Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 3 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appearance | Sellars | I 24 Sellars: thesis: seeming prima facie = to be. I 26 Seeming/Appearance/Tradition: Being is more basal than seeming. Seeming is not a relationship between a person, a thing and a property. Tradition: Sense data should explain seeming.> >Sense data theory. Sellars: this is unnecessary. Experience/Sellars thesis: "is green" and "seems to be green" are identical. Only the first one is affirmed. cf. Ryle: >Success word). Seeming to be green presupposes the concept of being green. Seeming/Sellars: is not a relationship at all. >Appearance, >Perception, >Belief, >Language use, >Predicate, >Property, >Seeing, >Experience, >Stimuli, >Relation. I 30 ff Experience/Experience History/Sellars: not the result of impressions, but of appearances. >Sensory impressions. Phenomena are conceptual (to resettle them in a rational relationship to beliefs). >Phenomena. Appearance: Evidence for the experience differs just as little as the experiences. I 32 Appearance: the concept of green translucence, the ability to recognize that something appears to be green, presupposes the concept of being green. >Concept/Sellars. I 36 Seeming/Appearing/Sense Data/Sellars: there can be no dispositional analysis of physical redness on the basis of the red-seeming. - We must distinguish between qualitative and existential appearance. >Dispositions. --- I 38 Seeming/appearing/being/Sellars: Problem: if it is asserted that physical objects cannot appear red without experiencing something that is red, the question of whether the redness that has this something is this redness that the physical object appears to have. Solution: a) on the basis of empirical generalization b) theory of perception which refers to "direct experience". Brandom I 425 Appearance: Sellars: two uses of "seems" or "looks like": Generic "seems"-statements: E.g. the chicken seems to have a number of spots, but there is no specific number that it seems to have. E.g. there seem to be a lot of crumbs on the table. But it does not seem that 998 crumbs are on the table or 999. --- Rorty VI 147/48 Appearing/seeming/explanation/SellarsVsNagel: the "appearances" that need to be rescued by scientific explanation, in turn, are language-relative. What appears to someone dependends on how one normally speaks. >Thomas Nagel, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Language use, >Word meaning. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Memory | Ryle | I 225 Memory/explanation/Ryle: chronicles do not explain what is recorded in them, memories do not either. No discoveries are made in the memory. >Learning, >Discoveries. Solution/Ryle: disposition and questions of execution. >Dispositions, >Abilities. I 230 1. Understanding: seeing that one could have done it. Sample: a sample is a series of performance. I 373 ff Memory: a) Learned and not forgotten: is a disposition (e.g. language mastery). b) Recall: is an incident or on purpose. Reminder: there is no source of knowledge, no discoveries (everything is already there). Learning material e.g. battles: I can learn, to imagine them better, but not remembering them better. >Imagination, >Knowledge. I 380f Success words: remember, memorize, spell: I cannot spell Edinburgh, as I want - I can remember mistakes, but I cannot remember something wrong. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
| Terminology | Ryle | Geach I 94 Namely rider/Ryle/GeachVsRyle: the namely rider does not help if a sentence does not designate: e.g [The only one who has ever stolen a book of Snead] (namely Robinson) made a lot of money by selling it. We memorize from that: Robinson made a lot of money by selling it. Geach I 255 Assertion/modus ponens/Ryle: "code-style": it is misleading that p does not have to be alleged. E.g. "if p then q, but p, therefore q". Conditional/Ryle: antecedent and consequent are not statements. Statements are neither needed nor mentioned in conditionals. Ryle: here the conditional is not a premise that coordinates with "p", as the "code style" suggests, but rather a "final ticket", a "license for the conclusion": "p", therefore q. Solution/Geach: to take propositions, not allegations. --- Ryle I 58 E.g. semi disopsitional/semi episodicall: "careful", "unswerving", etc. do not have anything extra - they are a manner. I 93ff Voluntary/Ryle: the use of "voluntary" is too extended. Laughter cannot be intentional - "Voluntary" is not "responsible" for punctual schoolwork. I 97 Wrong: to define voluntariness as the child of voluntary acts. But being fully committed in the matter with the mind. I 174 f Success words: healing, proving, recognizing, knowledge, observation, can, win, solve, find - these cannot be performed incorrectly. The tendency to disease is different than habit - preference is unlike investment: (you would leave it if you would get the money like this). I 178 Belief/Ryle: belief is a motivational word. Corresponding predicates are: "stubborn", "naive" and "temporarily". These predicates are not extendable to the object but extendable to certain nouns: like e.g. "confidence", "instinct", "habit", "jealousy", "attachment" and "aversion". Knowledge: is an ability word. I 195 Mix-categorical/Ryle: e.g. act obediently, e.g. bird moves south. I 199ff Power words/task words: difference: travel/arrive - treat/heal - grab/hold - search/find - see/catch sight of - listen/hear - aim/meet - the performance here may be accidental. I 245ff Thoughtless speech/Ryle: is not frankness but that which we are most interested in. It is also not a self-explanation and does not contribute to our knowledge. I 248 One cannot answer "How do you know?". I 297 Mix-categorical: is usually partly general, partly hypothetical: e.g. pedantic appearance: many people look like him - not human + pedantry. --- Flor I 261 Definition mix-categorical/Ryle/Flor: statements about the mental states or acts of a person must be in the form of hypothetical sentences or a mixture of hypothetical and categorical sentences - hypothetical: if-then-categorical: reports on events and states. Flor I 267 Defintion theme-neutral/Flor: statements are theme-neutral in which words such as "anything" or "anyone", "someone", or "something" are used. --- Sellars I 53 Defintion mixed-categorical-hypothetical/mix-categorical/Ryle: mixed-categorical are manifestations of associative connections of the word object- and of the word-word type. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Epistemology | Ryle Vs Epistemology | I 53 RyleVsEpistemology: demands, often wrongly, that dispositions express themselves similarly. Since they have realized that "knowledge" and "belief" are dispositional, they think that consequently there would have to be intellectually uniform processes. E.g. Someone who believes that the earth was round, would have to recognize and judge this repeatedly from time to time. I 174f Success Words/Ryle: absurd, pointless to say: that someone finds a treasure in vain, unsuccessfully wins a race, solves a puzzle wrong, a proves sentence invalidly. For this inability is a logical inability, it says nothing about human abilities, but only that winning unsuccessfully is a contradictory expression. RyleVsEpistemology: we will see later that the longing a guaranteed error-free observation is partly stirred by the fact that we do not recognize that observation is a success verb, so that a "faulty observation" is a contradictory expression like "contradictory evidence" or "unsuccessful healing"(correct would be: unsuccessful treatment), also "inconclusive observation" or futile observation are possible. Difference: whether it is a "search" word, or a "find" word. I 177 Deception/Ryle: we call feigned motives frauds or hypocrites, feigned inclinations are called charlatans and incompetents. Synonymous with the difference of ability and inclination. Knowledge/Belief/Ryle: epistemologists like to engage their readers in the distinction between knowledge and belief. Some say the difference is merely gradual, others that knowledge contains an introspective portion which belief lacks, or vice versa. (RyleVsEpistemology). In part, their confusion is because they consider "knowledge" and "belief" incident names. I 178 But even if they are recognized as a dispositional verbs, you also have to realize that they are dispositional verbs of entirely different kind. "Knowledge" is an ability word. The person can bring something in order or condition. "Belief", on the other hand, is a tendency verb and does not mean that something is ordered or produced. I 395 VsEpistemology/Ryle: epistemologists like to compare theoretical constructions with an act of seeing through, or similar to the teaching of a theory. RyleVs: as if Euclid had been equipped beforehand for what he was equipped for after acquisition of the theory. Conversely, epistemologists describe what Euclid did in teaching his theories as something that would be a revival of the original theory work (but is not). They describe path usage as if it were path construction. I 400 ff (+) Epistemology/Mental Processes/Event/Mental State/RyleVsEpistemology: wrong question, pointless: have you made two or three premises between breakfast and lunch? Have drawn one conclusion during dessert or more? Absurd. How long does a conclusion take? Epistemology/Mental States/Assets/RyleVsEpistemology: a realization is not an episode in the life of an explorer. A special division ability or squaring ability would have been expected of epistemology. It is certainly true, because tautological, that correct expressions have their meaning, but that does not entitle to ask where and when these meanings occur. The mere fact that an expression exists to be understood by anyone, says that the meaning of an expression cannot be marked as if it were an event, or as if it belonged to an event. (...) I 409 Processes end with judgments, they are not made of them. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
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