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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Basic Concepts | Montague | Hintikka I 156 Basic Concept/Montague/Hintikka: in Montague, the meaning functions associated with simple expressions are granted to be fixed. >Meaning, >Functions, >Meaning functions, >Meaning/Hintikka, >Definitions, >Definability. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Denotation | Frege | Berka I 387 Designate/denote/meaning/Frege: ("sense and meaning"): denotation has a two-dimensional semantics. It identifies designation and meaning function (because of a lack of content in logic.) denote sense < ----(express)---- name ----(mean)---- > meaning >Sense, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >Meaning; cf. >Twodimensional semantics. Frege/Berka: Frege thus equates designating with meaning. Frege I 87 Variable/designating/designation/denotationFrege: "x" designates nothing. X only indicates numbers. Hence, e.g. "x² + 3x" designates nothing. The entire function only indicates. By contrast, "sin" (sine) is a sign which designates but it is still no law! A lawis : e.g., "y = sin x". >Laws. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Extensionality | Stechow | 61 Extensional propositional logic/Stechow: cannot describe the meaning of "Modals". >Modality, >Modal Logic, >Meaning, >Extension, >Extensionality. E.g. the meaning of "must" is "follows from my knowledge". [[must f]] says in epistemic meaning that [[f]] is a superset of my knowledge. The meaning function [[must]] is a relation between two sets of situations. >Functions, >Situations. Such meanings (sets of possible worlds) we do not have when sentences (extensionally) designate truth values. >Truth values, >Possible worlds, >Intensions. |
A. von Stechow I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006) |
| Possible World Semantics | Hintikka | II 43 Semantics of Possible Worlds/possible world semantics/non-existent objects/non-existence/possibility/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds should assume possible individuals as inhabitants not only of possible worlds, but even of the actual world. II 50 Semantics of Possible Worlds/HintikkaVsFrege: here there is no >systematic ambiguity, i.e. the expressions mean intensionally the same as extensionally. >Intensions, >Extensions. E.g. to know what John knows is to know the worlds that are compatible with his belief, and to know which ones are not. II 51 Extra premise: for this, one must be sure that an expression in different worlds picks out the same individual. Context: what the relevant worlds are, depends on the context. E.g. Ramses: here the case is clear. On the other hand: E.g. Herzl knew that Loris was a great poet. Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal. II 53 Meaning Function/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: the difference of my approach to that of Frege is that I consider the problems locally, while Frege regards them globally. Fregean sense (= way of being given)/Hintikka: the Fregean sense must be regarded as defined for all possible worlds. >Fregean sense, >Way of givenness. On the other hand: Hintikka: if the Fregean sense is constructed as a meaning function, it must be regarded in my approach only as defined for the relevant alternatives. Frege: Frege uses the concept of the identity of the senses implicitly. And as a function of meaning the identity is only given if the mathematical function applies for all relevant arguments. Totality/Hintikka: this concept of the totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful. Solution/Hintikka: precisely the semantics of possible worlds helps to dispense with the totality of all possible worlds ((s) and to only consider the relevant alternatives, defined by the context). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: the Fregean sense was constructed as a quasi-object (object of setting, propositional object, thought object, object of belief), because they were assumed as entities in the actual world, however abstract they were. II 54 Meaning Function/HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses". Object of Knowledge/object of thought/Frege/Hintikka: Frege has never considered the problem, unlike e.g. Quine. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief. II 57 Meaning Function/semantics of possible worlds/Hintikka: in order to be a solution, the meaning function must be a constant function, that is, it must pick out the same individuals in all the worlds. II 205 Semantics of Possible Worlds/Hintikka: the semantics of possible worlds needs no conception of possible worlds as complete cosmological worlds, but only "small worlds", rather like event progress or situations, I also speak of "scenarios". >Situations. Possible World/Hintikka: the expression possible world is misleading, if one considers them as complete worlds. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frege, G. | Hintikka Vs Frege, G. | Cresswell I 148 Compositionality/Cresswell: It has long been known that it fails on the surface structure. (Cresswell 1973 p 77). HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: H. says that it is simply wrong. In saying that, he ignores the deep structure. And indeed you can regard the difference of the two readings of (39) (Everybody loves somebody) in the context of the game theory as changing the order in the choice of individuals. Then you could say that the only linguistic object is the surface structure. CresswellVsHintikka: but when it comes to that, his observations are not new. Compositionality/Cresswell: fails if we say that the two readings depend on the order in which we first process "and" then "or", or vice versa. Nevertheless, the Frege principle (= compositionality) is in turn applicable to (44) or (45). It is treated like this in Montague. (see below Annex IV: Game-theoretical semantics). I 149 HintikkaVsCompositionality/HintikkaVsFrege: fails even with higher order quantification. CresswellVsHintikka: this is a mistake: firstly, no compositionality is effective in the 1st order translation of sentences like (29). But authors who use higher-order entities (Montague and Cresswell) do not see themselves as deniers of the Frege principle. Hintikka seems to acknowledge that. (1982 p 231). I 161. "is"/Frege/Russell: ambiguous in everyday language. HintikkaVsFrege/KulasVsFrege: (1983): not true! Cresswell: ditto, just that "normal semantics" is not obliged to Frege-Russell anyway. Hintikka II 45 (A) Knowledge/Knowledge Objects/Frege/Hintikka: His concern was what objects we have to assume in order to understand the logical behavior of the language, when it comes to knowledge. Solution/Frege/Hintikka: (see below: Frege’s knowledge objects are the Fregean senses, reified, >intensional objects). Hintikka: For me, it is primarily about the individuals of which we speak in epistemic contexts; only secondarily, I wonder if we may call them "knowledge objects". Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: we can oppose the possible worlds semantics to his approach. (Hintikka pro possible worlds semantics). II 46 Idea: application of knowledge leads to the elimination of possible worlds (alternatives). Possible World/Hintikka: the term is misleading, because too global. Def Scenario/Hintikka: everything that is compatible with the knowledge of a knower. We can also call them knowledge worlds. Set of All Possible Worlds/Hintikka: we can call it illegitimate. (FN 5). Knowledge Object/Hintikka: can be objects, people, artifacts, etc. Reference/Frege/Hintikka: Frege presumes a completely referential language. I.e. all our expressions stand for some kind of entities. They can be taken as Fregean knowledge objects. Identity/Substitutability/SI/Terminology/Frege/Hintikka: SI is the thesis of the substitutability of identity ((s) only applies with limitation in intensional (opaque) contexts). II 47 E.g. (1) ... Ramses knew that the morning star = the morning star From this it cannot be concluded that Ramses knew that the morning star = the evening star (although MS = ES). II 48 Context/Frege/Hintikka: Frege distinguish two types of context: Direct Context/Frege/Hintikka: extensional, transparent Indirect Context/Frege/Hintikka: intensional, opaque. E.g. contexts with "believes" (belief contexts). ((s) Terminology: "ext", "opaque", etc. not from Frege). Frege/Hintikka: according to his own image: (4) expression >sense >reference. ((s) I.e. according to Frege the intension determines the extension.) Intensional Contexts/Frege/Hintikka: here, the picture is modified: (5) Expression (>) sense (> reference) Def Systematic Ambiguity/Frege/Hintikka: all our expressions are systematically ambiguous, i.e. they refer to different things, depending on whether they are direct (transparent, extensional) contexts or indirect ones (intensional, opaque). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: Fregean senses in Frege are separate entities in order to be able to work at all as references in intensional contexts. E.g. in order to be able to restore the inference in the example above (morning star/evening start) we do not need the identity of morning star and evening star, but the. identity of the Fregean sense of "morning star" and "evening star". II 49 Important argument: but Frege himself does not reinterpret the identity in the expression morning star = evening star in this way. He cannot express this fact, because there identity occurs in an extensional context and later in an intensional context. Identity/Frege/Hintikka: therefore we cannot say that Frege reinterprets our normal concept of identity. Problem: It is not even clear whether Frege can express the identity of the senses with an explicit sentence. For in his own formal language (in "Begriffsschrift"(1) and "Grundgesetze"(2)) there is no sentence that could do this. He says that himself in: "Über Sinn und Bedeutung": we can only refer to the meanings of our expressions by prefixing the prefix "the meaning of". But he never uses this himself. (B) Knowledge Objects/Possible World Approach/HintikkaVsFrege: Idea: knowledge leads us to create an intentional context that forces us to consider certain possibilities. These we call possible worlds. new: we do not consider new entities (intensional entities) in addition to the references, but we look at the same references in different possible worlds. Morning Star/Evening Star/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: Solution: "morning star" and "evening star" now single out the same object, namely the planet in the real world. II 50 (C) Possible Worlds Semantics/HintikkaVsFrege: there is no systematic ambiguity here, i.e. the expressions mean the same thing intensionally as extensionally. E.g. Knowing what John knows means knowing those possible worlds which are compatible with his belief, and knowing which are not. II 51 Extra premise: for that it must be sure that an expression singles out the same individual in different possible worlds. Context: what the relevant possible worlds are depends on the context. E.g. Ramses: here, the case is clear, On the other hand: E.g. Herzl knew Loris is a great poet Additional premise: Loris = Hofmannsthal. II 53 Meaning Function/Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: the difference in my approach to that of Frege is that I consider problems locally, while Frege considers them globally. Fregean Sense/(= way of givenness) Hintikka: must be considered as defined for all possible worlds. On the other hand: Hintikka: if Fregean sense is construed as meaning function, it must be regarded as only defined for the relevant alternatives in my approach. Frege: precisely uses the concept of identity of senses implicitly. And as meaning function, identity is only given if the mathematical function works for all relevant arguments. Totality/Hintikka: this concept of totality of all logically possible worlds is now highly doubtful. Solution/Hintikka: it is precisely the possible worlds semantics that helps dispense with the totality of all possible worlds. ((s) And to consider only the relevant alternatives defined by the context). Fregean Sense/Hintikka: was virtually constructed as an object (attitude object propositional object, thought object, belief object). This is because they were assumed as entities in the real world (actual world), however abstract. II 54 Meaning Function/M. F./HintikkaVsFrege/Hintikka: unlike Fregean senses, meaning functions are neither here nor elsewhere. Problem/Hintikka: Frege was tempted to reify his "senses". Knowledge Object/Thought Object/Frege/Hintikka: Frege, unlike E.g. Quine, has never considered the problem. Existential Generalization/EG/Hintikka: entitles us to move from a sentence S(b) with a singular term "b" to the existential statement (Ex) S(x). This fails in intensional (epistemic) contexts. Transition from "any" to "some". E.g. epistemic context: (10) (premise) George IV knew that (w = w) (11) (tentative conclusion) (Ex) George IV knew that (w = x) II 55 Problem: the transition from (10) to (11) fails, because (11) has the strength of (12) (12) George IV knew who w is. EG/Fail/Solution/Frege/Hintikka: Frege assumed that in intensional (opaque) contexts we are dealing with ideas of references. HintikkaVsFrege: Problem: then (11) would follow from (10) in any case ((s) and that’s just what is not desired). Because you’d have to assume that there is definitely some kind of sense under which George IV imagines an individual w. Problem: "w" singles out different individuals in different possible worlds. II 56 Possible Worlds Semantics/Solution/Hintikka: E.g. Suppose. (13) George knows that S(w) to (14) (Ex) George knows that S(x) where S(w) does not contain expressions that create opaque contexts. Then we need an additional condition. (15) (Ex) in all relevant possible worlds (w = x). This is, however, not a well-formed expression in our notation. We have to say what the relevant possible worlds are. Def Relevant Possible Worlds/Hintikka: are all those that are compatible with the knowledge of George. Thus, (15) is equivalent to (16) (Ex) George knows that (w = x). This is the additional premise. I.e. George knows who w is. (Knowing that, knowing who, knowing what). Knowing What/Logical Form/Hintikka/(s): corresponds to "knows that (x = y)" ((s) >single class, single quantity). E.g. knowing that "so and so has done it" does not help to know who it was, unless you know who so and so is. ((s) i.e. however, that you know y!) Solution/Hintikka/(s): the set of possible worlds compatible with the knowledge) II 57 Meaning Function/M. F./Possible Worlds Semantics/Hintikka: in order to be a solution here, the meaning function (see above) needs to be a constant function, i.e. it must single out the same individuals in all possible worlds. Frege/Identity/Opaque Context/Hintikka: Frege had to deal with the failure of the SI (substitutability in case of identity) ((s) i.e. the individuals might have a different name), not with the failure of the Existential Generalization (EG). ((s) I.e. the individuals might not exist). Hintikka: therefore, we need several additional premises. Possible Worlds Semantics: SI: here, for substitutability in case of identity, we only need on the assumption that the references of two different concepts in any possible world can be compared. Existential Generalization: here we have to compare the reference of one and the same concept in all possible worlds. Frege/Hintikka: now it seems that Frege could still be defended yet in a different way: namely, that we now quantify on world-lines (as entities). ((s) that would accomodate Frege’s Platonism). II 58 World Lines/Hintikka: are therefore somehow "real"! So are they not somehow like the "Fregean senses"?. HintikkaVs: it is not about a contrast between world bound individuals and world lines as individuals. World Lines/Hintikka: but we should not say that the world lines are something that is "neither here nor there". Using world lines does not mean reifying them. Solution/Hintikka: we need world-lines, because without them it would not even make sense to ask at all, whether a resident of a possible world is the same one as that of another possible world. ((s) cross world identity). II 59 World Line/Hintikka: we use it instead of Frege’s "way of givenness". HintikkaVsFrege: his error was to reify the "ways of givenness" as "sense". They are not something that exists in the actual world. Quantification/Hintikka: therefore, in this context we need not ask "about what we quantify". II 109 Frege Principle/FP/Compositionality/Hintikka: if we proceed from the outside inwards, we can allow a violation of Frege’s principle. (I.e. the semantic roles of the constituents in the interior are context dependent). II 110 HintikkaVsFrege/HintikkaVsCompositionality: Thesis: meaning entities should not be created step by step from simpler ones in tandem with syntactic rules. They should instead be understood, at least in some cases, as rules of semantic analysis. 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 2. Gottlob Frege [1893–1903]: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Jena: Hermann Pohle Wittgenstein I 71 Def Existence/Wittgenstein: predicate of higher order and is articulated only by the existence quantifier. (Frege ditto). I 72 Hintikka: many philosophers believe that this was only a technical implementation of the earlier idea that existence is not a predicate. HintikkaVsFrege: the inexpressibility of individual existence in Frege is one of the weakest points, however. You can even get by without the Fregean condition on a purely logical level. HintikkaVsFrege: contradiction in Frege: violates the principle of expressing existence solely through the quantifier, because the thesis of inexpressibility means that through any authorized individual constant existential assumptions are introduced in the logical language. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 |
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