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The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Being a Bat | Chalmers | I 236 Bat Example/Nagel/Chalmers: equipped with the approach of Crick and Koch(1), we may get even more insight into how it is to be a bat. Functional organization can tell us something about the kind of information a bat has access to. The distinctions which it is capable of making, and thus also classifications of the most prominent things in its field of perception. Bat/Chalmers: this of course shows nothing about the intrinsic nature of the experiences of bats, but Akins (1993)(2) can add something to this. Chalmers: Cheney/Seyfarth (1990)(3) How Monkeys See the World tries to answer such questions about bats by puting us into the mind of other species. Cf. >Hetero-phenomenology. I 295 Bat Example/Chalmers: Why should not we suppose there is a way for a thermostat of "How it is to be a thermostat"? Cf. >Thermostat example, cf. >Fuel gauge. I 296 Such an "experience" could occur like a lightning and completely without concept. >Experience, >Knowing how. I 298 For the thermostat, there is a canonical information space, and so we can say he has the canonical experiences of a thermostat. I 299 The experiences of a thermostat can be called proto-phanomenal. >Protophenomena. 1. F. H. C. Crick and C. Koch, Towards a neurobiological theory of consciousness. Seminars in the Neurosciences 2, 1990: pp. 263-75 2. K. Akins, What is it like to be boring and myopic? In B. Dahlbom (ed) Dennett and His Critics, Oxford 1993. 3. D. L. Cheney and R. M. Seyfarth, How Monkeys See the World, Chicago 1990. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Epiphenomenalism | Chalmers | I 150 Epiphenomenalism/Consciousness/Chalmers: Question: when consciousness only supervenes naturally (but not logically) on the physical, there is apparently no causality involved. Then consciousness would only be a side effect and would not exist at all. (Huxley (1874) (1)) argues thus. >Supervenience, >Consciousness/Chalmers. ChalmersVs: the causal unity of our physical world looks only like epiphenomenalism. I 151 VsEpiphenomenalism/Chalmers: a strategy against it would be to deny the causal unity of the physical world. We should not do that. There are better ways that assume more appropriate assumptions of metaphysics and causation. 1. Regularity-Based Causation/Chalmers: Instead of causality, we could assume regularity with Hume. Then one could argue that the behavior itself would have been the same without phenomenological consciousness. >Regularity, >Consciousness, >Behavior, >Causation. ChalmersVs: there are many systematic regularities between conscious experiences and later physical events, each of which leads us to conclude a causal link. >Causality. I 152 2. Causal overdetermination: one might assume that a physical and a phenomenal state, although completely separated, might cause a later physical state. Problem: causal redundancy. Solution: Tooley (1987) (2): we could assume an irreducible causal connection between two physical and one separate irreducible causal connection between a phenomenal and a physical state. This is a non-reducible view of causation. >Reducibility, >Irreducibility. ChalmersVsTooley: it is not easy to show that there is something wrong with it. I do not pursue this, but it has to be taken seriously. 3. Non-supervenience of the causation: facts about consciousness and those about causation are the only facts which do not logically supervene on certain physical facts. Chalmers: it is quite natural to speculate as to whether these two kinds of non-supervenience have a common root. Rosenberg: (1966) (3) has developed this. Rosenberg Thesis: Experience recognizes causation or some aspects of it. After that, causation needs recognition by someone or something. ChalmersVsRosenberg: this is, of course, very speculative, and leads among other things to panpsychism. >Panpsychism, >Aspects. I 153 In addition, the zombie problem would persist. >Zombies. 4. The intrinsic nature of the physical: thesis: a physical theory characterizes above all the relations of its entities, i.e. its propensities to interact with other elements. >Propensity, >Intrinsic. Problem: what is it that causes all these relations of causation and combinations? Russell (1927) (4): This is what the physical theory is silent about. Solution: to adopt an intrinsic nature of the physical elements. Chalmers: the only class of such intrinsic properties would be the class of phenomenal properties. >Phenomena. I 154 There must be no panpsychism following from this. Instead, we can assume proto-phanomenal properties. >Proto-phanomenal. I 159 VsEpiphenomenalism/Chalmers: Arguments against it fall into three classes: 1. Those which concern the relations of experience to normal behavior, 2. Those which concern the relations of experience to judgments about normal behavior, 3. Those which concern the overall picture of the world, which provokes the acceptance of epiphenomenalism. Ad 1. VsEpiphenomenalism: For example, the intuitions about why I withdraw my hand from a flame are strong, on the other hand, we can clarify these intuitions by assuming regularities. We simply perceive experiences more directly than the corresponding brain states. Ad 2. VsEpiphenomenalism: It seems to be extremely counterintuitive that our experiences could be irrelevant to the explanation of our behavior. >Behavior, >Explanation, >Experience, cf. >Subjectivity. I 160 Ad. 3. VsEpiphenomenalism: the image of the world which is drawn by it is implausible because there should be nomological appendages which are not integrated into the system of other natural laws. Epiphenomenalism/Chalmers: I do not describe my own position as epiphenomenalism. The question of the causal relevance of experience remains unanswered. >Relevance. 1. T. Huxley, On the hypothesis that animals are automata. In: Collected Essays, London 1987, pp. 1893-94. 2. M. Tooley, Causation: A Realist Approach, Oxford 1987 3. G. H. Rosenberg, Consciousness and causation: Clues toward a double-aspect theory, Ms Indiana Universwity, 1996. 4. B. Russell, The Analysis of Matter, London 1927 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Panpsychism | Chalmers | I 297 Panpsychism/Chalmers: if we admit a thermostat experience (flashy information state changes), then perhaps there is consciousness or conscious states everywhere? Perhaps in a stone? But a stone does not correspond to a thermostat. We can say that the stone contains subsystems that are conscious. I 298 Consciousness/Chalmers: if we assume that very simple systems have very simple phenomenology, it makes it less unintelligible to accept consciousness as a unified property of the universe. Experience/Chalmers: can experiences arise in a static state? Intuitively, it seems necessary that a change of state is necessary for a system to have an experience. Proto-phanomenal: we can call the "experiences" of a thermostat proto-phenomenal. >Proto-phenomenal. I 299 Panpsychism/Chalmers: The reason why I am not referring to my thesis as panpsychism is that it is misleadingly suggested that proto-phanomenal experiences are somehow basic and complex experiences are composed of them, which I do not believe. But I call my thesis of naturalistic dualism a variant of panpsychism. >Dualism, >Dualism/Chalmers, >Property dualism, cf. >Monism. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Terminology | Chalmers | I 20 Deflationary/Terminology/Chalmers: a deflationary concept of belief would be purely psychological (explaining behavior), not phenomenal (connected with Qualia). Which is the true concept, is not so decisive for my project. More important is the separation of the psychological and the phenomenal. I 28 Alertness/Attention/awareness/Terminology/Chalmers: Consciousness is always accompanied by attention, but not always vice versa. Awareness (also attention) falls more on the psychological side of differentiation. I 29 Newell (1992)(1) distinguishes between "awareness" and "consciousness". Chalmers: With "awareness" (attention) I will mean from now on "psychological consciousness" (behavior explaining, functional). I 154 Definition Proto-phenomenal Property/Chalmers: as the only one, a proto-phenomenal property does not contain experience itself, but it can contain several simultaneously present ones. This is strange to us, but cannot be excluded a priori. This would suggest a causal role of the phenomenal. To represent such a theory would simply mean to accept another possible world where something else had the role of causation, but such a world would not be logically excluded. > Dualism. I 232 Registration/Chalmers: registrations are judgments in a weaker sense: representational states, e.g. of the facial field, which are not yet judgments. 1. A. Newell, SOAR as a unified theory of cognition: Issues and explanations. Behavioral and Brain Studies 15, 1992: pp.464-92. Schwarz I 207 (annotation) Definition Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, that is, the world parameter inserts the world of the respective situation (corresponding as time parameter the point of time of the situation, etc.). Definition "diagonal proposition"/terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(1)): diagonal propositions are primary truth conditions. Definition horizontal proposition/Lewis: horizontal propositions are secondary truth conditions. (1980a(2), 38, 1994b(3), 296f). Newer Terminology: Definition A Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the A intension is for primary truth conditions Definition C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: the C intension is for secondary truth conditions. Definition A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Proposition/Terminology/Schwarz: corresponding. (Jackson 1998a(4), 2004(5), Lewis 2002b(6), Chalmers 1996b(7), 56,65) Definition meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(8),173): meaning1 refers to secondary truth conditions Definition meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: meaning2 is complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intension". Schwarz: Problem: this means quite different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization as Stalnaker's diagonal propositions. Also not via a priori implication as in Chalmer's primary propositions. 1. Robert c. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 2. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 3. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, and in [Lewis 1999a] 4. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 5. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 6. David Lewis [2002a]: “Tensing the Copula”. Mind, 111: 1–13 7. David Chalmers [2002]: “Consciousness and its Place in Nature”. In D. Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of Mind. Classical and Contemporary Readings, New York: Oxford University Press, 247–272 8. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Theories | Chalmers | I 165 Conscious Experience/Consciousness/Theories/Chalmers: three types of theories: A. Consciousness supervenes logically on the physical, for functional and eliminative reasons. I 166 B. Consciousness does not supervene logically, there is no a priori implication from the physical to the phenomenal, but nevertheless materialism is true. C. VsMaterialism and Vs Logical Supervenience. >Materialism, >Supervenience, >Physical/psychic. A. Variants: Eliminativism, Behaviorism, Reductive Functionalism. Cf. >Colour researcher Mary/Frank Jackson, >Elimination, >Behaviorism, >Reductionism, >Functionalism. 1. Physical and functional twins of us without conscious experiences are inconceivable. >Zombies. 2. Mary does not learn anything new when she sees red for the first time. 3. Everything about consciousness can be explained functionally. Representative: Armstrong (1968)(1), Dennett (1991)(2), Lewis (1966)(3), Ryle (1949)(4). Variants: Dretske (1995)(5), Rey (1982)(6), Rosenthal (1996)(7), Smart (1959)(8), White (1986)(9), Wilkes (1984)(10), B: Variants: Nonreductive Materialism. The only non-contradictory variant assumes strong metaphysical necessity as decisive. >Metaphysical necessity. 1. Zombies and inverted spectra are conceivable, but metaphysically impossible. >Conceivability. 2. Mary learns something new when she sees red, but this can be explained with an analysis in the Loar style ((s) semantically). >B. Loar. 3. Consciousness, cannot be explained reductively, but is nevertheless physical. Representatives, not explicit, but approximate: Levine (1983 (11), 1993(12)), Loar (1990)(13). Others who adopt physicalism without logical supervenience: Byrne (1993)(14), Flanagan (1992)(15), Hill (1991)(16), Horgan (1984b)(17), Lycan (1995)(18), Papineau (1993)(19), Tye (1995)(20) van Gulick (1992)(21). C. Different Variations of Property Dualism. Materialism is assumed to be false, certain phenomenal or proto-phenomenal properties are assumed to be irreducible. 1. Zombies and inverted spectra are logically and metaphysically possible. 2. Mary learns something new, namely non-physical facts. 3. Consciousness cannot be explained reductively, but it can be explained non-reductively by additional natural laws. Representatives: Campbell (1970)(22), Honderich (1981)(23), Jackson (1982)(24), H. Robinson (1982)(26), W. Robinson (1988), Sprigge (1994)(27). I 167 The ultimate choice is between the theories of the A type and the rest. I 213 Theory/Chalmers: even if consciousness cannot be explained reductively, there can be a non-reductionist theory of consciousness. Such a theory will be similar to the theories that physics gives us about motion, space, and time. The existence of these entities is not derived from something more basic. Instead, laws are stated about them. >Laws, >Laws of nature. I 216 First Person/Chalmers: Problem: with the perspective of the first person, a number of contradictory theories are possible: e.g. Solipsism, panpsychism, etc. >First person, >Solipsism, >Panpsychism. I 218 If we could only figure out which theory of consciousness is better than its competitors, we would have already gained a lot. >Consciousness/Chalmers. 1. D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London 1968 2. D. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, Boston, 1991 3. D. Lewis, An argument for the identity theory, Journal of Philosophy 63, 1966: pp.17-25 4. G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Oondon 1949 5. F. Dretske, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge 1995 6. G. Rey, A reason for doubting the existence of consciousness. In. R. Davidson, S. Schwartz and D Shapiro (Eds) Consciousness and Self-Regulation. Vol 3 New York 1982 7. D. M. Rosenthal, A theory of consciousness. In: N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (Eds) The Natur of Consciousness, Cambridge 1996 8. J. C. Smart, Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review 68, 1959: pp.141-56 9. S. L. White, Curse of the qualia. Synthese 68, 1986: pp. 333-68 10. K. V. Wilkes, Is consciousness important? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35, 1984: pp. 223-43 11. J. Levine, Materialism and qualia. The explanatory gap. PhPacific Philosophical Quarterly 64, 1983: pp.354-61 12. J. Levine, On leaving out what it's like. In: M. Davies and G. Humphreys (Eds) Consciousness: Psychological and Philosophical Essays, Oxford 1993. 13. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 14. A. Byrne, The emergent mind, Ph.D. diss. Princeton University, 1993 15. O. Flanagan, Consciousness reconsidered. Cambridge 1992 16. C. S. Hill, Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge 1991 17. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 18. W. G. Lycan, A limited defense of phenomenal information. In: T. Metzingwr (ed), Conscious Experience, Paderborn 1995. 19. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 20. M. Tye, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge 1995 21. R. van Gulick, Nonreductive materialism and the nature of intertheoretical constraint. IN: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 22. K. K. Campbell, Body and Mind, New York 1970 23. T. Hoderich, Psychological law-like connections and their problems. Inquiry 24, 1981: pp. 277-303 24. F. Jackson, Epiphenomenal qualia, Philosophical Quarterly 32, 1993: pp. 127-36 25. H, Robinson, Matter and Sense, Cambridge 1982 26. W. S. Robinson, Brains and People: An Essay on Mentality and Its Causal Conditions, Philadelphia 1988 27. T. L. S. Sprigge, Final causes. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45, 1971: pp. 149-70 |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
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