Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 17 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Attributes Cresswell Hughes I 184
Attribute/Hughes/Cresswell: two-digit relation: "x has the attribute y". >Relations.
Predicate calculus parallel to the set theory.
>Predicate calculus, >Set theory.
N.B.: two attributes are identical only if they apply necessarily to the same individuals. The sets are identical even at random identity of the elements.
>Extensionality, >true-of, >Satisfaction.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984


Hughes I
G.E. Hughes
Maxwell J. Cresswell
Einführung in die Modallogik Berlin New York 1978
Definitions Schiffer I 101
Functional definition/Schiffer: when the true-of-relation is a functional relation, it is "defined" in this way, and, indeed in tandem with the reference relation of names to objects. True-of: Satisfaction.
>Satisfaction, >Truth, >Reference, >Names, >Objects.
But this is no identity relative to a given functional relation and does not analyze the meaning.
>Meaning, >Identity.
I 159
Definition/Schiffer: does not work with open sentences. >Open sentence.
I 213
Definition/Schiffer: is about equality of meaning, not meaning. - This holds also for the lexicon. Synonymy, >Lexicon.
It has more to do with mention than with use.
>Mention, >Use.
Understanding: more with use than with mention.
>Understanding.
Problem: E.g. meaning equality does not help in case of e.g. "of" means ... e.g. "dog" means ... e.g. "she gave it to him" means....
>Index words, >Indexicality, >Anaphora.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

Denotation Field II 6
Primitive denotation/Field: a theory T1, based on primitive denotation, has compositionality - i.e. that the truth values of the sentences depend on the truth values of the non-logical parts. Primitive Denotation: Problem: E.g. - "He takes drugs": here only one token has a meaning, but not the type. ((s) Primitive denotation/(s): without descriptions)
>Descriptions.
II 6f
T1/Field: with primitive denotation; each name denotes what it denotes, a predicate denotes what it applies to, etc. - No composite expression has a primitive denotation.Compositionality. Def truth/primitive denotation: when a speaker says something true - hence we have tokens on certain occasions, not types of expressions.
Expressions like "John", "I", "You" are always only tokens.
>Demonstratives, >Index words, >Indexicality.
Advantage: diachronic theory of language.
II 8
T1 uses semantic terms: "satisfy", "denote", "apply" (unlike Tarski). VsT1: "John", "I" or "You" - problems with expressions like T2: without semantic expressions (E.g. satisfy, denotate, apply).
>Satisfaction, >true-of, >Tarski-scheme, >Truth/Tarski.
II, 18f
Denotation/T-Theory/Language/Field: for different languages at the same time: one could define "denote": E.g. E (English) to say the name N denotes an object a is the same as to demand that either a is France and N is "France" or "a" is Germany and "N" is "Germany" ... then for another language, e.g. German: corresponding "... a is France and N is "France"...".
II 21
Problem: So one could define magic physically acceptable by simply setting up a list of pairs of magic/object. Names/Denotation/FieldVsTarski: Tarski's definition boils down to mere lists - and also lists for applying predicates and for satisfaction.
>Lists, >Possible world semantics/Field, >Properties/Field.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Designation Prior I 155
Naming/applying/Prior: adjectives do not name, but can be applied to something. >Predication, >True-of.
The application is not part of the meaning.
>Meaning.
Descriptions can be understood without knowing to whom they are applied.
>Descriptions, >Understanding.

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

Gavagai Peacocke I 84
Gavagai/EvansVsQuine: his proposal, to interpret rabbits as unseparated rabbit parts has the consequence that what is always true of a unseparated rabbit part, also is true of another unseparated part of that rabbit. >Predication, cf. >Ostension, >Ostensive definition, >Definition, >Definability, >True-of, >Satisfaction.
Then there are no limits to vagueness.
>Limits, >Vagueness.
The price of denying that is to make the identification of predicates empirically unlimited - this also applies to the attribution of actions.
>Predicates, >Identification, >Ascription, >Actions, >Arbitrariness.

Peacocke I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983

Peacocke II
Christopher Peacocke
"Truth Definitions and Actual Languges"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Language Proust I 230
Animals/Davidson: since animals have no language, they also have no concepts. >Concepts, >Language, >Animals, >Animal language, >Language and thinking, >Thinking without language.
ProustVsDavidson: Davidson uses a Cartesian strategy.
>Cartesianism.
I 231
Triangulation: triangulation seems impossible in animals, because the absence of a shared symbolic language does not allow access to intersubjectivity. >Triangulation.
Concepts/Davidson: concepts are normative because each has its particular application conditions. With this, Davidson takes up Descartes' basic idea.
1. If an organism has the concept of X, it is predisposed to decide whether something is X or not.
2. The term can then be applied to new cases.
3. Concepts form an inferential structure (a theory).
>Predication, >True-of.
I 232
Concept/Animal/ProustVsDavidson: it is not an overstated assumption that certain animals can form concepts that make important aspects of their environment understandable to them. Possibly social animals (dogs, primates, etc.) have theories for the organization of social relations.
These theories contain concepts for dominant animals, offspring, enemies, allies, as well as the inferential and associative links between these categories for sharing food, protection, partnering, etc.
Cf. >Theory of Mind.

Proust I
Joelle Proust
"L’animal intentionnel", in: Terrain 34, Les animaux, pensent-ils?, Paris: Ministère de la Culture/Editions de la maison des Sciences de l’Homme 2000, pp. 23-36
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005

Meaning Tugendhat I 21
Meaning/Tugendhat ultimately not based on objects (not any more than on circumstances) but on truth conditions - later verification conditions. >Truth conditions, >Verification conditions, >Verification, >Circumstances/Tugendhat.
I 263
Sentence: Meaning/Tugendhat by specifying its truth conditions - and explains this by demonstrating the way of verification. >Sentence meaning.
I 282
Meaning/Tugendhat: the meaning of the sentence p is not the fact that p : that fails with sentences that contain deictic expressions. - Different situations have different truth conditions. >Situations, cf. >Situation semantics.
I 283
Meaning/Tugendhat: of a sentence: function. Arguments: use-situations of the sentence.
Values: the assertions (truth conditions).
>Functions, >Use, >Use theory (only for words, not for sentences).
I 432
Meaning/Tugendhat: function whose arguments are the speech situations and their values ​​are the objects . "The meaning maps the speech situations on the items". Vs: that is metalinguistically - it requires understanding of " I " , "here", etc. first to understand - (because demontratives are not names). Substitutability is the meaning of demonstratives.
>Understanding, cf. >Speaker meaning, >Substitution, >Demonstratives.

II 231
Meaning/Frege/Tugendhat: should not be translate as "reference". Only where Frege conceives sentences as a proper name. >Reference, >Fregean meaning, >Fregean sense, >Sense.
Frege distinguishes between reference of names and truth values of sentences.
>Truth values, >Sentences.
II 240
Otherwise error/Frege: ... that you can mingle meaning and concept on the one hand and meaning and subject matter on the other hand. - Correct: "What two concept words ( predicates ) mean is the same iff the corresponding extents (value progression) coincide. >Value progression, >Term scope.
II 247
Tugendhat: (meaning/reference): nevertheless there is a primacy of truth over the objects. >Truth/Tugendhat, >Truth.
II 242
Meaning/Tugendhat: sentences are meaningful in that they can be true/false. - predicates by apply to some (and not others) objects. >True-of, >Satisfaction.
Names: denote something.
Predicates can be attributed to a thing.
>Names, >Predication.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Meaning Theory Foster I 4
Meaning Theory/m.th./Foster: the meaning theory does not say what is "meaning" but it reveals what conditions it must meet. - Analog: Science theory does not explain what is the concept of a natural law, but it covers the canon of scientific methods.
I 6
Meaning Theory/Foster: the extension of "means that p" is not determined by the truth value or the extensional structure of the sentence , which is used for "p". - It is an error to presuppose an intensional idiom for "that means" (presupposes what we are looking for). - Solution: Extension instead of intension.
I 7
Meaning Theory/ Foster: examined language L: is about (contingent) facts - metalanguage: uses essentially methodological vocabulary (not contingent) to establish the theorems.
I 11
Meaning Theory/truth theory/FosterVsDavidson: the truth condition is determined to set out the specific truth value in all circumstances. - Problem : Tarski: the scheme would correspond to a counterfactual condition "would be true if ... " - but the schema is indicative.
I 17
Meaning Theory/Foster: Problem: all T-sentences of the Tarski schema ("Snow is white" is true iff snwo is white) remain true if one uses just something that preserves the truth values and the right side is a translation of the left. - It provides no meaning, only a truth-definition. A meaning Theory can arise when one knows that the conditions are met - i.e. that the truth th. is a meaning theory.
I 19
But only if the theory is formulated in the same language as the object language - Because the theory is not really interpreting. Solution/Foster: We need the facts and the knowledge that the facts are
truth-theoretical.
I 20
Then the meaning theory is a single sentence: q *: " a truth theory T in L represents that ... " - I 21 ... if we are aware, we can find out what determines each selected sentence. - This implies the ability to interpret each sentence due to its structure , because it implies to perceive what each element contributes. ( >Compositionality)
Per: that is interpretive.
Vs: Problem: "notes that" is still intensional!
I 22
E.g. someone who does not know what U denotes, could know the facts that U says . - Problem: if the meaning theory is purely extensional, then it is no longer interpreting.
Summary: Meaning theory/Foster: is a meaning theory for an object language L0 in the design of an appropriate range of possible worlds if it exhausts all possible facts that allows our philosophical standpoint. This together with a finite set of axioms true, which provides for each L0 - sentence S the relevant canonical reformulation of the T-conditional.
This would consist of the scheme

"(w) (x is true-of-w, if w, then it would be the case that p)"

by inserting the structural description (sound, character) of S for "p."
Instead of "part-of" relation "material-part-of" is between x and y: if y is a world and x is an ordered pair whose first element is the class of all material things, and whose second element is the class of all ordered pairs of all the tangible things that are in the part-whole relation.

Foster I
John A. Foster
"Meaning and Truth Theory"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Mention Geach I 74
Mention/Use/Geach: for each x: either x is white or x is not white. Mention: for each object x: either the predicate is "white" or its negation is true of x.
"True-of": is a simpler term. Therefore, Tarski begins his defintion of truth with it:
>Satisfaction.
E.g.,"Proxy": at use - quote: at mention.
Mention: "... its negation is true of ..".
Negation is mentioned.
Use of the negation: "x is ~ F" - ((s) Mention/(s): about the negation: "it is true" - likewise: "has a true negation".)
ad I 84
Mention/Use/Quote/Geach/(s) E.g. "is an obscene expression" is not an obscene expression.
I 195
Meta-language/mention/use/Geach: if p and q are meta-linguistical variables, then "~ p" means: "the negation of p" and not "it is not the case that p". >Meta language, >Variables, >Object language, >Levels/Order, >Use.
I 202
Mention/use/names/sentence/Geach: names of expressions are formed by quotation marks - then at the same time mention and use. - Mentioned by the combination of its own with the quotes - used as part of a complex expression. >Quotation marks, >Name of a sentence, >Quote.
Mention/Use: both are no contrasting pair.
I 225
Mention/Use: E.g. a class or number is specified by mention (not use) of a property. >Classes, >Properties.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Nominalism Bigelow I 97
Sets/BigelowVsNominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: if he eliminated quantities, they would come in again through the rules of composition through the back door. >Sets, >Set theory, >Platonism.
I 98
Example instead of refers to the set of rabbits
he could say
applies to all and only rabbits.
"All and only"/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): is a nominalistic avoidance of sets.
BigelowVsNominalism: one could say that this is just an abbreviation for "the crowd of all and only rabbits".
To apply/BigelowVsNominalism/Bigelow/Pargetter: "applies" needs to be discussed further before this paraphrase could prove anything ontologically.
((s) "applies to" = "true-of", >Satisfaction.
((s) BigelowVsQuine.)
>Semantic ascent.
Sets/Bigelow/Pargetter: whether you believe in them is one of those things. The semantics does not decide on this.

Big I
J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter
Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990

Observation Field II 267
observation/apply/explanation/Field: our observation of practice explains how our physical vocabulary applies to only and all that is true. That explains why some non-standard models are unintended.
>Unintended models, >Explanation, >Practice, >true-of, >Satisfaction.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Reference Tugendhat I 195
Reference/Tugendhat: red and rouge denote the same predicate, if applied by the same rule - ((s) use theory, not the meaning but the reference?).
I 343
Reference/tradition: is not primarily linguistic - then deictic expressions would be important.
I 438
Reference/Tugendhat: standing for (singular term) and being true-of (predicate) are superfluous, when we assume only the understanding of the equal sign. >Identity/Tugendhat, >Equal sign, >"Is"/Tugendhat, >Proxy.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

Semantic Ascent Stroud I 213
Semantic Ascent / Quine: mention instead use - transition from substantive to formal speech. >Mention, >Use, >Formal speech, >Formal language, >Theoretical language.
Stroud: It is still about reality and not just about language. - E.g. "Wombat" is true of some organisms.
>"true-of", >Satisfaction, >Reality, >External world, >World/thinking, >Language.
VsCarnap: these are not "external" questions.
>External /internal, >Interior/exterior.

Stroud I
B. Stroud
The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984

Strength of Theories Stechow 9 f
stronger/weaker/Stechow: a weaker significance is true in more situations.
Information inquiry: what is less informative, applies to more situations.
Conclusion: the proposition p logically implies the proposition q iff p is a subset of q.
>Stronger/weaker, >Truth, >Satisfaction, >True-of, >Conclusion, >Implication, >Propositions.
A. von Stechow
I Arnim von Stechow Schritte zur Satzsemantik
www.sfs.uniï·"tuebingen.de/~astechow/Aufsaetze/Schritte.pdf (26.06.2006)
Truth Geach I 15
Truth/GeachVsAristotle: Aristotle confused two pairs of concepts: a) sentences: true/false
b) predication: "true-of"
Tarski: "true-of" is basic.
>Satisfaction.
I 76
Truth/Tarski: satisfaction ("true-of"): cannot be applied to components, but only to whole sentences. Even complex sentences correspond to a propositional function.
>Propositional functions.
Semantic truth definition: relevant relation: predicate to the thing of which it is predicated to be true: it is about a sentence but not a fact.
>Truth definition, >Sentence/Geach, >Facts/Geach.
I 258
Truth/Oxford school: only for few allegations. GeachVs: then "p v q" would not be truth-functional!
>Truth functions.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

Truth Peirce Wright I 66
Definiton Truth/Peirce: that what is justified on an ideal border of recognition when all empirical information is obtained. PutnamVsPeirce: one cannot simply know when one has all the information. Wright dito.
Cf. >Lists, >Knowledge, >Completeness.
---
Horwich I 448
Truth/Pragmatism/Rorty: Peirce: For Peirce truth is the ideal final stage. >Pragmatism, >Truth/Pragmatism.
JamesVsPeirce: neglects the mind.
"True of" is no analyzable relation - (at least not between inhomogeneous entities).
Rorty: thus James omits correspondence.
>Correspondence, >Correspondence theory, >True-of.
Dewey: completes the way: only the try to interpose "language" or "ghost", can let intentionality appear interesting.(1)
>Intentionality, >Language, >Mind.

1. Richard Rorty (1986), "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth" in E. Lepore (Ed.) Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Oxford, pp. 333-55. Reprinted in:
Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of truth, Dartmouth, England USA 1994

Peir I
Ch. S. Peirce
Philosophical Writings 2011


WrightCr I
Crispin Wright
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001

WrightCr II
Crispin Wright
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

WrightGH I
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
German Edition:
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008

Horwich I
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
Truth Conditions Foster I 24
Truth-conditions/solution/Foster: the truth-conditions are the subset of all the circumstances with which the sentence matches. ->Possible worlds. - It is binary relation between sentence and world. Counterfactual conditional: "(x) (x is true-of w, if and only if when w would exist, it would be the case that p)". >Counterfactual conditionals.
Problem: this is non- extensional! The truth conditional would no longer be true when instead of "p" a material equivalent sentence were used with other truth-conditions. >Intension, >Extension.

Foster I
John A. Foster
"Meaning and Truth Theory"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976


The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Field, H. Schiffer Vs Field, H. I 105
SchifferVsField: wrong is his suggestion: physical relations as an explanation for the reference relation would also cover relations to things of which they are not true. (E.g. >"Arthritis"/"shmarthritis", E.g. >Addition/Quaddition. - FieldVsPhysicalism). Conclusion: no functional relation, which operates without disquotation scheme will be appropriate for the "true-of" relation. ((s) Anyway not the relation, but the theory works, if at all with the disquotation scheme.).
I 109
Def Conceptual Role/c.r./Field: (Field 1977): the subjective conditional probability-function of an agent Two mental representations S1 and S2 have the same cr for one person, iff. their (the person’s) subjective conditional prblty-function is so that s for any mental representation, given the subjective probability of s1 s is the same as that of s2 where s. SchifferVsField: This is of little use, because not two people have the same conditional probability function. But Field is anyway pessimistic with respect to a precise concept of intersubjective sameness of mental content that goes beyond sameness of referential significance.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987