Dictionary of Arguments


Philosophical and Scientific Issues in Dispute
 
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Disputed term/author/ism Author
Entry
Reference
Counterfactuals Frege II 64 f
Counterfactual/Frege: "If iron was lighter than water, it would float on water."
Here, we have the two notions that iron is not lighter, and that something that is lighter floats on water. The subordinate clause again expresses the one notion and a part of the other notion.
>Thought, >Clause,
E.g. "After Schleswig-Holstein was cut off from Denmark, Prussia and Austria quarreled."
Here, the subordinate clause expresses not only one notion, but also part of the other. Therefore, it cannot be replaced generally by another of the same truth value.
>Truth value.
II 64
Cases in which this simply does not work: 1) That the subordinate clause means no truth value because it only expresses part of a thought.
2) That it does mean a truth value, but does not limit itself to it, because its sense still comprises a portion of the other thought and not only one thought.
The first case occurs:
a) In the case of the odd meaning of the words.
b) If a part of the sentence only vaguely suggests, instead of being a proper name.
>Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning,
>Proper names, >Oblique sense, >Oblique meaning.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Indeterminacy Buridan Geach I 149
Indeterminacy/reference/Frege: "to refer to something indeterminate" is often rather: to refer indefinitely to something definite. Geach: in (4), (7), or (9) it is not a definite reference and also not an indication. (?).
In Buridan the "appellatio" is highly obscure to a "ratio", but that is Frege's "odd meaning" too! (GeachVsFrege).

Suppositio confusa/Buridan: respectively the first sentences of the following pairs
Suppositio determinata: respectively the second:

(10) To see, I need an eye
(11) There is an eye that I need to see with it
(12) There was always a living man
(13) There is a man who has always been alive
---
Geach I 150
This can easily be clarified in modern logic with quantifiers.


Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972
Indirect Speech Castaneda Frank I 459ff
Indirect speech/Frege: different senses (intensions) - direct speech: common reference object (extension) - Castaneda with Kant: "I think" is the only real oratio recta - anything else is open to the linguistic design - each "I" that comes afterwards is open to individual design, as well as any other object. >Indirect Speech/Frege, >Proper Speech, >Odd sense, >Odd meaning.

Cast I
H.-N. Castaneda
Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999


Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Mention Wessel I 220
Use/mention/Wessel: the statement "a and b are identical" is not about the terms "a" and "b", but about the objects they designate - that is, the terms "a" and "b" are used and not mentioned - (s) if the terms were mentioned, one would talk about the terms and not about the objects. >Mention/use, >Use, >Levels/order, >Metalanguage, >Object language.
I 286
Use/mention: logical follow-up relationship: A I- B: talks about statements (i.e. not content). >Consequence.
Conditional: A -> B: talking about the content which is talked about in the statements (e.g. current, magnetic field).
((s)Question/(s): mention is = if it is not talked about statements content-related?
Use: = if e.g. the truth is found? - But: "A is true" - does not mean "the current flows".)
I 313
((s) Use/mention/Wessel/(s): E.g. "The Inselsberg is referred to by the term Inselsberg": 1. incident used as a term, and designates the object,
2. the word is not used here as a term, but mentioned as a physical object
Inselsberg: is mentioned - name: is used.
Mention: = quote (quotes).
Instead of quotation marks: t: t A: name of statement A - "the statement A".
I 352
Incident/mention/use/Wessel: 1. Term or statement A occurs as a term or statement in: E.g. ~ A or A and B.
2. merely as a physical thing (darkness, sound) in E.g. "the statement A" (tA), or "the facts that A" (sA) - E.g. from "Ließchen says a" (only graphically A) and A ↔ B does not follow "Ließchen says B" - therefore it always needs to be defined what must be regarded as incident of a term.
(s) A sound cannot be true or false.
ad I 352
((s) Mention/use/density/Wessel/(s): different density of the pages: just plays no role in 2 + 2 = 4.)
I 35
"Odd"/Frege: occurrence as merely graphical part. >Odd sense, >Odd meaning, >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning, >G. Frege.
Extensionality rule: statements can be replaced by identical ones in meaning, but not any graphical parts.
>Extensionality, >Extensions.
Wessel: the extensionality rule is here not applicable. - Because intensional rules are very similar to extensional ones, but sometimes replacing of graphical parts by genuine statements.
I 353
Planets example /Wessel: Quine does not differentiate between graphic and genuine occurrence. Only identity sentences: evening star = morning star, number of planets = 9 and then substitutability for identities. >Substitution, >Substitutability, >Identity, >Morning star/evening star, >Planets example.
WesselVsQuine: See them as compound expressions: then evening star unequal morning star, as simple equal (for Venus).

Wessel I
H. Wessel
Logik Berlin 1999

Thoughts Frege Dummett I 62
Consciousness Content/Frege/Dummett: the content of consciousness are sensations but not meaning. Thoughts: thoughts are the grasping of external things.
Dummett I 19
Thought/Thinking/Frege: thought is not identical with the meaning of the sentence - beings with identical thoughts are possible without linguistic cover.
Frege II 47
Frege: a sentence about a non-existent unicorn is without truth value, predicates cannot be attributed or denied - the thought is the same, whether there is reference ("meaning") or not. Thought: is a sentence without truth value (because "meaning" (reference) is unresolved) - the same thought in an actor without meaning - judgment: is progress from thought to its truth value.
>Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning.
II 71
Truth Value: a truth value cannot be one part of a thought, as little as the sun can, because it is not a sense, but an object (truth value = object). >Truth value, >Object.
II 76
Thought: one part must be unsaturated, as a binding agent, e.g. "falls under". Thought: not all parts of the thought may be complete, at least one should be unsaturated (predicative), otherwise they would not stick together.
Dummett I 32
Frege: grasping the thought: is psychic act. The thought is not the content of consciousness. Consciousness is subjective, the thought is objective - WittgensteinVs.
>">Objectivity.

Frege IV 52
Thought/Frege: there is not a complete thought without a time determination. But then it is timelessly true or false. Expression/assertion/Frege: there is a difference: time determination belongs to the expression whereas truth belongs to assertion and is timeless. Timeless things are not part of the external world.
>Truth, >Timelessness.
---
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 ff
Thought/Frege: a thought is not the sentence meaning (reference), because it is possible common property of many thinkers (content, objective). Sense of the sentence: is the expressed thought (abstract).
Unequal content: sense can be grasped without knowing whether the sentence has a meaning (reference, existing object).
Thought/Frege: a thought is abstract. Contradiction: content, idea.
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 57ff
Odd Meaning/Frege: odd meaning refers to the expressed thoughts - (thought: abstract, unequal content).
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 66ff
Thought/identity criterion for thoughts/Frege/St: sentence A contains the same idea as sentence B, if (i) the assumption that A and B lead to a contradiction - (ii) vice versa - that allows us to conceive thoughts as invariant abstractions - (>partial identity: identity of thoughts) Invariant: is the thought. The thought contained in a sentence is what element A has in common with all the propositions which are logically equivalent to A, and that changes when we move on to a proposition B which is not logically equivalent to A.
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68
Thought/Frege/St: a thought is that element of an assertion that can be true or false, and which is the object of the believing-to-be-true of epistemic subjects. >Propositions.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


Dummett I
M. Dummett
The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988
German Edition:
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

Dummett II
Michael Dummett
"What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii)
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976

Dummett III
M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (a)
Michael Dummett
"Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (b)
Michael Dummett
"Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144
In
Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (c)
Michael Dummett
"What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (d)
Michael Dummett
"Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

Dummett III (e)
Michael Dummett
"Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326
In
Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982

SL I
R. Stuhlmann Laeisz
Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002

Stuhlmann II
R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz
Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995
Truth Values Tugendhat II 233ff
Def Truth value potential/Tugendhat: two names that denote the same object, have the same truth value potential. Solution for the conflict: Frege: subsets, quotes: names of sentences-
Searle: sentences are never names.
Tugendhat then truth value potential quasi transmission of the characteristics of sentences to names.
II 237
Truth Value/sentence/object/Frege: by substitutability it is proved that the truth values of sentences correspond to the object of the names - TugendhatVsFrege: it can be proved only in reverse that the objects of the names correspond to the truth values.
II 243
Odd meaning/Frege: name of a sentence. >Odd Meaning, >Names of sentences.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992



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