. This question is particularly important when it comes to the entire field of knowledge objects. Here, too, it cannot be decided a priori. But the assumption of this possibility is the necessary prerequisite for the possibility of a supersubjective, purely rational science. VI 17 Unambiguity: how is it possible to have unique descriptions for objects within an area without using any objects outside the area for help? E.g. railway map, stylized, topologically distorted. Only points and connections. How to determine the names of cities? We look for the nodes of the highest order, where the largest number of lines converge. VI 18 If two points have the same number, they are "homotop", i.e. they have the same structural properties. Then this relation is not sufficient for a unique identification. We would have to use other relations. Gradually, all real scientific terms will be used, including cultural ones, etc. If there is still no difference, the places are scientifically indistinguishable. The fact that they are subjectively different, e.g. that I am here and not there, makes no difference scientifically! Because someone else will say the same thing: "I am here and not there". >Indistinguishability. VI 19 Structure: must be sufficiently diverse for identification. (>characteristic). >Structure, >Features. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
Descriptions | Chaitin | Rucker I 350 Name / designation: "impossible object": "Name of the impossible object": >Chaitins sentence: e.g. "the first number, which I can not name with eleven words" - inconsistency. >Contradictions, >Consistency, >Names, >Possibility, >Metaphysical possibility, >Logical possibility. |
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Descriptions | Cresswell | I 184 Description/Quantification/Cresswell: definite and indefinite descriptions are not quantifiers - the bond is in the depth structure. >Quantifiers, Deep structure, E.g. if you offer each boy a job, some boy will refuse it - "it" signals no variable bound by "a job", however quantification in depth. >Quantification. II 47f Theory of descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: according to Russell e.g. (24) BELIEVE (a, x) u x e . β . L) is possible, because "The planet which is called "Phosphorus"" can occur outside the range of the modal operator. >Scope, >Modal operator, >Names, >Morning star/Evening star, >Theory of descriptions/Russell. II 48 N.B: this allows us to talk about the thing that is actually called "Phosphorus" and ask what happens when it is not called like this. ((s) Out of reach of the modal operator: allows unambiguous reference to the thing). II 140 Theory of descriptions/Russell/Cresswell: Thesis: a particular description is in the same syntactic category as a quantifier, e.g. "Someone" problem: E.g. "Someone does not come" does not mean the same as "It is not the case that someone comes". >Someone/Geach. Solution/Russell: different ranges in modal and doxastic contexts - A) (narrow range) "the person next door lives next door" is logically equivalent with "exactly one person lives next door" and therefore it is in a sense necessarily true. B) (wide range) it is true that the person next door could also have lived somewhere else (so it is contingent). >Narrow/wide, >Exactly one, >Necessity, >Contingency. II 149 Theory of descriptions/Russell/Kripke/Cresswell: Kripke per Russell with regard to descriptions - not only with regard to names. >Descriptions/Kripke, >Names/Kripke. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Descriptions | Dummett | III (c) 151 Dummett pro description theory: verbal explanations help to understand unfamiliar names. >Recognition/Dummett. I 43 There is a persistent tendency today to deny that a singular term has a meaning different from its reference to this or that object. DummettVs: This seems intuitively appealing in the case of proper names, but absurd in the case of complex terms such as some descriptions. If you like this direction, you can't help but say that this or that description is not really a singular term. Recently, it has been argued that labels behave differently than proper names in temporal or modal contexts. Nevertheless, as Gareth Evans has shown, there are proper names whose reference is descriptive - through descriptions. >Theory of descriptions/Dummett. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
Descriptions | Field | II 18 Description/acquaintance/Russell/Field: according to Russell: "analytical connection" between description and acquaintance. >Acquaintance. Problem/FieldVsRussell: this is circular, because the reference of descriptions is explained by reference to their parts - they will include names. >Proper names. RussellVsTradition: you can only give a lecture on something that can be defined from the logically basic concepts. - E.g. "If Cicero existed, then he denounced Catiline". FieldVsRussell: that makes contingent biographical characteristics become necessary. >Contingency, >Necessity, >Facts. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Descriptions | Frege | II 29 Description/Frege: e.g. the expression: "The capital of the German Empire" represents a proper name and means an object. Unsaturated: "capital of" Saturated: "the German Empire" Expression of a function: the expression of a function is e.g. "The capital of x" ((s) Russell: propositional function, PF). Frege: If we take the German Reich as an argument, we obtain Berlin as a function value. >Function, >unsaturated, >Object. II 54 Description/Subordinate Clause: e.g. the discoverer of the planetary orbits = is an object ("meaning" (reference): has no truth value. >Truth values. II 82 Description/Name/Frege "the king of this kingdom" does not refer to anything without a specification of time. ->Description: ((s) Frege implicitly differentiates descriptions of other singular terms already before Russell). >Singular terms. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 Description/terminology/Frege: descriptions are "compound proper names" (complex names). >Proper names, >Clauses. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
Descriptions | Geach | I 46 Description: indirect reference, by mediation of other characters. Name: direct reference, no parts (Aristotle: a name is syntactically simple). (Geach pro). >Names, >>Aristotle, >Reference, cf. >Complexity/Geach, >Simplicity, |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
Descriptions | Hintikka | II 172 Description/knowledge/Russell/Hintikka: knowledge by description: here, we know propositions about the "so-and-so" without knowing who or what the "so-and-so" is. >Propositional knowledge, >Knowlege how, >Knowledge. Ad (ii): e.g. description: instead of Bismarck: "the first chancellor of the German Reich". HintikkaVs (ii) this sweeps the problem under the carpet. Problem: the use of descriptions must ultimately lead to the fact that the descriptions are translated back into names, and this is not possible here! Also: Reduction/description/names/Hintikka: not all individuals with descriptions we talk about have identities that are known to everyone. The interpretation of Russell does not rule out the fact that many different entities act as legitimate values of the variables, which in principle can also be named with names. Ad (iii) Russell/Hintikka: that was Russell's implicit solution: he redefines the range of the individual variables so that they are restricted to individuals we know by acquaintance. Existential Generalization/EG/Russell/Hintikka: the existential generalization applies only to names of individuals with whom we are familiar. Concealed Description/Russell/Hintikka: the existential generalization fails for individuals whose names have to be conceived as covert descriptions ((s) because we know them only by description). Cf. >Acquaintance. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
Descriptions | Kripke | I 78 ff You could say "The Jonah of the book never existed", as one might say "the Hitler of Nazi propaganda never existed." Existence is independent of representation. >Existence/Kripke, >Description dependence/Kripke, >Presentation. I 94 Reference by description: E.g. "Jack the Ripper" E.g. "Neptune" was named as such before anyone had seen him. The reference was determined because of the description of its place. At this point they were not able to see the planet. Counter-example: "Volcano". I 94f It might also turn out that the description does not apply to the object although the reference of the name was specified with the description. E.g. the reference of "Venus" as the "morning star", which later turns out not to be a fixed star at all. In such cases, you know in no sense a priori that the description that has defined the reference applies to the object. I 93ff Description does not shorten the name. E.g. even if the murdered Schmidt discovered the famous sentence, Goedel would still refer to Goedel. I 112f Description determines a reference, it does not provide synonymy. "Standard meter" is not synonymous with the length - description provides contingent identity: inventor = post master. Cf. >Standard meter. I 115 Identity: through the use of descriptions contingent identity statements can be made. >Identity/Kripke. I 117 QuineVsMarcus ("mere tag") is not a necessary identity of proper names, but an empirical discovery - (Cicero = Tully) identity does not necessarily follow from description - the identity of Gaurisankar is also an empirical discovery. I 25/26 Description/names/Kripke: the description serves only to determine the reference, not to identify the object (for counterfactual situations), nor to determine the meaning. I 36 Description is fulfilled: only one sole object fulfils the description, e.g. "The man drinking champagne is angry" (but he drinks water). Apparent description: e.g. the Holy Roman Empire (was neither holy nor Roman) - it is a hidden proper name. --- III 353 Description/substitutional quantification: L must not occur in the substitution class: necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure that each sentence of the referential language retains its truth value is that whenever (Exi)f is true (when only xi is free), a substitution class f" of f will be be true (> condition (6)) - this does not work with certain L, even if (6) is fulfilled. III 369 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: y(ixf(x)) where f(x) is atomic, analyzed as follows: (Ey)(x)(y = x ↔ f(x)) ∧ y(y)) (Wessel: exactly one": (Ex)(P(x) ∧ (y)(P(y) > x = y)) "There is not more than one thing": (x)(y)(x = y) - is ambiguous, if there is more than one description: order of elimination. >Reference/Kripke, >Meaning/Kripke, cf. >necessary a posteriori. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
Descriptions | Logic Texts | Read III 127f Improper name/Quine: (= descriptions- only real names allow the substitution that can be found in the indistinguishability of identical. Improper names: lead to more complex form: E.g. "among the Roman orators there is a major one, and he denounced Catiline that". E.g. "Just one number counts the planets and it is more than seven"/Russell: here is only 7 a real name - hence these sentences may not be sentences in a conclusion of the principle of indistinguishability of the identical. >Leibniz principle, >Identity, >Indistinguishability, QuineVs:. problem : range: the marks must be eliminated, so that in the new wording no part corresponds with them. >Range, >Scope, >Narrow/wide. Strobach I 104 Indistinguishability/Strobach: requires Logic of the 2nd level: predicate logic 2nd level/PL2/Strobach: typical formula: Leibniz's Law: "x = y > (Fx ↔ Fy)". >Second order logic. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Stro I N. Strobach Einführung in die Logik Darmstadt 2005 |
Descriptions | Peacocke | I 19 Name/Identification/Necessary/Metaphysically possible /Epistemic/Kripke/Peacocke: E.g. assumed one could fix the reference of the name Bright by the fact that it intended to refer to the man who invented the wheel. Kripke: then still the statement is true: "it is possible that Bright has never invented the wheel". Cf. >Julius example, >Reference, >Possibility, >Necessity, >Indeterminacy, >Names. I 188/189 Possible world/Description/Peacocke: there is no specific individual relation between the use of the expression "the F" and the thing which is F. >Possible worlds, >Descriptions, >Predication. ((s) Otherwise certain aspects would be a priori). Identity between worlds/Peacocke: even in quite similar worlds identity is a relation for itself. >Cross world identity, >Identity. Identity between relations to the perceiving subject in various worlds: pointless to claim. >Unabmiguity, >Identification, >Perception. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
Descriptions | Prior | I 124 Theory of Descriptions/unicorn/Russell/Prior: a) "the so-and-so φ-s" b) "X thinks that the so-and-so φ-s" in a) and b) the marking has the same meaning whether the object exists or does not exist - in b) the sentence even has the same truth value. >Truth value, >Non-existence, >Thinking, >Thoughts. I 148 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: singular names: "The only thing that φ-s". >Names, >Singular Terms. Geach: this analysis has two parts: a) explicitly predicative use: "x is the only thing that φ-s" b) use as apparent subject: can be explained as an explication of an implicit predicative use: "the only thing that φ-s, ψ-s." >Predication, >"Exactly one". a) as "something that .." b) "If something ..." Prior: thie is a solution for the non-existing. Problem: different scope: a) as part of a complex predicate: "Something is both the only-thing- that-φ-s and not ψ-s.". b) as part of a complex sentence: "It is not the case that ..". Markings: useful: "the φ-re does not exist" not with logically proper name "this". >Scope, >Narrow/wide scope. I 152 Champagne-Example/PriorVsRussell: has overlooked that markings can be used differently : "the man over there," does not speak of something that it is "man" or that it is "over there". - If it is true that he is clever, then even if it is a disguised woman - attribution does not require proper identification - it is only required that it is "the only ...". >Descriptions/Russell. |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Descriptions | Quine | I 320 Elimination of singular descriptions/Quine: there are no more truth value gaps. All are wrong now: "..y .. and only y" instead of "y = (ix) (x .. ..)" when applicable to nothing. I 328f Descriptions can be revived. This is possible in all positions. Socrates is then again definable as a singular term. Quotes are names of linguistic structures. They eliminate the characteristic occurrences of the corresponding terms. II 75 ff Russell/Theory of Descriptions: a term is not defined by equivalence but through paraphrases. Reference is only simulated, not fixed. VII (i) 167 Descriptions/Quine: descriptions are singular terms. >Singular Terms/Quine. III 279 Description/Synonymy/Quine: whether a description assumption is available at all depends on an appropriate translation, and this in turn depends on the vague concept of synonymy. What is synonymous for us depends on what you first got to know in your individual learning history. Solution/Quine: we separate logic from empiricism by emphasizing the priority of the predicates: we insist that what we learn through perception is never terms, but only predicates. ((s) We then use these in the descriptions as building blocks.) III 280 Predicate/Quine: a predicate (instead of description) should then only apply to this (shown) object. Then we explain "(ix)Fx" as the actual name, where "F" stands for this basic predicate. That does not even apply to epistemology. Description/singular term/Quine: then nothing prevents us anymore to regard all singular terms as descriptions! If, for example, "The author of Waverley" is given, we do not need to stop looking for the correct "F" for translation into the "(ix)Fx" description. We allow the following: "(ix)(x is cerberus)" (>unicorn as description). Any less incompetent translation would only differ in its clarity, not in its meaning. Singular terms/Quine: treating all as descriptios has the advantage, III 281 to spare a difference to non-descriptive singular terms. The dispute over descriptions becomes one about predicates. >Predicates/Quine. III 293 Description/Equal Sign/Quine: if we have the equal sign, we can afford the luxury of introducing descriptions without having to calculate them as primitive basic concepts. Because with the equal sign we can eliminate a description from every sentence. >Equal sign/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Descriptions | Russell | Cresswell I 117 Descriptions/Russell: are never names - Other authors VsRussell: Descriptions are names, but not of normal objects but of intensional objects (various objects in different worlds). - CresswellVs intentional objects. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mental objects. Geach I 61 Description/Russell is never a name: E.g. The Duke of Cambridge is also a pub, but the Duke does not sell beer. Newen I 90 Theory of Descriptions/Russell: E.g. 1. There is at least one author of "Waverley" (existence assertion) - 2. There is at most one author of "Waverley" (uniqueness assertion) - 3. Whoever wrote "Waverley", was a Scott (statement content) - E.g. The current King of France/empty names: At least one king of France is bald - 2. At most one - 3. whoever ... is bald - E.g. identity: at least one denounced Catiline - 2. At most one ... - 1* at least one wrote "De Oratore" - 2* at most one ... - 3. Whoever denounced Catiline, wrote ... - E.g. negative existence sentences "It is not the case that 1. At least one .. - 2. At most one ... - RussellVsFrege: thus one avoids to accept Fregean sense as an abstract entity. Truth-value gaps/RussellVsFrege: they too are thus avoided. I 92 N.B.: sentences that seemed to be about a subject, are now about general propositions about the world. >Fregean sense, >Truth value gap. Russell I VIII E.g. Waverley - all true sentences have the same meaning - e.g. "Author of Waverley." Is no description of Scott - Description (labeling) is not the same as assertion - this does not refer to an object. - StrawsonVs - A sentence with "Waverley" says nothing about Scott, because it does not contain Scott. I 46 Descriptions/Russell: are always in the singular E.g. "father of" but not "son of" (not clear - always presuppoes quotes without "the": "jx": "x is φ" - instead of (ix)(jx) in short "R'y": the R of y, "the father of y" - characterizing function, not propositional function all mathematical functions are distinctive features. >Function/Russell. I 96 Description/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: "The author of Waverley" means nothing - we cannot define (ix)(jx) only its use - (> ?concept=Definitions">definition, definability). 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Flor III 122 Descriptions/Russell/Flor: are not names - reason: otherwise it would result in a mere triviality: "a = a" or something wrong. E.g. "The Snow man does not exist" is something different than to say, "Paul does not exist" - Descriptions: incomplete symbols - ((s) If description were names, they could not fail.) >Incomplete symbol, >Names. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
Descriptions | Searle | I 43 f "Topic-neutral" (Austin): "topic neutral" is not nomological. SearleVs"topic-neutral": e.g. digestive does not need an additional state which must be described separately. II 317 Description/Frege: the description delivers the sense, but not the definition (otherwise Aristotle is analytically Alexander's teacher). >Definition, >Analyticity, >Sense, >Meaning, >Names. II 319 Description/SearleVsKripke: some labels are rigid: when they include the identity condition for the object, e.g. "the object that I perceive" - also: every description can be made rigid by taking the actual world as an index, then "the inventor of bifocal glasses" is clear. >Rigidity, >Possible world. V 146 Theory of Descriptions/Russell/Searle: every sentence with reference can be replaced by an existence theorem. >Theory of descriptions/Russell. Searle: this is the true discovery of the theory of description. V 236ff Theory of description/Russell: sentence with description: hidden existence assertion. SearleVsRussell: a propositional act (expression of the proposition, certain reference) can never be identical with the illocutionary act of assertion (the propositional aact is part of the illocutionary act). (s) Reference is not existence assertion. V 240 Searle: from the fact that speech can be carried out only under certain circumstances (conditions) does not follow that the mere execution already claims that the conditions are satisfied, e.g. "bring this to the King of France" is not a claim and does not contain any. Cf. >theory of descriptions, >Speech acts. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Descriptions | Strawson | VII 118/19 Description/Meaning/Strawson: e.g. "He": minimal descriptive meaning. E.g. "Blue Grotto": maximum descriptive meaning. E.g. "The Blue Grotto": middle position, "impure" proper name. (Russell). >Name, >Description, >Improper name. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
Descriptions | Tugendhat | I 348 Descriptions/Frege (also Husserl): descriptions more fundamental than names - for finding the reference of names. MillVsFrege: Names more fundamental. >Names/Mill. VsMill: mysterious: "enclosed to the object itself". Solution/Mill: not to the object but to the idea of object. >Imagination. I 378 Frege: names are abbreviations for descriptions. >Abbreviated descriptions. I 396 Description/properties/Identification/Tugendhat: doubtful whether descriptions can really pick out an object. "Original" property: E.g. "the highest mountain", "the second highest mountain," and so on. Problem: there can also be two mountains of the same height, at one point there can be multiple or none so-and-so. Tugendhat: there must be added something else, ostension, name or location. E.g. someone who is lead in front of the highest mountain, does not need to know that it is the highest. - ((s) "This mountain" is not a property.) >Knowledge, >Identification, >haecceitism, cf. >Two lost wanderers. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
Designation | Chisholm | I 166 ff Planet/Denoting/Designating/Kaplan: Planets example: if you take as a necessary name a for the number nine, then you believe of a that it is an even number, then: in "x is even", you can replace x with a. ChisholmVs: Denoting (linguistically) is not helpful, cannot be a basic concept if intentionality is a basic concept: we explain the linguistic with the intentional. >Planets example, >Intentionality, >Basic conepts. I 167 Instead: Designating: numeral necessary because of successor relation! - It brings us the object closer - Numerals: its meaning happens to involve a property that constitutes an individual being of the number, a property for which applies that the number necessarily has it (E.g. successor - unlike names) (!). >Propoer names, >Singular terms, >Numerals. I 168 Designate/Chisholm: must necessarily bring features: "the property blue" instead of "the color of the sky", E.g. "All men are mortal" instead of "Aristotle's favorite proposition". >Features. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Designation | Cresswell | II 119 Naming/Denotation/Cresswell: E.g. the predicate "was so called" is a property of pairs so that it consists, when a is the name of a. - (> inserting). ((s) Name not as a property, but "naming"as a feature of a word-object-pair). See also >denoting position/Quine, >Names of expressions, >Name of a sentence, >Names, >Naming, >Denotation, cf. >Predication. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Designation | Geach | I 52 Naming/Denotation/Two-Names Theory/GeachVsAristoteles: Incorrect approximation of predication and naming: as if predicates were (complex) names : "on the mat". >Naming, >Predication, >Attribution, >Names, >Predicates, >Aristotle. ((s) "The man stabbing Caesar to death stabbed the one stabbed by Brutus.") Geach: Additionally, Geach would use a link. Two-names theory/Aristotle/Geach: "Socrates is a philosopher" should be true because the thing is named. GeachVs: "Philosopher" (general term) is not a name for "all (or every) philosopher". >General terms. --- I 153f Intentionality/naming/Parmenides/Geach: one cannot name anything that does not exist. (Geach pro) - ((s) Existence introduction is not arbitrary, not without premise). >Existence, >Existence statement, >Existence/Parmenides, >Introduction, >Nonexistence, >Fiction. E.g. Geach dreamed of a girl and wants to call it "Pauline". - On the other hand, acquaintance is sufficient - presence is not necessary. Problem: is the girl even more imaginary, if he has not dreamed of her? Geach: that is a sure sign that this is all nonsense. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. Geach with Parmenides: "There is only that what exists." GeachVsParmenides: However, one can talk about non-existent objects. - E.g. talking about absent friends without knowing that he is dead, changes the truth value, but not the fact that these are sentences. >Truth value, >Reference. Imaginary girls are not competing for identification in the dream. - If it is true of no identifiable girl that I dreamed of her, then I have not dreamed of any girl. >de re, >de dicto, >Identification. Solution: "I dreamed of a girl, but it is not true of a certain girl that I dreamed of her". - This is similar to: it is not true of a certain stamp that I want it. --- I 252 Predication/Geach: predication can be done without naming: in an if-that-sentence or in an or-sentence, a term P can be predicated of a thing without naming the thing "P". E.g. "If that what the policeman said is true, then he drove faster than 60". This does not call the policeman's sentence true. - (> Conditional). Predication/naming: centuries-old error: that the predicate is uttered by the thing. Frege: Difference >naming / >predication, >designation: to name a thing "P", a sentence must be asserted! But a property is also predicted in a non-assertive sub-clause (subset). Therefore, naming must be explained by predication, not vice versa. >Naming. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
Designation | Hacking | I 142 Naming/Hacking: there can be no complete theory of naming. >Naming, >Proper names, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theory language, >Unobservables, >Descriptions, >Theory of Descriptions, >Causal theory of names, >Denotation, >Reference, >Completeness, >Incompleteness. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
Designation | Kripke | III 380 Naming/designation/Kripke: designation has nothing to do with existence: wrong question: "Does ___ live on Mars?" and then insert name. ((s) The substitutional quantification: would be satisfied by a name because it refuses an ontology that goes beyond its expressions.) >Existence/Kripke, >Substitutional quantification/Kripke. --- Kripke I 121 Naming/designation/Kripke: designation does not create identity: Phosphorus/Hesperus has the same epistemic situation named as different celestial bodies - it is quite possible, therefore contingent, but does not affect the actual identity. We use them as names in all possible worlds. >Identity/Kripke, >Morning star/evening star, >Possible world/Kripke. I 134 Geach: designation reflects something important: Nixon = human (a priori). KripkeVs: e.g. Lot’s guests are Angles despite designation. Difference: there is a difference in the use of the name/designation. This is no case of indeterminacy of reference. >Indeterminacy, >Inscrutability of reference, >Reference/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
Designation | Quine | II 61 Naming: is a name or singular term. Designate: a predicate designates. Naming and designating are referring. They do not express meaning. VIII 27 Syncategorematic expressions such as "on" do not designate anything. Likewise, we can assume that words such as "unicorn" do not designate anything; neither something abstract nor something concrete. The same applies to "-ness" or punctuation marks. The mere ability to appear in a sentence does not make a string a name. Nominalism: interprets all words as syncategorematic! Ad XI 173 Note 18: Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: sentences do not designate! Therefore no names can be formed by them (by quotation marks). XI 173 Substitutional Quantification/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: Substitutional Quantification does not enter into an ontological obligation in so far as the names used do not have to name anything. That is, we are not forced to accept values of the variables. >Substitutional Quantification/Quine. XI 49 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: this is precisely what we use to disguise ontology by not getting out of the language. XI 132 Sense/designate/singular term/Quine/Lauener: it does not need a name to make sense. Example: unicorn. There is a difference between sense,meaning and reference. XII 73 Distinguishability/real numbers/Quine: N.B.: any two real numbers are always distinguishable, even if not every real number can be named! ((s) Not enough names). Because it is always x < y or y < x but never x < x. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Designation | Russell | VI 69 Designate/Russell: only familiar objects can be designated (> acquaintance) - problem: it is hard to find a name that is not a description. Only a "real name" can do this - "logical proper names" e.g. "this"). |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
Designation | Tugendhat | I 342 Naming/Tugendhat theories that name the objects are no philosophical theories but linguistic. >Philosophy, >Semantics, >Linguistics, >Theories, >Names, >Definitions, >Definition/Frege. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
Designation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 338 Naming/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: in order that mere naming can make sense, a lot has to be prepared already in the language. --- VI 154 Naming/Wittgenstein/Schulte: is still no move in the language game. >Language game, >Proper names. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
Discrimination | Social Psychology | Haslam I 36 Attitudes/psychological theories: Contemporary social psychologists tend to conceptualize attitudes as evaluative dispositions (e.g., Eagly and Chaiken, 1993)(1), and this conceptualization has driven, and continues to drive, the way in which attitudes are measured. >Attitudes and Behavior/psychological theories. Problem: verbally expressed attitudes may not be an accurate representation of people’s genuine feelings. The recommended solution is to try to measure implicit attitudes. Unlike explicit attitudes, such as those that individuals are aware of consciously and that are assessed by asking individuals to express their attitudes overtly in a questionnaire, implicit attitudes are assumed to be activated automatically in response to an attitude object and to guide behaviour unless overridden by controlled processes. In other words, implicit attitudes exist outside of conscious awareness or outside of conscious control. Solution: Indirect measures such as the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998)(2) and evaluative priming (Fazio et al., 1995)(3) rely on response times to measure evaluative biases in relation to different attitude objects. These measures rest on the idea that exposure to a concept or stimulus (e.g., a picture of members of your own racial group) activates concepts in memory (e.g., a feeling that members of my group are generally positive), and then facilitates a positive response to related concepts (e.g., a positive word such as ‘good’) while simultaneously inhibiting responses to unrelated concepts (e.g., a negative word such as ‘bad’). Haslam I 37 (…) the distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes raises interesting questions about the relationship between these constructs. Are implicit and explicit attitudes tapping distinct concepts such that people can hold opposing implicit and explicit attitudes towards the same attitude object (e.g., as suggested by Devine, 1989)(4)? Or do implicit and explicit attitudes reflect a single underlying evaluation, such that the only difference between them is the extent to which they are affected by conscious processes (e.g., Fazio, 2001)(5)? (…) reviews of the relations between implicit and explicit attitudes have typically found only modest correlations (e.g., r = .24; Hoffman et al., 2005)(6). However, there is considerable variability in the strength of this relationship (with some rs > .40 and others < .10) suggesting that additional factors, such as the desire to present the self positively and the strength of one’s attitudes, are important (Nosek, 2005)(7). Expression of attitudes: “Verbal expressions of liking are subject to social desirability biases … , physiological reactions may reflect arousal or other reactions instead of evaluation … , and response latencies may be indicative not of personal attitudes but of cultural stereotypes.” (Ajzen and Gilbert Cote 2008(8): p. 289) Haslam I 38 (…) other research points to the importance of attitude accessibility (i.e., the extent to which an attitude is frequently invoked or expressed; Fazio, 1990)(9) and social identity (i.e., the extent to which an attitude is associated with a salient group membership; Terry and Hogg, 1996)(10). Measuring attitudes: (…) there is now widespread use of tasks, such as the IAT (see above) , to measure implicit attitudes. However, just as Wicker (1969) did in his review of the literature on explicit attitudes, it is important to ask whether implicit attitudes actually predict behaviour and, if they do, do they predict it any better than explicit attitudes? See the review by Greenwald et al. (2009)(11). 1. Eagly, A.H. and Chaiken, S. (1993) The Psychology of Attitudes. Belmont, CA: Thomson. 2. Greenwald, A.G., McGhee, D.E. and Schwartz, J.L.K. (1998) ‘Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The implicit association test’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74: 1464–80. 3. Fazio, R.H., Jackson, J.R., Dunton, B.C. and Williams, C.J. (1995) ‘Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69: 1013–27. 4. Devine, P.G. (1989) ‘Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63: 754–65. 5. Fazio, R.H. (2001) ‘On the automatic activation of associated evaluations: An overview’, Cognition and Emotion, 15: 115–41. 6. Hofmann, W., Gawronski, B., Gschwendner, T., Le, H. and Schmitt, M. (2005) ‘A meta-analysis on the correlation between the Implicit Association Test and explicit self-report measures’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31: 1369–85. 7. Nosek, B.A. (2005) ‘Moderators of the relationship between implicit and explicit evaluation’, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 134: 565–84. 8. Ajzen, I. and Gilbert Cote, N. (2008) ‘Attitudes and the prediction of behaviour’, in W.D. Crano and R. Prislin (eds), Attitudes and Attitude Change. London: Psychology Press. pp. 289–311. 9. Fazio, R.H. (1990) ‘Multiple processes by which attitudes guide behaviour: The MODE model as an integrative framework’, in M.P. Zanna (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 23. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 75–109. 10. Terry, D.J. and Hogg, M.A. (1996) ‘Group norms and the attitude–behaviour relationship: A role for group identification’, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22: 776–93. 11. Greenwald, A.G., Poehlman, A.T., Uhlmann, E.L. and Banaji, M.R. (2009) ‘Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: III. Meta-analysis of predictive validity’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97: 17–41. Joanne R. Smith and Deborah J. Terry, “Attitudes and Behavior. Revisiting LaPiere’s hospitality study”, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications Parisi I 132 Employment discrimination/Social Psychology/Nadler/Mueller: (...) disparate treatment jurisprudence treats stereotypes as consciously held beliefs, suggesting that an honest employer explaining a discriminatory decision would include the biased motive among its reasons for the decision. However, discriminatory employment decisions are often driven by implicit biases (Rooth, 2010(1); Rudman and Glick, 2001(2)). The unconscious nature of these biases renders them invisible to the biased employer, allowing it to honestly maintain that a discriminatory hiring Parisi I 133 decision was based entirely on legitimate factors, thereby shielding the employer from liability. Evidence from the field and the laboratory supports the notion that implicit biases influence organizational decisions. For example, in one study job applicants with African-American names were less likely than those with white names to receive job interviews (Bertrand, Mullainathan, and Shafir, 2004)(3). Equal treatment: Successful women working in traditionally male domains (e.g. aircraft company executive) were penalized relative to men in the same position (Heilman et al., 2004)(4). 1. Rooth, D.-O. (2010). "Automatic Associations and Discrimination in Hiring: Real World Evidence." Labour Economics 17(3): 523-534. doi:10.1016/j.1abeco.2009.04.005. 2. Rudman, L. A. and P. Glick (2001). "Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash Toward Agentic Women.“ Journal of Social Issues 57(4): 743-762. 3. Bertrand, M., S. Mullainathan, and E. Shafir (2004). "A Behavioral-Economics View of Poverty." American Economic Review 94(2): 419-423. 4. Heilman, M. E., A. S. Wallen, D. Fuchs, and M. M. Tamkins (2004). "Penalties for Success: Reactions to Women Who Succeed at Male Gender-Typed Tasks." Journal of Applied Psychology 89(3): 416-427. doi:10.103 7/0021-9010.89.3.416. Nadler, Janice and Pam A. Mueller. „Social Psychology and the Law“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
Economic Models | Gelbach | Parisi I 33 Economic models/Gelbach/Klick: Econometric studies come in two basic flavors: structural and reduced form. Structural modeling involves writing down an explicit mathematical and statistical representation of the determinants of individual, firm, or organizational behavior, such that these relationships can be captured with a finite collection of parameter estimates Reduced form: Reduced form work instead involves attempting to estimate more generally defined contextual objects such as the average treatment effect of past implementations of policy changes. (...) it is possible that one doesn’t learn as much from reduced form estimation as from valid structural estimation. Thus, the choice between structural and reduced form approaches can involve trading off the need to make stronger assumptions (structural work) against the prospect of learning less information (reduced form work) that could prove to be valuable. Parisi I 34 Omitted variables: The fundamental challenge in this context is omitted variable bias. >Empirism/Economic theories. That is, when attempting to isolate the causal effect of policy P on outcome Y through, say, the use of multiple regression analysis, it is necessary to rule out the possibility that any estimated effect is driven by unobserved (or at least uncontrolled for) variables that happen to be correlated with P. Terminology: This general omitted variable bias problem goes by many names (e.g., endogeneity, selection effects, reverse causality, simultaneity, etc.),(...). Suppose we are interested in how changes in a policy P affect some continuous outcome variable Y. Traditional solution: A traditional way to model the relationship between these variables was to assume that there is a parametric function F that relates them structurally, through a combination of assumptions on individual behavior, organizations’ cost functions, and market forces (or other aggregating forces) relating them to each other, such that Y = F(P;τ,ε), where τ is a parameter and ε is an unobserved term. The causal effect of a policy change from P1 to P2 is thus to shift Y from F(P1;τ,ε) to F(P2;τ,ε). If we assume that F is linear in P and ε, then the structural relationship between Y and P is captured by the equation Y = Pτ+ε together with the claim that when ε is held fixed, a change in P’s value from P1 to P2 will induce a change of τ units in Y’s value. On this account, the parameter τ measures the causal effect on Y of a one-unit change in P. If P and ε are uncorrelated, then the OLS estimator is consistent for this causal effect. On the other hand, if P and ε are correlated, then the OLS estimator will differ from τ even in large samples. (...) Parisi I 37 Policies: The key to policy-relevant empirical work, then, involves two questions. First, is it reasonable to assume that ε and P are mean-independent, or that there is a linear structural relationship between Y and P, with P and ε uncorrelated? The second key question is how to estimate causal effects when it is not reasonable to assume that either situation (A) or (B) holds. An enormous amount of modern empirical work is focused on answering this question. Random assignment: One approach to solving the problem of dependence between ε and P is to assign policy levels to units randomly. This approach, common in studies involving the effects of medical and psychological interventions, is frequently used in empirical economics (...).The advantage of random assignment is that it directly imposes the mean independence of ε and P, so that τ may be regarded as the causal effect of the policy, at least within the particular population studied experimentally. For this reason, it is common in the empirical economics literature to consider randomized controlled trials (RCTs) the conceptual benchmark against which other study types are measured. Parisi I 38 Randomized controlled trials/problems: This is surely too strong a claim, as Heckman and Smith (1995)(1) and Deaton (2010)(2) have ably discussed, because RCTs do have potentially important drawbacks. One drawback is that not all questions are susceptible to study using RCTs. RCTs cannot measure what are sometimes called “general equilibrium effects,” that is, effects that a policy change has to behavior outside the study’s domain of impact. >Randomized assignment/Economic theories. 1. Heckman, James J. and Jeffrey A. Smith (1995). “Assessing the Case for Social Experiments.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(2): 85–110. 2. Deaton, Angus (2010). “Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development.” Journal of Economic Literature 48(2): 424–455. Gelbach, Jonah B. and Jonathan Klick „Empirical Law and Economics“. In: Parisi, Francesco (ed) (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics. Vol 1: Methodology and Concepts. NY: Oxford University Press. |
Parisi I Francesco Parisi (Ed) The Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics: Volume 1: Methodology and Concepts New York 2017 |
Element Relation | Geach | I 53 Two-class theory/GeachVs: this theory is even worse than the Two-names theory. >Two-names theory. Two-class theory: E.g. the general term "philosopher" denotes "class of philosophers". - Socrates is then only a member of the class. >General term, >Denotation. GeachVs: the element relation is very different from the subclasses relation: E.g. A parliamentary committee is not a member of Parliament. >Element relation, >Subsets. But: "a philosopher" means the same in both applications. Copula: fallacy of division: as if two varieties existed: one for "is a philosopher" and one for "is an element of the class of philosophers". >Copula/Geach. Geach: equivalent sets must not be divided into equivalent subsets - "every logician" is not equivalent to "class of logicians". >Equivalent class. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
Elm/Beech Example | Goodman | IV 143 I can know that "elm" and "beech" are separate classes of deciduous trees, but I can have no idea how to differentiate them. IV 143 Often nothing in the consciousness of the speaker determines the extension of his/her terms. E.g. I can know that "Feynman" and "Gell-Man" are names of important physicists, but I might not know by which the one differs from the other. My language skills, however, will not be endangered by my ignorance. >Competence, >Language, >Capabilities, >Distictions. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
Elm/Beech Example | Millikan | I 153 Elm/Beech/Expert/Layman/Understanding/to mean/Millikan: the layman can think something of gold, elm trees or monotremes, even if he has no knowledge of these. To mean: he can even mean the same as the expert! N.B.: there are therefore no full-bodied intensions, which are common to all idiolects of the speakers of a public language. Names/knowing/understanding/claiming/Millikan: Problem: is that not paradoxical? If I do not know anything about monotremes, except I've heard the name once, how can I mean the same with the word as the expert? E.g. Expert: I'm going to Brazil, to explore monotremes. I: What are monotremes? Expert: what do you mean with "monotreme"? Me: I mean what you mean, of course. Expert: do you know what monotremes are? Me: no idea, so I ask. Expert: then you cannot have meant the same as I have. Menon's paradox/Millikan: here we see a shadow of Menon's paradox. Solution/Carnap: instead of "What are monotremes" we actually ask "What does the term 'monotreme' mean?" ((s) > semantic ascent). Intuitive/Millikan: but this is the question about monotremes, not about words. Understanding/Millikan: even a parrot can ask something about monotremes without understanding anything of them. I 154 To mean/Parrot/Millikan: the parrot cannot mean the question of course. To mean/Millikan: I can mean something with "monotreme", because I intend that the word has its eigenfunction, even if I cannot specify it in detail. Expert/Layman/To mean/understanding/knowing/knowledge/Millikan: the paradox does not come from the fact that I cannot mean the same as the expert, but that there is a sense in which the expert knows what he means with "monotreme" and I do not know this in this sense ((s) not what I mean and not what the expert means). |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Equal Opportunities | Nussbaum | Mause I 200f Equal Opportunities/Sen/Nussbaum: The concept of realization opportunities, also called "capability-approach", which is significantly connected with the names Amartya Sen (1985)(1) and Martha Nussbaum (1999)(2), brings the question of the social conditions necessary to lead a good and fulfilled life to the fore. The approach of realising opportunities aims not only to guarantee equal opportunities, but also to actively support the individual in making the individual's life plan a reality. >Justice, >Equality. Life/Capability Approach: a fulfilled life depends on the relationship between what a person does or is and what he/she is able to do. >Life management. Functionings: are states that are appreciated by a person. Capabilities: objective possibilities, that can realize the chosen ways of life. >Capabilities. 1. Amartya Sen, Commodities and capabilities. New Delhi Oxford 1985. 2. Martha Nussbaum, Gerechtigkeit oder Das gute Leben. Frankfurt a. M. 1999 Sandra Seubert, „Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development (2000)“, in:Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
Equal Opportunities | Sen | Mause I 200f Equal Opportunities/Sen/Nussbaum: The concept of realization opportunities, also called "capability-approach", which is significantly connected with the names Amartya Sen (1985)(1) and Martha Nussbaum (1999)(2), brings the question of the social conditions necessary to lead a good and fulfilled life to the fore. The approach of realising opportunities aims not only to guarantee equal opportunities, but also to actively support the individual in making the individual's life plan a reality. Life/Capability Approach: a fulfilled life depends on the relationship between what a person does or is and what he/she is able to do. Functionings: are states that are appreciated by a person. Capabilities: objective possibilities, that can realize the chosen ways of life. >Capabilities. 1. Amartya Sen, Commodities and capabilities. New Delhi Oxford 1985. 2. Martha Nussbaum, Gerechtigkeit oder Das gute Leben. Frankfurt a. M. 1999 |
EconSen I Amartya Sen Collective Choice and Social Welfare: Expanded Edition London 2017 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
Equal Sign | Quine | IX 9 Equal Sign/Quine: "=" is a two-digit predicate. >Predicates/Quine. IX 10 Sign/Sign Set/Quine: each theory has introduced a basic vocabulary of primitive predicates, perhaps by definition. Mostly there are only finally many, then we do not need to add the equal sign "=". Because we can then define it with the help of the others. ((s) "primitive" does not mean "one-digit"). Equal Sign/Quine: suppose the only basic predicate of a theory is "φ". Then we can define "=" by the following explanation of "x = y": (1) ∀z[(φxz ‹› φyz) u (φzx ‹› φzy)]. For obviously "x= x" proves to be a simple example of a valid formula schema of quantifier logic. The same applies to all special cases of "(x = y u F) > Fy", as far as they are statements which contain no further predicate except "φ". This is seen in the following way: first, look at all results in which the statements made by "Fx" and "Fy" differ only in one place. The immediate context of this single occurrence must then be either "φxv" and "φyv" or "φvx" and "φvy", where "v" denotes any variable, (perhaps either x or y). IX 23 Individuals/Elemental Relation/Extensionality Axiom/Quine: Suggestion: "x ε y", if x is an individual, be true or false, depending on, b x = y or x unequal to y. Thus, the problem of applying the extensionality axiom to individuals disappears. "ε" of individuals has the property of "=". (Elemental relationship of individuals: equality! ("is element of", "is contained": becomes the equal sign before individuals). IX 26 Until then, the equal sign is only defined between class abstraction terms. Between variables we need further tools ...+.... X 88 Logical Truth/Structure/Definition/Quine: our definition of logical truth inevitably referred to the grammatical structure. Problem: this view is called into question when we introduce identity (identity predicate "=", equal sign). Identity/logical truth/Quine: the traceability of logical truth to grammatical structure is questioned when identity is introduced, because e.g. "x = x" or "x = y" may not be a logical truth, because not everything can be used. ((s) >Intension: because of it, not all theorems of identity are logical truths. Quine: it is about the fact that in one logical truth one predicate must be replaced by another, but the equal sign as a predicate cannot be replaced by another predicate. Identity/Logic/Quine: Truths of Identity Theory Example "x = x", "Ey((x = y)" or "~(x = y . ~(y = x))" ((s) symmetry of identity) are not suitable as logical truths according to our definitions of logical truth. >Logical Truth/Quine. Reason: they can be wrong if "=" is replaced by other predicates. Consequence: So should we not count identity to logic, but to mathematics? Together with ">" and "ε"? >Semantic Ascent. III 268 Two different names can stand for the same object, if the equal sign is inbetween, the equation is true. It is not claimed that the names are the same! III 271 Equal Sign/Quine: "=" is a common relative term. The equal sign is necessary because two variables can refer to the same or to different objects. From a logical point of view, the use of the equal sign between variables is fundamental, not that between singular terms. III 293 Equality Sign/expressiveness/stronger/weaker/Quine: we also gain expressiveness by making the equality sign obsolete ((s) when we introduce classes). Instead of "x = y" we say that x and y belong to exactly the same classes. I.e. (a)(x ε a. bik. y ε a) Identity/Quantities/Quine: the identity of classes can be explained in a way in reverse: "a = b" means that a and b have exactly the same elements. Then the equal sign is simply a convenient shortcut. Description/Equal Sign/Quine: if we have the equal sign, we can afford the luxury of introducing descriptions without having to calculate them as primitive basic concepts. Because with the equal sign we can eliminate a description from every sentence. >Descriptions/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Equality | Logic Texts | Menne I 62 Identity: one thing. Equality: two things. Equality is expressed in relation to a characteristic. Menne: one cannot meaningfully speak of the identity of properties. >Properties, >Schematic letters, >Quantification over properties. Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell/Whitehead/Menne: Identity of individuals: expressed by "x = x". Equivalence of statements, i.e. the equality of the truth value of two statements: by an Identity sign: "p ≡ p". classes: are called "identical". Identity: here a thing appears under two names. Equality: is expressed by reference to a property. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hoyningen-Huene II 60 Equality/Form/Hoyningen-Huene: Equality and difference belong to the logical form and not to the content. >Cf. >Identity. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Me I A. Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1997 |
Equivalence | Geach | I 189f Equivalence/Biconditional/GeachVsBlack: "is materially equivalent" is not synonymous with "if and only if". >Equivalence. "Three line" symbol ≡ is often read as "materially equivalent". But equivalence exists only between sentences, not names of sentences. Problem: Tom loves Mary ↔ Mary loves Tom" is only significant if "≡" (thee line) is read as "iff" (if and only if) rather than "materially equivalent".(⇔) cf. >Material, >Formal, >Description level, >Content, cf. >Formalism, >Formal language, >Formal speech, >Conditional. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
Essence | Wiggins | II 286 Essence/RussellVsEssentialism: it is a purely linguistic question which properties we use in the presence of a name. - So names might have essence, things can not have an essence. Socrates is no more stable than the things that happen to him. "Mr Smith" is a collective name of incidents, i.e. a speaker referred to something completely unknowable. Wiggins per: an ontology of events is possible: (e.g. M. Proust: houses, streets, fleeting as the years, thin layers of experience). >Ontology, >Existence, >Objects, >Unambiguity, >Reference, >Individuation, >Identification. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
Events | Kim | Schwarz I 132 Event/LewisVsKim: definition: Def Event/Kim: (Kim 1976)(1): a triple of a thing, a time and a property. LewisVsKim: (1986f(5),196) that is too fragile: Schwarz I 133 This assigns too many essential properties to events. For example, a football match could have happened a little later or a little different. Or would it have been another game then? Bennett: (1988(4),§23 24) intuitively the question has no sense. Schwarz: that's not what Lewis is all about. But fragility is what matters when it comes to causes and effects: Def Fragility/fragile/Event/Lewis/(s): a modified event would not be the same but different. Then modification cannot be expressed at all: "what was modified? >Identity, >Identification, >Similarity, >Distinctions, >Classification. Counterfactual analysis: according to it, A causes B if B would not have happened without A. >Counterfactual conditionals. Question: under what circumstances would one event have happened (even if it was different) and under what circumstances would it have been replaced by another. This will lead to problems later on. Cause/effect/Lewis/Schwarz: both are no intuitive event. For example acoustic feedback: here the later temporal parts are caused by the earlier ones. (1986f(5),172f). >Cause, >Effect. Similarly: e.g. the temporal parts of persons are linked by causal relationships! >Temporal identity, >Parts, cf. >Continuants, >Person. But these temporal parts are not events in the intuitive sense. Causes such as the presence of oxygen in an explosion (ok, as a cause) are also not an event in the everyday sense. (1986d(6),261). Event/BennettVsLewis/MellorVsLewis/Schwarz: shouldn't Lewis rather speak of "facts"? "that p causes q". Fact/Schwarz: if you understand them as classes of space-time regions, this is not an alternative, but only a terminological variant. >Facts, >Space-time regions. 1. Jaegwon Kim [1976]: “Events as Property Exemplifications”. In Myles Brand und Douglas Walton (ed.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, 159–177 4. Jonathan Bennett [1988]: Events and Their Names. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. D. Lewis [1986f]: Philosophical Papers II . New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press 6. D. Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 |
Kim I J. Kim Philosophy of Mind 2010 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
Everything he said is true | Field | II 147 Quantification/quotes/Field: normal quantification does not allow the generalization of names that are both inside and outside of quotation marks. But that is what we need for e.g. "Every name that came up in the discussion of staffing, referred to a man." >Quantification, >Self-reference, >Description levels, >Paradoxes, >Reference, >Quotation marks, >Scope. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Excluded Middle | Geach | I 76ff Law of excluded middle/Geach: the law is valid without any exception. Even Aristotle 9 Chap. De Interpretatione: tomorrow's sea battle: no refutation. No multi-valued logic: if we get the same truth value, if we ascribe P and its negation, then if P u P and P v P. - The same as for simple predication. Geach: only exception: vagueness. >Vagueness, cf. >Multi-valued logic. I 74 (A) For any x, either x is F or x is not F (B) For any predicate P and any object x, either P or its negation is true of x. I 75 in most cases we can treat (A) and (B) as equivalent. At first glance, the two look less fundamental than: (C) Either p or not p (D) Every sentence is either true itself or has a true negation Negation/Predicate Negation/Geach: the negation used in (A) and mentioned in (B) is the predicate negation. Negation/Sentence negation/Geach: The negation used in (C) and mentioned in (D) is the sentence negation. Negation/Everyday language/Geach: Here it is usually a part of the sentence that is negated, but the effect is that the whole sentence is negated. >Negation. I 76 Excluded Third/Geach: Semantic formulations often use the term "true" or "false" while omitting negation: E.g. For each predicate P and each object x, P is either true of x or false of x. E.g. Each proposition is either true or false. GeachVs: I cannot see any advantage in this. Negation must be used explicitly anyway. We lose nothing if we say instead of "false" that the negation is "true of". Excluded Middle/Quantification/Geach: The reason for my quantification of the law in (A) is to make it clearer what can be considered as a substitution of "x", e.g., no empty names. >Quantification. Empty names: are a matter of how to make them right. Question: why can't we use "every man" for x? I 78 Excluded Middle/Geach: Seems more substantial than other laws because it seems to be a premise like "either so and so or not so and so". or: "If so...then so...and if not so...then not so..." GeachVs: this is not a good argument, because, whatever comes out of "Either p or not p" and "If p then q" and "If not p then r" follows would also follow from the last two premises alone! Wittgenstein: with such superfluous assumptions we have to look for a hidden deception. When one realizes that one is to be taken by surprise, one then looks for the mistake in the wrong place. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
Existence | Kripke | I 70f Frege and Russell support the thesis according to which a proper name is not a fixed term expression and is synonymous with the description that replaces it. >Description/Kripke, >Name/Kripke, >Rigidity/Kripke, >Naming/Kripke, >Denotation/Kripke. E.g. if "Moses" means "the man who did this and that", then Moses never existed if no one did this and that (KripkeVs). I 81 You could say "the Jonah in the book never existed", as one might say "the Hitler in the Nazi propaganda never existed." But: existence is independent of representation. >Presentation. I 92 Counterfactual: even if you say "suppose Hitler would never have been born," then the name "Hitler" here refers, and still in a rigid manner, to something that would not exist in the described counterfactual situation. I 31, I 179 A discovery (e.g. fossils) does not provide proof of existence of figures from myths (this is not sufficiently determined). |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
Existence | Quine | I 54 Existence: is from the standpoint of theory always a settlement. It can only be avoided by greater complexity. Arbitration: the method of arbitration: question of existence is question of evidence. I 300 Existence: the category is dependent on the point of view, but not on the existence of the objects E.g. time period. I 316 Existence: no claim of existence arises from the meaning of singular terms. >Singular Terms/Quine. I 402f Existence: does not arise from the dichotomy "single thing" - "universalia" - it does not matter whether they exist. "Equator", "North Pole" - Linking with stimuli is a weak argument for primacy of physical objects but it makes terms accessible for all positions. >Stimuli/Quine. I 412 QuineVsProperties: there is a fallacy of subtraction: deriving existence from "about" and "is about" - "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects - but not also properties. "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects and not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would be true for classes instead of properties: Generic term symbolizes as much its extension as its intension. >Classes/Quine, >Properties/Quine, >Singular Terms/Quine. II 173 Existence: "All x are y" controversy: does this imply the existence of "x"? In medieval logic it does but not in modern times (thus one gains symmetry and simplicity). VII (f) 110 Existence/Ontology/Quine: is only values of bound variables: not predicates "F", not statements "p", etc. because these are not the names of entities. VII (i) 167 Existence/Quine: we can do without "a exists" when singular terms are included in description after translation. VIII 31 Existence/Quine/(s): comes ultimately only from "The word appendicitis is a name" - but do names have to denote? >Denotation/Quine. IX 29 Existence/Ontology/Quine/(s): we cannot infer the quantity from the element. ((s) An existing thing may possibly belong to many quantities) - but the fact that we state the element implies its existence as a thing - then there is also {x: Fx} if it is to be an element of something. IX 33 Existence/Quine: must not be confused with the property of being a quantity - and virtual classes must not be confused with extreme classes. Existence of a means being an element of ϑ (universal class). The property of being a quantity means that a is an element of something. Important argument: the whole point is that you do not know if ϑ is a something. If we postulate the existence of ϑ, i.e. ϑ ε ϑ, then, in fact, all things become quantities. Existent would then be the property of being a quantity. But if there are extreme classes at all now, then ϑ is not real, ϑ ε ϑ. ((s) absurd.) IX 176 Definition/Existence/Quine: does not assume existence, but a description - Vs: even classes are not created by description. IX 218 Existence/Quine: is for NF (New Foundations) plus extreme classes: the property of being a quantity: IX 221 Existence/Quine: what was existence for NF (New Foundations), becomes only the property of being a quantity - i.e. where NF (New Foundations) said "{x: Fx} ε ϑ", we now have to say "^uFu ε Uϑ", and also limit all variables that can be hidden in the "F" to quantities (i.e. "Uϑ"). Lauener XI 128 Existence/Value of a bound variable/Quine/Lauener: since "exists" is not a predicate, we need quantification. Its logic is that of the existence quantifier. Quantifiers only receive meaning when the values of the variables are identifiable. Ideology: Part of the predicates - (as opposed to logical constants and quantifiers) - values of the variables are precisely the objects. Lauener XI 130 Everything to which a predicate applies is a value of a variable because a predicate is an open sentence. Predicate variables only exist freely. Everything that exists are objects, not e.g. properties. >Object/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
Existence | Strawson | Meggle I 312 Existence/Strawson/Hungerland: existence does not follow from speech, it is presupposed in the speech. - If there is no reference, a statement is neither true nor false. >Nonexistence, >Truth value, >Truth value gap. Strawson VII 96ff Existence / Russell / Strawson: only if a sentence really has subject-predicate form, the existence is guaranteed - therefore only logical proper names such as "the" are real names: existence is guaranteed by acquaintance. >Logical proper name, >Acquaintance. VII 102 StrawsonVsRussell: only complete sentences can be true or false. It is pointless to say "the present King" was needed "as the expression" to make a false statement. A sentence always remains the same. >Sentence/Strawson, cf. >Subsententials. Statement and assertion: change over time. Cf. >"The present King of France". |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
Existence Statements | Quine | VIII 24ff Existence Statement/Quine: special: "There is one thing that is so and so" (mentions the name) - general: "There is a thing that is so" (specifies a variable instead of names) - E.g. Pegasus: is a sense equivalent to description. >Descriptions, >Pegasus example, >Non-existence, >Unicorn example. XII 27 Object/Translation/Indefiniteness/Expression Conditions/Language Learning/Radical Interpretation/Quine: the expression conditions are not sufficient to be able to say with certainty what a speaker of a foreign language regards as objects. Problem: how can assertions of existence (theorems of existence) ever be empirically invalidated? Solution: the knowledge of the conditions of utterance does not ensure the reference to the subject, but it does help to clarify what serves as empirical confirmation of the truth of the whole sentence. XII 28 We then project our own acceptance of objects onto the indigenous language. We can be sure that the assumed object is an observed object in the sense that the amplified stimuli emanate quite directly from it. XII 33 Abstract/abstract object/existence/coherence/Quine: Existence assertions about abstract objects can only be judged by their coherence or by simplicity considerations. Example: to avoid paradoxes with classes. Property/Quine: the law of education for properties states that every statement that speaks about a thing ascribes a property to it (predication). This is a cultural heritage. VII (i) 167 Existence/Logic/Quine: we can dispense with such confusing notations as "a exists" because we know how to translate singular sentences of existence into more basic expressions if the singular term is contained in a description. Observation sentence: is meaningless in the past, since it is assumed that it was learned by direct conditioning. Theorem of Existence/Russell: For this reason, Russell declares singular theorems of existence pointless if their subject is a real proper name. ((s) Real proper name: "this". No, not only!"Nine" too: are names whose reference is saved. So from acquaintance, which corresponds to a descriptions. For fake names, the description corresponds to what a fiction says about it: e.g. Pegasus. "winged horse". Name/identification(s): each name corresponds to a description because no thing in the world can only be referenced by a name and for each description a name can be invented but not every description is fulfilled by an object. ((s) Precisely because of the necessary acquaintance the question whether the theorem of existence is true is pointless.) Quine: the reason is the same here. ((s) Theorem of existence (s): Example "There is Napoleon": can only refer to one learning situation. Circular, so to speak, from the very beginning. Exactly the same: e.g. "There are daisies". Davidson/(s): One could also not say meaningfully: Example: "It has turned out that this and that does not exist": because then one says only that one has learned a word wrongly. >Reference, >Learning. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Existence Statements | Strawson | VII 112 Existence sentence/StrawsonVsRussell: Russell blurs the distinction between pure existence sentences and phrases that contain an expression to point to an object or to refer to it. >Names/Russell. "Inquiry into Meaning and Truth"(1): logically catastrophic theory of names (logical proper names). Russell depraves the descriptions of the status of logical subjects, but offers no substitute. >Logical proper names, >Descriptions. 1. Russell, Bertrand (1940). Inquiry into meaning and truth. London: Routledge. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
Existential Generalization | Wiggins | II 302 Existential Generalization/Wiggins: Modal logic Vs Existential generalization: E.g. "Cicero is necessarily a human being" as "N Cicero is a human". If we do not differentiate de re and de dicto here, then (Human(Cicero)) l- English (Ex)(Human x). (Notation: I- = provable). Because Cicero is a name with secured sense. Problem: if Cicero is a human, then there are humans. - That is, the context "---" must apply to any possible world (which is wrong). >Possible worlds, >Modal logic. Then there is something that is necessarily a human N((x)[(x = Cicero)>(x is a human)]) does not help, if the reason is the secured reference of the name, then the existence follows from the English meaning of the sentence (which is undesirable). >Reference, >Existence. Solution/Wiggins: we should distinguish de re/de dicto from the reach of "necessary" itself. >de re, >de dicto, >Necessity. II 303 Existential Generalization/EGWiggins: EG is ok for well-defined names - Existential generalization does not apply in any context of the form N (---a---) except for numbers. >Numbers, >Names. |
Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
Existential Quantification | Wittgenstein | II 37 Name/function/Wittgenstein: (Ex) .fx. - The values of (Ex) are proper names. >Quantification. --- II 234 Existential quantification/Variable/Domain/Value/Russell/Wittgenstein: (Ex).fx: Russell regards the "x" in brackets so, as if it were a thing - e.g. "I met a thing which is a man" - WittgensteinVsRussell: the "x" stands for men, not for things - (see I 201: not "this is soz" but "this color is soz"). >Existence statements. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
Experience | Sellars | McDowell I 163 Experience/Sellars/McDowell: experience is not possible without concepts that play a role in the system of beliefs. What we regard as the message of experience, is already a part and no external constraint of the system. >Concepts/Sellars, >Consciousness/Sellars. Experience/experience history/Sellars: experience history not the result of impressions, but of phenomena. Phenomena/Sellars: phenomena are conceptually (in order to establish them in a rational relationship to beliefs). >Beliefs/Sellars. --- I XXXVIII Sellars: Three possible experiences: 1. This is a red object, 2. The object appears to be red (maybe it is white in red light). 3. It looks like it would be an object. (Also hallucination is possible). >Appearance/Sellars. One might assume that they cherish the same thought in all three cases, but obtain a new setting every time towards this thought. (Reductive-materialistic: Armstrong, Dennett). Ambiguity: process or result of process: experience, activities, non-descriptive content - experience object. I 44 Fact/Sellars: the fact that something seems to be red over there, is not experiencing. (Although it is a fact, of course.) >Appearance. But that does not mean that the common descriptive core might be perhaps experiencing. Facts: are experienced but are not experiencing. And also no experience. Experience: we need a name for the experience, which is not only an abbreviation for a description. Does the everyday language have such names? I 44 Experience/Sellars: ambiguity: experiencing: activity, non-descriptive content - experience object: the fact that something over there this seems to be red, is not experiencing. -However: the common descriptive core can be an experiencing - facts: are experienced, but are not an experiencing- and no experience. I 45 Experience/Sellars: Problem: sensation always seems to presuppose an object. - Possible solution: should we align sensations and propositional attitudes? >Sensations. - "Vs: this is the approximation leading to Locke/Descartes - Descartes/Locke: sensations on a stage with ideas. - SellarsVs. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
Expressions | Meixner | I 71 Expression/Express/Meixner: expressing something is not referencing. >Reference. Functions can be expressed by unconfirmed expressions. >Functions, >Unsaturated. Predicate: expresses a property, it does not denominate it! >Predicates, >Properties, >Naming, >Denotation. Predicate: is a linguistic indicator of universals, more direct than names. >Universals, >Names. I 102 Expression/Denominating/Meixner: Facts are expressed by sentences and denominated by that-sentences (subordinate clauses). >States of affairs, >That-sentences, >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Exemplification. I 118 Expressions/Expressing/Meixner: sentences can express something that is not in line with their meaning, e.g. "the sentence on page n line 1 is wrong ...". >Propositions, cf. >Paradoxes. I 152 Expressing: sentence expresses both a proposition and a fact (if it expresses something different from its meaning) - proposition: content of the sentence - fact: is unambiguously determined by this sentence content (proposition). >Content. I 153 Expressing: concepts such as universals through predicates. Satisfaction: concepts are satisfied by entities. >Satisfaction. Exemplification: universals by entities - instantiating/instantiation: concepts and universals by entities (inverse to instantiation: concepts and universals apply to entities) Cf. >True of. I 154 Expression/Expressing: Predicates express concepts or properties (universals). - concepts do not express anything, universals do not express anything, properties express nothing, they are expressed. Sentence: expresses proposition or fact. Fact, proposition: express nothing, they are expressed. E.g. "author of Waverley", "the person who is identical with Scott" do not express the same universal singularisation, but they do denominate the same individual. E.g. "brother of..."/"only brother of": ((s) can apply to the same individual, or "only" to none.) |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
Extensions | Lewis | IV 254 Extension/tradition: e.g. in the Fregean tradition, extensions of sentences are truth values. - Lewis: new: instead: extensions are functions of indices on truth values - N.B.: these functions are suitable >intensions, but unsuitable extensions for sentences - they are suitable only for names. IV 258 Object/extension/Lewis: a given object is neither extension nor intention by itself - e.g. one can say in a metameta language that one and the same thing is both, the intention of the expression in the object language "my hat" and the extension of the meta language expression "intention of "my hat"". Nevertheless, some entities can only serve as extensions, while others - e.g. functions of indices - can serve as both - but there is no thing that would be inappropriate to be an extension. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
Extensions | Quine | Graeser I 60 Extension/Quine/Graeser: when bachelor/unmarried man are coextensive, then why are they not just randomly empirically (contingent) - not sure if it is a matter of meaning. Lauener XI 175 Reference/Extension/singular term/general term/Follesdal/Lauener: singular terms: have a reference - general terms and sentences have an extension. >Singular Terms/Quine, >General Terms/Quine. XII (c) 51 Predicate/co-extensive/extension-equal/coextensiveness/synonymy/Quine: coextensive predicates: e.g. equilateral/equivalent triangle E.g. featherless biped/rational creature: It was never clear when to say that the predicates had the same meaning. Extension: (here = reference) is safe. Meaning: the intension is uncertain. Translation indeterminacy: here: across to Extension/Intension. >Indeterminacy/Quine, >Intensions/Quine. VII (b) 21 Extension/meaning/Quine: e.g. "living creature with heart" - "living creature with kidneys": (general term): same extension, different meaning. VII (e) 89 Extensionality Principle/Quine: P1 ((x ‹ y ) › ((y ‹ x) › (x = y))) that is, a class is determined by its elements. ((s) If x and y are subsets of each other, then they are equal). VII (f) 115 General Term/predicate/Quine: Predicates are not names of classes. This does not mean that there are not often classes that are associated with predicates without being named by them. For example, if we are talking about the extension of a general term or predicate: The class of all things of which the predicate is true. Thus, the theory of validity appeals to classes but not to the individual statements represented by schemes of quantifier logic (quantificational theory). Example: (Ex)(x is a dog . x is white) it does not involve an appeal to an abstract extension of a predicate. >Predicates/Quine. VII (f) 116 Truth values/extension/Quine: even validity and the extension of predicates can be eliminated through truth value tables (truth tables). For an extensional treatment of nominalism see VII (f) 118 > Nominalism. IX 1 Extensionality law: Classes are identical if their elements are the same. This does not apply to attributes! >Classes/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 |
Extrinsic | Field | I 193 Extrinsic explanation/Loar/Field: E.g. when the role of numbers is only the role of names (descriptions) of properties of the physical system. - Then the properties of numbers will have no effect on the system. >Numbers, >Mathematical entities, >Ontology, >Properties, >Effect. Extrinsic explanation is often useful but it must have an underlying intrinsic explanation. >Explanation, >Intrinsicness, >Terminology/Field. III 44 Extrinsic explanation/Field: E.g. distance and angle size, use real numbers, but these are causally irrelevant. >Real numbers, >Causality. Intrinsic explanation: uses "betweenness" and congruence - (without numbers). Numbers: are eliminated because they are causally ineffective - (as opposed to electrons). Extrinsic explanation/Field: extrinsic explanations are fruitless, if they are to be the final outcome. - Intrinsically: can be arbitrarily: E.g. standard meter. >Standard meter. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
Facts | Sellars | I 28 Def minimal fact/Sellars: facts about which can be reported reliably, because here errors are less likely. The fact that the tie seems to be on a certain occasion green. (SellarsVs). With seeing, one provides more than a description of the experience. One affirms a claim. >Evidence/Sellars. I 44 Fact: the fact that something seems to be red over there, is not experiencing. (Although it is a fact, of course.) But that does not mean that the common descriptive core might be perhaps experiencing. Facts: are experienced but are not experiencing. And also no experience. >Experience. --- II 315/16 Subject: is named and not uttered - fact: is uttered and not named. (Although the name of an utterance can be made). >Description levels, >Level/Order, >Metalanguage, >Name of a sentence. II 320 SellarsVsWittgenstein: we must avoid to join his equating of complex objects with facts. >Facts/Wittgenstein, >Complex/Wittgenstein. The claim that the complex object K, wold be the fact aRb is logical nonsense. Fact: you can say in two different ways something "about a fact": a) The statement includes a statement that expresses a true proposition. In this sense every truth function of a true statement is a statement "about a fact". b) it contains a fact expression, that means the name of a fact rather than a statement. II 323 Natural-linguistic objects: (> Searles background): Solution: natural-language objects are seen as linguistic counterparts of non-linguistic objects (not facts!). One can speak of them as "proper names". That coincides with Wittgenstein's view that elementary statements must be constructed as proper names occurring in a particular way. Cf. >Atomic sentences, >Atomism. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
Features | Lyons | I 81 Def marked/feature/linguistics/Lyons: "("positive"): For example, the plural form is often marked by an s, i.e. the s is a positive sign for the plural, while the singular is not marked by a sign but "unmarked, "neutral"). Def unmarked/without feature/linguistics/Lyons: For example, lack of a feature ("neutral") singular form due to absence of the s, while the plural ("positive") is marked by an s (order/distinction). >Order, >Distinctions. Lyons: marked/unmarked: one could also say presence contrasts with absence. General/N.B.: often the unmarked form is of more general significance than the marked one. More general, the members of the pair do not have to be characterized by the presence or absence of a feature: Example "dog"/"bitch": "dog" contains male and female form. This leads to a characteristic form of error: in pleonasm, either a tautology "female bitch" or a contradiction results: "male bitch". I 82 Marked/unmarked: the difference takes place on the paradigmatic level. >Terminology/Lyons. I 167 Grammatical features/subclasses/Lyons: the previous subclasses can then be subdivided finer, i.e. hierarchically: Na > {Na1, Na2} etc. Problem/Lyon(s): due to the hierarchical order there is not always a unique ((s) "way back") within the structure. I 167 Problem/Lyons: 1. this leads to a large number of incoherent word lists and to many multiple occurrences of a word in several lists. >Lists. 2. It complicates the formulation of grammatical rules. >Grammar, >Rules. I 168 Chomsky: in reality this subcategorization of the vocabulary is not strictly hierarchical, but leads to overlapping e.g. proper names {John, Egypt}, inanimate {book, Egypt} etc. Problem/Chomsky: if the subcategorization is expressed by substitution rules, one of the two distinctions must be superior, the other cannot be represented naturally anymore. For example, if first the division into proper names and appellatives (e.g. book, human) is made and then a division into "human"/"non-human", then the only way to establish a rule is by referring this rule to both completely incoherent classes, namely "proper name-human" and "appellative-non-human". Since the lexicon does not contain a list of "human nouns". >Lexicon/Lyons. Chomsky: this gets worse and worse with increasing refinement. Solution/Chomsky: a grammar must not consist exclusively of substitution rules. Chomsky/Lyons: we will not discuss his solution here, since we assume a very simple system. Def Grammatical Feature/Lyons: for nouns. For example, "concrete", "animate", "human", whereby "concrete" must be independent of "animate"/"inanimate". This feaeture is used for classification or "indexing". I 169 E.g. Boy: [Appellative,],[Human],[Masculine]. Notation: square brackets. Lexical substitution rules/replacement: are then formulated in such a way that one can select a word according to features. Lexicon/Lyons: new: we have to abandon the set of rules of the form Na > {boy,...} but the more general form remains valid: X > x I x e X New: X is now the word class that satisfies characterization by features. >Word classes. Lists: Lists of class compositions e.g.[Appellative],[Human],[Masculine] there is no list (order). Grammar/Semantics/Congruence/Lyons: the expressions used for the features e.g. "proper name", "appellative" were called grammatically. I 170 We have not yet departed from the principle that such expressions, when they stand for word classes, are terms for distributional categories. N.B.: this leads us to semantics! >Semantics. Classification: because of features such as "animated", etc., this often contradicts the meaning of words. >Classification. VsContent Grammar/Lyons: this is the reason why most authors have withdrawn from "content grammar". In a language description, the lexicon must contain both grammatical and semantic information for each word. Lyon's thesis: There is often congruence between semantic and grammatical classification. There the grammatical information can be partly taken from the meaning of the word. >Congruence/Lyons, >Grammar/Lyons. I 171 Neutral/Grammar/Lyons: sometimes has to be distinguished from "inanimate": e.g. "The child ate its dinner". |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
Fictions | Logic Texts | Read III 158 Russell: all sentences about fictional entities are false - Frege: these sentences have no truth value (empty name). - Russell: names for fictional entities are disguised descriptions - no meaning by naming or denotating. >Truth value gaps, >Denotation, >Meaning, >Non-Existence. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
Fictions | Millikan | I 201/202 Fiction/names/naming/Millikan: Names like "Winnie the Pooh" are alleged names, not empty names. Empty name: e.g. "Nicholas", used by a child. Used by an adult: alleged name. >Reference, >Nonexistence. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Fido-Fido-Principle | "Fido" -Fido principle, philosophy: Gilbert Ryle's expression for the mistaken assumption that words function as names and therefore must designate something. In the extreme case that the typical dog name Fido stands for "dogness". See also proper names, descriptions, universals, reference, meaning. |
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Fido-Fido-Principle | Rorty | III 217 "Fido" -Fido: "Fido" is the name of the name of the dog. >Description levels, >Levels/Order. Ryle: The idea that all the words are names is the ’Fido’ -Fido Theory of meaning. It is frequently linked to Plato (e.g. by Austin).- It is contrary to Saussure and Wittgenstein: no association but use. >Use Theory, >Myth of the museum. III 218f "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning (Ryle): all words are names (RyleVs)(suitable for dogs, but not for abstractions). WittgensteinVs "Fido"-Fido is about use, not about associations. "Fido"-Fido: one learns the meaning of "Fido" by someone pointing to the corresponding dog, but one does not learn the meaning of "good" by someone pointing to something. One can vaguely remember the dog, but not vaguely "good". >The good, >Learning, >Meaning, >Reference, >Pointing, >Ostensive definition. Alleged Problem: I do not know if someone is calling the name of the dog or the dog. (DerridaVs). |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Fine-grained/ coarse-grained | Block | Fodor IV 169 Fine-Grained/Twin Earth/Conceptual Role/Conceptual Role Theory/CRT/Block/Fodor/Lepore: Problems with the twin earth point in to a different direction than Frege's problems (intension/extension). Frege: needs more fine-grained concepts as extensions Putnam: needs less fine-grained than extensional equivalence. (Narrower conception): Synonymous expressions must be treated as extensionally distinguished. (Water/Twin-Earth Water). Therefore, a common theoretical approach (CRT) will hardly work. Solution/Block: "Two Factors" version of the CRT. The two are orthogonal to each other: A) Actual CRT: covers the meaning aspect of Frege IV 170 B) Independent, possibly causal, theory of the reference: (Twin Earth/Water/Twin-Earth Water). Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: this has almost nothing to do with CRT. Moreover, neither a) (meaning) nor b) (causality) is available. But let's assume it anyway: For example, we make the distinction of meaning/reference with the "two-factor" theory: we then have enough distinction ability, but pay a high price: Question: What actually holds the two factors together? E.g. what prevents the existence of an expression whose inferential role corresponds to the expression "4 is a prime number" and whose content is "water is wet"? But what would it mean? And what would be expressed? The problem is repeated at the level of metatheory: What holds a theory of extension and a theory of meaning together? BlockVsVs: it is clear to him, and what he says about it is puzzling: "the conceptual role is primarily in the determination of the nature of the reference, but not vice versa." IV 171 Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: precisely in the case of the twin earth, the conceptual role cannot determine the reference! Conceptual Role/Block: seems to say that it is indeed not the conceptual role of water that determines what it refers to, but the conceptual role of names! Their reference is, after all, causally determined according to Kripke. Conceptual Role/(s): Difference: a) Conceptual role of a particular concept, e.g. water, B) a word class, e.g. name. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: but that does not solve the problem! We need something that excludes the confusion between extension and intension. What is it that excludes an expression like (see above) "prime number/wetness"? Block: T is not a kind-term, if the causal theory of kind-terms is not true for it. Fodor/LeporeVsBlock: that just does not prevent "water" from having the extension of a kind-concept and at the same time the logic of a number concept. >Twin Earth, >Extension, >Intensions, >Causal theory of names. |
Block I N. Block Consciousness, Function, and Representation: Collected Papers, Volume 1 (Bradford Books) Cambridge 2007 Block II Ned Block "On a confusion about a function of consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
Formal Language | Tarski | Berka I 458 Formal language/Tarski: in a formal language the meaning of each term is uniquely determined by its shape. I 459 Variables: variables have no independent meaning. - Statements remain statements after translation into everyday language. Variable/Tarski: variables represent for us always names of classes of individuals. >Class name. Berka I 461 Formal language/terminology/abbreviations/spelling/Tarski: here: the studied language (object language). Symbols: N, A, I, P: negation, alternation, inclusion, quantifier - metalanguage: Symbols ng (negation), sm (sum = alternation), in (inclusion) - this is the language in which the examination is performed. ng, sm, etc. correspond to the colloquial expressions ((s) the formal symbols N, A, etc. do not). I 464 E.g. object language: Example expression: Nixi, xll: - meta language: translation of this expression: (structural-descriptive name, symbolic expression): name: "((ng ^ in) ^ v1) ^ v2" - but: see below: difference name/translation.(1) >Structural-descriptive name, >Quotation name, >Metalanguage. 1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 --- Horwich I 112 Formal language/Tarski: in it all assertible sentences are theorems. - There may be a language with exactly specified structure, which is not formalized. - Then the assertibility may depend on extra-linguistic factors.(2) >Assertibility. 2. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
Formal Speech | Prior | I 25 Formal speech/Carnap: solution for "x is neither a fact nor a falsehood" - "x" does not name an object. Nothing is named by a true sentence (equally not by a that-clause). >That sentences, >Naming, >Names, >Objects. Prior per, but for a different reason than why "Pegasus" nothing shall appoint. >Pegasus example, >Non-existence. ((s) >Quine: relative clause = general term.) >Relative Clause/Quine, >General Terms/Quine, |
Pri I A. Prior Objects of thought Oxford 1971 Pri II Arthur N. Prior Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003 |
Four-Dimensionalism | Lewis | Schwarz I 25 Four-dimensionalism/Lewis: The time operator shifts the range: E.g., „In 1642 there were no cuckoo clocks“ is like e.g., „there are no cuckoo clocks in Australia“. The sentence about 1642 is true if there are no cuckoo clocks in this area (part of reality). Intrinsic change/time/four-dimensionalism: Problem: e.g., I make the sentence true: "Last night there was someone in my bed" but I am sitting here at the table. Cf. >Truth maker/Lewis. Schwarz I 26 Intuitive Answer: (some representatives): Having slept last night is not at all incompatible with being awake now. The things seem to instantiate only incompatible properties, these are in reality merely time-relative. Objects about which we quantify with "last night" are in themselves neither sleeping nor sitting nor anything else. They also have neither shape nor color. Correct: you are "awake at t" etc. Properties: According to this view, simple properties are actually relations between strangely featureless things and times. Cf. >Properties/Lewis. Time-relative properties/LewisVs: This is unacceptable. Form/Lewis: A form is a property and not a relation! Properties, intrinsic/SchwarzVsLewis: Lewis misstated the problem; it is not about intrinsic properties, but about single-digit properties. Properties/Relation: Question: Whether form predicates express disguised relations similar to e.g. "famous" and "far". It is meaningless to say someone is famous without reference to anything. Lewis: But I guess it makes sense without reference to anything else to say something is red or round. Intrinsic change/Lewis: Lösung: Solution: According to the analogy of time and space: e.g., a long wall is high and red in some places, low and gray in others. As a whole, it is neither high nor low, neither red nor gray. Solution: It is simply composed of different parts. Schwarz I 27 Change/Lewis: Ordinary things have different properties at different times by being composed of parts with those properties. >Change/Lewis. Identity/time/temporal identity/Lewis/Schwarz: Problem: Then past things are not strictly identical with present things. The thing that used to be asleep and the thing that is sitting here now are not strictly identical. The different temporal parts are different things after all.(1976b(1) >Temporal Identity. MellorVsLewis:That is absurd. When we talk about someone, we are not talking about his parts. LewisVsVs: E.g., surely the whole man was Hillary on Mt. Everest. Solution: Hillary has a past temporal part that is on a past part of Everest. Edmund Hillary as a whole meets this condition. Problem: E.g., Then I am strictly speaking as a whole neither waking nor sitting. But as a whole I am not formless because of that. Lewis/Solution: I have a complex four-dimensional form. There are always temporal parts which are ignored. I/Four-dimensionalism/Lewis: "I" often refers only to a single temporal part of me. Ted Sider: (1996(3), 2001a(4), 188-208): Ted Sider elaborated: Names always refer to temporal parts. I tonight was a temporal counterpart of me now. 1. David Lewis [1976b]: “The Paradoxes of Time Travel”. American Philosophical Quarterly, 13: 145–152. In [Lewis 1986f]. 2. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell. 3. Theodore Sider [1996]: “All the World’s a Stage”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 433–453. 4. Theodore Sider [2001a]: Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
Four-Dimensionalism | Quine | X 54 Four Dimensionalism/Quine: E.g. a shrinking body tapers into the future, a growing one tapers sharply into the past. That makes tense formation superfluous. It always has to be in the present tense - so you can quantify over objects that never exist simultaneously. ((s) Time slice/(s): is not flat like a slice of a sausage, but a complete body at a point of time.) XIII 75 Four Dimensionalism/Possibilities/possible objects/Possibilia/Quine: four dimensionalism creates a place in the sun for all future actualities, however unpredictable, but it does not give comfort or help for mere possibilities. XIII 197 Four Dimensionalism/Change/Quine: it is wrong, as some have claimed, that in four dimensionalism (not Quine's expression) there is no change and instead there is only an eternally static reality. Change: still exists, it is merely embodied (incorporated). It is now simply said that the earlier stages of a body differ from the later ones, just as its upper stages differ from the lower ones. The later stages are just as inaccessible from the earlier ones as the lower ones from the upper ones! ((s) >Facts are not necessary). Time/Time Use/Tense/Logic/Quine: Time is not present in pure mathematics and logic. If it is brought in, then by predicates like "later than". Four-Dimensionalism: corresponds to this extension of logical notation by predicates like "later than". Time/Logic/Time Logic: alternatively one could take time into logic, but this would be very cumbersome and would only be appropriate if one wanted to investigate everyday language. Time/Time Use/Tense/Logic/Quine: Time is not present in pure mathematics and logic. If it is brought in, then by predicates like "later than". Four-dimensionalism: corresponds to this extension of logical notation by predicates like "later than". Time/logic/time logic: alternatively one could take time into logic, but this would be very cumbersome and would only be appropriate if one wanted to investigate everyday language. Time/Spatialization/Space Time/Quine Dimensionism/Quine: shouldn't one be surprised about relations between things that no longer exist? For example Mark Anton and Cleopatra are both dead, the relation between them existed earlier, even if it no longer exists today. Question: what about the great-great-grandfather relation? ((s) here always only a part exists). For example the class of the great generals in history: the elements hardly exist at the same time. XIII 198 Simplest Solution: to see them all as inhabitants of space-time. As timelessly coexistent. Time/Translation/Quine: we translate by moving into the 4th dimension. Time/Dimension/Quine: time as the 4th dimension is treated on the same level as the spatial dimensions, but in an important sense it is independent of them: Space/Quine: here we also distinguish directions between the axes, unlike in time. N.B.: we can amalgamate time with space by saying e.g. so and so many miles correspond to one hour; we haven't used that yet, but we need it in relativity theory. Relativity Theory/Space-time/Relativity/third/Quine: For example two piles at a distance of 5 meters: can be described differently by different observers. Theory of Relativity: here we have spatiotemporal diagonals. It does not allow any measure, XIII 199 not even over all four dimensions simultaneously, which is analogous to the distance and independent of the velocity of the observer. Interval/Solution/Quine: instead of the distance there can be an interval, but it is different: it can be 0, even if the events are spatially far apart. Four Dimensionalism/Quine: we maintain it completely independent of relativity. XIII 221 Square Measure to the Square/Quine: square measure should have four spatial dimensions! Unlike liters per hour: ((s) because now we have to calculate m² x 2!). Fourdimensionality/Quine: For example, if we take time as the fourth dimension, the square of a surface is then XIII 222 the spatiotemporal size of a cube over time, the temporal equivalent of the edge length, whatever that is. Squares of surfaces/Relativity Theory/Relativity/Einstein/Quine: Example E = mc²: c: is distance by time c²: is the square of the distance divided by the square of the time, or surface by square hour. E = mc² thus equates energy with area tons per square hour. V 182 Object/Ontology/Quine: great progress: four dimensionalism, four dimensional spatio-temporal objects. We are so body-oriented that we do not take the Evening Star and the Morning Star as phases of Venus either, they are simply Venus and can be referred to with one or the other term depending on the time of day. Similarly: Example Carnap: Rumber and Titisee: is the same lake, depending on the weather. Example Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. N.B.: they would not be seen as complementary temporal parts of an entire nameless person, but as an identical person with two names. Four Dimensionalism/Quine: for example, one can identify a battle with the physical object, which consists of the union of the corresponding time segments of all participants. Or one can make substance terms (mass terms) into singular terms, each naming a diffuse physical object. ((s) Example Putnam: Water: all H2O in the universe). V 184 Four Dimensionalism/Ontology/Quine: ((s) here still in the classical separation matter/space) the points are replaced by the point moments. For example, purely spatial squares, i.e. squares perpendicular to the time axis, are then identified only instantaneously and not over time. Probably there is still the above time-consuming square, but now oriented as a three-dimensional square parallelepiped of infinite length, parallel to the time axis of space time or someone's time axis. Vs: 1. inelegance of the double ontology of matter and space. 2. (more severe): invalidity of a theory of absolute position. Without it, an ontology of purely spatial or spatiotemporal manifolds seems inconsistent. V 185 Solution/Quine: we try to construct the manifolds somehow according to physical objects. Maybe with the help of numbers and measurements, a Point: is then a number triple of real numbers, a space-time point is a quadruple. Squares etc. are identified as classes of such triples or quadruples according to analytical geometry. Until then there is no talk of physical objects or physical space. Next step: Measurement/Measuring: Connection with objects by using pure numbers by measurement. For example, if you say that four villages are located so that they form the points of a square, you only say something about the relationships between the distances: that four of the six are equal and the other two are also equal. >Measurements/Quine. Manifoldness: with this we got rid of the ontology of manifolds, but we are now dealing with much more than physical objects: with numbers, pairs of numbers, triples, quadruples, and classes of such. Thus we have abstract objects. So we still have a double ontology. Abstract/Quine: but we would have needed the ontology of abstract objects for many purposes anyway: V 186 E.g. to talk about squares etc. Manifoldness/Quine: these were only single squares, circles, etc. Form: Forms would be classes of such. Thus objects of higher abstraction. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Functionalism | Avramides | I 146 Functionalism/Avramidis: functionalism allows to refer to behavior with propositional attitudes, not on linguistic behavior. - It allows a subjective image of the mind. >Propositional attitudes, >Behavior, >Understanding, >Language behavior. I 147 Problem: this requires an indefinite number of further propositional attitudes. I 149 Functionalism/Lewis: we take mental concepts as theoretical terms (TT) and define our mental-theoretical terms by reference to the platitudes (commonplaces) of folk psychology. >Theoretical terms, >Folk psychology, >Everyday language, >Observation. These shall contain both, theoretical terms and the rest. - Then we transform every theoretical term into a name, replace the names with free variables. - then existential closure (of the open formulas ((s) Ramsey sentence). >Ramsey sentence, >Open formula. With that we achieve the original theory with the claim that it has a single implementation. - Then the theory has input/output concepts, but no specifically mental terminology. >Input/output. Problem/Avramides: how do we characterize input and output? BlockVsFunctionalism: either characterizes them chauvinistically or liberally. ((s) Because a purely physical characterization of the inputs and outputs would include or exclude the wrong ones.) >Philosophical chauvinism. I 153f AvramidesVsFunctionalism: if he is set to non-mentalistic characterization of the inputs and outputs, then he has to say what distinguishes mental from non-mental systems that have the same functional organization. Avramides: we always start with mentalistically characterized behavior. - Even with the marsians we say that his behavior must have an interpretation. So if normal evidence (Ned Block: not only linguistic, but mainly linguistic behavior) is part of our theory of propositional attitudes, we are committed to a symmetry between the semantic and the psychological. >Language behavior, >Ned Block. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
Functions | Tarski | Berka I 454 Definition Quotation function/Tarski: the in Tarski schema (or variants) occurring expression ""p"" (quotes twice) must be regarded as a function whose argument is a propositional variable and the values constant leading names of statements. So the quotation marks become separate words (like the word "name") with the syntactic role of functors. >Functors, >Names of sentences. Problem: "for any p and q - is p iff q, so is "p" identical with "q"" stands in stark contrast to the conventional use of quotes. >Quotation marks. Solution: functors must be construed here intensional. >Intensionality. I 455 VsQuotation function: quotation function with variable argument: leads to Liar-paradox, even without the term "true statement". E.g. "the first statement on page 13". Problem: requirement for quotation marks: if the statement "p" is identical with the statement "q", so p if and only if q.(1) 1. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935 |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
General Terms | Cartwright | I 22 General Terms/Cartwright: only general terms can be cause and effect. Names of particulars can not be an expression of cause or effect. >Names. Correct: aspirin eliminates headache - but a certain aspirin may fail. >Cause, >Effect, >Causality, >Description levels, cf. >Singular terms. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
General Terms | Evans | I 320 General Term/Evans: general terms can change their meaning - names cannot. >Rigidity, >Possible worlds, >Descriptions. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
General Terms | Quine | I 102 Distinction singular/general term: is independent from stimulus meaning. A name or general term for space-time segments: has the same stimulus meaning ("rabbitness"). I 212 Difference verb/noun/adjective: is less important but the difference between singular term/general term is very important. >Singular Terms/Quine. I 212 Abstract terms: are alleged names of properties, e.g. "roundness": "F"/"round": "a" in "Fa" - should not be used carelessly without metaphysical determination. It is thereby unbinding. Each abstract singular term provides an abstract general term. V 102 General term/Quine: E.g. has one more degree of freedom: can be different dogs - Fido: has only one degree of freedom. - ((s) temporal). >Freedom/Quine. V 123 General term/Quine: is e.g. animal, dog, body, built-in individuation. - General term: is true - singular term: is a denominator function of a particular. Problem: are learned as observation sentences. They bear no reference on objects but return of mom is the return of a circumstance. Therefore reference by a general term because of individuation: singular term does not individuate. Wrong: This is a Fido. V 125 Individuation/general term/Quine: square is an individuating word - "(s) Fido, not: E.g. This is a Fido. V 125 a) General term: E.g. "Square" in -This is a square- and E.g. -This is the same square as that one- b) singular term: E.g. "The square is a form". ((s) here, form is the general term; predication must always combine a singular term and a general term) - they are language-bound: E.g. Red is a color (general term). - Object-bound: E.g. -The square is a form: just like E.g. Fido is a dog (singular term). V 126 Singular term/general term/Platonism/universalia/language acquisition/Quine: E.g. A dog is an animal - problem: different dogs are different animals - on the other hand, the square is a form that says something about a single form, just like - "E.g. Fido is a dog". (s) Otherwise you would need two universals: dogness and animality - platonistic/Quine: The dog is numerous. VII (d) 70 General term/Quine: "Red" and "River" are similar - but places are only conceptually connected with color, not like the parts of the river - this is not a question of abstractness. It is not a "name" of any separated entity (as "attribute", "squareness"). A general term in everyday language is often like a name - with "square" much like a singular term (because of pointing) - with "red" there is no difference to a singular term. General term: 1) showing does not assume identity from occasion to occasion (unlike the case with the singular term) - 2) The general term is not a name of any separated entity. VII (d) 77 General Term/Quine: is indispensable - it probably originated from reaction similarity - to understand it one needs the operator "class of" or "-ness". - Missing these operators was the reason to assume "abstract entities". >Abstractness/Quine. VII (f) 107f General term: E.g. "is a whale" or "can swim": may be regarded as names of classes - predicates: if they denote classes, they can be considered in a way that they have properties as their meaning. (>Church). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
General Terms | Zink | Wolf II 173 General term/natural kind/Zink: unlike proper names general names do not depend on historical facts but on the current use. >Language use, >Names, >Descriptions, >General terms, >Facts. Evening Star/Morning Star: detectivistic. >Morning star/evening star. So also in the case general terms: it is a discovery that they apply to the same objects. >Natural kinds, >Reference. |
Zink I Sidney ZInk "The Meaning of Proper Names", in: Mind 72 (1963) S. 481-499 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
Generality | Kripke | I 145 Kripke: common names such as "cat" do not express any property. >General term, >Names/Kripke, >Properties/Kripke, >Naming/Kripke. >Denotation/Kripke. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
Generality | Wittgenstein | II 62 General/Universality/Wittgenstein: cannot be isolated. - It can be understood only by seeing how it is used. - If you interpret a general term, you’re doing the same thing as if you interpret an isolated case. >Wholes, >Circular reasoning. --- Hintikka I 152 Universality/General/General sentence/WittgensteinVsRussell: his writing presupposes that there are names for each general proposition. - Which could be called an answer to the question "what" (instead of "what kind?"). - That functions of E.g. "Which people live on the island" - but not for E.g. "Which circle is square". >Properties, >Distinction. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
Goedel | Quine | XIII 82 Goedel/Goedel Theorem/Quine: Evidence/Self-Evidence/Quine: it is too much to ask that a proof should be self-evident. E.g. Euclid's parallel axiom is not self-evident. E.g. set theory is also not self-evident because it is shaken by paradoxes. Self-Evidence/Quine: we find it in a small number of axioms of number theory. They are the axioms of Dedekind, which are called the axioms of Peano. Elementary Number Theory/Quine: there was always the question whether there were still valid laws that could not be derived from the axioms. They existed! That was a question of adequacy. Laws/Quine: the question of further, still undiscovered laws seemed to be a problem of all branches of mathematics. By supplementing the axioms, perhaps this could be remedied? But Goedel proved in 1931 that this cannot be done! Goedel/Quine: proved that there can be no complete deductive system for even the smallest fragment of mathematics, such as Elementary Number Theory. XIII 82 Tendency: Goedel/Quine: proved that there can be no complete deductive system for even the smallest fragment of mathematics, such as the elementary number theory. Def Elementary Number Theory/Quine: includes digits, notation for plus, times, power and equality. >Numbers/Quine. XIII 83 Sentence operators: for "not", "and" and "or" and the quantifiers "Each number x is such that..." and "there is a number x so that...". The numbers are the positive integers and the zero. With this you can express e.g. Fermat's last theorem. Goedel/Quine: Thesis: No axiom system or other deductive apparatus can cover all truths that can be expressed even in this most moderate notation. Any valid proof procedure will disregard some true sentences, even infinitely many of them. Self-Evidence/Mathematics/Goedel/Quine: therefore we must drop the requirement of self-evidence. Wrong solution/Quine: could one not simply take all discovered truths as axioms? Vs: this is not impossible because there could be no axiom system with infinitely many axioms - which exist. Rather, it is the case that a proof must be able to be examined in finite time. Goedel/Goedel's Theorem/Quine: is related to the reflexive paradoxes. The point is that the notation of the elementary number theory must be able to speak about itself. ((s) Self-Reference). Goedel Numbering/Goedel Number/Quine: ...+... XIII 84 Mention/Use/Goedel/Quine: Goedel's evidence also requires this distinction. For example, the digit "6" names the number 6 and has the Goedel number 47. We can say that the Goedel number 47 names the number 6. Syntax/Arithmetic/Goedel/Quine: after all expressions have their naming by Goedel numbers, the syntactic operations can be mirrored by expressions, by arithmetic operations via numbers. Quote/Goedel/Quine: Problem: the corresponding notation is not part of symbolic logic and arithmetic. Quotation marks cannot be simply named by Goedel numbers. Quote/Quine: of an expression: names this expression. Goedel Numbers/Goedel number/Quine: 47 names 6, furthermore 5361 names 47 if 53 and 61 are randomly the Goedel numbers of the digits "4" and "7". ((s) Quotation marks sic). Quote/Goedel/Quine: the quote relation is represented as by the arithmetic relation that has 5361 to 47 and 47 to 6. The general relation can be expressed in the notation of the elementary number theory, though not easily. The arithmetic reconstruction of syntactic concepts like this was a substantial part of Goedel's work. Liar/Liar's Paradox/Goedel/Quine: is useful in one of the two parts where Goedel's proof can be split. The bomb explodes when the two parts are put together. The liar can be completely XIII 85 expressed by Goedel numbering with the exception of a single expression: "truth". If that could be done, we would have solved the paradox, but discredited the elementary number theory. Truth/Goedel Number/Goedel Number/Quine: truth is not definable by Goedel numbers, within the elementary number theory. >Goedel Numbers/Quine. Goedel's Theorem/Quine: formal: no formula in the notation of the elementary number theory is true of all and only the Goedel numbers of truths of the elementary number theory. (This is the one part). Other part/Quine: deals with every real evidence procedure, here it is about that every evidence must be testable. Formal: a given formula in the notation of the elementary number theory is true of all and only the Goedel numbers of provable formulas. Church/Quine: here I skip his thesis (Church-Thesis), (see recursion below). Goedel/Quine: the two parts together say that the provable formulas do not coincide with the truths of the elementary number theory. Either they contain some falsehoods, or they do not cover some truths. God forbids that. Goedel/Quine: his own proof was more direct. He showed that a given sentence, expressed in Goedel numbers, cannot be proved. Either it is false or provable, or true and not provable. Probably the latter. Wrong solution/Quine: one could add this lost truth as an axiom, but then again others remain unprovable. Goedel/N.B./Quine: ironically, it was implausible that there could be a proof procedure for all truths of the elementary number theory. This would clarify Fermat's theorem, and much more. XIII 86 On the other hand, Goedel's result hit him like a bomb. N.B.: these two shortcomings turned out to be equivalent! Because: Kleene/Quine: showed that if there is a complete evidence procedure, any statement could be tested as true or false as follows: a computer would have to be programmed to rewind any statement, in alphabetical order, the shortest first, then always longer. In the end, because of the completeness of the procedure, he will have proved or refuted every single sentence. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Good | Benjamin | Bolz II 46f Good/Evil/Benjamin: the knowledge about it is profoundly void, it is not contained in the name (paradise recognition).(1) >Words, >Word of God, >Names, >Expressions, >Reference, >Names/Benjamin. 1. W. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften. Unter Mitwirkung von Th. W. Adorno und Gershom Sholem herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann und Hermann Schweppenhäuser Frankfurt/M. 1972-89. Bd II S. 152 |
Bo I N. Bolz Kurze Geschichte des Scheins München 1991 Bolz II Norbert Bolz Willem van Reijen Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
Good | Kierkegaard | Bolz II 47 Good/Evil/Kierkegaard: "Chatter about good and evil," reduced to the means, the simplicity of language changes into a multiplicity. The simple name gives way to an "over-naming". Babylonian language confusion. >Language, >Naming, >Reference, >Names, >Simplicity, >Unity and Multiplicity, >Indeterminacy, >Underdeterminedness. |
Kier I S. Kierkegaard Philosophical Fragments 2009 Bo I N. Bolz Kurze Geschichte des Scheins München 1991 Bolz II Norbert Bolz Willem van Reijen Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
Grammar | Foucault | I 118 Search for the original root. Grammar/Hobbes: made from a system of symbols, which the individuals have chosen for themselves first. The language cannot explain to the thought at once, it must proceed linearly in one order. This linear order is foreign to the representation. The thoughts follow each other in time, but each one forms a unity. The language is for thinking and the sign what the algebra is for geometry. It substitutes for the simultaneous comparison of the parts the order whose degrees one can go through one after the other. In this sense language is the analysis of thought. Definition General Grammar: the study of the linguistic order in its relation to the simultaneity, which is to represent it according to its task. Thus, it has not thinking, and not language, as the actual object, but the discourse as a sequence of signs. In contrast to thinking, language stands as the reflected to the immediate. Language/Adam Smith: "The invention of even the simplest adjectives must have required more metaphysics than we can all comprehend." Consequences: division of the science of language into A) Rhetoric: spatial, figures, tropes, B) Grammar temporal order in time. Grammar presupposes a rhetorical nature even of the most primitive languages (see below). 2. Grammar: Reflection on the relationship that it maintains with the universality. Two forms, depending on whether one considers the possibility of a universal language. Universal/Foucault: to award each sign the unique way of representation, the power to go through all orders. The universal discourse is no longer the "only text", which, in the cipher of its mystery, contains the key to deciphering the world. Rather, the possibility to define everything. I 127ff Grammar/Foucault: The general grammar is not a comparative. It defines the system of identity/difference, which presupposes and uses those features. Analysis of the band of the link, different word types, theory of the structure, the origin, the root, the rhetorical space, the derivation. I 132 Theory of the verb: indispensable for any discourse. Without verb no language. >Verbs, >Language. Edge of the discourse, where the signs become the language. The verb indicates that the discourse is the discourse of the human who not only comprehends the names, but also judges them. I 134 The verb is the represented being of language, which makes it receptive to truth and error. This is why it differs from all signs which can be conformed, faithful (or not), what they designate, but are never true or false. What is the meaning and power that goes beyond the limits of the words? I 287ff Grammar/Language/Foucault: The horizontal comparison between languages achieves another function: it no longer allows to know what everyone brings back as memories from the time before Babel. Lexicography: first beginnings. Grammar: Principle of a primitive and general language that provides an original measure. (already existed before) Grammar/old: flection: the root is changed, the flexions are constant. Grammar/New element: role of subject or object, time of action, system of modifications. No more judging search after the first expression, but analysis of the sounds. Vowel rectangle. Comparative Grammar: one does not longer compare between the different languages a certain meaning, but the relations between the words. Language/old: as long as it was defined as a discourse, it could have no other history than that of its representations. Language/new: inner mechanism as the bearer of identity and difference, as a sign of neighborhood, a characteristic of kinship, a support of history. >Language, >Words, >Subject, >Object. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Grammar | Lewis | II 220 Grammar/Lewis: The meanings of the constituents are determined by the truth conditions of whole sentences. II 218 Grammar/Lewis: like a language, set-theoretical entity that can be discussed in complete abstraction of the human practice - clearly generates a language. II 219 Gavagai: problem: that you can specify several equally good grammars. IV 191ff Categorical Grammar/Adjukiewicz/Lewis: (1950s): Categories: names, sentences, generic names - context-free phrase structure rules - lexicon alone specified - proper names are distinguished from NP - both may be a subject, but only names may be object - allows undue iteration of >modal operators. - Vs: transformational grammar: new: simple >phrase structure grammar as a basis, eliminates the weaknesses. IV 194 Phrase structure grammar/Lewis: Meaning: is then determined through the base structure (phrase structure grammar) - i.e. the transformational component is irrelevant to the semantics. Cf. >transformational grammar. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
Haecceitism | Haecceitism: the thesis that an object can be fixed by the identification as "this here" to allow further assertions on this subject to be stated. E.g. To claim that in a different world, this object is different. See also identification, identity, logical proper names, anti-haecceitism, index words, > indexicality, individuation, dthat, rigidity, possible worlds. |
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I, Ego, Self | Castaneda | Frank I 159 ff I/Castaneda: "volatile egos": like "here", "now", irreducible. - They are entirely epistemological, only for re-presentation, not empirical. Limited identity: only consubstantiation (sameness between coexisting sets of characteristics): not diachronic (transsubstatiation), therefore not all properties are identical, no substitutability, no strict identity with person. "I" is criteria-less, content-neutral. - "I" can only be represented by the impersonal and situation independent quasi-indicator "he". I-design/Castaneda: Vs "I" as "Something". >Guise theory, >Quasi-Indicator. I 167ff I*/Castaneda: "I myself" in an episode of self-awareness one refers to oneself - (corresponding for he*). I 186 "I" is no demonstrative. >Demonstratives. I 170 Transcendent I/Castaneda: we experience ourselves as a not completely identical with the content of our experiencen and therefore associated to the world beyond experience. I 171 I/Self/Consciousness/Self-Awareness/SA/Logical Form/Hintikka/Castaneda: E.g. "The man who is actually a, knows that he is a". Wrong: "Ka (a = a). - Right: (Ex) (Ka (x = a)) -the individual variables occurring in "Ka (...)" are conceived as relating to a range of objects that a knows - "there is a person whom a knows, so that a knows that this person is a" - CastanedaVs: does not work with contingent assertions: "there is an object, so that a does not know it exists" - E.g. "the editor does not know that he is the editor" - (Ex) (Ka(x = a) & ~Ka(x = a))) was be a formal contradiction - better: (Exa)(Ka (x = a) & Ka (x = himself) (not expressible in Hintikka). I 226f I/Castaneda: no specific feature - different contrasts: opposites: this/that, I/she - I/he - I (meaning/acting person) - I/you - I/we -> Buber: I/it - I/you -> Saussure: network of contrasts (plural). Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 Frank I 378 I/hall of mirrors/Castaneda: seems to need two selves: one he speaks to, one he speaks about - but simple self as different from I and body not sufficient. I 430f I/Extra sense/Castaneda: psychological role that one associates with "I" - which explains mental states that do not explain proper names or descriptions: "I'm called for on the phone": spec. mental states - PerryVsCastaneda: not sufficient, you also need to know that it is the own It! - A proposition with "he*" itself says nothing about the meaning of this expression, therefore no identification - E.g. "heaviest man in Europe" could know this without a scale if "he*" could act independently without antecedent. Solution: intermediary extra sense for Sheila's beliefs about Ivan's extra-sense-i. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 I 470 I/Castaneda: Variable, not singular term, not singular reference: instead: i is the same as j and Stan believes of j... >Singular Terms, >Variables. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
I, Ego, Self | Kaplan | Frank I 412 Vivid name/Kaplan: restriction: there must not only be one a of which I think he is going to be the next president, but a "vivid Name". (> vivid name/Locke). - Perry: but that does not solve the problem of the essential index word "I". I 430 I/Kaplan: "rigid intension", not individual - "I" designates in each claim in which it occurs, the person who is making the claim. >Index words, >Indexicality, >Names, >Designation, >Denotation. John Perry (1979): The Problem of the Essential Indexicals, in : Nous 13 (1979), 3-21 --- I 459ff I/Kaplan: designates always the one who makes the claim (the user). - CastanedaVs: only de re not in a de dicto-references - does not help with the preparation of a network of beliefs. I 469 Problem: the pronoun does not always express the speaker - more of a bound variable: "Stan thinks of me ..." VsKaplan: the first person aspect is a "grammatical illusion". >Pronoun, >de re, >de dicto. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1983 b): Reply to John Perry: Meaning, Belief, and Reference, in: Tomberlin (ed.) (1983),313-327 |
D. Kaplan Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions. Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
I, Ego, Self | Ryle | I 251 ff I/Ego/Self/Ryle: the "I" is accomodated in the persecutor. Ryle/thesis: the "I" is fundamentally different from the "you" and the "he". I 253 I/Ryle/thesis: the ego is fundamentally different from "you" and "he". I 269 The latter two can be used in changing opportunities for any person - the ego or I is with me like my shadow and cannot change. >Ego, >Self, >Person. "Now" gives you a similar feeling of inevitability. >"Now" "I" is not a name. The individuation/identification by a pronoun is different from the identification by a name. >Names, >Identification, >Individuation, >Pronouns, >Anaphora. I 255 I/pronouns/Ryle: difference: e.g. I warm myself in front of the fire, but the I could not be replaced in this case by my body. >Body, >self, >Perspective, cf. >He/He himself, >Quasi-indicator. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
Idealism | James | Diaz-Bone I 50 Idealism: JamesVsIdealism: VsEpistemological Criticism as a critique of the conditions of the possibility of cognition ("a priori metaphysics"; JamesVsKant). Idealism is not reality-related. --- I 75 VsIdealism: Examples for idealism are also "The Absolute", "God", "Matter". These are "enigmatic" names. Context: E.g. Solomon knew the names of all spirits, and since he knew their names, he could submit them to his will. >Magical Thinking, >Absoluteness. |
James I R. Diaz-Bone/K. Schubert William James zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 |
Identification | Geach | I 139f Identification/Reference object/Intentionality/Geach: Problem: E.g.: "Someone made a derogatory remark about an unnamed person. Mrs. Supanich claims to be that person." E.g. "Ralph is the person x so that it was the will of the testator that x should inherit his business." Def Shakespearian context/Geach: is given if any name can be used ("A rose, whatever its name may be, would smell lovely.") Def non-Shakespearian context/Geach: is given if not every name can be used because of opacity. E.g. inheritance example: Shakespearian. E.g. "Ralph was (one person that) expressly from the testator..." - (here any name can be used). - Even non-extensional contexts can be Shakespearian: E.g. "It is logically and chronologically possible that Caesar was the father of Brutus." (But not when instead of "Caesar" a description is used). We also do not want quantification on "possible names". >Someone, >Reference, >Identification, >Name, >Description, >Context, >Quantification. I 145ff Intentionality/Identification/Intensional object/Geach: E.g. a fraudster buys a car under a wrong name: Problem: The correct name cannot be assigned. Solution: identification over time - then ad hoc name possible: "A" (Existential generalization, "Existence interoduction"). >Existential generalization, >Temporal identity. E.g., "Hutchinson" is not the same person as __ and the plaintiff believed that __ wanted to buy her car. - N.B.: wrong: "Hutchinson is the Person x and the plaintiff believed of x that he wanted to buy her car" (then the plaintiff would have lost). ((s) Identification not with "the buyer", then the purchase would have been achieved - but in case of misidentification: then there was no purchase.) I 148f Identity/Intentionality/Intensional objects/Geach: Problem: de re "in relation to someone .." - "... >de re. Hob and Nob believe that she is a witch". This presupposes that one and the same person is meant. - This is the same problem as "There is a horse that he owes me" (which horse?). >Intensional objects. The Cob-Hob-Nob case. To refer to indeterminate things often means to refer in an undefined way to something specific. - Problem: Quantification does not help: "Hob thinks a witch has blinded Bob's mare and Nob wonders if she (same witch) killed Cob's sow." The range of the quantified sentence part seems to be fully within the earlier dependent context, on the other hand it covers something of the later context. - This cannot be represented in a logical schema at all. Problem: Anaphora: "she" or "the same witch" is tied to an antecedent: "the only one ..." Best solution: Hob thinks that the (one and only) witch which is F, blinded Bob's mare, and Nob wonders if the witch who is F has killed Cob's sow. ((s) additional property F). N.B.: the sentence is true if a suitable interpretation of the property F is true. ((s) Otherwise the sentence is false because of the non-existence of witches.) >Non-existence, >Predication, >Attribution. cf. the logical definition of >"Exactly one". |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
Identification | Strawson | I 57 Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing. >Dependence. I 64 Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being. I 65 Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves. >Continuant, >Person, >Subject. I 66 Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable. >Particulars/Strawson, >Language community, cf. >Private language, >Understanding, >Communication. I 87 Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things. I 153 Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term. >General terms. Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual. That is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness). >Complete concept. I 245 Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you". Crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it. >Particulars/Strawson, >Introduction/Strawson. VII 124 Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression. E.g. "Scott is Scott". >Waverley example. --- Tugendhat I 400-403 Identification/Strawson: a) pointing b) description, spacetime points. TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders. Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora). >Deixis/Brandom. Difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?" Identification: only kind: by spacetime points. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
Identity | Cresswell | I, 117 ff Contingent Identity/some authors: here the Leibniz principle fails. >Leibniz principle. Cresswell: better: that is only apparent identity. E.g. the largest wooden building = the most beautiful building right: the largest wooden necessary wooden - but not necessary identical with the most beautiful. Problem: If it is identical, then it is necessarily indentical. Necessary identity/(s): according to Kripke identity is necessary when names rather than labels are involved. >Identity/Kripke, >Descriptions, >Proper names. I 126 Necessary identity/Cresswell: if morning star = evening star, then: (if morning star and evening star nominal): false: N (morning star x)(evening star y) (x = y) but true: (morning star x)(evening star y)N(x = y). For x = y is true in every world under an attribution V iff V(x) = V(y), and then it is true in every possible world if it is true in one and then N(x = y). Cresswell later: this corresponds in Hughes/Cresswell/HC: "The man next door = the major" as a natural truth: that is unnatural. Cf. >Morning star/Evening star. Hughes I 167f Identity/Hughes/Cresswell: identity is always necessary: (x =) always underlying, even if x appears under different descriptions. The descriptions are contingent, but not the identity of the object with itself - this also applies to non-identity: it is always necessary even if the corresponding sentence is true. >Non-identity. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Hughes I G.E. Hughes Maxwell J. Cresswell Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978 |
Identity | Kripke | I 53 Identity: identity is given by arbitrary criteria (only math is required). Identity is not for objects or people. >Criteria. Identity over time: is it still the same object if several parts of a table have been replaced? There is a certain vagueness. Where the identity relation is vague, it might appear intransitive. I 62 A kind of "counterpart" concept could be useful here. (However, without Lewis worlds that are like foreign countries, etc.) You could say that strict identities only apply to individual things (molecules) and the counterpart relation to those individual things that are composed of them, the tables. I 116 Our concept of identity, which we are using here, deals with identity criteria of individual objects in concepts of other individual objects, and not in concepts of qualities. Identity: through the use of descriptions one can make contingent identity statements. >Counterparts, >Counterpart relation, >Counterpart theory, >Possible world/Kripke, >Possible world/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. I 63f Kripke (VsTradition): molecular motion: is necessarily identical with heat. We have discovered it, but it could not be otherwise. Physical truths are necessary: e.g. heat equals molecular motion - but there is no analogy to mind-brain identities. >Identity theory/Kripke. I 117 Ruth Barcan Markus: thesis: identities between names are necessary ("mere tag"). QuineVsMarkus: we could label the planet Venus with the proper name "Hesperus" on a beautiful evening. We could label the same planet again on a day before sunrise, this time with the proper name "Phosphorus". If we discover that it was the same planet twice, our discovery is an empirical one. And not because the proper names have been descriptions. I 120f Designation does not create identity: the same epistemic situation, Phospherus/Hesperus named as different celestial bodies is quite possible and therefore contingent, but does not affect the actual identity. We use them as names in all possible worlds. >Possible world, >Naming/Kripke. I 124 Identity: a mathematician writes that x = y are only identical if they are names for the same object. Kripke: those are not names at all, but rather variables. >Names/Kripke, >Variables. I 125 Definition "Schmidentity": this artificial relation can only exist between an object and itself. Kripke: it is quite okay and useful. I 175 Does the mere creation of molecular motion still leaves the additional task for God to turn this motion into heat? This feeling is actually based on an illusion, what God really has to do is to turn this molecular motion into something that is perceived as heat. >Sensation/Kripke, >Pain/Kripke, >Contingency/Kripke. --- Frank I 114 Identity/Kripke: if an identity statement is true, it is always necessarily true. E.g. heat/motion of molecules, Cicero/Tullius, Water/H20 - these are compatible with the fact that they are truths a posteriori. But according to Leibniz it is not conceivable that one occurs without the other. Frank I 125 Identity/body/Kripke: "A" is the (rigid) name for the body of Descartes - it survived the body, i.e.: M (Descartes unequal A). This is not a modal fallacy, because A is rigid. Analogue: a statue is dissimilar to molecule collection. >Rigidity/Kripke. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Identity | Quine | I 208ff Identity/Davidson/Quine: we are unable to pick out the relationship that is constitutive for the knowledge of the identity of an object. The reason is that every property can be considered as relevant. If the mind can only think if it establishes a clear relationship to the object, then thought is impossible. (QuineVsRussell). Identity: does not work without conceptual scheme. Identity: QuineVsHume, QuineVsLeibniz: Confusion of word and object: there is no relation between different objects but a relationship between singular terms - a = b different names. I 211 Copula form indefinite singular terms: no longer Fa but a = b = E.g. Agnes = a lamb - but: Agnes bleats: Fa. I 211 Synonymy and analyticity is graded, identity is absolute. I 365 Identity conditions strong/weak/(s):> E.g. Paul and Elmer. II 23 Identity/absolutely distinguishable: an open sentence is only fulfilled by an object. Relatively distinguishable: only fulfilled in the given order. Identity: are objects that are not relatively distinguishable, not all objects that are not absolutely distinguishable. >Objects/Quine. I 397 Theseus' ship: it is not about the term "the same" but the term "ship" - each general term has its own individuation principle. II 156ff Individuation: in our world moment-to-moment individuation by predicates - for objects at random (everything can be the object), for predicates crucial truth value. Identification between possible worlds: is dependent on predicates - for body also from space displacement, composition, etc., therefore not cross-worlds - "The same object" is meaningless. -> singular term, instead predicate. Geach I 238 Identity/GeachVsQuine: Thesis: identity is relative - if someone says x is identical to y, this is an incomplete expression. - It is an abbreviation for "x is the same A as y". (Weird that Frege has not supported this). Identity/tradition/Geach: can be expressed by a single scheme: (1) l- Fa (x) (Fx ux = a) in everyday language: whatever is always true of something that is identical to an object y, is true of a and vice versa. From which we derive the law of self-identity from: l- a = a if we take Fx for x unequal to a then scheme (1) provides us with: (2) l- (a unequal a) Vx (x unequal a u x = a) - this results in l- a = a. Geach I 240 But Geach is for relative identity. Quine V 86 Identity/Quine: initially only means extending the time pointing - then it is a relative mass term: E.g. "the same dog as" - used for individuation of absolute general term E.g. "dog". Geach: this is a reduction to a relative term - Quine: that does not work when objects overlap. V 89 Identity/Geach: is only with respect to general terms the same thing. V 161 Identity: is restricted: in terms of general terms: "the same apple" - is unrestricted: Learning: 1. Anyone who agrees with the sentences [a = b] and [a is a g] also agrees to [b a g] ((s) > transitivity). 2. Disposition, to agree on [a = b], if it is recognized that one can agree [b is a g] due to [a is a g] for any g. - Relative identity: also this kind of identity is relative, because the identity scale depends on words. - [a = b] can get wrong when adding new terms. I 162 Definition identity/Set Theory/Quine: x = y as the statement y is an element of every class, from which x is an element - characterization of the identity by using all relative clauses. V 162 Definition Identity/Set Theory/Quine: with quantification over classes is x = y defined as the statement y is a member of each class, from which x is element. Language learning: here initially still substitutional quantification - then no class, but exhaustion of relative clauses. VII (d) 65ff Identity/Quine: important: is the demand for processes or temporally extended objects - by assuming identity rather than flow kinship, one speaks of the flow instead of stages. IX 24 Definition identity/Quine: we can now simplify: for y = z - y = z stands for x (x ε y x ε z) - because we have identified the individuals with their classes. X 90 Definiton identity/Quine: then we define "x = y" as an abbreviation for: Ax ↔ Ay (z) (bzx ↔ bzy. Bxz ↔ Byz .Czx ↔ Czy .Cxz ↔ Cyz (z') (Dzz'x ↔.... .. Dzz'y .Dzxz'↔ Dzyz' Dxzz '↔ Dyzz')) - i.e. that the objects u x. y are not distinguishable by the four predicates, not even in terms of the relation to other objects z and z'. X 99 Identity/Quine: is only defined (in our appearance theory of set theory) between variables but it is not defined between abstraction expressions or their schematic letters. XII 71 Relative identity/Quine: results from ontological relativity, because no entity without identity - this is only explicable in the frame theory. - E.g. distinguishability of income classes. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
Idiolect | Cresswell | II 151 Def "extreme Fregeanism"/KripkeVsFrege/KripkeVsRussell/Cresswell (he ascribes this setting to both of them): thesis that names in general belong to idiolects. >Names. Problem: then the Pierre-Example is not about Pierre, but about the reporter of the case, and his idiolect! >Pierre example. ((s) Pierre example: Pierre thinks Londres is beautiful, but has heard London is ugly.) |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Idiolect | Putnam | I (a) 34 Meaning/Putnam: "Quine" has the same meaning, even if the >causal chains are quite different (despite idiolect). I (a) 32ff Idiolect/Putnam: (Kripke): the use of >names is also possible with completely false beliefs. Putnam pro: knowledge does not have to specify the reference in the idiolect. The use of names is joint. Theoretical terms: one might regard theoretical terms as proper names of variables. Then false identifications can be made without destroying the reference. Causal chain: the causal chain is about the event of introduction, the physical size does not have to play a significant role. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Imagination | Mill | WI 11 VsMill: ideas (and imagination) cannot explain names, as they are not intersubjectively accessible. Always new ideas, but not always new names. >Proper name, >Proper name/Mill, cf. >Reference, >Meaning, >Idea. |
Mill I John St. Mill A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, London 1843 German Edition: Von Namen, aus: A System of Logic, London 1843 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Mill II J. St. Mill Utilitarianism: 1st (First) Edition Oxford 1998 |
Imperatives | Millikan | I 53 Imperative/Indicative/Millikan: imperative and indicative are not names of reproductively determined families, but rather categories of eigenfunctions. >Grammar/Millikan, >Terminology/Millikan. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Incomplete Symbols | Russell | I 64f Def incomplete Symbol/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: E.g. proposition or sentence. (Contrast: Judgment that is already complete because it brings together perception and sentence about the perception). >Proposition, >Sentence, >Judgment, >Perception. I 65 E.g. the proposition Socrates is a human being requires some kind of supplement. - But if I judge the same wording, the corresponding judgement is complete - although no explicit amendment was made to the proposition. I 64 Incomplete Symbol/Principia Mathematica/Russell: sentence or proposition - complete: Judgment (brings together sentence and perception). >Description, >Name. I 95 Description/name/proper name/Principia Mathematica/Russell: E.g. round square is a description, not a proper name. - ((s) so names are not abbreviated descriptions.) - Description: incomplete. - Name/Russell: complete, complete symbol. I 95 Incomplete symbols: formulas in mathematics: only useful in use - descriptions, remain undetermined. - Symbol for classes. I 95f Complete symbols: proper names: e.g. Socrates. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Flor III 117 Def incomplete symbols/Russell/Flor: class names, or expressions that contain class names and thus can be replaced by other symbols. Example "all humans" "some people": - (logical fictions). |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 |
Indeterminacy | Stalnaker | I 142 Indeterminacy/reference/name/representation/modal property/possible world/vagueness/Stalnaker: if it is indeterminate whether the object T has certain modal properties, then the name "T" (in other worlds) is indeterminate. >Proper names, >Centered worlds, >Modal properties, >Modalities, >Modal logic, >Possible worlds. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Index Words | Anscombe | Frank I 78 This/Index Word/Anscombe: particularly prone to error. "This is all that remains of poor Jones." I 79 Unfortunately the urn is empty! >Demonstratives, >Logical proper names, >Predication, >Identification. |
Anscombe I G.E. M. Anscombe "The First Person", in: G. E. M. Anscombe The Collected Philosophical Papers, Vol. II: "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind", Oxford 1981, pp. 21-36 In Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Manfred Frank Frankfurt/M. 1994 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Index Words | Carnap | II 203 I/this/demonstratives/Carnap: index words are not readily determinable because the logical nature of the language elements must not be dependent on non-linguistic factors. Cf. >Logical proper names, cf. >Demonstratives. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
Indexicality | Husserl | Chisholm II 140 Indexicality/Husserl: indexicality is understanding via names. Indexicality involves two different acts: 1. the meaning-conferring, 2. the acts of perception. >Perception, >Meaning/Husserl, >Naming, >Index words, >Intentionality/Husserl. |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
Individual Constants | Bigelow | I 101 Names/Individual Constants/BigelowVsTarski: Tarski allowed only things as referents that can occupy a place at a time. >Ontology, >A. Tarski, >Reference, >Identification, >Individuation. We, on the other hand, will also allow Possibilia. >Possibilia, >Modalities, >Modal realism, >Possibilism. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
Individuals | Russell | V ~ 38 Def Individuals/Russell: constructions of sense-data or sense experience - (is irrelevant for logic). >Sense data, >Sensory impression. I 53 Unit set/ Frege/Peano/RussellVsQuine: unequal Individual: "i'x" the class whose only element is x" so: i'x = y^ (y = x) : "the class of objects identical to x". >Unit set, >Def "One". I 74 Def Individuen/Principia Mathematica(1)/Writing/Russell: Items that are neither propositions nor functions. Letters: a, b, c, x, y, z, w >Proposition, >Function. >Numbers/Frege. I 132 Def Individuen/Principia Mathematica/Russell: a term that can occur in any set of atoms. Def Universal/Principia Mathematica/Russell: Term that occurs like the R. (In R1 (x) R2 (x,y) R3 (x,y,z) R4 (x,y,z,w)... 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. III 127 Def Absolutely simple individuals / Russell: are unchangeable, but not necessarily of eternal duration. Def Individuen/Russell: are completely independent from each other and their names are actual names and vice versa. VI 77 Knowledge/Existence/Russell: sometimes you know the truth of an existential statement without being able to give an example: They know that there are people in Timbuktu. This shows that existential statements do not say anything about a particular individual, but only about a class or function. >Existence statement. VI 80 Identification/Russell: an identification does not necessarily have to describe an individual, it can also be a predicate, a relation or something else. >Description, >Predicate, >Relation. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
Individuation | Nozick | II 71ff I/Self/Individuation/Nozick: E.g. three completely bandaged persons with amnesia: X will die, Y will live, Z has 50/50 chance: they have to be moved into separate rooms: "the one who now hears my voice": this is not sufficient: Localization: (due to possible blindness), life history (for amnesia), physical description (ditto). Name: is insufficient: E.g. Oedipus. Originator of the tokens: is not sufficient: oral cavity + vocal chords ditto - Consciousness: is not sufficient: God covers the same description. >Identification, >Self-identification, >Localization, >Self-knowledge, >Self, >Person, >Action, >Memory, >Loss of memory, >Names. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
Infinity | Quine | V 165 Infinity/material/Quine: if you need an infinite number of characters (e.g. for natural numbers) you cannot say, a sign is a physical object, because then you will soon come to an end. Also forms are not used as classes of inscriptions. These are again physical realizations of forms. IX 64 Infinity/Quine: is only necessary for induction - x = {y}, y = {z}, z = {w} ... ad infinitum - this is the case if {,,,x}. XIII 96 Infinite Numbers/Quine: For example, suppose we randomly assign items to any class, the only limitation is that no object can belong to more than one class. Problem: then there will not be enough items for all classes! A class for which there is no correlate will be the class of all objects that do not belong to their correlated classes. Because its correlate should belong to it, iff it does not belong to it. Cantor: proved in 1890 that the classes of items of any kind exceed the number of items. XIII 97 The reason for this has to do with the paradoxes, if the relation, which is mentioned there, is specified correctly. It turns out that there are infinitely many different infinities. For example, there are more classes of integers than there are integers. But since there are infinitely many integers, the infinity of infinitely many classes of integers must be of a higher kind. For example, there are also more classes of classes of integers than there are classes of integers. This is an even higher infinity. This can be continued infinitely many times. The argument here depended on the class of non-elements of their own correlated classes (nonmembers of own correlated classes). Russell's Antinomy/Quine: depended on the class of nonelements of selves. Cantor's Paradox/Quine: if one takes the correlation as self-correlation, Cantor's paradox amounts to Russell's Paradox. That is how Russell came up with it. Cantor/Theorem/Quine: his theorem itself is not a paradox. Russell's Antinomy/Solution/Quine: is prevented by excluding a special case from Cantor's theorem that leads to it. (See Paradoxes) Cantor Theorem/Corollar/unspecifiable classes/Quine: the existence of unspecifiable classes follows as a corollar from Cantor's theorem. I.e. classes for which we cannot specify the containment condition. There is no other identifying move either. For example, the infinite totality of grammatically constructible expressions in a language. According to Cantor's theorem, the class of such expressions already exceeds the expressions themselves. Classes/larger/smaller/criterion/Quine: our criterion for larger and smaller classes here was correlation. Def greater/classes/quantities/Quine: one class is larger than another if not each of its elements can be paired with an element of the other class. XIII 98 Problem: according to this criterion, no class can be larger than one of its real subclasses (subsets). For example, the class of positive integers is not larger than the class of even numbers. Because we can always form pairs between their elements. This simply shows that infinite sets behave unusually. Infinite/larger/smaller/class/quantities/Quine: should we change our criterion because of this? We have the choice: a) We can say that an infinite class need not be larger than its real subclasses, or b) change the criterion and say that a class is always larger than its real parts, only that they can sometimes be exhausted by correlation with elements of a smaller class. Pro a): is simpler and standard. This was also Dedekind's definition of infinity. Infinite/false: a student once wrote that an infinite class would be "one that is a real part of itself". This is not true, but it is a class that is not larger than a (some) real part of itself. For example the positive integers are not more numerous than the even numbers. E.g. also not more numerous than the multiples of 3 (after the same consideration). And they are also not less numerous than the rational numbers! Solution: any fraction (ratio) can be expressed by x/y, where x and y are positive integers, and this pair can be uniquely represented by a positive integer 2x times 3y. Conversely, we get the fraction by seeing how often this integer is divisible by 2 or by 3. Infinite/Quine: before we learned from Cantor that there are different infinities, we would not have been surprised that there are not more fractions than integers. XIII 99 But now we are surprised! Unspecifiable: since there are more real numbers than there are expressions (names), there are unspecifiable real numbers. Names/Expressions/Quine: there are no more names (expressions) than there are positive integers. Solution: simply arrange the names (expressions alphabetically within each length). Then you can number them with positive integers. Real Numbers/Cantor/Quine: Cantor showed that there are as many real numbers as there are classes of positive integers. We have seen above (see decimals and dimidials above) that the real numbers between 0 and 1 are in correlation with the infinite class of positive integers. >Numbers/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Infinity Axiom | Wittgenstein | IV 83 Infinity axiom/Russell/Wittgenstein/Tractatus: 5534 would be expressed in the language in that way that there would be infinitely many names with different meanings. >"Not enough names..." Solution: if we avoid illusionary sentences (E.g. "a = a" E.g. "(Ex) x = a") (this cannot be written down in a correct term notation) - then we can avoid the problems with Russell's infinity axiom. >Infinity. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
Institutionalisation | Habermas | IV 407 Institutionalisation/Money/Power/Media/Habermas: Thesis: Conditions for an optimal institutionalisation of media (here: money and power): Real values and coverage reserves must be such that they have an empirically motivating force. The physical control of cover reserves must be possible. It must be possible to measure, relinquished and deposit the media. The normative anchoring of the media must not create any new communication effort and must not cause any further risks of dissent. >Media/Habermas. Problem: this reaches its limits at the level of the social system: new names for media can always be found, but these are initially only postulates that must prove useful. IV 410 Another condition for the institutionalisation of media is their calculability: in the case of value retention and influence as media (as proposed by Talcott Parsons) this is not or hardly given. Neither is depositing possible. The scientific system with a recognisable gradation of reputation is an exception. >Science, >Reputation, >Recognition. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Intensional Objects | Quine | VII (h) 152 Intensional Objects/Quine: intensional objects are no classes, but class terms or attributes (properties). They are not numbers but number names (number terms). Two open sentences which specify the same class, still determine different properties if they are not analytically equivalent - Vs: the equivalence is unresolved - problem: this further swells the realm of the intensional objects. Problem: wrong: "Any two conditions which determine an x as the only one (unique) are analytically equivalent" - that’s not certain when it comes to intensional objects or with true but non-analytical sentences (planets). >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Intensions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Intensionality | Boer | I 21 Definition Intensionality/Boer: is nowadays negative, defined as non-intensionality. So we need a definition of "extensional sentence". Denotation/denoting/Boer: Assuming, denotating terms are: names, indices, demonstrativa and mass terms. Definition English +/Boer: be an extension of English by zero or more denotating expressions and predicates. --- I 22 Definition extensional reading/Boer: (preliminary): E.g.: "A thing x is such that ... x ..." is unique, then it is an extensional reading S iff it fulfills the following extensional principles: Definition strong principle of existential generalization/extensionality/Boer: for a denotating term D and variable v which does not belong to S if S has the form [... D ...], then one can conclude from S validly [an existing thing v is such that ... v ...]. Definition replacement principle for co-extensive predicates/Boer: ...from [for object x1,...xn, either P(x1, ... xn) or Q (x1, ... xn) or neither P nor Q], one can deduce every sentence by replacing one or more occurrences of P in S by Q. (DF). (LL). Definition substituting principle for material-equivalent propositions/Boer: for every sentence P and Q in English +, if P is present in S, one can conclude from S and [Either P and Q, or neither P nor Q] every sentence one or several occurrences of P in S by Q. Definition of the substitutability of the identity/Boer: for each denotating term D and E of English+: if S has the form [... D ...], one can deduce every sentence from S and an equation of the form [D = E] (or [E = D ] which is formed by replacing one or more occurrences of D by E in S. --- I 22 Validity/everyday language/Boer: can only be asserted relatively to a particular reading. English +/Boer: we need it to exclude the fact that the four principles are not trivially fulfilled by there being no counterexamples to the inferences in question simply because there are not enough names or predicates to formulate one. |
Boer I Steven E. Boer Thought-Contents: On the Ontology of Belief and the Semantics of Belief Attribution (Philosophical Studies Series) New York 2010 Boer II Steven E. Boer Knowing Who Cambridge 1986 |
Intensionality | Lewis | IV 251 Intensional language/compositionality/Lewis: here for intensional language: here it applies only to intensions, not to extensions. - Tradition: knew only extensional languages. - Intensional language: extensions depend on the context. Cf. >extensionality, >intensions. --- IV 253 New: Intension-determining rules - allow composite modal operators and quantifiers. - If only intensional rules, the extensions disappear - then we only have semantic values of one level instead of two. --- IV 257 Intensional language: here teh sub-sentences are only S names (sentence names without truth value), no sentences. --- IV 260 Intensional language/extensional/Lewis: the difference is so hard to grasp that it hardly makes a difference which we use. - Greater difference: if a language can be formally analyzed or not. - Ontology: for it, it is only important whether suspect entities have to be assumed - which does not coincide with the difference internal/external. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
Intensionality | Quine | I 379 Chisholm: intensional vocabulary ("importance", "denote", "synonym") is not easy to eliminate by other items. IX 178 Intensional Relations/Russell: can be different, even though they put the same things in relationship to each other - e.g. attributes of ordered pairs, triples, etc. VII (h) 150 Ontology/Modality/Intensionality/Extensionality/Quine: an object x must meet this condition to survive: if S is a sentence with a referencing occurrence of a name of x and S' emerges from S by replacing this name by any other name of x, then S and S' need not only agree in the truth value, VII (h) 151 but also when "necessary" and "possible" occur as prefixes. Likewise, the substitution must be kept analytical. N.B.: so Venus as a physical object is excluded by the simultaneous use of evening star and morning star. Instead, we now have three objects! The Venus term, the Evening Star term, the Morning Star term. (s) Terms as objects, these are no material objects anymore. Quine: also number term (number names) instead of numbers, classes names instead of classes (semantic ascent). Example "9 Term" and "Number of Planets Term". N.B.: a number term is not larger or smaller than other number terms. >Extensionality, >Intensions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Intensions | Cresswell | II 70 Definition Intension: the predicate P: that what defines the extension in every world. >Extensions. II 70 Intension/Extension/Cresswell: this distinction is in contrast to the distinction sense/reference. >Sense, >Reference, cf. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. Intension/extension: is distinguished within the realm of the reference - reference: any linguistic expression is simply an intension. Intension: is simply something that is the element of a D's ((s) of any meaning category.) >Meaning category. Intension: that what is known if one knows the meaning of a simple predicate. >Meaning, >Predicates. II 149 Morning Star/Evening Star/Kripke/Cresswell: since Kripke the evening star/morning star problem is mostly formulated with Phosphorus and Hesperus - (names are more problematic than descriptions). >Names, >Descriptions, >Phosphorus/Hesperus. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Intensions | Dummett | Brandom I 508 Intension/Extension/Brandom: you can treat pragmatic and inferential contents similarly as extensions and intensions. >Extensions, >Pragmatics. I 511 Dummett: if you do not distinguish between name and bearer you do not need to distinguish between intension and extension. >Proper names, >Meaning, >Reference. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
Intentionality | Buridan | Geach I 129 Intentionality/Buridan/Geach: (14th century). It is meant to be about intentional verbs between two proper names. E.g. "search for", "fire at",... --- I 130 ..."hope, ___ will be a better man than his father", "believes ___ is a scoundrel". Definition salva congruitate: Replacing where the sentence structure is preserved. In the sentence structure here it is about whether "any A", "every A", "the only A", is preserved or whether "A" still represents a simple or complex term. Possibility/possible/modality/modal logic/Buridan/Geach: there are obscure passages in Buridan, in which is quantified via possibilities: e.g. possible horses. A general term is "stretched" so that it stands simultaneously for real and possible objects. E.g. "Someone is necessarily condemned": a real or possible man is condemned. Intentionality/Buridan/Geach: E.g. "owe": "I owe you a horse". Problem: is there a specific horse I owe you? Here, no "possible horses" are mobilized. Intentional objects/Geach: do not have to be introduced here as a "sense" of expressions, as if their possessions could satisfy somebody instead of the real horse. However, the meaning (Buridan: "ratio") is somehow important in intentional verbs. Buridan: the expression, "appeal to" (appellat) --- I 131 Its own "ratio". (Evokes them). That is, the truth value could change if the "ratio", the "meaning" of the intentional expression changes. ((s) While the expression literally remains the same). Even if the expression still refers to the same thing in the world. E.g. Buridan: If something is white and sweet, I can say truthfully, "I have seen something white" but not "I have seen something sweet". Geach: I can say, "there is something sweet, which I have perceived with the sense of sight." (Or, "there is something sweet that I have seen"). I differentiate something with "ratio" that... Difference: "b f't an A" ("B sees an A") or "There is an A, the b f't". (In Latin, this does not correspond to anything). Reference/Intentionality/Austin/Geach: Difference: E.g.: "I saw a man born in Jerusalem" "I saw a man who passed through Oxford". --- I 132 Intentionality/Buridan: from "there is an A that "b F't A", one cannot conclude: ""b F't A", since one cannot be sure that it is under this aspect (ratio) that b perceives A (thinks of it, etc.) However, from "b F't A" to There is something that b F't". GeachVs: Buridan accepts even more, but even this is doubtful. Intentionality/Geach: must be assumed as a three-digit relation: between a person, a verb, and an object. For a z, b F't z under the ratio: A For a z, and for a w: z is an A and b F't z under the ratio w. For the example of Austin: For a z, z is a man and I saw z in Oxford under the aspect: "ran past". For a z, z is a man and z is born in Jerusalem, and for a w, I saw z under the aspect w. GeachVsBuridan: Problem: with him one has to quantify via rationes (aspects)! I'm not at all impressed when there is talk about mysterious entities, but what are they? It is all right to quantify via anything if one can provide identification criteria (an individuation principle). But for rationes, we do not get any evidence of such criteria in Buridan. --- I 133 This gap makes Buridan's approach at best schematic. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
Intentions | Putnam | I (b) 70ff Gricean Intention/names/reference/Putnam: (continuation of the example, see there) names are inserted in the primitive language by >Gricean intention: 1. The speaker will induce the belief that he refers2 (sic) to the description, under which the name was originally introduced. 2. The fact that this description could be replaced by any other that fulfills what has been described in terms of the original introduction in a hypothetical situation. N.B.: this is a chain of transfers involving the use of reference2 (sic) and thus does not require reference3. Therefore the use of intentions - to refer - is not circular in the formulation of the causal theory of reference. Question: have the rising terms of reference only family resemblance? --- II 73 N.B. of all examples: sentences are only accepted in the long term if they are true. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
Interaction | Bruner | Upton I 61 Interaction/parent-child/language learning/Bruner/Upton: Def joint-action formats a term coined by Jerome Bruner to refer to the joint attention episodes that characterise parent—child interactions. According to Bruner, these episodes are essen tial for learning new skills, including language. Cf. >Triangulation. Joint attention and sharing interactions are key features of early relationships and, according to Bruner (1985)(1), these play a key role in the development of language. To begin with, such interactions might only involve the carer and child, for example playing a game of Peek-a-boo. In joint-action formats the mother creates simple, structured activities with objects such as toys so as to teach her infant what the objects are for and how to use them – for example, building blocks into a tower, or using a spoon for feeding. Upton I 62 These shared sequences are also talked about by the mother, which encourages the infant to acquire language (Bruner, 1975(2), 1985(1), 1993(3)). The joint-action formats provide a mapping activity during which the child learns to link words and phrases with the correct objects and events. Pointing has an important role to play in ensuring joint attention during joint-action formats – for example, when reading picture books with their carers, infants show joint attention to objects shown in the book through pointing, which is usually accompanied by labelling of the object. Adults’ role: the adult response to pointing by an infant is usually to label the object pointed at (Hannan, 1992)(4). Blindness: Research has also shown that blind children are able to label significantly fewer objects than sighted infants (Norgate, 1997)(5), which lends further support to the importance of pointing for acquiring object names. >Ostension, >Ostensive definition. Spcial context/Bruner: Bruner argues that, in this way, the mother (or other carer) provides a social context in which the meaning of language can be learned. This idea that the social context supports language acquisition is supported by evidence that the first words to be understood by an infant are typically the child’s own name, the names of other family members and the names of familiar objects such as clock, drink and teddy (Harris et al., 1995a)(6). >Language acquisition, >Learning, >Language development, >Language. 1. Bruner, J.S. (1985) Actual Minds, Possible Worlds. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 2. Bruner, J.S. (1975) The ontogenesis of speech acts.Journal of Child Language, 2: 1—19. 3. Bruner, J.S. (1993) Explaining and interpreting: two ways of using mind, in Harman, G (ed.) Conceptions of the Human Mind: Essays in honor of George A Miller. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. 4. Hannan, T.E. (1992) An examination of spontaneous pointing in 20- to 50-month-old chil then. Perceptual andMotor Skills, 74: 65 1—8. 5. Norgate, S.H. (1997) Research methods for studying the language of blind children, in Horn berger, N.H. and Corson, D (eds) The Encyclopedia of Languczge and Education, Vol. 8:Research methods in language and education. The Netherlands: Kiuwer Academic Publishers. 6. Harris, M., Barlow-Brown, F. and Chasin, J. (1995a) The emergence of referential understanding: pointing and the comprehension of object names. First Language, 15: 19–34. |
Upton I Penney Upton Developmental Psychology 2011 |
Internet Law | Pariser | I 249 Online Rights/Pariser: while it is illegal to use a photo of Brad Pitt to sell a wristwatch, Facebook may use our names to sell one to our friends. |
Pariser I Eli Pariser The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is Changing What We Read and How We Think London 2012 |
Interpretation | Foster | 2 Meaning Theory/Interpretibility/Foster: a meaning Theorymust be interpretive, i.e. the reference of the expressions must be clear. >Meaning theory, >Reference, >Meaning. I 3 Interpretability: is obtained in that the expressions of the object language are determined by structural descriptions (sounds, characters). Structural descriptions: Names concatenated with a predicate or a function expression - (but only physically, therefore no meaning is provided). I 3 Interpretability: the assignment of two lists is not sufficient for the identification of the reference. >Lists, >Order. I 5 To enable interpretability, the meaning theory must be in the same language as the object sentences. I 10 Interpretation/Meaning Theory/Foster: the interpretation is done by a localization of every sentence in the network of language by truth conditions. We obtain truth conditions through the structure of the sentence. This leads quasi to the interpretation of the whole language from the perspective of a sentence. >Truth conditions. |
Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
Interpretation | Mates | I 72 Interpretation/logic/Mates: an interpretation assigns: individual constants: individuals - one-digit predicates: properties (classes of individuals) - two-digit predicates: relations - statement letter: truth values - truth values come into play when the logical constants are interpreted. >Individual constants, >Individuals, >Properties, >Predicates, >Relations, >Truth values, >Constants. I 73 Truth values: may change when we pass from one interpretation to another, without the form of the statement being changed - the terms "true" and "valid" refer to all interpretations of a particular type. >Truth, >Validity, >Universal validity, >Proofs, >Provability. I 74 A statement is always true in relation to an interpretation. I 78 Interpretation/QL/Mates: if quantifiers have to be considered, we need a helping concept. We need two interpretations I and I"- b: is an individual constant - then b-variant - the interpretations then differ at the most in what they assign to b ("at most to b-th place"). I 81 Then has the substitution y"(namely y a/b) a specific truth value at every interpretation. >Inserting. I 83 Complete interpretation: not desirable because we also examine statements, where not names for all individual constants are available - e.g. real numbers. >Real numbers, >"Not enough names". I 91 Interpretation/translation/truth/intention/artificial language/Mates. Problem: The interpretation also has a "manner of being given". E.g. "2" as the "smallest prime" or "only even prime number" - translation: not unambigiuous - solution. helping concept: "predicate of the German language" - Problem: no systematic rules - meaning/everyday language: depends on the context. >Sense, >Everyday language. I 92 Interpretation specifies truth conditions (WB) fixed - truth condition: Then here in German. - With that it will give every statement a meaning. >Truth conditions, >Translation, >Translation indeterminacy. I 93 Interpretation/logic/Mates. would there be a complete I, then scheme: (W) X is only true if and only then at I when p - although the truth conditions are in German. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
Interpretation | Rorty | III 213 Interpretation/Derrida/Rorty: nothing ever speaks on its own - that is because notthing has the originality - the non-relational, absolute character - for which the metaphysicists are looking. - Nevertheless, we cannot help but want to create something that speaks like this. >Derrida, >Metaphysics. VI 361f Interpretation/Reconstruction/Philosophy/Change in meaning/theory change/Rorty: E.g. Plato reconstructs: that he believed all the words were names. >Names, >Words, >Concepts, >Plato. Problem: Plato would never have accepted this - then he also did not mean it. Rational reconstruction: alleges what the author had actually meant (re-education) - in contrast, historical reconstruction: according to Quentin Skinner: what the author himself would have accepted. VI 363 But here it is not once about "thinking" and once about "truth". >Meaning(Intending). VI 376 Interpretation/Reconstruction/Philosophy/Doxography/Topics/Rorty: Error: presenting all authors as if they were talking about the same issues. VI 363F Meaning/Rorty: who wants to find out what a deceased person meant, must determine how the expressions match his general linguistic pattern and other behavior! He must determine what the other person would have responded to questions about his statements. That intended content differs, depending on who asks these questions. >Meaning change, >Theory change. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
Introduction | Quine | VII (d) 77 Introduction/Language/General Term/Quine: the use of general terms has probably arisen in the course of language development because similar stimuli cause similar reactions. Language would be impossible without general terms. To understand them, you have to recognize the additional operator "class of" or "-ness" at their introduction. Failure to do so was probably the reason for assuming abstract entities. >General Terms/Quine. IX 13 Introduction: It would be a mistake, e.g. to write "* (Fx)" for "x = 1 u ∃yFy" , because it would be wrong to conclude "* (F0) * (F1)" from "F0 F1" - so we have to distrust our definition 2.1 which has "Fx" in the definiendum, but does not have it in the definiens. XI 39 Name/Logic/Quine/Lauener: the logical status of proper names does not depend on the type of introduction, but only on the relation to the other expressions. >Proper Names/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
Jobs | Klein | Brocker I 935 Jobs/Naomi Klein: while factories are moving abroad ((s) into cheaper regions), "on the way abroad, they turn into something completely different, namely 'contracts' awarded to a contractor. The latter may subcontract them to up to ten subcontractors.(1) The brand companies of the global North do not invest, they pass on the costs of production to others. >Investments, >Labor, >Costs. This is not about job export. It is about escaping from the role of the employer.(2) LedbetterVsKlein, Naomi: she had no idea of macro economics when she lamented the loss of jobs on the American labour market(3). She had overlooked the importance of increasing productivity in production as well as the important role of small enterprises, which had contributed much more to employment growth in the USA than the large brand companies. KleinVsVs: the central thesis for her is that with the transformation of the employment relationship, production relationships have also changed. Klein: the intensified alienation of labour, the direct exploitation of human labour and the flight of "employers" from their duties and responsibilities have led to the fact that "not even the classic Marxist separation between workers and factory owners is working properly"(4). >Commodity. 1. Naomi Klein, No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies, Toronto 2000. (Tenth Anniversary Edition with a New Introduction by the Author, New York 32010.) Dt.: Naomi Klein, No Logo! Der Kampf der Global Players um Marktmacht – Ein Spiel mit vielen Verlierern und wenigen Gewinnern, Frankfurt/M. 2015 (zuerst 2001) p. 205 2. Ibid. p. 235 3. James Ledbetter »Brand Names«, in: The New York Times, 23. April 2000. 4. Klein ibid. p. 232 Christine Bauhardt, „Naomi Klein, No Logo! (2000)“ in: Manfred Brocker (ed.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Judgments | Chalmers | I 173 Phenomenal Judgments/Chalmers: phenomenal judgements are the core of the relationships between cognition and consciousness. These are verbal expressions of assertions about consciousness. >Phenomena, >Cognition, >Consciousness. I 174 Judgment/Chalmers: judgements can be taken as what I and my zombie twin have in common. >Zombies. Semantic content/Chalmers: semantic content, on the other hand, is formed partly by conscious experiences themselves (e.g., beliefs about sensations of red). The judgments of the zombies have only the same form as my reports, they have no content. >Experience. I 175 I can only refer to the judgments of the zombies in a deflationist manner ((s) quoting into it). >Deflationism. Content/Chalmers: content can be attributed only by phenomenal beliefs, but it is unclear what role consciousness plays in this. >Content, >Semantic content. Phenomenal Judgments/Chalmers: 1st level: concerns the objects of experience. This is about awareness. >Awareness/Chalmers. I 176 2nd level: Judgments on conscious experiences. E.g. I note that I have an experience of something red. Such judgments can also be about kinds of experiences. 3rd level: on conscious experiences as a type of experience. E.g. about the fact that we have conscious experiences at all and how this can be explained. I 177 Problem: Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, but judgments have to be explained because they are in the field of psychology. Paradoxically, consciousness is ultimately irrelevant to the explanation of phenomenal judgments. (Avshalom Elitzur (1989)(1), Roger Shepard (Psychologist, 1993)(2). I 288 Judgement/phenomenal judgement/Qualia/Chalmers: a complete theory of the mind must provide (a) a nonreductive explanation of consciousness, and (b) a reductive explanation,... I 289 ...why we judge that we are conscious. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Reduction/Chalmers. Even if consciousness itself is not part of the explanation of phenomenal judgments, the roots of consciousness will be. I 290 Consciousness system: has itself no access to information such as "This pattern has a wavelength of 500 nanometers" nor "There is now a 50 Hertz vibration in the brain". The system only has access to the localization in the information space. Thus the system finds itself in a place of this space. Later it can find names like "red", "green" etc. for it. Also the differences can only be expressed with such names of Qualia. >Qualia, >Color words. I 292 A conscious experience is a realization of an information state, a phenomenal judgment is explained by a different realization of the same information state. If we then postulate a phenomenal aspect of information, we have everything we needed to make sure our judgments are correct. 1. A. Elitzur, Consciousness and the incompleteness of the physical explanation of behavior. Journal of Mind and Behavior 10, 1989,: pp. 1-20. 2. R. N. Shepard, On the physical baisis, ölinguistic representation and conscious experiences of colors. In: G. Harman (Ed) Conceptions of the human Mind: Essays in Honor of George A. Miller, Hillsdale NJ 1993. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
Knowledge | Logic Texts | Read III 202 Knowledge/Read: from knowledge follows truth. >Truth. --- Sainsbury V 141 Knowledge paradox/unexpected examination/Sainsbury: it does not matter that the students might have expectations which they are not entitled to have. V 143 It is precisely because we believe that we have refused the teacher, and that we have thus taken away the opportunity from her to let the work be written, makes the announcement come true again. Variant: the class knows of the truth of the announcement. Then n can show the class that she cannot know that it is true. Variant: the announcement also contains the fact that the class does not know because of the announcement ... - E.g. A1 "You will not know on the morning in question ..." - questionable principle: "If you know ... then you know, that one knows it. "- N.B.: a paradox occurs only when we have to conclude on W(A1). V 148 Variant: Announcement: A2 either [M and non-WM (If A2, then M)] or [D and non-WD (If A2, then D)] - New: this is self-referential - Problem: then you know on Tuesday (If A2, then D) that A2 is wrong.V V 150 Real knowledge paradox/Sainsbury: A3 W (non-A3) e.g. the man knows that the announcement is wrong -that is how we come to MV 3 (...) inter alia: "What is proved is known". - MV 3: 1. Assumed, A3 2. W (non-A3) (definition of A3) 3. Non-A3 (which is known is true) 4. If A3, then non-A3 - (1-3 combined) 5. Non-A3 (after 4.) 6. Non-W (non A3) (according to 5. + definition of A3) 7. W (non-A3) - (5. + what is proved is known). - 6 and 7 contradict each other. V 160 Locus classicus: Montague/Kaplan. V 155 Believe paradox/Sainsbury: G1 a does not believe what G1 says - if a G1 believes, then he can understand that he says something wrong. - Contains two assumptions: 1) that a can understand that G1 is false, if he believes in it, and true, if he does not believe in it. 2) that a will understand what he can understand - now one can construct through inserting of rationality, self-consciousness, as well as unity and understanding, the paradox analogously to the paradox of knowledge. V 156 Self-consciousness: If G(f), then G[G(f)]. Reasonableness: If G(f) then non-G (non-G). Closure: If G (if f, then y) and G (non-y), then G (non-f). - Although believe does not involve knowledge, one can construct the same paradox. V 160/61 Knowledge/believe/knowledge paradox/Sainsbury: there is a discussion as to whether knowledge or belief should be correctly represented by an operator or a predicate. E.g. Operator: A1 is true. E.g. predicative: it will have to do with names of expressions, rather than with their use. Montague/Kaplan: predicative version, to rule out that operators are to blame. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sai I R.M. Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 German Edition: Paradoxien Stuttgart 1993 |
Knowledge | Millikan | I 154 Knowledge/Meaning/Knowing/to mean/understanding/tradition/Millikan: Traditionally, knowledge of meaning has been equated with that of public intension. And of course, when I ask about the meaning of "monotreme", I ask for a public standard. Fully-developed Intension/Millikan: but we have seen above that there are no such public standard intensions available to everyone. >Meaning(Intending), >Understanding, >Communication. I 155 Names/Understanding/Millikan: it may be that the use of names does not even overlap. Natural species/Millikan: that is the other extreme: concepts for natural species are names for things that experts talk about. >Names. Third extreme: things that are present to us. For example "square". Use/Word use/Knowledge/Understanding/Word/Name/Millikan: being able to use a word is not sufficient to know its meaning. For example, if we only know that a word has a standard meaning, and intend that meaning. I 156 On the other hand, it is too much to ask that you have infallible means to identify the referent to know the meaning of the corresponding word. Intension/Millikan: one can never know whether an intension is infallible. Definition understanding/meaning/knowing/knowledge/Millikan: to know the fully developed intension. This does not mean that you have to know what the experts know. Knowledge of meaning/Millikan: the knowledge of meaning has not always something to do with intensions. E.g. Hubots and Rumans (> Terminology/Millikan) have no sensorium in common. Nevertheless, one can say that the one knows the term of the other when he is able to translate it into his own language. I 157 Knowledge/Knowledge of meaning/Meaning of the word/Millikan: is a vague matter. Minimum: one must be able to specify whether a large number of sentences is meaningful or not. Intension/Tradition/Millikan: Thesis: Intensions are the basic material of meaning. Millikan: a deeper reason for this attitude is a rationalism with regard to intentionality. Tradition: Thesis: Knowledge of an expression in an idiolect must be a priori knowledge. This leads to the fact that meanings must be intensions or are determined by intensions. Reason/tradition: one does not know a priori that a term is empty. Therefore it cannot be meaning what this expression is missing. But the only kind of meaning that has an empty expression is intension. Therefore, meaning must be intension. >Intension, >Meaning. I 240 Knowledge/Thinking/Millikan: knowing what you think yourself is a posteriori knowledge, not a priori. Problem: precisely then we need a criterion for thinking of something and a criterion of whether one can identify the real value of his thoughts. >Thought. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
Knowledge | Russell | Frank I 654ff Proposition/Knowledge/Russell: one can know propositions, even if one is not familiar with all components. >Proposition, >Statement. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 Russell IV 116 Knowledge/wrong knowledge/false knowledge/Russell: E.g. Someone thinks that the name of the Prime Minister starts with B (Bannerman is correct) - but he thinks Balfour was Prime Minister - no true knowledge. Hintikka 167 Knowledge/who/what/where/HintikkaVsRussell: Russell cannot explicitly analyze constructions of the form white + W sentence. General: (10) a knows who (e.g., x) is such that A (x) becomes (11) (Ex) a knows that A (x). Hintikka: but this is only possible if we modify Russell's approach: Problem: the existential generalization now collapses in a way that cannot be traced back to the non-existence, and which cannot be analyzed with Russell's theory of descriptions. >Existential Generalization, >Theory of descriptions. Problem: for each person, there are a lot of people whose names the person knows and of whose existence the person knows, but of whom the person does not know who they are. ((s) celebrities, people of whom one has heard, hear-say) not aquaintance, but by description. I 168 Charles Dodgson, for instance, was for Queen Victoria one person she had heard of, but she did not know herself. Problem: if we assume that (11) is the correct analysis of (10) it applies: (12) ~ (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x But this is trivially wrong, even according to Russell. The following is certainly true: (13) Victoria knew that Dodgson = Dodgson Existential Generalization/EG: results then in: (14) (Ex) Victoria knew that Dodgson = x So exactly the negation of (12) is a contradiction. Descriptions/Hintikka: descriptions are not involved here at all. Therefore Russell's theory of descriptions cannot help here. I 170 Existential Generalization/EG/Ambiguity/Uniqueness/Russell/Hintikka: What ways Russell could have taken? Knowledge-who/Russell/Hintikka: Russell himself often speaks of the equivalence of knowledge who did something with the existence of an individual of whom is known that it has done so. >Identification, >Individuation. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
Knowledge | Stalnaker | I 49 Knowledge/Lewis/Stalnaker: conclusion: knowledge of actual things is determined, not because it is causal knowledge, but because it is indexical knowledge. That is not knowledge of the existence, but of the fact that we are in a certain relation to things. >Indexicality, cf. >Centered worlds. N.B.: therefore all impersonal ontological beliefs are justified by a priori reasons. This will not be accepted by many authors. I 189 Fact/unknown/knowledge/truth value/Stalnaker: e.g. "Julius was the inventor of the zipper." This establishes an unknown fact. We know by virtue of our designation, that it is true, although we do not know the fact (because we do not know who is Julius). Reference of names: the reference of names depends on facts. >Causal theory of reference, >Causal theorys of names, >Facts. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
Labour | Locke | Höffe I 253 Labour/Locke/Höffe: Locke [claims](1) that one acquires property already in its natural state. God had given the earth and all lower living beings to all people together. But in the state of nature there is also a non-collective property, as quasi-divine fiefdom the property of one's own person. Acquisition of property: On the basis of this still pre-economic property, humans can acquire property through activity in the usual, economic understanding. The decisive, property-creating factor is thus work, which is both commanded by God and forced by the needs of humans. Labour: In this theory of labour, "the unquestionable property of the worker"(2), labour, is given two functions. Labour justifies the distinction between mine and yours and, as an economic labour value theory, represents the most important value-creating factor. Origin/Nature: Locke does not deny that the things of nature are common to all. However, he considers two other factors that lie in the human him- or herself to be a far more significant basis of ownership: that the human is master of him- or herself and that he or she is the owner of his or her own person together with the work that this person does. Divine Reasoning/Moralizing Reasoning/Höffe: Locke does not deny the differences in the work assignment. However, he does not point out any differences in physical talent, but names a difference with a moralizing undertone: God gave the initially uncultivated common property - thus not in labour, but again in a divine gift lies Locke's first step of argumentation - to the hard-working and intelligent for use, instead of abandoning them to the whims of troublemakers. However, even the diligent may not acquire as much property as they like, for they are subject to a natural law limit, which of course cannot be so obviously justified by the prohibition of damage (Laws/Locke). >Property/Locke. 1. J. Locke, Second treatise of Government, §§ 27ff. 2. Ibid., § 27 |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Höffe I Otfried Höffe Geschichte des politischen Denkens München 2016 |
Lambda Calculus | Meixner | I 90 Lambda operator/Meixner: "A (b1, ... bn)" is true if and only if b1, bN .. EXEM λo1 ... oN [A (O1 ... oN] - here stands "A (b1,. ..bN)" for any sentence with N different names. >Names, >Sentences. λO1 ... ON [A (O1 ... oN]: represents the name of an N-ary (predicative) universal. >Universals. O1 the placeholder replaces the O1 b1 name wherever it occurs in A (b1, ... bn). >Placeholder. λO1 ... oN .: this prefix indicates that λo1 ... ON [A (O1 ... on] is not a complete expression, but just a name: λO1 ... oN binds all vacancies in [A (O1 ... oN]. >Expressions/Meixner. The name "λO1 [O1 is a human being."] corresponds to the characteristic of being human. >Properties. |
Mei I U. Meixner Einführung in die Ontologie Darmstadt 2004 |
Lambda-Abstraction | Cresswell | I 169 Lambda abstraction/Cresswell: takes over the binding of the variable (instead of the existence quantifier). The idea is that every predicate has as many digits as possible which are also needed, so that their argument digits can be connected to one another that is the reason why, however it is only a one-digit predicate, we must form the two-digit predicate ‹λxy ‹a man, x››. This two-digit predicate determines the class of all pairs ‹a, b› in which b is a donkey. "Has ‹x, y›" determines the class of all pairs ‹a, b› in which a has b, and therefore a pair ‹a, b› can only then exist in all three relations if a is a man who has b and b is a donkey. II 97 λ-abstraction/lambda abstraction/logical form/everyday translation/Cresswell: Example - "is an x such that x does not whistle". - This can be regarded as a complex predicate. Abstraction operator: its main task is the formation of complex predicates. >Abstraction operator, >Predicates. II 98 λ-categorial language/syntactic categories/Cresswell: generic names/common nouns: are in category (0/1) intransitive verbs: (0/1) transitive verbs: (0/11) (Montague: (0/1(0/01) Adverbs: (0/1)/(0/1) some adverbs: (0/0) (also sentence operators like "not" and operators for the formation of time.) - adjectives: ((0/1 )/(0/1)) prepositions: (((0/1)/(0/1))1). Meaning of a functor: is a certain kind of function. --- II 99 Meaning of expressions in category (t/s1 ,,, sn): are functions whose arguments are derived from the meanings of s1, ... sn and their values from the meanings of t - meanings: are always intensions here. >Intensions. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
Language | Benjamin | Bolz II 13 Language/Benjamin: language is not primarily a means of communication, but the medium in which the world is revealed to us. >World/thinking, >World, >Thinking. Bolz II 41 Language/Benjamin: BenjaminVsEquality of language and communication: Language is not pronouncing thoughts. >Communication, >Thoughts. There is nothing that is not in some sense language. Bolz II 42 Language/Benjamin: Form of all existing, all existing communicates. The communication through the word is only a special case of language. But this does not mean that the mental being is identical with the linguistic communication.(1) >Communication, >Mind, >Being, >Words. Language: there is an unbreakable contrast between linguistic and mental being. The language communicates itself.(2) We must distinguish between "thing" and "language thing". Language: language is not identical with "language at all". >Description levels, >Levels/Order. Bolz II 44 Language/Hamann: "Language is the mother of reason and revelation, its most important thing". >Reason. Names: Jewish custom: everyone has a secret name. >Names, >Judaism. Bolz II 56 Language/Benjamin: Grief and melancholy make speechless, but precisely this speechlessness can represent the essence of language. 1. W. Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften. Unter Mitwirkung von Th. W. Adorno und Gershom Sholem herausgegeben von Rolf Tiedemann und Hermann Schweppenhäuser Frankfurt/M. 1972-89. Bd II, S. 140 2. Ebenda. S. 145ff |
Bo I N. Bolz Kurze Geschichte des Scheins München 1991 Bolz II Norbert Bolz Willem van Reijen Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
Language | Berkeley | Avramides I 140 BerkeleyVsLocke: no "generalizing forces" - linguistic generalization is no generalization of mind. - Singular names do not have to give rise to the understanding of ideas. >Generalization. It is not the main purpose of language to evoke ideas. Instead: even eliciting of passion discouraging and encouraging of actions, etc. >Ideas, >Understanding. Breidert I 228ff Language/Berkeley: Philosophical errors are often explained linguistically. - Incorrect projection: the idea of a thing. Ambiguity: "something" or "a thing": is applicable to ideas or acts of will. Ideas/Berkeley: ideas of things perceived. Notion/Berkeley: concept of a mind and its activities. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Ber I W. Breidert Berkeley In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
Language | Carnap | II 203 Language/Carnap: constructs two symbolic languages. In them he can give an exact definition of "analytic" and "the logical consequence of" etc. Then he constructs the logical syntax for a group of language systems that only need to meet certain conditions. The most important one: the logical nature of the elements of this language system must not depend on a non-linguistic factor. That means that relationships are not readily determinable in natural languages, where pronouns like "I" or "this" occur. >Demonstratives, >Pronouns, >Logical proper names, >Definability. II 204 Language/Carnap: 1) object sentences: affect an object from the exact sciences - 2) synthetic sentences: the formal traits of symbols. >Symbols. II 205 3) pseudo-object sentences: E.g. "Five is not an object, but a number" - the contentual manner of speech: Pseudo object sentences. >Material speech. Formal phraseology parallel syntactic sentences. >Formal speech. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
Language | Duhem | I 194 Language of Physics/Duhem: is not the representation of the observed facts. Technical language: e.g. Seemann says, "remove Bram and Oberbram!" The officer's words are for the crew the names of concrete, clearly defined objects, a well-known maneuver. This is for the initiate the effect of a technical expression. >Observation Language. Quite different is the language of the physicist: For example, when the pressure is increased by a certain number of atmospheres, the electromotive force of the column is increased by a certain number of volts. This can be realized in a myriad of different ways. >Observation, >Physics, >Experiments, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Unobservables. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
Language | Foucault | I 66 Language/16th century/Foucault: the real language is not a uniform and smooth whole, but rather an opaque, mysterious, self-contained matter, a fragmented, puzzling mass from point to point. A character network in which each character, in relation to all others, can and actually does play the role of the content or character of the secret or clue. Things themselves hide their puzzles like a language and manifest it at the same time. Language belongs to the great distribution of similarities and signatures. Consequently, it must be examined as a matter of nature itself. Language is not what it is, because it has a meaning. Its representative content does not play any role at all. The original form is given by God. I 74ff Language: In the 17th and 18th centuries, the own existence of language, its old strength of a thing written into the world was dissolved in the functioning of the representation. Every language was considered a discourse. Signs were dispensed to name and then embrace the name in a simultaneously decorative and demonstrative duplication, conceale and hide it, to name it by other names, delayed presence, second sign, shape, rhetorical apparatus. I 114ff Language/Foucault: Classical Age/17th Century: Language unrestricted and restrained: unrestricted, because the words have obtained the power to represent thought, as the thinking represents itself. Classical: nothing is given which would not be given in the rep. Classical language is not an external effect of thought; it is thought itself. (17th century) This makes language almost invisible. Its entire existence consists in the representative role. No place outside the representation anymore and no more value without it. In this way it discovers a certain relation to herself, which up to then was neither possible nor comprehensible at all. 16th century: language was in a position of constant comment towards itself. 17th century: we no longer ask how to solve the great enigmatic word sequence, we ask how the discourse works, the elements that it emphasizes, how it analyzes and composes. Instead of comment now: Criticism. (>Words/Foucault). I 127 Because it has become the analysis of order, language makes connections over time that have not existed before. Languages evolve through population shifts, wars, victories, fashions, exchange of goods. They do not, however, develop by virtue of a historicity which they themselves possess. No internal developmental principle. >Discourse/Foucault, >Archeology/Foucault. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
Language | Lewis | Avramides I 75 Definition language/Lewis: assigns meaning to noise or sign strings - Possible language/Loar: abstract entity which must still be referred to the speaker. --- Loar I 158 Language/Lewis: all possible sentences known in sense diviso, not in sensu composito - ((s) It is not about not learning complete sentences from memory, but known components.) - the building blocks, not the finished structure. --- Lewis II 202 Language/Lewis: thesis: the Convention according to which L is used in the population P is a convention of truthfulness and trust in L. >Convention/Lewis. --- Schwarz I 70 Language/infinite/Lewis: if sentences are finite sign strings from a finite alphabet, there are no more than Aleph1 many sets of sentences, as many as there are real numbers. - But there are many more ways in which a world could have been - at least Aleph2. --- I (b) 28ff Language: It is a popular exercise to reshape a language so that its non-logical vocabulary consists only of predicates. It is just as easy to reshape it in a way that its non-logical vocabulary consists only of names. (Assuming the logical vocabulary includes a copula). This name could be designated by individuals, quantities, properties, types, states, relationships, sizes, phenomena, etc. But they are still names. If we had that, we could replace all theoretical terms by variables of the same sort. I (b) 33 ff If an individual usually deviates, it is no longer part of the usual observation language. --- II 228 f E.g. Assume a population of notorious liars who are often untrue. In this case, there would not even exist regularity. - LewisVs: I deny that L is used in this population. The normal use of language in this case is far from being determined. I deny that the entire population uses the language L, but it would be possible that every single liar uses L! Provided that he falsely believes himself to be a member of a population, in which a convention of truthfulness and trust in L exists. II 229 Irony/Ironist: these people are actually true in L. However, they are not true in the literal sense in L! That means that they are true in another language associated with L, which we can call "literally-L". Between L and "literally-L" there is this relation: a good way to describe L is to first determine literally-L and then to describe L itself as a lanugage that resulted from certain discrepancies. This two-step determination of L may be much simpler than any direct determination of L. II 240 There is only one philosophy of language. Language and languages are complementary. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
Language | Locke | Black II 130 Language/Locke/Black: to transmit thoughts - (>ideas). --- Euchner I 33 Language/Locke: 1. recording 2. communication of thoughts 3. ease and speed of communication. Language also is a prerequisite for society. >Communication, >Society. --- Euchner I 170 Language/Locke/Euchner: today: Locke fails to recognize the irreducible linguistic basics of empirical perception - but the correction has already been created: to include also abstract and general ideas among the empirically given, of which each reconstruction of knowledge must start. >Idea/Locke, >Perception/Locke, >Perception/today's theories, >Reality/today's theories, >Language/today's theories. --- Arndt II 181 Language/knowledge/LockeVsPascal/VsPort Royal/Arndt: 1. no necessary relations between concepts 2. It is not clear how their content determination leads to mind independent objects. Language/Descartes/Pascal: subsequent codifying of objects. Locke: actual constitution of objects. II 183 Linguistic expression/Locke: "nodes" in which ideas, summarized in the mind, find their stable expression. We must refrain from words and look at meanings. - But the ideas are something almost finished. Arndt: problem: then indicators more representative than synthetically. Words: signify directly the idea, objects only indirectly. II 188 Ideas/meaning/Locke: analysis of ideas identical to the analysis of the meanings - language: not only a means of communication but also of knowledge. Clarity/LockeVsDescartes: in his view bound to naming. Presupposes the possibility of clear signification. II 199 Language: is signifier at the same time and presupposes objectivity. II 206 Language/Locke: is already finished: no one creates the abstract idea "fame" before he has heard the name. - So independence of the mixed modes of the existence of the signified - thus one can understand names before they were applied to existing things (!) E.g. So punishments can be established for not yet committed acts. Punch line: dependence on community is result of the independence of the existence of the signified. Translation: problem: nominal essence: change from community to community. Language ultimately relates to particular therefore we learn name first. >Translation, >Names. --- Saussure I 34 Language/Locke: These words are signs of ideas in consciousness - ideas in turn are signs for objects outside of consciousness. >Signs, >Words. |
Loc III J. Locke An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Loc I W. Euchner Locke zur Einführung Hamburg 1996 Loc II H.W. Arndt "Locke" In Grundprobleme der großen Philosophen - Neuzeit I, J. Speck (Hg) Göttingen 1997 |
Language | Minsky | I 196 Language/thinking/Artificial Intelligence//Minsky: Language builds things in our minds. Yet words themselves can't be the substance of our thoughts. They have no meanings by themselves; they're only special sorts of marks or sounds. If we're to understand how language works, we must discard the usual view that words denote or represent, or designate; instead, their function is control: each word makes various agents change what various other agents do. If we want to understand how language works, we must never forget that our thinking-in-words reveals only a fragment of the mind's activity. >Intentions/Minsky. I 197 For example, all English speakers learn that saying big brown dog is right, while brown big dog is somehow wrong. How do we learn which phrases are admissible? No language scientist even knows whether brains must learn this once or twice — first, for knowing what to say, and second, for knowing what to hear. Do we reuse the same machinery for both? Our conscious minds just cannot tell, since consciousness does not reveal how language works. Thinking: We sometimes seem to think in words — and sometimes not. What do we think in when we aren't using words? And how do the agents that work with words communicate with those that don't? [We make a theory with three levels]: The upper region contains agents that are concerned specifically with words. The lower region includes all the agencies that are affected by words. And in the center lie the agencies involved with how words engage our recollections, expectations, and other kinds of mental processes. There is also one peculiarity: the language-agency seems to have an unusual capacity to control its own memories. I 198 Tradition: Many people have tried to explain language as though it were separate from the rest of psychology. Indeed, the study of language itself was often divided into smaller subjects, called by traditional names like >syntax, >grammar, and >semantics. But because there was no larger, coherent theory of thinking to which to attach those fragments, they tended to lose contact with one another and with reality. Once we assume that language and thought are different things, we're lost in trying to piece together what was never separate in the first place. Artificial Intelligence/language: we'll introduce two kinds of agents that contribute to the power of words. The first kind, called polynemes, are involved with our long-term memories. A polyneme is a type of K-line; it sends the same, simple signal to many different agencies: each of those agencies must learn, for itself, what to do when it receives that signal. When you hear the word apple, a certain polyneme is aroused, and the signal from this polyneme will put your Color agency into a state that represents redness. The same signal will set your Shape agency into a state that represents roundness, and so forth. K-line: see >Terminology/Minsky. Isonome: Each isonome controls a short-term memory in each of many agencies. For example, suppose we had just been talking about a certain apple, and then I said, Please put it in this pail. In this case, you would assume that the word it refers to the apple. |
Minsky I Marvin Minsky The Society of Mind New York 1985 Minsky II Marvin Minsky Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003 |
Language | Plato | Gadamer I 409 Laguage/Plato/Gadamer: (Ancient philosophy had no word for what we call language.) Gadamer I 411 GadamerVsPlato: Plato [in Cratylos](1-3) obviously retreats from the real relationship between word and thing. Here, he explains the question of how one can recognize existence as something too great, and there, where he speaks of it, where he thus describes dialectic in its true essence, as in the excursus of the 7th letter(4), linguisticity is only envisaged as an external moment of dubious ambiguity. It is one of the pre-walls (pro-teinomena) that precede and that the true dialectician must leave behind, like the sensual appearance of things. Thinking: The pure thinking of ideas, the Dianoia, is mute as a dialogue of the soul with itself (aneu phones). Logos: The Logos(5) is the stream that emanates from such thinking through the mouth (rheuma dia tou stomatos meta phthongou). >Language and Thought/Plato. Gadamer I 412 In any case, even where Plato, prefacing his dialectic, transcends the level of discussion of "Cratylus", we read no other relationship to language than (...) : tool, image and production and evaluation of the same from the original image, the things themselves. Recognition: Thus, even if he does not recognize the area of words (onomata) as having an independent function of recognition, and precisely by calling for the transgression of this area, he adheres to the question horizon in which the question of the "correctness" of the name arises. Correctness: Even if he does not want to know anything about the natural correctness of names (e.g. in the context of the 7th letter), he still holds onto a relationship of equality (homoion) as a yardstick there, too: for him, image and archetype is precisely the metaphysical model in which he thinks all reference to the notion of the noetic. >Word/Plato, >Correctness/Plato. 1. Krat. 384 d. 2. Krat. 388 c. 3. Krat. 438 d-439 b. 4. VII. letter 342ff. 5. soph. 263 e, 2 |