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The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Definitions | Mates | I 248 Definitions/Mates: we need them to represent formalized theories. - They introduce designations that do not belong to the vocabulary of the language, but make them more readable. >Theories, >Formulas, >Logical formulas, >Theoretical language, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Definitions, >Definability. I 250 Def Creative Definition/Mates: leads to new theorems in which the defined symbol does not occur. >Symbols. Requirement: a satisfactory definition should be non-creative. >Vocabulary/Mates. I 248 Metalinguistic definitions/Mates: Metalinguistic definitions bring a name of the defined symbol in object language: the symbol itself - e.g. a) metalinguistically: if a and b are terms so is a = b for I21ab b) object-language: (x) (y) (x = y I21xy). >Metalanguage, >Object language, >Identity, >Definition/Frege, >Symbolic use. |
Mate I B. Mates Elementare Logik Göttingen 1969 Mate II B. Mates Skeptical Essays Chicago 1981 |
| Facts | Poincaré | Duhem I 196 Definition Raw Fact/Poincaré: "The scientific fact is only the raw fact, translated into a comfortable language. Everything that the scholar creates of a fact is the language in which he expresses it." >Expressions, >Language use, >Theoretical language, >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Mathematical entities. E.g. I observe a galvanometer and ask a layman: does the current flow? He'll try to determine something on the wire. The assistant will understand the question like this: does the light strip move? >Experiments, >Experiments/Duhem, >Measurements. The difference between a raw and a scientific fact is the same as that between two expressions in two different languages. It is not correct that the words "the current flows" are based on a convention, to translate the fact that the magnet strip is distracted! >Conventions. E.g., it may well be that the assistant says: the current is flowing, but the magnet does not move, the galvanometer seems to have a defect. I 197 He can observe the occurrence of gas bubbles or something else on a voltmeter that is also connected to the circuit. "The current flows" does not mean a certain concrete fact in a technical or conventional language, but a symbolic formula. For the theorist, an infinite number of different kinds can be translated into concrete facts, since all these incoherent facts permit the same theoretical interpretation. >Interpretation, >Translation, >Translation indeterminacy. |
Duh I P. Duhem La théorie physique, son objet et sa structure, Paris 1906 German Edition: Ziel und Struktur der physikalischen Theorien Hamburg 1998 |
| Language | Genz | II 29 Base sentence/theory language/Genz: base sentences can be derived from the theory language, but not vice versa. II 30 Theory language/Genz: theory language is a product of human imagination that has to prove itself in base sentences. >Theory language. Concept/Einstein/Genz: a concept is logically independent of the sensory experience. They do not behave like soup and beef, but like coat check number and coat. >Concepts, >Experience, >Perception, >Measurement. Freedom: there is freedom here, but not as strong as for the poet, but as for the person who solves a word puzzle. He/she can suggest any word, but in the end there is only one correct word. >Freedom, >Determinism. II 31 Theory language/reality/Genz: to what extent do sentences and terms of the theory language play a role in reality? >Reality. Concepts: if terms could be defined by base sentences, and the sentences of the theoretical language could be derived from observations that can be expressed by base sentences, then the status of the theoretical language would be the same as that of the base sentences. >Definitions. Solution/Genz: the theory language does not only summarize observations, but also generalizes them (by natural laws). >Observation, >Generalization. |
Gz I H. Genz Gedankenexperimente Weinheim 1999 Gz II Henning Genz Wie die Naturgesetze Wirklichkeit schaffen. Über Physik und Realität München 2002 |
| Language | Mbembe | Brocker I 917 Language/Mbembe/Herb: Mbembe is looking for a new "vocabulary" (Mbembe 2016(1), 66) that frees African discourse from the hegemony of Western categories and designs new forms of thought for the African subject. "Postcolony" is the main word of the new vocabulary. Mbembe gives a first definition of this. Def Postcolony/Mbembe: appears here as "epoch", "peculiarity" or "zeitgeist". "As an epoch, the postcolony in fact comprises manifold periods of time, consisting of overlapping, nested and enclosing discontinuities, overturns, inertia, fluctuations" (66). It goes without saying for Mbembe that such an undertaking cannot be mastered with the linear concepts of time of traditional African studies and ethnological field studies. "Commandement." [is] the new basic word of colonial and post-colonial domination. For Mbembe - following Derrida - colonial sovereignty can be defined in three ways: as founding, meaningful and ratifying violence. (2016, 73-125). >Colonialism, >Postcolonialism, >Vocabulary, >Language use, >Theoretical language. Brocker I 922 Postcolonialism/Mbembe: The colonial language is anything but understanding and consensus-oriented. "Its main purpose is to transmit orders, enforce silence, prescribe, censor and intimidate" (2016, 257). Language turns out to be an instrument of rule, it becomes a "guillotine" (260). The colonial vocabulary is used to dress and prepare the victims of the colony. In practice, violence and sex go hand in hand. For Mbembe, colonial rule is phallocracy in the literal sense. Hegel/Mbembe: In the Africa picture in Hegel's The Reason in History (Mbembe 2016(1), 252) he discovers the archetypes of the colonial language. Hegel sees Africa as a continent of drives, its inhabitant, the Negro, as an animalistic driving force. In his character there is "nothing to be found that reminds one of humanity" (253). Admittedly, Hegel with his anticipation of the verbal economy is from the view of Mbembe Brocker I 923 not only an accomplice, but also a commentator on colonialism. With his theory of self-consciousness, Hegel provides the keywords for the postcolonial debate on alterity. (Cf. Fanon 1981(2); Spivak 2013(3)). 1. Achille Mbembe, De la postcolonie. Essai sur l’imagination politique dans l’Afrique contemporaine, Paris 2000. Dt.: Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie. Zur politischen Vorstellungskraft im Afrika der Gegenwart, Wien/Berlin 2016 2. Fanon, Frantz, Die Verdammten dieser Erde, Frankfurt/M. 1981. 3. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty, Kritik der postkolonialen Vernunft. Hin zu einer Geschichte der verrinnenden Gegenwart, Stuttgart 2013. Karlfriedrich Herb, „Achille Mbembe, Postkolonie (2000)“. in: Manfred Brocker (Hg.) Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Mind Body Problem | Putnam | IV 146ff Mind Body Problem/Leib-Seele-Problem/Putnam: you can no longer see the mind body problem as a real theoretical problem. A "solution" would not throw the least light on the world. The identity of logical and structural states of machines is also not important at all - even if everything is accurate, it would only be a discovery about the language. IV 147 Mind Body Problem: it is the question whether or not mental events can be identified with physical events in connection with it. >Identity theory, >Type/Token identity, >Type/Token, >Token-physicalism. Question: can a logical analogue be constructed? Carnap: partially interpreted calculation: machine: state A, when flip-flop circuit 36 is on. Theoretical Language: for the machine: "flip-flop circuit 36 is on." Observation Language: for the machine: "I am in state A". Here, the theoretical language is partially interpreted by the observation language. >Observation language, >Interpretation, cf. >Theoretical term. IV 148 Putnam: thesis: all considerations for or against the identification of body and mind can be parallelized with considerations for or against the finding that state A is actually identical to the flip-flop circuit 36 being on. State A : is directly observable. Flip-flop circuit: the flip-flop circuit can only be determined indirectly via highly complicated conclusions. (1) "synthetic" statement: "I am in state A exactly when the flip-flop circuit is 36 on". (2) also synthetic: "I have pain exactly when my C fibers are irritated." IV 148/149 A synthetic statement cannot have an identity, otherwise it would be analytical. >Analyticity/syntheticity. This traditional argumentation for dualism does not use "bare facts of direct experience" at all, but is a complicated train of thought that includes: a) an objectification of universals (properties, states, events) and b) a sharp analytical/synthetic distinction. >Dualism. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Observation Language | Brunkhorst | Habermas IV 495 Observation language/Brunkhorst/Habermas: Brunkhorst has distinguished two pairs of theoretical and observation languages, which, according to the pragmatic roles of their basic concepts, refer either to conditions and events in the lifeworlds of capitalists and wage workers or to systematic contexts of capital exploitation. The class language (Lk) is structured in basic concepts of action theory such as 'concrete work','class interest' etc.; the exploitation language (Lv) in basic system-theoretical concepts such as 'abstract work' or 'value'. (1) Within these two languages, it must first be possible to operationalise the theoretical concepts and assign concepts to an observation language. Statements expressed in one theoretical or observational language must then be translated into statements in the other language. Marx's value theory can be understood as an attempt to explain these translation rules. See Value Theory/Habermas. Correspondences between the theoretical language Lkt and the language of observation Lvb allow, for example, to conclude from economic crisis phenomena to the Habermas IV 496 life risks of the workers. Assignment: There are assignment rules between the observation language and the theoretical language, Translation: Within observation languages and theoretical languages there are translation rules, e.g. for the transition from the economic subsystem to the lifeworld. Re-translation/Habermas: is only possible if the reference ((s) reference object) is retained. 1.Unveröffentliches Manuskript „Zur Dialektik von Verwertungssprache und Klassensprache“, Ms Frankfurt (1980). |
Brunk I Hauke Brunkhorst Zur Dialektik von Verwertungssprache und Klassensprache. Manuskript Frankfurt/M. 1980 Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
| Observation Language | Lewis | IV 79 Observation language/Lewis: Vs separation in object language and theoretical language - Lewis pro >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Observation sentences. Theoretical terms/Lewis: one could call my suggestion one for the elimination of theoretical terms. But it would be better to see it as a defence: to define them, to show that there is no good reason to work without them. They are then no less well understood and interpreted than the old ones. Observation language/Lewis: I do not intend to define theoretical terms in an observation language, whatever that should be at all. Some statements report observations and some do not. But I don't know of any special section of language reserved for observation reports. I do not understand what a theoretical term should be as a counterpart to an observation concept. (Although I think I understand what a theoretical term is. Understanding: I do not mean "knowing how to analyse the term". |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Reference | Leeds | I 370/71 Reference/Leeds: is no longer defined in terms of translation, because one cannot say in theoretical terms: (Ey) (N refers to y) Whereby N is a foreign-language word. >Theoretical terms, >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical language, >Meaning, >Assertion of existence. Problem: the existence of y is not secured. Today: Causal theories. >Causal theory of reference, >Causal theory of names, >Causal theory of knowledge. Problem: Numbers are probably not referring - hence there is probably no reference definition for any language possible. >Numbers, >Mathematical entities. I 372/373 Problem: if reference is undefined ("B" or "C"), from a foreign-language expression, then "A" veut dire A" is just as ambiguous! - Then there are several reference schemes defined by a single Tarskian reference sentence - We cannot say that a foreign language has no standard interpretation by invoking the indeterminacy of the translation. >A. Tarski, >Truth definition/Tarski, >Translation, >Translation indeterminacy. I 374 Standard interpretation: must not be given, even if ""Caesar" has the relation R to Caesar" is trivially true by determination. Cf. >Primitive Reference/Field. |
Leeds I Stephen Leeds "Theories of Reference and Truth", Erkenntnis, 13 (1978) pp. 111-29 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Science | Dawkins | I 154 Language/science/Dawkins: we always need to assure ourselves that we can re-translate our casual language. For example, "intentions" of genes. (By the way, its only intention is to multiply.) >Observation, >Observation language, >Theoretical terms, >Observation terms, >Theoretical language. I 170 Language/science/Dawkins: when we say "it's 90 % sure" (that this other animal is my half-sibling) to which "it" do we refer then? Do we mean that the zoologist is sure or that the animal is sure? Dawkins: with a little luck, both possibilities can lead to the same. I 364 Language/science/Dawkins: there is no reason not to label the bacteria according to Axelrod with predicates such as "forgiving", "not envious", etc. >Cooperation, >Altruism, >R. Axelrod. |
Da I R. Dawkins The Selfish Gene, Oxford 1976 German Edition: Das egoistische Gen, Hamburg 1996 Da II M. St. Dawkins Through Our Eyes Only? The Search for Animal Consciousness, Oxford/New York/Heidelberg 1993 German Edition: Die Entdeckung des tierischen Bewusstseins Hamburg 1993 |
| Semantic Ascent | Stroud | I 213 Semantic Ascent / Quine: mention instead use - transition from substantive to formal speech. >Mention, >Use, >Formal speech, >Formal language, >Theoretical language. Stroud: It is still about reality and not just about language. - E.g. "Wombat" is true of some organisms. >"true-of", >Satisfaction, >Reality, >External world, >World/thinking, >Language. VsCarnap: these are not "external" questions. >External /internal, >Interior/exterior. |
Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Systems | Pareto | Brocker I 99 System/Sociology/Pareto: The ((s) system concept introduced by Pareto, among others, combines (...) a groundbreaking method of knowledge for the social sciences of the time, that of functional understanding. This implies that social phenomena - such as norms, ideas, the economy or the system of government - not only stand for themselves and are therefore not only immanent but also to be understood as elements of the respective system. They take on specific tasks and services, such as the stabilisation of patterns of action or the solution of certain problems of social order formation. >Norms, >Ideas, >Economics, >Systems/Luhmann, >Systems/Parsons, >Systems theory. Pareto still had the corresponding theoretical language at his disposal, but according to today's understanding he already had a functionalist structural theory of society in mind. Brocker I 100 For Pareto, the constitutive elements of the social system are: a) "logical" and "non-logical action", b) "residuals", c) "derivatives" and d) "circulation of the elites". >Emotion/Pareto, >Argumentation/Pareto. Maurizio Bach, Vilfredo Pareto, Allgemeine Soziologie (1916) in: Manfred Brocker (Hg). Geschichte des Politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert. Frankfurt/M. 2018. |
Brocker I Manfred Brocker Geschichte des politischen Denkens. Das 20. Jahrhundert Frankfurt/M. 2018 |
| Theories | McDowell | I 188 Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (E.g. here is a black swan) cannot be distributed among the sentences of the theory. >Quine-Duhem thesis, >Indeterminacy of meaning, >Gavagai. I 189 This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning. McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our observation language is distinct form our theoretical language, so that the relevant experience is not already expressed in the theoretical language. >indeterminacy/McDowell, >Concept/McDowell, >Experience/McDowell, >Observation language. |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Thinking | Sellars | I XXIX Thinking/Perceiving: Sellars' everyday theory: modelled after the example of words and phrases of colloquial language, but no speaking with an inner tongue. >Everyday language, >Theory/Sellars, >Models/Sellars. I 80 To each of us belongs a stream of episodes that are not direct experiences themselves and to which we have privileged, but by no means immutable or infallible access. >Privileged access. They can occur without open language behavior. The word ideas are not thinking itself. Nor is the open speech behavior thought itself. We do not need to have word ideas, neither must we have an idea at all if we know what we think. It is wrong to construct the privileged access according to the model of perception. >Words/Sellars. I 83 Sellars thesis: mentalistic discourse (thoughts) ascribable to semantic speech. (Sellars pro modified Rylean explanation: thoughts are a short form for hypothetical and mixed categorical-hypothetical statements about verbal or non-verbal behavior). Tradition: thoughts without word ideas are possible. >Imagination, >Language and thought. Sellars: Categories of intentionality are semantical. >Intentionality. I 94 Thinking: the terms belonging to thinking are theoretical terms. >Theoretical terms. I 94 Thoughts are theoretical, not empirical, they cannot be defined in terms of an observation language. Their "purity" is not a metaphysical, but so to say, a methodological purity. The ability to have thoughts, is formed in the course of the acquisition of public language. Only after the public language is firmly established, the inner speech can ever occur. Theoretical episodes (thoughts) are not direct experiences. I 95 The terms belonging to thinking are theoretical terms, but their status is clarified by the opposition between theoretical and non-theoretical speech. >Theoretical language, >Observation language. Only a small step to using the language to describe oneself: if someone says who is watching us "Dick thinks 'p'" then Dick can say, "I think p". |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Use Theory | Sellars | Rorty III 193 Vs theory of use: Sellars, Bernard Williams: physics has a priority over other discourse constituents. (HeideggerVs). >Meaning, >Theoretical entities, >Theoretical terms, >Science, >Physics, >Truth, >Theoretical language, >Everyday language, >Use theory, >Language use, >Meaning change, >Theory change. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Carnap, R. | Chisholm Vs Carnap, R. | Carnap VIII 164 Pragmatics/ChisholmVsCarnap: his representation was over-simplified. Carnap: ditto. I have ignored possible effects of uncertainty and actual errors of the speaker. (> Radical Interpretation, RI). Chisholm: the analysis can be simplified by the concept of belief. Carnap pro. Belief/Pragmatics/Carnap: requires a conceptual framework of theoretical pragmatics. The basic concepts of pragmatics are best not behavioristically defined, but introduced as theoretical constructions in the theoretical language connected with the observation language on the basis of postulates and correspondence rules. Def Belief/Church: relationship between a person and a fact. Def Belief/Carnap: relationship between a person and a statement. The concept of Church is not pragmatic: (state which does not necessarily include language). VIII 165 It is neither implied that the person is aware of the belief, nor that they could verbalize it. Carnap: for the statement, verbalization is of course the condition. This corresponds to the believing-to-be-true. The pragmatic concept of intension serves the purpose of linking Churchian belief and believing of a statement. Chisholm II 68/69 Meaning postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: there is "no clear sense" in which such a sentence is related to words and their use! SauerVsChisholm: the objection is not severe: Solution: if ’(x) (Fx > Gx)’ is a meaning postulate in S, then one should not depart from this sentence itself, but from " ’(x)(Fx > GX)’ is a meaning postulate in S". That is a statement about "F" and "G" in S. II 71 Analytical/Meaning postulates/ChisholmVsCarnap: do not secure that the definition of "square" means square is not merely ad hoc and arbitrary. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Quine, W.V.O. | McDowell Vs Quine, W.V.O. | I 162 McDowellVsQuine: contradiction: If experience is not part of the order of justification, it can not be exceeded by worldviews. But that is what "conceptual sovereignty" requires. The whole thesis of the indeterminacy of translation would become meeaningless if we can not talk about how someone comes to a worldview but only about causal acquired dispositions. On the other hand, if we were to abandon the "Tribunal," we would lose the right to speak of a more or less reasonable worldview. I 184 McDowellVsQuine: if we reject the Third dogma there are fatal consequences for Quine: for his argument he needs to maintain the duality endogenous/exogenous, which DavidsonVsQuine also rejects. I 185 McDowell: the "empirical significance" cannot be a proper meaning anyway, since - as a counterpart to "conceptual sovereignty" - it cannot have anything to do with reasons and justification. McDowellVsQuine: but that does not indicate that meaning is generally underdetermined! To that end one would have to show that we have an indelible leeway when we look for a kind of understanding that leads us outside the field of "empirical significance." An understanding, that shows how life phenomena are structured in the order of the justification, the space of reason. That can not be learned from Quine. I 186 Scheme/McDowellVsQuine: the idea of a structure that must be found in every understandable conceptual scheme must not have the effect that one imagines the scheme as one side of the dualism of world and schema. I 188 DavidsonVsQuine: If "empirical meaning" cannot be divided sentence by sentence among individual sentences, this does not mean that rational accountability towards experience cannot be dvided sentence by sentence among individual sentences. But then experience must really be regarded as a tribunal. Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (Ex a black swan) can not be distributed among the sentences of the theory. McDowell: This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning. McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our experiential language is distinct from the theoretical language, so that the relevant experience does not already speak the language of theory. I 189 Theoretical Language/observational language/McDowellVsQuine: now it may be that both are actually distinguishable. Then, the observational significance of a single theoretical sentence would be indeterminate. But we could not derive a general indeterminacy of meaning from that! If we try, we are confronted with the third dogma. Esfeld I 63 Semantic holism/Quine: is conceived by him as a Type B (top down). Conceptual content is mainly the system of beliefs of each person as a whole. No two people ever have the same belief system. VsQuine: Problem: 1. How can two people share a belief at all if they do not share the whole system? 2. Confirmation: how can expereince confirm propositions or beliefs at all? how should we understand the metaphor of the "tribunal of experience"? Experience: if it is conceptual, it consists in beliefs or statements. Then it is not even outside the system of beliefs. So it can not be confronted with the system! Experience: On the other hand if it were non-conceptual, it is unclear how it can exercise a rational control over a system of beliefs. Quine: "The core idea of the third dogma." "Tribunal." nothing more than excitation of receptors! Experience in this sense may cause beliefs. (DavidsonVs). Esfeld: but how then can experience be a reason? I 64 (S.McDowell I 157ff). |
McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of an allied field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
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| Necessity | Leibniz, G.W. | Staln I 169 Def necessity / Leibniz: truth in all possible worlds. Stalnaker: even that is no ontological thesis, but the attempt to create a theoretical language for modal discourse. |
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