# Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 entries.
Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Determinism Genz II 250
Time/Newton/mechanics/Genz: in Newtonian mechanics, not only the earlier point of time determines the later point of time, but also vice versa the later determines the earlier one. >Isaac Newton.
Deterministic/Genz: we must distinguish between forward deterministic laws and forward and backward deterministic laws.
>Laws, >Natural laws.
II 251
Question: are there also purely backwards deterministic laws? Definition Time/Genz: as long as we do not know anything else, we can simply define time as the direction in which deterministic laws of nature apply. This is necessarily identical to the direction in which the order cannot increase.
>Time, >Space, >Time reversal, >Time arrow, >Order, >Symmetries, cf. >Chirality.
II 252
Deterministic/time/forward/backwards/quantum mechanics/Genz: the deterministic laws of quantum mechanics are deterministic in both temporal directions.
II 253
N.B.: but it does not say whether they are the same in both time directions! The fact that they are not the same was first shown directly by an experiment in 1998.
CPT-Theorem/Genz: the CPT-Theorem says together with the "CP violation" that backwards deterministic laws of quantum mechanics must differ from forward deterministic laws.
Experiment 1998: a K-Meson (neutral) can develop into its anti-particle. This can also be done in the opposite direction, but the process must then proceed more quickly (asymmetry).
II 254
N.B.: then we can decide from the laws of nature alone, whether we have a real process that takes place in time, or whether a backwards running film is shown by a physical process. Not time-reversal-invariant: for example, the transformation of a K-Meson into its anti-particle is not time-reversal-invariant.
Experiment: has of course not been observed directly, but by observations on numerous particles in the same state.
Asymmetry/Genz: asymmetry only applies to the duration of the process, not to it itself.
>Asymmetry.

Gz I
H. Genz
Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999

Gz II
Henning Genz
Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002

Natural Laws Pinker I 344
Mirror/natural laws/Pinker: for all objects and processes in the universe is true that one cannot know if one sees the thing itself, or its mirror image - exception: decay of cobalt 60: emits preferably particles at the South Pole. >Symmetries, >Asymmetry.
Chirality/Pinker: random, not predetermined by nature - the mind treats both cases as if they were the same.
>Chirality.
I 346
Language: the words "next to" say nothing about the right and left - but there is nothing appropriate for up and down or in front and behind. >Localization, >Local/global, >Reference system.
I 347
We are quite insensitive to right/left, a tiger may come next time from the other side - Definition "right"/encyclopedia/Pinker: "eastern direction, if you look north".
I 352
Mental turning: the mirror image must be fold in the fourth dimension.
I 382
Natural Law/Law/Pinker: the laws of physics determine that objects with a greater density than water are not on the surface. Selection along with physics specifies that objects that move quickly, are streamlined.
>Selection.
Genetics causes that the offspring resembles the parents.
The human intentions provide chairs with forms and materials that turn them into stable seating.

Pi I
St. Pinker
How the Mind Works, New York 1997
German Edition:
Wie das Denken im Kopf entsteht München 1998

Phenomena Feynman I 736
Phenomenon/Feynman: (context here: magnetic field, coil) the changeover from north to south should not concern us, the two are also mere agreements. -the change is not a phenomenon! ((s) The two would be reversed: top/bottom and right/left at the same time, therefore no change! (As if you looked at the original image from behind: now north is at the bottom, but the vector now also points to the right instead of to the left.)
I 736
True Phenomenon/Feynman: for example, if we have an electron moving through a field that points into the book page: if we then use the formula for the force v x B, we find that the electron, in accordance with the physical law, will deviate in the displayed direction. The phenomenon is that we have a coil with a current that runs in a certain circumferential direction, and an electron that circulates in a certain way. That is physics, regardless of how we call everything. ((s) Because the electron is not both positive and negative at the same time.)
Feynman: Now we carry out the same experiment in a mirror: now the force is reversed if we calculate it according to the same law, and this is good, for the corresponding movements are then mirror images.
>Chirality.
I 736
Reflection/Chirality/Symmetry/Feynman: the main thing is that in the study of any phenomenon there are always two or an even number of right-handed rules and that the phenomena as a result always look symmetrical. However, it may appear as if we could indicate the north pole of a magnet!
E.g. compass needle really points north.
Vs: but of course this is again a local property that has to do with the geography of the earth.
It is as if we were talking about in which direction Chicago is (north of Pittsburgh), so it does not count!
That the compass needle has a bluish color is only a convention!
If, however, a magnet had the property that small hairs grow on its north pole, but not on the south pole, that would be the end of the law of mirror symmetry.
E.g. telephone call to a Mars resident: we could send him right-polarized light and say: "This is right-turning light".
I 737
We could indicate our size in the diameter of hydrogen atoms. And this is how absolute length can be defined. But we could not define "left" with the fact that our heart beats on the left side. Maybe his beats on the right!
>Objectivity, cf. >Twin Earth, >"Meanings are not in the head".

Feynman I
Richard Feynman
The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963
German Edition:
Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001

Feynman II
R. Feynman
The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967
German Edition:
Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993

Space Kant I 85
Space/relativism/rationalism/Leibniz: (according to Kant): only capability exists of the mutual relationship of the things in it. KantVsLeibniz: counter-example: incongruity of left and right hands or mirror image - an inversion does not restore the identity here.
>Chirality.
---
Strawson V 28
Space/Time/Kant: totality seems to impose a disjunction on us: either limited, there is one last element, or unlimited. Since the antinomies are not empirically decidable, it thus confirms that space and time only exist as phenomena, and not as things in themselves.
>Antinomies/Kant.
StrawsonVsKant: it is not clear if there is no empirical solution.
V 48
Space/Time/Kant: not produced by things, but by the subjects - space and time are states of consciousness - state of consciousness: not of high importance, merely effects of things, not their states. >Subject/Kant, >Perception/Kant, >Experience/Kant.
V 49
Space does not arise from experience, but experience presupposes space. >Time/Kant.
I. Kant
I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994
Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls)
Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03

Strawson I
Peter F. Strawson
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959
German Edition:
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972

Strawson II
Peter F. Strawson
"Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit",
In
Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977

Strawson III
Peter F. Strawson
"On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Strawson IV
Peter F. Strawson
Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992
German Edition:
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994

Strawson V
P.F. Strawson
The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966
German Edition:
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981

Strawson VI
Peter F Strawson
Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Strawson VII
Peter F Strawson
"On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950)
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993

The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 controversies.
Disputed term/author/ism Author Vs Author
Entry
Reference
Kant Wittgenstein Vs Kant Brandom I 75
WittgensteinVsKant: standards pragmatic, not explicit. ---
Münch III 327
WittgensteinVsKant: new: regulated use is viewed (only) constitutively for all intuitive beyond the realm of concepts. Kant considered the descriptive as another ability. Precisely the "view" with a radically different procedure.

Elmar Holenstein, Mentale Gebilde, in: Dieter Münch (Hg) Kognitionswissenschaft, Frankfurt 1992
---
Kant I 12
I/Kant: general I (an I, which is produced by the moral) overcomes affective subjectivity. - Problem: the absolute I, in the I-experience I burden myself with the affective and sometimes psychological pathos of existence: to be unique, but still not neccessary. - Fear of nothingness, helplessness of reason. ---
Kant I 13/14
The Unconditional: necessary idea of reason: to think the unconditioned without contradiction. The conditional is meaningless, must be eliminated in the moral purification of the self. ---
Kant I 14
WittgensteinVsKant: In relation to the Absolute, there is nothing to see, nothing scientifically expressible anyway. "The solution to the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem." ---
Putnam III 220
WittgensteinVsKant/Putnam: you can read it this way that the language game so far resembles our lives, since neither the game nor life is based on reason. Thus, a core of Kantian philosophy is disputed.
Wittgenstein II 35
There are no true a priori propositions (the so-called mathematical propositions are no propositions). WittgensteinVsKant. ---
IV 109
Chirality/WittgensteinVsKant/Tractatus: 6.36111 right and left hand are in fact completely congruent. That you cannot bring them to cover one another has nothing to do with that. One could turn the gloves in a four-dimensional space.

W II
L. Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

W III
L. Wittgenstein
The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958
German Edition:
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

W IV
L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
German Edition:
Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Bra I
R. Brandom
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
German Edition:
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
German Edition:
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

Mü III
D. Münch (Hrsg.)
Kognitionswissenschaft Frankfurt 1992

Putnam I
Hilary Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993

Putnam I (a)
Hilary Putnam
Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973)
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (b)
Hilary Putnam
Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (c)
Hilary Putnam
What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (d)
Hilary Putnam
Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482.
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (e)
Hilary Putnam
Reference and Truth
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (f)
Hilary Putnam
How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (g)
Hilary Putnam
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (h)
Hilary Putnam
Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (i)
Hilary Putnam
Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam I (k)
Hilary Putnam
"Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133
In
Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993

Putnam II
Hilary Putnam
Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988
German Edition:
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Putnam III
Hilary Putnam
Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Putnam IV
Hilary Putnam
"Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164
In
Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994

Putnam V
Hilary Putnam
Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981
German Edition:
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Putnam VI
Hilary Putnam
"Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98
In
Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

Putnam VII
Hilary Putnam
"A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994

SocPut I
Robert D. Putnam
Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000
Quantum Mechanics Einstein Vs Quantum Mechanics Esfeld I 256
Incompleteness/Quantum Mechanics/QM/EinsteinVsQuantum Mechanics: For example, suppose two electrons are emitted from one source and move away with opposite spin in opposite directions. Overall state: singlet state.
Einstein/Podolsky/Rosen/EPR: if the result of a measurement of the location or momentum of one system is given, then we can predict with certainty the result of the measurement of the same observables of the other system. (without intervention)
I 257
Consequence: the quantum mechanics is incomplete. There is therefore an element of reality that corresponds to this physical quantity regardless of whether the second measurement is actually performed. This exists before the first measurement. The quantum mechanics is incomplete because it makes everything dependent on the measurement and therefore does not recognize this element.
To justify this one needs the two principles of separability and local effect.
Local Effect: to exclude that there is an interaction between the measurement on the first system and the reality on the second system.
Separability: to exclude that the determination of the local properties depends on something other than the state the system is in.
Einstein-Podolsky-RosenVsQuantum Mechanics: further conclusion: quantum systems simultaneously have a definite numerical value of two or more incompatible observables.
I 258
For example, an experimenter only decides clearly after the emission which observable he wants to measure. Separability and local effect imply that this decision is irrelevant.
Nevertheless, once the decision has been made, we can predict the value of the corresponding observable for the other system.
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen: therefore the two systems must have a definite value of all observables between which the experimenter can choose.
Einstein did not consider this conclusion to be self-evident because it is based on the assumption of separability and the local effect.
I 271/272
Metaphysics/Science/Esfeld: Separability and local effect are metaphysical principles in the sense that they are a precise formulation of assumptions that are at the center of our everyday view of nature.
I 271/272
The question of whether quantum mechanics is complete also seems to be a metaphysical question. It depends on whether we underline separability and local effect as the foundation of science. Bell's inequality/Bell/Esfeld: Bell has eliminated the seemingly clear distinction between physics and metaphysics!
Metaphysics: Einstein's realism shows that metaphysics has predictable consequences that can be tested.
"Experimental Metaphysics"/Shimony: (Ferdinand Gonseth, 1948, Michele Besso, 1948): are similar to Quine's position: rejection of the separation between mathematics, science, and philosophy. Every element of our knowledge can be subject to revision.
I 273
Thesis: metaphysical questions cannot be decided by experiments! On the contrary: EinsteinVsQuantum Mechanics must be understood in the sense of the Quine-Duhem-Thesis: no separation between metaphysics and physics in quantum mechanics. For example, Bell's experiments can be seen as a test of two hypotheses, namely the conjunction of parameter independence and result independence.
But the point is: what you think is what the Bell experiments confirm or disprove depends on what background assumptions you base yourself on.
Hennig Genz Gedankenexperimente, Weinheim 1999
VIII 216
Einstein-Podolsky-RosenVsQuantum Mechanics/EPRVsQM/Genz: incompleteness of Quantum Mechanics: Spin has an element of reality. Since quantum mechanics can only consider one of these elements of reality, it is incomplete. Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Argument/Version Bohm: For example, a part of it rests in the laboratory and decays in a time interval into an electron and a positron. (There is no such thing, but it does not matter). (In the real experiment (Aspect) photons were assumed).
If Gretel detects the electron, she can be sure that Hänsel has the positron.
From a quantum mechanical point of view, the particle pair is a single system.
VIII 216
The angular momentum of the particle decaying in its resting system is zero, since the conservation law applies to the angular momentum, it is also zero for the decay products. If, however, only the spins of the particles contribute to their total angular momentum, the law of conservation becomes a conservation law for the sum of the spins. Consequently, the two spins remain coupled. But now the coupling of the spins to the total spin zero guarantees more: that the sum of the settings of the spins in any direction is zero.
If the total spin were not zero, it could be that it is zero in x direction, but not in y direction.
VIII 217
Example Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen/Bohm: Problem: Gretel can align her star Gerlach apparatus as she wants. The alignment of the device determines which component of the spin of the entering particle should have a "sharp" value with spin 1/2. Hänsel and Gretel choose directions for x or y (perpendicular to the direction of propagation z). Since the two particles fly apart, the chirality is different!
Both now want to measure "transversal" spins perpendicular to the extension.
VIII 218
Gretel: measures in x direction plus or minus. If she turns the apparatus by 90°, she measures in y direction, again plus or minus. N.B.: Hänsel always measures the opposite. If Gretel has the apparatus in the same direction as Hänsel, she measures the opposite of his spin. If she now turns it in y direction, she has to measure the opposite again, even if Hänsel has not turned his apparatus.
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen: now claim that Gretel can use it to determine Hänsel's spin in both the x and y directions without disturbing Hänsel's positron in any way.
Quantum MechanicsVsEinstein-Podolsky-Rosen: actually it is not the case according to quantum mechanics. Before the measurement it is pointless to speak of a state at all.
VIII 219
Bertlmann's Socks/Genz: are not particularly exciting. Corresponds to the "glove correlation": if I find one, I know that I have lost the other.
VIII 220
Quantum MechanicsVsEinstein-Podolsky-Rosen: also the spin operators of the positron do not exchange with each other, but a statement about the "sum" is valid: σxσy - σyσx = 2iσz.
Translated into the formalism of quantum mechanics, the conclusion of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen is that the state |  > of the positron must be both an eigenstate of σx and of σy for certain eigenvalues mx and my.
But the quantum mechanics does not know such a state!
Unlike the product of operators, the product of eigenvalues is independent of the order!
0 = (mxmy - mymx) | ψ > = (σxσy - σyσx) | ψ > = 2iσz | ψ >,
so that | ψ > of σz would have to be destroyed (σy | ψ > = 0). But because σz, just like σx, and σy can have only 1 and -1 but not 0 as eigenvalue, there can be no such state!
But the contradiction is one between the formalism of quantum mechanics and the demands of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and none with experimentally verifiable statements.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002