Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 9 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Congruence | Lyons | I 242 Def Congruence/Grammar/Lyons: (grammatical correspondence) of genus, number and case between verb and noun. (in all languages). The constituents are considered to be of equal rank, in contrast to the regimen, where the verb rules the "object" and the "subject" the verb (tradition). Congruence: between words of the same category Rection: (see below) between words of different categories. I 244 Congruence/Regimen/Modern Grammar/Lyons: new: here we describe the difference in the terms endocentric/exocentric. >Terminology/Lyons. Rection/Hockett: Rection can only be found in exocentric constructions. For example, ad urbem, differs distributionally from the constituents ad, and urbem. Congruence/Hockett: Congruence can be found in endocentric constructions, in a binding beyond hierarchical structures i.e. direct constituents, I 245 between certain predictive attributes and subjects. Congruence/Lyons: Congruence thus prevails both in endo- and in exocentric constructions e.g. un livre intéressant coincides distributionally with un livre, against this: Le livre est intéressant : (here too there is congruence between livre and intéressant) is exocentric, because its distribution differs from that of le livre on the one hand and that of intéressant on the other. >Distribution/Lyons. LyonsVsHockett: thus it is not true (as many have claimed) that a subject's number is determined by the person and the verb's number. What is also incorrect is (which is even more often claimed) that the subject and not the verb determines or vice versa, that rather subject and verb form a category that belongs to the construction of which they are members. Solution/Lyons: (see below) Numerus and person are nominal categories, which can be identified flexibly or otherwise somehow in the surface structure of the verbal complex. >Surface structure, >Deep structure. Tradition: expresses it this way: "The verb corresponds to the subject in number and person". I 245 Congruence/Subject-verb-congruence/context-independent/Lyons: Example (1a) The dog bites the man (1b) The dog bites the men I 246 (1c) The dogs bite the man (1d) The dogs bite the men (2a) The chimpanzee eats the banana usw. Context-independent Grammar/Lyons: e.g (1) ∑ > NP sing + VP sing or NP plur + VP plur. (2) VP sing > V sing + NP (3) VP plur > V plur + NP (4) NP > NP sing or NP plur (5) NP sing > T + N sing (6) NP plur > T + N plur (7) N sing > N + 0 (Zero) (8) N plur > N + s (9) V sing > V + s (10) V plur > V + 0 More than one symbol is replaced at a time. Lexical Substitutions/Lyons: here we assume that their rules are outside grammar. >Lexicon, >Grammar. I 247 Congruence/context-dependent grammar/Lyons: Suppose we want to take into account the fact that the subject's number determines the verb's number. I 248 We follow approximately Chomsky's "Syntactic Structures" (N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, Berlin, New York 1957): (here still without transformational rules): (1) ∑ > NP + VP (2) VP > Verb + NP (3) NP > NP sing or NP plur (4) Verb > V + s/in the context NP sing + ... or V + 0/in the context NP plur + ... (5) NP sing > T + N + 0 (6) NP plur > T + N + s New: Here we get along with only 6 instead of 10 rules. New: It completely disappears that the noun is the carrier word of the nominal complex. Context dependency: N.B.: according to rule (1) all sentences created by these rules are of the same type (NP + VP). Rule (3): The number becomes a category of the nominal complex, regardless of whether it occurs as subject or object. Rule (4): The number in the verb is determined by the preceding nominal expression. That depends on the context. N.B.: in this way the rule can only be formulated in a system of concatenation rules (see above I 212: linear). The nominal expression on the left determines the congruence, not the expression on the right. I 249 Subject/object: since the left-standing nominal complex is derived from the NP created by rule (1), it can be interpreted as a subject and not as an object. >Transformational grammar, >Transformation rules. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Formal Language | Weizenbaum | I 143 Meaning/Programming Language/Program/Computer/Weizenbaum: in a hierarchy of programming languages whose lowest level is machine language, a higher-level programming language is in reality a formal language. >Language, >Computer languages, >Computer programming, >Software, >Formal language, cf. >Ideal language. The meanings of expressions written in this language are defined (...) by their transformation rules, which in turn are embodied in the procedures they translate into assembler- and ultimately into machine language. For the meanings one would have to refer to the machine language (with the symbols 0 and 1) and finally to the machine itself. Then you would say, "The program means what this machine does with this code. Problem: the translator (assembler) is itself a program that transforms the computer into a completely different machine. I 144 One could say that the distinctions between languages and their embodiments by machines disappear. Programming language: can be understood as a machine itself, ultimately every formal language at a higher level is an abstract machine. |
Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Grammar | Chomsky | Searle VIII 414 ChomskyVsStructuralism: phrase structure rules alone cannot resolve ambiguities. E.g. >Active/Passive. Solution/Chomsky: transformation rules, transformation phrase markers by permutation, insertion, eradication of elements in other phrase markers - then the syntax consists of two components: base and transformation. VIII 418 Deep structure/Chomsky: determines the meaning. >Meaning. Surface structure: determines the phonetic form (late works: sometimes the meaning). Syntax/Chomsky: is to be separated from semantics - (according to Searle): man is a syntactic creature, the brain is syntactic. >Syntax. VIII 421 SearleVsChomsky: from this it would follow that if one day we had syntactically modified forms, we would have no language anymore, but something else. VIII 421 Generative grammar/NeogrammariansVsChomsky: semantics crucial for the formation of syntactic structures. >Young turks, >Neogrammarians. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Language | Quine | X 134 Language/Carnap/Quine: the language is presented as a deductive system Carnap - 1. Formation rules: Deliver the grammar and the lexicon so that they deliver the well formed formulas - 2. Transformation rules: these provide logical truths (including the mathematical, generally the analytical truths). >Logical Truth/Quine.# VI 17 Ontology/Language/Quine: as far as the assumption of a scientific theory can be called a linguistic matter, the assumption of an ontology can also be called a linguistic matter - but not more than this. >Ontology/Quine. VI 63 Language/Observation/Translation/Quine: most of our utterances are not correlated with stimuli at all, e.g. connectives etc. VI 64 The linguist can create an archive of uninterpreted sentences and dissect them. Recurring segments can be treated as words. (Analytical hypothesis). VI 65 Ultimately, we depend on very poor data material. We can expect successive statements to have something to do with each other. Later, the translator will be dependent on psychological hypotheses. What will the jungle inhabitants most likely believe to be true? What will they probably believe? VI 66 In this case, preference is given to recognizably rational translations. But to establish an alleged grammar and semantics of the natives would be nothing more than bad psychology. Instead one should assume that the psyche of the natives is largely like ours. VI 67 When the linguist discovers an error, he will wonder how far back it goes. VI 105 Language/QuineVsMentalism: The prerequisite of language is that people perceive that others perceive something. This, however, is the seduction to overstretch the mentalistic way of speaking. Mentalism. VII (b) 26 Definition/Quine: can serve two opposite purposes: 1. abbreviation and practical representation (short notation) 2. reverse: redundancy in grammar and vocabulary. Economical vocabulary leads to longer strings. Conversely, economical vocabulary simplifies the theoretical discourse about a language. Language/Quine: by habit these two types are fused together, one as part of the other: External language: is redundant in grammar and vocabulary and economical in terms of the length of strings. Partial language "primitive notation": is economical in grammar and vocabulary. VII (b) 27 Part and whole are connected by translation rules. We call these definitions. They are not assigned to one of the two languages, but connect them. But they are not arbitrary. They should show how primitive notations can serve all purposes. VII (d) 61 Language/Translation/Whorf/Cassirer/Quine: you cannot separate the language from the rest of the world. Differences in language will correspond to differences in life form. Therefore, it is not at all clear how to assume that words and syntax change from language to language while the content remains fixed. VII (d) 77 Introduction/Language/General Term/Quine: the use of general terms has probably arisen in the course of language development because similar stimuli cause similar reactions. Language would be impossible without general terms. In order to understand them, one must recognize the additional operator "class of" or "-ness" when introducing them. Failure to do so was probably the reason for accepting abstract entities. >General Terms/Quine. VII (d) 78 Science/Language/Quine: how much of our science is actually contributed by language, and how much is an original (real) reflection of reality? To answer this, we have to talk about both the world and the language! ((s) And that is already the answer!) Quine: and in order to talk about the world, we have to presuppose a certain conceptual scheme that belongs to our particular language. Conceptual Scheme/Quine: we were born into it, but we can change it bit by bit, like Neurath's ship. VII (d) 79 Language/Quine: its purpose is efficiency in communication and prediction. Elegance is even added as an end in itself. X 34/35 Truth/Language/Quine: Truth depends on language, because it is possible that sounds or characters in one language are equivalent to "2 < 5" and in another to "2 > 5". When meaning changes over many years within a language, we think that they are two different languages. Because of this relativity, it makes sense to attribute a truth value only to tokens of sentences. Truth/World/Quine: the desire for an extra-linguistic basis for truth arises only if one ignores the fact that the truth predicate has precisely the purpose of linking the mention of linguistic forms with the interest in the objective world. X 42 Immanent/Language/Quine: are immanent in language: educational rules, grammatical categories, the concept of the word, or technically: the morpheme. ad X 62 Object language/meta language/mention/use/(s): the object language is mentioned (spoken about), the meta language is used to speak about the object language. X 87 Language/Grammar/Quine: the same language - the same infinite set of sentences can be created with different educational rules from different lexicons. Therefore, the concept (definition) of logical truth is not transcendent, but (language) immanent. (logical truth: is always related to a certain language, because of grammatical structure). >Logical Truth/Quine. Dependence on language and its grammatization. XI 114 Theory/Language/Quine/Lauener: we do not have to have an interpreted language in order to formulate a theory afterwards. This is the rejection of the isolated content of theoretical sentences. Language/Syntax/Lauener: Language cannot be considered purely syntactically as the set of all correctly formed expressions, because an uninterpreted system is a mere formalism. ((s) Such a system is not truthful). XI 115 Language/Theory/ChomskyVsQuine/Lauener: a person's language and theory are different systems in any case, even if you would agree with Quine otherwise. XI 116 Quine: (ditto). Uncertainty of translation: because of it one cannot speak of a theory invariant to translations. Nor can one say that an absolute theory can be formulated in different languages, or conversely that different (even contradictory) theories can be expressed in one language. ((s) Because of the ontological statement that I cannot argue about ontology by telling the other that the things that exist in it do not exist in me, because then I contradict myself that there are things that do not exist). Lauener: that would correspond to the fallacy that language contributes to the syntax but theory to the empirical content. Language/Theory/Quine/Lauener: i.e. not that there is no contradiction between the two at all: insofar as two different theories are laid down in the same language, this means that the expressions are not interchangeable in all expressions. But there are also contexts where the distinction between language and theory has no meaning. Therefore, the difference is gradual. The contexts where language and theory are interchangeable are those where Quine speaks of a network. V 32 Def Language/Quine: is a "complex of dispositions to linguistic behaviour". V 59 Language/Quine: ideas may be one way or the other, but words are out there where you can see and hear them. Nominalism/Quine: turns away from ideas and towards words. Language/QuineVsLocke: does not serve to transmit ideas! (> NominalismVsLocke). >Nominalism. Quine: it is probably true that when we learn a language we learn how to connect words with the same ideas (if you accept ideas). Problem: how do you know that these ideas are the same? V 89 Composition/language/animal/animal language/Quine: animals lack the ability to assemble expressions. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Meaning | Weizenbaum | I 143 Meaning/Programming Language/Program/Computer/Weizenbaum: in a hierarchy of programming languages whose lowest level is machine language, a higher-level programming language is in reality a formal language. >Language, >Computer languages, >Computer programming, >Software, >Formal language, cf. >Ideal language. The meanings of expressions written in this language are defined (...) by their transformation rules, which in turn are embodied in the procedures they translate into assembler- and ultimately into machine language. For the meanings one would have to refer to the machine language (with the symbols 0 and 1) and finally to the machine itself. Then one would say: the program means what this machine does with this code. Problem: the translator (assembler) is itself a program that transforms the computer into a completely different machine. I 144 One could say that the distinctions between languages and their embodiments by machines disappear. >Robots. Programming language: can be understood as a machine itself, ultimately every formal language at a higher level is an abstract machine. >Abstraction, >Abstractness. |
Weizenbaum I Joseph Weizenbaum Computer Power and Human Reason. From Judgment to Calculation, W. H. Freeman & Comp. 1976 German Edition: Die Macht der Computer und die Ohnmacht der Vernunft Frankfurt/M. 1978 |
| Propositions | Foucault | II 128ff Statement/Proposition/Discourse/Foucault: There is no general, independent, neutral statement. Proposition: An alphabet, construction rules or transformation rules of a formal system are required. Then one can define the first proposition of this language completely, but not the statement. There is no statement that requires no others. No first statement. Statement/Foucault: is that which places the units of meaning in a space in which they multiply. Statement: must have material existence. Also time and space. Cf. >Inscription/Goodman. Problems: Does each repetition form a new statement? Translation? Identity? >Statement, >Translation, >Repetition, >Identity, >Rules >Utterance. |
Foucault I M. Foucault Les mots et les choses: Une archéologie des sciences humaines , Paris 1966 - The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970 German Edition: Die Ordnung der Dinge. Eine Archäologie der Humanwissenschaften Frankfurt/M. 1994 Foucault II Michel Foucault l’Archéologie du savoir, Paris 1969 German Edition: Archäologie des Wissens Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Rules | Carnap | II 195 Rule/Carnap: an indication of a general rule for how statements that contain the term A, can be reformulated so that only B and C occur. Neutral towards realism/idealism. II 202 Rules/Carnap: a) form rules (syntax) b) transformation rules (logic) In principle no difference between them - hence syntax is expressible in the language. (VsWittgenstein). >Syntax, >Realism, >Idealism. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Rules | Chomsky | Lyons I 259 Phrase structure rules/PS-Rules/Chomsky: (N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, Berlin, New York 1957): (1) S > NP + VP (2) VP > Verb + NP (3) NP > NP sing or NP plur (4) NP sing > T * N + 0 (null) (5) NP plur > T + N + s (6) Verb > Aux + V (7) Aux > C(M) (have + en) (be + ing) (M = auxiliary) I 260 Lexical substitution/Lyons: we have ignored it here, but instead Lexicon/Chomsky: Example T = {the} N = {man, ball,…} V = {hit, take, walk, read,…} M = {will, can, shall, must} Rule (7): develops Aux into a chain with up to four elements. Of these, C is obligatory, (his task to regulate congruence relations is interpreted by a transformation rule). The other rules on the right side of (7) are optional. Each element is independent of the other two. The output of rule (7) will therefore contain one of the following eight chains (in Aux's position in the output of rule (6)): (1) C (2) C + M (3) C + have + en (4) C + be + ing (5) C + M + have + en (6) C + M + be + ing (7) C + have + en + be + ing (8) C + M + have + en + be + ing Definition Core Chain/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: this is the output of phrase structure rules (kernel string). Definition core sentence/kernel sentence: is any sentence created from a single core chain without the use of any optional transformations. Transformation rules/Chomsky: no sentence is created without applying at least a limited number of mandatory T-rules. It is wrong (how often assumed) that core sentences would be generated by phrase structure rules alone. I 264 T-rules/Chomsky/Lyons: are heterogeneous. The construction of a partial transformational grammar for a language itself is an enormously complex matter. Many factors influence the decision whether to apply a T-rule or a basic rule (Phrase structure rule, constituent structure rule) to a certain element. T-rules: not all of them are transformational by their very nature! Transformational: two criteria for "inherent" transformational rules: 1. Any rule that does not meet the conditions imposed by a constituent structure rule is transformational. I 265 2. Definition T-rule: is the one that in the symbol chain to the left of the replacement arrow contains at least one symbol that acts as a variable, which assumes as a value any one of the whole class of subchains that are dominated by this symbol in the P-marker. This P-marker belongs to the chain serving as a rule input. For example, all symbols (except V) are in this sense variables in the structural descriptions of the above passive transformation: SB: NP - Aux – V – NP V: on the other hand, is a constant: it is an end symbol that does not dominate any substring other than itself ("self-dominance" is therefore a formal requirement of the system). Transformation/Chomsky: the difference between constant and variable is fundamental for its definition. |
Chomsky I Noam Chomsky "Linguistics and Philosophy", in: Language and Philosophy, (Ed) Sidney Hook New York 1969 pp. 51-94 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky II Noam Chomsky "Some empirical assumptions in modern philosophy of language" in: Philosophy, Science, and Method, Essays in Honor of E. Nagel (Eds. S. Morgenbesser, P. Suppes and M- White) New York 1969, pp. 260-285 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Chomsky IV N. Chomsky Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge/MA 1965 German Edition: Aspekte der Syntaxtheorie Frankfurt 1978 Chomsky V N. Chomsky Language and Mind Cambridge 2006 Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
| Rules | Lyons | I 157 Rules/Grammar/Transformational Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Chomsky seems to reject this. In his opinion: ChomskyVsGrammatical rules: Thesis: The grammatical structure of the language is determined ((s) not according to the above rules) and is "intuitively" (unconsciously) mastered by the native speaker. (ChomskyVsRules due to the consequence of "uncertainty of grammar"/ChomskyVsUncertainty of grammar). Lyons: the differences in opinion here are exaggerated. Not all grammar is uncertain. I 219 Phrase structure grammar/Constituent grammar/Rules/Chomsky/Lyons: Each rule brackets the constituents that form the construction defined by it and also describes them. >Constituent grammar, >Phrase structure grammar. Layers: (of the structure) are determined by the order in which the rules are applied. Def Initial symbol/Terminology/Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Example ∑ for sentence ((s) stands farthest left or above a branch). Grammar: produces a chain of symbols by applying the rules. >Lexicon. Def End Symbol/Grammar/Lyons: specifies the class of elements of the lexicon e.g. adjective. Def End chain/terminal string/grammar/terminology/Lyons: consists of end symbols. I 220 Sentence/Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: occurs when we replace the end symbols from the end chain with an element of the lexical class they describe. Its constituent structure is fully determined by the replacement rules that create the end chain. >Terminology/Lyons. I 220 Replacement rules/Grammar/Alternative rules/Extension/Chomsky/Lyons: to distinguish transitive and intransitive verbs, we introduce: (1) ∑ > NP + Vp (2a) VP > V intr + Adv 2b) VP > V tr + Adv (3) Np > A + N. I 221 If we introduce the option between (2a) and (2b), we must change the word classification in the lexicon: V intr = [{ran, etc.} V ir = {love, kill, etc.}. >Word classes. Grammar/problem: it is still unsatisfactory: 1. It still produces illegal sentences such as Poor John kill old women ((s) no special form for 3rd person singular). Solution: we must consider the congruence between the "subject" and the verb. >Congruence/Lyons. 3 (we leave that out here). 2. as it stands now, we can only produce sentences with five words like "Old men love young women" or sentences with four words like "Poor John ran away". The following sentences are not possible: e.g. John ran away, e.g. Men love young women, e.g. Old men love women, e.g. Old men love young women passionately. Optional Rule/Extension/Grammar/Replacement Rules/Lyons: For example: we extend rules (3) by making two rules out of one: (3) NP > N (4) N > A + N We say that (3) is obligatory, but (4) optional. New: then we also get: e.g. John ran away, e.g. Men love young women, e.g. Old men love women etc. All these sentences are subtypes of the sentence type. ∑(NP + VP). This means that their structures are identical at a certain level of analysis. Family Tree/Structure Tree: Example (I) John ran away (II) Poor John ran away (III) Men love women (IV) Old men love women (V) Men love young women, (VI) Old men love young women I 223 Rules/Replacement Rules/Order/Grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: the priority of a certain order of rules over another can significantly change the result of the grammar. optional: e.g. (1) ∑ > NP + VP (2a) VP > V intr + Adv 2b) VP > V tr + Adv (3) Np > A + N. (4) N > T + N (5) N > Adj + N Rules (4) and (5) are optional. New: therefore the grammar now generates men, the men, good men, and the good men. Order: if (5) should come before (4), there would be e.g. good the men. Order: also that of (3) is essential: if it were in front (2b), it would have to be repeated afterwards to guarantee the extension for the complex resulting from VP > V tr + NP. The sequence can therefore prevent inadmissible sentences and reduce the scope of the rule corpus. Order: Assumed, (6) N > N + and + N If (6) operates before (5), we get for example (old men) and women and men and (old women) If (6) operates after (5), we get for example old (men and women). I 224 Semantically, it is the same, despite the different brackets. Def Recursive Rules/recursive/Recursion/Lyons: allow infinitely repeated application (only in infinite cases they are called recursive). Example (6b) N > N + and + N + and + N (6c) N > N + and + N + and + N + and + N (6d) … E.g. This is how you can tell stories: e.g. He came in and he sat down and he said that ...and he... Recursion/Grammar/Lyons: a "realistic" model of grammar I 225 will be designed in such a way that there are more examples of recursive structures with two constituents than with three, more with three than with four, etc. ((s) the simplest forms should be the most likely ones). >Constituent Structure Grammar. Probability/Grammar/Correctness/Lyons: the probability of an occurrence must not be confused with its correctness. Coordination/Recursive rules/Grammar/Lyons: Problem: Coordination using a recursive rule: ambiguity by different possible brackets e.g. Tom and Dick and Harry, (Tom and Dick) and Harry, Tom and (Dick and Harry). Dilemma: a) Intuition: recursive rules do not indicate what the intuitively perceived structural description is. b) and yet recursive rules are necessary. I 227 Formation rules/phrase structure rules/constituent structure grammar/Chomsky/Lyons: Spelling/Terminology: PSG - phrase structure grammar. PS rules - Phrase structure rules. a) Formation rules = phrase structure rules b) Transformation rules: specify how the end chains are transformed into real sentences. I 249 Context Dependence/Rules/Economy/Lyons: the rule growth to cover all other congruence ratios would be small. >Context/Lyons. On the other hand, it would be significant in context-independent grammar. Here, context-dependent grammars are more economical. Correctness/Lyons: both types of grammars formalize the congruence ratios correctly. >Correctness/Lyons. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
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| Churchland, P. | Dennett Vs Churchland, P. | II 64 Language/numbers/measurement/Paul Churchland: has compared statements with numbers: E.g. "X is a weight in grams of 144" "Y has a speed of 12 meters per second." DennettVsChurchland: There are problems when we apply the same transformation rules and equating rules to different ways of expressing the same statement. Statements are, after all, unfortunately not so well-behaved theoretical structures such as numbers. Statements more closely resemble the dollar than the numbers! E.g. "This goat is worth $ 50". And how much in Greek drachmas?, Today more than in ancient Athens? etc. I Lanz 302 Churchland: (via everyday psychology/Sellars ChurchlandVsDennett): are building on Sellars: everyday psychology has the status of a useful empirical theory. It has to be checked whether a) the everyday psychological predicates actually denote natural species b) whether the lingua mentis theory of functionalism, closely adjoining the everyday psychology, is plausible. Churchland negates a) and b). Instead, P.S. Churchland: >"Neurophilosophy": ad a): It is remarkable that we do not have the faintest idea of what underlies psychological phenomena familiar to us because of everyday psychology. I 303 ad b): VsMentalese, VsLingua Mentis Theory: from the perspective of evolution language is a latecomer. There were intelligent beings before language came into the world, and there are intelligent beings who are not gifted with language. So, because of the evolutionary continuity between humans and their ancestors, you have to assume a large number of non-language analog cognitive processes also with humans. |
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
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| Constituents | Chomsky, N. | Lyons I 259 Chomsky: (Syntactic Structures): Thesis: the idea of the constituent structure (formation structure) corresponds to a limited section of the language and the rest of the language can be derived by repeatedly applying a rather simple class of transformations to the chains given by the constituent structure grammar. If we were to extend the constituent structure grammar to describe the whole language directly, we would give up simplicity. Syntax/Chomsky: should be divided into two parts: 1. Basic component: constituent structure component (phrase-structur component, base component, phrase structure component, phrase structure rules (PS rules) ((s) constituents). 2. Transformation component (tranfsormational component) with additional rules. Transformation Rules/Chomsky: all transformation rules should be understood as additional rules. |
Ly II John Lyons Semantics Cambridge, MA 1977 Lyons I John Lyons Introduction to Theoretical Lingustics, Cambridge/MA 1968 German Edition: Einführung in die moderne Linguistik München 1995 |
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