Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Accessibility | Bigelow | I 126 Accessibility relation: can be restricted: for example, by the requirement that a possible world w from the accessible possible world u does not contain any individuals that do not also contain u. That is, that the one world is only a re-structured one of the other. This would e.g. contradict Lewis counterpart theory. >Possible worlds, >Possible worlds/Lewis, >Counterpart theory/Lewis. I 136 Definition weak centering/accessibility/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: we will say that degrees of accessibility are weakly centered if no possible world is more accessible from a given possible world than this possible world itself. This is best satisfied with: d(w, w) = 0. N.b.: this ensures that some additional sentences will be true in all possible worlds, in addition to those guaranteed by the above axioms. These are derivable as theorems if we take the following axioms: A9 (reflexivity) and A16. (B would > would g)> (b> g) Everyday translation: no world can be more accessible to a world than this world is accessible to itself. This leaves open the possibility that some possible worlds have the accessibility "zero-distance" from the world w. Definition strong centering/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: (in the semantics for counterfactual conditionals): no possible world can be accessible from a given world as this world is accessible from itself. This is best satisfied: If w is not equal to u, then either d(w, u) is undefined or d (w, u) > 0. This semantic condition allows a completeness proof for the axiom system which we obtain by adding the axiom of the strong centering to the above axioms: (a ∧ b)> (a would > would b) >Completeness. Counterfactual logic/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: with these axioms, we get Lewis' favored counterfactual logic. BigelowVsStrong centering. Modal logic/Axiom system/Bigelow/Pargetter: our system will be the one Lewis calls VW: V ": "variably strict", "W". "Weakly centered". 139 Accessibility Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Problem: we must restrict it, and for a proof of completeness for S5, we must show that it is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric. >Systems S4/S5. S5/Canonical Model/Bigelow/Pargetter: does not only contain the Leibnizian necessity (truth in all worlds). S5: is interesting because it allows a reductionist access to possible worlds. >Reduction. Necessity: in the canonical model a proposition is necessarily true if it is true in all accessible possible worlds. >Necessity. Possible worlds: when they are designed as the maximum consistent extensions of S5, they disintegrate into different equivalence classes. ((s) i.e. for each world there is an additional sentence describing an individual with possibly different descriptions which do not contradict the other sentences). >Possible worlds, >Equivalence classes. Equivalence classes/accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: within an equivalence class, all worlds are accessible to one another. But between equivalence classes there is no accessibility from one possible world to the other. ((s), then the maximum consistent extensions must be something other than I suspected, then an extension will modify all existing propositions and makes them incomparable with a subset of the previous consistent set). >Maximum consistent. Accessibility/canonical model/Bigelow/Pargetter: in a canonical model, not all possible worlds are accessible to one another. >Canonicalness. We show it this way: Fa: (spelling: latin a) be an atomic sentence that can be added to the axioms of S5, or its negation, whereby the result being a maximally consistent set or world. With this, we are constructing a world where Fa is true. If it were accessible from all other worlds, MFa would be true in all possible worlds. But a proposition which is true in all worlds must be a theorem. But we know that Fa is not Problem: R2 (universal substitution) would ensure that Mα would be true for every α, even if α = (b u ~ b). Interpretation/Bigelow/Pargetter: if the intended interpretation of S5 is Leibnizean, as we hope ((s) necessity = truth in all worlds) then it follows that this intended interpretation of S5 is not captured by the canonical model. Possible world/Bigelow/Pargetter: that supports what we want to show, namely that possible worlds are not sets of sentences. Accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: ...and it also shows that the accessibility relation... I 140 ... which is relevant to alethic modal logic, is not an equivalence relation. Logical truth/Bigelow/Pargetter: is truth in all possible worlds (pro Leibniz!) not merely truth in all accessible worlds? >Logical truth. I 242 Accessibility Relation/Accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, we do not believe that the accessibility relation supervenes to properties and relations of the first level of the possible worlds, but on higher level universes! >Universals, >Supervenience. Two worlds can be perfectly similar in terms of universals of the first level and still have different accessibility relations! Humean World/Bigelow/Pargetter: is an example for the failure of the supervenience of the 1st level of the accessibility relation. >Humean world. For example, "all Fs are Gs", whereby F and G are universals of the 1st level, and higher-level universals that supervene on them. I 243 Counterfactual conditional: then also counterfactual conditionals should be valid like: "If this thing had been an F, it would have been a G". We would never be sure if it was a law, even if there were no exceptions. This uncertainty is reflected in uncertainty as to whether the counterfactual conditional is true. >Counterfactuals, >Counterfactual conditionals. Even if we live in a world with laws, we allow the possibility that this world is a Humean world. It might be that the generalization is correct, but without necessity. The world would look the same in both cases. Humean World/Bigelow/Pargetter: is, with respect to the actual world, precisely a world, which is the same, without laws. For other worlds there would be other Humean worlds. I 245 Accessibility/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, there are strong reasons to believe in a supervenience of the accessibility relation on the contents of the world. This allows us to assume that the contents of the 1st level do not exhaust all the contents of the world. Combinatorial theories. Therefore, must accept higher-level universals, and hence the property theory of the world's properties. Universals/Natural Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: Higher-level universals are the key to laws. >Levels/order, >Description levels. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Colour | Carnap | VI 126 Colors/Carnap: arise as abstraction classes of color identity. VI 102 Abstraction class: class of elements related to an arbitrary element - (s)> Unit Sets. VI 152 Similarity Circles/Carnap: at first, you take all classes of elementary experiences (EE) that are partially similar to each other - (due to reflexivity). >Experience. Then the two-, three-, etc. classes of partially similar EE - then one removes from this list all the classes that are contained in a different one as subclass VI 181 GoetheVsPositivism/GoetheVsEmpiricism/GoetheVsNewton/GoetheVsCarnap: (color theory): we are to remain in the field of sensory perception itself and notice the laws in the area of perception that exist between them - CarnapVsGoethe: the laws of physics do not apply there, but different, more complicated ones do. >Perception, >Phenomena, >Qualia. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Discourse | Bohman | Gaus I 155 Discourse/Bohman: Discourse in political practices and in the public sphere seems to be directed to an implied audience or 'unseen gallery' and thus goes beyond 'sociable' interaction among friends (Gamson, 1992(1): 20). 1) Thus, discourse is communication directed to an indefinite audience, and an extension of face-to-face interaction that is made possible by technologies of writing, mass media or computer assisted communication and by formal political institutions (Thompson, 1995)(2). Second order coummuncation/reflexion: (...) discourse that has the property of being public is also reflexive or second-order communication; it must at least Gaus I 156 include the possibility of communication about the mode and assumptions of communication itself, for example, whether it is really public or not (Habermas, 1984)(3). This reflexivity is apparent especially when communication fails, when the assumptions that we make for practical purposes 'until further notice' in Garfinkel's (1969(4): 33) phrase are no longer successful in producing mutual understanding or co-ordination of action. In this case, speakers must make explicit the basis of communication itself by providing reasons and arguments that others might be able to accept. Just how far the demand for justification can be pursued by speakers and institutionalized in practices is subject to dispute among the proponents of various theories of discourse. Linguistics: For some, the linguistic medium makes reflexivity possible, while for others it imposes insuperable limits on reflection (Hoy and McCarthy, 1994)(5). >Discourse/Political Theory, >Discourse/Social sciences. 1. Gamson, William (1992) Talking Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Thompson, John (1995) The Media and Modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 3. Habermas, Jürgen (1984) The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I. Boston: Beacon. 4. Garfinkel, Harold (1969) Studies in Ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 5. Hoy, David and Thomas, McCarthy (1994) Critical Theory. London: Blackwell. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Discourse | Bourdieu | Gaus I 158 Discourse/Bourdieu/Bohman: BourdieuVsFoucault: [In contrast to Foucault] Bourdieu's challenge is more epistemic, relativizing linguistic activities and practices to a background habitus, a set of dispositions inculcated in socialization. >Discourse/Foucault, >Discourse theory/Bohman. Bourdieu: the object here is to appeal to 'generative and implicit schemata' rather than explicit or consciously sanctioned rules. Practices are regular and reproducible patterns of action 'without being the product of rules and without presupposing a conscious aim or the express mastery of them' (Bourdieu, 1977(1): 55). He criticizes ideal theories for their 'linguistic communism', as blind to the forms of status and inequalities that make it possible for speakers to be authoritative and persuasive. The capacity to produce comprehensible utterances 'may be quite inadequate to produce sentences that are likely to be listened to, likely to be recognized as acceptable in all situations in which there is occasion to speak' (Bourdieu, 1991(2): 55). Normative discourse theories leave out social relations among speakers, their different social positions and their capacities to garner linguistic authority. Bourdieu thinks that because habitus is not a matter of rules, its limitations are not in principle accessible to speakers at the level of second-order Gaus I 159 communication, when speakers must offer explicit justification for their actions and practices. Both challenges see power as operating within discourse itself, not merely as an external constraint upon it. Bohman: these same sorts of constraints on discourse may also operate in the ways that deeply historically embedded inequalities such as race and gender shape discourse and restrict its reflexivity (Butler, 1993(3): 232). 1. Bourdieu, Pierre (1977) Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2. Bourdieu, Pierre (1991) Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Polity. 3. Butler, Judith (1993) Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex. London: Routledge. Bohman, James 2004. „Discourse Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Bourd I P. Bourdieu La distinction. Critique sociale du jugement, Paris 1979 German Edition: Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft Frankfurt/M. 1987 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Experience | Apel | Gadamer I 452 Experience/World/Apel/Gadamer: GadamerVsReflection Philosophy: The consciousness of conditionality does not in any way cancel out the conditionality itself. It is one of the prejudices of reflection philosophy that it understands as a relationship of sentences, which is not at all on the same logical level. >Reflection philosophy, >Levels/order, >Levels of description. Apel: So the reflection argument is out of place here. For it is not at all a matter of relations of judgements that are to be kept free of contradictions, but of living conditions. The linguistic constitution of our experience of the world is capable of encompassing the most diverse living conditions(1). >Experience, >Life, >Language. 1. K. -O. Apel, Der philosophische Wahrheitsbegriff einer inhaltlich orientierten Sprachwissenschaft, Festschrift für Weisgerber, S. 25 f. (Now in: K.-O. Apel, Transformation der Philosophie, 2 vol. Frankfurt 1973, there vol. 1, p. 106—137) shows correctly that someone's talking about oneself is by no means to be understood as an objectively fixed assertion of an essence, so that a refutation of such statements by demonstrating their logical reflexivity and contradictoriness is meaningless. |
Ape I K. O. Apel Transformation der Philosophie: Band I. Sprachanalytik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik Frankfurt/M. 1994 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Given | Dilthey | Gadamer I 70 Given/Humanities/Science/Dilthey/Gadamer: Since [Dilthey] is concerned with epistemological justification of the work of the humanities, the motif of the truly given dominates him everywhere. So it is an epistemological motif or better the motif of epistemology itself that motivates its conceptualization and that corresponds to the linguistic process (...) (>Experience/Dilthey). ((s)VsDilthey: see Wilfrid Sellars' criticism of the concept of the given: >Given/Sellars). Humanities/Gadamer: This is precisely what characterizes the development of the humanities in the 19th century, that they not only outwardly described the natural sciences as a role model but that they, coming from the same reason for which modern science lives, develop the same pathos of experience and research as they do. ((s) Cf. >Sensations/Carnap). Gadamer I 71 Dilthey/Gadamer: The conditions in the humanities are in fact of a special kind, and Dilthey wants to formulate this through the concept of "experience". In connection with Descartes' distinction of res cogitans he defines the concept of experience by reflexivity, by being within. He also wants to justify the knowledge of the historical world epistemologically from this special way of giving facts. The primary conditions on which the interpretation of historical objects are based are not data of experiment and measurement, but units of meaning. This is what the concept of experience wants to say: Given/Dilthey: The sense entities we encounter in the humanities no matter how strange and incomprehensible they may be to us - can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, representational or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of sense. Gadamer I 231 Given/Humanities/Dilthey/Gadamer: The concept of the given is [in the humanities] of a fundamentally different structure [than in the natural sciences]. It distinguishes the conditions of the humanities from those of the natural sciences, "that everything solid, everything alien, as is inherent in the images of the physical world, is given, must be thought away from the notion of what is given in this field"(1). All that is given is brought forth here. Dilthey: According to Dilthey, the old preference that Vico already attributed to historical objects is the basis of the universality with which understanding takes possession of the historical world. Gadamer: The question is, however, whether on this basis the transition from the psychological to the hermeneutical point of view is really successful or whether Dilthey gets entangled in problem contexts that bring him into an unwanted and unacknowledged proximity to speculative idealism. Not only Fichte, but also Hegel is visible right down to the words at the quoted passage. His criticism of "positivity"(2) the concept of self-alienation, the definition of the spirit as self-knowledge in otherness can easily be derived from Dilthey's sentence, and one wonders where actually the difference remains that emphasized the historical view of the world compared with idealism and that Dilthey undertook to legitimize epistemologically. This question is reinforced when one considers the central turn with which Dilthey characterizes life, this basic fact of history. >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften VIl, 148. 2. Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, ed. Nohl, S. 139f. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Given | Humanities | Gadamer I 70 Given/Humanities/Science/Dilthey/Gadamer: Since [Dilthey] is concerned with epistemological justification of the work of the humanities, the motif of the truly given dominates him everywhere. So it is an epistemological motif or better the motif of epistemology itself that motivates its conceptualization and that corresponds to the linguistic process (...) (>Experience/Dilthey). ((s)VsDilthey: see Wilfrid Sellars' criticism of the concept of the given: >Given/Sellars). Humanities/Gadamer: This is precisely what characterizes the development of the humanities in the 19th century, that they not only outwardly described the natural sciences as a role model but that they, coming from the same reason for which modern science lives, develop the same pathos of experience and research as they do. ((s) Cf. >Sensations/Carnap). Gadamer I 71 Dilthey/Gadamer: The conditions in the humanities are in fact of a special kind, and Dilthey wants to formulate this through the concept of "experience". In connection with Descartes' distinction of res cogitans he defines the concept of experience by reflexivity, by being within. He also wants to justify the knowledge of the historical world epistemologically from this special way of giving facts. The primary conditions on which the interpretation of historical objects are based are not data of experiment and measurement, but units of meaning. This is what the concept of experience wants to say: Given/Dilthey: The sense entities we encounter in the humanities no matter how strange and incomprehensible they may be to us - can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, representational or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of sense. Gadamer I 231 Given/Humanities/Dilthey/Gadamer: The concept of the given is [in the humanities] of a fundamentally different structure [than in the natural sciences]. It distinguishes the conditions of the humanities from those of the natural sciences, "that everything solid, everything alien, as is inherent in the images of the physical world, is given, must be thought away from the notion of what is given in this field"(1). All that is given is brought forth here. Dilthey: According to Dilthey, the old preference that Vico already attributed to historical objects is the basis of the universality with which understanding takes possession of the historical world. Gadamer: The question is, however, whether on this basis the transition from the psychological to the hermeneutical point of view is really successful or whether Dilthey gets entangled in problem contexts that bring him into an unwanted and unacknowledged proximity to speculative idealism. Not only Fichte, but also Hegel is visible right down to the words at the quoted passage. His criticism of "positivity"(2) the concept of self-alienation, the definition of the spirit as self-knowledge in otherness can easily be derived from Dilthey's sentence, and one wonders where actually the difference remains that emphasized the historical view of the world compared with idealism and that Dilthey undertook to legitimize epistemologically. This question is reinforced when one considers the central turn with which Dilthey characterizes life, this basic fact of history. >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften VIl, 148. 2. Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, ed. Nohl, S. 139f. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Knowledge | Hintikka | II 17 Def Knowledge/Hintikka: knowledge is that what enables the knowing person to concentrate on the subset W1 of the set of all worlds W. >Possible worlds. W1: W1 is then relative not only to the knowing person b, but also relative to the scenario w0 ε W. Def b knows that S iff. S is true in all epistemic b alternatives. Reflexivity/transitivity/knowledge/Hintikka: we must assume here: if b can exclude all scenarios in W-W1, he/she can in fact exclude the assertion that he/she is not in such a position. II 29 Knowledge/game theory/Hintikka: typical example for the acquisition of knowledge: cheating husbands or wise men. This is about the fact that the decisions of the players depend on the respective level of knowledge, and of what one expects the other knows. >Game theory. Game Theory/game-theoretical/Hintikka: "Inquirer": the inquirer asks questions. Nature/oracle/opponent: the nature or opponent is the source of information. Answer: an answer can be used by the inquirer as a premise to derive a conclusion: C. This can only be about the question "C or not C". Premise/T: the premise can be a fixed initial premise (the "theoretical premise"). Final Rules: final rules can be limited to those that fulfill the subformula principle. Question Game: we call this an "interrogative game". Advantage: the game theory allows us to investigate cognitive strategies, not just static cognitive situations. Nature: the "oracle" can literally be nature. The answers can be given by scientific experiments. II 30 Restrictions: restrictions arise from the logical form, in particular the logical complexity, e.g. the prefix structure of the quantifiers for possible answers. E.g. Sensory Perception/perception/Hintikka: perception can only answer yes-no questions. This corresponds to atomic sentences for logicians. Experiment: an experiment, on the other hand, can provide responses that encode functional dependencies ((s) represent). Prefix/logical form/experiment/Hintikka: the answer to an experiment must have a structure with a prefix "∀∃": „(x)(∃y)“. This can be extended: ∀∃∀ ... Science Theory/Hintikka: this structure is extremely important for the philosophy of the sciences. II 31 Knowledge/logical form/Hintikka: it is very important that we have different kinds of knowledge. For example, implicit knowledge must be treated in the model of a sub-oracle. >Knowledge, >Propositional knowledge, >Knowing how. Knowledge/Hintikka: but neither implicit nor active knowledge obeys the epistemic logic! Completedness: it is neither completed with respect to logical reasoning nor completed when the relation of the logical inference is restricted. Knowledge Logic/Hintikka: we need a different logic of knowledge than the epistemic logic. Definition Knowledge/game-theoretical/game theory/Hintikka: the knowledge of the inquirer consists of all the conclusions C, which he/she can find out in the questioning process. Definition Virtual Knowledge/game theory/Hintikka: ditto, except that the inquirer is not allowed to introduce additional individuals here. II 151 Knowledge-who/identity/psychology/psychiatry/Hintikka: there are interesting examples here. One must be able to recognize oneself as the same in different situations. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Kripke Semantics | Hintikka | II XIII Kripke Semantics/HintikkaVsKripke: Kripke semantics is not a viable model for the theory of logical modalities (logical necessity and logical possibility). Problem: the right logic cannot be axiomatized. Solution: to interpret Kripke semantics as a non-standard semantics,... II XIV ...in the sense of Henkin's non-standard interpretation of the logic of higher levels, while the correct semantics for logical modalities would be analogous to a standard interpretation. >Logical possibility, >Logical necessity, >Modal logic, >Modalities. --- II 1 Kripke Semantics/Hintikka: Kripke semantics is a modern model-theoretic approach that is misleadingly called Kripke semantics. E.g.: F: is a framework consisting of SF: a set of models or possible worlds and R: a two-digit relation, a kind of alternative relation. Possible Worlds: w1 is supposed to be an alternative, which could legitimately be realized instead of w0 (the actual world). R: the only limitation we impose on it is reflexivity. Truth Conditions/modal logic/Kripke semantics/Hintikka: the truth conditions for modal sentences are then: II 2 (TN) Given a frame F, Np is true in w0 ε SF iff. P is true in every alternative wi ∈ SF to w0. (T.M) Given a frame F, Mp is true in w0 ε SF iff. P is true in at least one alternative wi ∈ SF to w0. Model Theory/modal logic/Hintikka: Kanger, Guillaume and later Kripke have seen that when we add reflexivity, transitivity, and symmetry, we get a model theory for axiom systems of the Lewis type for modal propositional logic. Kripke Semantics/modal logic/logical possibility/logical necessity/HintikkaVsKripke/HintikkaVsKripke semantics: problem: if we interpret the operators N, P as expressing logical modalities, they are inadequate: we need more than one arbitrary selection for logical possibility and necessity of possible worlds. We need truth in every logically possible world. But in the Kripke semantics it is not necessary that all such logically possible worlds are contained in the set of alternatives ((s) that is, there may be logically possible worlds that are not considered). (See below the logical possibility forms the largest class of possibilities). Problem: Kripke semantics is therefore inadequate for logical modalities. II 12 Kripke/Hintikka: Kripke has avoided epistemic logic and the logic of propositional attitudes, concentrating on pure modalities. >Epistemic logic. Therefore, it is strange that he uses non-standard logic. But somehow it seems clear to him that this is not possible for logical modalities. Metaphysical Possibility/Kripke/HintikkaVsKripke: Kripke has never explained what these mystical possibilities actually are. II 13 Worse: Kripke has not even shown that they are so restrictive that he can use his extremely liberal non-standard semantics. |
Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
| Laws | Nozick | II 144 Law/Laws of Nature/LoN/Language/Interpretation/WittgensteinVsArmstrong/Nozick: laws cannot be formulated linguistically, because they can always be interpreted differently. >Rule Following, >Interpretation, >Laws, >Laws of nature, >Laws/Armstrong, >L. Wittgenstein, >D. Armstrong. II 145 Event/Law/LoN/Relation/Hume/Nozick: Hume: the relations between events are not logical. - The connection between the event and the law cannot be causal. >Causality/Hume, >Causal laws, >Causal relation, >Events. Another problem: logical connections have to be interpreted in turn. >Logic, >Necessity, >de re necessity. II 146 If the interpretation should be fixed, then the law should include something analogous to reflexive self reference. - This is mysterious itself. >Self-reference. Hence, we must not treat laws related with statements. - Because of Gödel there is probably not a "picture of all the facts" from which all factual statements can be derived. Determinism/Nozick: therefore should not rely on derivability from causal laws. >Derivation, >Derivability, >Determinism, >K. Gödel. II 146 Law/fact/general/special/make true/Nozick: if a law is not treated as a quasi-statement but as a general fact, how can it make individual states true? - How can "make true" be a real relation between facts? Then it must be related to causality. Thereby, the problems would be repeated. - That laws should limit facts, only names the problem. >Truth, >Description levels, >Levels/order. II 147 If laws are mere descriptions, they explain nothing. - If they are to be mere conjunctions of events, then there is no fundamentality and no hierarchy. >Conjunction. But: Fundamental orders may be variously interpreted or axiomatized again. >Order, >Facts, >World, >Totality. II 148 Instead fundamental order: "organic unity". Problem: this is not a justification. - Analogous to the artwork. Problem: Justification needs again a fundamental order. Possible Worlds with reflexive self-subsumption could be more coherent, than those without reflexivity. >Possible worlds. Then the question of why a particular statement applies, is repeated. - The problem of the relationship between facts and laws cannot be solved here. >Explanation. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Life | Dilthey | Gadamer I 71 Life/Dilthey/Gadamer: The meanings that we encounter in the humanities - as strange and incomprehensible to us as they may be - can be traced back to the last units of what is given in consciousness, which themselves no longer contain anything foreign, objective or in need of interpretation. They are the units of experience, which are themselves units of meaning. Gadamer: This is how a concept of life emerges in the epistemology of the humanities, which restricts the mechanistic model. This concept of life is conceived teleological: Dilthey: for him, life is productivity par excellence. As life objectifies itself in sense formations, all understanding of sense is "a retranslation of the objectivations of life into the spiritual vitality from which they have emerged". Thus the concept of experience forms the epistemological basis for all knowledge of the objective. >Experience/Dilthey, >Experience/Gadamer, >Experience/Husserl. Gadamer I 232 Life/Dilthey/Gadamer: As is well known, [Dilthey] speaks of the "thought-forming work of life"(1). What distinguishes this phrase from Hegel is not easy to say. Life, however much it may show an "unfathomable face"(2), Dilthey may mock the all too friendly view of life, which sees in it only progress of culture - as long as it is understood in terms of the thoughts it forms, it is subjected to a teleological interpretation scheme and is conceived as a spirit. Spirit/Hegel/Dilthey: It is true that Dilthey in his later years leaned more and more about Hegel and talked about spirit where he used to say "life". He is just repeating a conceptual development that Hegel himself had also taken. In the light of this fact that we owe Dilthey the knowledge of the so-called "theological" youth writings of Hegel seems remarkable. In these materials on the history of the development of Hegelian thought, it becomes quite clear that the Hegelian concept of the spirit is based on a pneumatic concept of life.(3) Dilthey himself has tried to account for what connects him to Hegel and what separates him from Hegel(4). But what does his criticism of Hegel's belief in reason say, of his speculative construction of world history, of his aprioristic derivation of all concepts from the dialectical self-development of the absolute, when he too gives the concept of the "objective mind" such a central position? DiltheyVsHegel: (...) Dilthey turns against the ideal construction of this Hegelian term. "Today we must start from the reality of life". He writes: "We seek to understand it and to present it in adequate terms. By thus separating the objective spirit from the one-sided reasoning in the general reason that expresses the essence of the world spirit, and also from the idealistic construction, a new concept of the same becomes possible. There are several things included in it: language, custom, every kind of way of life, every style of life, as well as family, civil society, state and Gadamer I 233 right. And now also that which Hegel distinguished as the absolute spirit from the objective one - art and religion and philosophy - falls under this term.(5) >Spirit/Dilthey, >Comparison/Dilthey. Gadamer I 239 Understanding/Historical Consciousness/Dilthey/Gadamer: Dilthey starts from life. Life itself is designed for contemplation. [Dilthey's life philosophical tendency] (...) is based on that very thing, that in life itself there is knowledge. >Lebensphilosophie/Dilthey. Already the inner being, which characterizes the experience, contains a kind of turning back of life to itself. "Knowledge is there, it is connected with experience without reflection" (V Il, 18). But the same immanent reflexivity of life also determines the way in which, according to Dilthey, meaning is absorbed in the context of life. For meaning is only experienced by stepping out of the "hunt for goals". >Meaning/Dilthey. It is a distance, a distance from the context of our own actions that makes such reflection possible. Gadamer I 240 In both directions, contemplation and practical contemplation, the same tendency of life, a striving for firmness(6), shows itself according to Dilthey. From there it is understood that he could consider the objectivity of scientific knowledge and philosophical self-reflection as the completion of the natural tendency of life. 1. Dilthey, Ges. Schriften Vll, 136. 2. Ges. Schriften Vlll, 224. 3. Dilthey's fundamental treatise: "Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels", first published in 1906 and multiplied in the 4th volume of the Collected Writings (1921) by estate manuscripts, opened a new epoch of Hegel studies, less by its results than by its task. It was soon (1911) accompanied by the publication of the "Theologische Jugendschriften" by Hermann Nohl, which were opened up by the vivid commentary of Theodor Haering (Hegel 1928). Cf. from the author: "Hegel und der geschichtliche Geist" and Hegels Dialektik IGes. Werke Bd. 31 and Herbert Marcuse, Hegels Ontologie und die Grundlegung einer Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit, 1932, who proved the model-forming function of the concept of life for the "Phenomenology of the Spirit". 4. in detail in the records of the bequests on the "youth history of Hegel" (IV, 217-258), more deeply in the 3rd chapter of the "Aufbau" (146ff.). 5. Dilthey, Ges. Schr. Vll, 150. 6. Ges. Schriften Vll, 347. |
Dilth I W. Dilthey Gesammelte Schriften, Bd.1, Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften Göttingen 1990 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Mathematics | Bigelow | I VII Mathematics/BigelowVsField: can be understood realistically when viewed as a study of universals, properties and relations, of patterns and structures of things that can be in different places at the same time. >Universals, >Properties, >Relations, >Structures. I 346 Mathematics/Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: Pro Realism of Mathematics. ((s) The thesis that numbers exist as objects. And thus also sets, and all possible mathematical objects or entities. (FieldVs.) We agree with the antirealists that there are human creations: For example, words, ideas, diagrams, images, terms, theories, texts, academic departments, etc. >Antirealism. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: of mathematics: is well compatible with modal realism. >Modal realism, >Modalities. Science/Bigelow/Pargetter: no one believes that everything in science is real. There must be (useful) fictions. Therefore, one can in principle be a realist in relation to everyday things and at the same time a mathematical antirealist. For example, Field: Field/Bigelow/Pargetter: is at the same time a realist regarding space-time, particles and fields. Vgl. >Hartry Field, >Relationism, >Substantivalism. I 347 Realism/Antirealism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: nevertheless, there is something wrong with this marriage: mathematics is not a small element of science but a very large one. It is also not easy to isolate. Example: Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: did not know about instantaneous speed yet. For him, speed was simply a course divided by time. A falling object then had an average speed, although Galileo was not aware of this either. Therefore, he made the following mistake: if two bodies are dropped together and one of them continues to fly, they both have exactly the same speed until the first one stops. Galileo: but had to assume that this body was slower, because the other body needed less than twice as much for the eventual double distance. I 348 Rate of fall/Bigelow/Pargetter: therefore the average velocity cannot be proportional to the distance. Realism/Bigelow/Pargetter: if anything is evidence for realism, it is this: an object that falls twice as far does not have twice the average velocity. If you find out, you are a realist in terms of how long it takes for an object to reach a given distance. This makes us realists in terms of velocity, time and distance. ((s) The problem arose from the fact that Galileo was forced to adhere to the definitions he had set up himself, otherwise he would have had to change his theory.). Average/VsRealism/Bigelow/Pargetter: one could argue that average is only an abstraction. VsVs: we do not need the average here at all: it is simply true that the object falls faster in the second section, and that simply means that the average velocity cannot be the same. Velocity/Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: he respects that it is physically real. And caused by forces and proportional to these forces, so velocity was causally effective for him. Velocity/today/Bigelow/Pargetter: we think today that it is the instantaneous speed which is causally effective, never the average velocity. I 349 Realism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the equations we use to describe the relations between different falling objects are human inventions, but not the relations themselves. Rate of fall/fall law/Galileo/Bigelow/Pargetter: the distance is proportional to the square of the time traveled. How is this abstract law based on concrete physical facts? Galileo: in the first unit of time the body falls a certain distance, in the second unit not double, but triple of this distance, in the third five units, and so on. Predecessor/Bigelow/Pargetter: this had already been anticipated in the Middle Ages. >Numbers. I 350 Middle Ages/Thesis: an increment has been added to each section. One, three, five, seven... Now the sum of the first n odd numbers is n². Then it seems to be based on nothing but rules for the use of symbols that (1 + 3 +... + (2n - 1) = n². But this is a mistake: Numbers/Number/Bigelow/Pargetter: may be abstract, but they are present in an important sense in the physical objects: in a collection of objects that have this number, they are the common thing. For example, a collection of objects which has the number n². I 350 You can just see that the pattern has to go on like this. I 351 And so it is in Galileo's case. Realism/Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: the differences to physical bodies should not blind us for the similarities. If objects instantiate the same numbers, the same proportions will exist between them. >Instantiation. Instantiation/Bigelow/Pargetter/(s): For example, a collection of 3 objects instantiates the number three. I 352 Equation/Bigelow/Pargetter: (e.g. Galileo's fall rate, which was wrong) is a description of real relations between real objects. Platonism/Bigelow/Pargetter: this view can roughly be called Platonist. Bigelow/Pargetter: pro Platonism, but without the usual Platonic doctrines: we do not assume forms or ideals taken from an earlier existence that we cannot see in our world, and so on. >Platonism. Realism/Universal Realism/Universals/Bigelow/Pargetter: our realism is closer to Aristotle: the universals are here in our world, not in an otherworldly. >Realism, >Aristotle. BigelowVsAristotle: we disapprove of his preference for quantitative versus quantitative characteristics of objects. I 377 Mathematics/Bigelow/Pargetter: (...) I 378 Patterns unfold patterns. The structures of mathematics show up not only in the hardware of physics, but also in the "mathware", through properties and relations in different areas of mathematics. For example, not only objects, but also numbers can be counted. Proportions, for example, stand in proportions to each other. This is the reflexivity within mathematics. Cf. >Hartry Field. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Order | Schurz | I 76 Def Quasi-order/Schurz: must satisfy three axioms: (i) reflexivity (ii) transitivity (iii) Connexity: i.e. everything is comparable to everything. (x)(y)(x ≤My v y ≤M x). From this follows the antisymmetry of ≤M. And it follows that ≤M is an equivalence relation. Def Order/Schurz: This order is a quasi-order in which no two objects have the same rank. Ordinal Scale: Whether the conditions of transitivity and connexity are met is an empirical question. >Scales, >Measurements. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Order | Simons | I 25 Partial order: the partial order is reflexive and transitive. "Less than": "less then" ensures reflexivity, because nothing can be less than itself (this also applies to total order). The full classical mereology equals the full Boolean algebra without zero. >Mereology, >Parts, >Part-of-relation, >Partial order. |
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 |
| Reflection | Gadamer | I 347 Reflection/History of Effects/Hermeneutics/Gadamer: Our whole presentation about horizon formation and horizon fusion should (...) describe the full extent of the consciousness of the history of effects. >History of Effect/Gadamer, >Hermeneutics/Gadamer, >Understanding/Gadamer. But what kind of consciousness is this? Here lies the crucial problem. No matter how much one emphasizes that the consciousness of the history of effects is, as it were, inserted into the effect itself. As consciousness it seems to be essentially in the possibility to rise above what it is consciousness of. The structure of reflexivity is basically given with all consciousness. It must therefore also apply to the awareness of the history of effects. Doesn't this force us to agree with Hegel, and doesn't the absolute mediation of history and truth, as Hegel thinks, appear to be the foundation of hermeneutics? Ultimately, it is Hegel's position that legitimizes [19th century historism], even if the historians who were inspired by the pathos of experience preferred to refer to Schleiermacher and Wilhelm von Humboldt instead. GadamerVsSchleiermacher/GadamerVsHumboldt: Neither Schleiermacher nor Humboldt have really thought their position through. They may emphasize the individuality, the barrier of strangeness that our understanding has to overcome, but in the end only in an infinite consciousness the understanding finds its completion and the thought of individuality its justification. Hegel/Gadamer: It is the pantheistic enclosure of all individuality in the Absolute that makes the miracle of understanding possible. Thus, here too, being and knowledge permeate each other in I 348 the Absolute. Neither Schleiermacher's nor Humboldt's Kantianism is thus an independent systematic affirmation of the speculative completion of idealism in Hegel's absolute dialectic. The criticism of the philosophy of reflection(1) that Hegel meets, meets with them. VsHegel/Gadamer: For us it is about thinking of the historical consciousness of the effect in such a way that in the consciousness of the effect the immediacy and superiority of the work does not dissolve again into a mere reflexion reality, thus to think of a reality where the omnipotence of reflection is limited. This was precisely the point against which the criticism of Hegel was directed, and at which in truth the principle of the philosophy of reflection proved to be superior to all his critics. >Reflection/Hegel. I 350 VsReflection Philosophy/Gadamer: [The] question arises how far the dialectical superiority of reflection philosophy corresponds to a factual truth and how far it merely creates a formal appearance. The fact that the criticism of speculative thinking, which is practiced from the standpoint of finite human consciousness, contains something true, cannot be obscured by the argumentation of the philosophy of reflection in the end. >Young Hegelians/Gadamer. Examples for reflection/Gadamer: That the thesis of scepticism or relativism wants to be true itself and in this respect cancels itself out is an irrefutable argument. But does it achieve anything? The argument of reflection, which proves to be so victorious, rather strikes back at the arguing party by making the truth value of reflection appear suspicious. It is not the reality of skepticism or relativism that is affected by this, but the truth claim of formal argumentation in general. 1. The expression philosophy of reflection has been coined by Hegel against Jacobi, Kant and Fichte. Already in the title of "Glauben und Wissen" but as a "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity". Hegel himself counters it with the reflection of reason. |
Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
| Relations | Relations, philosophy: relations are that what can be discovered or produced in objects or states when compared to other objects or other states with regard to a selected property. For example, dimensional differences between objects A and B, which are placed into a linguistic order with the expression "larger" or "smaller" as a link, are determinations of relations which exist between the objects. Identity or equality is not accepted as a relation by most authors. See also space, time, order, categories, reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity. |
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| Scales | Schurz | I 76 Def Quasi-order/Schurz: must satisfy three axioms: (i) reflexivity (ii) transitivity (iii) Connexity: i.e. everything is comparable to everything. (x)(y)(x ≤My v y ≤M x). From this follows the antisymmetry of ≤M. And it follows that ≤M is an equivalence relation. Def Order/Schurz: This order is a quasi-order in which no two objects have the same rank. Ordinal Scale: Whether the conditions of transitivity and connexity are met is an empirical question. I 77 Interval scale/measurement/Schurz: Example temperature scale: (expansion of the mercury column). Pointe: here there is no zero point, which could be found by mere observation. Ex Celsius: arbitrary choice of the zero point (freezing of water) and the degree division: (divided a hundred times until boiling). Fahrenheit/zero: is -32° a 1°F is 5/9°C. Meaningless: to say, Ex a liquid is twice as warm at 20° as one is at 10° C. The whole ratio depends on the arbitrary choice of the zero point. Fahrenheit: Here you would have the ratio 68° to 50° instead. Solution: Ex If one had three liquids, with 10°, 20° and 30°, then the statement that the temperature difference between b and a is as large as that between b and c and half as large as that between a and c has a meaning, because it is valid independently of the zero point! Interval scale/interval/difference/objectivity/zero/Schurz: truncates when forming the difference of two temperature values. Only these interval statements are objective. Ratio/Schurz: ratio statements are not objective because the zero point is arbitrary. Also e.g. location and time measurements are interval scaled, because the zero point of a spatial coordinate system or time scale is arbitrary. Meaningless: to say, "the year 2000 is twice as late as the year 1000". In contrast: Ratio scale/absolute zero/Schurz: Here the absolute zero is objectively given: Ex Mass, volume, length (as opposed to location) duration, (as opposed to time) are ratio scaled quantities. Meaningful: Bsp An object of 100 kg is twice as heavy as one of 50 kg. These ratio statements have objective meaning. Extensive size/Schurz: are such quantities on the ratio scale because they grow by joining (concatenating) objects into larger wholes. I 78 Ratio scale/Schurz: The empirical metrization of extensive quantities leads to ratio scales. Here, however, the numerical absolute value of the quantity is still arbitrary, depending on the arbitrary choice of unit. Meaningless: Ex to say the magnitude value of Peter's weight is 100. This is true only if the unit of mass is chosen as one kilogram. If one chooses 1 gram, the absolute value would be 100 000. Measure/measure/unit//Carnap: subtle problem: one must also justify that the unit chosen is constant in time. (Carnap 1976(1), 88-100). Absolute scale: simple counting scale where the unit is "one piece". Scale/Mathematics/Scale transformation/Schurz: In mathematics, the difference between the various types of scales is specified by the permissible scale transformations. These determine the degree of arbitrariness,. Def scale level/order: absolute, ratio, interval, ordinal, nominal scale. Here the level becomes lower and lower, because the scales become more and more comprehensive. Def Metricability/Schurz: Ex An extensive comparative size feature ≤M Ex "longer than" over an object area D in the form of a ratio scale is metricable, iff ≤M is a monotonous quasi-order over D and the Def Archimedean condition is fulfilled, i.e. every object b, no matter how large, must be outweighed by sufficiently many copies of an object a, no matter how small. Def derived metrization: traced back to the metrization of other terms: E.g. density to the quotient of mass by volume. theory derived metrization: theory dependent. I 79 Ex temperature scale according to Kelvin, change of scale level due to theoretical considerations. >Measurement, >Order, >Method, >Monotony. 1. Carnap, R. (1976). Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaft, 3. Aufl. München: Nymphenburger. (Engl. Orig. 1966). |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Self- Consciousness | Castaneda | Frank I 211ff Self-consciousness/Fichte: all consciousness includes self-consciousness. >J.G. Fichte, >Consciousness/Fichte. CastanedaVsFichte: mixing of external reflexivity (in relation to others) and internal reflexivity (the fleeting egos among themselves). >I, Ego, Self/Castaneda. CastanedaVsKant: not apperception, but conversely! >Apperception. No I is a naked isolated individual, but a collective point of connections. False problem: how to be subject and object of self-reflection at the same time: starts from a false assumption of amonolithic self. >Subject-Object-Problem, >Subject, >Object. I 231f Self-consciousness/ Castaneda: is based on the basis of beliefs, that consist of a hierarchy of powers, dispositions and inclinations. Lowest levels: metaphysical, self-evident. - This postulates an infinite number of aspects. >Aspects, >Background. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Self- Consciousness | Nozick | II 81f Self - Knowledge / Nozick: not by terms: shifts the problem "who is I". Not by acquaintance (as with object) >Acquaintance. Not by dispositions: circular: like-acquired dispositions? >Dispositions. Solution: reflexive self-knowledge as to be unexplained basic concept. >Reflexivity, >Self-identification, >Self, >Consciousness. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Self- Reference | Nozick | II 75 Self-reference/Nozick: (in all possible worlds) has two components: a) rigid: in all worlds to the same thing b) in each possible world to itself (in this one possible world). >Possible worlds, >Rigidity, >Identity across worlds, >Centered worlds, >Reflexivity, >Reference, >Names. Therefore the term must be defined by its meaning - which in turn makes circumstances superfluous. >Circumstances, >Sense, >Meaning. Rigidity is insufficient: E.g. Gödel number. But the Gödel number is necessary self-referential. >Gödel numbers. II 81 I/self-reference/truth/semantic facts/Nozick: Problem: truth (or semantic fact) does not help to know that you are the one, to which a sentence with "I" refers to. >Truth, >Semantic facts. E.g. "Only this originator of tokens "I am in Cambridge" ". Here you still have to know that you are there. Otherwise, there is nothing better than "exactly this X". ((s) Solution/(s): It must be knowledge about the truth.) Cf. >Quasi-Indicator, >He/Himself, >I/Castaneda. II 93 Self-reference/Nozick: should not be defined by a permanent feature, but by something that arises in the act of referencing. - ((S) That is then indexical, but unproblematic). - Punchline: E.g. "exactly this" will still be described from the outside - that means, it is still not reflexive. - Nozick: pro: then there is no question "How is that possible?". >"How is it possible"-Questions. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Systems | Quine | VII (e) 91 Abbreviations/Quine: defining abbreviations are always outside of a formal system - that's why we need to get an expression in simple notation before we examine it in relation to hierarchy. IX 190 System/Quine: a new system is not introduced by new definitions, but by new distinctions. ((s) Example (s): if I always have to note "n + 1" to mark the difference between real and rational numbers, I did not eliminate the real numbers, but kept the old difference. I only changed the notation, not the ontology.) IX 232 Theory/Enlargement/Extension/System/Quine: an enlargement is not an extension! Extension: addition of axioms, can create contradictions. Magnification/Quine: means to relativize an added scheme to already existing axioms of a system, e.g. to "Uϑ", (s) so if something exists in "Uϑ", it must be a set. Such a magnification never creates a contradiction. IX 237 Theory/stronger/weaker/Quine: if a deductive system is an extension of another in the sense that its theorems include all of the other and others, then in a certain way one is stronger than the other. But this basis of comparison is weak: 1. It fails if each of the two systems has theorems that are not found in the other. (Comparability). 2. It depends on randomness of interpretation and not simply on structural properties. Example: suppose we would have exactly "=" and "R" as primitive two-digit predicates with an ordinary identity axiom and transitivity. Now we extend the system by adding the reflexivity "x(xRx)". The extended system is only stronger if we equate its "R" with the original "R". But if we reinterpret its "xRy" as "x = y v x R y" using the original "R", then all its theorems are provable in the non-extended system. (>Löwenheim, >Provability), Example (less trivial): Russell's method ((1) to (4), Chapter 35) to ensure extensionality for classes without having to accept them for attributes. Given is a set theory without extensionality. We could extend it by adding this axiom, and yet we could show that all theorems of the extended system could be reinterpreted with Russell's method as theorems already provable in the non-extended system. Stronger/weaker/Quine: a better standard for the comparison of strength is the "comparison by reinterpretation": if we can reinterpret the primitive logical signs (i.e. in set theory only "e") in such a way that all theorems of this system become translations of the theorems of the other system, then the latter system is at least as strong as the first one. IX 238 If this is not possible in the other direction, one system is stronger than the other. Def "ordinal strength"/Quine: another meaningful sense of strength of a system is the following surprising numerical measure: the smallest transfinite ordinal number, whose existence can no longer be proven in the system. Any normal set theory can, of course, prove the existence of infinitely many transfinite numbers, but that does not mean that you get them all. Transfinite/Quine: what is so characteristic about it is that we then iterate the iteration further and iterate the iteration of iterations until our apparatus somehow blocks. The smallest transfinite number after blocking the apparatus then indicates how strong the apparatus was. An axiom that can be added to a system with the visible goal of increased ordinal strength is the axiom that there is an unattainable number beyond w (omega). (End of Chapter 30). An endless series of further axioms of this kind is possible. Strength of systems/Ordinal Numbers/Quine: another possibility to use ordinal numbers for strength: we can extend the theory of cumulative types to transfinite types by accrediting to the x-th type for each ordinal number x, all classes whose elements all have a type below x. So the universe of the theory of cumulative types in chapter 38, which lacks the transfinite types, is even the ω-th type. Def "Natural Model"/Montague/Vaught/Quine: this is what they call this type, if the axioms of set theory are fulfilled, if one takes their universe as such a type. So Zermelo's set theory without infinity axiom has the ω-th type as a natural model. (We have seen this in chapter 38). So the ordinal strength of this system is at most ω, obviously not smaller. With infinity axiom: ω + ω. Strength of the system of von Neumann-Bernays: one more than the first unattainable number after w. XII 33 Object/existence/system/Quine: systematic considerations can lead us to reject certain objects XII 34 or to declare certain terms as non-referring. Occurrence: also individual occurrences of terms. This is Frege's point of view: an event can refer to something on one occasion, not on another (referential position). Example "Thomas believes that Tullius wrote the Ars Magna". In reality he confuses Tullius with Lullus. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Ultimate Justification | Nozick | II 131 ff Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Leibniz/existence/Nozick: 1. Inegalitarian Theory: Distinction of something before the nothing 2. Egalitarian Theory: (Probability Theory): Nothing is equal: when multiple options are accepted, then nothing is very unlikely because only one of many possibilities can consist. Richness: all possibilities are realized. Cf. >Possible Worlds/Leibniz, >Possible Worlds. Requirement: possible worlds are separated, otherwise contradictions - realm of possibilities includes possible worlds. >Possibility, cf. >Real world. In addition: principle of invariance: otherwise there are possible worlds that exclude possibilities: Restricted richness/self-subsumption: validity due to application, reference and supply by itself. Then existence is not a hard fact and not arbitrary (due to invariance). >Invariance, >Bare Facts, >Existence/Nozick. II 137 Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: Problem: the various limited types of richness all apply because of their limitation and because of their validity and because of their special invariance principle. - This is just the characteristic of reflexivity. >Reflexivity, >Description levels, >Levels/order. II 138 Explanation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: it is no shame that circularity occurs at the end if it is only avoided in the middle. - It should not be an addition ("and that are all"). >Circular reasoning, >Lists. Principle of sufficient reason: every truth has an explanation. >Sufficient reason. II 278 Self-subsumption/self-affirmation/Ultimate Justification/Nozick: self-subsumption is a sign of a fundamentality, not for truth. - Something can be fundamental in one dimension, without being fundamental in another. >Wholes, >Totality. A fundamental principle needs not to be "non-circular". - In different realms different relations, orders and connections apply. - E.g. justification, explanation, evidence. >Justification, >Explanation, >Evidence. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
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| Descartes, R. | Nozick Vs Descartes, R. | II 87 I/Self/Synthesis/Nozick: let us begin with the act of reflexive self-reference. Act: what is the point, where are its limits? We could look for a pre-existing entity, the support of the act, the agent. This already includes a theory, namely that every act needs an agent (actor, player). LichtenbergVsDescartes: has not found that "he thinks", but only that "it thinks". In the "agent view" we should assume: "I'm tired" = "agent of this act is tired". Problem: what does my knowing that I am the agent consist in? (Sometimes my subsequent knowledge of a previous act). If there must be a pre-existent being for it, how am I supposed to know about it? And how am I to know that this pre-existing being is the agent of my current act? Suppose, then, there is no pre-existent entity: rather that the I is represented around the act (outlined, delineated). Then there are two possibilities: 19 an agent is postulated, then the boundaries are outlined 2) we imagine that an entity is outlined and is synthesized around the act. Reference/Self-Reference/Nozick: when we start with the act of reference: A refers to x, then we can also form the concept that A refers to A. II 93 Then we can build a concept of Gödel's self-reference, by virtue of a permanent defining feature of A, and then it is necessarily self-referring in all possible worlds. Next step: self-reference not by a permanent defining characteristic, but by a characteristic which arises in the act. Explanation: Are we not applying self-reference in the latter case to explain itself? Namely, if it is the sense? This merely points back to an earlier constant or bound variable. Indexicality: something can refer to something else by virtue of a characteristic that is given in the act, but that is not reflexive! E.g. "exactly this" is described from the outside. Therefore, there is no particular problem: how is reflexive self-reference possible? Reflexivity/Nozick: there are no particular issues with respect to reflexivity, but there are about the intelligibility of speech of acts, even of non-reflexive ones with independent agents. Nozick: I do not deny these problems, but we were willing to put them to the side, because we presumed with LichtenbergVsDescartes that "thinking is going on" and not "I think". Reflexive Self-Reference/Nozick: we have understood it as composed of simple components and not as irreducible mysterious phenomenon. But if we want to guarantee the explicability of reflexive self-reference, we must explain why these acts occur. II 94 Solution: we explain them with a pre-existing person, but it does not exist independently of the act of synthesis. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that there is an intuitive and compelling quality of the view that the self is independent of all acts. That would be a view that is discussed vehemently between Buddhists and Vedantists. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Fichte, J.G. | Castaneda Vs Fichte, J.G. | Frank I 211 Experience/CastanedaVsFichte: do not need to belong to Is (plural of I) But if they do, so the integration in the I requires unity of the experiences in its possession. Likewise CastanedaVsKant: against the role of apperception, instead: vice versa! Fichte: demands that the unity of consciousness contents transmits itself top down, from the self that experiences itself through experiencing, on the contents, which belong to the non-self. Castaneda: that contradicts the facts of experience and prevents an explanation of animal consciousness. VsFichte: unwarranted mixing of external and internal reflexivity! I 239 Consciousness/Accumulation/Subsumption/Castaneda: assuming the subsumtiven nature of consciousness, lower levels can exist irrespective of the higher levels. CastanedaVsFichte: not every consciousness is self-consciousness. This is the anti-idealistic naturalization of consciousness. The unity of consciousness episode cannot be explained, because this consciousness belongs to a self or I. In fact, the unity of experience in an I requires the unity of any consciousness content! That means if a consciousness episode internally belongs to an I, then the unity of that consciousness is an element in the constitution of this affiliation, i.e. it is an internal requirement of the existence of that I. Castaneda: nevertheless Fichte’s view is still widely spread, even among anti-Cartesian philosophers of our time. Consciousness/Fichte: "Wissenschaftslehre nova methoda, 1798, 1982, p 34" "All consciousness is accompanied by an immediate self-consciousness"... I 244 Perception/Physiology/Castaneda: in complex cases, a kind of blind physical monitoring arises from finely tuned adaptation. This includes such things as the presentation of stimulus levels. This works even without the emergence of visualizations of the monitoring itself. VsFichte: Then consciousness without self-consciousness would exist (s.c.). Of course there can be recording systems. However, this recording is not identical with s.c. Fra I 331 Consciousness/CastanedaVsChisholm: everybody first refers to their own world (as per Chisholm), but from that does not follow the necessity that every consciousness and every thought are explicitly self-conscious. (CastanedaVsFichte). The first-person perspective is only implicitly contained in a non-reflexive consciousness. An explicit self-consciousness differs from this consciousness, however, if it refers to conscious explicit self-reference. Consciousness/CastanedaVsFichte: is only a special case of consciousness, it is not present in every consciousness episode. E.g. purely sensitive consciousness, e.g. cognitive, but not self-conscious (>E.g. Friedrich watches the bees). Not only evolutionarily differentiated, but also in adults. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Hegel, G.W.F. | Luhmann Vs Hegel, G.W.F. | Reese-Schäfer II 30 Reflection: no hierarchy of reflexivity. 2. order observation has no hierarchically higher position. Whoever observes an observer, however, uses a different distinction than himself. (LuhmannVsHegel).LuhmannVsSubject Theory. Subject/Object/Luhmann: difficult problem. First of all: who is the observer? He is the last figure, who in turn has a need for explication about certain distinctions. LuhmannVsSubject Tradition: here you have continuities and discontinuities that allow you to decide whether you want to apply the concept of the subject by location. ((s) Not actually Hegel is the opponent here). AU Cass. 7 Luhmann: Maybe we should better take off on differentiation. But there is no final decision in this matter. ...classical subject who always knew it was a subject. Against it speaks the fact that one easily loses sight of the fact that social systems are also subjects! For example, this lecture is its own subject! For example, society is a subject. But no analogy to consciousness! That would give known problems. Best of all, we do not use the concept of the subject. Another reason: our two-page distinction, in which the world is divided into two sides (S/U). Then the question is: Where does the observer actually occur? In the system or in the environment? Time/Hegel/(Encyclopedia): § 258: "Time as the negative unity of being outside is (also?) a bad ideal par excellence. It is being in that it is not, and in that it is, is not. Luhmann: Why is the distinction being/not being introduced here? AU Cass. 9 Movement/Luhmann: according to Hegel and Aristotle, this is something that connects non-being with being. Time/Movement/Luhmann: but movement is not sufficient for the definition of time, because time does not move past us. Aristotle also sees this. Time depends from the beginning on a distinction. Central question: who is the observer? This is immediately followed by the question: who asks this question? |
AU I N. Luhmann Introduction to Systems Theory, Lectures Universität Bielefeld 1991/1992 German Edition: Einführung in die Systemtheorie Heidelberg 1992 Lu I N. Luhmann Die Kunst der Gesellschaft Frankfurt 1997 Reese-Schäfer II Walter Reese-Schäfer Luhmann zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 |
| Hume, D. | Nozick Vs Hume, D. | Brendel I 254 Skepticism/Dretske/Nozick/Brendel: both. Thesis: the truth of the skeptical hypothesis is, however, not to be excluded. But it does not follow the impossibility of any knowledge. DretskeVsHume/NozickVsHume/Brendel: knowledge and the possibility of skepticism can coexist peacefully. Nozick II 111 I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. The solves the problem e.g. of localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception." NozickVsHume: perhaps he did not search thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he? 2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment. 3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff. II 112 A property is never the identical with the object. The difficulty of specifying the relationsh of a property with an object is the general reason why we have such trouble locating the self, but that is not a particular problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways how a person can be identified with a property: 1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick" 2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that. I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective. Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it. Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem: 1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring. People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you, II 113 but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ! Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring! |
No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 Bre I E. Brendel Wahrheit und Wissen Paderborn 1999 |
| Hume, D. | Castaneda Vs Hume, D. | Frank I 214 Subject/Object/Reflexivity/Castaneda: Tradition: Problem: how can a self be both subject and object of its own experience at the same time? CastanedaVs: this is a fictitious problem emanating from a monolithic self. There is no such self. CastanedaVsHume: this does, however, not justify Hume’s conclusion that there is no experience of the self! VsHume: wrong identification of the external ITself with the internal itSELF. There is no external self but there is an internal self. The internal self is what one refers to when one says "I". Then we can say that although there is no problem with the self, there is a serious problem with the Is! We can concentrate on the internal reflexivity without loss. Self-consciousness/SC/Castaneda: takes places in episodes of thinking about oneself qua oneself. The thinker appears to HIMself as himSELF, i.e. as I. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Kant | Bubner Vs Kant | I 80 Kant: defended himself against contemporary transcendental philosophy with the essay "Von einem neuerdings erhobenenen vornehmenen Ton in der Philosophie" ((1796) KantVsJacobi). Kant invents a position for his polemics that deals "enthusiastically instead of critically" with philosophy. He attributes this enthusiasm to Plato. Opposite position: attributed to Aristotle. BubnerVsKant: both positions cannot be historically proven. Kant had very little knowledge of antiquity. I 88 KantVsPlato: the mathematician Plato is not a good metaphysicist. An unfathomable confusion of view and concept. "Intellectual view" erroneously brings together immediacy and discursivity. There was no explanation of how the two came together. "Undemocratic esotericism" is only understandable for members of a "club" > connection to the contemporary discussion about the French Revolution. Violates Rousseau's equality demands. I 89/90 BubnerVsKant: the accusation of confusion can only be upheld if one accepts the Kantian premises. In reality Plato's text is different: the Phaidon praises the "flight into the Logos" as a way out of the immediateism of the pre-Socratics, the "second best journey" renounces the unbroken gaze and seeks the mirror of things in the speeches. The synthetic construction of logic is the access to the world to which we must confine ourselves. Plato is by no means inferior to Kant in his contempt of the "noble tone". I 108 Synthesis/Kant: while the other syntheses find something else, which leads them by their doing to a unity ((s)so nevertheless??) which is again distinguished from it, the highest Synthesis has to do only with itself. Synthesis/VsKant: his followers have uncovered the weakness that there is no evidence for the highest point of this chain of thought. I/Fichte: action of the settling I I/Hegel: vitality of the mind in constant self-mediation. (As an absolute principle). I 109 "Intellectual View"/Bubner: the idea introduced by Kant's successors VsKant to bring together immediacy and reflexivity. BubnerVs: hermaphroditic. The anonymous author of the "Eldest System Program" follows this model. They demand from the philosopher the aesthetic talent that breaks down the barrier to art production. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Kant | Nozick Vs Kant | II 12 Hypothesis/How-is-it-possible questions/Nozick: a hypothesis that is false does not explain how something is possible. But maybe it increases understanding. Hypothesis: must not even be plausible. How-is-it-possible question: can go so deep that the only answers that are sufficient, are implausible. One should not exclude that the p with which the question began is excluded at the end. (VsKant). II 110 Synthesis/Self/I/Nozick: VsKant: VsSynthesis: against the perspective of self-synthesizing self could be argued that it does not localize itself as an entity, it is not a "part of the equipment of the universe". possible solution: II 111 I/Self/Property/Tradition: Thesis: the I (self) as a property. I.e. not as an object. That solves, for example, the problem of the localization and other problems: 1) Hume: "I cannot perceive myself independent of any other perception." NozickVsHume: perhaps he has not searched thoroughly. He has done nothing specific to search for the self, has he? 2) Advantage: the approach explains why it is difficult to imagine the self without embodiment. 3) It is difficult to imagine how the self should be identical with any particular stuff. II 112 A property is never identical with the object. The difficulty to specify the relation of a property to the object is the general reason why we can only locate the self with difficulty, but it is not a specific problem of the relation between self and body. Property/Nozick: there are at least two ways to identify a person with a property: 1) with a non-indexical, non-reflexive property: E.g. "being Robert Nozick" 2) an identification whose definition uses a reflexive pronoun of the first person: E.g. "being me". This introduces reflexivity. Right into the nature of the self at that. I Problem: it is obscure, because it introduces the reflexivity in the nature of the self, but it explains why all public or physicalist descriptions leave me out, because they are not reflective. Unit/Merger/I/Self/Tradition: the I merges with the "one", but does not disappear in the process. The I is a property of the one, I am not separate from it. Reflexivity/Property: E.g. reflexive property: "being me". Problem: 1) P is the ability to be reflexively self-referring. People have P, tables do not. I have the property P and so do you, II 113 but you have it by virtue of the fact that you are you, I have it by virtue of the other fact that I am I. We both have the property of being me, but the property is indexical. I.e. the properties differ! Point: they both arise from the same non-indexical property P: being reflexively self-referring! II 318 Action/Decision/Free Will/Knowledge/Belief/Nozick: Is there a parallel between belief and action, according to the model by which we have established conditions for belief and knowledge in the previous chapter? Belief is in connection with facts (covariance). What are actions to be connected to? Just like beliefs should respond to facts, actions should respond to correctness or quality ("bestness", optimum, "optimal desirability", "the best"). Then we need to know the relevant facts as well. II 319 Our actions must be sensitive to accuracy or "the best". Conditions: (1) Action A is correct (2) S does A on purpose (intentionally) (III) if A were not right, S would not do A intentionally. (IV) if A were correct, S would intentionally do A. Distinction: "Allowed"/"the best" (nothing better). Similar: "Maximum": several maximums possible: even if there is nothing bigger. Maximum: only one possible. "bigger than all the others". then: correctness: (3) if A was not allowed, S would not do A (4) if A were mandatory, S would do A. "the best": (1) A is the best (at least maximum, perhaps maximum) (2) S does A intentionally (3) if A were not as good as a possible other thing, S would not do A (4) if A were better than anything else, S would do A. II 320 So here we can also introduce a reference to a motif M in accordance with conditions (3) and (4). Moral/Kant/Nozick: when we happen to do something moral, immoral motives may be present. Problem: it could be that if the act is immoral, other non-moral (neutral) motives move the person to carry out the action anyway. NozickVsKant: he would be better served with our conditions (3) and (4). In addition, we need the inclusion of methodologies (see above, example grandmother: would still believe, even if the facts were different. E.g. Theater/Nuclear Reactor: if it were not a play, the person would still believe it via other methods). Action: similar: E.g. someone carries out a mandatory action after careful consideration. If it were not right, its moral quality would never have come to his attention, but he could still have chosen it. Only this time without reflection on its correctness. Method/Action/Nozick: like with belief, methods can also be weighed against each other even with actions: A person meets the Kantian requirements if there is a motive M for which he does a, which satisfies the conditions (3) and (4), and outweighs any other motive M' that does not satisfy (3) and (4). II 352 Self-Choice/Action/Morality/Ethics/Free Will/Nozick: the concept of a free action as in connection with accuracy (or "the best") is defined in terms of the result. And not so much as a process. Tradition: Thinks that a free action emerges from a process of choice that could also have had an incorrect result. How close can we get to the process of choice in a simulation? II 353 Anyway, we will not get out of a causal nexus. 1) Locke/Hume/Tradition/Nozick: we are not free if our actions are caused. 2) Kant: we are free if our actions are in harmony with reason 3) Free actions must not be caused by any independent source, II 354 but must come forth from our nature. (Spinoza: only God is free). Hegel: combines 2) and 3): (with Aristotle) Reason and thought are the essence of man. We are free when we are limited by a law of reason in a way conscious of ourselves, which is a constitutive principle of our nature. Nozick: is that enough? Although our actions come forth from our nature, would we then not be unfree in the extent that we are bound by our nature? Could external sources not be as binding for us? Why should I want to be moral? Do I have to wish to be happy? Why should I want to be rational? "Your being is rationality, do what is rational to realize your nature". Why should I realize my nature? It's bad enough that it is so difficult. "Your nature, that is you." If I am not really me, do I have to wish to be me? Could I not wish to be the Messiah? "But you have no choice, you had to be what you are." So, that is what you offer me as freedom. Objective morality seems to be something inevitable. Categorical Imperative/Nozick: some read it as follows: "Do this if you wish to be rational" "Do this if you want to be free" (absurd: command). Freedom/Nozick: has to be something that does not bind us. II 355 Then there can be no free will with objective morality. Law/Kant/Nozick: the law that does not bind us is the one that we give ourselves, that is not borrowed from nature, but is set by reason itself as a necessity of its own nature. Nozick: but does that not bind us, too? Could we not act as autonomously out of very different motives? NozickVsKant: the status of morality in his theory is unclear. Example: Suppose someone finds out what the categorical imperative wants and then does the opposite. "But what motive could he have for that?" Perhaps he just wants autonomy? The chances are not good. Morality/Freedom/Nozick: Thesis: must not only be chosen by ourselves, it must also be given by something that is in turn chosen for its part! Only something that arises from a chosen nature will not bind us. But if the nature is chosen, how should then it be inevitable? (>self-choice, self-ownership.). |
No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Principia Mathematica | Gödel Vs Principia Mathematica | Russell I XIV Circular Error Principle/VsPrincipia Mathematica(1)/PM/Russell/Gödel: thus seems to apply only to constructivist assumptions: when a term is understood as a symbol, together with a rule to translate sentences containing the symbol into sentences not containing it. Classes/concepts/Gödel: can also be understood as real objects, namely as "multiplicities of things" and concepts as properties or relations of things that exist independently of our definitions and constructions! This is just as legitimate as the assumption of physical bodies. They are also necessary for mathematics, as they are for physics. Concept/Terminology/Gödel: I will use "concept" from now on exclusively in this objective sense. A formal difference between these two conceptions of concepts would be: that of two different definitions of the form α(x) = φ(x) it can be assumed that they define two different concepts α in the constructivist sense. (Nominalistic: since two such definitions give different translations for propositions containing α.) For concepts (terms) this is by no means the case, because the same thing can be described in different ways. For example, "Two is the term under which all pairs fall and nothing else. There is certainly more than one term in the constructivist sense that satisfies this condition, but there could be a common "form" or "nature" of all pairs. All/Carnap: the proposal to understand "all" as a necessity would not help if "provability" were introduced in a constructivist manner (..+...). Def Intensionality Axiom/Russell/Gödel: different terms belong to different definitions. This axiom holds for terms in the circular error principle: constructivist sense. Concepts/Russell/Gödel: (unequal terms!) should exist objectively. (So not constructed). (Realistic point of view). When only talking about concepts, the question gets a completely different meaning: then there seems to be no objection to talking about all of them, nor to describing some of them with reference to all of them. Properties/GödelVsRussell: one could surely speak of the totality of all properties (or all of a certain type) without this leading to an "absurdity"! ((s) > Example "All properties of a great commander". Gödel: this simply makes it impossible to construe their meaning (i.e. as an assertion about sense perception or any other non-conceptual entities), which is not an objection to someone taking the realistic point of view. Part/whole/Mereology/GödelVsRussell: neither is it contradictory that a part should be identical (not just the same) with the whole, as can be seen in the case of structures in the abstract sense. Example: the structure of the series of integers contains itself as a special part. I XVI/XVII Even within the realm of constructivist logic there are certain approximations to this self-reflectivity (self-reflexivity/today: self-similarity) of impredicative qualities, namely e.g. propositions, which as parts of their meaning do not contain themselves, but their own formal provability. There are also sentences that refer to a totality of sentences to which they themselves belong: Example: "Each sentence of a (given) language contains at least one relational word". This makes it necessary to look for other solutions to the paradoxes, according to which the fallacy does not consist in the assumption of certain self-reflectivities of the basic terms, but in other assumptions about them! The solution may have been found for the time being in simple type theory. Of course, all this refers only to concepts. Classes: one should think that they are also not created by their definitions, but only described! Then the circular error principle does not apply again. Zermelo splits classes into "levels", so that only sets of lower levels can be elements of sets of higher levels. Reducibility Axiom/Russell/Gödel: (later dropped) is now taken by the class axiom (Zermelo's "axiom of choice"): that for each level, for any propositional function φ(x) the set of those x of this level exists for which φ(x) is true. This seems to be implied by the concept of classes as multiplicities. I XVIII Extensionality/Classes: Russell: two reasons against the extensional view of classes: 1. the existence of the zero class, which cannot be well a collection, 2. the single classes, which should be identical with their only elements. GödelVsRussell: this could only prove that the zero classes and the single classes (as distinguished from their only element) are fictions to simplify the calculation, and do not prove that all classes are fictions! Russell: tries to get by as far as possible without assuming the objective existence of classes. According to this, classes are only a facon de parler. Gödel: but also "idealistic" propositions that contain universals could lead to the same paradoxes. Russell: creates rules of translation according to which sentences containing class names or the term "class" are translated into sentences not containing them. Class Name/Russell: eliminate by translation rules. Classes/Principia Mathematica/Russell/Gödel: the Principia Mathematica can do without classes, but only if you assume the existence of a concept whenever you want to construct a class. First, some of them, the basic predicates and relations like "red", "colder" must be apparently considered real objects. The higher terms then appear as something constructed (i.e. something that does not belong to the "inventory of the world"). I XIX Ramsey: said that one can form propositions of infinite length and considers the difference finite/infinite as not so decisive. Gödel: Like physics, logic and mathematics are based on real content and cannot be "explained away". Existence/Ontology/Gödel: it does not behave as if the universe of things is divided into orders and one is forbidden to speak of all orders, but on the contrary: it is possible to speak of all existing things. But classes and concepts are not among them. But when they are introduced as a facon de parler, it turns out that the extension of symbolism opens the possibility of introducing them in a more comprehensive way, and so on, to infinity. To maintain this scheme, however, one must presuppose arithmetics (or something equivalent), which only proves that not even this limited logic can be built on nothing. I XX Constructivist posture/constructivism/Russell/Gödel: was abandoned in the first edition, since the reducibility axiom for higher types makes it necessary that basic predicates of arbitrarily high type exist. From constructivism remains only 1. Classes as facon de parler 2. The definition of ~, v, etc. as valid for propositions containing quantifiers, 3. The stepwise construction of functions of orders higher than 1 (of course superfluous because of the R-Axiom) 4. the interpretation of definitions as mere typographical abbreviations (all incomplete symbols, not those that name an object described by the definition!). Reducibility Axiom/GödelVsRussell: this last point is an illusion, because of the reducibility axiom there are always real objects in the form of basic predicates or combinations of such according to each defined symbol. Constructivist posture/constructivism/Principia Mathematica/Gödel: is taken again in the second edition and the reducibility axiom is dropped. It is determined that all basic predicates belong to the lowest type. Variables/Russell/Gödel: their purpose is to enable the assertions of more complicated truth functions of atomistic propositions. (i.e. that the higher types are only a facon de parler.). The basis of the theory should therefore consist of truth functions of atomistic propositions. This is not a problem if the number of individuals and basic predicates is finite. Ramsey: Problem of the inability to form infinite propositions is a "mere secondary matter". I XXI Finite/infinite/Gödel: with this circumvention of the problem by disregarding the difference between finite and infinite a simpler and at the same time more far-reaching interpretation of set theory exists: Then Russell's Apercu that propositions about classes can be interpreted as propositions about their elements becomes literally true, provided n is the number of (finite) individuals in the world and provided we neglect the zero class. (..) + I XXI Theory of integers: the second edition claims that it can be achieved. Problem: that in the definition "those cardinals belonging to each class that contains 0 and contains x + 1 if it contains x" the phrase "each class" must refer to a given order. I XXII Thus whole numbers of different orders are obtained, and complete induction can be applied to whole numbers of order n only for properties of n! (...) The question of the theory of integers based on ramified type theory is still unsolved. I XXIII Theory of Order/Gödel: is more fruitful if it is considered from a mathematical point of view, not a philosophical one, i.e. independent of the question of whether impredicative definitions are permissible. (...) impredicative totalities are assumed by a function of order α and ω . Set/Class/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell/Type Theory/Gödel: the existence of a well-ordered set of the order type ω is sufficient for the theory of real numbers. Def Continuum Hypothesis/Gödel: (generalized): no cardinal number exists between the power of any arbitrary set and the power of the set of its subsets. Type Theory/VsType Theory/GödelVsRussell: mixed types (individuals together with predications about individuals etc.) obviously do not contradict the circular error principle at all! I XXIV Russell based his theory on quite different reasons, similar to those Frege had already adopted for the theory of simpler types for functions. Propositional functions/statement function/Russell/Gödel: always have something ambiguous because of the variables. (Frege: something unsaturated). Propositional function/p.f./Russell/Gödel: is so to speak a fragment of a proposition. It is only possible to combine them if they "fit together" i.e. are of a suitable type. GödelVsRussell: Concepts (terms) as real objects: then the theory of simple types is not plausible, because what one would expect (like "transitivity" or the number two) to be a concept would then seem to be something that stands behind all its different "realizations" on the different levels and therefore does not exist according to type theory. I XXV Paradoxes in the intensional form/Gödel: here type theory brings a new idea: namely to blame the paradoxes not on the axiom that every propositional function defines a concept or a class, but on the assumption that every concept results in a meaningful proposition if it is claimed for any object as an argument. The objection that any concept can be extended to all arguments by defining another one that gives a false proposition whenever the original one was meaningless can easily be invalidated by pointing out that the concept "meaningfully applicable" does not always have to be meaningfully applicable itself. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Göd II Kurt Gödel Collected Works: Volume II: Publications 1938-1974 Oxford 1990 |
| Reductionism | Castaneda Vs Reductionism | Frank I 216 CastanedaVsReductionism: constantly has to deal with the reflexivity of consciousness or should have to do with it. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1989): Self-Consciousness, I-Structures and Physiology, in: Manfred Spitzer/Brendan A. Maher (eds.) (1989): Philosophy and Psychopathology, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1989, 118-145 |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Gestaltung | Castaneda, H.N. | Fra I 167 I/Self/SB/Castaneda: thesis: the self consists in reflexive "I-compositions". This is only possible as a generalization of the intensional relation between indicators and quasi-indicators. Fra I 168 The quasi-indication is the linguistic representation of the unity of external and internal reflexivity on which the self is based. |
Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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