Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denotation | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 328 Denotation/Reference/Wittgenstein: language game: reference occurs only within a language game. - On the other hand: Denotation: runs without a language game. >Reference, >Language game. Hintikka: It is precisely the absence of a language game that Wittgenstein emphasizes with the expression "denotate". I 327 ff Denotation/Description/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: a simple relationship of the type "denotation" only has content if the corresponding object exists and is open to the public. "Naming is something like attaching a name tag to an object." (WittgensteinVs, QuineVs) I 328 Remarks on the philosophy of Psychology/Wittgenstein: e.g. names that have meaning only in company of their bearers. They serve only for the avoidance of the constant pointing/showing, example: lines, points, angles in geometric figures, with A, B, C, ..a, b. etc." Denotation/Wittgenstein/Beetle Example/Hintikka: as Wittgenstein puts it, it is quite possible that everyone has something different in the box. If that were the case, we would not use the word "beetle" to describe a thing. For the word beetle to make sense, a public language game is needed to support it semantically. But it is precisely the lack of a language game that Wittgenstein emphasizes with the expression "denotating". Color/Definition/Reference/Wittgenstein: Now we can understand what Wittgenstein means when he says: ""red" means the color that comes to my mind when I hear the word "red"" would be a definition. No explanation of the nature of the denotation by a word. >Colour. The point loses its essence if "denotation" is understood here in the sense of "name". Even a completely successful definition does not indicate what it means that the definition refers directly - i.e. without language play - to its subject. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Mentalese | Black | II 99 Mentalese/language of thought/Black: precursor: Ockham. Ockham presumed for it even genus, case, number. BlackVs: neither speaker nor listener uses it to refer to images in the mind. Instead: public articulation. >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mental states, >Meaning, >Communication, cf. >Beetle example, >Mentalism. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Perspective | Nagel | Frank I 142ff Perspective/Nagel: is not something that is only accessible to a single individual - it is rather a type. ((s) If we were unable to take the perspective of someone else, we would not know what the concept means - If perspective belonged only to us, the concept would exist just as little as Wittgenstein’s Beetle). >Beetle example. I 145 Nagel: it is the concepts which are bound to perspective, not the physical structure. - Hence the different structure of the bat(1) is not an argument against understanding. - We can give up our perspective in favor of another and yet mean same things.(1) 1. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450 I 52 Perspective/subjectivity/Nagel: there is no place where the perspectivist could settle. Peacocke I 167 I/Nagel: I am not truer from one point of of view than from another. - The world contains no points of view - no facts of the first person. >First Person, >World, >World/thinking, >Objectivity/Nagel. |
NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Principles | Strawson | V 13 Def "Sense Principle"/Strawson: there is no legitimate use of ideas or concepts that would not refer to the empirical conditions of its application. - (VsMetaphysics) >Language use, >Language behavior, >Sense, >Senseless, >Foundation, >Metaphysics, cf. >Private language, >Beetle example. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 |
| Privileged Access | Wittgenstein | Hintikka I 316 ff Beetle-Example/private experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the existence of the beetle is not disputed - Problem: comparison only through public language - Color: problem actually the concept of color uniformity (i.e., the method of comparison). - Experiences: the problem is not that the memory can be deceptive, but it is not defined what it actually is what we should remember. - Wittgenstein: an explanation cannot be uttered. I 320 Sensations are private - sensation language cannot be private. - Wittgenstein does not criticize the metaphysics of Descartes - but his semantics. >Experience, >Sensations. Beetle-Example/language game/private experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the linking of experiences with words or gestures is a semantic (logical) one - it is not about remembering one's own experiences - this is not a step in the language game. - ((s) Because it takes place without words of the public language.) I 342 It's not about imperceptibility but about the impossibility of comparison with others. >Incorrigibility. I 332f I 348 Primary language games/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: Steps in them are not correctable - otherwise they could not serve as the basis of the relation language/world - in primary language games there are no criteria - but they can provide criteria as a whole for mental processes. - Terminology: "primary language games": for Wittgenstein: "beginning of the language game". >Language games. I 375 Definition Beetle Example/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: = the question whether the terms for private experiences are actually names of these experiences - that is not the same as the question of "natural expressions" for sensations. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Rule Following | Rule following, philosophy: is an expression for a problem that L. Wittgenstein formulated by excluding that a person could follow a rule that applies only to them as an individual. See also private language, rules, feelings, meaning, beetle example. |
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| Sensations | Millikan | I 303 Senstation Language/Sensation/Private Language/Wittgenstein/MillikanVsWittgenstein/Millikan: the problem is not quite what Wittgenstein meant. It is not impossible to develop a private language, but one cannot develop languages that speak only of what can be seen only once and from a single point of view. >Private language/Millikan, >Private language/Wittgenstein, cf. >Beetle example. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Sensations | Wittgenstein | Rorty I 128 Wittgenstein: sensations would have some half of an existence between nothingness and something, they would "fell out" of the world like the beetle in the box. >Beetle example. Wittgenstein: sensation "not something, but also not nothing. The result was that a nothing would do the same services as the something about what cannot be stated." (Philosophical Investigations § 304.) RortyVsWittgenstein: confusion of the concept of incorrigibility with the notion of incommunicability. >Incorrigibility. --- Rorty VI 147 Sensation/Wittgenstein: Feeling alone (without language) is not enough. --- Dummett I 35 WittgensteinVsFrege: no personal objects (sensations), otherwise private language, for the subject itself unrecognizable. >Private Language, >Beetle example. --- Wittgenstein VI 118 Sensation/Wittgenstein/Schulte: a sentence about the sensations, because it completely remains at the level of linguistics, is outside the true/false dimension. VI 199f Sensation/Wittgenstein/Schulte: has no object. >Object. VI 200 Expression: is not description (but more direct). >Description. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wittgenstein | Newen Vs Wittgenstein | New I 94 Object/Thing/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Newen: the question of what kind the objects of the Tractatus are is still controversial: 1) James Griffin: simple physical particles 2) Hintikka: points in the visual field 3) H. Ishiguro: exemplifications of not further reducable properties 4) Peter Carruthers: everyday objects. Object/Tractatus/NewenVsTractatus/NewenVsWittgenstein/Newen: there are conflicting principles here, one of which must be abandoned I 95 to be able to determine the object level: (i) elementary propositions have the form "Fa", "Rab"... external properties are attributed. (ii) external and internal properties relate to each other like different dimensions, e.g. lengths and colors. (iii) elementary propositions are logically independent. Problem: then the truth value of a sentence "Ga" may depend on that of a sentence "Fa". E.g. a point cannot be red and blue at the same time. Point: but then the sentences are no longer independent. Wittgenstein/VsWittgenstein/Self-Criticism/Newen: Wittgenstein himself noted this in his 1929 essay Some Remarks on Logical Form. I 98 Elementary Proposition/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Newen: sentences over points in the visual field or physical particles are no elementary propositions there, because they cannot be independent ((s) it must be possible to exclude opposing properties). I 99 Middle Wittgenstein: recognizes a basic structure in dependence that cannot be eliminated. Example "What is blue is not red." Sentence Meaning/PU/Wittgenstein/Newen: the meaning of sentences can therefore not only be guaranteed by the representative relation of names. Representation Theory/WittgensteinVsWittgenstein/Self-Criticism/Wittgenstein/Newen: the representation theory must therefore be revised. 100 Middle Wittgenstein/Newen: Thesis: The meaning of characters is determined by the syntactic rules of his language system. VsWittgenstein/Newen: the question of how these syntactic rules are made is not answered here. NS I 35 Rule-Following/Wittgenstein: means acting according to a custom. Without justification or consideration. It is simply the competency of acting in a learned, conventional and natural way. Custom/Convention: customs are not valid because they have been established or agreed, but because usually everybody feels bound by them. This also applies to rules that define the meaning of a linguistic sign. ((s) Rules/(s): thus establish something, but are not determined themselves, but generally agreed and stable.) NS I 36 VsWittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: the vagueness of usages. There are also misuses which would have to be included as meaning constituting. They can be very widely spread. VsWittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: Problem: holism of usages: when a single new usage is introduced, the meaning of the expression would have to change. NS I 37 Beetle Example/Private Language/Wittgenstein/Newen/Schrenk: the expression "beetle" can have a clear use, even if everyone has a different beetle in their box or if the box is empty! Wittgenstein: even if the thing changed continually. The thing in the box does not belong to the language game. Never even once as a something. (§ 293). Newen/Schrenk: this shows that the meaning of an expression is not defined by the fact that we have a sensation, but by the practice of a community. One person alone cannot give meaning expressions. NS I 38 Newen/SchrenkVsWittgenstein: E.g. Robinson can, however, introduce words for pineapple etc. thanks to a regularity of nature. WittgensteinVsVs/Newen/Schrenk: would argue 1) that Robinson cannot establish customs, because he would not notice if he deviated from them. ((s) Vs: why not? He still has the time sequence.) Then there would be no difference anymore between following and believing to follow. VsVs/Newen/Schrenk: 2) Another objection would be that Robinson can only form categories, because he learned in his community how to make categories. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
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