Disputed term/author/ism  Author 
Entry 
Reference 

Beliefs  Schiffer  I 273 Def subdoxastic/Stich: (1978): a subdoxastic state is not a religious state, but an informationbearing state. You are unconscious and inferentially insulated from beliefs. >Unconsious, >Belief state, >Beliefs, >Inference. E.g. if there is a transformational grammar, then the states they would represent would be subdoxastic. Schiffer thesis: language processing is done through a series of internal subdoxastic states. 1. Stephen P. Stich (1978). Beliefs and subdoxastic states. In: Philosophy of Science 45 (December):499518  I 26 Belief/Schiffer: problem: such a psychological theory does not create the meaning of beliefs.  Solution: functionalist reduction. >Psycho functionalism. Ultimately: "Bel = def 1st element of an ordered pair of functions that satisfies T (f,g) "... ((s) from which the theory says that it is belief) ...)  ((s) "Loarstyle"). >Meaning theory/Loar. I 28 Schiffer: It is already presupposed that one forms beliefs and desires as functions of propositions on (sets of) internal Ztypes. >Functional role/Schiffer. The criterion that a Ztoken is n a belief, that p is, that n is a token of a Ztype which has the functional role, that correlates the definition of bel T with p. I 150 Belief property/SchifferVs: if belief properties existed, they would not be irreducible (absurd).  ((s) It is already proven for Schiffer that there is a neural proposition for E.g. stepping back from a car.) This is the cause  then we have a mental proposition in addition. This is then not supported by any counterfactual conditional. Counterfactual conditional/(s): indicates whether something is superfluous  or whether it is then sufficient as an explanation. >Counterfactual conditionals. I 155 Belief properties/Schiffer: presumed they existed (languageindependent), then they should be simple (nonassembled), i.e. no function of other things. Vs: E.g. the proposition, to love Thatcher is composed of love and Thatcher  but belief is no such relation (see above). Problem: if belief properties are semantically simple, then there is an infinite number of them.  Then language learning is impossible. >Language acquisition, >Learning. I 163 Belief predicates: less problematic than belief properties: irreducibility out of conceptual role. >Conceptual role. E.g. Ava would not have stepped back if she did not have the belief property that a car is coming. Conceptually and ontologically independent of the singular term "The EC of the belief that a car comes" This is a benign predicatedualism (in terms of conceptual roles). It has no causal power. Pleonastic: Ava stepped back because she had the belief property... I 164 Belief/(s): Where, Ava believes that a car is coming, she believes this in every possible world that is physically indistinguishable from the actual world. Problem: that cannot be proven  but is probably true. Then ultimately, she stepped back, because she was in the neural state... SchifferVsEliminativism/SchifferVsChurchland: the eliminativism should then have the result that nobody believes anything. >Eliminativism, >Reductionism. 
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 
Definitions  Quine  Rorty I 302 Definition: Quine’s attack on the first dogma had made it doubtful. Operational definition: along with Sellar’s doctrine that a "sensory fact" is a function of socialization it became twice as questionable with Quine’s holistic attacks. >Two dogmas, >Definability. Quine I 327 Definition: is an instructions for transformation. It reinstates the singular term. Definitions are flexible, without truth value gaps. II 109 Carnap quasianalysis: encompasses a full reduction through definition. QuineVs: an assignment of sense qualities to spacetime points must be kept revisable. Therefore it is not attributable to definitions. VII (b) 24 Definition/Quine: can serve opposite purposes: e.g abbreviation or more economic vocabulary (then longer chains). Part and whole are bound by translation rules. The definition key is neither for synonymy nor analyticity. Ad X 70 Definition/object language/meta language/Quine/(s): the term which is defined, cannot stand in the object language, even if the rest of the definition is (not always) in the object language. X 84 Definition/VsQuine: from appropriate method of proof is of no interest, because the property of being provable by a particular method is uninteresting. It is only interesting in connection with the completeness theorem. QuineVsVs: logical truth is not mentioned there. X 101 Context Definition: introduces merely a facon de parler. That creates eliminability at all times without ontological commitment. XIII 43 Definition/Quine: Lexicon entries are a distant echo of what philosophers and mathematicians call definition. Lexicon/Dictionary/Quine: is intended to facilitate our conversations. Def Definition/Quine: to define an expression means to explain how to do without it. XIII 44 Defining is eliminating. Definition/Quine: a) an expression. b) an object. >Expressions, >Objects. One way is reduced to the other, because we define people by defining "people" and numbers by defining numbers or the word "number". Expression/Definition: Definition of expressions is the broader term, because expressions like "or" are also included. Object Definition/Object: this is what we talk about when we think more about the nature of an object. Elimination/Quine: the concept of definition as elimination is especially helpful when definitions are not compatible as in the case of natural numbers. This also applies to the many possible definitions of the ordered pair. All that is required is that x and y can be uniquely obtained from Definition/Quine: has several purposes: sometimes to elucidate the use of the established language, XIII 45 sometimes an idiolect, sometimes philosophical considerations. Definition: if it requires translation from one structure to another, this can enable us to enjoy the advantages of each by switching back and forth. (See singular terms). 
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Crosscultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 4662 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "NonReductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 6682 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 
Grammar  Schiffer  I 253 Grammar/Lewis/Schiffer: (simplified) for language in a community: (for subsentential expressions): Def propositional determinant/Schiffer: for words: E.g. property, relation, particular, etc. ((s) instead of semantic value). Def Grammar/Lewis/Schiffer: is then an ordered pair, the 1st element of which is a set of correlations of words and propositional details 2nd element a set of such combination operations. Operation: is stipulated, not found in language. Meaning is then the propositional determinant that is correlated with the word by the grammar. >Language community, >Convention/Lewis, >Semantic value, >Ordered pairs, >Grammar/Lewis. 
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 
Imaginary Numbers  Quine  XIII 30 Imaginary Numbers/Quine: are actually of the same type as real numbers, they were only introduced later. They were only used to be able to draw roots from negative numbers. Equation: always has n solutions if the highest exponent is n. Real numbers: are the positive numbers and the 0. XIII 30 Negative real numbers/Quine: in order to get them in the first place, we first need a new kind of proportions (ratios) together with irrational numbers. Solution: we use excellent real numbers (positive and negative) to distinguish them from (positive) real numbers. Notation: excellent (signed, designated) real numbers: are notated as ordered pairs (gP) '0,x' and 'x, 0'. Ordered pairs/gP/Order/Quine: an artificial way to construct an ordered pair is for example {{x,y},x}... Here x is element of both elements. ((s) Thus, the order is determined). Then we can easily get y out as well. Imaginary unit: notation i: = √1. Def imaginary number: is any product yi, where y is a signed real number. Def complex number: is any sum x + yi, where x and y are signed real numbers (called positive or negative signed). Because of the "indigestibility" of i, the sum is not commutative. I.e. the sum cannot be broken up differently. Example 5 = 3 + 2 = 4 + 1. This is the reason why complex numbers are often used to represent points of a plane. XIII 31 Complex Number/Tradition: previously (in the 19th century) they were assumed to be ordered pairs of two designated real numbers. Proportions/Ratio/Rational Numbers/Quine: have two senses. Positive Integers: have three senses. Complex numbers: the same thing happens here. Example a) √2, as originally constructed, b) the positive real number + √2, c) the complex number √2, thus √2 + 0i, thus <√2,0>. Real number: can always be represented as a complex number with the imaginary part = 0. N.B.: now the rational numbers have four senses and the positive integers have five senses! But that does not matter in practice. Also not as philosophical constructions. In "set theory and its logic" I have almost completely eliminated these doublings. Complex numbers with the imaginary part 0 become marked real numbers and these become unmarked normal real numbers etc. Numbers/Quine: (set theory and its logic): at the end all these numbers (complex, imaginary, real, rational) become natural numbers. Only the latter are doubled, only once, from the natural number n to the rational number 1/n. >Numbers/Quine, >Number Theory/Quine. 
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 
Individuation  Schiffer  I 122 Individuation/sentence/Schiffer: sentences are individuated by the ordered pair. ((s) Phrases are individuated by meanings, assuming character strings, but not vice versa.) >Ordered pair. Schiffer: but only if one assumes propositions as meanings. >Proposition, >Meaning. Problem: how are we to individuate them differently? Paratactic analysis/Davidson/solution: "On Saying That" 1968^{(1)}). >Paratactic analysis. 1. Donald Davidson (1968). On saying that. Synthese 19 (12):130146 
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 
Intensionality  Quine  I 379 Chisholm: intensional vocabulary ("importance", "denote", "synonym") is not easy to eliminate by other items. IX 178 Intensional Relations/Russell: can be different, even though they put the same things in relationship to each other  e.g. attributes of ordered pairs, triples, etc. VII (h) 150 Ontology/Modality/Intensionality/Extensionality/Quine: an object x must meet this condition to survive: if S is a sentence with a referencing occurrence of a name of x and S' emerges from S by replacing this name by any other name of x, then S and S' need not only agree in the truth value, VII (h) 151 but also when "necessary" and "possible" occur as prefixes. Likewise, the substitution must be kept analytical. N.B.: so Venus as a physical object is excluded by the simultaneous use of evening star and morning star. Instead, we now have three objects! The Venus term, the Evening Star term, the Morning Star term. (s) Terms as objects, these are no material objects anymore. Quine: also number term (number names) instead of numbers, classes names instead of classes (semantic ascent). Example "9 Term" and "Number of Planets Term". N.B.: a number term is not larger or smaller than other number terms. >Extensionality, >Intensions. 
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 
Interpretation  Peacocke  II 168 interpreted language/Peacocke: Tscheme T (s) ↔ p plus satisfaction relation "sats" (even uninterpreted) between series of objects and sentences. >Language, >Satisfaction, >Disquotation scheme, >Sentences, cf. >Statements, >Objects, >Predication. II 171 Variant: an ordered pair whose first component is an interpreted language in the sense of the previous section and whose second component is a function of sentences of the first components to propositional attitudes. >Propositional attitudes. Then the listener takes the statement as a prima facie evidence. >prima facie). 
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 
Language  Peacocke  II 166 Psychologizing of language/Peacocke: Problem: there may be an infinite number of types of situations that are specified psychologically, in which a given semantic predicate is applicable, and which have nothing in common, that is specifiable with psychological vocabulary. >Situations, >Behavior, >Vocabulary. ((s) Question: can you identify these infinitely psychological predicates as psychologically?) PeacockeVsVs: it is not about reduction  the fine propositional adjustments do not have to be attributed before translation. Vgl. >Reduction, >Reductionism. II 168 Interpreted language/Peacocke: we get an interpreted language by using the Tscheme T(s) ↔ p plus performance relation 'sats' (uninterpreted itself) between rows of objects, and sentences. >Interpretation, >Disquotational scheme, >Satisfaction. II 171 Variant: a variant of this is an ordered pair whose first component is an interpreted language in the sense of the previous section and whose second component is a function of sentences of the first components to propositional adjustments. Then the listener takes the utterence as prima facie evidence. >Prima facie, >Evidence. II 168 Language/Community/Peacocke: we get a language community by the convention that the speaker only utters the sentence when he intends to (Schiffer ditto). >Language community, >Language behavior, >Intention, >Meaning/intending, >Language/Schiffer. Problem: the attribution of a criterion presupposes already a theory by the speaker. II 175 Language/Community/Convention/Peacocke: Problem: 'common knowledge': E.g. assuming English *: as English, except that the truth conditions are changed for an easy conjunction: T (Susan is blond and Jane is small) ↔ Susan is blond. >Truth conditions, >Conjunction. Problem: if English is the actual language, then also English* would be the actual language at the same time  because it could be common knowledge that each member that believes p & q therefore believes also p. >Conventions. 
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 
Mathematics  Benacerraf  Field I 20 Mathematics/Identification/Interpretation/Benacerraf: (1965)^{(1)} Thesis: There is an abundance of arbitrariness in the identification of mathematical objects with other mathematical objects. >Numbers, >Sets, >Arbitrariness, >Equations, >Identification. E.g. numbers: numbers can be identified with quantities, but with which? Real numbers: for them, however, there is no uniform set theoretical explanation. You can identify them with Dedekind's cuts, with Cauchy's episodes,... I 21 ...with ordered pairs, with the tensor product of two vector spaces, or with tangent vectors at one point of a manifold. >Real numbers. Facts: there does not seem to be a fact that decides which identification to choose. >Nonfactualism. Field: the problem goes even deeper: it is then arbitrary what one chooses as fundamental objects, e.g. amounts? Field I 21 Basis/Mathematics/Benacerraf: one can assume functions as fundamental and define sets as specific functions, or relations as basic building blocks and sets as a relation of additivity 1. (adicity). I 23 Mathematics/Indeterminateness/Arbitrariness/Crispin Wright: (1983)^{(2)}: Benacerraf's Paper creates no special problem for mathematics: Benacerraf: "Nothing in our use of numerical singular terms is sufficient to specify which, if any amounts are they. >Singular terms, >Reference. WrightVsBenacerraf: this also applies to the singular terms, which stand for the quantities themselves! And according to Quine also for the singular terms, which stand for rabbits! FieldVsWright: this misses Benacerraf's argument. It is more against an antiplatonic argument: that we should be skeptical about numbers, because if we assume that they do not exist, then it seems impossible to explain how we have to refer to them or how we have beliefs about them. According to Benacerraf's argument, our practice is sufficient to ensure that the entities to which we apply the word "number" forms a sequence of distinct objects under the relation we call "<". (lessthan relation). But that's all. Perhaps, however, our use does not even determine this. >Mathematical entities. Perhaps they only form a sequence that fulfills our best axiomatic theory of the first level of sequences. That is, everything determined by the use would then be a nonstandard model of such a theory. And that would also apply to sets. >Numbers, >Sets. 1. Benacerraf, P. What Numbers Could Not Be, The Philosophical Review 74, 1965, S. 47–73. 2. Benacerraf, P in: Paul Benacerraf/Hilary Putnam (eds.) Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings. Cambridge University Press: New York, 2. ed. 1983. 
Bena I P. Benacerraf Philosophy of Mathematics 2ed: Selected Readings Cambridge 1984 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 55367 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 
Meaning Change  Brandom  I 670 Change of concept/Change of meaning/QuineVsFeyerabend: Solution: The semantically relevant is not the meaning but the reference. >Meaning, >Reference. What we want to represent, and not what we say about it  the extensional content is communicated  even from a Zoroastrian you can find out whether the sun is shining.  Inferential significances which indeed vary from one speaker to another do not matter then. Instead, there are extensions that vary from possible world to possible worlds. >Extensions, >Possible worlds. I 671 Content/Concept change/Scheffler/Boyd/Putnam: content is no longer viewed as inferential role: inference can be reintroduced at two levels. >Content, >Inferential role, >Inferential content. a) some inferential accuracies can be read from inclusion relations between the extensions of predicates b) insight into the relativity of extensions against various context elements leads to a new concept of intensions: Definition intension: functions of indices to extensions! >Intensions, >Extensions. A more robust type of content that is at best shared by the audience. (BrandomVs). Scheffler/Boyd/PutnamVsFeyerabend: Progress as talk of more and more objects that bring more and more predicate extensions into play).  Inferential significances which indeed vary from one speaker to another do not matter  instead there are extensions that vary from possible world to possible world. I 671f Inferential contents as functions/Change of concept: possible solution: ordered pairs of circumstances and consequences of the use. >Use, >Circumstances. Advantage: It would not be necessary to always admit that the meaning of the word changes with every new belief. BrandomVs: cannot explain why one intension and not the other is now associated. I 673 Problem: functions can only be constructed by arguments which are beyond behavioral dispositions. Change of concept/Intensional theory/BrandomVs: not easy to show: e.g. that the early theorists used "electron" intensionally in a way that allowed plenty of room for our rethinking. QuineVs: reference instead of meaning! (see above). 
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 
Meaning Theory  Foster  I 4 Meaning Theory/m.th./Foster: the meaning theory does not say what is "meaning" but it reveals what conditions it must meet.  Analog: Science theory does not explain what is the concept of a natural law, but it covers the canon of scientific methods. I 6 Meaning Theory/Foster: the extension of "means that p" is not determined by the truth value or the extensional structure of the sentence , which is used for "p".  It is an error to presuppose an intensional idiom for "that means" (presupposes what we are looking for).  Solution: Extension instead of intension. I 7 Meaning Theory/ Foster: examined language L: is about (contingent) facts  metalanguage: uses essentially methodological vocabulary (not contingent) to establish the theorems. I 11 Meaning Theory/truth theory/FosterVsDavidson: the truth condition is determined to set out the specific truth value in all circumstances.  Problem : Tarski: the scheme would correspond to a counterfactual condition "would be true if ... "  but the schema is indicative. I 17 Meaning Theory/Foster: Problem: all Tsentences of the Tarski schema ("Snow is white" is true iff snwo is white) remain true if one uses just something that preserves the truth values and the right side is a translation of the left.  It provides no meaning, only a truthdefinition. A meaning Theory can arise when one knows that the conditions are met  i.e. that the truth th. is a meaning theory. I 19 But only if the theory is formulated in the same language as the object language  Because the theory is not really interpreting. Solution/Foster: We need the facts and the knowledge that the facts are truththeoretical. I 20 Then the meaning theory is a single sentence: q *: " a truth theory T in L represents that ... "  I 21 ... if we are aware, we can find out what determines each selected sentence.  This implies the ability to interpret each sentence due to its structure , because it implies to perceive what each element contributes. ( >Compositionality) Per: that is interpretive. Vs: Problem: "notes that" is still intensional! I 22 E.g. someone who does not know what U denotes, could know the facts that U says .  Problem: if the meaning theory is purely extensional, then it is no longer interpreting. Summary: Meaning theory/Foster: is a meaning theory for an object language L_{}0 in the design of an appropriate range of possible worlds if it exhausts all possible facts that allows our philosophical standpoint. This together with a finite set of axioms true, which provides for each L_{0}  sentence S the relevant canonical reformulation of the Tconditional. This would consist of the scheme "(w) (x is trueofw, if w, then it would be the case that p)" by inserting the structural description (sound, character) of S for "p." Instead of "partof" relation "materialpartof" is between x and y: if y is a world and x is an ordered pair whose first element is the class of all material things, and whose second element is the class of all ordered pairs of all the tangible things that are in the partwhole relation. 
Foster I John A. Foster "Meaning and Truth Theory" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 
Metalanguage  Quine  X 71 Metalanguage/Set Theory/Quine: in the metalanguage a stronger set theory is possible than in the object language. In the metalanguage a set z is possible so that ERz applies  ((s) A set of that is the satisfaction relation (in the form of a set of ordered pairs)  not in the object language, otherwise >Grelling paradox. >Set Theory/Quine, >Object Language/Quine. X 61 Object Language/Metalanguage/Mention/Use/(s): the object language is mentioned (it is spoken about), the metalanguage is used to talk about the object language. Object Language/Metalanguage/OS/MS/ordered pairs/Quine: if we define ordered pairs ('x,y': the set whose only elements are {{x},1} and {{y},2}.), this does not mean that in the object language the variables could also take sets or ordered pairs as values. We use the ordered pairs only in metalanguage. Metalanguage: is the everyday language in which we talk about logic. For example, if I say that the pair '3.5' fulfills the sentence "x < y" then I temporarily assume that the sentence "x < y" belongs to the object langauge and that the numbers 3 and 5 belong to the subject area of the object language. But I don't have to assume that the ordered pairs '3,5' belong to the object language. It is enough that it belongs to metalanguage, and it does. Fulfillment/metalanguage/object language/Quine(s): what fulfills belongs to metalanguage, what is fulfilled to object language 
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 
Metaphysics  Bigelow  I 275 Metaphysical Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: per metaphysical realism, which does not simply interpret the causal relation as a predicate, or a set of ordered pairs, but as a universal. >Metaphysical realism, >Universals, >Relations, >Predicates, >Sets, >Ordered pairs. 
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 
Nonfactualism  Field  II 183 Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: E.g. relativistic mass or net weight in the Special Relativity Theory:  no fact decides which hypothesis is to be assumed.  The laws are, however, in some cases easier to formulate, depending on the choice. >Facts, >Relativity theory. II 224 Fact/discourse without facts/Nonfactualism/Field: 1. Questions of vagueness (Sorites): E.g. there is no fact, to which "bare" precisely refers. 2. assessment questions/morality/ethics. 3. sentences with indicators/index words. 4. Subjunctive conditional/counterfactual conditional >Counterfactual conditionals, >Index words, >Indexicality. >Vagueness, >Sorites. II 241 Nonfactualism/Factualism/Reference Framework/Relativity/Field: Nonfactualist: has a relativized Tpredicate  but for him there is no "real" time order. Deflationism: distinguishes nonfactualism/factualism on the basis of accepted sentences. >Deflationism. Problem: also the factualist could have a relativized concept by introducing it as a basic concept.  E.g. "cosmically privileged framework".  Then one can no longer distinguish factualism and nonfactualism. Solution: to ask the factualist why his framework is privileged a) if he speaks of scientific exceptions, it is distinguishable from nonfactualism b) if unscientific, then indistinguishable. II 242 Nonfactualism/ethics: does not have to say that the sentences have no truth values.  It can say that the truth value ascriptions do not have the factual status, as the assertions themselves. >Truth values, >Ethics. Problem: if you only have the disquotation scheme, how should you state what is not entirely supported by facts? Solution: everyday language: also contains an (implicit) fact operator. >Everyday language. FieldVs: the rules for this are unclear. II 243 Nonfactualism/Ethics/nondeflationism/Gibbard/Field: (Gibbard 1990)^{(1)}: admits that evaluations have a factual component  factual and nonfactual must be connected in one and the same analysis. Sets of ordered pairs of possible worlds and standard systems, so that an utterance is true in this world according to this norm. Possible world: is here a complete specification of factual information. >Norms, >Possible worlds. II 244 But it does not contain any "normative facts". Complete norm: associates with each evaluative predicate a nonevaluative equivalent  E.g. "maximizes utility". >Utilitarianism. Nonfactualism: Thesis: the real world contains no "normative facts". N.B.: this nonexistence is not a normative fact on its part. Otherwise, error theory: Thesis: "It is a fact that there are no facts".  Then: E.g.: "We should do this and that, according to norm N": is itself not normdependent but factual. II 254 Factualism/Field: Factualism does not postulate here a realm of facts, which the nonfactualist denies. Everything that the factualist asserts can be expressed by the nonfactualist by "~ A v B" (negation and disjunction). ((s) Then there is no antecedent that is made false by the absence of facts and thus creates a trivially true consequence.) 1. Gibbard, Alan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 55367 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 
Possible Worlds  Bigelow  I 138 Definition Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: a possible world e, in which a sentence a is true, is then defined as the maximum consistent set containing a as an element. >Modalities/Bigelow. Possible world/(s): Possible worlds are then completely described in all details, nothing is unmentioned and no detail is described contradictory. N.B./Bigelow/Pargetter: the wit is that then every nontheorem in any possible world is wrong. It will be wrong in a maximum consistent extension. There will be a maximum consistent extension in which the sentence is wrong, i.e. a world in which it is wrong. Theorem: is then a sentence that is true in all possible worlds. And that is what a completeness theorem is supposed to show. >Completeness. Maximum Consistent Extension/Bigelow/Pargetter: a consistent set of sentences is extended by adding either a or ~a if it does not become inconsistent as a result. The extension is maximally consistent if a (or ~a) was the last sentence that could be added. >Maximum consistent. ((s) there may be many extensions depending on whether an individual is described differently in the sentence added. This provides equivalence classes. I 206 Definition Possible World/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a maximum consistent property that includes all the things and properties of a world. World/Properties/Theory/Bigelow/Pargetter: how do the previous theories in philosophy history look like, in which one tried to describe the world as an aggregate of properties? E.g. Wittgenstein, Tractatus E.g. Carnap, The logical structure of the world. .... >L. Wittgenstein, >Tractatus, >R. Carnap, >Properties, >Facts, >Circumstances, >World, >Reality, >Ontology, >Atomism. Bigelow/Pargetter: we could consider the spacetime points as the last individuals of the world. Each of them can either have a certain property or not. >Spacetime points. Then we can construct sets of ordered pairs ‹assigned, x› Democritus' world/Terminology/Cresswell/Bigelow/Pargetter: that is how Cresswell called worlds constructed from such points. (Cresswell 1972(1), 1973^{(2)}) >M. J. Cresswell. That is roughly the same as Russell's logical atomism. An ndigit predicate, followed by n individuals. >B. Russell, >Predicates. Atomism: we should assume that such atomic sentences are logically independent of each other. >Atomism. I 207 If it is only a question of whether a point is occupied or not, the corresponding sentence set will surely be consistent. Book: a complete "book of the world" would not be a world, but only a representation. Properties: then arise from books as follows: instead of the atomic sentences, we form longer sentences from combinations of descriptions of points by ordered pairs. This simply leads to a longer book. I 208 Points: instead of them we could also take waves, or elementary particles. Properties: instead of the property of a spacetime point to be occupied we could also choose properties such as charge, mass, and so on. From these we can make sequences: ‹P^_{1}, P_{2},... x› this represents a point with several properties. Mass: is of course a determinable (see above).), i. e. we still need real numbers to indicate the proportion that determines the Dable. >Determinates/determinables. Therefore, we are dealing with a sequence that relates an individual to its properties: ‹r_{1}, r_{2},... x› wherein r_{i} is a real number. Def possible world/Bigelow/Pargetter: a lot of such sequences... {‹r_{1}, r_{2},... x›, ‹r' 1, r' 2,... y›,... }} I 209 ...then represent a possible world (which is much richer than a Democritical world). >Democritus. 1. Cresswell, M. J. (1972). The world is everything that is the case. Australasen Journal of Philosophy 50, pp.113. 2. Cresswell, M. J. (1973). ogic and languages. London: Methuen. 
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 
Properties  Quine  Rorty VI 151 Major Property/holism/Quine/Rorty: at best: "property, which is necessary for the use of a certain description"  but not: "property, which is necessary for the identity of an object with itself." Quine I 43 Features: independent existence is pointless. >Existence/Quine I 218 Mass Term/Quine: is archaic(> (> E. Cassirer, Philosophie der symbolischen Formen, Berlin 19231929)))  Properties: a) Is commonality decisive? b) Is it about cattered clumps? I 217 Features: are usually merely convenient abbreviations for long crossreferences  Quine/Cassirer: features of archaic remains. I 219 Not all abstract objects are properties: numbers, classes, functions, geometric figures, ideas, possibilities  give up or trace back to abstract objects  one can faithfully distinguished concrete objects by use of "ness". >Object/Quine I 322 Property abstraction (elimination) instead of "a = x(..x..)"  new: irreducible twodigit operator "0": "a0x(..x..)"  variables remain as the only ones  primacy of the pronoun. >Variables/Quine I 344/45 Properties/Quine: there are no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic)  there are only more or less important properties. I 344 Properties/relations: meaning of timeless open sentences  is unidentifiable (Howpropositions). I 361 Elimination of relations and properties in favor of classes of ordered pairs, open sentences, general terms  even scattered objects (in the case of color) (46). I 412 QuineVsProperties: fallacy of subtraction: to derive existence from "about" and "deals with"  "round" and "dog" are terms for physical objects  but no additional features. "Round" and "dog" are general terms for objects not singular terms for properties or classes. The same argument would be for classes instead of properties: general term symbolizes its extension as well as its intension. >General Term/Quine I 412 Properties: not every general term is necessarily about properties or classes  properties and classes are acceptable as values of variables. I 464 QuineVsRussell/Whitehead: theory of incomplete symbols: eliminated classes only in favor of properties. II 129f Properties: are hard to individuate  not to define like classes by the same elements  various properties can get to the same things. Properties: "Zettsky" (like Russell): properties are identical when they were members of the same classes  QuineVs  solution: property is identical if two sentences ↔ (follow seperately)  unsatisfactory, less analyticity and necessityoperator. Properties/Quine: identical when coextensiveclasses: are not specified by elements, but by condition of containment (open sentence). Property is not the same as predicate  property: open sentences  propositions: completed sentences. Properties are not the same as classes: since no individuation principle for properties  solution "last classes" (do not belong to any other class, only have elements themselves)  like Russell: statement function only comes through their values  properties = last classes or properties = statement function. >Classes/Quine Properties as last classes are every element of the zero class, therefore all identical?  Vs: this identity definition only applies to theories that allow no objects who belong to no class (Unicorn). Properties/identity: (here) are interchangeability in all contexts  Prerequisite: exhaustion of a finite lexicon by interchangeability of atomic contexts  RyleVs: Category confusion. Properties: QuineVsCarnap/Russell: minimize grammatical categories, expand scope  if all can be attributed to "has", then all properties are extensional  rest could be listed by list. Properties: contexts with "has" unproblematic  "contained in" prohibited (less classes)  "is" leads to circular definition of properties  properties do not count. "Nap had all properties but one": is prohibited.  however: "all properties" allowed. II 144 f De re: E.g. spy should be an essential property (wrong)  no belief is de re (essential property). Modal Logic/Quine: the entire modal logic is contextdependent  what role does someone or something play?  Same level as essential properties. Necessity/Quine: the whole concept is only meaningful in context. Property Einstein/Quine: are preserved.  But not de re. >de re/Quine X 95 Properties/Quine: do not exist for lack of distinctness (only amounts)  "synonymy unclear"  open sentences that apply to the same objects never determine different amounts, but differnt properties could underlie. 
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Crosscultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 4662 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "NonReductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 6682 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 
Proportions  Bigelow  I 78 Proportion/Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: in any case, we can assume proportions between relations. >Relations, >Ontology, >Ontology/Bigelow. Problem: but not proportions between properties. >Properties. Flux/Bigelow/Pargetter: but assumes that speed is a property rather than a relation. >Flux, >Flux/Bigelow. Vector: to explain its nature, we now need something that fills the gap between property and relation. >Vectors. Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: for all things with the same property, there is a relation; that of accordance! Formally: if Fx and Fy, there is a relation RF, so that x RF y. Properties/Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: even if two individuals have different properties, there is a relation between them: formal: there is a relation RFG between Fx and Gy... I 79 ...so that x RFG y. At any rate, we assume this in case F and G are vectors of the same kind. For example, rotating homogeneous disk: 1. points on same radius (same direction): each has a different speed. Then there are some that are 1m/sec faster than others. etc. Relation: between properties: because point x has the property (here: speed or location?) it stands in a certain relation to the point y: it is so and so much faster. Properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: are therefore also in proportions. I 80 2. corresponding to points on the same circumference (same speed, different direction). Relations/Property/Bigelow/Pargetter: then we have relations between velocities with respect to size (if the points lie on the same radius) e.g. speed of x has r times the size of the velocity of y: x Pr y. For example, be a point at the same distance from the center of the borderline, then it has the same speed (size). z P0 y The two relations are summarized as follows x Pr y. z P0 y, then we have a derived relation between x and z. Definition derived relation P*/Bigelow/Pargetter: we define it by saying: x P* z iff for a y, x pr y and y p0 z,... I 81 Proportion/properties/Bigelow/Pargetter: on the rotating disk, two points will be placed in this "twostepproportion" of the form P*. Namely, by virtue of their intrinsic properties. Vectors/Bigelow/Pargetter: the property of instantaneous speed are considered vectors because they are in a family of twostep proportions! nstep Proportion/Bigelow/Pargetter: this can be generalized to proportions that include n steps. This gives us more general vectors. Vector/Bigelow/Pargetter: the vector of a speed of a point on a rotating disk can be represented as an ordered pair of real numbers. General: all ordered ntuples of real numbers can be understood as vectors. We need some for the flux theory, but not all of them. Vectors/Bigelow/Pargetter: are useful for representing physical properties, because they can be embedded in a network of proportions. I 358 Ratios/Bigelow/Pargetter: are special cases of real numbers. >Real numbers. Conversely however, not all real numbers correspond to ratios. Proportion/Bigelow/Pargetter: is a more general term than ratio and forms the basis for our system of real numbers. Some proportions in the geometry, for example, do not correspond to ratios. E.g. pentagon:.... 
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 
Realism  Bigelow  I VII Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: pro scientific realism. Logic can also be understood best in this way. Modal Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro: a scientific realist should be a modal realist. ((s) I.e. he/she should assume the existence of possible worlds). >Modal realism, >Possible worlds. I 38 Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: our realism is neutral in relation to reductionism. >>Reductionism. I 275 Metaphysical realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: pro metaphysical realism, which does not simply interpret the causal relation as a predicate, or as a set of ordered pairs, but as a universal. >Metaphysical realism, >Causal relation, >Ordered pairs, >Predicates, >Universals. I 341 Best explanation/BE/Bigelow/Pargetter: behind it are different kinds of realism. >Best explanation. I 342 Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: many of his varieties are based on a best explanation. Since we are assuming there is something to explain in the explanation. Foundation/fundamental realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: a fundamental class of entities is assumed. These do not explain anything themselves, but provide the material to be explained. >Foundation, >Explanation. Vs: the raw material should be sensations (perception, experience). >Sensations, >Perception, >Experience, >Perception, >Experience, cf. >R. Carnap. Appearance/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we start with it, we can reach the best explanation for any kind of realism by concluding. >Appearance. But it is not "realism about phenomena". Realism always accepts objects. BigelowVsTradition: erroneously assumes that we ourselves are in some way outside and not in the midst of reality. Realism/Explanation/Bigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: not everything we assume to be real does contribute to explanations at all! ((s) For example redundancies and repetitions are not unreal, tautologies are not unreal either, nor boring stuff. So we cannot assume from the outset that reality is a valid explanation. Neither would we deny the existence of boring stuff.). >Explanations, >Causal explanation. Reality/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is also doubtful whether all things should explain appearances. I 343 Def direct realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: thesis: we perceive objects "directly". I. e. without deducing their existence from anything fundamental by inference. There is some truth in it! (pro: Armstrong 1961^{(1)}, discussion in Jackson 1977b^{(2)}). BigelowVsDirect realism: even if we could keep object and appearances apart through reflection, it would be questionable whether the material thing would be the better explanation! >Objects, cf. >Thing in itself. Appearance/Bigelow/Pargetter: dealing with it is tricky. It seems as if we have to find out something about our inner states first. The normal case, however, is the extroverted perceiver. The situation of extroverted perception must also precede introverted reflection. >Perception, >Reflection. Best Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: nonetheless, if we are realists, we will understand material objects as the best explanation of our appearances (or perception). Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: now it shows that there is a hierarchy of two realisms ((s) a) direct, naive, b) reflected, by deduction from appearances) and how this hierarchy is destroyed in practice: we begin with a realism and come to the conclusion of the best explanation to the second realism, and these merge into one and the same reality. >Abduction. The hierarchical order does not remain in things, but becomes an extrinsic characteristic of their relation to us as perceivers. There is also a feedback: the inverse conclusion from the reflected realism on the unreflected. I 344 Holism/Bigelow/Pargetter: that leads to some kind of epistemic holism that we accept. It does not threaten realism. >Holism. Explanation/Best Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: if we accept realism on the basis of conclusions drawn from the best explanation, we must ask what kind of explanation is at issue. It can be about different kinds of (Aristotelian) causes (see above). The most convincing ones are certainly those that are concerned with "efficient" causes: e.g. Cartwright, Hacking: Realism/Cartwright/Hacking: is best supported by causal explanations. >Realism/Cartwright, >Realism/Hacking. Quine/Two Dogmas/Bigelow/Pargetter: Quine has caused many philosophers not only to sit in the armchair, but also to question the experiments that scientists have carried out in real. We reject that. >Two Dogmas, >W.V.O. Quine, >Experiments, >Science, >Certainty, >Method, >Measurements. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: but we also reject the other extreme, that realism would have to arise solely from causal explanations. >Causal explanation, >Causality. I 345 There may also be formal reasons (formal causes/Aristotle) for realism. >Aristotle. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is also a legitimate question as to what constitutes modalities in science. Modal realism is the best explanation here for such matters. >Modal Realism. Metaphysics/Platonism/Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: can be supported by the Best Explanation: by inferences on the best explanation we show that we need modalities and universals in the sciences. Modality/Bigelow/Pargetter: their primary source is mathematics. Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: our metaphysics allows a realistic understanding of mathematics. (BigelowVsField). >Mathematics/Hartry Field, >Mathematical entities, >Platonism, >Universals. 1. Armstrong, D. M. (1961). Perception and the physical world. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 2. Jackson, F. (1977b) Perception. A representative theory. Cambridge University Press. 
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 
Relations  Quine  I 272f Opaque verb: "hunts lions" is nothing in relation, does not refer to a lion  relative term police chasing a man.  I 361 Abstraction of relations, propositions and properties: opaque (> planetsexample).  I 295 Properties, relations: are meaning of timeless open sentences  is unidentifiable (like >propositions).  I 362 Elimination of relations and properties in favor classes of ordered pairs, open sentences, general terms  even scattered objects (in the case of colors) Relativity: additional dimension: spacetime: Point moments are absolutely different, independent of relative movement of the viewpoint.  I 439 Abstract term "Equator", etc: can and should be reformulated. "Closer to the equator than": Relative Term  Or: by position of the sun  fourdimensional SpaceTime coordinates (quintuple, hyper bodies, not Cartesian)>reintroduction of geomtretric object at the spacetime points.  I 462 Nominalism: cannot use relations, classes, etc. ("ancestor", "successor", "greater than", "the same number of", quantification)  but there are stages of renunciation.  IX 17 IX 17 Relations/Quine: connex: ∀x∀y[x,y ε (R U ^R)''ϑ › x(R U ^R U I)y,  ((s) (R U ^R U I): E.g. "greater or smaller or equal". (>Law of comparability, trichotomy).) reflexive: ∀x∀y[x,y e(R n U ^R)''ϑ > xRx irreflexive: R <≤_I, symmetric: R = ^R asymmetric: R =_^R antisymmetric: R ∩ ^R ≤ I transitive: R I R ≤ R intransitive: R I R ≤ _R. IX 43 Relations/Quine: classes of classes.  Namely simulated by the class of all ordered pairs with Fxy. 
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 
Satisfaction  Chisholm  II 70 Satisfaction/Sauer: closed sets: each ordered pair (x) (Qx> Rx) , if it is satisfied, is fulfilled by every thing  but not every open set (Qx> Rx). To try to solve that with a meaning postulate is to bring back the old problem of language dependencs without reference to the world. >Dependence, >Reference, >Meaning postulates. Sauer, W. Über das Analytische und das synthetische Apriori bei Chisholm. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986 
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 
Sensations  Carnap  Putnam V 240f CarnapVstranslation of sensations into physical objects.  >Quine: indeterminacy of translation. Carnap VI 129 Sensation/Carnap: Component of experiences. >Experiences. They get their individuality by the indication to which elementary experiences they belong. Def Sensation: An ordered pair of an elementary experience and a quality class to which the experience belongs. Sensations/Carnap: belong to psychology. >Psychology/Carnap. VI 91 Sensation/Feeling/Carnap: as an individual component of perception only the result of an analysis. VI 93 Further decomposition: Intensity and quality elements. >Qualities. 
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 27290 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177  194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen WittgensteinSymposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a readymade world, Synthese 51 (2):205228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 48398 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 3043 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 
Sentence Meaning  Lewis  II 197 Sentence meaning/Lewis: function from worlds to truth values  simpler: sets of worlds. Does not assign the sets of worlds to the sets themselves, but ordered pairs of sentences to possible utterance situations. >Possible worlds, >truth values. 
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 335 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 
Set Theory  Bourbaki  Thiel I 308 Quantum theory: in Bourbaki it is never spoken of logicism, always only of the set theory. Sets are genuine mathematical objects, and they are not reducible to others (logic: classes). The concept of sets is an essential tool for the unification of mathematics. >Sets, >Set theory, >Classes, >Logic, >Unification. I 308/309 Set theory: as a fundamental discipline of mathematics: basic concepts such as relation and function are traced back to the concept of the set, by explicit definition. >Element relation, >Subset, >Relations, >Functions. Relation functions as a symmetrical or asymmetrical pairing for a twodigit relation. Sometimes we need means to express the order: ordered pairs. >Ordered pairs. I 310. Def Functions: unambiguous relations. 
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 
Set Theory  Thiel  Thiel I 308 Set Theory: Bourbaki never talks about logicism, only about set theory. Sets are genuinely mathematical objects, not reducible to others (logic: classes). The set concept is an essential tool for the unification of mathematics. >Unification, >Generalization, >Generality. I 308/309 Set Theory: as a fundamental discipline of mathematics: Basic concepts such as relation and function are traced back to the concept of set by explicit definition. Relation as symmetrical or asymmetrical pair formation. Twodigit relation. >Relations. Sometimes we need means to express the order. Ordered pairs. Def I 310. Functions: Def: right unambiguous relations. If one presupposes the traceability of all higher types of numbers to the natural numbers once, one can also win these still settheoretically. >Reduction, >Reducibility, >Numbers, >Real numbers. I 311 The real question is a philosophical one and concerns the justification of the reductionist program behind everything. Thiel: whether even numbers as mathematical entities turn out to be sets still appears today to be one of the most important philosophical questions, despite all the logical dead ends into which the classical logizistic approach has fallen. >Mathematical entities, >Logic, >Ontology, >Platonism, cf. >Hartry Field. 
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 
Validity  Quine  VII (f) 116 Validity/Quine: even validity and extension of predicates can be eliminated in favor of truth value tables  validity in the quantifier theory can be eliminated by proof theory.  VII (i) 161 Validity/Quine: sentences that are valid for a universe, are also valid for a small universe  except for an empty universe.  Therefore, laws for large universes also should consider possible smaller universes.  Test, whether theorems are also valid for empty universes: put all universal quantifiers as true and all existential quantifiers as false.  X 77 Validity/valid/Quine: There are two definitions of validity, a) (so far) as a property of schemes that refer to insertion. b) uses the set theory: therefore two auxiliary terms: 1. Auxiliary term "settheoretic analogue": a logical scheme, open sentence of set theory: instead of predications "Fx", "Fy", "Gx" etc., so we write "X ε a" y ε α "x ε β" etc. the values of the variable "α", "β" etc. are amounts. Twodigit predicate letters. For "Hxy" we use ordered pairs Existential quantification: E.g. (Ex)(Fx.Gx): Settheoretic analogue: the open sentence "Ex(x ε α. x ε β)". N.B.: This sentence talks about quantities and allows quantification about them. E.g. "(α)". Schematic letters "F" etc. on the other hand, only predicates represent and are not variables that take values. >Schematic letters, >Quantification. Settheoretic analogue/s.a.: while the scheme is only the logical form of sentences, the settheoretic analogue is actually a sentence of this form. 2. Auxiliary term for the new definition of validity: model. >Models. 
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 
Disputed term/author/ism  Author Vs Author 
Entry 
Reference 

Church, A.  Sellars Vs Church, A.  Putnam I 66 Description/PutnamVsSellars: nor does the analysis of the description help Sellars: (1) "wheel" describes a wheel in English. Putnam: that means that "wheel" plays in English the role that "Rad" has in German. ChurchVsTarski: (1) is not statement on the German word "Rad". SellarsVsChurch: introduces a special means: the "point mention" (as Frege's "oblique sense"): A word in point mention denotes its own linguistic role: "Rad" and "wheel" are then both names for a certain role, namely the same! Important: wheel is not synonymous to a description of this role: it is rather a name of that role! That concludes: (2) "wheel" has in English the role "Rad". Then the extension of described is a class of ordered pairs (word/role), not (word/thing). (> Description). Sellars: no relation word world but word role. I 66/67 Description/Sellars: this is not a big restriction for him as nominalist as "roles" are not abstract entities for him. PutnamVsSellars: but this does not cast a particular light on the problem of reference. 
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 27290 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177  194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen WittgensteinSymposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a readymade world, Synthese 51 (2):205228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 48398 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 3043 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 
McGinn, C.  Field Vs McGinn, C.  I 76 Metalogic/Modal Operator/Logic/Field: "it is logically possible that" should be primitive and as understandable as negation or existential quantification. Is this legitimate? Certainly not in physics. Physics/Field: only describes the current world, not possibilities! One should not call on "facts about possibilities". (Field: but that’s a matter of taste). Metalogic: this looks quite different: Def Logic/Field: is the science of what is possible! Possibility/Field: is intimately connected with logic, in a manner in which it is not connected to physics. Provability/Field: it is more natural to explain it in terms of the possible existence of sign chains than of a current existence of an abstract sequence of abstract analogues of such signs (symbols). Consistency/Absence of Contradictions/Field: isn’t semantic consistency of the theory of discrete linear orders not explained more naturally in terms of the possible existence of entities than by the current existence of an ordered pair whose first element is an infinite set and whose second element is a subset of the Cartesian product of this set with it itself? Entailment/Field: it can be doubted in the way of Lewis that set theoretical explanations of the logical entailment are incorrect, because it also allows inconsistent elements as consistent elements. E.g. "There are married bachelors". Metalogic/Field: Basic concept: modal operator "It is logically possible that" McGinn: even: "It is physically possible that" (FieldVsMcGinn). I 77 Metalogic: However, I do not completely welcome the introduction of the concept of possibility itself into the metalogic. 
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 55367 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 
Peirce, Ch.S.  Quine Vs Peirce, Ch.S.  I 54 Method/Quine: The question of what exists is the question of proof. The final arbitration in this matter is the scientific method, as amorphous it may be. However it is defined in detail, the scientific method produces theories, whose connection with any surface stimulation is solely in the scientific method, without independent testing instance, by which they are supported. In this sense, it is the final arbitrator of truth. Peirce was trying to define the truth straight as a scientific method. Namely an ideal theory, which one approaches as a limit if one does not disist to apply the (supposedly canonical) rules of method to the constantly renewing experience. Definition Truth/Pierce: Ideal Theory QuineVsPeirce: there is a lot wrong with this analogy: Appointment of Organon for infinite process, limit, erroneous use of the analogy with numbers, because the concept of the limit is dependent on the term "closer than". And this is defined for numbers, but not for theories.  I 55 Vs: but we have, after all, no reason to believe that the surface stimulation of people, even if one considers it in the eternity, allows a certain systematization, which is scientifically seen better or easier, than possible alternatives. Although the scientific method is the way to the truth, it does not even enable a definition of truth. Likewise, any socalled pragmatic truthdefinition is doomed (QuineVsPragmatism) to fail.  I 444 Definition ordered pair: provides the possibility to treat two objects as one. One can thus adjust relation classes by perceiving them as classes of ordered pairs. Footnote: we are interested in "relationsinextension" here. They stand in a relationship to relationsinintension like classes to properties (difference class/property.). E.g. The fatherrelation becomes the class of exactly those ordered pairs whose respective members  for example (Abraham, Isaac), are a man and one of his children. Peirce: Definition ordered pair: (terribly cumbersome with mental charts, etc.) QuineVsPeirce: simply a defective noun that is not used to be at home, where we are used to embed completely grownup general terms. Mathematical  I 445 Definition: (1) If (x, y) = (z, w), so x = z and y = w. If relations are classes of ordered pairs, then pairs on the same level as other objects as members of classes must be available. The ordered pair plays the role of an object, which performs the task of two.  X 23 Verification Theory/Peirce/Quine: roughly: "tell me what difference the truth/falsehood of a sentence would make for the possible experience, and you have said everything about its meaning." QuineVsPeirce: also this equates the concept of proposition with the concept of objective information. Basic Rules: is here the whole of possible distinctions and combinations of sensory perceptions. Introspection: some epistemologists would catalog these alternatives by introspection of sense data, others (naturalists) would observe the nerve stimulation (at the nerve endings). Problem: you can not assign senses proof to unique individuals sentences. (Underdetermination of empiricism).  XII 94 Empiricism/QuineVsCarnap: empiricism has 1. abandoned to deduce the truth about the nature of the sensory experience. Thus, it has made a substantial concession. 2. it has abandoned the rational reconstruction, that is, the attempt to translate these truths into observation terms and logical mathematical tools. QuineVsPeirce: Suppose, we think that the meaning of a statement consists in the difference that its truth makes for the experience. Could we then not formulate in a pagelong sentence of observation language all differences that might account for the truth, and could we then not see this as a translation? Problem: this description could be infinitely long, but it could then be trapped in an infinite long axiomatization. N.B.: thus, the empiricist gives up the hope that the empirical meaning of typical statements can be expressed via the reality. Quine: the problem is a not too high complexity for a finite axiomatization, but the holism:  XII 95 Meaning/QuineVsPeirce: what normally has experience implications ("difference of opinions") only relates to theories as a whole, not individual experience sentences. QuineVsCarnap: also the "structure" should be one in which the texts, in which logical mathematical observation terms will be translated into, are whole theories and not just terms or short sentences. 
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 
Disputed term/author/ism  Author 
Entry 
Reference 

Math/Interpretat.  Benacerraf, P.  Field I 20 Mathematics/Identification/Interpretation/Benacerraf: (1965) Thesis: There is a wealth of arbitrariness in identifying mathematical objects with other mathematical objects: Example numbers: can be identified with sets, but with which? Real numbers: for them, however, there is no uniform settheoretical explanation. They can be identified with Dedekind's sections, with Cauchy sequences, I 21 with ordered pairs, with the tensor product of two vector spaces or with tangent vectors at a point of a multiplicity. Fact: there does not seem to be any fact here that decides which identification to choose! (>Nonfactualism). Field: but the problem goes even deeper: it is then arbitrary what you choose as basic objects, e.g. sets? 
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 55367 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 
NonFactualism  Field, Hartry  I 21 Field: thesis: the most natural conclusion is that topological spaces, numbers, ordered pairs and functions neither are definitely sets nor definitely no sets. There is no fact that decides! II 243 Nonfactualism: Thesis: the actual world contains no "normative facts". II 256 Nonfactualism: thesis in case of an epistemic impossibility of the antecedent of a conditional there is no question of acceptability ((s) > assertibility?). 
