Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 12 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atomism | Sellars | I 33 Standard Conditions: assuming them leads out of the logical atomism. >Circumstances/Sellars. It is not enough that the conditions are appropriate, the subject must know that they are. >Conditions, >Standard conditions, >Ideal observer, >Observation, >Idealization. Circumstances: to determine them it is necessary to know something about the objects: how they are under different circumstances. --- I 34 Logical atomism: VsSellars: it could reply that Sellars 1) overlooks the fact that the logical space of physical objects in space and time is based on the logical space of sense content. >Logical space. 2) the concepts of the sense contents have the kind of logical independence from one another which is characteristic of traditional empiricism. >Independence, >Empiricism. 3) concepts for theoretical entities such as molecules have the kind of interdependence which Sellars may have rightly attributed to the concepts of physical facts, but: the theoretical concepts have empirical content precisely because they are based on a more fundamental logical space. >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Unobservables. Sellars would have to show that this space is also loaded with coherence, but he cannot do that until he has abolished the idea of a more fundamental logical space than that of the physical objects in space and time. >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Localization, >Objects. Logical atomism: statements only occur truth-functionally in statements. >Truth functions. --- I 70 Atomism/SellarsVsAtomism/SellarsVsWittgenstein: analysis does not stand for definition of terms, but for the exploration of the logical structure of discourse - which does not follow a simple pattern. >Analysis/Sellars. cf. Def truth-functional/Tugendhat: depends on other sentences, not on situations. Def truth-functional/Read: directly dependent only on the occurring concepts. --- II 314 SellarsVsWittgenstein/Paradox: to say of a particular atomic fact that it was represented by a certain elementary statement, we have to use a statement in which the elementary statement occurs, but this is not truth-functional. We have to say something like: (1) S (in L) represents aRb. >Complex, >Relation, >Atomism/Wittgenstein, >Atomism. This representation relationship cannot be expressed through a statement. Wittgenstein dito. --- II 321 If only simple non-linguistic objects could be represented, if complex objects were facts, that would lead to the well-known antinomy that there would have to be atomic facts which would be prerequisites for the fact that language can depict the world, but for which no example can be given if the speaker demands one. Both difficulties are avoided by the realization that complex objects are no facts (VsTractatus). >Facts, >States of affairs. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Conjunction | Wessel | I 372 orderly conjunction/orderly adjunction/Wessel: "A, then B" (not to be confused with conjunction) - not reversible, de Morgan s rules are valid. >Time, >Temporal logic, cf. >Causality, >Temporal order, >Order. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Demonstration | Strawson | I 22 Ostension/pointing/Strawson: pointing shows no order. >Order, >Definition, >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Ostensive definition, >Pointing. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Events | Sellars | I XXXII Motive/Sellars: a motive is no event (not in time). So it has no reasons. >Reason/Cause, >Reasons, >Motives, >Events, >Temporal order, >Will, >Act of will, >Motivation/Psychology. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Grammar | Foucault | I 118 Search for the original root. Grammar/Hobbes: made from a system of symbols, which the individuals have chosen for themselves first. The language cannot explain to the thought at once, it must proceed linearly in one order. This linear order is foreign to the representation. The thoughts follow each other in time, but each one forms a unity. The language is for thinking and the sign what the algebra is for geometry. It substitutes for the simultaneous comparison of the parts the order whose degrees one can go through one after the other. In this sense language is the analysis of thought. Definition General Grammar: the study of the linguistic order in its relation to the simultaneity, which is to represent it according to its task. Thus, it has not thinking, and not language, as the actual object, but the discourse as a sequence of signs. In contrast to thinking, language stands as the reflected to the immediate. Language/Adam Smith: "The invention of even the simplest adjectives must have required more metaphysics than we can all comprehend." Consequences: division of the science of language into A) Rhetoric: spatial, figures, tropes, B) Grammar temporal order in time. Grammar presupposes a rhetorical nature even of the most primitive languages (see below). 2. Grammar: Reflection on the relationship that it maintains with the universality. Two forms, depending on whether one considers the possibility of a universal language. Universal/Foucault: to award each sign the unique way of representation, the power to go through all orders. The universal discourse is no longer the "only text", which, in the cipher of its mystery, contains the key to deciphering the world. Rather, the possibility to define everything. I 127ff Grammar/Foucault: The general grammar is not a comparative. It defines the system of identity/difference, which presupposes and uses those features. Analysis of the band of the link, different word types, theory of the structure, the origin, the root, the rhetorical space, the derivation. I 132 Theory of the verb: indispensable for any discourse. Without verb no language. >Verbs, >Language. Edge of the discourse, where the signs become the language. The verb indicates that the discourse is the discourse of the human who not only comprehends the names, but also judges them. I 134 The verb is the represented being of language, which makes it receptive to truth and error. This is why it differs from all signs which can be conformed, faithful (or not), what they designate, but are never true or false. What is the meaning and power that goes beyond the limits of the words? I 287ff Grammar/Language/Foucault: The horizontal comparison between languages achieves another function: it no longer allows to know what everyone brings back as memories from the time before Babel. Lexicography: first beginnings. Grammar: Principle of a primitive and general language that provides an original measure. (already existed before) Grammar/old: flection: the root is changed, the flexions are constant. Grammar/New element: role of subject or object, time of action, system of modifications. No more judging search after the first expression, but analysis of the sounds. Vowel rectangle. Comparative Grammar: one does not longer compare between the different languages a certain meaning, but the relations between the words. Language/old: as long as it was defined as a discourse, it could have no other history than that of its representations. Language/new: inner mechanism as the bearer of identity and difference, as a sign of neighborhood, a characteristic of kinship, a support of history. >Language, >Words, >Subject, >Object. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Judgments | Strawson | V 217 Judgment / Strawson: a second, corrective judgment seems to be precipitated by a second point of view. Vs: but that is not logically necessary - and not logically necessary that they comply at all. >Perspective, >Order, >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Statement, >Assertion, >Utterance/Strawson. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Language Development | Psychological Theories | Slater I 191 Language Development/psychological theories: Between 12 months of age, when infants begin to utter their first word, and 36 months, when toddlers have learned up to a thousand words, they have also mastered many of the intricacies of their native language grammar. How is it possible for such a complicated system to be acquired, via mere exposure rather than by overt instruction, by the vast majority of children in only two years? Slater I 192 Categorical perception/phonetics: categorical perception (CP), >Phonetics/psychological theories, >Categorical perception. Around 1957 [when Chomsky(1) and Liberman(2) published] CP was only present for speech, and only for the components of speech when they are heard as speech (not when these same components are heard as non-speech). This led to the proposal that humans have evolved a special neural mechanism — the speech mode — that is innate and dedicated to the interpretation of articulatory signals that are produced by the human vocal tract. These two nativist perspectives — Chomsky at the level of syntax and Liberman at the level of phonetics — set the stage for a definitive test of innate constraints on language. >Language Development/Eimas, >Chomsky/psychological theories. Slater I 199 Two decades after Eimas et al. (1971)(3), the first studies of auditory word recognition in fluent speech were begun (Jusczyk & Aslin, 1995)(4), documenting the fact that eight month olds could recognize chunks of speech even when they were embedded in sentences. Infants of this same age were also shown to be remarkably adept at extracting auditory word-forms from fluent speech, even when these word-forms were defined solely on the basis of temporal order statistics (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996)(5). However, when infants were required to map word-forms onto objects in a reference task, they often failed until much later (14 months of age), unless those word-forms were familiar and/or the visual objects were familiar (Stager & Werker, 1997)(6). Recent evidence suggests that under the right circumstances, this mapping process can take place, along with segmentation from fluent speech, even in six month olds (Shukla, White, & Aslin, 2011)(7). See also >Language Acquisition/psychological theories. 1. Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. Mouton: The Hague. 2. Liberman, A. M., Harris, K. S., Hoffman, H. S., & Griffith, B.C. (1957). The discrimination of speech sounds within and across phoneme boundaries. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54, 358—368. 3. Eimas, P. D., Siqueland, E. R.,Jusczyk, P., &Vigorito,J. (1971). Speech perception in infants. Science, 171, 303-306. 4. Jusczyk, P. W., & Aslin, R. N. (1995). Infants’ detection of the sound patterns of words influent speech. Cognitive Psychology, 29, 1—23. 5. Saffran, J. R., Aslin, R. N., & Newport, E. L. (1996). Statistical learning by 8-month-old infants. Science,274, 1926—1928. 6. Stager, C. L., & Werker, J. F. (1997). Infants listen for more phonetic detail in speech perception than in word leaming tasks. Nature, 388, 38 1—382. 7. Shukla, M., White, K. S., & Aslin, R. N. (2011). Prosody guides the rapid mapping of auditory word forms onto visual objects in 6-mo-old infants. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108, Richard N. Aslin, “Language Development. Revisiting Eimas et al.‘s /ba/ and /pa/ Study”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Order | Carnap | VI 206 System/Reference/Transformation/Meaning/Relation/Permutation/Carnap: any other relations could be accepted arbitrarily, for which still exactly the same empirical propositions (according to the signs!) apply, which now mean something else, however. - E.g. we only need a harmonized transformation of the set of the basic elements in itself and as a new basic relation those relations whose inventory is the transformed inventory of the old basic relations. Then, the new relations are structurally equivalent (isomorphic) to the old ones. VI 213 Order/Carnap: E.g. dog in the zoological realm: point - as an individual different - temporal order unlike any other - the distinction singular term/general term corresponds to that between orders - qualities are ordered differently than by space and time - this is equivalent to the difference between identity of localization and sameness of color of view field points - reason: different equally located (with the same number of digits) quality classes can never belong to the same elementary experience, but those of the same color can. Only thus could we separate the two orders of field of view and color body (>dimensions). VI 215 Identity of location: is what allows the knowledge synthesis in the first place. - ((s) Two things can only be in the same place after one another - temporal dimension - not with sameness of color). >Similarity, >Quality, >Identity, >Space, >Time; cf. >Simultaneity. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Order | Wessel | I 372 Subordinate conjunction/ordered adjunction/Wessel: "A, then B" (not to be confused with conjunction) - not reversible, de Morgan's rules apply. >Time, >Temporal logic, cf. >Causality, >Temporal order, >Order. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Propositions | Sellars | I XXXII Proposition/thoughts/tradition: classical empirical model of thoughts: they have the function to give worrds and sentences a meaning. >Word meaning, >Sentence meaning. Task: to produce actions in form of beliefs. RyleVsTradition: category confusion: thoughts are not locatable. >Thoughts, >Categories/Ryle, >Localization, >Spatial order, >Temporal order, >Logical space. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Space | Geach | I 315 Space/time/Geach: Time and space are radically different: that you need "between" in both cases, is misleading. Spatial order: affects individual objects. Temporal order: what is ordered here, is represented by complex sentences. Geach: in the temporal sense there are more and more complex structures, not in the spatial dimension. E.g. "x is between (y and w) and z" makes no sense. >Time, >Space, >Dimensions, >Localization, >Temporal order, >Spatial order. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Time | Geach | I 303 Time/GeachVsQuine: Vs time cuts, Vs "hours-thick sclices". >four dimensionalism). Space and time are not equal axes - otherwise temperature curves would be the same as "world lines" in the "temperature-time continuum". It is not true that quantifiers can only be applied to four-dimensional space-time points. ((s) This is not what Quine asserts: "Sometimes"/Quine: "there are some points of time...">Logical form/Quine.) I 314 Space/time/Geach: Space and time are radically different: that the expression "between" is used in both, is misleading - spatial order: affects individual objects. - Temporal order: what is ordered here is represented by complex sentences. Geach: in the temporal, ever more complex structures can be built, not in the spatial. - e.g. "x is between (y is over w) and z" makes no sense. I 316 Time/Modal logic/Geach: I am convinced that the basic time determinations "before", "after", etc. belong to the formal logic. I think they have to do with "possible" and "necessary". >Possibility, >Necessity, >Modal logic, >Modalities. One has claimed that a world in which the modus ponens no longer applies can be described as a world in which the time is two-dimensional or the past can be changed. If the basic truths about time are logical, then a differently temporal world would be a chimera. >Space/Geach, >Time, >Spacetime. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
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