Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Entry
Reference
Experience Minsky Minsky I 62
Experience/mental time/moment/Minsky: Our everyday ideas about the progression of mental time are wrong: they leave no room for the fact that every agent has a different causal history. To be sure, those different pasts are intermixed over longer spans of time, and every agent is eventually influenced by what has happened in the common, remote history of its society. But that's not what one means by now. The problem is with the connections between the moment-to-moment activities of largely separate agencies. >Now/Minsky, >Time, >Time perception.

Minsky I
Marvin Minsky
The Society of Mind New York 1985

Minsky II
Marvin Minsky
Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003

Free Will Frith I 85
Libet/Experiment/Frith: (1983)(1): e.g. raising a finger when one feels the desire to do so. The brain activity was measured with an EEG. It was already known that there was an activity before the spontaneous movement (standby potential). The activity can arise up to one second before the lifting of the finger.
New: Libet: the people should remember the moment when they felt the desire.
I 86
This point of time they could read on a special clock. The experiment was repeated and confirmed with different clocks. Desire: occurred about 200 msec before the actual lifting of the finger.
N.B.: the characteristic change in brain activity, the standby potential occurred approximately 500 msec before actual lifting.
Interpretation: does the experiment show that we have no free will?
Problem: the alternatives are extremely trivial.
I 87
Freedom of Will/Frith: the experiment does not show that we do not have free will, but that we are not aware of having made the choice at an earlier point of time. >Consciousness, >Decisions, >Will.
I 204
Libet/experiment/experiments/time/clock/Frith: Variant: reacting to a tone with pressing a button. The clock to be observed was a special dial on a computer screen.
N.B.: the "mental" and the physical time did not agree. In your head pressing the button occurs a bit later and the sound of the bell occurs somewhat earlier.
Mental time/Frith: here the components of the action are connected.
>Time, >Time perception, >Subjectivity.
I 205
Variant: the finger twitch is triggered from the outside by a magnetic pulse. Then you do not feel like you are the originator. >Authorship.
I 206
Action: the finger-twitch is no action then. The brain no longer connects the sound and the twitching. >Actions, >Behavior.
Mental time: is here pulled apart.
N.B.: by doing this, the brain realizes that you are not the originator.
>Brain, >Brain states, >Brain/Frith.
I 249
Libet/experiment/freedom/freedom of will/will/Frith: the instruction to behave self-determined leads to an illusory freedom. Instead we play a complex game with the experimenter. >Experiments, >Method.

1. B Libet, C A Gleason, E W Wright, D K Pearl (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain Sep;106 (Pt 3):623-42. doi: 10.1093/brain/106.3.623.

Frith I
Chris Frith
Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World, Hoboken/NJ 2007
German Edition:
Wie unser Gehirn die Welt erschafft Heidelberg 2013

Now Minsky Minsky I 62
Now/moment/mental time/Minsky: [a] When a pin drops, you might say, I just heard a pin drop. But no one says, I hear a pin dropping. Our speaking agencies know from experience that the physical episode of pin dropping will be over before you can even start to speak. [b] What sorts of feelings have you now? we often find our half-formed answers wrong before they can be expressed, as other feelings intervene. What seems only a moment to one agency may seem like an era to another. >Memory/Minsky, >Experience/Minsky.
The slower an agency operates — that is, the longer the intervals between each change of state — the more external signals can arrive inside those intervals. Does this mean that the outside world will appear to move faster to a slow agency than to a faster agency? Does life seem swift to tortoises, but tedious to hummingbirds?
>Time perception.

Minsky I
Marvin Minsky
The Society of Mind New York 1985

Minsky II
Marvin Minsky
Semantic Information Processing Cambridge, MA 2003

Perception Vollmer II 71
Perception/animal/Uexküll: Time perception: time quantum. - E.g. man: 1/16 s - e.g. Fighting Fish 1/30 s - E.g. snail 1/4. E.g. birds of the prairie: have mainly two-dimensional perception.
E.g. tree-dwelling monkeys: a strongly three-dimensional perception.
>Heterophenomenology, >Animals, >Animal language, >J.J. von Uexküll.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988



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