Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abstractness | Tugendhat | I 499 Abstract singular terms/Tugendhat: cannot be identified in space and time. - They are a collective terms, which break up into different subject areas with different identity criteria. >Singular terms, >Identity criteria, >Identity, >cf >General terms. I 500 Example 1. attributes 2. states of affairs 3. types 4. institutions and their parts 5. classes 6. numbers >Attributes, >States of affairs, >Type/Token, >Institutions, >Classes. II 97 Abstract terms/Tugendhat: events occur in space and time, but not abstract objects. >Events, >Space, >Time. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Criteria | Henrich | Habermas IV 158 Criteria/Identity/Conditions of Identity/Henrich/Geach/Habermas: Peter Geach argues that identity predicates can only be used meaningfully in connection with the general characterization of a class of objects. (1) HenrichVsGeach: Henrich distinguishes between identity conditions and identity criteria: "It makes no sense to say that an object appears under one description as (the same) number, under another as (different) lines. The black line on the paper, which denotes the number 8, is not this number itself (...). Definition Identity conditions/Henrich: types of objects are fundamentally different from each other. >Identity conditions. Def Identity criteria/Henrich: Identity criteria can individualize [(s)objects] in the area of an object type in different ways.(2) Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient. The additional conditions depend on it, Habermas IV 159 how the person can even be identified as a person. >Person, >Individuation, >Identification, >Particulars, >Specification, >Objects, >Subjects. 1.P. Geach, Ontological Relativity and Relative Identity, in: K. Munitz, Logic and Ontology, NY. 1973 2. D. Henrich, Identität, in: O. Marquard, K. Stierle, Identität, Poetik und Hermeneutik, Bd. VIII, München, 1979, S. 382 |
Henr I Dieter Henrich Denken und Selbstsein: Vorlesungen über Subjektivität Frankfurt/M. 2016 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Extensionality | Simons | Chisholm II 185 Extensionality/Quine: we assume space time points instead of "durable goods". SimonsVsQuine: language without continuants (permanent object) cannot be learned. Chisholm: probably time and modality, but not temporal or modal components: either a) accept phenomena, refuse extensionality or b) reject phenomena, demand extensionality for real lasting objects. >Entia Sukzessiva. SimonsVsChisholm: it is better to accept Aristotle things with unnecessary parts: trees simply consist of matter. This is more evidence than Wittgenstein's atoms. --- Simons I 3 Extensionality/Simons: if extensionality is rejected, more than one object can have exactly the same parts and therefore more than one object can be at the same time in the same place. Then we are dealing with continuants. Continuant/Simons: everything which is not an event is a continuant (see below) or everything that can have mass. >Continuants, >Parts. I 11 Extensional Mereology/CEM/extensionality/Simons: a characteristic property of extensional mereology is the relationship "part-of-or-identical-with". This corresponds with "less-than-or-equal" relationship. Overlapping: overlapping can be used as the only fundamental concept. Limiting case: separateness and identity. I 105f Part/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: 1. A whole is sometimes not one of its own parts. 2. Sometimes it is not transitive. 3. The existence of "sum-individuals" is not always guaranteed. That means, that the axioms, for individuals who obey any predicate, are wrong. 4. Identity criteria for individuals who have all parts in common, are wrong. I 106 5. Provides a materialist ontology of four-dimensional objects. Part/Simons: thesis: there is no uniform meaning of "part". I 117 Extensionality/Simons: extensionality is left with the rejection of the proper parts principle: I 28 Proper Parts Principle/strong/strong supporting principle: if x is not part of y, then there is a z which is part of x and which is separated from y. Solution for distinguishing sum (Tib + Tail) and whole (process) Tibbles (cat). >Tibbles-expample. Simons: the coincidence of individuals is temporarily indistinguishable (perceptually). >Superposition: superposition means being at the same time in the same place. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Identity | Kripke | I 53 Identity: identity is given by arbitrary criteria (only math is required). Identity is not for objects or people. >Criteria. Identity over time: is it still the same object if several parts of a table have been replaced? There is a certain vagueness. Where the identity relation is vague, it might appear intransitive. I 62 A kind of "counterpart" concept could be useful here. (However, without Lewis worlds that are like foreign countries, etc.) You could say that strict identities only apply to individual things (molecules) and the counterpart relation to those individual things that are composed of them, the tables. I 116 Our concept of identity, which we are using here, deals with identity criteria of individual objects in concepts of other individual objects, and not in concepts of qualities. Identity: through the use of descriptions one can make contingent identity statements. >Counterparts, >Counterpart relation, >Counterpart theory, >Possible world/Kripke, >Possible world/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. I 63f Kripke (VsTradition): molecular motion: is necessarily identical with heat. We have discovered it, but it could not be otherwise. Physical truths are necessary: e.g. heat equals molecular motion - but there is no analogy to mind-brain identities. >Identity theory/Kripke. I 117 Ruth Barcan Markus: thesis: identities between names are necessary ("mere tag"). QuineVsMarkus: we could label the planet Venus with the proper name "Hesperus" on a beautiful evening. We could label the same planet again on a day before sunrise, this time with the proper name "Phosphorus". If we discover that it was the same planet twice, our discovery is an empirical one. And not because the proper names have been descriptions. I 120f Designation does not create identity: the same epistemic situation, Phospherus/Hesperus named as different celestial bodies is quite possible and therefore contingent, but does not affect the actual identity. We use them as names in all possible worlds. >Possible world, >Naming/Kripke. I 124 Identity: a mathematician writes that x = y are only identical if they are names for the same object. Kripke: those are not names at all, but rather variables. >Names/Kripke, >Variables. I 125 Definition "Schmidentity": this artificial relation can only exist between an object and itself. Kripke: it is quite okay and useful. I 175 Does the mere creation of molecular motion still leaves the additional task for God to turn this motion into heat? This feeling is actually based on an illusion, what God really has to do is to turn this molecular motion into something that is perceived as heat. >Sensation/Kripke, >Pain/Kripke, >Contingency/Kripke. --- Frank I 114 Identity/Kripke: if an identity statement is true, it is always necessarily true. E.g. heat/motion of molecules, Cicero/Tullius, Water/H20 - these are compatible with the fact that they are truths a posteriori. But according to Leibniz it is not conceivable that one occurs without the other. Frank I 125 Identity/body/Kripke: "A" is the (rigid) name for the body of Descartes - it survived the body, i.e.: M (Descartes unequal A). This is not a modal fallacy, because A is rigid. Analogue: a statue is dissimilar to molecule collection. >Rigidity/Kripke. Saul A. Kripke (1972): Naming and Necessity, in: Davidson/Harmann (eds.) (1972), pp. 253-355. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Individuation | Buridan | Geach I 134 Individuation/identification/Buridan/Geach: E.g. a horse dealer has exactly three horses: Brownie, Blackie and Fallow. The customer accepts the dealer's statement: "I will give you one of my horses". But the dealer does not deliver and denies that he owes the customer anything. His argument: "I should owe you either Brownie, or Blackie or Fallow. I 135 But what I said did not refer to Blackie any more as on Fallow or the other way around and just as little on Brownie. I owe you none of the three." GeachVsBuridan: a part of the difficulties that Buridan has himself comes from the fact that he allows the conclusion of "I owe you a horse" to "There is a horse I owe you"! But even if we cannot do it in general, it seems plausible in this particular case to allow "I owe you something", so "there is something ..." We can even accept this without accepting Buridan's invalid rule. Geach: many authors believe that any case of an invalid conclusion procedure is an invalid conclusion, but that is a great logical error! Horse dealer: "If I owe you a horse, I owe you something, and that can only be a horse of mine, you will not say because of my words that it is something else I owe you! Well then: Tell me which of my horses I owe you. Solution/Buridan: One can say that x owes me y, if and only if I am even with him by giving y! Whichever of the three horses should be y, by handing out the two they will be even! So: whichever x will be, the dealer owes the customer x. I 136 It is true of Brownie, it is true of Blackie and it is true of Fallow that it is a horse that the dealer owes the customer. If we now consider e.g. only Brownie and Blackie, we could say that the dealer owes these two. But Buridan himself warns us not to confuse collective and distributive use. >Distribution. Solution: it is not the case that "there are two horses ..." But "it is true of everyone that he owes it"! Buridan: according to his own principle, we cannot conclude from "there are two .." to "The dealer owes two ..". For that would be the wrong "ratio" (aspect), namely that the dealer would have had to say, in a sentence, that he owes the two. Similarly, we cannot conclude from "Brownie is a horse that the dealer owes" (Buridan: true) to "The dealer owes Brownie". To do so, the dealer would have had to explicitly express the sentence. >Aspects, >Propositions, >Sentences. GeachVsBuridan: that cannot be allowed! I cannot conclude from "I owe you something" to "There is something that I owe you"! Cf. >Someone. E.g. The bank has stored somewhere the money of people. From this I cannot conclude: some of it is mine! But this is anything but trivial. The problem is not limited to this example. E.g. From "b F't one or another A" I cannot conclude: "There is one or another identifiable thing that b F't". That is why we must rebuild Buridan's whole theory. I 137 E.g. Geach is looking for a detective story: according to Buridan it turns out: For an x, Geach searches for x under the aspect ("ratio") "detective story". Problem: even if I was looking exactly for a detective story, there was an identifiable x not necessarily a detective story I was looking for. (?). We rather need a dyadic relation between Geach and an aspect (ratio)! Geach sought something under the ratio "detective story". The bound words are an indivisible relative term. Clearer: Geach sought something under the ratio which is evoked (appellata) by the term "detective story" Then "search ... of" is a singular relative term. We can abbreviate it: "S'te" Then we have a quote rather than a "ratio". Then we do not need to quantify via "ratio". We can say: "There is a detective story that Geach seeks" as "For an x, x is a detective story, and for a w, w is a description which is true of x, and Geach S'te w ("sought something under the ratio evoked by the particular identifier w"). Here we quantify via forms of words whose identity criteria, if not quite clear, are clearer than those of rationes. >Identity criteria, >Description, >Identification. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Inverted Spectra | Shoemaker | Stalnaker I 19 Qualia/exchanged spectra/Shoemaker/Stalnaker: Shoemaker tried to reconcile the visibility of reversed spectra with a functionalist and materialist theory of the mind. >Functionalism, >Materialism. StalnakerVsShoemaker : per old-fashioned view that comparisons of the qualitative character of experience are possible. Cf. >Hetero-phenomenology. Stalnaker I 233f Inverted spectra/Shoemaker/Paradox/Stalnaker: E.g., four people, partly differently wired/without backup system. Paradox: it follows that in a person two qualia would be the same and different at the same time. >Qualia. Solution/Stalnaker:we need two different identity criteria. >Criteria, >Identity, >Identity criterion, >Identity conditions. Functional Theory: provides intrapersonal criteria. >Personal identity. Identity of the physical realization: provides criteria for interpersonal identity. Problem : the two equivalence relations can not go together. I 236 The addition of the back-up system changes the qualitative character because it changes the memory mechanisms. >Memory. Problem: subsequent changes in the system, but also unrealized possibilities change the qualitative character. >Qualities. I 237/8 The paradox can be solved by the asymmetry. - But only if we allow that intentionality plays a role in the individuation of qualia. >Intentionality, >Individuation. |
Shoemaker I S. Shoemaker Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Pain | Cavell | I (a) 44 Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: different objects require very different identity criteria. E.g. in the case of sensations, style, colors, diseases, for example, it may be a description, in the case of material objects it may be a place. >Identity, >Identity conditions, >Criteria. I (a) 45 Pain/Identity/Cavell: it seems as if we could say of pain and of cars, but not of colors: in a certain way there are two, but in a certain way only one. >Colors. Pain/Numerical Identity/Qualitative Identity/Malcolm: Malcolm disputes the fact that one can reasonably say in (descriptive) identical painful occurrences that it is two. Thesis: with regard to sence perceptions, the concept of "numerical identity" has no application. Malcolm: if the description is the same, there cannot be the additional question whether the idea would be the same! E.g. Cavell: one can say our "twin cars" do not differ, yet there are two. Why not with pain then? Because here "equals" means "descriptively equal"? Obviously not! >Description, >Imagination, >Equality. I (a) 46 Why should not the skeptics have the feeling that here it is presupposed what is still to be examined? For example, in cars, the question is answered: there are two, in the case of colors, the question is also answered: it is one! But with pain? Pain/Malcolm: there is a danger to think it is here as in the colors, styles, opinions or sudden ideas. It is a truism that there can be the same shades of color at the same time in many places. Pain/CavellVsMalcolm: this seems to show that colors of headaches are different. But I can answer the question whether the pain is numerically identical with its: namely, not! However, we have the same insidious pain which Dr. Eternity describes as part of the eternity syndrome! I (a) 47 Malcom only shows, by adjusting the pain to the colors, how both are counted or identified by means of descriptions. Only in this respect they then behave like cars! Colors cannot be counted differently, but this does not show that pain cannot be counted differently! If I were put under pressure here, I would even say that pain in this respect is more like objects than colors. I (a) 48 Pain/Cavell: Thesis: in pain it is important that the other needs our attention! This makes it so important to know how strong the pain is. This seems to make a standard description necessary. Physical identity (i.e., empirical indistinguishability) is not sufficient: for example, two peas in a pod can be indistinguishable, but we do not say it is one pea! >Indiscernibility, >Indistinguishability, >Countability, >Similarity, >Classification, >Identification. I (a) 49 However, it is not necessary either, because if there is a standard description that secures the application of "(descriptive) equal", then we can tolerate an unlimited discrepancy. |
Cavell I St. Cavell Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002 Cavell I (a) Stanley Cavell "Knowing and Acknowledging" in: St. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?, Cambridge 1976, pp. 238-266 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (b) Stanley Cavell "Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language", in: St. Cavell, The Claim of Reason, Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, New York 1979, pp. 168-190 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Stanley Cavell Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell I (c) Stanley Cavell "The Argument of the Ordinary, Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke", in: St. Cavell, Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome: The Constitution of Emersonian Perfectionism, Chicago 1990, pp. 64-100 In Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen, Davide Sparti/Espen Hammer (eds.) Frankfurt/M. 2002 Cavell II Stanley Cavell "Must we mean what we say?" in: Inquiry 1 (1958) In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Person | Habermas | IV 158 Person/Identification/Habermas: Persons cannot be identified under the same conditions as observable objects. In the case of persons, spatiotemporal identification is not sufficient. >Identification, >Individuation, >Individuals, cf. >Individuation/Strawson, >Person/Strawson, cf. >Continuants, >Personal identity. IV 159 While entities are generally determined by the fact that a speaker can make a statement of them, persons belong to the class of entities who can take on the role of a speaker themselves. For categorization as a person, it is not enough that a person can say "I", but how they do it. >I, Ego, Self, >Self-identification, >Self-reference, >Subjects. The expression "I" not only has the deictic meaning of the reference to an object, it also indicates the pragmatic attitude or perspective from which the speaker expresses himself/herself. >Reference, >Perspective. In the communicative role of the speaker, someone addresses at least one listener. >Speaking, >Communication. IV 160 The peculiarity of the person is explained by the fact that persons do not have to acquire the identity conditions first and even the criteria by which they can be identified under these conditions (...) until they can be identified at all as a person and, if necessary, as this particular person. >Person/Locke, >Person/Kant, >Person/Strawson. IV 161 Identity/Person/Habermas: since persons acquire their identity through linguistically mediated interaction, they fulfil the identity conditions for persons and the basic identity criteria for a certain person not only for others but also for themselves. They see themselves as people who have learned to participate in social interactions. Cf. >Identity/Henrich. The person can answer the question of what kind of person he/she is, not just one of all. Identity criteria/conditions of identity/Habermas: are only fulfilled by the person when he/she is able to attribute the corresponding predicates to himself/herself. >Identity criteria, >Identity conditions, >Criteria. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Person | Mead | Habermas IV 161 Person/Mead/Habermas: Identity/Person/Habermas: since persons acquire their identity through linguistically mediated interaction, they fulfil the identity conditions for persons and the basic identity criteria for a certain person not only for others but also for themselves. They see themselves as people who have learned to participate in social interactions. The person can answer the question of what kind of person he/she is, not just one of all. >Socialization/Habermas. Identity criteria/identity conditions/Habermas: are only fulfilled by the person when he/she is able to attribute the corresponding predicates to himself/herself. Mead: distinguishes two stages in the acquisition of identity conditions: Habermas IV 162 a) The acquisition of an ascribed identity through learning, the assumption of a role in a social group, ultimately orientation towards the past. b) The identity asserted under one's own direction: here it is about who one wants to be; orientation towards the future. |
Mead I George Herbert Mead Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Works of George Herbert Mead, Vol. 1), Chicago 1967 German Edition: Geist, Identität und Gesellschaft aus der Sicht des Sozialbehaviorismus Frankfurt 1973 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Proper Names | Geach | I 46f Name/Aristotle/Geach: direct reference, no parts (Aristotle: syntactically simple) (Geach ditto) - description: indirect reference, mediation of other characters. I 143 Calculus of Natural Deduction/Gentzen/Geach: here there are "possible names" (> "introduction of existence"). But not quantification over it. GeachVsQuine: so he can no longer regard names as "hidden descriptions". >Names/Quine, >Descriptions/Quine, >Theory of decriptions/Russell. I 155 Names/Geach: knowing the causal chain is not important, but its existence. - The right to use a name can exist, even if one does not know that. >Causal theory of names. Russell: a proper name must name something (Geach dito). >Names/Russell. GeachVsRussell: but then he makes a wrong conclusion: "only a name that has to name something is a name". Just as wrong: fallacy of "what one knows, must be" to "only what must be like this, can be known". >Knowledge, >Truth. I 162 Quasi-names/Geach: appear in encyclopedias, for foreign gods. - (Geach pro). Quasi-names appear only in object position after intentional verbs. - This is no "second order existence". - There is no identy criterion to decide whether different peoples worship the same God. >Identity criteria, >Objects of belief. I 208 Names/Geach: whether something is a proper name does not depend on who it is given to. Quasi quotation: is not a name. >Quasi quotation. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Singular Terms | Brandom | I 407 Singular Term/Predicate/Subsentential Expressions/Brandom: this is about objective referencing (reference), not about believed propositions - non-propositional, conceptual contents. >Reference. I 527ff Singular Terms - substitution inferences are always symmetrical: equivalence classes. >Substitution, >Equivalence classes. Predicate substitution inferences may be asymmetric: Families (reflexive, transitive). I 512f Singular Term/Frege: the concept particular cannot be explained independently from the concept singular term. Brandom: not clear what singular terms are, cannot be explained by successful reference. Quine: singular terms include reference, error is possible. Brandom: not everything can be recognized as a singular term: E.g. "√2", "natural satellite of the Earth" may be more than one thing. Problem: if omniscience of the speaker should be required. I 517 Because sentences are fundamental, it is not clear why there should be any subsentential expressions at all. - They cannot have a semantic content in the same respectas sentences. - Subsentential expressions are necessary for the formation of potentially infinite number of sentences. >Subsententials. I 528 Singular Term/Brandom: its introduction does not only require application criteria but also identity criteria (for substitutability). I 533 Singular Term/Brandom: are those expressions which play a dual syntactic and semantic substitutional role: 1) SIS: substitution-inferential significance - 2) SSR - substitution-structural role. I 533 Definition singular term/Brandom: an expression that is substituted and whose occurrence is symmetrically inferentially significant - the substitutable (singular term): symmetric - substitution frame (predicates) asymmetrical. I 535 Inversion: Substitutions are not always right: the conclusions are often inferentially weaker than the premises - from "something is a dog" follows "it is a mammal", but not vice versa - singular term: exists, because expressive power of the language would be lost if they were allowed to be asymmetric - Example/(s): if substitution led to weakening of the determination of the object. I 546 Singular term/Brandom: Frames can be regarded as derived singular terms: e.g. "the father of a" may then be substituted into her (FregeVs). Brandom: they are still subsitutable and therefore they differ from sentences. I 548 There are exceptions in the singular terms that behave differently, but they can only exist, because there are normal singular terms. I 561 They play both the syntactic and semantic substitutional role. I 569 Singular Term/Predicate/Brandom: indispensable in all languages with conditionals. - Why are objects needed: for the same reason as singular terms: you need something that means what conditionals mean. --- II 162 Singular Term/Brandom: 1) Obtain - 2) Designate - 3) Name --- Newen I 165 Singular Term/Brandom: Problem: because it does not have reference as a basic concept, it creates 1) equivalenz classes of syntactically identical terms (substitutability) 2) inferential role: helps to isolate the grammatical entities and identify their role as subject, verb , etc. >Inferential role. Subject Term/Singular Term: here the implications are symmetrical and reversible. - E.g. Franklin/Postmaster. Verb: here the reversal is not symmetrical - E.g. goes for a walk/exercises. - At the same time transcendental argument for the splittedness of the world - (predecessor: Strawson). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Synonymy | Cresswell | II 59 Synonymy/Reality/World/Language/Cresswell: the knowledge of some synonyms does not tell us anything about the relation between language and the world - and it is about that when we study meaning. >Language, >World, >World/thinking, >Reality, >Foundation, >Observation, >Observation language, >Observation sentence. Equality of meaning is not suitable for definition. >Meaning. II 106 Synonymy/Cresswell: is language-relative - therefore, we cannot say for the attribution of propostional attitudes: "He expressed a sentence that is synonymous with ...". >Language dependence. II 161 Synonymy/Cresswell: is attractive for people who do not want any language-independent meanings - But that would not be a real semantic relation. No one has hitherto attempted a recursive specification of a synonymy relation. Synonymy: is always relative to a particular language - ((s) That means you cannot assume any more propositions.) >Propositions. QuineVsSynonymy: you cannot create identity criteria for language. >Synonymy/Quine. |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Synonymy | Geach | 169/70 Synonymy/Criteria/propositional identity/Geach: we know that strict reciprocal implication is not a sufficient criterion for synonymy. E.g. "Necessarily either both, p and q, or neither p nor q" usually does not suffice: that does not justify the conclusion: Everyone believes that p if and only if he believes that q". ((s) because of lack of identity criteria for intensional objects.) >Identity criteria, >Intensional objects. Geach: entailment as a substitute for strict implication is complicated, but does not help. >Entailment/Geach. Transitivity must be abolished - even from reciprocal entailment, the identity of propositions does not follow. >Transitivity. Geach: no one knows what he says when he says that two propositions are identical. >Propositions, >Intensions, >Objects of thought. If the difference between two propositions is not an obstacle, that both are believed at the same time, why should it be an obstacle being expressed simultaneously by one and the same proposition? - Problem: then the whole apparatus of synonymy and non-ambiguity threatens to collapse. On the other hand, if we cannot recognize the same meaning (sense) in different linguistic disguises, there is also little purpose in postulating propositions. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Understanding | Tugendhat | I 289 Understanding/Tugendhat: Understanding the usage rule of an assertoric sentence: not knowing the circumstances, but know in what capacity it is used. >Language use, >Circumstances. ((s) This is not use theory, because this refers to word meanings). >Use theory. I 308 Understanding/TugendhatVsMeta Language: Understanding is not expressed in a meta language - but in mastering the sign rules. >Metalanguage/Tugendhat, >Metalanguage. I 489 Understanding/singular Term/Tugendhat: we understand a singular term only if we know to which other types it refers - but not a circle, but complementary. >Singular Terms, >General terms, >Predicates. I 495 Understanding/Tugendhat: by Leibniz law of identity, the equal sign is not defined - one can say that his understanding is demonstrated when one can infer from the truth of "Fa" to the one of "Fb" - but with that the circumstances are not shown. >Leibniz principle, >Equal sign. Criteria/identity criterion/Tugendhat: shift to object area. >Criteria, >Identity criteria, >Identity conditions. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Extensionality | Verschiedene Vs Extensionality | Simons I 105 VsCEM/VsExtensional Mereology/Simons: Criticisms in ascending importance: 1. That there are different meanings of "part" where a whole does not count as one of its own parts. 2. That there are meanings of "part" for which the part-whole relation is not transitive. 3. That the existence of "sum-individuals" is not guaranteed or (equivalently) that the axioms for individuals who obey any predicate are wrong. 4. That the identity criteria for individuals of the axioms that identify individuals who have all parts in common are wrong. I 106 5. That the ontology imposed by extensional part-whole theory is a materialistic ontology of four-dimensional objects. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Lewis Vs Quine, W.V.O. | IV IX LewisVsQuine: Realism in relation to unrealized possibilities. IV 27 Possibility/Quine: Vs unrealized possibilities: the identity criteria are not clear. LewisVsQuine: But identity is not a particular problem for us. Individuation/possible worlds: in every world, things in every category are as individual as in the actual world. Identity/Possible World: Things in different worlds are never identical. (Because of P2) The counterpart relation is the correspondence of identity across worlds (cross world identity). Lewis: while some authors say they can do different things in different worlds and have different properties, I prefer to say that they are only in the actual world and in no other worlds but that they have counterparts in other worlds. IV 32 Essentialism/LewisVsQuine: we actually have the ability to say which properties are essential regardless of description. And also regardless of whether the attribute follows analytically from any other descriptions of the thing. For example, the single-digit sentence φ and an object that is designated by the singular term ζ To say that this attribute is essential means to claim the translation of N φ ζ (N = necessary). IV 147 Centered possible worlds/de re/de se/Quine/Lewis: (Ontological Relativity, "Propositional Objects"): For example, a cat that is chased by a dog wants to go to the roof to be safe. de dicto: the cat wants a state of affairs, which is the class of all possible worlds in which it is on the roof. It fears the class of all possible worlds where the dog catches her. Problem: Crossworld Identity. Question: which of the many similar cats in the many possible worlds (with many dogs and roofs) is it? Some cats are on roofs, some in the dog's claws. Does the cat belong to both the desired and the feared conditions? Solution: centered possible world: pairs consisting of a world and a designated time in space, the desired state is then a class of centered worlds. In fact, the gravitational center is the cat's pineal gland. No centered world belongs to two classes (desired and feared). It would be problematic if the wish were fulfilled under one centering and not fulfilled under another. Quine: does not accept this solution in the end. He prefers the shared theory that the objects of "simple settings" are classes of stimulus patterns, while the more complex settings are linguistic. LewisVsQuine: the benefits of unified objects (properties only) should not be given away. Property/Lewis: corresponds to a class of centered worlds, more precisely a property of space-time points, but also a property of cats. Let X be a class of centered worlds, Y be a property. Then the class corresponds exactly to the centered worlds that are centered on a cat with the property Y. It cannot be centered on two different cats. To rule that out, we can redefine centered worlds as pairs of a world and a designated inhabitant in it. Quine/Lewis: he has actually replaced propositions by properties through centering. IV 148 I'm not sure what his reasons are. They are not the same in relation to Catilina and the Great Pyramid (> ontological relativity) (here he wants to avoid the counterpart relation) but certainly in the cat example. Possible World/LewisVsQuine: big difference: by possible world I simply mean big individual things, of which our actual world is one. Possible Worlds/Quine: means certain abstract entities, certain classes of classes of quadruples of real numbers. ((s) space-time points). Quine/Lewis: I suspect that he at least distinguishes our concrete world from the abstract "replacement world" that it represents! Let's call it "updated ersatz world" to distinguish it from the world itself. Lewis: Variety of concrete worlds. Quine: Variety of abstract ersatz worlds, one of which represents our special one. Stalnaker: pro Quine: corresponds better to everyday language than "how it could have been". Lewis: the actual ersatz world is special only because it represents our concrete real world. And it is special not only from its own point of view, but from every world. One could assume the following now: therefore it is not contingent special, because contingency is variation from one possible world to another. LewisVs: in this way it looks like it is a non-contingent fact, which is updated by the many possible worlds. And that is wrong! ((s) Then every fact in the actual world would be necessary, every movement. >Determinism.) Schwarz I 46 Possibility/LewisVsQuine: there must be a theory of what would be true under these or other conditions. But not only because they are needed for the analysis of dispositions and causality. Schwarz I 132 Def Event/Quine/Schwarz: (1960b(1),171): Suggestion: to identify them with the space-time region in which they occur. Vs: this is too coarse-grained for effects and causes. For example, if a ball flies through the air and rotates, then flight and rotation occupy the same region, but only flight causes the window to break. Counterfactual analysis/counterfactual conditional/CoCo/Possible World/Similarity/Lewis: the next possible world in which rotation does not take place are not the next possible worlds in which flight does not take place. The two events correspond to the same space-time region in the real world, but not in all possible worlds. ((s) "Next" is not decisive here). Event/Identity/LewisVsQuine: Modification: Events are identical if they occupy the same space-time region in all possible worlds. Def Event/Lewis: is then the class of all regions (in all possible worlds) in which it happens. (1986d(2)). Schwarz I 220 Def Analytical Truth/LewisVsQuine/Schwarz: a sentence is analytical when its primary truth conditions cover all situations. Schwarz: More interesting is his thesis that practically every sentence can empirically prove to be wrong. Our theories cannot be divided into a revisable empirical and an unrevisable analytical component. 1. Willard Van Orman Quine [1960b]: Word and Object. Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press 2. David Lewis [1986d]: “Events”. In [Lewis 1986f]: 241–269 |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Ryle, G. | Kripke Vs Ryle, G. | I 53 KripkeVsRyle: The usual argument doubts that the essentialism makes sense, and says that the answer to the question whether a property of an object is accidental or essential depends on how the subject is described. This argument is therefore not of the opinion that all the properties are accidental. If you have a identity criterion, then the question whether Nixon has specific characteristics in another possible world is a well-defined question. Sometimes, in the case of numbers, it might seem easier (but even here it is argued that identity criteria are given completely arbitrary). |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg) Oxford/NY 1984 |
| Searle, J.R. | Zink Vs Searle, J.R. | Wolf II 15 Names/ZinkVsSearle: Example Assuming that most of Aristotle's descriptions proved to be false and correct in relation to another person, then we should not say that "Aristotle" is the name of that other person, it is sufficient, "was born in 384 B.C., in Stagira". Meaning of the proper name/Zink: "The person who is actually called E.N.". (Certain identification, like Burks). ZinkVsBurks: not any property, but a predicate such as "person" with identity criteria must be included. Wolf II 167 Name/Meaning/Searle: ("Proper Names", Mind 67) no set of descriptions can indicate the meaning! The use presupposes the truth of a certain set of descriptions. But neither this set is exactly defined, nor is the meaning in the set. For then every true description of the thing would be analytically true! No discovery about it would be an empirical discovery! Possible Solution/Searle: the necessary and sufficient conditions for the meaning of the name: that it is identical to an object originally baptized in that way. II 168 SearleVs: "Aristotle" can be applied to any individual baptized this way. ZinkVsSearle: this can be eliminated by localization. |
Zink I Sidney ZInk "The Meaning of Proper Names", in: Mind 72 (1963) S. 481-499 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
| Synonymy | Davidson Vs Synonymy | Cresswell II 161 Synonymy/Cresswell: Problem: it involves a relativation on languages. That’s the reason for DavidsonVsSynonymy: (Davidson 1969, 161-167). QuineVsSynonymy: (1960): it is impossible to establish identity criteria for languages. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
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