Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Hegel | Bubner I 182 Absolute Mind/Hegel: the eternal and self-contained idea operates as an absolute mind, creates and enjoys. (According to Aristotle, who distinguishes the self-thought as the highest activity of reason.) >Absolute Spirit. I 183 Absolute/HegelVsAristoteles: for him, the Absolute fits in with the categories of a self-uniting unity that seamlessly fits into systematic philosophies. He goes beyond this, in that he does not reserve the theory of goodness to a sub-domain of metaphysics. Thus, the doctrine of God means philosophizing in an encyclopaedically comprehensive dimension. There is no longer a supreme object. >Aristotle. HegelVsAristotle: Furthermore: parting with the teleology of nature. >Teleology, >Nature/Aristotle, >Nature. Instead: subjectivity principle. Heartbeat of the whole. The energeia, which permeates all things, is attributed to thought activities. I 184 Absoluteness/Hegel/Bubner: Absoluteness of the idea presents itself as the method of logic, and fulfills the condition of self-reference with this typically modern trick. >Self-reference, >Idea, >Logic/Hegel. Adorno XII 115 Absoluteness/Consciousness/Hegel/Adorno: by adopting an absolute identity of being and mind, Hegel tried to save the ontological proof of God. This assumption is actually the content of his philosophy. >Absolute spirit, >Proof of God. KantVsHegel: denies such an identity between what is and our consciousness. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Cognition | Schelling | Adorno XIII 72 Recognition/Schelling/Adorno: The post-Kantian idealists have proved with particular stringency and violence that all recognition is really nothing more than a thinking of thought - Schelling thus resumed the Aristotelian concept of a noesis noeseos. Simply asked: if here only the absolute mind recognizes itself, is not the whole recognition a single tautology? >Tautologies, >Mind, >Absolute Mind, >Aristotle, >Thinking, >Knowledge, >Idealism, >Idealism as author. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Hermeneutics | Hegel | Gadamer I 171 Hermeneutics/Hegel/Gadamer: In the beginning, Schleiermacher as well as Hegel are aware of loss and alienation from tradition, which challenges their hermeneutical reflection. Yet they determine the task of hermeneutics in very different ways. Cf. >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher. [While,] according to Schleiermacher, historical knowledge [opens] the way to replace what has been lost and to restore tradition, provided it brings back the occidental and the original, Hegel takes a different path: Gadamer I 173 Hegel: "(...) not the real life of their existence is there, not the tree that carried them, not the earth and the elements that formed their substance, nor the climate that determined their determination, nor the change of seasons that controlled the process of their becoming. Thus, with the works of that art, fate does not give us its world, not the spring and summer of moral life in which it flourished and matured, but only the veiled memory of that reality". Hegel calls the behaviour of the later ones towards the handed down works of art an "outward action", "which wipes away raindrops or dust from these fruits and, in place of the inner elements of the surrounding, producing and inspiring of morality, erects the extensive scaffolding of the dead elements of their outward existence, of language, of history, etc., not in order to live in them, but only to imagine them in themselves"(1). The true task of the thinking mind in relation to history, also in relation to the history of art, would not be an external one, according to Hegel, if the mind saw itself represented in it in a higher way. >Spirit/Hegel, >History/Hegel, >Art/Hegel. Gadamer I 174 HegelVsSchleiermacher/Gadamer: Here Hegel points beyond the whole dimension in which the problem of understanding arose in Schleiermacher. Hegel raises it to the basis on which he founded philosophy as the highest form of the absolute mind. In the absolute knowledge of philosophy that self-consciousness of the spirit is completed, which, as the text says, "in a higher way" also embraces the truth of art. Thus for Hegel it is philosophy, i.e. the historical self-penetration of the mind that accomplishes the hermeneutical task. It is the extreme counterposition to the self-forgetfulness of the historical consciousness. It transforms the historical behaviour of the imagination into a thinking behaviour towards the past. Cf. >F. Schleiermacher, >Truth of Art. 1. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. Hoffmeister, S. 524. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Metaphysics | Heidegger | Tugendhat II 25 Being/Heidegger: HeideggerVsMetaphysics: has localized the being in the being. - Gadamer I 262 HeideggerVsMetaphysics: The questioning that turns towards this fundamental, that it is that, is itself a questioning after Being, but in a direction that necessarily remained unthought in all previous questioning after the Being of Being, indeed, that was precisely concealed and hidden by the question after Being posed by metaphysics. Heidegger/Gadamer: By showing the question about being at the same time as the question about nothingness, Heidegger has linked beginning and end of metaphysics. That the question about being could arise from the question about nothingness presupposed the thinking of nothingness, at which metaphysics fails. >Being/Heidegger, >Nothing/Heidegger. --- Figal I 116ff Metaphysics/Heidegger: 1928 still a positive concept. Figal I 165 Metaphysics/Heidegger: Christianity and nihilism do not differ in their orientation to God. Metaphysics interprets the presence into the absence. Nietzsche's death of God brings the West into the situation of being able to put an end to metaphysics. --- Cardorff II 84 HeideggerVsMetaphysics: "because not asking for being". Cardorff II 86 Metaphysics/Heidegger: all attempts, being as remaining, always-equality, availability, presence, i.e. thinking as an independent presence, belong to metaphysics for Heidegger. Likewise, eternal recurrence of the same, Hegel's absolute mind, etc. >God, >F. Nietzsche, >Nihilism, >Christianity, >Being/Heidegger. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 Figal I Günter Figal Martin Heidegger zur Einführung Hamburg 2016 Hei II Peter Cardorff Martin Heidegger Frankfurt/M. 1991 |
| Metaphysics | Idealism | Adorno XIII 91 Metaphysics/idealism/Adorno: at the moment when reason raises itself as judge over whether metaphysics is possible, it already determines itself as the true metaphysics. >Circularity, >Reason, >Ultimate judtification, >Judgments. Logic/Hegel/Adorno: Hegel equates the thus understood metaphysics with logic. >Logic/Hegel. Here, too, one finds the identity principle in its full purity. Then, in the form of logic, I have at the same time the rules of the Absolute, because the Absolute itself is nothing but the mind, whose laws are supposed to be the ones of logic. >Identity/idealism, >Identity/Henrich, >Absoluteness, >Absolute mind. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Reality | Idealism | Adorno XIII 104 Reality/idealism/Kant/Adorno: in idealism, the real should be conceived as something mediated by the subjectivity, and not merely as something opposed to subjectivity. Cf. >Given, >Subjectivity, >Thinking/World. That is, that we know of the external reality in no other way than in the form of judgments and thus mediated through thought. >Judgments, >Knowledge, >Cognition. But if, in the sense of this principle, Kant and the post-Kantian idealists believed that what is to be uniformly traced back to a subjective principle, then this is the principle of reason as that of thought. >Principles, >Thinking, >Reason/Idealism, >Absolute Mind. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Spirit | Idealism | Adorno XIII 79 Spirit/idealism/Adorno: the spirit is limited in the Kantian formulation, but absolute in the following idealists. This difference is so much a matter of the whole that every single concept, which occurs in these philosophies, changes. >I. Kant, >Absolute Mind, >G.W.F. Hegel, >Spirit/Fichte. Given/idealism/Adorno: in the case of the consequent idealists, the given, which is actually given by Kant, is itself derived. >Given. Infinite/idealism/Adorno: these idealists have ultimately taken the infinite into philosophy, with the immense consequence that the thinking of the finite human being, assuming itself as a thinking of the Infinite, presumed to be able to set the Absolute out of itself and to derive it from itself. >Infinity, >Absoluteness. |
A I Th. W. Adorno Max Horkheimer Dialektik der Aufklärung Frankfurt 1978 A II Theodor W. Adorno Negative Dialektik Frankfurt/M. 2000 A III Theodor W. Adorno Ästhetische Theorie Frankfurt/M. 1973 A IV Theodor W. Adorno Minima Moralia Frankfurt/M. 2003 A V Theodor W. Adorno Philosophie der neuen Musik Frankfurt/M. 1995 A VI Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften, Band 5: Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie. Drei Studien zu Hegel Frankfurt/M. 1071 A VII Theodor W. Adorno Noten zur Literatur (I - IV) Frankfurt/M. 2002 A VIII Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 2: Kierkegaard. Konstruktion des Ästhetischen Frankfurt/M. 2003 A IX Theodor W. Adorno Gesammelte Schriften in 20 Bänden: Band 8: Soziologische Schriften I Frankfurt/M. 2003 A XI Theodor W. Adorno Über Walter Benjamin Frankfurt/M. 1990 A XII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 1 Frankfurt/M. 1973 A XIII Theodor W. Adorno Philosophische Terminologie Bd. 2 Frankfurt/M. 1974 |
| Substance | Kant | Strawson V 187 Substance/StrawsonVsKant: it is wrong, to conclude an underlying substance from the variability of the things - even according to his own principles - because if it should be a condition of experience, then it is circlular. >Circular reasoning. --- Holz I 31 Substance/Spinoza: is according to him unique in its very nature, infinite, and indivisible. >Substance/Spinoza. Substance/HegelVsSpinoza: whoever starts from the thinking conditions of the substantial unity of the world and the experience conditions of the qualitative difference of beings (of manifoldness) can conceive this manifoldness only as manifestations or aspects of the one substance in which "all that one had thought to be true, has perished". This, however, reveals the actual thinking condition, the difference in the content of thought. Leibniz saw the danger. I 32 Hegel: one must not "let the multiplicity disappear in the unity". If deduction is only possible as a reduction (as in Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought. Kant draws from this the consequence of establishing the unity of the world in the priority of thinking. The unity is then only transcendental or subjectively idealistic justified. HegelVsKant: tries to renew the metaphysics of substance, which wants to establish the unity of existence in the unity of a being: the self-development of the absolute mind in world history. >Thinking/Kant. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Understanding | Ranke | Gadamer I 215 Understanding/Ranke/Historism/Gadamer: Ranke, Thesis: The last result of historical science is "compassion, complicity of the universe"(1). Rankes' famous twist to erase himself is based on this pantheistic background. DiltheyVsRanke: Of course, such self-extinction is in truth, as Dilthey(2) has objected, the expansion of the self into an inner universe. RankeVsDilthey: For Ranke, self-extinction is still a form of real participation. One must not understand the concept of participation in psychological-subjective terms, but must think of it from the standpoint of the concept of life that underlies it. Because all historical phenomena are manifestations of All-Life (German: "All-Leben"), participation in them is participation in life. Gadamer: From there the expression of understanding gains its almost religious sound. Understanding is direct participation in life, without the mental mediation through the concept. It is precisely this point that the historian is concerned not to relate reality to concepts, but to reach the point where "life thinks and thought lives". The phenomena of historical life are grasped in understanding as the manifestations of All-Life, the divinity. Such an understanding penetration of the same means in fact more than a human cognitive achievement of an inner universe, as Dilthey reformulated the historian's ideal against Ranke. It is a metaphysical statement that puts Ranke in the greatest proximity to Fichte and Hegel when he says: "The clear, full, lived insight, that is the marrow of being (German: "Seyns") has become transparent and sees through itself"(3). In such a phrase it is quite noticeable how close Ranke remains to German idealism. The full self-transparency of being, which Hegel thought of in the absolute knowledge of philosophy, legitimizes even Ranke's self-confidence as a historian, no matter how much he rejects the claim of speculative philosophy. Gadamer I 216 Gadamer: The pure devotion to the vision of things, the epic attitude of one who seeks the fairy tale of world history(4) may indeed be called poetic, provided that for the historian God is present in everything not in the form of the concept but in the form of the "external imagination". Indeed, one cannot better describe Ranke's self-image than by these terms of Hegel. The historian, as Ranke understands him, belongs to the figure of the absolute mind, which Hegel described as that of the >Kunstreligion. DroysenVsRanke/Gadamer: For a sharper-thinking historian, the problem of such a self-conception had to become visible. The philosophical significance of Droysen's historiography lies precisely in the fact that he seeks to detach the concept of understanding from the indeterminacy of aesthetic-pantheistic communion that he has with Ranke and formulates his conceptual premises. The first of these preconditions is the concept of expression(5). Understanding is understanding of expression. >History, >History/Ranke, >Historiography, >World History, >Universal history. 1. Ranke (ed. Rothacker). S. 52. 2. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften V, 281. 3. Lutherfragment 13. 4. Ebenda S. 1 5. Vgl. auch unten S. 341 f. , 471 f. und Bd. 2 der Ges. Werke, Exkurs VI, S. 384ff. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kant | Hegel Vs Kant | Leibniz I 32 Hegel: we must not "let multiplicity disappear in unity". If deduction were only possible as reduction (as with Spinoza), this would be the self-abolition of the world in thought. Kant: draws from this the consequence of founding the unity of the world in the priority of thought. Only then is unity transcendentally or subjective idealistically justified. HegelVsKant: tries to renew the metaphysics of substance, which wants to explain the unity of being with the unity of the being: the self-development of the absolute mind in world history. --- Rorty II 153 HegelVsKant/Rorty: both God and the moral law must be temporalized and historized to remain credible. Rorty VI 195 HegelVsKant/Rorty: "transcendental idealism" is just another name for skepticism. VI 203 HegelVsKant/Rorty: he is too much geared towards scientific research. --- Vollmer I 220 Knowledge/Criterion/Realization/Vollmer: we need a criterion for when realization is valid. Such a criterion would itself be a piece of knowledge and would also need a criterion recourse. On the other hand, the criterion could not be a simple convention, since a convention cannot justify any recognition. If at all, then by further conventions. Regress. This is approximately: SchellingVsKant: we need a recognition of recognition. And that is circular. HegelVsKant: Examination of recognition: cannot be carried out without recognizing. As if you wanted to learn to swim before you go into the water. Vollmer: the argument was developed by Leonard Nelson and is therefore called "Double Nelson". |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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