Dictionary of Arguments

Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute

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Disputed term/author/ism	Author	Entry	Reference
Analysis	Chalmers	I 77 Analysis/Analyzability/Chalmers: if higher-level properties logically supervene on microphysical structures, the analysis is no problem. But we must look at the intensions of the concepts! Our terms are not suitable for all purposes from the outset. E.g. Are computer viruses alive? Is something book-like, stuck together by chance, a book? >Terms, >Definability. I 78 E.g. tables can be attached to the wall without legs, etc. >Definition/Chalmers,> A-Facts/B-Facts. I 81 Analysis/Analyzability/Chalmers: Analyzability is given when it can be shown that intensions specify functional or structural properties. Therefore, higher-level facts can in principle be derived from microphysical facts and can be explained reductively. Analysis/Awareness/Chalmers: the primary intensions of some concepts create problems with regard to conscious experience, e.g. color concepts. >Circumstances/Chalmers, > Ideal observer, etc.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Centered Worlds	Chalmers	I 133 Centered World/Indexicality/Chalmers: if a centered world is once determined, i.e. if the localization of the center (e.g., I) is established, then a primary intension (e.g., water and H₂O) provides a perfect non-indexical property. Cf. >Identity across worlds, >Identification, >Indexicality, >Intensions/Chalmers, >Terminology/Chalmers. Concepts: now one could assume that the term zombie would simply not be used in a zombie-centered world. >Zombies. ChalmersVs: the situation is more complicated: primary intensions do not require the presence of the original concept. This suggests that a posteriori necessity is not necessary for my arguments with regard to consciousness. >Necessity a posteriori. Intensions: the falling apart of primary and secondary intensions causes an uncertainty with regard to water: something watery does not have to be H₂O. But that does not apply to consciousness. If something feels like a conscious experience, then it is conscious experience, no matter in which world. >Consciousness/Chalmers.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Content	Chalmers	I 203 Content/experience/phenomenal belief/Chalmers: 1. What do our concepts like "consciousness" or "red experience" actually pick out (in a given world)? >Experience, >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Reference. 2. What constitutes the content of these concepts, is it determined by the psychological nature alone, or also by the phenomenal? >Concepts, >Phenomena. I 204 Zombie: could it have the same intensions of beliefs as I do? If it is subject to a conceptual confusion, that might be the same for me. >Zombies, >Intensions. The zombie could not make true or false judgments about consciousness in itself, but also in relation to me! For it could not use the term properly. But the concept of consciousness differs from the concept of "water" insofar as the "acquaintance" with the object is much more direct in the case of consciousness. >Acquaintance, >Knowing how, >First person, >Other minds, >Incorrigibility. I 205 Experience: is there a public language usage, e.g. for the term "red experience"? >Language use. Problem: Inverted spectra. >Inverted spectra. Solution: Standard conditions for standard observers. Moreover, we do not want to limit the term to my personal experiences, but look at every one's experiences. >Observation, >Standard conditions. I 206 Qualia: secondary intensions are not enough. We also learn something when we learn how it is to experience something red: the experience of something red could have been different, but it is so. In this way, we limit the scope of possibilities. For this, however, we need different primary intensions. Cf. >Color researcher Mary. I 207 Communication/Qualia: Only if others can have such experiences (under relevant causal conditions), my Qualia are communicable. >Understanding, >Intersubjectivity. Content/Consciousness/Conclusion/Chalmers: Beliefs about experiences are central. And these cannot be the same with my zombie twin as with me. But we do not need a causal theory of knowledge. We can even refer to experiences by assuming a property dualism. >Causal theory of knowledge, >Property dualism.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Intensions	Chalmers	I 54 Intension/Chalmers: intension is a function that defines how a concept is used in different situations. It is not the same as "meaning" and also not a definition. >Meaning, >Definitions, >Situations, >Reference, >Use, cf. >Extension. I 57 Intension/Chalmers: depending on whether a concept picks out an object in the actual world, or in a counterfactual world, I will speak of primary and secondary intension. >Concepts, >Possible worlds, >Actual world, >Terminology/Chalmers. Secondary Intension/Chalmers: secondary intension is therefore, independent of empirical factors. It describes how reference depends on how the outer world turns out. >twin earth, > rigidity). I 61 When counterfactual worlds are involved, it is not a priori determined what the reference is, since the actual world can be determined by different speakers as their own (mirror-inverted), >Centered Worlds/Quine. The determination as a primary or secondary intension will then also vary inversely. Cf. >Intensions/Stalnaker, >Propositions/Chalmers. I 62 Meaning/Chalmers: Both primary as well as secondary intensions are candidates for the "meaning" of a concept. "Water" could mean H₂O, or twin earth water, depending on what is meant by the concept in the respective world. I 63 Necessary Truth/Chalmers: both can even be constructed as a necessary truth when possible worlds are conceived as uttering contexts. Cf. >Character/Kaplan, >Content/Kaplan, >Two-dimensional Semantics. I 200 Primary Intension/Chalmers: For example, the largest star in the universe: picks out a star in every given centered world. Even non-existent objects have a primary intension, e.g. the Nicholas, (Santa Claus). This primary intension could have picked out an object if the world had turned out accordingly. Cf. >Non-existence, >Possibilia. For my concept of consciousness, the primary intension is more important than a causal relation to an object. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 205 Also, a zombie can have primary intensions that are overlapping with mine. >Zombies. I 206 Quality/Qualia: primary intensions do not specify Qualia. >Qualia.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Knowledge	Tye	Chalmers I 141 Knowledge/Colour Researcher Mary/Frank Jackson/Qualia/TyeVsJackson/Tye/Chalmers: (Tye 1986)⁽¹⁾: There is a difference in the intensionality between "This fluid is water" and "This fluid is H₂O". >Intensions, >Intensionality, >Reference. In a way, both sentences express the same fact, but one sentence can be known without the other being known. Chalmers: these gaps arise because of the difference between primary and secondary intension (localized or non-localized in the actual or in a possible world). >Primary Intensions, >Secondary Intensions, >Color researcher Mary, >Qualia. 1. Tye, Michael (1986). The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95 (January):1-17.	Tye I M. Tye Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts (Representation and Mind) Cambridge 2009 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Knowledge how	Chalmers	Chalmers I 142 Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990)⁽¹⁾ goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b)⁽²⁾ Tye (1986)⁽³⁾, Churchland (1985)⁽⁴⁾, Papineau (1993)⁽⁵⁾, Teller (1992)⁽⁶⁾, McMullen (1985)⁽⁷⁾: the examples with water/H₂O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors... I 143 ... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before. >Color researcher Mary, >Qualia, >Knowledge, >Propositional Knowledge, >Experience, >Intentions, >Primary Intension, >Terminology/Chalmers. VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)⁽⁸⁾): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library). I 144 ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983)⁽⁹⁾: there is an ontological gap here. ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours. >Conceivability, >Possible worlds. 1. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 2. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 3. M. Tye, The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95, 1986: pp. 1-17 4. P. M. Churchland, Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985: pp. 8-28 5. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 6. P. Teller A contemporary look at emergence. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 7. C. McMullen, "Knowing what it's like" and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 211-33 8. J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria 56, 1990: pp. 129-47 9. Th. Nagel, The objective self. In. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds) Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essayys. New York 1983.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Knowledge how	Loar	Chalmers I 142 Knowledge how/Qualia/primary/secondary intension/LoarVsJackson/LoarVsMaterialism/Loar/Chalmers: Loar (1990)⁽¹⁾ goes deeper in his critique than Horgan (1984b)⁽²⁾ Tye (1986)⁽³⁾, Churchland (1985)⁽⁴⁾, Papineau (1993)⁽⁵⁾, Teller (1992)⁽⁶⁾, McMullen (1985)⁽⁷⁾: the examples with water/H₂O, Superman/Clark Kent etc. still allow the physical and/or phenomenal concepts to have different primary intensions. For example, heat and e.g. average kinetic energy designate the same property (secondary intension), but simultaneously introduce different properties (primary intensions)! But this is not known a priori. N.B.: then Mary's knowledge about the phenomenal qualities of colors... I 143 ... was already a knowledge of physical or functional properties, but they could not connect the two before. VsJackson/Chalmers: further objections: (Bigelow/Pargetter (1990)⁽⁸⁾): BigelowVsJackson, PargetterVsJackson: even for an omniscient being there is a gap between physical and indexical knowledge (for example, Rudolf Lingens with memory loss reads his own biography in the library). I 144 ChalmersVsBigelow/ChalmersVsPargetter/ChalmersVsLoar: the lack of phenomenal knowledge is quite different from the lack of indexical knowledge. Knowledge/Indexicality/Nagel/Chalmers: (Nagel 1983)⁽⁹⁾: there is an ontological gap here. ChalmersVsNagel: we can argue more directly: there is no imaginable world in which the physical facts are as in our world, but in which the indexical facts differ from ours. 1. B. Loar, Phenomenal states. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 1990: pp. 81-108 2. T. Horgan, Jackson on physical information and qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34, 1984: pp. 147-83 3. M. Tye, The subjective qualities of experience. Mind 95, 1986: pp. 1-17 4. P. M. Churchland, Reduction, qualia and the direct introspection of brain states. Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985: pp. 8-28 5. D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, Oxford 1993 6. P. Teller A contemporary look at emergence. In: A. Beckermann, H. Flohr and J. Kim (Eds) Emergence or Reduction? Prospects for Nonreductive Physicalism, Berlin 1992 7. C. McMullen, "Knowing what it's like" and the essential indexical. Philosophical Studies 48, 1985: pp. 211-33 8. J. Bigelow and R. Pargetter, Acquaintance with qualia. Theoria 56, 1990: pp. 129-47 9. Th. Nagel, The objective self. In. C. Ginet and S. Shoemaker (eds) Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essayys. New York 1983.	Loar I B. Loar Mind and Meaning Cambridge 1981 Loar II Brian Loar "Two Theories of Meaning" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Morals	Chalmers	I 83 Moral/Aesthetics/Chalmers: it is often said that there is no conceptual connection between physical properties and moral or aesthetic properties. This does not mean, however, that moral and aesthetic properties are as problematic as conscious experiences. Cf. >Consciousness/Chalmers, >Experience. 1. Is a possible world conceivable, which is physically indistinguishable from ours, but morally different? >Conceivability. 2. Are moral facts not phenomena that impose themselves upon us? We can deny them. This is done by moral antirealists such as Blackburn (1971)⁽¹⁾ and Hare (1984) ⁽²⁾. I 84 Moral/Supervenience/Boyd/Brink/Chalmers: Boyd (1988)⁽³⁾ and Brink (1989)⁽⁴⁾ Thesis: moral facts supervene on natural facts with an a posteriori necessity. That is, they suprvene on the secondary, not the primary, intension of moral concepts. (> Horgan and Timmons, 1992a ⁽⁵⁾, 1992b ⁽⁶⁾). >Intensions, >Primary intensions, >Propositions/Chalmers, >Supervenience, >a posteriori necessity. 1. S. Blackburn, Moral realism. IN. J. Casey (Ed) Morality and Moral Reasoning, London 1971. 2. R. M. Hare, Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl.58, 1984: pp. 1-16 3. R. N. Boyd, How to be a moral realist. In G. Syre-McCord (Ed), Essays on Moral Realism. Ithaca, NY 1988 4. D. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge 1989. 5. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, Troubles for new ware moral sentiments; The "open question argument" revived. Philosophical Papers 1992. 6. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, Trouble on moral twin earth: Moral Queerness revived. Synthese 92, 1992: pp. 223-60.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Proofs	Chalmers	93/94 Proof/Argument/Chalmers: to argue against something, one can proceed on three levels: 1. The Unimaginability 2. The lack of recognizability (epistemic) 3. The conceptual analysis. For the irreducibility of conscious experience, I will argue on all three levels. >Experience, >Conceivability, >Knowledge, >Certainty, >Concepts, >Analysis/Chalmers. This will be about an a priori version of the logical necessity with regard to primary intensions. >Intensions.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Supervenience	Blackburn	Chalmers I 88 Supervenience/Horgan/Blackburn/Chalmers: Question: (Blackburn 1985)⁽¹⁾, (Horgan 1993)⁽²⁾: How do we explain the supervenience relation itself? Primary Intension/Chalmers: for logical supervenience on primary intensions, we simply need to present a conceptual analysis, together with the finding that the reference is preserved over possible worlds (is rigid). >Rigidity, >Intensions, >Primary Intension. The supervenience conditional is an a priori conceptual truth. >Conditional, >a priori. I 89 Secondary Intension: here, the logical supervenience can be explained by saying that the primary intension of the concept extracts a referent of the actual world, which is projected unchanged to other physically identical worlds (by rigidifying operations). >Secondary Intension. Such facts are contingent. (FN 51/Chapter 2) >Contingency. Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: natural supervenience is - as opposed to the logical - contingent. This is ontologically expensive, therefore we can be glad that logical supervenience is the rule. >Supervenience/Chalmers 1. Simon Blackburn (1985). Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):211-215. 2. Terence Horgan (1993). On What There Isn’t. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):693-700.	Blckbu I S. Blackburn Spreading the Word : Groundings in the Philosophy of Language Oxford 1984 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Supervenience	Chalmers	I 33 Supervenience/Chalmers: supervenience is in general a relation between two sets of properties: B properties: higher-level properties A properties: lower-level properties (for us physical properties). The specific nature of these properties is not relevant to us. >Levels/order, >Description Levels. Basic pattern: Definition Supervenience/Chalmers: B-properties supervene on A-properties, if two possible situations are not identical with regard to their A-properties and at the same time differ in their B-properties. For example, biological properties supervene on physical ones insofar as two possible physically identical situations are also biologically identical. Local/Global Supervenience/Chalmers: we distinguish global supervenience, depending on how the situations under consideration, refer to individuals or possible worlds. Local Supervenience/Chalmers: B supervenes locally on A when the A properties of an individual determine the B properties of that individual. I 34 E.g. form supervenes on physical properties. Definition Global Supervenience/Chalmers: when A facts about the world determine B facts about the world. That is, there are no two possible worlds which are identical with respect to A, which are not also identical with regard to B. For example biological properties supervene globally on physical properties. Definition local supervenience implies global supervenience, but not vice versa. E.g. two physical organisms can differ in certain biological characteristics, one individual can be fitter than the other, triggered by environmental conditions. >Extrinsic properties,> Niches. Chalmers: For example, one could imagine that two physically identical organisms might belong to different species, if they had different evolutionary stories. Consciousness: here it will be more about local supervenience. I 35 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: logical supervenience is conceptual and stronger than natural supervenience. Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: this term is used to distinguish between logical supervenience. I 38 A situation would be conceivable in which laws that automatically produce B facts might not produce these for once. (Kripke 1972, 1980)⁽¹⁾. I 39 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: Problem: There could be a possible world which is identical to our actual world, but not additionally with non-physical elements such as angels and ghosts. These could be physically identical with us, but biologically different from us. This has led some authors (Haugeland 1982⁽²⁾, Petrie 1987⁽³⁾) to say that the logical possibility and logical necessity are too strong terms for our supervenience relations. Solution/Chalmers: we must explicitly refer to our actual world or specified possible worlds. I 40 Other problems have to do with negative existence statements about what does not exist in our world, or does not exist in other possible worlds. Such problems can never be determined by local facts or local characteristics. Supervenience should always be determined by reference to positive facts and characteristics. I 84 Name/Supervenience/Explanation/Chalmers: E.g. according to Kaplan (1989)⁽⁴⁾ the name "Rolf Harris" simply picks out its speaker directly. Does that mean that the property to be Rolf Harris does not logically supervene on physical facts? >Names, >Reference, >Identification, >Vivid name/Kaplan. Secondary intension of the name: what resulted from a certain egg and sperm in all possible worlds. This supervenes logically on facts. Primary intension of the name: is that what results from the linguistic usage, of those who have, or had assiociate with Rolf Harris, or heard of Rolf Harris. The primary intension may be absent, which is a problem for the supervenience >Propositions/Chalmers, >Terminology/Chalmers. I 87 Logical Supervenience/Chalmers: apart from conscious experience, indexicality, and negative existence theorems everything supervenes logically on physical facts, including physical laws. >Indexicality, >Experience, >Non-existence, >Existence statements. I 88 Supervenience/Horgan/Blackburn/Chalmers: Question: (Blackburn 1985)⁽⁵⁾, Horgan (1993)⁽⁶⁾: How do we explain the supervenience relation itself? Primary Intension/Chalmers: For logical supervenience on primary intensions, we simply need to present a conceptual analysis, together with the determination that the reference over possible worlds remains preserved (is rigid). Thereby, the supervenience conditional is an a priori conceptual truth. I 89 Secondary Intension: here, the logical supervenience can be explained by saying that the primary intension of the concept picks out a referent of the actual world, which is projected unchanged to other physically identical worlds (by rigidifying operations). Such facts are contingent. (See Horgan and Timmons 1992b.⁽⁷⁾) Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: natural supervenience is - as opposed to the logical - contingent. This is ontologically expensive, so we can be glad that logical supervenience is the ussual case. I 124 Supervenience/Consciousness/Chalmers: we have seen that conscious experience does not logically supervene on the physical facts, but not that it does not supervene at all! 1. S. A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Reprint: Cambridge 1980 2. J. Haugeland, Weak supervenience. American Philosophical Quarterly 19, 1982: pp. 93-103 3. B. Petrie, Global supervenience and reduction. Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 48, 1987: pp. 119-30 4. D. Kaplan, Demonstratives. In: J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (Eds) Themes from Kaplan. New York 1989 5. S. Blackburn, Supervenience revisited. In: I. Hacking (ed) Exercises in Analysis: Essay by Students of Casimir Lewy. Cambridge 1985 6. T. Horgan, From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world. Mind 102, 1993: pp. 555-86 7. T. Horgan and M. Timmons, Troubles for new ware moral sentiments; The "open question argument" revived. Philosophical Papers 1992.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Supervenience	Horgan	Chalmers I 88 Supervenience/Horgan/Blackburn/Chalmers: Question: (Blackburn 1985)(1), Horgan (1993)⁽²⁾: How do we explain the supervenience relation itself? Primary Intension/Chalmers: For logical supervenience on primary intensions, we simply need to present a conceptual analysis, together with the determination that the reference about possible worlds is preserved (or is rigid). The supervenience conditional is thus an a priori conceptual truth. >Intensions, >Primary Intension, >Rigidity, >Reference. I 89 Secondary Intension: here, the logical supervenience can be explained by saying that the primary intension of the concept extracts a referent of the actual world, which is projected unchanged to other physically identical worlds (by rigidifying operations). Such facts are contingent. (FN 51/C 2) >Secondary Intension. Natural Supervenience/Chalmers: is - as opposed to the logical - contingent for its part. This is ontologically expensive, so we can be glad that logical supervenience is the rule. >Contingency, >Ontology. 1. Simon Blackburn (1985). Spreading the Word: Groundings in the Philosophy of Language. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):211-215. 2. T. Horgan (1993). From supervenience to superdupervenience: Meeting the demands of a material world. Mind 102 (408):555-86	Horgan I T. Horgan Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology (Representation and Mind) Cambridge 2009 Horgan II T. Horgan The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content 2010 Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014
Zombies	Chalmers	I 94 Zombies/Robots/Chalmers: zombies and robots are logically possible. There could be a twin of me, who is molecular identical with me, but without inner experience. >Robots, >Experience, >Qualia, >Phenomena, cf. >Artificial Consciousness, >Artificial Intelligence, >Strong AI. I 95 Zombie Identity/Chalmers: The identity between my zombie twin and I will insist on the following levels: 1. Functional: he will process the same information as I do. 2. Psychological: he will show the same behavior. Phenomenal: the zombie will not be identical with me: he will not have the same inner experiences. I 96 Zombies/Chalmers: it is not a matter of whether the assumption of their existence is plausible, but whether it is conceptually incoherent. In any case, there are no hidden conceptual contradictions. >Analyticity. I 97 Conceivability: since such a zombie is not conceptually excluded, it follows that my conscious experience does not logically follow from the functional constitution of my organism. >Conceivability/Chalmers. Conclusion: (phenomenal) consciousness does not supervene logically on the physical. >Consciousness/Chalmers. I 131 Zombies/Necessity a posteriori/VsChalmers: one could argue that a zombie world would be merely logical, but not metaphysically possible. There is also a distinction between conceivability and true possibility. >Necessity a posteriori, >Metaphysical possibility. Necessary a posteriori/Kripke: For example, that water is H₂O, this necessity is only a posteriori knowable. Then it is logical, but not metaphysically possible, that water is not H2O. VsChalmers: it was unnatural to assume the same for zombies, and that would be enough to save materialism. ChalmersVsVs: the notion of necessity a posteriori cannot bear the burden of this argument and is only a distraction maneuver. ((s) It is not brought into play by Kripke himself). I 132 ChalmersVsVs: the argument against me would only have a prospect of success if we had used primary intensions (e.g. water and H₂O), but we are dealing with secondary intensions (e.g. water and "wateriness"). Therefore, psychological/physical concepts a posteriori could pick out other things than what would correspond to the a priori distinction. I 180 Zombie/Behavior/Explanation/Chalmers: since the relationships within my zombie twin are the exact reflection of my inner being, any explanation of his behavior will also count as an explanation of my behavior. It follows that the explanation of my assertions about consciousness is just as independent of the existence of consciousness as the explanation of the assertions of the zombies. My zombie twin can adopt this argumentation, and complain about me as a zombie. It can mirror the whole situation.	Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014

The author or concept searched is found in the following controversies.

Disputed term/author/ism	Author Vs Author	Entry	Reference
Chalmers, D.	Stalnaker Vs Chalmers, D.	I 194 Semantic Facts/Semantics/Stalnaker: the semantics assumes that the Semantic facts about a language that specifies two types of intensions that can be abstracted from these very Semantic facts and then also cannot be applied in possible worlds (poss.w.) in which those facts do not persist. We can take the primary intension in the actual world and consider its extension in any poss.w.. Meta semantics/Stalnaker: only assumes that the semantics (plus context) I 195 defines a normal intension. So it assumes less what can be derived from a semantics for a language. primary intension/meta semantics/Stalnaker: here these functions have a more limited domain. Their values are only determinded for such poss.w. that contain this expression (the token). Semantics/meta semantics/Chalmers: this distinction makes little difference. StalnakerVsChalmers: on the contrary: it is not only about how you distinguish the different representations how referents are dependent from facts, the distinction reflects two different ways to use the two-dimensional device. Difference: a) we characterize the relevant two-dimensional and primary intensions as types of meaning, b) not as meaning. Stalnaker: this has consequences for our understanding of a priori knowledge and truth. I 202 Necessary a posteriori: is divided into necessary truth a priori knowable by conceptual analysis and a part which is only a posteriori knowable but this one is contingent. Chalmers and Jackson show this with two-dimensional semantics. Stalnaker: I agree with the two that this phenomenon has its roots in the relation between how we represent the world and the world itself, but Two-dimensional semantics/StalnakerVsJackson/StalnakerVsChalmers: thesis: I think that shows something about the nature of mental representations and not only on the contingent functioning of languages. I 210 Two-dimensional frame/Stalnaker: can be interpreted a) as Kaplan originally but extended b) meta-semantically. I 211 Ad a) then the causal chains are part of the semantic content Chalmers: this makes little difference StalnakerVsChalmers: the difference is greater than he thinks. Necessity a posteriori is then analyzed differently. Causal chain/Stalnaker: if it is part of the descriptive semantics then it is said by it how - given this descriptive semantics - the references are determined by the facts. Problem: how did the facts determine which semantics the language has?	Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003