Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 1 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fido-Fido-Principle | Logic Texts | Read III 32f RyleVsCarnap: (Review of Carnap's meaning and necessity): Error: "Fido"-Fido principle: because the name "Fido" gets its meaning from the fact that it refers to a single individual. Hence, we are tempted to assume that other words work in the same way. In his presentation of universals Russell fell into the same trap: according to his view, atomic statements consist of a number of individuals and a universal. >Predication. E.g. "Fido is a dog." What does "dog" refer to? According to the "Fido"-Fido theory, it must have its meaning from the fact that it is assigned to a single thing, to being-a-dog or the universal, dog. Statement/Russell: Russell's statements were designed by him to make the meaning of sentences. Consequently, he said, they must contain these generic entities, universals. This is an unjustified step. "Fido"-Fido principle: RyleVs: it mistakenly equates meaning with reference. >Meaning, >Reference. "Fido"-Fido Principle: incorrect equation of reference and condition: Russell: falsely believed that Fido was assigned to being-a-dog, whereas predicates, verbs and adjectives would be related to universals. >Universals, >Individual. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ordinary Language | Dummett Vs Ordinary Language | Dummett (e) III 185 Oxford Philosophy/Dummett: strongest influence: by Ryle. RyleVsCarnap: false methodology VsHeidegger: Laughing stock - Ryle: influence of Husserl. III (e) 196 Particularism/Utility Theory/Oxford/Dummett: supposedly, the UT could only explain each sentence. The philosopher should not want to discover a pattern where there is none. DummettVs: we do not learn language sentence by sentence, either! However, right: It is the sentences and not the words which have a "use" in the general sense. III (e) 196/197 Everyday language: here the Oxford philosophy could not contribute anything (because of their anti systematic approach) to the better understanding of those principles on the basis of which we obviously learn the language so quickly. (> Chomsky). DummettVsOxford: continuously used psychological and semantic terms that a theory of meaning must not assume but explain! E.g. "Express an attitude" "reject a question", etc. (DummettVsAustin). Likewise "truth" and "falsehood" were constantly used unexplained. III (e) 198 DummettVsParticularism: disregarded the distinction semantic/pragmatic. Anyone who is not in the claws of theory would initially tend to distinguish what a sentence literally says from what one might try to communicate with it in special circumstances. According to the "philosophy of everyday language" only the latter term is considered to be legitimate. "literal meaning" was considered an illegitimate byproduct. III (e) 199 DummettVsOxford, DummettVsStrawson: artificially introduced new concepts such as "presupposition" or "conversation implicature" or DummettvsAustin: the distinction between "illocutionary" and "perlocutionary" acts (DummettVsSpeech act theory) took the place of the general semantic concepts, and without anyone noticing the "normal language" (everyday language) ceased to exist. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Russell, B. | Ryle Vs Russell, B. | Read III 33 Russell fell into the trap in his account of universals: according to his opinion, atomic statements consists of a number of individuals and a universal. E.g. "Fido is a dog." What does "dog" refer to? According to the "Fido"-Fido-theory of the Fido, it must get its meaning through the fact that it is assigned to a single thing, to "being-a-dog" or the universal, dog. (>RyleVsCarnap). Statement/Russell's statements were designed by him to make the meaning of sentences. Consequently, he said, they must contain these generic entities, universals. This is an unjustified step. --- Read III 296 "Fido"-Fido principle: RyleVs: reference equals meaning. --- Read III 34 > Various AuthorsVsRussell: >statements, >facts. Russell: believed that predicate expressions, verbs, and adjectives related to universals, "is president" refers to presidency, "runs" to what is common to all things that are going. But many philosophers deny that the concept of the object reference can be applied to such parts of speech. Meaning: Russell and others simply identify meaning and object reference. (>reference/VsRussell). |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
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