Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 22 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Beliefs | Esfeld | I 50 ~ Belief/Quine/Esfeld: a foundation is not possible because of the fundamental revisability of each belief. Confirmation holism: because individual belief can be justified only through experience, each belief can be revised (Type B). >Foundation, >Experience. Confirmation holism refers to the belief-system of an individual - that is justification holism. No belief can be a foundation (type A or B). >Confirmation. I 95ff Intra-personnel problem: the changes of beliefs are a problem here. An inter-personnel problem is the communication (same meanings?). Inferential context: the inferential context is the linguistic use in the community. Contents: content will therefore not be determined in the system of beliefs, but externally. One should not ask which other beliefs the persons have but what they should have. Therefore, belief is not in the head. There are identity conditions for them (for intentional content there are no identity conditions). >Content, >Identity conditions. I 132ff Beliefs/Esfeld: beliefs are a basic linguistic unity because they are the only ones which have the dual character: one can ask for reasons for them and they can even be given as reasons. >Justification, >Reasons. I 161ff Belief/Esfeld: beliefs can result in determinations that go beyond what we are ready for -> answer dependence of our terms: something is only red if it appears red for normal observers under normal circumstances: "it belongs to the concept that ... ": is not a reduction on appearance. However answer dependence does not include characteristics in the recipient. >Terminology/Esfeld, >Qualities/Esfeld. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Brain | Deacon | I 45 Brain/Deacon: in the co-evolution of language and brain, the relationship between cause and effect was reversed in that the new ability of the symbolic reference (which is reserved exclusively for the human species) was decoupled from genetic transmission. >Symbolic Reference, >Symbols/Deacon. If it is true that there has been a pressure in selection on symbolic organisms, our unique mental ability must also be understood in these terms. Then the architecture of our brains should also show systematic deviations from the architecture of monkey brains. >Animals, >Animal language. Size: is only an insignificant feature. What is more important is the transformation, the re-engineering of the architecture. I 146 - 164 Brain/Learning/Deacon: Brain size has probably something to do with intelligence, but there are many other factors to consider, such as the proportion of brain capacity required to control the musculoskeletal system. Learning. I 164 Second level learning, i.e. the development of new reactions to new situations only occurs in organisms that live longer. In more short-lived species, such an ability would not pay off. >Behavior. I 166 Small dogs with correspondingly small brains are very similar to big dogs in their brain performances. Their cerebralization (i.e. their brain performance relative to their weight) is even slightly greater than that of their larger conspecifics. I 170 Cerebralisation/encephalisation: the origin of their increase in primates is not in the head! It is in the relatively slower growth of their bodies. I 183 To compare the brains of animals with those of humans, we do not need to compare sizes in general, but we need to compare the sizes of the individual parts of the brain. The structure of the brain or the control of the relative growth of individual body parts at all. Is controlled by homeotic genes. I 194 The brain adapts to the rest of the body during evolution. This explains the otherwise extremely improbable result that adding further components of this extremely networked structure leads to an increase in functions and does not restrict them. Solution: the brain itself plays a systemic role in the design of its parts. Neurons - unlike other cell types - are designed for communication and thus for tuning the function with remote cells. Cf. Learning, >Learning/Hebb. I 195 In this way, the nervous system itself can participate in the process of its construction. Cf. >Neural Networks. I 199 Xenotransplantation of brain parts between different animal species showed that growth and interconnection with foreign tissue is possible. The molecular processes are identical in the different animal species. I 202 In foreign tissue, neurons begin to produce an increased number of axons, some of which turn out to be less suitable and are then used less frequently. This is a Darwin-like process of selective elimination. I 474 Deacon thesis: the initial unspecific connectivity and subsequent competition of the connections influences cognitive processes through tendencies in neural computation resulting from superior patterns due to regional distribution. This is how differences between the species develop. Cf. >Computation, >Information Processing/Psychology. I 205 Cells in different brain regions have not previously gotten their compounds dictated and can specialize in different directions. Literally every developing brain region adapts to the body in which it is located. I 207 Displacement/Deacon: if a genetic variation strengthens the relative size of a population of nerve cells, the axons will shift from smaller to larger regions. I 212 We do not have to speculate about special brain functions, which are reserved solely for humans when we understand the shift that does not depend on the sheer size of the brain. The course for the division of regions for individual brain functions is set shortly after birth. I 213 The formation and differentiation of the brain regions of the human being takes place along the formation of the functions of its body parts and other bodily functions such as eyes, ears, musculoskeletal system. This formation is very different to the formation of small and large dogs. I 214ff Thought experiment: Assuming that a human embryonic brain is transplanted into a gigantic monkey body. It is possible to predict quite accurately which brain regions develop and how, adapted to the body functions and their relative expression. Factors such as the deviating size of the retina or the competition of the brain cells for the control of muscle cells are decisive. These changes are not isolated adaptations. I 220 Langauge/Brain/Deacon: Thesis: Increasing vocalization can be traced back to motor projections of the midbrain and brain stem, while symbolic learning can be traced back to the extension of the prefrontal cortex and competition for synapses throughout the brain. DeaconVsTradition: early on it was assumed that musicians, for example, have a particularly large brain region for processing auditory signals. That turned out to be wrong. I 221 There is competition between central and peripheral regions of the brain as well as between neighbouring regions. A selection is made not only with regard to regions, but also in terms of functions. >Selection. I 253 Language/mammals/Deacon: most mammals are unable to speak because the connection between motor cortex and vocal control instances in the brain stem has been cut during early development. I 267 In the brain, the operations for organizing the combinatorial relations, which regulate the use of symbols and associations, are located in the prefrontal cortex. I 277 The cerebellum is very fast in the formation of predictions. Linking to the cerebellum is, for example, beneficial for fast conjugations that are used in the formation of sentences. The prefrontal cortex is then responsible for filtering out the right associations. I 343 Brain/Human/Evolution: What is decisive is not an absolute growth in the size of the brain, but a growth in size relative to an increase in body height within species. And we can see that, in addition to this relative growth in size in the case of the human being, it has led to an increase in the size of the prefrontal cortex. This corresponds to a shift in learning disposition. I 345 This development can only be understood in terms of Baldwin's evolution (Baldwin effect). Cf. >Evolution/Deacon. I 346 Tool use/Deacon: passed on from individual to individual, i.e. learned and is not a characteristic that is reflected in the brain structure. >Culture, >Nature, >Evolution. I 347 The first tools were used by living beings whose brains were not well adapted for the use of symbols. However, experiments with monkeys such as Kanzi show that even such brains with considerable social training are able to learn to use symbols. >Symbols/Deacon. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Brains in a Vat | Putnam | VI 391 Brains in a vat/BIV/metaphysical realism/Putnam: brains in a vat is a part of metaphysical realism, not of internal realism. Then "verified" does not imply "true". >Internal realism, >Metaphysical realism. --- V 21f Brains in a vat/Reference/Putnam: the language of brains in the vat does not refer to anything in the outside world. There is no reference. They cannot even think "We are brains in a vat". V 77ff Bracketing/Putnam: parenthetical thoughts have no reference conditions that would make them true. Internalism: (existential questions only within a theory:) as brains in a vat we cannot think here that we are in the vat, except the bracketed sense. V 179 Brains in a vat/PutnamVsBrains in a vat: our worldview is coherent, because, taken as a whole, it includes an explanation of our activity of coping and developing a world theory. --- I (a) 21 Brains in a vat/Putnam: brains in a vat cannot refer to brains in a vat. Meanings are not in the head. I (f) 156f Brains in a vat/Putnam: brains in a vat is no problem for internalism, there are no possible worlds. Externalism: here it is possible that some brains are outside the vat. >Internalism, >Externalism. Realism: realism asserts extrinsic connections between signs and things that help explain the nature of the reference. PutnamVs: e.g. textbooks are the main cause of my beliefs about electrons, but my use of the word "electron" does not refer to these books. VsRealism: realism cannot determine the "right kind of causality". >Reference. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Content | Searle | I 66f Wide Content: wide content encompasses the causal relations to the world beyond the words so that meanings are not in the head (Putnam pro, but not "wide content". (> Content/Fodor), >Meanings not "in the head", >wide/narrow content. II 26f The fulfillment of conditions is fixed by propositional content. There is not a desire or belief without fulfillment conditions (i.e. no regress). >Satisfaction condition/Searle, >Regress. II 80 Deception: e.g. the moon is bigger on the horizon - that is part of the content. Solution: if we had no beliefs, we would believe the moon had changed its size. II 87 Content/Searle: the content is not the same as the object. II 196 Hallucination/deception: brains in the vat have exactly the same intentional content. II 319 Intentional Content/Pierre Example/Searle: intentional content is sufficient, and that is different in "London is ugly" and "Londres est jolie". Kripke: intentional content is not rigid, because descriptions are not rigid either. Names: names are neither equivalent to descriptions nor to intentional contents. >Pierre-Example. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Elm/Beech Example | Elm/Beech example, philosophy: thought experiment of H. Putnam (Putnam, H. Reason, truth and history, Cambridge, 2008). The speaker cannot distinguish elms and beeches, but he knows that both are different trees. What is the status of his knowledge? Putnam draws the conclusion that meanings are not in the head. See also reference, knowledge, causal theory, meaning, thought experiments. |
||
| Elm/Beech Example | Searle | II 254f Meaning/SearleVsPutnam/Searle: meaning is in the head, they depend on >Satisfaction conditions of intentionality. Putnam: meanings are not in the head and conditions in the world are decisive. An indexical determination and not the concept fixes the meaning. Searle: meaning is not determined by ideolect. Cf. >Twin earth, >Idiolect. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Meaning | Davidson | I (c) 64 Meaning/Davidson: Quine has revolutionized our understanding of communication by having shown that there is not more about meaning than what a person with the associated facilities is able to learn by observing. Causal theory of meaning/VsDescartes: Senses do not matter - only in learning, but then contingently. (VsScepticism) >Causal theory of reference, >Skepticism. I (c) 47 Def Meaning (interpretation): The meaning of a sentence is given by the fact that the sentence is assigned a semantic space in the structure of records that make up a language . The meaning of a sentence consists in being the holder of this place and no other place in the macro structure of the language. This is the only content of the concept of meaning for Davidson. >Sentence meaning, >Meaning theory. Glüer II 53 DavidsonVsSocial nature of meaning: Idiolect in principle is also to be interpreted (via causal hypotheses). Putnam/Kripke: causal theory: correct link between word and object. DavdisonVsPutnam: Interpretation of whole sentences. >Use theory, >Interpretation, >Radical interpretation. Rorty VI 419 DavidsonVsQuine/Rorty: Davidson rejects the notion of "stimulus meaning": this would be like Newton’s attempt to climb to the "Newton of the mind". Instead: distal theory of meaning. There is no "central region" between linguistically formulated beliefs and physiology. >Proximal theory. Davidson I 95 Causal theory of meaning: Meaning does not matter - only in learning, but then contingent (VsSkepticism). I 99 DavidsonVsPutnam: that meanings are not in the head is not due to special names for natural kinds, but due to broad social character of language. >Natural kinds, >Communication. Glüer II 50 Meaning/Davidson/Glüer: The interpretation is given by the fact that the semantic space of a sentence is located in the structure of sentences that make up the language - (multiple languages = truth - theories) possible - Def Meaning/Davidson: then consists in being the holder of this unique place in the macro structure of the language. Glüer II 51 Meaning/Tarski/Davidson: Tarski-type theories are not based on meaning as defined entities (pro Davidson : Meaning is not fixed ultimately) - consequences: 1. DavidsonVsTarski: actually spoken language becomes ultimately irrelevant - 2. The trivial thesis that meaning is conventional, must be abandoned. Frank I 672 Sunburn-example/Davidson: as sunburn is still a reddening of my skin, even though it was caused by the sun - not only external causation leads to the fact that meanings are not in the head - otherwise, pro Putnam: meanings are not in the head, but rather simple propositional attitudes. >Propositional attitudes. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Meaning | Gärdenfors | I 18 Meaning/Gärdenfors: Thesis: Semantics, understood as a "meeting of minds", implies that the meanings of expressions do not reside in the external world and also not exclusively in the speakers' image schemas, but are from the communicative interactions of the language users. Therefore, meanings are in the mind of the speakers. Gärdenfors (1993)(1), Warglien & Gärdenfors (2013)(2) GärdenforsVsPutnam: meanings are in the head. Gärdenfors: I do not assume that speakers have the same image schemas or the same representations. >Meaning/Putnam, >"not in the head", >Twin earth. 1. Gärdenfors, P. (1993). The emergence of meaning. Linguistics and Philosophy, 16, 285–309. 2. Gärdenfors, P., & Warglien, M. (2013). The development of semantic space for pointing and verbal communication. In J. Hudson, U. Magnusson, & C. Paradis (Eds.), Conceptual spaces and the construal of spatial meaning: Empirical evidence from human communication (pp. 29–42). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Meaning | Lewis | II 197 Meaning/Name/Lewis: may be a function of worlds in truth value - of generic names: function from worlds to quantities. II 213 Putnam: meanings not in the head - Lewis pro: mental state does not determine the meaning - meaning cannot be found out through mental state - mental state contains too little information about causation and situation. II 213/14 Carrier of meaning: speech acts - not sounds or characters! -> Intentionality, > meaning (intending). --- IV 194 Meaning/Lewis: Here’s a function that provides as output an appropriate extension for given combinations of factors provides as time, place, context, speaker, world - intension/Lewis: function that leads from indices (time, place, speaker, world) to appropriate extensions for a name, sentence, or general term - intensions are extension-determining functions - Carnap’s intension: provides truth value for sentences or things, for names and quantities, for general terms. IV 200 Intension/meaning/Lewis: E.g. "Snow is white or not" differs finely in the meaning of "Grass is green or not" - because of the different intensions of the embedded sentences. - (Intension: Function of indices on extensions). - Meaning/Lewis: semantically interpreted phrase markers minus the top nodes of the structure treeS - synonymy: sameness of intension. Meaning/BenacerrafVsLewis: how can you ever "choose" meaning? - Lewis: this is a general objection Vs quantity-theoretic approaches. IV 202 Definition phrase structure rules/Lewis: = semantically interpreted phrase markers - Definition meaning: a structure tree ... - we often talk about meanings as if they were symbolic expressions, although they are not - the category meaning is simply the top node - intension: is the second component of the top node. --- Schwarz I 216 Meaning/object/word/Lewis: thesis: our words are merely linked to conditions to be fulfilled by a potential reference - so it may be that something fulfills them of which we did not think beforehand that it would fulfill them. >Reference, >Words, >a posteriori. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Meaning | Poundstone | I 339 Meaning/PoundstoneVsPutnam: meaning is in your head, that is in the consciousness of the one who knows the encryption (cryptography). Vs: Putnam: meanings are not in the head. >Twin Earth, >Meanings are not in the head, >Meaning/Putnam. An extreme case: rules result in "iii ...". Then it is divided between the text and key. >Code, >Information, >Encoding, >Text, >Understanding, >Decoding. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Meaning | Putnam | I (a) 16 Meaning/Putnam: meaning is not in the head. Proof: the linguistic division of labor shows that I am not the only one who has the criteria ((s) at least I am willing to learn from others). PutnamVsTarski: understanding of the reference must be added. This must be independent of recognition (realistic position). >Reference/Putnam. I (g) 49 Meaning/theory/PutnamVsCarnap/VsPositivismus: the theory does not determine the meaning. Otherwise the term gravity would change if a 10th Planet was discovered. Positivists also require, that the theory is dependent of all additional assumptions, otherwise the schema theory and prediction would collapse. >Theory, >Additional assumptions, >Prediction. I (e) 141ff Meaning/Putnam: meaning results from the deletion of quotes. >Disquotation. I (k) 258 Term Transformation/change of meaning/significance/Putnam: e.g. if aliens had replaced all the stars of the Big Dipper through giant light bulbs, we would say : "that is not really a star" but not "this is not really the Big Dipper". >Meaning change. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Meaning | Searle | I 66 Naturalization of content: naturalization of content is the separation of consciousness and intentionality (SearleVs) SearleVsPutnam/Searle: meanings are in the head (> Intentionality/Searle). --- II 25 ff Meanings are in the head (VsPutnam) because perception is self-related. Perception provides self fulfilling conditions. >Putnam: Meanings are "not in the head". II 255 Meaning/Searle: meaning is in the head, fulfilling conditions are in the intentionality. Putnam: they are not in the head, conditions in the world have a crucial indexical determination; it is not the concept which fixes the meaning. Searle: meaning is not determined by ideolect. - > Elm/beech example, > Twin Earth. --- V 69 Meaning goes beyond the intention. It is usually a matter of convention. V 68 Chess/Searle: the figures usually have no meaning, and who makes a move usually means nothing. >Chess, >Chess figures/Wittgenstein. --- IV 157 Meaning/Searle: meaning depends on the context - like other non-conventional succession of forms of intentionality. >Context dependence. IV 159 Ultimately, meaning depends on our perception as a basic form of intentionlity. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Meaning | Stalnaker | I 204 Meaning/Stalnaker (like Putnam): meanings are not in the head. Reason: the reason that meanings are not in the head is because they are abstract objects. Abstract objects: abstract objects are associated with things, some of which are actually in the head - namely things that have meanings or content. ((s) e.g. phrases, signs, symbols). >Meanings are not in the head, >Objects, >Content, >Abstract objects, >Abstract concepts. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Mental States | Davidson | I (b) 30 Twin Earth/Davidson: Subjective states do not arise as a consequence of the state of the brain or the nervous system. I (b) 35 False theory: the objects would be the meanings of sentences (Vs), that is, the >propositions. DavidsonVs: with this, it would be so arranged that, e.g. if a Frenchman attributed the same state of consciousness to Paul as I do, the same subject would be named by us both, whereas this would not be the case in the theory under consideration, for the sentence in question of the Frenchman would not be the same as mine (falsely). It should not concern us that the Frenchman and I use different words, it is similar to ounces and carats. (> Measuring). My monism is ontological: it asserts that mental events and objects can also be described as physical. >">Anomalous Monism. I (e) 99 Mind/Davidson: if we consider the subjective or mental exclusively as a consequence of the physical characteristics of a person, meanings cannot be something purely subjective or mental. (Putnam: Meanings are not in the head). Frank I 626 Mind/Davidson: does not work without language, both equal. Donald Davidson (1984a): First Person Authority, in: Dialectica 38 (1984), 101-111 - - - Frank I 657ff Mental states/external attribution/Davidson: "narrow" state/twin earth: "inner", is solipsistic, as in Descartes. The narrow states are the same for the twin earth. BurgeVsPutnam: they do not exist. SearleVsPutnam: narrow states are unnecessary, ordinary propositional attitudes suffice. DavidsonVsSearle/VsBurge: ordinary mental states are narrow (internal) and at the same time "non-individualistic", i.e. externally identifiable. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Models | Hacking | I 357f Model/Hacking: a model states interactivity between speculation and experiment. Models are in the head. Cf. >"Meanings are not in the head". E.g.: An atomic nucleus is treated temporarily as if it had an infinite mass. Molecules are treated as a rigid rod. We can ignore the spin. >Method, >Quantum mechanics, >Physics. CartwrightVsModel: in the examples above we see that not all can be true, but we all use them at the same time. >Model theory. |
Hacking I I. Hacking Representing and Intervening. Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, Cambridge/New York/Oakleigh 1983 German Edition: Einführung in die Philosophie der Naturwissenschaften Stuttgart 1996 |
| Natural Kinds | Putnam | Newen I 126f Natural Kind/terms/Putnam/Newen/Schrenk: the reference of natural kinds can only be relatively stated to the environment and the prevailing natural conditions. N.B.: we can talk about natural species solely on the basis of examples. It is not necessary that we have an idea about the defining characteristics. E.g. water: in earlier times, one talked just the same about it as today, without having a clue of H2O. Def Natural Kind/Putnam/Newen/Schrenk: a natural kind is a unified type of individual things, whereby this type is defined by properties in nature and not by epistemic or pragmatic criteria. Implications: Putnam: thesis: meanings are not in the head, e.g. Twin Earth. --- Putnam III 145 Natural Kind/Putnam: e.g. star has an artificial nature, i.e. their constellations. Natural kind: limits are also arbitrary here. --- I (a) 38f Natural Kind/Putnam: it is not analytic that tigers have stripes (not even a few). It is also not analytic that tigers are animals and lemons are fruits. One who uses the word "aluminum", does not have to differentiate it from molybdenum. >Elms/Beeches, >Analytic/synthetic. What determines reference then? The causal connection to the event of introduction includes belonging to a linguistic community. Stereotypes: temperature: has a strong stereotype; electricity: has a weak stereotype. >Stereotypes. I (e) 135ff Natural Kind/Putnam: natural kinds are e.g. natural substances, genera and physical variables. >Criteria. Putnam: early: natural kinds are defined by criteria. Putnam: later: they are defined through the world. What counts into that is determined by laws. These are not analytical definitions, all stereotypes can also be made true from other things. >Laws, >Natural laws. I (e) 138 Only the DNA decides what a lemon is. I (e) 139 What makes the composition of any importance, is its connection to the laws of behavior. With the introduction of the term they are commonly not known. I (e) 139 Natural Kind/Putnam: a natural kind must have the same composition or obey the same laws. Their names are not synonymous with markings: the research may result into something new. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Naturalism | Searle | I 66 Naturalization of content: naturalization of content is the separation of consciousness/intentionality (SearleVs: Searle is against such a separation). >Consciouness, >Intentionality. Meaning/SearleVsPutnam/Searle: meanings are in the head. >Intentionality/Searle. Putnam: Meanings are not in the head. There is a thesis: intentionality is biological, teleological: SearleVs: in a case of confusion we needed words like "horse-or-cow". ((s) > Disjunctive predicates.) |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Phenomena | Feynman | I 736 Phenomenon/Feynman: (context here: magnetic field, coil) the changeover from north to south should not concern us, the two are also mere agreements. -the change is not a phenomenon! ((s) The two would be reversed: top/bottom and right/left at the same time, therefore no change! (As if you looked at the original image from behind: now north is at the bottom, but the vector now also points to the right instead of to the left.) I 736 True Phenomenon/Feynman: for example, if we have an electron moving through a field that points into the book page: if we then use the formula for the force v x B, we find that the electron, in accordance with the physical law, will deviate in the displayed direction. The phenomenon is that we have a coil with a current that runs in a certain circumferential direction, and an electron that circulates in a certain way. That is physics, regardless of how we call everything. ((s) Because the electron is not both positive and negative at the same time.) Feynman: Now we carry out the same experiment in a mirror: now the force is reversed if we calculate it according to the same law, and this is good, for the corresponding movements are then mirror images. >Chirality. I 736 Reflection/Chirality/Symmetry/Feynman: the main thing is that in the study of any phenomenon there are always two or an even number of right-handed rules and that the phenomena as a result always look symmetrical. However, it may appear as if we could indicate the north pole of a magnet! E.g. compass needle really points north. Vs: but of course this is again a local property that has to do with the geography of the earth. It is as if we were talking about in which direction Chicago is (north of Pittsburgh), so it does not count! That the compass needle has a bluish color is only a convention! If, however, a magnet had the property that small hairs grow on its north pole, but not on the south pole, that would be the end of the law of mirror symmetry. E.g. telephone call to a Mars resident: we could send him right-polarized light and say: "This is right-turning light". I 737 We could indicate our size in the diameter of hydrogen atoms. And this is how absolute length can be defined. But we could not define "left" with the fact that our heart beats on the left side. Maybe his beats on the right! >Objectivity, cf. >Twin Earth, >"Meanings are not in the head". |
Feynman I Richard Feynman The Feynman Lectures on Physics. Vol. I, Mainly Mechanics, Radiation, and Heat, California Institute of Technology 1963 German Edition: Vorlesungen über Physik I München 2001 Feynman II R. Feynman The Character of Physical Law, Cambridge, MA/London 1967 German Edition: Vom Wesen physikalischer Gesetze München 1993 |
| Representation | Esfeld | I 136 ~ Representation: harmless: beliefs represent things and facts of the world but they are not the original semantic property of beliefs. EsfeldVsDescartes: representation is intentional, not preconceptive. >Intentionality, >Representations/Descartes. Representation/Descartes: 1st A belief represents things. 2nd Access is only guaranteed by representation. 3. The things of which we are conscious, are representations (strong representation, realism). >Beliefs, >Realism. Fodor: Fodor is pro Descartes, the content of belief states is derived from original representative content. Problem: which causality is effective right now? Which characteristic is relevant? This does not allow conclusions. >Jerry Fodor. I 144ff Representative semantics/Esfeld: Vs: similarity is not an explanation. But which one is the correct causal relation? >Similarity, >Explanation, >Semantics. VsRepresentation: a causal relation is not fixable. A representation cannot distinguish between reference (extension) and meaning (intension) - meaning is therefore not in the head. >Reference, >Causal relation, >Meanings are not in the head. |
Es I M. Esfeld Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002 |
| Twin Earth | Monod | Dennett I 268 Twin Earth/Monod/Dennett: Monod posed and solved the problem of Putnam's twin earth: meaning is not in the head, it is also not quite in the DNA. >Twin earth, >Meanings are not in the head, >Meaning. Dennett: this also applies to the poetry. >Hermeneutic circle. In the opinion of some authors, "gene centrality" is thus disproved. >Genes. Dennett: that was an over-simplification anyway. I 271 Niche: every functional structure implicitly carries information about the environment in itself. >Niches. |
Mon I J. Monod Le hasard et la nécessité, Paris 1970 German Edition: Zufall und Notwendigkeit Hamburg 1982 Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Twin Earth | Poundstone | I 323 Twin Earth/PoundstoneVsPutnam: long molecular chains correspond with sticky liquids - then no confusability - the water would be undrinkable - thought experiments: physical feasibility is relevant - Twin Earth/Poundstone: only possible connection: hydrogen/oxygen (peroxide): extremely unstable. when ammonia is liquid, mercury is fixed - completely different world. ((s) H2O/XYZ cannot be the only change then. - Poundstone argues holistically.) Putnam: on the twin earth we would make identical experiences. - But there is more than a reality that fits to it. >Knowledge, >Certainty, >Skepticism, >Experience, >Perception, cf. >Qualia. I 327 Translation/Twin Earth/PoundstoneVsPutnam: Variant: supposing there is a text of "Schiller", "The Maid of Orleans" - but translation would result into Urfaust. - Then we might have a slogan: "meanings are not in the book". >Meaning/Putnam, >Meanings are not in the head, >Twin Earth. Vs: such a translation would not be possible because the word frequencies would have to give the same pattern in each translation. Cf. >Theorem of Löwenheim. Solution: algorithm which completely modifies the text. N.B.: there is no evidence that the Voynich manuscript is not a translation of a known text. >Proofs, >Provability. |
Poundstone I William Poundstone Labyrinths of Reason, NY, 1988 German Edition: Im Labyrinth des Denkens Hamburg 1995 |
| Word Meaning | Deacon | I 59 Word Meaning/Deacon: it is not the case that words differ from other signals by chance or conventionally. I 60 Tradition: assumes that there are two kinds of referential or meaningful relations: a) transparent: here a similarity between the signal (word, picture, sign) and the object addressed (icon) works >Icons. b) opaque: this resemblance is missing here. Instead, additional knowledge about the code is required. >Symbol. Icon: Refers to similarity characteristics between the sign (word, sound, image) and the object. (Transparency). >Similarity. Symbol: refers without such similarity, instead a code has to be learned. (Opacity). Signal: is simply a sign that is physically correlated with other objects without considering the semantics. >Signal, >Semantics. >Index, >Petrol gauge example, Dretske. I 62 Reference: Examples such as the > twin earth show that reference does not generally need something like meaning to be determined. >Twin Earth, >Reference, >H. Putnam. Reference/Solution/DeaconVsPutnam: what makes inanimate things such as blackening of the paper or a sign on the screen meaningful is an interpretation of which a crucial part really... I 63 (even if not everything) happens „in the head“. Reference is not intrinsic "in the" word (noise, gesture), but reference is formed by a kind of response to it. Cf. >"Meanings are not in the head"/Putnam. >Reference/Deacon, > Interpretation/Deacon, >Intrinsicness, >Words, >Subsententials, cf. >Sentences. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Externalism | Davidson Vs Externalism | I (d) 72 VsExternalism: In many cases, it is assumed that the externalism which refers to facts that lie outside the mind and may be unknown to the person concerned, cannot be reconciled with the authority of the first person. Putnam: meanings are not in the head, after all. The same is true for thoughts in general, in his opinion. (likewise Searle) DavidsonVs: This conclusion is not valid, at least not for my externalism. Which are the factors that determine the content of the thought of another person must be found out by the interpreter on the basis of indirect evidence, or suspected correctly. But because these factors determine both the content of this thought as well as the content of the thought that one believes to have, there is no room for errors regarding the content of one’s thoughts in the way they may arise for other thoughts. Frank I 660 DavidsonVsExternalism: those who believe that the contents of our thoughts are often determined by factors of which we know nothing, have of course noticed that if they were right, the Cartesianism of self-assurance and the Fregean notion of the thoughts that are thought completely must be wrong. But they have barely made an attempt to solve the conflict with the strong intuition that we do have the authority of the first person indeed. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Externalism | Stalnaker Vs Externalism | II 170 Externalism/Stalnaker: this had amazing paradoxical consequences: 1. If what we think is not in the head we cannot know what we mean or think. Or at least not have the authority of the first person. Note: not necessarily: what follows is that the intrinsic state is not authoritative which means it does not follow that if the head of someone is in an intrinsic state that he has a certain conviction. But this does not mean that he does not have the authority of the first person. 2. The externalism threatens the explanatory role of mental states. We explain the behavior of people in the way that they believe and want something. Problem: how can mental states be causally relevant if they themselves depend on something outside? VsExternalism/Stalnaker: some grant it truth but deny its significance. It would only show that our normal concepts are inappropriate for behavior explanation. This suggests that we need to make only minor revisions. Solution/some: the def "organismic contribution": that is the component which is dependent or supervenient on internal states. VsExternalism/revisionism/terminology/Stalnaker: the revisionist objection against the externalism makes a positive and a negative assertion. a) negative assertion: there can be no behavior explanation which is not individualistic (non-externalist). b) positive assertion: although the normal psychological concepts are not individualistic, they can be reinterpreted to preserve the structure of intentional explanation. narrow content/Stalnaker: first, I examine a very simple causal analogue of the narrow content: a "narrow footprint". Example normal footprint: is a causal-relational concept. Something is a footprint by virtue of the manner in which it was created. It is not with the sand intrinsically. Versus: "Narrow footprint"/twin earth/tw.e./Stalnaker: e.g. here a footprint that is similiar to the one of Jone was accidentally created by a wave. Pointe: so there is something on the tw.e. which is intrinsically indistinguishable from a footprint, not a footprint. Then a philosopher might say with a sense for grip formulations: "Externalism": "Divide the cake in whatever way you want, footprints are not in the sand!". VsExternalism: revisionism might reply that this would only apply to colloquial terms and these are of no interest to science. Scientifically only states that are intrinsically with the sand count. Solution/revisionism/VsExternalism: the concept of narrow content (here: e.g. "narrow footprint"). narrow concept: here the relevant state is independent from the causal history. E.g. narrow footprint: is a foot shaped impression, howsoever caused. Then we could isolate that component which is intrinsically with the medium (here: the sand). II 172 ExternalismVsVs: pointe: the new concept is still a relational one! E.g. narrow footprints are now not anymore dependent on a specific cause but are still dependent on general causes which are extrinsically with the sand. E.g. assuming normal feet on the TE have a different shape. Then the footprint which was caused by a wave is not only not a normal footprint but also no narrow footprint. Then the footprint in the sand is just not in the shape of a foot. ((s) only if you transfer the shape from the actual world to the twin earth). Stalnaker: there are still a lot of everyday examples for this strategy: Disposition concept/Stalnaker: we begin with a causal interaction e.g. water solubility then we use counterfactual conditionals (co.co.) to obtain a stable property that the thing has no matter whether it comes to the interaction. intrinsically/Stalnaker: water solubility may be a purely intrinsic property, others not: e.g. observability also depends on the skills of the observer. Narrow concept/Stalnaker: e.g. belief may be a narrow description of the concept of knowledge in the sense that the dependence on special causes between facts and knower was replaced by a more general of patterns of causal relations between facts and internal states. Alternative: Def narrow footprint: "foot-shaped impression" is now reference-determining definde: it shall now mean, formed in the way how feet are formed in the actual world (act.wrld.). Important argument: then the by the wave formed impression on the TE is still a narrow footprint. intrinsically: so, it seems we have isolated a purely intrinsic state of the sand. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Perry, J. | Lewis Vs Perry, J. | Lewis IV 70 Person/Identity/Split/Perry/Lewis: we both have the same objective, but different priorities. Perry: does not use the temporal identity (identity to t). He does not allow the identification of the I-Relation (IR) and the R-Relation (RR) but only of certain temporal underrelations of them. LewisVsPerry: for this, he must introduce an unintuitive distinction between people who exist (have states) at different times. ((s) >Castaneda: "Volatile I": Frank I 210 "I" / Castaneda: thesis: "here", "now", "there" are volatile. Irreducible volatile individual things only exist as content of experience.) Fra I 402 (Castaneda thesis: "I" is irreplaceable for its user.)). Lewis IV 70 All persons are identifiable at one time (except for problem cases). Example Stage S1 is R relative to t short R1r in relation to S2 if and only if S1 and S2 are Rr simpler and S2 is also localized to t. Then the R1 relation is the R-Relation between stages at t and other stages at other times or at t. IV 71 And S1 is IR to t short I1 relative to S2 when both S1 and S2 are stages of a dP which is determinable to t and S2 is localized to t. We must omit the enduring person that cannot be determined to t. Enduring Person/Perry: (continuant, e.p.): a C is an e.p. if for a person stage S, isolated to t, C is the aggregate that comprises all and only stages that are Rtr on S. Generally, a dP is a continuant that is determinable at a time. No one is condemned to permanent unidentifiability. Def Lifetime/Perry: enduring person, (continuant). Def Branch/Terminology/Perry: maximum R correlated aggregate of person stages (exactly what I call a dP). Split: here some lifetimes are not branches. The whole is a lifetime (no branch) that can be determined to t0 (before splitting). C1 and C2 are not yet distinguishable, while C can no longer be determined to t1 (after split). PerryVsLewis: Thesis: the RR is not the same as the IR (in this case). Because C is a lifetime and then according to Perry S1 and S2 are IR, but because of the split they are not RR. It follows that for each time t the RtR is the same as the I1R. Lewis: maybe that is enough, then every question about survival or identity arises at a certain time! This means that only RtR and ItR are relevant for t. It is harmless that S1 and S2 are IR because they are neither It0 nor It1R nor ever ItR at any time. Perry thesis: each person stage at a time must belong to exactly one dP determinable at the time. Persons can share stages: E.g. Split: S belongs to three lifetimes: C, C1, C2 but only to two branches: C1 and C2. S1 belongs to two LZ C and C1 but only to one branch: C1. Stages/Perry: are only split if all but one carrier cannot be determined. Therefore, we can count with identity if we only count the people who are identifiable at a time and get the right answer. One person exists before the split, two after. Altogether there are three, but then also the indeterminable ones are counted! But with the split, the first one disappears and two new ones emerge. LewisVsPerry: I admit that counting by identity to t is slightly counterintuitive, but isn't it just as counterintuitive to omit indeterminable persons? "There are"/exist: seeing it timeless there are people but they exist at a time. (i.e. they have states, stages). IV 72 And so they are not identical to the people we count. Isn't it unjustified to exclude them? Perry can say: we have excellent practical reasons. Methusela/Perry/Lewis: Perry does not go into this, but his approach can be applied to it: The whole of Methuselah is both a lifetime and a branch and thus an unproblematic person. Branches/Lewis: (= continuants, permanent persons) the (arbitrarily chosen) segments of 137 years. For Perry, it's the double 274 years. Lifetime: is not identical for the trivial exceptions of the beginning and the end. This means that the first and the last 137 years are both: branch and lifetime, since they cannot diverge. Each stage belongs to exactly one person who can be determined to t and to an infinite number of indeterminable persons! Counting by identity provides the correct answer, because it omits the indeterminable one. RtR and ItR are identical for each time t, but the RR and IR differ for two stages further apart than 137 years. (But not more than 274). Identity/Perry: he says nothing about degrees of personal identity. Lewis: but he could take it over. LewisVsPerry: pro Perry for normal cases, but in pathological cases (splits, etc.) an exact point of reference is missing: This leads to overpopulation again: For example, how many people were involved in a split that occurred a long time ago? I say: two, Perry: three. Or he says: none that can be determined today. IV 151 Heimson Example/LewisVsPerry: as far as his argument goes and I think it works, but it's too complicated without doing anything extra. His solution must be at least as good as mine, because it is part of my solution. Whenever I say that someone attributes property X to themselves, Perry says: the first object is a pair of him and property X. The second object is the function that ascribes the pair Y and X to any subject. The apparent advantage of Perry is that he explains external attribution (e.a.) as well as self attribution (s.a.). Belief de re: Attribution of characteristics to individuals. Perry's schema is made for attribution de re, but de se falls under this as a special case. IV 152 De re: Heimson and the psychiatrist agree to attribute Heimson the quality of being Hume. LewisVsPerry: my solution is simpler: the self-attributions of a subject are the whole of its belief system ((s) >Self-Ascription/Chisholm). External attributions: are no further belief settings apart from the ... Belief/Conviction/LewisVsPutnam: is in the head! ((s) Putnam also speaks only of meanings that are not in the head.) Lewis: but I agree with Perry that belief de re is generally not in the head, because in reality it is not belief at all! They are facts, power of the relations of the subject's belief to things. LewisVsPerry: his scheme represents something else besides belief. For belief it is redundant. If we have a few first objects and a few necessary facts that are not about belief. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Woodfield, A. | Davidson Vs Woodfield, A. | Frank I 672 DavidsonVsPutnam: I doubt his assumption (1) that ordinary propositional attitudes are not in the head. And that the authority could not be applied apply to it because of that. This does not follow from the external individuation. E.g. Sunburn/Davidson: It is just as absurd to say that external cause leads to the fact that meanings are not in the head as to believe that, because sunburn is caused by the sun it is not a condition of my skin. E.g. Suppose it could be that someone else suffered an indistinguishable burning of the skin by some other cause (> "tie identical"/> Sellars). Nevertheless, only one of us has real sunburn, the other doesn’t. This is enough to show that a recognition of externalism does not discredit an identity theory of the mental with the physical. Andrew WoodfieldVs: "No de re state about an object outside the brain can possibly be identical to a state of this brain, since no brain state presupposes the existence of an external object." ((s) You can hallucinate everything). Concept/DavidsonVsWoodfield: individual states and events as such do not require anything conceptually! Some of their descriptions, however, do so very much!" E.g. my grandfather did not presuppose me, but if someone is described as my grandfather. I 673 Then there must be other people apart from my grandfather, including myself. I 674 DavidsonVsPutnam/DavidsonVsWoodfield: Both are wrong to assert that it is "absurd" to think that two physically identical people might differ in their ordinary psychological states. They can. (Twin earth) Twin earth/Putnam: (somewhere): psychological states identical DavidsonVsPutnam: not the identical (anomalous monism). This weakens the threat to first person authority, which then no longer simply arises from the fact that the contents are individuated externally. Donald Davidson (1987): Knowing One's Own Mind, in: Proceedings and Adresses of the American Philosophical Association LX (1987),441-4 58 |
Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning | Stalnaker, R. | I 204 Meaning / Stalnaker: this is uncontroversial: they are not in the head! Neither wide narrow content, no A-intensions, C-intensions, two-dimensional intensions - none of this is in your head. This was first detected by Frege. |
|
| |||