Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Entry
Reference
Causality Mayr I 62
Causality/Mayr: most scientists assume that there is a historical and causal continuity for all phenomena in the material universe.
I 101
Cause/Biology: It can be difficult or even impossible to pinpoint the exact cause in an interaction of complex systems. >Cause, >Effect, >Causal explanation, >Single-case causation.
I 102
Strict causality can usually be identified by retrospectively looking at the option chosen at each step of the action chain. In retrospect, even randomly chosen components can be seen as causal.
I 363ff
Causality/Mayr: especially for animals strictly causal sequences can be proven! >Animals, >Behavior.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Causation Bigelow I 276
Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we should understand it as a relation between events (in a broad sense). Speech of causation/causality/Davidson/Bigelow/Pargetter. We take over from Davidson (1980)(1):
Problem: singular causal statements. E.g.
"The short circuit caused the fire."
>Causality, >Causes, >Observation sentences.
Truth conditions: the statements can be true because the relation exists, even if it is clear that short circuits are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for fire.
>Truth conditions.
Generalization: can be true, but only if we reword the sentence.
>Generalization/Bigelow.
Causal Relation/Davidson/Bigelow/Pargetter: exists, if and only iff there is a way of describing the events so that they can be brought under a general causal law.
>Causal relation.
BigelowVsDavidson: (see above) the causal relation is rather local than global.
BigelowVsDavidson: the nature of the causal relation is not derived from the existence of an underlying law.
>Laws.
I 277
Bigelow/Pargetter pro Davidson: however, the truth conditions of a singular causal statement require the existence of a relation (but not under a description). Causal statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: some must be rewritten: E.g.
"The stone caused the window pane to break."
Must be rewritten to:
"That the stone touched the window pane caused the window pane to break."
E.g.
"Becker's easy victory over Lendl surprised the commentators."
Must be changed:
"Becker's victory surprised ... and if it had not been easy, it would not have been surprising."
Bigelow pro Davidson: So far his theory is convincing.
Causality/causal statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: sometimes we must also make general causal statements:
For this, we need types of events or properties of events.
Causal statements: must then be counterfactual conditionals: E.g.
"If Lendl's defeat had not been so clear, it would not have been surprising."
E.g.
"The antidote slowed the death of Protheros."
This seems to require causal relations between characteristics of events (e.g. lightness, slowing).
I 278
Universals: are sometimes used here. Sometimes it is about unique events, sometimes about characteristics of events. >Universals, >Events.
Problem: why should the relations between such different entities be summarized? Why should they all be causal?
Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: we must assume that they all supervene on a basic causal relation. This can not be specified in modal terms.
>Modalities.
Causal Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is largely unknown to us. It is best to recognize it when it is encountered.
I 279
Our task is now to figure out what it is. This is a metaphysical, not a semantic task. >Metaphysics, >Semantics.
I 288
Causation/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Let's assume that we can close the gap between everyday forces and the fundamental forces.
I 289
Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: how do we justify that we have chosen forces for the explanation? >Forces, >Forces/Bigelow.
Explanation/David Fair/FairVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Fair 1979)(2): he selects instead of forces energy flow.
((s) >Energy transfer/Gerhard Vollmer).
Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: we take them because they occur in Newton's 3rd law. For us, there are two instances of causation then, because there are two forces.
David Fair: for him it is an instance of energy flow and thus a causation.
BigelowVsFair: his theory does not provide the right relations of higher levels between universals that we need.
Energy flow/energy transfer/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: this term requires the identification of packages of energy in time.
Energy/Cause/Effect/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: The energy present in the effect is numerically identical to the energy lost in the cause.
Problem/BigelowVsFair: but there is also cause, where no energy is transmitted, but only impulse. Therefore, it needs a shared access. Then the causation is hardly a unifying element in any explanation.
Problem: besides, there are cases where both energy and impulse are transmitted, and how should one choose then? The causation cannot be identified with both. ((s) also BigelowVsVollmer).
>Single-case causation, >G.Vollmer.
I 290
BigelowVsFair: besides, energy transmission and pulse transmission supervene on properties and relations. Therefore, according to Fair, there can be no Humean world, which coincides with a causal possible world in all properties of the 1st level. This should, however, be possible (see Chapter 5): a theory that allows this must also recognize causation as a relation of a higher level. Fair cannot do this. >Levels/order, >Description levels.


1. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and and events. Oxford University Press.
2. Fair, D. (1979). Causation and the flow of energy. erkenntnis 14, pp. 219-50

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Classification Mayr I 133
Classification: Classification usually is done by logical division downwards: how many species are classified and what weight do the different characteristics have: "progressive" or "downwards classification". (Actually identification). >Identification, >Individuation, >Specification.
Therefore later: "Upwards classification: hierarchical arrangement of ever-growing groups of related species into classes.
>Species.
Darwin's method confirmed the upward classification and thus triggered a scientific revolution.
>Darwinism, >Evolution.
I 134
Classification/20th Century (1950) two new schools: a) Numerical Phenetics
b) Cladistics.
Cladism: the cladist system is intended to reveal the history of the tribe only, while the evolutionary system strives to form taxa from the most similar and closely related species
(useful for ecology and biology).
>Ecology.
Both species can continue to coexist, because they have very different objectives.
I 173
Systematics: not only to describe but to contribute to understanding.
I 175
Def Class/Biology/Mayr: Grouping of entities that are similar and related to each other. Classification: two important functions:
a) recovery of information
b) comparative research. Information storage.
1) Classes should be as homogeneous as possible
2) Attribution according to most common characteristics,
3) If the differences are too great, create a new class
4) The degree of difference between classes is ordered in a hierarchy.
I 176
Taxonomy: two steps: 1) Differentiation of species (microtaxonomy).
2) Classification of species into related groups (macrotaxonomy).
I 177
Microtaxonomy: The delineation of the species "Species Problem": Species usually means "organism type".
Problem: Males and females are also different types of organisms, just like young and adult organisms.
Def "Variety": (Linné, even Darwin): Deviations that are slightly smaller than those of a new species. ("typological" or "essential concept of species"). ("Common essence" ("Nature")).
>Similarity.
"Typological concept of species: four characteristics:
1) Common "nature".
2) Between the species sharp discontinuity 3) Each species is spatially and temporally constant.
4) Possible variation within the species is strictly limited. ("Natural kind").
>Species, >Natural kinds, >Essence, >Essentialism.
I 178
MayrVsTypological Concept of Species: Darwin refutes the notion of ​​the "constancy of species". Populations vary geographically, individuals vary within a population. In the animate nature there are no types or essences! Def twin species: (discovered only recently: spatially separated, but equally developed, discovered in almost all animal species), forces a new criterion for the delineatation of species: reproductive isolation of populations.
I 178
Biological Concept of Species (VsTypological Concept of Species): derives from this criterion of the lack of reproduction among one another.
I 183
Def Species Taxa: special populations or population groups that correspond to the species definition. They are entities ("individuals") and cannot be defined as such. Individuals cannot be defined, but are merely described and delineated. >Definitions, >Definability.
I 185
Macrotaxonomy: The classification of species (in superordinate groups) Groups: Usually easily recognizable: birds, butterflies, beetles.
Downward classification (actually identification). Dichotomy (Aristotelian), high time of medical botany.
E.g. warm-blooded or not warm-blooded, with feathers or not.
I 187
Upwards Classification/Mayr: Even Linné himself from 1770 onwards: better suited. Classes are distinguished and then grouped into superordinate groups. Unfortunately no strict methodology. There was no theoretical basis for the hierarchy. Functional Classification: Sub-form of the upwards classification. Only selected features.
I 188
Two criteria: genealogy (common descent) and degree of similarity (extent of evolutionary change).
Causal classification: E.g. diseases according to causes: pathogen, aging process, toxic substances, genes, malignant changes, harmful radiation, etc.
>Causal explanation.
Any classification that takes into account the causes is subject to severe restrictions and can never become a purely artificial system.
I 189
"Taxon": Separate group of offspring. Each taxon consists of the descendants of the next common ancestor. "Monophyletic". Genealogy: Does not a classification make! Similarity cannot be neglected, because the diverging branches were subject to changes of varying extend. Result: Classification into families, genera, divisions, orders.
>Systems, >Theories, >Explanation, >Causes, >Effects,
>Single-case causation.
Homology/Mayr: Relationship between species and higher taxa is shown by the occurrence of homologous features. I.e. a feature derived from the same feature of its next common ancestor.
>Homology.
I 373
You must always infer homology! There is a lot of evidence for homology, e.g. position of a structure in relation to other structures, also transitional forms with fossil ancestors.
>Evidence.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Constants Vollmer II 59
Constants/explanation/physics/Vollmer: even the random values ​​e.g. the gravitational constant could be explained: by Mach's principle. "Cube world"/Wheeler: the constants are not explainable at all.
Cf. >Single-case causation/Vollmer, >Natural constants, >Explanation,
>Coincidence, >Necessity, >Natural laws.

Vollmer I
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988

Vollmer II
G. Vollmer
Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988

Explanation Mayr I 99
Biology: Questions: e.g. unique events: "Why are there no hummingbirds in the old world"? E.g. "Where did Homo sapiens begin?" This leads to historical representation as the only possible form. This approach is fundamentally different from the explanation by means of causal laws. One can never categorically prove that a historical representation is "true".
>Single-case causation, >Causality, >Causal explanation, >History,
>Historiography.
I 100
Reproducibility/Science: the uniqueness is not reserved for the living nature! E.g. each of the nine planets is unique. Every mountain range and stream has unique features on the earth. Hume/Science: cannot say anything satisfying about the cause of any unique phenomenon.
>Causes, >Effect, >Causality/Hume.
MayrVsHume: the historical representation can often explain unique events satisfactorily and sometimes even make verifiable predictions.
>History/Mayr).
I 101
History/Causation/Mayr: earlier events usually contribute causally to later ones. "Particularistic causality".
I 103
Biology/explanation/Mayr: here we often find more than a causal explanation. Perhaps one has to explain most of the phenomena of biology even with several theories! A theory of science that cannot cope with pluralism is unsuitable for biology. >Theories.
I 166
Explanation/biology: by direct causes: molecular biology, functional morphology, developmental biology, physiological genetics Indirect: evolutionary biology, classical genetics, ethology, systematics, comparative morphology, ecology.
Problem: separation of morphology and genetics. Overlaps.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Proofs Mayr I 114
Evidence/Mayr: it is certainly true that birds came to their feathers with the help of natural selection, but it is not to be proved! Why the acquisition was an advantage is even more difficult to prove! >Provability, Cf. >Single-case causation, >Causation, >Causality,
>Causal explanation.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998

Science Mayr I 51
Science/Mayr: puts great importance on the discovery of new "facts" that the creation of new concepts (or terms) moves into the background. Darwin would not have won the Nobel Prize because "selection" was not a "discovery" but a new concept, a new theory. >Discoveries/inventions, >Theories, >Facts.
I 54
Science/Mayr: the development against superstition, in the direction of provability, was unfavorable to biology itself, since it could not offer reproducible experiments. >Magical thinking.
I 56
John Moore (1993)(1) "Eight Criteria of Science": 1. Must be based on data obtained in the field or laboratory by observation or request
Without relying on natural factors.
2. In order to answer questions, data must be collected. In order to confirm assumptions observations must be done.
>Observation, >Experiments.
3. Objective methods must be used to avoid subjective bias.
>Method.
4. Hypotheses must agree with observations and concepts.
>Hypotheses, >Concepts, >Comparisons, >Comparability.
5. Any hypothesis must be verified, competing hypotheses have to be developed. Their suitability is to be compared.
6. Generalizations must be universally valid in the field of corresponding science. Unique events must be explainable, without supernatural factors.
>Generalization, >Generality, >Single-case causation.
7. Confirmation only after repetition.
>Confirmation, >Verification, >Justification.
8. Steadily improving theories.
>Progress.

I 58
"Provincial Science": a polemical concept, introduced for a distinction from physics whose law is universally valid.
I 62
Science/Biology/Mayr: the integration of biology into science philosophy has changed many of its principles: Rejection of strict determinism and trust in universal laws, the acceptance of purely probabilistic predictions and historical representations.
I 65
E. M. Carr (Spiritual Scientist) (1961)(2) Five Differences History/Science: 1. History: Special, Science: General
2. History does not teach lessons
3. History, unlike science, makes no predictions
4. History subjective, science: objective
5. History, unlike science, also touches religious and moral questions.
>Historiography, >Science, >Prediction, >Subjectivity,
>Objectivity, >Religion, >Morality, >Ethics.
I 141
Science/Evolution/Mayr: Difference: genetic diversity is random and not a fruit of considerations. This difference is not so important, however, because the source of diversity does not play an important role in Darwinism! Cultural transmission is something quite different than genetic inheritance.
But: the most appropriate theory comes through: this is a Darwinian process.
>Culture, >Cultural values, >Change in values, >Inheritance,
>Genes.

1. J. A. Moore (1993). Science as a Way of Knowing. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
2. E. H. Carr (1961). What is History? London: MacMillan.

Mayr I
Ernst Mayr
This is Biology, Cambridge/MA 1997
German Edition:
Das ist Biologie Heidelberg 1998



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