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The author or concept searched is found in the following 7 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actions | Habermas | III 36 Action/Rationality/Habermas: Actors behave rationally as long as they use predicates in such a way that other members of their environment would recognize their own reactions to similar situations under these descriptions. III 126 Action/Habermas: a) Teleological action: the actor realizes a purpose or causes the occurrence of a desirable state by choosing and appropriately applying the means promising in the given situation. III 127 The central concept is the decision between action alternatives based on an interpretation of the situation. Strategic action: here, the expectation of decisions from at least one other purposefully acting actor is included. This model of action is often interpreted utilitarian. b) Norm-regulated action does not refer to the behaviour of a basically solitary actor who finds other actors in his environment, but to members of a social group who orientate their actions towards common values. This model is based on the role theory. III 128 c) Dramaturgical acting refers primarily to interaction participants who form an audience for each other, in front of which they present themselves. The actor evokes a certain image, an impression of himself/herself in his audience by revealing his subjectivity more or less purposefully. d) Communicative action: the concept refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who enter into an interpersonal relationship (by linguistic or non-linguistic means). The actors seek an understanding to coordinate their plans and thus their actions. >Rationality, >Understanding, >Understandability, >Communicative action/Habermas, >Communication theory/Habermas, >Communication/Habermas, >Communicative practice/Habermas, >Communicative rationality/Habermas. III 144 Def Action/Habermas: Actions are only what I call such symbolic expressions with which the actor, as in teleological, norm-regulated and dramaturgical action, makes a reference to at least one world (the physical, the consciousness or the mentally divided world) but always also to the objective world. From these I distinguish between body movements and secondary operations. III 150 The model of communicative action does not equate action with communication. >Behavior, >Language Behavior. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Excluded Middle | Dummett | II 110 Law of the excluded middle/Dummett: not generally valid because the understandability of a mathematical theorem does not always present a decision procedure - it is not necessary to find a proof, only necessary to recognize it when it is present. >Proof, >Provability, >Decidability. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Naturalism | Naturalism, philosophy: The view that we must regard the phenomena which meet us, even those which we consider to be our own states, as processes controlled by laws of nature. Their understandability is not guaranteed. See also nature, naturalized epistemology. |
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| Understanding | Danto | I 56 It is as if the philosophers derived solely from the analysis of the nature of intelligibility how the world should be like. >World, >World/thinking, >Reality, >Knowledge, >Certainty, >Rationalism, >Analysis, >Understandability. I 60 The structure of understanding must always be the same in any universe. I 74 Understanding/ Verificationism: to understand a sentence is to know how a sentence can be verified. >Verificationism, cf. >Truth conditions. DantoVs: verification would not necessarily be a conclusive verification. >Pain. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Understanding | Lewis | IV 12 Understanding/understandability/Lewis: it is about understandability in our world, not in a conceivable world - someone may say that e.g. a >round square is an understandable thing that does not exist in any possible world. >Possible world/Lewis, >Conceivability, >Metaphysical possibility/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Understanding | Mackie | Stegmüller IV 392 Understandability / explanation / Mackie: it is not true that things must always be understandable. - There is no reason to suppose that the universe is governed by our needs. Cf. >Anthropic principle. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
| Validity Claims | Habermas | III 65 Definition validity claim/Habermas: a validity claim is equivalent to the assertion that the conditions for the validity of a statement are fulfilled. While yes/no opinions on claims to power are arbitrary, statements on claims of validity are characterised by the fact that the listener agrees or disagrees with a criticisable statement for reasons. They are an expression of insight. HabermasVsTugendhat: this neglects this distinction in E. Tugendhat 1976(1). III 66 Examples of claims of validity are those of truth, correctness, appropriateness or comprehensibility (or well-formedness). These claims of validity are usually implicitly raised. >Truth, >Correctness, >Appropriateness, >Understandability, >Well-formedness. IV 107 Validity Claim/Speech Act/Habermas: a speaker can motivate a listener to accept his/her offer independently of the normative context. >Motivation. This is not the achievement of an effect with the listener, but a rationally motivated communication with the listener, which comes about on the basis of a criticisable validity claim. This is about a speaker's demand that the listener should accept a sentence as true or as truthful. >Agreement. IV 111 Norm validity/truth/Durkheim/Habermas: the idea of truth can only borrow from the concept of norm validity the determination of the impersonality deprived of time (2) of an idealized agreement, an inter-subjectivity related to an ideal communication community. >Norms, >Ideal speech community. The authority behind knowledge does not (...) coincide with the moral authority behind norms. Rather, the concept of truth combines the objectivity of experience with the claim to intersubjective validity of a corresponding descriptive statement, the idea of correspondence of sentences and facts with the concept of an idealized consensus. >Consensus, >Intersubjectivity, >Correspondence, >Facts, >Reality, >Objectivity, >Experience. Validity Claim/Habermas: only from this connection does the term of a criticizable validity claim emerge. 1. E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie, Frankfurt 1976, p. 76f, 219ff 2. Vgl. 1.E. Durkheim, Les formes élementaires de la vie religieuse, Paris, 1968, German: Frankfurt 1981, S. 584. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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