Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstractness | Quine | I 102 Abstract/Concrete/Quine: abstract and concrete are independent from stimulus meaning. I 212 ff Abstract terms: abstract terms are alleged names of properties. "Roundness": "F"/"round":"a" in "Fa" - should not be used unhesitatingly without metaphysical definition because this would be too non-binding. Every abstract singular term provides an abstract general term. I 219 Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometrical figures, ideas, possibilities - some of these categories can be abandoned or reduced. - One can faithfully distinguish them from concrete ones by use of "-ness". I 238 Plural: the plural is an abstract singular term: "lions are dying out". The disposition is "eats mice" (31). I 286 Intensional abstraction: intensional abstraction is "the act of being a dog", "the act of baking a cake", "the act of erring". I 289 Class abstraction is attributed to singular descriptions: (iy)(x)(x from y iff ..x..) instead of: x^(..x..). This is not possible for intensional abstraction. Difference classes/Properties: classes with the same elements are identical. Properties are not quite identical if they are attributed to the same things. I 361f Abstraction of relations, propositions and properties are opaque (>Planets-example/Quine). I 295 Class abstraction is transparent, whereas intensional abstraction is opaque. V 167 Abstract general term: is a relative clause: "Y is a class X such that FX". New is that these are classes of classes. A normal relative clause equals a general term: "y is a thing x such that Fx". VII (d) 75 Concrete/abstract/Quine: by pointing to a square we do not assume identity with others. "Squareness" is shared by other objects, but we do not need to insinuate entities like "attributes". We do not point to the "attributes" (as an entity) nor do we need it in reference to the word "square". VII (d) 77 Abstract Singular Term/Quine: the abstract singular term functions like names. Philosophically revolutionary is setting abstract entities (unlike general term). VII (f) 113 Abstract Entities/Quine: classes and truth values may be accepted as abstract entities. Only statements and predicates should not be regarded as names of these and other entities, i.e. "p", "q"p,"F" etc. These should not be bindable (quantifiable) variables (>2nd order logic) - (E.g.)(x is a dog. x is white.) does not commit X to "dogness" or to the class of white things as universals. The solution is using the explicit form: belonging to two classes: (Ex)(xεy.xεz). Of course, there are names for abstract entities like the singular term "dogness", "class of white things" (as names ((s) it does not imply existence)). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Abstractness | Tugendhat | I 499 Abstract singular terms/Tugendhat: cannot be identified in space and time. - They are a collective terms, which break up into different subject areas with different identity criteria. >Singular terms, >Identity criteria, >Identity, >cf >General terms. I 500 Example 1. attributes 2. states of affairs 3. types 4. institutions and their parts 5. classes 6. numbers >Attributes, >States of affairs, >Type/Token, >Institutions, >Classes. II 97 Abstract terms/Tugendhat: events occur in space and time, but not abstract objects. >Events, >Space, >Time. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| General Terms | Quine | I 102 Distinction singular/general term: is independent from stimulus meaning. A name or general term for space-time segments: has the same stimulus meaning ("rabbitness"). I 212 Difference verb/noun/adjective: is less important but the difference between singular term/general term is very important. >Singular Terms/Quine. I 212 Abstract terms: are alleged names of properties, e.g. "roundness": "F"/"round": "a" in "Fa" - should not be used carelessly without metaphysical determination. It is thereby unbinding. Each abstract singular term provides an abstract general term. V 102 General term/Quine: E.g. has one more degree of freedom: can be different dogs - Fido: has only one degree of freedom. - ((s) temporal). >Freedom/Quine. V 123 General term/Quine: is e.g. animal, dog, body, built-in individuation. - General term: is true - singular term: is a denominator function of a particular. Problem: are learned as observation sentences. They bear no reference on objects but return of mom is the return of a circumstance. Therefore reference by a general term because of individuation: singular term does not individuate. Wrong: This is a Fido. V 125 Individuation/general term/Quine: square is an individuating word - "(s) Fido, not: E.g. This is a Fido. V 125 a) General term: E.g. "Square" in -This is a square- and E.g. -This is the same square as that one- b) singular term: E.g. "The square is a form". ((s) here, form is the general term; predication must always combine a singular term and a general term) - they are language-bound: E.g. Red is a color (general term). - Object-bound: E.g. -The square is a form: just like E.g. Fido is a dog (singular term). V 126 Singular term/general term/Platonism/universalia/language acquisition/Quine: E.g. A dog is an animal - problem: different dogs are different animals - on the other hand, the square is a form that says something about a single form, just like - "E.g. Fido is a dog". (s) Otherwise you would need two universals: dogness and animality - platonistic/Quine: The dog is numerous. VII (d) 70 General term/Quine: "Red" and "River" are similar - but places are only conceptually connected with color, not like the parts of the river - this is not a question of abstractness. It is not a "name" of any separated entity (as "attribute", "squareness"). A general term in everyday language is often like a name - with "square" much like a singular term (because of pointing) - with "red" there is no difference to a singular term. General term: 1) showing does not assume identity from occasion to occasion (unlike the case with the singular term) - 2) The general term is not a name of any separated entity. VII (d) 77 General Term/Quine: is indispensable - it probably originated from reaction similarity - to understand it one needs the operator "class of" or "-ness". - Missing these operators was the reason to assume "abstract entities". >Abstractness/Quine. VII (f) 107f General term: E.g. "is a whale" or "can swim": may be regarded as names of classes - predicates: if they denote classes, they can be considered in a way that they have properties as their meaning. (>Church). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Idealism | Quine | II 221 Idealism/QuineVsBradley, QuineVsIdealism: all of Bradley’s relations are real - there is no recourse: Definition from outside to inside. Basic: use of two-place predicates is no reference to an ever so real relation (otherwise abstract singular terms or bound variables). >Singular terms, >Abstract terms, >Abstract singular terms, >Bound variables, >Reference. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Laws | Newton | Kanitscheider I 116 NewtonVsKepler: wrong explanatory approach based on Aristotelian dynamics: Kepler's laws used by Newton as the starting hypothesis. Newton: introduces new, abstract dynamic terms, which do not themselves refer to the observable movement of particle paths, but use invisible forces of the masses as the cause of the movement. Î 117 Transition from empirical hypotheses to a closed theory. >Predictions, >Abstract terms, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theory language. |
PhysNewton I Isaac Newton The Principia : Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy Berkeley 1999 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Rationality | Weber | Habermas III 239 Rationality/Weber/Habermas: the term can have several meanings: a) increasing theoretical mastery of reality through increasingly precise abstract terms b) methodological achievement of objectives through more precise calculation of means.(1) III 240 Practical rationality/Weber/Habermas: a) Weber starts from a broad concept of technology that exists for every action, e.g. prayer techniques... III 241 b) This broad meaning limits Weber by specifying means that are part of the objective world. III 242 c) Not only means, also purposes can be more or less rational. (2) III 243 In this context, a distinction is made between formal (more technical) and material (more ethical) rationality. d) According to formal rationality, the actor must be aware of his preferences. Weber is, however, sceptical about normative issues. >Purpose rationality, >Purposes, >Preferences, >Goals, cf. >Technology. 1. M. Weber, Gesammelte Ausätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I. 1963, p. 265f. 2. Ibid. p. 265 |
Weber I M. Weber The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism - engl. trnsl. 1930 German Edition: Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus München 2013 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Relations | Quine | I 272f Opaque verb: "hunts lions" is nothing in relation, does not refer to a lion - relative term police chasing a man. --- I 361 Abstraction of relations, propositions and properties: opaque (> planets-example). --- I 295 Properties, relations: are meaning of timeless open sentences - is unidentifiable (like >propositions). --- I 362 Elimination of relations and properties in favor classes of ordered pairs, open sentences, general terms - even scattered objects (in the case of colors) Relativity: additional dimension: space-time: Point moments are absolutely different, independent of relative movement of the viewpoint. --- I 439 Abstract term "Equator", etc: can and should be reformulated. "Closer to the equator than": Relative Term - Or: by position of the sun - four-dimensional Space-Time coordinates (quintuple, hyper bodies, not Cartesian)>reintroduction of geomtretric object at the space-time points. --- I 462 Nominalism: cannot use relations, classes, etc. ("ancestor", "successor", "greater than", "the same number of", quantification) - but there are stages of renunciation. --- IX 17 IX 17 Relations/Quine: connex: ∀x∀y[x,y ε (R U ^R)''ϑ › x(R U ^R U I)y, - ((s) (R U ^R U I): E.g. "greater or smaller or equal". (>Law of comparability, trichotomy).) reflexive: ∀x∀y[x,y e(R n U ^R)''ϑ > xRx irreflexive: R <≤_I, symmetric: R = ^R asymmetric: R =_^R antisymmetric: R ∩ ^R ≤ I transitive: R I R ≤ R intransitive: R I R ≤ _R. IX 43 Relations/Quine: classes of classes. - Namely simulated by the class of all ordered pairs with Fxy. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Relative Terms | Quine | I 270 Opaque verb: hunting lions puts nothing in relation, does not denote a lion. Relative Term: the police chases a man. >Opacity. --- I 370 ~ E.g. Paul and Elmer: believing does not produce sentences like saying. - This cannot be decided: that Paul believes true and Elmer does not. If truth value does not matter, believing is not a relative term - w believes x is no predicate - w believes p: p is no term. >Beliefs, >Predicates. --- I 439 Abstract term equator etc.: can and must be rephrased: closer to the equator than: relative term. Or by position of the sun. Four-dimensional coordinates space-time (quintuple, Hyper bodies, not Cartesian) > reintroduction of geometrical objects to the space-time points. --- V 86 Relative general term: smaller than, mother of (no observation term) - relative mass term/(material term): darker than, redder than - points are taken in pairs - absolute mass term: is dark. - Absolute general term: is small. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Sets | Quine | IX 21 Ontology/Class/Sets/Relations/Quine: Classes and relations as values of quantifiable variables must be regarded as real objects. >Ontology/Quine. IX 219 Set/Quine: the property to be a set only means that ∃z(x ε z) ((s), there is something that x is a part of) - then ∃y x(x ε y (Ez(x ε z) u Fx)) - since Ez(x ε z) x ε Uϑ. - Even narrower: a ∩ Uϑ ε ϑ - Uϑ is then the class of all sets. The point is that ϑ ε ϑ (if there are extreme classes), so Uϑ is still the most comprehensive class that exists. The condition of being a set: ∃y(z ε y). III 318 Sets/class/von Neumann/Quine: (...) Classes are not sets. IX 228 Set/Neumann/Quine: a class is a set if it is not larger than a certain set (sets can be an element, classes cannot). IV 418 Ontology/Quine: Standards of ontological admissibility: two principles. 1. No entity without identity. 2. Ontological thriftiness. According to Quine, there are physical objects and quantities. V 149 Class/Set/Quantification/Quine: Classically, a quantification via classes is an object of quantification (referential quantification). >Quantification. Class: abstract terms for classes are singular terms. Include/Epsilon/Quine: "ε" is a two-digit predicate or relative general term. "Is an element of." (Originates from the predication scope "is one"). Now we get the theorem of comprehension: V 150 Comprehension/Quine: (1) (EZ)(x)(x ε Z . ≡ Fx) The compression set assigns a class to each element relationship. III 293 Classes/Sets/Condition/spelling/Quine: we always have the need to assign of the class of all and to only assign those objects that fulfill a certain condition. We write this as x^. III 294 Example x^~(x e a) the class of all non-elements of a. These are abstracts. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Words | Foucault | I 116f Language/words/Foucault: Critique in contrast to the comment as the analysis of a visible form in contrast to the discovery of a hidden content. >Content, >Language, >Meaning. Criticism of words: Impossibility to build a science or a philosophy with the traditional vocabulary: the general concepts are denounced, by means of which this is blended, what is separated in the representation, the abstract terms are criticized, which separate what must remain connected. Analysis of Figures. Types of words with their respective expressions, the tropes: the different relationships which the words can entertain with the same representative content. (Pars pro toto, essential or secondary, etc.) It was no longer a matter of saying again what was already said in the old texts, but to define by which figures and pictures, in the sequence of which order, to express what aims, this or that speech of God or the prophet in us has been remained in the traditional form. 19th century: Literature as a privileged object of criticism has been approaching what language is in its very essence since Mallarmé, and thus it challenges a second language, which is no longer the form of criticism, but of the commentary. >Literature, >Texts, >Writing. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstraction | Berkeley Vs Abstraction | Ber I 233 BerkeleyVsAbstraction: if one erroneously assumes mental objects were physical or if one refines real things to general abstract terms or splits simple things with metaphysical craftsmanship into diverse parts. Where will this lead? But when I ask a simple person regarding the free will, they agree immediately. And I agree with them because of what I find inside me. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Attributes | Quine Vs Attributes | III 262 General Terms/Quine: are represented by predicate letters such as "F", "G", etc. (§ 12.22, where they were simply called "Termini"). Universality/Quine: is not ambiguity! Ex ambiguous: is the singular term "Miller"! It can refer to different people in different contexts. Similarly: Singular Term: "the basement", "the President" ((s) >indefinite description). General Term: "basement", "President". Concrete Term: "Cerberus", "Unicorn" Abstract Term: "7", "3 + 4", "piety" terms for numbers, classes, attributes. Concrete General Term: "man", "red house", "house". Abstract General Term/Quine: "prime", "zoological genus", "virtue", because every virtue and every number and every species is an abstract object. ((s) then "piety" is an abstract singular term). Attribute/Quine: I do not care much for them as entities that are supposed to be different from classes. III 263 Attributes: can be considered different, even if they apply to the same things. E.g. "having a heart", "having kindneys". Classes/QuineVsAttributes: classes are easier to identify and to distinguish. If we must distinguish, then: Attribute/Quine: e.g. "human nature": Name of an attribute. Class Name/Name of a Class/Quine: "humanity". |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Properties | Quine Vs Properties | I 215 We have seen that the appearance of abstract singular terms cannot be separated from that of abstract general terms ("virtue is rare"). Already a mass term has something of the hybrid appearance of the abstract singular term. E.g. "water" rather designates 1) a common characteristic of different puddles and glass filling levels than 2) a scattered part of the world that consists of those puddles. I 216 Mass terms are archaic remnants from the first phase of language acquisition, preforms of abstract singular terms. The difference between the "red" that is said about apples and the "red" that is said of their outside has no meaning. "Red" becomes the name of a property that is not only lumps and drops of a homogeneous substance, but also in common with apples. This abstract object can no longer be put aside as easily as the water property was put aside by giving 2) (common property) preference over 1) (dispersal). I 217 Because even if we have learned to construe water as a distributed concrete object, we tend to additionally permitting an abstract object like "redness". This analogy then spreads beyond the the mass terms up to terms with strictly divided reference. Therefore, roundness and sphericity. Every general term leads to an abstract singular term. The usefulness of abstract terms is mostly in the abbreviation of cross-references: E.g. "The same is true for Churchill", "Both plants have the following property in common". Only that in such cases the cross-reference merely refers to word structures. But we stubbornly tend to objectifying what has been said again by establishing a property instead of talking only of words. QuineVsProperties: Many thoughtless people insist on the reality of properties for no other reason than that both plants (or Eisenhower and Churchill) "must admittedly have something in common"! I 218 Properties: In as far as talk of properties has its origin in such abbreviated cross-references, the putative properties probably do not correspond to simple abstract terms, but to longer expressions. E.g. "being equipped with spikes in clusters of five." Properties: Cassirer: "Properties are remnants of the secondary deities of a disused faith". X 94 Properties/Predicates/Propositions/Individuation/QuineVsFrege: also the conception of the first logician is untenable: properties behave just like propositions. X 95 Properties/Quine: behave to predicates or open sentences like propositions to sentences. One cannot, just like with propositions, distinguish individual properties. Sets: can be distinguished due to the principle of extensionality. Principle of Extensionality: two sets are identical if they have the same elements. Open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine two different sets, but they can be based on two different properties. Properties/Identity: for two properties to be identical, the corresponding open sentences must be synonymous. And that is not possible because of confusion. Solution/Some Authors: Sets as values of "F". Quine: nevertheless, predicate schematic letters should not be regarded as quantifiable variables. Predicate/Quine: predicates have properties as their "intentions" or meanings (or would have them if properties existed), and they have sets as their extensions. But they are neither the name of one nor of the other. Intention: of a predicate: property Extension: of a predicate: set. Name: a predicate is never a name, neither of its intention (property) nor of its extension (set). Variable/Quine: quantifiable variables, therefore, cannot take the place of predicates, but of names. |
W.V.O. Quine I Quine Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980, Reclam II Quine Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt/M 1985, Suhrkamp III Quine Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt/M 1978 IV Oliver R. Scholz "Quine" aus Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrh., Reinbek 1993 V Quine Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 VI Quine Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn (Schöningh) 1995 VII Quine Form al logical point of view Cambrinde 1953 IX Quine Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Vieweg 1967 X Quine Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 XI Henri Lauener Quine München 1982 XII Quine Ontologische Relativität Sprechen über Gegenstände, Naturalisierte Erkenntnistheorie |
| substit. Quantific. | Quine Vs substit. Quantific. | V 158 VsSubstitutional Quantification/SQ/Quine: the SQ has been deemed unusable for the classic ML for a false reason: because of uncountability. The SQ does not accept nameless classes as values of variables. ((s) E.g. irrational numbers, real numbers, etc. do not have names, i.e. they cannot be Gödel numbered). I.e. SQ allows only a countable number of classes. Problem: Even the class of natural numbers has uncountably many sub-classes. And at some point we need numbers! KripkeVs: in reality there is no clear contradiction between SQ and hyper-countability! No function f lists all classes of natural numbers. Cantor shows this based on the class {n:~ (n e f(n))} which is not covered by the enumeration f. refQ: demands it in contrast to a function f enumerating all classes of natural numbers? It seems so at first glance: it seems you could indicate f by numbering all abstract terms for classes lexicographically. Vs: but the function that numbers the expressions is not quite the desired f. It is another function g. Its values are abstract terms, while the f, which would contradict the Cantor theorem, would have classes as values... V 159 Insertion character: does ultimately not mean that the classes are abstract terms! ((s) I.e. does not make the assumption of classes necessary). The cases of insertion are not names of abstract terms, but the abstract terms themselves! I.e. the alleged or simulated class names. Function f: that would contradict Cantor's theorem is rather the function with the property that f(n) is the class which is denoted by the n-th abstract term g(n). Problem: we cannot specify this function in the notation of the system. Otherwise we end up with Grelling's antinomy or that of Richard. That's just the feared conflict with Cantor's theorem. This can be refute more easily: by the finding that there is a class that is not denoted by any abstract term: namely the class (1) {x.x is an abstract term and is not a member of the class it denotes}. That leaves numbers and uncountability aside and relates directly to expressions and classes of expressions. (1) is obviously an abstract expression itself. The antinomy is trivial, because it clearly relies on the name relation. ((s) x is "a member of the class of abstract expressions and not a member of this class"). V 191 Substitutional Quantification/SQ/Nominalism/Quine: the nominalist might reply: alright, let us admit that the SQ does not clean the air ontologically, but still we win something with it: E.g. SQ about numbers is explained based on expressions and their insertion instead of abstract objects and reference. QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: the expressions to be inserted are just as abstract entities as the numbers themselves. V 192 NominalismVsVs: the ontology of real numbers or set theory could be reduced to that of elementary number theory by establishing truth conditions for the sQ based on Gödel numbers. QuineVs: this is not nominalistic, but Pythagorean. This is not about the extrapolation of the concrete and abhorrence of the abstract, but about the acceptance of natural numbers and the refutal of the most transcendent nnumbers. As Kronecker says: "The natural numbers were created by God, the others are the work of man." QuineVs: but even that does not work, we have seen above that the SQ about classes is, as a matter of principle, incompatible with the object quantification over objects. V 193 VsVs: the quantification over objects could be seen like that as well. QuineVs: that was not possible because there are not enough names. Zar could be taught RZ coordination, but that does not explain language learning. Ontology: but now that we are doing ontology, could the coordinates help us? QuineVs: the motivation is, however, to re-interpret the SQ about objects to eliminate the obstacle of SQ about classes. And why do we want to have classes? The reason was quasi nominalistic, in the sense of relative empiricism. Problem: if the relative empiricism SQ talks about classes, it also speaks for refQ about objects. This is because both views are closest to the genetic origins. Coordinates: this trick will be a poor basis for SQ about objects, just like (see above) SQ about numbers. Substitutional/Referential Quantification/Charles Parsons/Quine: Parsons has proposed a compromise between the two: according to this, for the truth of an existential quantification it is no longer necessary to have a true insertion, there only needs to be an insertion that contains free object variables and is fulfilled by any values of the same. Universal quantification: Does accordingly no longer require only the truth of all insertions that do not contain free variables. V 194 It further requires that all insertions that contain free object variables are fulfilled by all values. This restores the law of the single sub-classes and the interchangeability of quantifiers. Problem: this still suffers from impredicative abstract terms. Pro: But it has the nominalistic aura that the refQ completely lacks, and will satisfy the needs of set theory. XI 48 SQ/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: the SQ does not make any ontological commitment in so far as the inserted names do not need to designate anything. I.e. we are not forced to assume values of the variables. XI 49 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: we precisely obscure the ontology by that fact that we cannot get out of the linguistic. XI 51 SQ/Abstract Entities/Quine/Lauener: precisely because the exchange of quantifiers is prohibited if one of the quantifiers referential, but the other one is substitutional, we end up with refQ and just with that we have to admit the assumption of abstract entities. XI 130 Existence/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: with the saying "to be means to be the value of a bound variable" no language dependency of existence is presumed. The criterion of canonical notation does not suppose an arbitrary restriction, because differing languages - e.g. Schönfinkel's combinator logic containing no variables - are translatable into them. Ontological Relativity/Lauener: then has to do with the indeterminacy of translation. VsSubstitutional Quantification/Quine/Lauener: with it we remain on a purely linguistic level, and thus repeal the ontological dimension. But for the variables not singular terms are used, but the object designated by the singular term. ((s) referential quantification). Singular Term/Quine/Lauener: even after eliminating the singular terms the objects remain as the values of variables. XI 140 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: is ontologically disingenuous. |
W.V.O. Quine I Quine Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980, Reclam II Quine Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt/M 1985, Suhrkamp III Quine Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt/M 1978 IV Oliver R. Scholz "Quine" aus Hügli (Hrsg) Philosophie im 20. Jahrh., Reinbek 1993 V Quine Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 VI Quine Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn (Schöningh) 1995 VII Quine Form al logical point of view Cambrinde 1953 IX Quine Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Vieweg 1967 X Quine Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 XI Henri Lauener Quine München 1982 XII Quine Ontologische Relativität Sprechen über Gegenstände, Naturalisierte Erkenntnistheorie |
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