Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 5 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appearance | Peacocke | I 29 Being/seeming/appearance/Sellars: seeming red is more fundamental than being red. >Appearance/Sellars, >Psychological nominalism. PeacockeVs: "looks red" is not semantically unstructured in contrast to "red". - Therefore it should not be the fundamental concept. >Basic concepts, >Simplicity, cf. >Complexity, >Explanation. Three solutions: 1) physically red as fundamental (anti-perception theory / representative: Shoemaker). >S. Shoemaker. 2) "No priority theory": nothing is fundamental. 3) Red must be explained in terms of perception (perception theory). >Perception, >Perception theory. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Experience | Peacocke | I 5 Perception/experience/tradition/Peacocke: experience has a content. >Empirical content, >Content On the other hand: Feeling/sensations/tradition: sensation has no content. - E.g. sensation of smallness. It may nevertheless be a certain sensation. >Knowledge, >Thinking, >World/Thinking, >Distinctions. I 16f Experience/PeacockeVsPerception Theory/Tradition: more than just perception: emotional content, not merely representative content: e.g. tilted cube: jumps over, the network of lines looks completely different (perception). On the other hand: e.g. rabbit-duck-head: the line web does not change, therefore the perception theorist could claim that there are two representational components: a) the lines, b) Rabbit/duck >Rabbit-duck-head, >Perception theory/Peacocke. Perception theory: translation variant: the missing property must be introduced in suitable statements. PeacockeVs: this would only provide a priori knowledge, not empirical knowledge, since the postulated type of experience could not be missing. - Vs added terms: these do not have to be available to the clueless, so they do not change the truth or falsity. >Overdetermination of the representational content. Overdetermined: the angle could be changed by appropriate overlapping without changing the picture. I 199 Experience/Peacocke: also non-inferential experience is possible. Doubts: are inferential, always from conclusion. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Overdetermination | Peacocke | I 16f Experience/PeacockeVsPerception Theory/PeacockeVsTradition: Experience is more than just perception: sensation-like content, not merely representational: E.g. tipping dice: jumps, the network of lines looks completely different. >Sensation. On the other hand: E.g. Rabbit-Duck-Head: the network of lines does not change, therefore the perception theorists might argue that there are two representational components: a) the lines, b) Rabbit Duck Head. >Rabbit Duck Head. Perception Theory: Translation variant: The missing properties must be introduced into appropriate statements. PeacockeVs: that would only provide a priori knowledge, not empirical, because the postulated experience type could not go wrong. Vs added terms: they do not have to be available to the naive person, so they do not change the truth; Overdetermination of the representational content. >Representational content. Overdetermination: the angle can be changed by appropriate overlapping without changing the picture. I 20 Perception/overdetermined/overdetermination/Peacocke: E.g. the angle could be changed without changing the representational content. Such problems arise when one tries to construct a sensation-like property (e.g.size) as a representational property. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Perception | Peacocke | passim Peacocke Thesis: experience, perception: does never exist without sensation. --- I 8 Perception Theory/tradition: Thesis: feelings are not part of the perception - Adequacy Thesis: all essential lie in 'appears to the subject ..' plus some complex conditions such as objects and circumstances. I 11 PeacockeVs: it is undecidable whether two trees are the same size and at the same distance, or at different distsances and different in size - and we assume that they are the same size, even if we see different sizes - (added knowledge: brings representation into the game). I 19 Perception/Peacocke: needs terms. I 91f Observation Terms/Theoretical Terms: Square: - must be experienced as such, an X-ray tube not. - For scientists, the X-ray tube may be constructed entirely differently, for a lay person not - in this case it is a different term. - Sensitivity for property: necessary but not sufficient condition: - E.g. 'tomato-like': appearance or taste, here is no theory required. - Square: a minimal theory of perspective is required. - There is nothing 'square-like' what corresponds to 'tomato-like'. - Without square term no sensation of square, (not only no representation). - A perspectively distorted square is perceived as a square, but not perceived as distorted. (> Higher order: >description levels). - Not so with tomato-like: cannot be known as a tomato. (> Forgery). - 'Tomato-like' is not a criterion, otherwise tomato would be an observation term! - Representation: tomato, not 'tomato-like'. I 154 'As'/seeing-as/perception/thinking/Peacocke: E.g. 'This acid burns the table': only liquid is seen, not 'as acid'. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Qualities | Peacocke | I 43f Perception theory/tradition/primary, secondary qualities/Peacocke: the perception theory also has consequences for the explanation of the experience: I 44 e.g. that something is experienced as square, is explained by the fact that it is square. But in the perception theory, this explanation does not function in the case of red - because the question is to be kept open, if there is a primary quality as the reason for it s being red. >Perception theory/Peacocke, >Primary qualities, >Secondary qualities, >Experience, >Perception, >Knowledge, >Explanation. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Peacocke, Chr. | Tradition Vs Peacocke, Chr. | I 17/18 Translation/Perception TheoryVsPeacocke: natural reaction: the statements that seem to conflict with the adequacy thesis (AT) could be translated into statements that do not add any properties incompatible with the adequacy thesis. For example, "in order to cover the closer tree, a larger area would have to be pushed between the tree and the observer than for the more distant tree". PeacockeVsPerception Theory/PeacockeVsAdequacy Thesis: it is not clear how this should work against the second kind of example. But does it work against the first? What should the translation explain? 1. It could explain why we use the same spatial vocabulary for both three-dimensional objects and the visual field. That is enough for "above" or "beside". But the adequacy theory needs more than that! It needs an explanation why something is bigger than something else in the visual field. So. 2. problem: as an access that introduces meanings, the access of the adequacy thesis seems inadequate. Example disturbances in the visual field, curved rays ... + .. Counterfactual: Problem: whether an object is larger in a subject's field of vision is a property of its experience. In the real world counterfactual circumstances are as they wish. An approach should therefore only take into account the properties of actual perception. I 19 Translation/Peacocke: a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable components can be made with Kripke's distinction between fixation of the speaker and the meaning of an expression: Kripke: for example: one could fix the reference of the name "Bright" by demanding that it should refer to the man who invented the wheel. ((s) Evans: Example Julius, the inventor of the zipper). N.B.: nevertheless the sentence is true: "it is possible that Bright never invented the wheel". Peacocke: analog: the experience of the type that the closer tree is larger in the field of vision agrees that a larger piece must be covered to make it invisible. This condition fixes the type of experience. But it would be possible that the type of experience does not meet the condition! Just as Bright did not have to be the inventor of the wheel. PeacockeVsPerception Theory: Translation: does not provide an approach that leaves the possibility open that the type of experience that actually satisfies the conditions of translation might fail. |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Other Minds | Agassi, J. | Frank I 640 Mental States / Other Minds / Self-attribution / Agassi: about the internal states of others we know better! Common sense: every person has access to any information that is available only to her. Agassi: but other scientific advances have undermined the first person authority: Freud / Agassi: "I know your dreams better than you do." Perception theory / Agassi: "I can cause delusions with you and describe your perceptions better than you can do it". Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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