Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atomism | Sellars | I 33 Standard Conditions: assuming them leads out of the logical atomism. >Circumstances/Sellars. It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are. >Conditions, >Standard conditions, >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Idealization. Circumstances: to determine them it is necessary to know something about the objects: how they are under different circumstances. --- I 34 Logical atomism: VsSellars: it could reply that Sellars 1) overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sense content. >Logical space. 2) the concepts of the sense contents have the kind of logical independence from one another which is characteristic of traditional empiricism. >Independence, >Empiricism. 3) concepts for theoretical entities such as molecules have the kind of interdependence which Sellars may have rightly attributed to the concepts of physical facts, but: the theoretical concepts have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space. >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables. Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of the physical objects in space and time. >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Localization, >Objects. Logical atomism: statements only occur truth-functionally in statements. >Truth functions. --- I 70 Atomism/SellarsVsAtomism/SellarsVsWittgenstein: analysis does not stand for definition of terms, but for the exploration of the logical structure of discourse - which does not follow a simple pattern. >Analysis/Sellars. cf. Def truth-functional/Tugendhat: depends on other sentences, not on situations. Def truth-functional/Read: directly dependent only on the occurring concepts. --- II 314 SellarsVsWittgenstein/Paradox: to say of a particular atomic fact that it was represented by a certain elementary statement, we have to use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but this is not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1) S (in L) represents aRb. >Complex, >Relation, >Atomism/Wittgenstein, >Atomism. This representation relationship cannot be expressed through a statement. Wittgenstein dito. --- II 321 If only simple non-linguistic objects could be represented, if complex objects were facts, that would lead to the well-known antinomy that there would have to be atomic facts which would be prerequisites for the fact that language can depict the world, but for which no example can be given if the speaker demands one. Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus). >Facts, >States of affairs. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Conjunction | Wessel | I 372 orderly conjunction/orderly adjunction/Wessel: "A, then B" (not to be confused with conjunction) - not reversible, de Morgan s rules are valid. >Time, >Temporal logic, cf. >Causality, >Temporal order, >Order. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Credit Expansion | Rothbard | Rothbard III 991 Credit expansion/Rothbard: If inflation is any increase in the supply of money not matched by an increase in the gold or silver stock available, the method of inflation just depicted is called credit expansion - the creation of new money-substitutes, entering the economy on the credit market. As will be seen below, while credit expansion by a bank seems far more sober and respectable than outright spending of new money, it actually has far graver consequences for the economic system, consequences which most people would find especially undesirable. This inflationary credit is called circulating credit, as distinguished from the lending of saved funds - called commodity credit. Inflation/Rothbard: Credit expansion has, of course, the same effect as any sort of inflation: prices tend to rise as the money supply increases. Like any inflation, it is a process of redistribution, whereby the inflators, and the part of the economy selling to them, gain at the expense of those who come last in line in the spending process. Inflation: This is the charm of inflation - for the beneficiaries - and the reason why it has been so popular, particularly since modern banking processes have camouflaged its significance for those losers who are far removed from banking operations. The gains to the inflators are visible and dramatic; the losses to others hidden and unseen, (…). >Inflation/Rothbard. Rothbard III 992 Investment/consumption: Inflation also changes the market's consumption/investment ratio. Superficially, it seems that credit expansion greatly increases capital, for the new money enters the market as equivalent to new savings for lending. Since the new "bank money" is apparently added to the supply of savings on the credit market, businesses can now borrow at a Iower rate of interest; hence inflationary credit expansion seems to offer the ideal escape from time preference, as well as an inexhaustible fount of added capital. Actually, this effect is illusory. On the contrary, inflation reduces saving and investment, thus Iowering society's standard of living. It may even cause large-scale capital consumption. 1) In the first place, as we just have seen, existing creditors are injured. This will tend to discourage lending in the future and thereby discourage saving-investment. 2) Secondly (…) the inflationary process inherently yields a purchasing-power profit to the businessman, since he purchases factors and sells them at a later time when all prices are higher. Rothbard III 994 Market Interest rates: The credit expansion reduces the market rate of interest. This means that price differentials are Iowered, and, (…), Iower price differentials raise prices in the highest stages of production, shifting resources to these stages and also increasing the number of stages. >Production structure/Rothbard. As a result, the production structure is lengthened. The borrowing firms are led to believe that enough funds are available to permit them to embark on projects formerly unprofitable. Free market: On the free market, investment will always take place first in those projects that satisfy the most urgent wants of the consumers. Then the next most urgent wants are satisfied, etc. The interest rate regulates the temporal order of choice of projects in accordance with their urgency. A Iower rate of interest on the market is a signal that more projects can be undertaken profitably. Equilibrium: Increased saving on the free market leads to a stable equilibrium of production at a Iower rate of interest. Credit expansion: But not so with credit expansion: for the original factors now receive increased money income. In the free-market example, total money incomes remained the same. The increased expenditure on higher stages was offset by decreased expenditure in the Iower stages. The "increased length" o fthe production structure was compensated by the "reduced width." But credit expansion pumps new money into the production structure: aggregate money incomes increase instead of remaining the same. The production structure has lengthened, but it has also remained as wide, without contraction of consumption expenditure. Rothbard III 995 Production structure/inflation/Rothbard: The owners of the original factors, with their increased money income, naturally hasten to spend their new money. >Factors of production/Rothbard. They allocate this spending between consumption and investment in accordance with their time preferences. Let us assume that the time-preference schedules of the people remain unchanged. >Time preference/Rothbard. This is a proper assumption, since there is no reason to assume that they have changed because of the inflation. Production now no longer reflects voluntary time preferences. Business has been led by credit expansion to invest in higher stages, as ifmore savings were available. Since they are not, business has overinvested in the higher stages and underinvested in the Iower. Consumers act promptly to re-establish their time preferences – their preferred investment/consumption proportions and price differentials. The differentials will be re-established at the old, higher amount, i.e., the rate of interest will return to its free-market magnitude. As a result, the prices at the higher stages of production will fall drastically, the prices at the Iower stages will rise again, and the entire new investment at the higher stages will have to be abandoned or sacrificed. Rothbard III 997 Investments: (…) bank credit expansion cannot increase capital investment by one iota. Investment can still come only from savings. >Money supply/Rothbard, >Saving/Rothbard, >Interest rate/Rothbard. Rothbard III 998 Money supply: an increase in the supply of money does Iower the rate of interest when it enters the market as credit expansion, but only temporarily. In the long run (and this long run is not very "long"), the market re-establishes the free-market time-preference interest rate and eliminates the change. In the long run a change in the money stock affects only the value of the monetary unit. Business cycle/Rothbard: This process - by which the market reverts to its preferred interest rate and eliminates the distortion caused by credit expansion - is, moreover, the business cycle! Rothbard III 1010 Credit expansion/Rothbard: Limitations: How does the narrow range of a bank's clientele limit its potentiality for credit expansion? The newly issued money-substitutes are, of course, Ioaned to a bank's clients. The client then spends the new money on goods and services. The new money begins to be diffused throughout the society. Eventually - usually very quickly - it is spent on the goods or services of people who use a different bank. Example: Suppose that the Star Bank has expanded credit; the newly issued Star Bank's notes or deposits find their way into the hands of Mr. Jones, who uses the City Bank. Two alternatives may occur, either of which has the same economic effect: (a) Jones accepts the Star Bank's notes or deposits, and deposits them in the City Bank, which calls on the Star Bank for redemption; or (b) Jones refuses to accept the Star Bank's notes and insists that the Star client - say Mr. Smith - who bought something from Jones, redeem the note himself and pay Jones in acceptable standard money. Money-substitutes: Thus, while gold or silver is acceptable throughout the market, a bank's money-substitutes are acceptable only to its own clientele. Clearly, a single bank's credit expansion is limited, and this limitation is stronger (a) the narrower the range of its clientele, and (b) the greater its issue of money-substitutes in relation to that of competing banks. Rothbard III 1011 Bankruptcy: (…), the greater the degree of relative credit expansion by any one bank, the sooner will the day of redemption - and potential bankruptcy - be at hand and they are impelled to spend a great proportion of the new money. Some of this increased spending will be on one another's goods and services, but it is clear that the greater the credit expansion, the greater will be the tendency for their spending to "spill over" onto the goods and services of nonclients. This tendency to spill over, or "drain," is greatly enhanced when increased spending by clients on the goods and services of other clients raises their prices. In the meanwhile, the prices of the goods sold by non-clients remain the same. As a consequence, clients are impelled to buy more from nonclients and less from one another; while nonclients buy less from clients and more from one another. The result is an "unfavorable" balance of trade from clients to nonclients.(1) Bank reserve: The purpose of banks' keeping any specie reserves in their vaults (assuming no legal reserve requirements) now becomes manifest. It is not to meet bank runs - since no fractional-reserve bank can be equipped to withstand a run. It is to meet the demands for redemption which will inevitably come from nonclients. 1. In the consolidated balance ofpayments of the clients, money income from sales to nonclients (exports) will decline, and money expenditures on the goods and services of nonclients (imports) will increase. The excess cash balances of the clients are transferred to non-clients. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Demonstration | Strawson | I 22 Ostension/pointing/Strawson: pointing shows no order. >Order, >Definition, >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Ostensive definition, >Pointing. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Events | Sellars | I XXXII Motive/Sellars: a motive is no event (not in time). So it has no reasons. >Reason/Cause, >Reasons, >Motives, >Events, >Temporal order, >Will, >Act of will, >Motivation/Psychology. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Grammar | Foucault | I 118 Search for the original root. Grammar/Hobbes: made from a system of symbols, which the individuals have chosen for themselves first. The language cannot explain to the thought at once, it must proceed linearly in one order. This linear order is foreign to the representation. The thoughts follow each other in time, but each one forms a unity. The language is for thinking and the sign what the algebra is for geometry. It substitutes for the simultaneous comparison of the parts the order whose degrees one can go through one after the other. In this sense language is the analysis of thought. Definition General Grammar: the study of the linguistic order in its relation to the simultaneity, which is to represent it according to its task. Thus, it has not thinking, and not language, as the actual object, but the discourse as a sequence of signs. In contrast to thinking, language stands as the reflected to the immediate. Language/Adam Smith: "The invention of even the simplest adjectives must have required more metaphysics than we can all comprehend." Consequences: division of the science of language into A) Rhetoric: spatial, figures, tropes, B) Grammar temporal order in time. Grammar presupposes a rhetorical nature even of the most primitive languages (see below). 2. Grammar: Reflection on the relationship that it maintains with the universality. Two forms, depending on whether one considers the possibility of a universal language. Universal/Foucault: to award each sign the unique way of representation, the power to go through all orders. The universal discourse is no longer the "only text", which, in the cipher of its mystery, contains the key to deciphering the world. Rather, the possibility to define everything. I 127ff Grammar/Foucault: The general grammar is not a comparative. It defines the system of identity/difference, which presupposes and uses those features. Analysis of the band of the link, different word types, theory of the structure, the origin, the root, the rhetorical space, the derivation. I 132 Theory of the verb: indispensable for any discourse. Without verb no language. >Verbs, >Language. Edge of the discourse, where the signs become the language. The verb indicates that the discourse is the discourse of the human who not only comprehends the names, but also judges them. I 134 The verb is the represented being of language, which makes it receptive to truth and error. This is why it differs from all signs which can be conformed, faithful (or not), what they designate, but are never true or false. What is the meaning and power that goes beyond the limits of the words? I 287ff Grammar/Language/Foucault: The horizontal comparison between languages achieves another function: it no longer allows to know what everyone brings back as memories from the time before Babel. Lexicography: first beginnings. Grammar: Principle of a primitive and general language that provides an original measure. (already existed before) Grammar/old: flection: the root is changed, the flexions are constant. Grammar/New element: role of subject or object, time of action, system of modifications. No more judging search after the first expression, but analysis of the sounds. Vowel rectangle. Comparative Grammar: one does not longer compare between the different languages a certain meaning, but the relations between the words. Language/old: as long as it was defined as a discourse, it could have no other history than that of its representations. Language/new: inner mechanism as the bearer of identity and difference, as a sign of neighborhood, a characteristic of kinship, a support of history. >Language, >Words, >Subject, >Object. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Judgments | Strawson | V 217 Judgment / Strawson: a second, corrective judgment seems to be precipitated by a second point of view. Vs: but that is not logically necessary - and not logically necessary that they comply at all. >Perspective, >Order, >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Statement, >Assertion, >Utterance/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Language Development | Psychological Theories | Slater I 191 Language Development/psychological theories: Between 12 months of age, when infants begin to utter their first word, and 36 months, when toddlers have learned up to a thousand words, they have also mastered many of the intricacies of their native language grammar. How is it possible for such a complicated system to be acquired, via mere exposure rather than by overt instruction, by the vast majority of children in only two years? Slater I 192 Categorical perception/phonetics: categorical perception (CP), >Phonetics/psychological theories, >Categorical perception. Around 1957 [when Chomsky(1) and Liberman(2) published] CP was only present for speech, and only for the components of speech when they are heard as speech (not when these same components are heard as non-speech). This led to the proposal that humans have evolved a special neural mechanism — the speech mode — that is innate and dedicated to the interpretation of articulatory signals that are produced by the human vocal tract. These two nativist perspectives — Chomsky at the level of syntax and Liberman at the level of phonetics — set the stage for a definitive test of innate constraints on language. >Language Development/Eimas, >Chomsky/psychological theories. Slater I 199 Two decades after Eimas et al. (1971)(3), the first studies of auditory word recognition in fluent speech were begun (Jusczyk & Aslin, 1995)(4), documenting the fact that eight month olds could recognize chunks of speech even when they were embedded in sentences. Infants of this same age were also shown to be remarkably adept at extracting auditory word-forms from fluent speech, even when these word-forms were defined solely on the basis of temporal order statistics (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996)(5). However, when infants were required to map word-forms onto objects in a reference task, they often failed until much later (14 months of age), unless those word-forms were familiar and/or the visual objects were familiar (Stager & Werker, 1997)(6). Recent evidence suggests that under the right circumstances, this mapping process can take place, along with segmentation from fluent speech, even in six month olds (Shukla, White, & Aslin, 2011)(7). See also >Language Acquisition/psychological theories. 1. Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. Mouton: The Hague. 2. Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., Hoffman, H. S., & Griffith, B.C. (1957). The discrimination of speech sounds within and across phoneme boundaries. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54, 358—368. 3. Eimas, P. D., Siqueland, E. R.,Jusczyk, P., &Vigorito,J. (1971). Speech perception in infants. Science, 171, 303-306. 4. Jusczyk, P. W., & Aslin, R. N. (1995). Infants’ detection of the sound patterns of words influent speech. Cognitive Psychology, 29, 1—23. 5. Saffran, J. R., Aslin, R. N., & Newport, E. L. (1996). Statistical learning by 8-month-old infants. Science,274, 1926—1928. 6. Stager, C. L., & Werker, J. F. (1997). Infants listen for more phonetic detail in speech perception than in word leaming tasks. Nature, 388, 38 1—382. 7. Shukla, M., White, K. S., & Aslin, R. N. (2011). Prosody guides the rapid mapping of auditory word forms onto visual objects in 6-mo-old infants. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, Richard N. Aslin, “Language Development. Revisiting Eimas et al.‘s /ba/ and /pa/ Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Order | Carnap | VI 206 System/Reference/Transformation/Meaning/Relation/Permutation/Carnap: any other relations could be accepted arbitrarily, for which still exactly the same empirical propositions (according to the signs!) apply, which now mean something else, however. - E.g. we only need a harmonized transformation of the set of the basic elements in itself and as a new basic relation those relations whose inventory is the transformed inventory of the old basic relations. Then, the new relations are structurally equivalent (isomorphic) to the old ones. VI 213 Order/Carnap: E.g. dog in the zoological realm: point - as an individual different - temporal order unlike any other - the distinction singular term/general term corresponds to that between orders - qualities are ordered differently than by space and time - this is equivalent to the difference between identity of localization and sameness of color of view field points - reason: different equally located (with the same number of digits) quality classes can never belong to the same elementary experience, but those of the same color can. Only thus could we separate the two orders of field of view and color body (>dimensions). VI 215 Identity of location: is what allows the knowledge synthesis in the first place. - ((s) Two things can only be in the same place after one another - temporal dimension - not with sameness of color). >Similarity, >Quality, >Identity, >Space, >Time; cf. >Simultaneity. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Order | Wessel | I 372 Subordinate conjunction/ordered adjunction/Wessel: "A, then B" (not to be confused with conjunction) - not reversible, de Morgan's rules apply. >Time, >Temporal logic, cf. >Causality, >Temporal order, >Order. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Propositions | Sellars | I XXXII Proposition/thoughts/tradition: classical empirical model of thoughts: they have the function to give worrds and sentences a meaning. >Word meaning, >Sentence meaning. Task: to produce actions in form of beliefs. RyleVsTradition: category confusion: thoughts are not locatable. >Thoughts, >Categories/Ryle, >Localization, >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Logical space. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Space | Geach | I 315 Space/time/Geach: Time and space are radically different: that you need "between" in both cases, is misleading. Spatial order: affects individual objects. Temporal order: what is ordered here, is represented by complex sentences. Geach: in the temporal sense there are more and more complex structures, not in the spatial dimension. E.g. "x is between (y and w) and z" makes no sense. >Time, >Space, >Dimensions, >Localization, >Temporal order, >Spatial order. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Time | Geach | I 303 Time/GeachVsQuine: Vs time cuts, Vs "hours-thick sclices". >four dimensionalism). Space and time are not equal axes - otherwise temperature curves would be the same as "world lines" in the "temperature-time continuum". It is not true that quantifiers can only be applied to four-dimensional space-time points. ((s) This is not what Quine asserts: "Sometimes"/Quine: "there are some points of time...">Logical form/Quine.) I 314 Space/time/Geach: Space and time are radically different: that the expression "between" is used in both, is misleading - spatial order: affects individual objects. - Temporal order: what is ordered here is represented by complex sentences. Geach: in the temporal, ever more complex structures can be built, not in the spatial. - e.g. "x is between (y is over w) and z" makes no sense. I 316 Time/Modal logic/Geach: I am convinced that the basic time determinations "before", "after", etc. belong to the formal logic. I think they have to do with "possible" and "necessary". >Possibility, >Necessity, >Modal logic, >Modalities. One has claimed that a world in which the modus ponens no longer applies can be described as a world in which the time is two-dimensional or the past can be changed. If the basic truths about time are logical, then a differently temporal world would be a chimera. >Space/Geach, >Time, >Spacetime. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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