Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 11 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Absoluteness | Berkeley | I 224f Absolute/time/space/science/BerkeleyVsNewton: there is no absolute time, no absolute space, absolute motion, absolute power. I 225 A force cannot be the cause of another force, only God is cause. >Cause, >Causation, Causality, >Forces. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Absoluteness | Fraassen | I 46 LeibnizVsNewton: VsAbsolute Space. - Fraassen: One cannot assume absolute space or absolute motion; there can be no experience of them. >Absoluteness/Feynman, >Space, >Motion, >Empirical Adequacy/Fraassen. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Process/Flux | Simons | I 124f Flux/Heraclitus/ChisholmVsQuine: Quine needs spatial and temporal extension on the same level Chi: not every sum of flux stages is a flux process. We have to say what conditions a sum must satisfy to be a flow process. >Mereological sum. Problem: that in turn presupposes continuants: shore, observers, absolute space or an introduction of "is co-fluvial with". >Continuants. This could only be explained circularly by "is the same river as". Thus, the four-dimensionalism has not eliminated all singular or general terms that denote continuants. SimonsVsQuine: one does not bath in a flux stage but in the whole flux. Error: it is wrong trying to change the subject to leave the predicate unchanged. I125 Time-stage/flux-stages/SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: stages can be misleading: e.g. a Philip stage is not drunk, but the whole man. One does not bath in a flux stadium. A consequent description in four-dimensionalism is only achieved by higher beings. For us, this is not decidable. Terminology: process ontology equals four-dimensionalism here. Simons: this is not impossible, only the language is different. >Four-dimensionalism. I 127 SimonsVsFour-Dimensionalism: four-dimensionalism is a convenient representation of the Minkowski-space, but representation is not an ontological argument. >Minkowski-space. I 126 Process/Geach/Simons: a process has all its properties timeless, that means, what has different properties, are the temporal parts and not the whole process. Hence, there is no change, e.g. like the poker which is hot on one end and cold at the other. >Timelessness. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Relationism | Stalnaker | I 82f Relationism/relationalism/Stalnaker: to represent relationism in terms of the logical space, it must be assumed that the logical space itself is partially conventional. >Logical space. I 84 This means, we must assume that the localization function sometimes only conventionally differs and therefore actually represents the same possible world. >Localization. It is not conventional that the origin of the coordinate system can be chosen freely. - This is true for each coordinate system. It would be true even if an absolute theory of space were true. >Coordinate system, >Absoluteness, >Absolute space, >Space, cf. >Substantivalism. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Space | Bennett | Esfeld I 216ff Space/Bennett: (this come from Spinoza): Bodies are properties of regions. - Their respective properties are not identical but "realized as" reconstruction of bodily properties. They are based on properties of regions: e.g. a region of space slimy*: there are slimy (without star) things. The whole matter is a field that is identical to the space. Esfeld: but this does not mean space = field. Esfeld: there is not even a conceptual difference between space and matter! - There is no absolute space without matter (holism of space). Cf. >Substantivalism, >Relationism, >Empty space, >Matter, >Body, >Objects, >Absoluteness, >Holism. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Space | Kanitscheider | I 193f Superluminal velocity/space/Kanitscheider: Superluminal velocity is probably real in our world by expansion of space (not in space). Probably not the only case. In some models of the Big Bang, galaxies fly apart at faster-than-light speeds at the beginning. This is no conflict with Special Relativity (SR), because the curvature was infinite at that time. Thus, strictly speaking, there is no finite environment to which SR could be applied! No volume element is small enough to serve as a local inertial frame. In no area the tidal forces disappear. >Relativity theory, >Space-time/Kanitscheider, >Universe/Kanitscheider. I 294 Time/Tradition/Kanitscheider: linear one-parameter sequence of finitely many present layers, reference system-independent meaning. Space/Tradition/Kanitscheider: This is not valid in the same way for space, because the Galilei transformation of classical mechanics includes a relativity of equi-locality. Therefore, the absolute space is already abandoned in classical mechanics, because the spatial coincidence of events at different times became reference system dependent. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Space | Wessel | I 376 Time/space/logic/Wessel: The expression of time and space is no problem for relation predicates: "before", "next", etc. Problem: time and space seen as subjects, where one in turn ascribes predicates: - e.g. "space is curved" - "narrows", "time slows down", etc. >Time, >Spacetime, >Curved space. I 376 Space/Introduction: here whole statements are introduced, not individual terms. >Introduction. E.g. "X iff Y" whereby X contains the space term. - "Space" is not independent. Space terms are not capable of logical explication or they are superfluous. >Explanations, >Definition, >Definability. "Absolute space"/Wessel: Absolute space would depended on the elimination of all objects of a space structure - that is not permitted. Cf. >Substantivalism, >Relationism, >Absoluteness, >Empty space. I 378 Space warp/curved space/Wessel: curved space is meaningless if space is the container of all things. - It is only useful as a curved row of objects, against an uncurved row. I 378/79 Space/existence/Wessel: the space exists iff any given space exists - this requires the simultaneity of objects - analog for the time. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Space Time | Thorne | I 99 Space-time/Minkowski/Thorne: Minkowski's absolute spacetime is not curved - (4-dimensional). >Minkowski space, >Space curvature, >Space, >Time, >Absoluteness. |
Thorne I Kip S. Thorne Gekrümmter Raum und verbogene Zeit München 1996 Thorne II Kip S. Thorne Christopher Nolan The Science of Interstellar New York 2014 |
| Theoretical Terms | Genz | II 38 Theoretical Terms/reality/definitions/laws/Genz: the reality of theoretical terms is to derive connections between base sentences that would not be possible without them. Example: Absolute space/Newton/Genz: absolute space is a theoretical term that cannot be defined within its theory. It also does not go into any proof of a base sentence. Such a thing does no harm as long as it does not result in base sentences. >Absoluteness, >Definition, >Observation, >Derivation, >Derivability. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Time | Kanitscheider | I 294 Time/tradition/Kanitscheider: linear, one-parameter sequence of a finite number of layers of the present, meaning independent of the reference system. Space/Tradition/Kanitscheider: This does not apply in the same way to space, because the Galileo transformation of classical mechanics includes a relativity of the same location. Absolute space is therefore already abandoned in classical mechanics, because the spatial coincidence of events at different times became dependent on the reference system. II 49 Time/Friedman Universe: The finite value for the time in the past is not, as Friedman still naively assumed, the time since the creation, but a validity limit of the time coordinate. There is no specifiable date. You can't derive the Big Bang from that. >Coordinate system/Kanitscheider, >Definability. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Unobservables | Fraassen | I 54 Unobservability/Fraassen: as long as we do not forbid negation, we can express in an observation language that something is unobservable. And we can even express to a certain extent, how these unobserved entities are. E.g. Unobservable/Copenhagen interpretation: says that there are things that sometimes have a certain position and sometimes not. >Copenhagen Interpretation. N.B.: that was expressed without using a single theoretical term - e.g. the consequence of a theory: absolute space: would have neither position nor volume. - This has nothing to do with what exists in the observable world. >Ontology, >Existence. N.B.: a theory reduced to observation language would not be a description of a "part of the world". - ((s) because there is no meaningful separation observable/unobservable - Syntax/Fraassen: this is only a problem for the syntactic representation of theories. I 57 Limits of observability are empirical, not philosophical. >Observability. I 71 Unobservable/Truth/Theory/Fraassen: if a theory has implications about the unobservable, then evidence does not guarantee the truth of the theory. ((s) this practically always the case.) -Conversely, the evidence would never justify a conclusion that goes beyond this evidence. - Conclusions about what is observable also go beyond the evidence. >Evidence. I 72 Fraassen: There are no rationally compelling reasons to go beyond the evidence. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Four-Dimensionalism | Chisholm Vs Four-Dimensionalism | Simons I 120 Object/Thing/Chisholm: Thesis: "mereological constance objects in the original sense: entia per se: cannot change. Objects in the derived sense: Entia per alio: are subject to flux, but only in the sense that they are successively constituted by different entia per se, which differ in their parts. Continuants/Chisholm: he does not deny them! Rather ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism (because of his ontology of temporal objects). Simons I 124 Event/occurrents/Ontology/Chisholm/Simons: Chisholm disproves three arguments for the ontology of events (occurrences): (Chisholm 1976, Appendix A) 1. Argument of spatial analogy: there is a great disanalogy between space and time: a thing cannot be in two different places at the same time, but a thing can be in the same place at two different times. ChisholmVs: this is not conclusive, a defender of temporal parts can argue against it. But then he can use this argument to argue for his thesis without circularity. 2. Argument of change (change): for example, how can Philip be drunk once and sober once? For him, both are contradictory together. ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism/Solution: instead of saying a time stage of Philip is (timelessly) drunk, we simply say in everyday language: he was drunk last night and is now sober. Either we use grammatical times as in everyday language, or we relativize our predicates to the time ((s) "have-at-t", "be-at-t"). 3. Argument of the river (not "flux-argument"): Example River/QuineVsHeraclitus: Quine uses the temporal extension of the river on the same level as the spatial extension. ChisholmVsQuine: not every sum of river stages is a river process. I 125 Solution/Chisholm: we have to say what conditions a sum has to meet to be a river process. ChisholmVsQuine: Problem: this again requires continuants: (river banks, human observers) or a theory of absolute space or the introduction of a technical term ((s) predicate) "is cofluvial with"). Problem: this can only be understood in terms of "is the same flux as". So circular. VsFour-Dimensionalism/VsProcess-Ontology: he did not succeed in eliminating all singular or general terms that denote continuants. Process-Ontology/Four-Dimensionalism/SimonsVsProcess-Ontology: all representatives except Whitehead speak with a "split tongue" when it comes to concrete examples. Continuants/Quine: says he can "reconstruct them four-dimensionally". "Describe them as new". Reconstruction/Redescription/SimonsVsQuine: when something is rewritten, it gets a new description. Reconstruction is strictly speaking a discarding. So continuants must then disappear from our ontology and something else must take their place. Problem: thus, it is misleading to speak of river stages or cat stages. E.g. not one Philip stage is drunk, but the whole person is. For example, one does not bathe in one river stage, but in the whole river. Error: it cannot be right to change the subject and leave the predicate unchanged, and think you still have a true sentence! Similarly: Four-Dimensionalism/Cartwright: (1975,p. 167) "four dimensional objects have different careers". SimonsVsCartwright: only continuants like generals or opera singers have careers. Four-dimensional objects have no career, they are at best a career. Problem: if continuants are to disappear from ontology, then there is nothing that can be a career. That is talking with a "split tongue": you cannot enjoy the advantages of the old entities if you abolish them. Four-Dimensionalism needs a whole new way of speaking (unfamiliar, contrary to everyday language). Whitehead/Simons: is the only one who can do this and it is literally obscure. I 126 Process-Ontology/Simons: all this does not show their impossibility, only their alien nature. We must not only adopt continuants, but also events that involve them, especially changes of continuants. SimonsVsProcess-Ontology/SimonsVsVsFour-Dimensionalism: that the space-time requires the task of continuants is not so sure and rather depends on the circumstances. Certainly, Minkowski diagrams simply represent time as another (equal) dimension. I 127 Argument/Simons: it is not a conclusive argument to derive an ontology from a convenient representation. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Field Vs Leibniz, G.W. | I 39 Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: Leibniz’s modal argument VsSubstantivalism: (see above: "empty space real", not merely a logical construction): E.g. question: it is useful to assume the possibility of a world that is just like our actual world, just shifted one mile throughout its entire history? (LeibnizVsAbsolute Space: No!). Every possible world that is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the real world. LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: it must deny this: it must regard two such possible worlds as genuinely separate. And that seems absurd. FieldVsLeibniz: that seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not quite as strong an argument against the existence of electrons? E.g. (DS) There is a possible world, different from our actual world but qualitatively identical with it, merely shifted one mile in its entire history. (DE) There is a possible world, different from our actual world but qualitatively identical with it, it only differs from it in that electron A and electron B were reversed during its entire history. I 40 FieldVsLeibniz: that seems to be a difference! ((s) Vs: (> Feynman): the electrons must differ at least in the pulse (or one other parameter)). If they share all properties, it’s pointless. Field: But if the reality of spacetime regions implies (DS), does the reality of electrons not imply (DE) then? The "Leibniz argument against electrons" does not seem to be good! But why? Because the existence of electrons does not imply (DE) (Field pro), or because (DE) is ultimately not such a bad conclusion? (DE): can also be formulated without mention of possible worlds: it could have been possible in the actual world, that A and B had been reversed. (Similarly for (DS)). Leibniz Principle/Field: we accept that as a convention. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Leibniz, G.W. | Hegel Vs Leibniz, G.W. | Descartes I 47 Leibniz: model of the organism as mechanism. HegelVsLeibniz: organic models > romantic philosophy of nature. Prehistory: Descartes: movement emancipates itself, space geometrizes itself. The concept of space is then detached from the bodies that behave towards each other in space. Newton: "Absolute space" as a prerequisite of classical physical theory. |
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| Newton, I. | Berkeley Vs Newton, I. | John Gribbin Schrödingers Kätzchen Frankfurt/M 1998 III 318 Bucket Experiment/Newton/Gribbin: Newton: the water "knows" whether it moves relative to space - because: a) both at rest: flat, b) bucket accelerated against water: flat - c) both rotate: concave - d) bucket stops (again water moves against bucket) concave - BerkeleyVsNewton: not the absolute space, but the distant stars are decisive - > Mach's principle. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
| Plato | Aristotle Vs Plato | Bubner I 23 AristotleVsPlato: Distinction Theory/Practice: Vs linking the theory of ideas to ethics. The elevation of good to an idea must be rejected as well as the leading role of the highest knowledge in the form of the philosophers' king. Aristotle: The practical good that is accessible to all men differs from the eternal objects. Ontology: therefore, the good as a principle is not really meaningful in it. I 119 Knowledge/Menon/Plato: Aporia: either you cannot learn anything, or only what you already know. Plato responds to that with the myth of Anamnesis. (Memories form the past life of the soul). Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato (Menon): no knowledge arises from nothing. In the case of syllogism and epagogé (nowadays controversial whether it is to be construed as induction) there is prior knowledge. I 120 Universality/Knowledge/AristotleVsPlato: VsAnamnesis: also knowledge about the universal comes from sensory experience and epagogé. I 164 Metaphysics/Aristotle/Bubner: two main complexes: 1) general doctrine of being, modern: ontology, 2) The doctrine of the highest being, which Aristotle himself calls theology. The relationship between the two is problematic. AristotleVsPlato: not ideas as explanation of the world, but historical development. I 165 Good/Good/AristotleVsPlato: VsIdea of Good as the Supreme: even with friends one must cherish the truth as something "sacred". No practical benefit is to be achieved through the idealization of the good. Nicomachean Ethics: Theorem: The good is only present in the horizon of all kinds of activities. "Good" means the qualification of goals for action, the for-the-sake-of-which. I 184 Subject/Object/Hegel/Bubner: under the title of recognition, Hegel determines the S/O relation towards two sides: theory and practice. (Based on the model of AristotleVsPlato's separation of the empirical and the ideal). Also HegelVsKant: "radical separation of reason from experience". --- Kanitscheider II 35 Time/Zenon: (490 430) (pupil of Parmenides) the assumption of the reality of a temporal sequence leads to paradoxes. Time/Eleatics: the being is the self-contained sphere of the universe. Time/Space/Aristotle: relational ontology of space and time. (most common position). "Not the movement itself is time, but the numeral factor of the movement. The difference between more and less is determined by the number of quantitative difference in motion" (time specification). "Consequently, time is of the type of the number". II 36 Time/Plato: origin in the cosmic movement. (Equality with movement). Time/AristotleVsPlato: there are many different movements in the sky, but only one time. Nevertheless, dependence on time and movement. First, the sizeability of the variable must be clarified. World/Plato: Sky is part of the field of created things. Therefore cause, so the world must have a beginning in time. AristotleVsPlato: since there are no absolute processes of creation and annihilation (according to the causal principle) there cannot have been an absolute point zero in the creation of the world. >Lucretius: Genetic Principle/Lucrez: "No thing has arisen out of nothing, not even with divine help". Space/Time/LeibnizVsNewton: (Vs "absolute space" and "absolute time": instead, relational stature of space as ordo coexistendi rerum, and time as ordo succedendi rerum. II 37 Space reveals itself as a storage possibility of things, if the objects are not considered individually, but as a whole. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | Chisholm Vs Quine, W.V.O. | III 86 Analytic/Synthetic/Chisholm: many authors maintain that the distinction is untenable. III 87 1. for that one would have to speak of necessity 2. from the behavior of people it is not evident that their language is such that it is necessarily true: if a certain expression applies to something, then it applies also another way of saying the same thing. 3. The behavior does also not show the need that two expressions must apply to the same thing. ChisholmVsQuine/Chisholm: That together, if it were true, would be insufficient to show that the distinction is untenable. An additional premise would have to contain a philosophical generalization on the conditions for such a distinction. Generalization/Chisholm: how would it be defended: we see that in connection with the question of the criterion (see below) and skepticism (see below) - ChisholmVsQuine: none of the possible generalizations was ever defended. Therefore, it is not true that the distinction analytic/synthetic was proved untenable. Simons I 124 Event/occurrents/Ontology/Chisholm/Simons: Chisholm disproves three arguments for the ontology of events (occurrences): (Chisholm 1976, Appendix A) 1. Argument of spatial analogy: there is a great disanalogy between space and time: a thing cannot be in two different places at the same time, but a thing can be in the same place at two different times. ChisholmVs: this is not conclusive, a defender of temporal parts can argue against it. But then he can use this argument to argue for his thesis without circularity. 2. Argument of change: for example, how can Philip be drunk once and sober once? For him, both are contradictory together. ChisholmVsFour-Dimensionalism/Solution: instead of saying a time stage of Philip is (timelessly) drunk, we simply say in everyday language: he was drunk last night and is now sober. Either we use grammatical times like in everyday language or we relativize our predicates to the time ((s) "have-at-t", "be-at-t".) 3. Argument of the river (not "flux-argument"): Example River/QuineVsHeraclitus: Quine uses the temporal extension of the river on the same level as the spatial extension. ChisholmVsQuine: not every sum of river stages is a river process. I 125 Solution/Chisholm: we have to say what conditions a sum has to meet to be a river process. ChisholmVsQuine: Problem: this again requires continuants: (river banks, human observers) or a theory of absolute space or the introduction of a technical term ((s) predicate) "is cofluvial with"). Problem: this can only be understood in terms of "is the same flux as". So circular. VsFour-Dimensionalism/VsProcess-Ontology: he did not succeed in eliminating all singular or general terms that denote continuants. |
Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Substantivalism | Leibniz Vs Substantivalism | Field I 39 Metaphysical Possibility/Essentialism/Modality/Leibniz/Field: the modal argument of Leibniz VsSubstantivalismus: (see above: "empty space is real", not only a logical construction): e.g. question: Does it make sense to accept the possibility of a possible world (poss.w.), which is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (LeibnizVsabsolute space: No!). Every poss.w. which is qualitatively identical with our world would simply be the actual world. LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: He must deny this: Substantivalism needs to take two of those poss.w. as truly separate. And this seems absurd. FieldVsLeibniz: That seems convincing at first glance. But (Horwich, 1978) is it not a strong argument against the existence of electrons as well? e.g. (DS) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one, with the exception of its history which is shifted one mile. (DE) There is a poss.w. which is distinct from our actual world, but is exactly like our actual one. The only difference between the two is that in the poss.w. electron A and B were reversed during all its history. I 40 FieldVsLeibniz: There seems to be a difference. Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999 VIII 57 Symmetry/Equilibrium/Genz: a balance scale can also be stable in a slanted position! - equilibrium is indifferent ->Sombrero- Leibniz Vs: e.g. >Buridan's donkey. If there is no sufficient reason for a deviation, then there will not be one - Leibniz: there is no indifferent equilibrium > LeibnizVsSubstantivalism: there can be no independent space - because then the universe could be shifted (pointless) - today: VsLeibniz – Solution: spontaneous symmetry breaking. |
Lei II G. W. Leibniz Philosophical Texts (Oxford Philosophical Texts) Oxford 1998 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Various Authors | Berkeley Vs Various Authors | Ber I 224 Absolute/time/space/science/BerkeleyVsNewton: there is no absolute time, no absolute space, no absolute motion, no absolute force. I 225 Theological root: an idea is not cause of another idea, a force is not cause of another force. Cause of all natural things is only God. Reality/Time/BerkeleyVsNewton: God gives us a sequence of ideas. Therefore, there is no absolute time. Time is the series of these ideas. Bucket Experiment/BerkeleyVsNewton: tries to show that there is no absolute space, but its refutation is flawed. Yet there is no absolute space. Science/VsBerkeley: how is a natural science possible at all, if all perceptions are not confused, but directly caused by God? Solution/Berkeley: just as he clings to the reality of things, he also clings to the regularity of natural phenomena, which could also be broken by him as a result of the Creator's goodness and wisdom. Ber I 212 BerkeleyVsScholasticism: its "pros and cons" (Sic et Non) had become fashionable. Mirror only uncertainty. Since Descartes: there have been attempts to escape the controversy by withdrawing to unquestionable knowledge in order to begin a new construction. |
G. Berkeley I Breidert Berkeley: Wahrnnehmung und Wirklichkeit, aus Speck(Hg) Grundprobleme der gr. Philosophen, Göttingen (UTB) 1997 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mach Principle | Mach, E | Kanitscheider I 376 Mach’s Principle / laws / Kanitscheider: fixed stars instead of "absolute space" - (Berkeley: rotation against absolute space unobservable) - Mach thesis: there can only be relative motion - problem: then the matter has its inertia property just because there is other matter - Russell: the laws of nature can be formulated without taking into account existence of matter - Kanitscheider per - it is not part of their meaning, that matter exists. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| absolute Space | Newton, I. | Kanitscheider II 38 Materie/Raum/Descartes: neu: absolutistische Raumauffassung besonderer Art: Die Geometrie wird dem Raum nicht von außen durch Objekte aufgeprägt, sondern besitzt die geometrische Struktur innerlich - NewtonVsDescartes: nicht Ausdehnung, sondern träge Masse ist die Schlüsseleigenschaft der Materie. Newton: These: Raum ist absolut, von Materie unabhängig. II 39 Einstein: es gibt keinen "feld-leeren" Raum. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 |
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