Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Extinction | Gould | I 291ff Extinction/Evolution/Life/Gould: extinction is not a domino in a development with great consequences, extinction is what all species have in common. They cannot take all their ecosystems with them even when they die out. Therefore, species do not depend very much on each other. New York, for example, could survive without its dogs. II 339 ff Mistake: it is a mistake to say that "any species that is extinct is extinct because of its overspecialization." This is perhaps the most common misunderstanding about the history of life. It is a wrong understanding of progress and a wrong equation of disappearance and ineptitude. If one imagines life as a continuous and constant struggle, disappearance must be the final sign of inadequacy. >Explanation, >Theories. II 340 GouldVs: but the present life does not even come close to perfection. The allegedly classic case of extinction based on competitive inferiority cannot be maintained. For example, when the Andes rose, there was probably a considerable rain shadow over South America and the tropical forests were transformed into dry areas. II 346 Consolation for believers in progress: in the case of mass extinction, an attempt is made with a definition "background rate". The background rate compares the normal development (normal extinction). Discovery: for more than half a billion years, the background rate has been declining slowly but steadily. During the early Cambrian period, at the beginning of adequate fossil records, about 600 million years ago, the average rate stood at 4.6 extinct species per million years. Since then, the rate has been steadily decreasing to about 2.0. If the Cambrian rate had continued, about 710 more genera would have died out! It is interesting to note that the total number of genera has increased since then by almost the same number (680). II 347 No species is immortal. The inevitable should never be depressing. IV 13 Extinction/Gould: extinction is more than just a negative force. IV 178 Mass extinction/Gould: mass extinction must be reinterpreted from four points of view: 1. Mass extinction is not the peak of a continuum, but fractures. 2. Mass extinctions are much more frequent, faster, deeper and very different (in terms of the number of extinct creatures) than we have ever imagined. IV 179 The end of the Ediacara fauna was the first mass extinction. The fauna has been replaced and not improved or strengthened. IV 182 A periodicity of mass extinction has been discovered: it had been 26 million years since the last great death in the Permian period a climax arose. Common cause explanations: common causes for mass extinctions are: mountain formations, volcanism, temperature fluctuations, ... New: a sinking sea level could be considered and has actually been observed before the last mass extinction. But: most mass extinction is preceded by a slow decline in animal groups! Possible explanation: there are only a few fossils, as fewer rocks are suitable for conservation. IV 185 Evolution/classification: some branches of the evolutionary tree contain many species, others, very few. There are strong differences. During normal times, species-rich branches tend to increase their richness. Question: why do they not conquer the entire biosphere for themselves? Solution: in the event of mass extinction, they have worse chances. IV 201 Extinction: each is inevitable forever. An extinct experiment will never be repeated. The chances are mathematically too slim. Biologists speak of the "principle of the irreversibility of evolution". |
Gould I Stephen Jay Gould The Panda’s Thumb. More Reflections in Natural History, New York 1980 German Edition: Der Daumen des Panda Frankfurt 2009 Gould II Stephen Jay Gould Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes. Further Reflections in Natural History, New York 1983 German Edition: Wie das Zebra zu seinen Streifen kommt Frankfurt 1991 Gould III Stephen Jay Gould Full House. The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin, New York 1996 German Edition: Illusion Fortschritt Frankfurt 2004 Gould IV Stephen Jay Gould The Flamingo’s Smile. Reflections in Natural History, New York 1985 German Edition: Das Lächeln des Flamingos Basel 1989 |
| Extinction | Psychological Theories | Slater I 28 Extinction/stimuli/conditi0oning/psychological theories: Extinction refers to the notion that if a conditioned stimulus is presented repeatedly without the unconditioned stimulus then the strength of the conditioned response will diminish over time until the conditioned stimulus no longer evokes the conditioned response. >Stimuli. Although conditioned responding does seem to decline after several presentations of the conditioned stimulus in the absence of the unconditioned stimulus, several interesting findings suggest that the association between the conditioned and the unconditioned stimulus lives on. Field (2006a)(1) articulates three conditions under which this phenomenon occurs: (1) the renewal effect (2) the phenomenon of reinstatement Slater I 29 (3) The phenomenon of spontaneous recovery in which extinguished conditioned responses occur simply following the passage of time. These new findings, along with Bouton’s (2002)(2) critical analysis of extinction as a process that involves acquisition of new “learning” that is stored with and qualifies the previously learned information, suggest that extinction is not as simple or straightforward as Watson and Rayner first thought. >Experiment/Watson, >Conditioning/Watson. 1. Field, A. P. (2006a). Is conditioning a useful framework for understanding the development and treatment of phobias? Clinical Psychology Review, 26, 857–875. 2. Bouton, M. E., (2002). Context, ambiguity, and unlearning: Sources of relapse after behavioral extinction. Biological Psychiatry, 52, 976–986. Thomas H. Ollendick, Thomas M. Sherman, Peter Muris, and Neville J. King, “Conditioned Emotional Reactions. Beyond Watson and Rayner’s Little Albert”, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Antirationalism | Black Vs Antirationalism | III 33 Cause/Reason/Rationality/Black: Reasons must also be applied correctly! They must be "good reasons". Irrationality/Anti-Rationality/Black: the punishment for it can be damage, injury or extinction. III 34 VsAnti-Rationalism/Black: Just because our Skepticus is still alive we can now assume that he applies at least proto-rationality. Canonical form: (of this argument): "You should respect fundamental reasons, because otherwise you expose yourself to frustration, pain or death." Skepticus/Black: has the choice to "imitate" an animal with its reflexes. Namely, by trusting his own reflexes. VsAnti-Rationalism/Black: consequently, he would have to be completely weak-willed, and distrust all social ties. He would be without friends! Circularity/Black: so far, there is nothing circular about our argument. Reasoning/Black: for us here the first step (the assumption of proto-rationality) is of extreme importance. We can then infer on wider rationality. ((s)VsBlack: Why actually, animals also stop after quasi-rationality? His argument therefore leads to the difficulty of distinguishing humans and animals or finding a reason why intelligent life has developed.) BlackVsVs: for expansion we assume social skills. III 35 That means that something is involved in his dealings with others. III 36 Rationality/Black: As a child you had no choice of wanting to be rational or not, but as an adult you do. VsAnti-Rationality/Black: the price for this is high, but: one would have to become the pet of someone else. Cleansing oneself of reason would lead to a catatonic (apathetic) state. You would only live in the immediate present. |
Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg) Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Dennett, D. | McGinn Vs Dennett, D. | I 69 Consciousness / McGinn: Even a syntactic CaIM explanation, which assumes that there is in fact symbols in the brain that makes it impossible to explain consciousness as mere aggregation of such symbols. (McGinnVsDennett, McGinnVsPinker). (CaIM = combinatoric atomism with lawlike mappings). Basic structure of the states of consciousness: if there ever is such a thing, it is at the level of consciousness! It is not a method for extracting of consciousness from brain states or brain characteristics. II 191 Def death / McGinn: the annihilation of the ego, dying is the process of extinction. II 192 We have only the very idea of it, to exist in an instant and to cease to exist in the next moment. The process remains vague and opaque. It is in many ways the same as the beginning of existence. We can not simply imagine the beginning of the ego as we imagine how matter takes a form. (DennettVs). |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Bubner Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | I 44 BubnerVsHegel: shortens the concrete liveliness of Platonic dialogues to external reflection, because of his own strong understanding of methods. Plato's dialogues do not permit a clean separation of the philosophical statement from the pictorial decoration. To leave their mysteriousness standing demands the active cooperation of the conscious participant. I 47 At no point does the exact knowledge of the method correspond in a way with its practice that no rest would remain. Plato's method never represents the goal, but serves the better knowledge. I 49 Otherness/Hegel: the other is to be taken as isolated, in relation to itself, abstract as the other. not of something, but as the other of itself. BubnerVsHegel: the fascination of recognizing a basic form of one's own science of logic carries Hegel's interpretation far beyond Plato. He reads into Plato an identity of identity and difference that only German idealism has fully articulated. I 72 Paradoxes/Movement/Zenon/Hegel: Hegel adopts Aristotle's solution: the introduced distinction of two aspects in space and time, namely continuity and discretion. Bubner: but this is unhistorical, because Zenon could not yet have been aware of it. Solution: the continuum introduced by Aristotle makes the infinite divisibility of space and time compatible with its unity. Hegel: "the equality of oneself, continuity is the absolute connection, the extinction of all differences, all negatives, of being-by-oneself. The point, on the other hand, is the pure being-by-oneself, the absolute discriminating and abolishing of all equality and connection with others. These two, however, are set in space and time in one, space and time thus the contradiction (!). It is closest to showing it by movement: For in movement, the opposite is also set for the imagination. BubnerVsHegel: here Hegel discovers more than the translation gives. It is anachronistic to elevate Zenon to a dialectician. But anachronisms are the price of structural comparisons that are philosophically illuminating. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Subjectivism | Verschiedene Vs Subjectivism | Stegmüller IV 177 VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: he has a hard time where most people consider norms and values to be objectively anchored, so that beliefs have already found their way into the meaning of moral words. IV 178 VsVs: that would be a "metaethical fallacy": the conclusion of beliefs about their correctness. IV 216 Def Moral in the broad sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: consists of an attitude to life and a system of rules of conduct that someone makes his own. Can vary from person to person. Def Moral in the narrower sense/Mackie/Stegmüller: limitation of the self-interests of the doers. Not flexible, as it must contain everything that is required to maintain cooperation. Core piece: "Minimal Morality". Reasonable. VsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: two negative cornerstones: 1. Hierarchy of objective norms 2. The impossible changeability of human nature. IV 242 ObjectivismVsSubjectivism/Ethics/Stegmüller: one could say that subjectivism degrades norms to a "bundle of conventions". VsVs: but this is not the case: SubjectivismVsObjectivism/Ethics/Mackie/Stegmüller: the objectivists make things too easy for themselves if they regard the norms as objective, predetermined principles. The subjectivist is faced with something like a miracle: he has to explain how such systems can develop at all! 1. What human considerations and abilities explain the emergence of those artificial conventions? 2. How are they maintained? IV 304 VsSubjectivism/Moral: anyone could object that subjectivism would not prevent the extinction of a minority! There is no danger of being killed by a member of the minority! (VsRawls). IV 305 VsVs: 1. Every person is a member of some minority. 2. Minimal morality only presupposes that all are rational egoists. Morality/Ethics/Sympathy/Mackie: through the mass media, the "close range" of the human, within which he/she is capable of compassion, expands. IV 306 Minority Problem/Mackie/Stegmüller: when it comes to empiricism, one could argue that all arguments against people of a certain skin colour are based on false empirical premises. Now there is no guarantee against genocide, it has taken place! Cultural achievements can be destroyed within a very short time. IV 307 Moral Reason/Stegmüller: Motifs are Janus-faced: Seen from the inside, they are explanations, from the outside they are causes. Nor can the justification we have achieved be applied to all the principles of morality in the narrow sense. But this is not a shortcoming of the concept of justification itself. The network of standards is only intended to provide something like a framework. |
Carnap V W. Stegmüller Rudolf Carnap und der Wiener Kreis In Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I, München 1987 St I W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd I Stuttgart 1989 St II W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 2 Stuttgart 1987 St III W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 3 Stuttgart 1987 St IV W. Stegmüller Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie Bd 4 Stuttgart 1989 |
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