Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 13 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Actions | Davidson | Glüer II 108 Actions/Davidson: Action depends on description (Example: Mary) - Events are independent of description. >Events/Davidson. E.g. Mary shoots the burglar and kills her father. Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation. Glüer II 109 f Davidson can argue precisely on the basis of the anomalism thesis (cf. >anomalous monism) in favor of a monism 1: monism results from the combination of two other premises of the theory of action: (Causal Interaction) principle of causal interaction. At least some mental events interact causally with physical events. (Undeniable) (Nomological Character) principle of the nomological character of causality: events that are in cause-effect relation fall under strict laws. Brandom I 724 Action/Davidson: is an act if there is a description under which it is intentional - Brandom: there are two kinds of intentional explanation: a) what was intended - b) what was achieved I 726 Success/Problem: Nicole successfully killed the animal in front of her (cow instead of stag) - is description dependent. Brandom I 727 She believed of a cow (de re) that it was a stag - incorrect de dicto: she believed "the cow was a stag" (that the cow). I 728 Reference: she had (without realizing it) the intention, in relation to the cow, to shoot it - it is about the content of the commitment, not about the type of commitment. - as in beliefs. Brandom I 957 Accordion Effect/success/Davidson: Example: even though the powder was wet, she succeeded in bending her finger - so there is success in every action. - Example Mountain Climber. I 958 Solution/Brandom: Reference to VURDs: there needs to be nothing that I intend and in which I succeeded. I 729 Example: I reach for the bread and spill the wine. I 957 Intention: is not wanting that a sentence becomes true (de dicto). Intentions do not correspond to the specifications agreed on, but to the ones recognized - Davidson: muscle contraction does not need to be part of the intention - Brandom: but intentionally I can only contract my muscles in this way by reaching for the bread - the content of the intention can thus be specified as de re - thus success or failure can be established. Glüer II 92 Quine: ontology is only physical objects and classes - action is not an object - DavidsonVsQuine: action event and reference object. Glüer II 96 Action/Event/Adverbial Analysis/Davidson/Glüer: Problem: there are 2 types of adverbs resist: 1) Example "almost" hit: syncategorematic, not removable 2) Example "good", "large", "small" can possibly be omitted. MontagueVsDavidson: Events are superfluous, "modifier theory" - KimVsDavidson: to not identify events with individuated individuals, but with properties - ((s) i.e. inversely) Glüer II 110 Action: is not definable in the language of the propositional attitudes (burglar example) - instead: there must be a primary cause and a proper causation - ((s) Because the example of the differing causal chain superimposes an intention and makes it ineffective - Example Mountain Climbers.) ((s) Something does not yet become action, because it is intentional, proper causation must be added.) >Intentions, >Explanations, >Meaning, >Language. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 D II K. Glüer D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Attributive/referential | Donnellan | I 183 Def Referential/Donnellan: is supposed to enable the listener to single out the person the speaker is talking about. - E.g. "The killer of Schmidt is insane": in any case, the person who rioted in court, even if he is not the killer. - Here, empty descriptions do not fail. - ((s) The description may also be wrong, and still identify the person.) Attributive/Donnellan: "whoever it is": E.g. An absent murderer can be anyone, but definitely the murderer - ((s), the description must be apply). >Descriptions. I 191 Referential/Donnellan: Here it is probable that the speaker believes that the reference is satisfied. An incorrect description would mislead the listeners. Attributive/Donnellan: the same possibility of incorrect description does not exist here: "Whoever it is" cannot be described incorrectly, the speaker believes a disjunction: "him or him or him..." - attributively used descriptions may fail and yet express something true. E.g. "The House of Deputies (correctly House of Representatives) includes representatives of two parties" - No problem, if it is clear what the speaker means, you can correct him. >Meaning (Intending). I 195 Intent/Intention/Meaning/Donnellan: it's not about what someone wanted to say - otherwise you could take any description - nevertheless, the intention decides about referential or attributive use. I 199 Champagne Example/Donnellan: attributively no problem. I ~ 202 Referential/Donnellan: could also be called a weak reference: whatever - real reference: attributive. >Champagne example. I 202 Problem of the Statement/Donnellan: E.g. (Linsky): her husband is kind to her (in the café, but he is not her husband) - referentially true - attributive: if phi, then psi, but there is no phi, then it's not correct to say: he says of him... (de re) - but referential: he said correctly of the so described that he ... ((s) also de re!) - Kripke: precisely not like distinction de re/de dicto - E.g. If the described person is also the president of the college, it is true of the president that he is kind - referential: here the speaker does not even have to agree. Wolf I 18 Name/Description/Donnellan: a) referential use: the reference can succeed, even if the description is not true: E.g. The man in court is not the murderer, but he is correctly determined as the one who behaves wildly. b) attributive use: "whoever it was" applies if we have no specific person in mind. ((s)> role functional role: what ever it is.) >Roles, >Functional role. Chisholm II 109 Donnellan/referential/attributive/Brandl: can the distinction not be explained by the fact that in one instance reference is made by signs and in another instance by speakers? No, then the referential use would only have drawn attention to a problem of pragmatics. Then Russell could have simply expanded his theory pragmatically. Brandl: one can make the distinction referential/attributive even more pronounced if one applies it to precisely those signs with which the speaker makes it clear from the outset that he/she is not referring to a whole range of objects. Newen I 94 Referential/Predicative/Singular Terms/Identification/Name/Strawson: Thesis: Proper names/demonstratives: are largely used referentially - descriptions: have at most predicative, i.e. descriptive, meaning (but can also refer simultaneously) Ad Newen I 94 Referential/(s): selecting an object - attributive/(s): attributing properties. Newen I 95 Attributive/Donnellan/(s): in the absence of the subject matter in question - referential/(s): in the presence of the subject matter in question Newen I 95 DonnellanVsRussell: he has overlooked the referential use. He only considers the attributive use, because... Descriptions/Russell: ...are syncategorematic expressions for him, which themselves cannot refer. >Syncategorematic. Newen I 96 Referential/description/KripkeVsDonnellan: the referential use of descriptions has absolutely nothing to do with the semantics of descriptions. Referential use is possible and communication can succeed with it, but it belongs to pragmatics. Pragmatics: examines what is meant (contextual). It does not examine the context-independent semantics. Solution/Kripke: to make a distinction between speaker reference and semantic reference. >Speaker reference, >Reference. Semantic meaning: is given by Russell's truth conditions: the murderer of Schmidt is insane iff the murderer of Schmidt is insane. >Truth conditions. |
Donnellan I Keith S. Donnellan "Reference and Definite Descriptions", in: Philosophical Review 75 (1966), S. 281-304 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Compositionality | Gärdenfors | I 241 Compositionality/conceptual space/linguistics/Gärdenfors: how can conceptual spaces describe the mechanisms that act during the formation of composite meanings? (For compositionality Szabo 2004). (1) Compositionality/GärdenforsVsFrege: thesis: since the communicative context changes the meaning of the expressions involved, the linguistic expression is under defined in its meaning. Communication/Transformation/Gärdenfors: Thesis: the compilation of meanings often transforms these meanings. --- I 242 Direct composition/Gärdenfors: (non-Fregean): direct compositions are mappings between semantic areas (Holoyak & Thagard, 1996; Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; Gärdenfors, 2000). (2)(3)(4) Combination adjective-noun: e.g. blue rectangle: its meaning is defined as the Cartesian product of the blue region of the color space and the rectangle region of the shape space. A product of compact and convex amounts will in turn be compact and convex. The mapping functions are continuous. The function product is also continuous. N.B.: thus the fixed point properties remain in the composition. (See fixed point/Gärdenfors (I 97): certainty about the common focus on an object. Meaning/GärdenforsVsFrege: the meaning of the compound structure is no longer formed by the meaning of the components but by the areas and functions. These can be located as regions in the product space (e.g., of color and size). It is assumed that the areas involved are separable. But in practice, they are not completely separate: some pre-processing must take place before the areas can be combined. --- I 244 Head/Modification/Gärdenfors: the analysis with head and modifier will usually not work because our knowledge about the respective areas will change the representation of the modifier: e.g. white wine is not white, e.g. a large squirrel is not a big animal. ((s)> syncategorematic expressions in Analytical Philosophy). Solution/Gärdenfors: we need contrast classes. E.g. adjectives such as "large" need contrast classes, which introduce yet another property. Then we can assume compact convex regions of metric spaces for the head and modifier, as well as a radial (continuous) projection between the spaces. (C. Berge, Topological Spaces, Mineola, NY, 1997). (5) Problem: e.g. Lion > Stone Lion: here, not all areas can be equally attributed, e.g. habitat, behavior, etc. --- I 246 Metaphorical composition: even if the head and modifier have no common dimensions, one can create an image between the two by using convexity and compactness. For example, a bumpy road and a bumpy relationship share the geometrical quality of a dimension: a) the length b) the time. --- I 247 Dimension: its diversity is sometimes seen as an obstacle: cf. Lakoff & Johnson (1980).(6) > Metaphors/Gärdenfors. --- I 249 Noun verb combination/Gärdenfors: in my analysis a force pattern can be applied to different situations. E.g. the engine is running - the clock is running. --- I 250 Thesis about noun-verb combinations: the meaning of the verb is modified by the patient, but not by the agent. E.g. (From Keenan, 1984, p.20)(7): a) Oscar cut the lawn. The machine cut the lawn. b) Oscar cut the dress. The sharp stone cut the dress. Gärdenfors: the meaning of "cut" varies greatly between the pairs, but not so strong within the pairs. This shows that the meaning is not modified by the agent. 1. Szabo, Z. (2004). Compositionality. Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compositionality 2. Holyoak, K. J., & Thagard, P. (1996). Mental leaps. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 3. Fauconnier, G., & Turner, R. (1998). Conceptual integration networks. Cognitive Science, 22, 133–187. 4. Gärdenfors, P. (2000). Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Berge, C. (1997). Topological spaces. Mineola, NY: Dover. 6. Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 7. Keenan, E. J. (1984). Semantic correlates of the ergative/absolutive distinction. Linguistics, 22, 197–223. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Designation | Quine | II 61 Naming: is a name or singular term. Designate: a predicate designates. Naming and designating are referring. They do not express meaning. VIII 27 Syncategorematic expressions such as "on" do not designate anything. Likewise, we can assume that words such as "unicorn" do not designate anything; neither something abstract nor something concrete. The same applies to "-ness" or punctuation marks. The mere ability to appear in a sentence does not make a string a name. Nominalism: interprets all words as syncategorematic! Ad XI 173 Note 18: Sentences/QuineVsFrege/Lauener: sentences do not designate! Therefore no names can be formed by them (by quotation marks). XI 173 Substitutional Quantification/Ontology/Quine/Lauener: Substitutional Quantification does not enter into an ontological obligation in so far as the names used do not have to name anything. That is, we are not forced to accept values of the variables. >Substitutional Quantification/Quine. XI 49 QuineVsSubstitutional Quantification: this is precisely what we use to disguise ontology by not getting out of the language. XI 132 Sense/designate/singular term/Quine/Lauener: it does not need a name to make sense. Example: unicorn. There is a difference between sense,meaning and reference. XII 73 Distinguishability/real numbers/Quine: N.B.: any two real numbers are always distinguishable, even if not every real number can be named! ((s) Not enough names). Because it is always x < y or y < x but never x < x. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Ethics | Brentano | Chisholm II 276 Ethics/Brentano/Moore/Koller: Brentano and Moore converge in amazing ways. Ethics/Brentano/Moore: The ultimate goal of right action: "the best thing you can do": II 279 The greatest possible sum of the good which can be attained. VsMoore/VsBrentano: that does not only assume that we already know what the good is, but also that we can recognize the best among the achievable good. So that there is something that is intrinsic and recognizable good. Brentano/Moore: assert for this reason that there is a direct, immediate knowledge of what is good in itself. Immediate evidence. Good/Ethics/Value/Brentano/Moore: the good is what you should desire and should be taken for good. Brentano: what it is worth to love it with a love that is properly characterized for its own sake. II 280 E.g. (Brentano): pleasure, clear insight, knowledge, joy (if it is not joy in the bad), correctness of our judgment and of our emotions, (of our love, hate, and will). Brentano: Principle of summation (of the good: 1. Something good is better than something bad 2. The existence of good is better than its non-existence 3. A greater good is better than a smaller one. II 280 Ethics/Value/Good/Moore: Question: What things in isolation are to be considered for good on their own? This also requires the determination of levels of value. II 281 Method of isolation. This is why pleasure, taken alone, is of no great value for Moore. Only together with the experience of beautiful things it has a valuable force. This leads to the Principle of Organic Units: Many things take on quite different properties, depending on the context. (MooreVsBrentano). ((s) "syncategorematic" values.) MooreVsBrentano: since the inner value is characterized by connecting several simple properties, it can not simply match the sum of its parts. For example, when no one is aware of a beautiful object, it has no value. II 282 Method of Isolation/Moore: that are now applied again to recognize the value of such organic units. Thesis all things that have real value are complex organic entities. E.g. the joys of human intercourse, enjoying beautiful things. E.g. Bad: Enjoying ugly things, cruelty, hating the good, etc. Exception: Pain: is already an evil without any connection to others. Mixed virtues/Moore: as whole things clearly good, but contain something bad: e.g. courage, compassion, (hating the bad) knowledge of bad or ugly things. II 283 Acting/ethics/Brentano/Moore: that is sufficient as a basis to answer the question: what action is right? Of several possibilities for action is only the one right that either produces more or at least not less good things in the world. It is indifferent whether this good is beneficial to the agent himself, or to others. An action is therefore correct, if it has correct consequences. Criterion/Ethics/Moore/Brentano: the purpose of doing as much good as possible in the world is then the criterion for correct action. Judgement: Problem: in regard to this our knowledge is always incomplete. II 284 Moore/Brentano: therefore ethics cannot provide general rules. We have "rules of medium generality". These then apply in the majority of cases. Ethics/values/ontology/intrinsic properties/Moore/Brentano/Koller: ontological question: what are the objects of the intrinsic value concepts, on which things can the concepts of the intrinsic good and bad be applied at all? What is the logical structure of these concepts, can the method of isolation always be applied? II 287 KollerVsBrentano/KollerVsMoore: the questions about the epistemological justification of intrinsic valuations and the question of their suitability for a sustainable foundation of ethics are precisely the questions that make the approach of Brentano and Moore appear doubtful. Chisholm II = Peter Koller Ethik bei Chisholm in Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986 |
Brent I F. Brentano Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (Routledge Classics) London 2014 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
| Infinity | Hegel | Holz I 87 Infinity/scholasticism/Holz: infinity allows a syncategorematic but not a categorematic infinite ((s) that is, that "infinite" can always occur together with the idea of a unity.) >Syncategorematic. The truly infinite is not a modification but the absolute. >Absoluteness, >Absoluteness/Hegel. Holz I 87 Poor infinity/Hegel: poor infinity is the mere progress of addition. Holz: this must be metaphysically founded by the principle of the sufficient ground, according to which the multiplicity is traced back to the unity of the origin. >Foundation, >Sufficient reason, >Metaphysics, >Beginning/Hegel, >Unity and multiplicity. |
Holz I Hans Heinz Holz Leibniz Frankfurt 1992 Holz II Hans Heinz Holz Descartes Frankfurt/M. 1994 |
| Language | Fodor | II 120 Language infinite: ((s) = thesis that there are infinitely many sentences of a natural language): Fodor pro: in any case, artificial production is possible: 1) by a complete grammar, 2) by descriptions, which have a semantic influence on the grammatical forms (e.g. if an adjective is syncategorematic), and 3) by a process that finds out, which of several dictionary entries is true. >Grammar, >Lexicon, >Descriptions. ((s) For the question whether there are infinitely many sentences in a natural language, see the discussion here.) |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Nominalism | Quine | I 404 Learning by stimuli > sense data - VsPhysicalism rather than VsNominalism. I 407f Terms: Terms should be accepted because of usefulness (VsNominalism). I 462f Nominalism: cannot use relations, classes, etc. ("ancestor", "successor", "greater than", "as many" quantification) - but there are stages of renunciation. II 102 VsNominalism: Even if it were possible to reinterpret somehow ingeniously all speech about qualities through paraphrase in speech about similarity to individual things that exemplify these qualities, one universal would still remain: the relationship of similarity. II 221 QuineVsNominalism: tokens are not sufficient for proof theory - (Goodman ditto). VIII 24ff Nominalism/Quine: admits diseases as something that anyone can have, but not as an abstract entity - "Unicorn", "on": are syncategorematic expressions, they do not designate anything. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Predicates | Quine | I 174f Predication: is a combination of a general term with a singular term. General term: also verb, adjective, (also attributive), noun. Singular term before "is" - then general term ("is" = prefix). I 311 Singular term: can always be traced back to the form "=a" (except if variable) - i.e. it is actually a general term. (predicate)! Example "=Mama","=Socrates","=Pegasus". >General Terms/Quine, >Singular Terms/Quine. I 323 Elimination of singular terms: is the fusion of "=" with a piece of text but "=" remains together with variables in a predicative position. "=" is a predicative general term. II 61 ff Naming: Name or singular term - Designate: predicate - both are reference, not meaning. >Reference/Quine. II 158/159 Predicate/Object/Quine: in our world, moment to moment identification is governed by the principle of individuation of predicates. They are neutral to the actual quantification of physical objects, because quantification respects all moment to moment groups, no matter how randomly they are composed. For the predicates, however, they are of importance: since all propositions contain predicates, the identification at the corresponding place is a decisive thing for the truth value. >Truth Value/Quine. Likewise one needs a cross-world identification, which is relative to the predicates used in each case. Also here it will be mostly such for bodies. However, our identification for bodies was based on space displacement, shape change, and chemical change. II 199 Predicate: is a sentence with a gap - general term: is a special type predicate with a gap at a particular end. II 205 Predicate/Tradition: is not always a separated, it is continuous character string (unlike a general term) - the predicate letter F always had to remain connected with an argument. New: term abstracts allow predicates to be combined to general terms. This is the logical operation of predication. >Predication/Quine. VII (f) 115 Predicate/Quine: has no names of classes - classes are their extensions: the things from which the predicate is true. Theory of validity appeals to classes, but not to individual sentences. X 7ff Predicate/Quine: by this I mean only those barbaric expressions that produce statements when completed with variables or individual terms. No attributes. IX 128 Existence/Subject/Predicate/Quine: if the existence is questionable, it is better to use a predicate - ((s) E.g. pedantically is applicable, even if the figure of Beckmesser does not exist.) - Quine: instead of class term sequence for transfinite sequences, being able to have the NO (class of ordinal numbers) as an argument, better predicate Term SEQ - ((s)> lambda calculus). X 50 Predicates/Quine: are not names of properties - so you can call them syncategorematic. Other authors: Vs.See also more autors on predicates. X 102 Predicates/Quine: are not names of properties, but of objects. >Object/Quine. XII 68 Universal Predicates/Quine: they do exist. E.g. self-identity - E.g. "Is different from Hans or sings" - universal words/Carnap: quasi-syntactical predicates: are applicable to everything, without empiricism, only because of the meaning - Quine: is no solution to ontological relativity. - ((s) i.e. the question of what we refer to ultimately). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Prosentential Theory | Brandom | I 436 Definition pro-sententional theory of truth/Camp/Grover/Belnap/Brandom: is the result if you consider "is true" to be a syncategorematic part of pro-sentences. Analogy to pronouns. Savings - has the same semantic content as its anaphoric predecessor - recognizes its predecessor - e.g. "She stopped." Predecessor: Maria stopped. E.g. "for all you can say is true: if the policeman said it, then it is true". Cf. >Anaphora, >Truth theory. Four Conditions for pro-sentences (analog to pronouns): 1) They must occupy all the grammatical positions (embedded and freestanding) 2) They are generic: every clause of statement may be the predecessor of a pro-sentence, e.g. He is standing, he is his F. 3) They can be used quantificatorily 4) The class of the admissible substituent determines the significance of the pro-sentence - the anaphora is a relation between Tokenings. "This is true" is a response to a Tokening of "I am hungry". - E.g. "everything he said is true" is not accessible for simpler redundancy and quote redemption approaches. I 438 Per: it can explain complicated sentences: E.g. "Something that Hans said is either true, or it was said by Fritz". Cf. >Everything he said... I 441 Prosentential Theory/Brandom: "refers to" is a pro-sentence forming operator. - E.g. "The one Kissinger referred to as "almost third-rated mind" understood as a pronoun whose anaphoric predecessor is a particular quote by Kissinger - nominalization of sentences - ((s) Instead of describing a sentence: the name of a sentence). >Quote/Quotation. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Second Intention | Quine | Berka I 39 Second Intention/Quine (Quine I 96): stimuli that are about stimuli - words that deal with words - all quotes are second intentions. >Intentions, >Stimuli. --- Geach I 297 A logical rule may only contain syncategorematic words and terms of second intention. Second intentions: this is about inconsistencies between propositions (sentences) - Peirce: special symbols of second intentions: true and false. --- I 45 Expression of second intentions: e.g. "extra" (= "no") - for transforming expressions of Boolean Algebra. --- I 47 Second intentions: collective terms - E.g. identity - notation: "1st intention j": i and j are the same thing. >Identity. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Terminology | Husserl | Chisholm II 153 Noema/Husserl: the act itself constitutes the object. We separate files and transcendental objects. II 154 ChisholmVsHusserl: the noema explains nothing. --- Husserl I 19/57 Husserl: research strategy: scheme part-whole. General thesis: the existence of the world is not questioned, only our statements about it. The scheme true/false cannot be recognized by mere observation. I 37 Real/Husserl: the real is not intentional, but also: the color quality experiences an "objectifying view" and the "perception complexion" is also real. Meaning/Husserl: meaning is constituted by what is meant by a sign, the speaker gives the sound a sense. We refer to an object by meaning. Meaning/Husserl: meaning is the power of consciousness. Phenomenological pre-understanding: all objects exist only as intentional units. I 39 Noema(thought)/Husserl: noema has a a) a relational sense: as intension and b) a subject core as a carrier. Noesis: is performance or the nature of the conception sense (Greek: noesis = perception). I 53 "Principle of all principles"/Husserl: "the principle of all principles" is the requirement that only one "originally given view" may be the reason of knowledge, e.g. mathematical axioms. Husserl excludes here any reference to empirical statements and creates the relation of consciousness to itself as a suitable method, a "way of givennes to oneself". I 58 Bracketing (era): prior knowledge is enclosed in parentheses. I 42 f Def Noesis: is a performance or the nature of the conception sense (Greek: the perception, comprehension). I 43 Def Noema: Greek: noema means the idea. There are two aspects of the intentional object: a) noematic meaning (content): it is the "how" of the determinations. And b) it is a coherent sense unit in the abundance of various provisions. I 44 b) Noematic object (objectively) "core": is the linking point and support of various predicates. That, with what an identical "something" is being held. I 65 ff A horizon of possibilities is given by any act of consciousness. I 67 Interior Horizon/Husserl: the interior horizon is the anticipation of the dimension of meaning. Outside horizon: means that perception is not limited to one object, but to the entire space of possible objects. I 68 Appresentation: is co-meaning. I 69 Apperception: rethinks contents of sensation into attributes of objectivity. Truth/Husserl: truth is tied to the process of closer definition. Eidetic variation/Husserl: the eidetic variation is activated by contingencies. Constitution/Husserl: constitution is a performance of consciousness when an object is given to us to look at. I 45 Thought/Husserl: if one understands thinking as a process, you can see that predicates can convert. I 72 Def Kinesthesia/Husserl: kinesthesia is the conscious moving during perception i.e. >body awareness. The body is turned into the organ of perception. The sensations can no longer be regarded as single, completed, last units, depending on the way of thinking. They are in a sequence. I 85 Transcendental Ego/Husserl: the transcendental ego has a primordial sphere: initially there are only own things in the private sphere. We assume others to be a transcendental ego as we are. (> Empathy). Intersubjectivity/Husserl: intersubjective are a) objects, b) social. Objectivity/Husserl: objectivity arises through a variety of perspectives. Environment/Husserl: environment is a) set by the intentional consciousness and b) set by a communicating association of people. The communicative environment is previous to any selfish. I 89 Def primordiality/Husserl: this includes all experiences of experience, including the introductory experiences of consciousness that are fundamental to the foreign experience. The consequence of this would be that experiences of consciousness can be experienced by the other in their original condition. Such a conception would encompass different modes of consciousness as original: both objective and personal. --- Tugendhat I 167 "Syncategorematic"/Husserl: sycategorematic expressions are not representing an object. Tugendhat I 177 Husserl: main term "species": "species" comes from the Greek "eidos", which means "sight" or "appearance" (common feature in Kant, term). |
E. Husserl I Peter Prechtl, Husserl zur Einführung, Hamburg 1991 II "Husserl" in: Eva Picardi et al., Interpretationen - Hauptwerke der Philosophie: 20. Jahrhundert, Stuttgart 1992 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Vocabulary | Quine | VII (b) 24 Definition/Quine: can serve opposite purposes: abbreviation - or more economical vocabulary. (Then longer chains). >Definition. --- X 49 Vocabulary/Quine: is divided into two types: lexicon and particles. - Logical particles/Quine: E.g. tilde (produces negation) (point (creates conjunction), hyphon (generates more variables), existential quantifier E, parenthesis - in the lexicon: expressions that are divided into categories (categorematic). - particles: syncategorematic: not in categories, not independent. >Lexicon, >Logical particles. --- XII 79f Substitutional quantification/sQ/Quine: Here are the variable placeholders for words of any syntactic categories (except names). - Important argument: then there is no possibility to separate names from the rest of the vocabulary and real referential variables. >Substitutional quantification. XII 80 To be distinguished from others (indistinguishability). |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| |||
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Frege, G. | Russell Vs Frege, G. | Dummett I 59 RussellVs distinction sense / reference (meaning / reference) (RussellVsFrege) --- Stepanians I 44 Proof/Frege/Stepanians: Frege requests with the demand for completeness and rigor much stronger requirements for evidence than his mathematical contemporaries. Mathematics/VsFrege: mathematicians were more interested in truth than in the epistemological status. Intuitively plausible transitions were sufficient. --- Stepanians I 87 Explicit definition/Frege/Stepanians: must satisfy two conditions 1. Frege's adequacy criterion: Hume's principle must follow from it. The justification for this principle is that the basic laws of arithmetic have to be provable on the principle's basis. 2. the explicit definition must master the problem with recourse to concept scope, where the context definition fails: it must solve the Caesar-problem (see above). --- I 88 VsFrege: his explicit definition of the number concept does not solve the Caesar problem, but shifts it only to concept scope. Solution: would it only be if the concept scope excluded from the outset that Caesar is such a one. Solution/Frege: requires here simply that the knowledge of the concept scope excludes this. Value-over-time/terminology: = concept scope. I 88 Concept scope/Frege/StepaniansVsFrege/VsFrege/Stepanians: Frege's own view of concept scopes will prove to be contradictory (see Russell's paradox). I 91 Concept scope/Frege/Stepanians: was a newly introduced logical object by Frege for solving the Caesar-problem. They were not present yet in the concept script. Frege must justify them. Additional axiom: "Basic Law V": The scope of F = is the scope of G bik All Fs are G and vice versa. Russell's paradox/antinomy/RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: Basic Law V allows the transition from a general statement via terms to a statement about objects that fall under F - the scope of F. It is assumed that each term has a scope, even if it might be empty. I 92 RussellVsFrege/Stepanians: shows that not all definable terms in Frege's theory have a scope: Concept scope/Frege/RussellVsFrege: since concept scopes are objects the question has to be allowed whether a concept scope falls under the concept whose extent/scope it is. If so, it includes itself, otherwise not. Example: the scope of the term cat is itself not a cat. On the other hand: Example: the scope of the term non-cat contains very well itself, since it is not a cat. Contradiction: a concept scope which includes all concept scopes that do not contain themselves. If it contained itself, it should not to contain itself by definition, if it did not contain itself, it must include itself by definition. I 96 Object/concept/Frege/Stepanians: we discover (in a purely logical way) objects on concepts as their scopes. I 97 VsFrege/VsConcept scope/Stepanians: the idea of the concept scope is based on a linguistic deception (See Chapter 6 § 2). That was Frege's own diagnosis. I 114 Sentence/declarative sentence/statement/designating/VsFrege/Stepanians: one has often accused Frege that a declarative sentence does not want to denote anything but wants to claim (a truth value as an object) something. FregeVsVs/Stepanians: sentences as names for truth values are actually about subsets, whereas these subsets make a contribution to the truth value of the sentence structure (complete sentence). Sentence/assertion/declarative sentence/Frege: (later, function and concept, 22, footnote): the total sentence means F nothing. Basic Laws/terminology/Frege: (later): in the basic laws he differentiates terminologically and graphically between sentential "truth value names" that contribute towards the determination of the truth value and "concept type sets" that mean F nothing, but claim something. --- Horwich I 57 RussellVsFrege/Cartwright: Russell's analysis differs from Frege, by not using unsaturation. (1) 1. R. Cartwright, „A Neglected Theory of Truth“ , Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 in: Paul Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth, Aldershot 1994 --- Newen I 61 Meaning determination/meaning/Russell/Newen: Two modes are possible: a) syncategorematic: according to the occurrence in a sentence. b) categorematic; independent from the occurrence in a sentence. Relational principle of meaning: applies to categorematic expressions: the meaning is the object (or the property). They are defined by acquaintance. --- I 62 RussellVsFrege: Thesis: simple expressions mean what they signify. Syncategorematic/meaning/Russell. E.g. "and", "or": indicating their meaning means indicating the meaning of sentences in which they occur. ((s)> Context, contextually). Contextually/Russell/Newen: syncategorematic expressions: their meaning is indicated by their meaning in schemes (sentence scheme). --- Quine II 103 Russell: classes, if there are any, must exist, properties at best must be in place (weaker). Quine: I think this is arbitrary. In Russell's analysis of the concept of meaning, its relative indifference reappears opposite the existence-term (subsistence): Frege: threefold distinction a) expression, b) what it means, c) that to what it (if at all) refers to. This is not natural for Russell. RussellVsFrege: ~ the whole distinction between mean and designate is wrong. The relationship between "C" and C remains completely mysterious, and where should we find the designating complex that supposedly refers to C? QuineVsRussell: Russell's position seems sometimes to come from a confusion of terms with their meanings, sometimes from a confusion of the expression with its mention. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Step I Markus Stepanians Gottlob Frege zur Einführung Hamburg 2001 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Milne, E.A. | Kanitscheider Vs Milne, E.A. | I 345 Space/Space-Time/Geometry/Universe/Metric/Milne: this has the surprising result that Milne's space-time metric has the same shape as the line element of Robertson/Walker, if the function R(t) = ct and the curvature k = 1 is selected. However, the mathematical terms here have a different >meaning (meaning change) They determine the equivalent observers and not the time-dependent spatial structure. The properties of the three-dimensional equivalence are very different, depending on whether they are viewed from scale t or τ . The most important difference is that space and time in t measure are not common for all egos. There is no "public space"! But all "private" spaces have an Euclidean structure. In the τ measure space and time apply to all, but the space itself is hyperbolic. The preference of the t space forces Milne to indicate how the velocity distribution of the egos, which he then identifies with the nuclei of the galaxies, looks like if there are no preferred reference systems (cosmological principle). (I 346 +). Substrate/Milne: one demands that the velocities, which are dropped in the component intervals (u,u +du), v,(v + dv), (w, w + dw) shall be assessed equally by all observers. Universe/Milne: with increasing distance the escape velocity increases and the density goes towards infinity near the point r = ct. The edge, which flees from the observer at the speed of light, creates the impression of a horizon. It itself is not occupied by galaxies, the particles (observer = galaxy) thus represent an "open" set, whose boundary prevents the human from looking into the "outer" space. The world has no windows. The weakening of the light of very distant objects acts like a curtain. The limiting spherical shell can be seen as a counterpart to the initial singularity in a certain way, because here and there the particles lie arbitrarily dense and both are inaccessible. According to the Lorentz transformation, moving clocks go slower and so every observer, although the clocks are congruent, has the impression that all spatially distant events belong to an earlier epoch. I 348 Every fundamental observer therefore considers himself to be the "oldest inhabitant" of the universe, because his own clock will indicate a later point in time for an event that takes place at his own place than any clock of another fundamental observer. All distant galaxies will therefore appear younger to us, both because the clocks of these distant objects follow, and because of the time it takes for light to reach us. If t is the age of the universe, then the most distant galaxies today can have reached ct. But what we see of them, however, is at most ½ c t away. ("radar method"). The term "age of the universe" in Milne only makes sense for members of the substrate, i.e. for certain fundamental observers. Looked on from the outside, the term is meaningless. The world is just "appearance", in no sense is it "in itself". I 348 VsMilne: Hardly anyone has violated the rules of empirical knowledge acquisition as much as he has. KanitscheiderVsMilne: The main criticism must start with the use of the subjective time lapse as the foundation of physical time without establishing a basis for the additive properties of time intervals. Only because he restricts himself to a comparative conceptual form ("sooner/later") of time, he can claim that his classification of clocks does not require any convention. He uses a relational, but a subjective time and no relatively objective, physical time. KanitscheiderVsMilne: also his method is derived because it includes the constancy of the speed of light. I 351 In other theories, the reference to natural clocks (earth rotation) or the laws of mechanics (law of inertia) are applied. God/Milne: from the dependence between the dynamic time scale and the atomic scale t one can see that the world could not have existed before the time t = 0 and therefore must have been created. GrünbaumVsMilne: the value of τ = minus infinite cannot be assigned real meaning in the same way as a finite value. It is only a "syncategorematic sign", like the transfinite cardinal number Aleph 0 and therefore the singularity of the time scale does not exclude the existence of matter for t < 0. Nor can one deduce any divine intervention from it. I 353 Substrate/KanitscheiderVsMilne: Question: in which way the substrate in Milne, which provides local rest systems everywhere in the form of continuously distributed fundamental observers, can be identified with the real galaxies. I 354 Due to the discrete set of galaxies, only a part of the fundamental observers (observation points) can be materialized. Contradiction to its strict homogeneity requirement. |
Kanitsch I B. Kanitscheider Kosmologie Stuttgart 1991 Kanitsch II B. Kanitscheider Im Innern der Natur Darmstadt 1996 |
| Moore, G.E. | Danto Vs Moore, G.E. | I 92 Argument of the open question/Intuitionism/Morality/G.E. Moore: should "causes joy" be all that what "good" really means? No, then it would say: does "causes joy cause joy"? And the answer would be absolutely meaningless. Known as the "open question argument". Moore used it to show that "good" is indefinable. Good/Definability/Moore: "Red" is a quality or property of things themselves, simple as yellow. Based on our "intuition" we can say if something is good, just as we can say that something is yellow. We do not argue, even indirectly, that something is good or bad, we just see that it is! I 108 DantoVsMoore: VsArgument of the open question: becomes blunt when we assume complete expressions - example "good husband". I 95 DantoVsMoore: Can we even imagine that two things can be exactly the same, with the only difference that one is good and the other is not? I 112 Would goodness be some kind of scent? Could the good be absent without the bad being present? This shows that something must be wrong, an idea that the good is simple and therefore indefinable. The two things have to be different somehow. DantoVsMoore: his argument of the open question becomes blunt if we assume complete (syncategorematic?) expressions like "good husband" instead of the fragment "good" alone. I 108 DantoVsMoore: he approaches moral questions too cognitively: the question which things are good in his view depends too much on whether they are recognized as such. I 119 Moore: seems to have had the feeling to have found a point in the basic inventory of the world itself. That the term "good" belongs to the atoms of reality itself and that the understanding, the knowledge and the world have the same architecture. DantoVsMoore: but if this turns out to be an illusion, whole contingents of philosophy sink. This gives the term "definition" an even greater weight, because definitions integrate the basic concepts into larger contexts. They must not be vulnerable. |
Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 |
| Tradition | Quine Vs Tradition | IV 403 Logical particles: are treated by Quine as syncategorematic expressions! (Derives from Russell: e.g. Socrates "is a man"). Logical particles: prepositions, conjunctions, copula, etc.: Locke: links between ideas or propositions. Tradition: the generated concrete terms. QuineVsTradition: actually to be treated as syncategorematic expressions. Superficially they resemble designating expressions. V 58 Idea/Notion/Berkeley/Hume/Quine: the two were not guileless and even drew the line at the abstract idea of a triangle, accepting only ideas of certain triangles. QuineVsTradition: vain questions about the causal connection of ideas. VII (a) 11 Universals/Predicate/Attribute/Meaning/Tradition/"McX"/Quine: one possibility was excluded beforehand: McX cannot argue that such predicates as "red" or "is red" (which we all use) should be considered names of individual universals to be at all meaningful (of "universal entities"). Names/Quine: we have seen that being a name is a much more specific property than having a meaning. McX cannot pin us down to that with the predicate "pegasated" we have introduced the attribute of "pegasating". Difference predicate (concept)/attribute (universal). McXVsQuine: different strategy: let us concede: 1) distinction between mention and use (naming and meaning) 2) that "is red" and "pegasated" are not names of attributes. Nevertheless, they are to have meaning. But these meanings, whether they are mentioned (named) or not, are nevertheless universals! And some of them I call attributes, or something with ultimately the same purpose. QuineVsVs: here one could only resist by refusing to ever concede meaning. But I do not want that, because I do not want to reject the meaning of words and sentences at the same time. QuineVsMcX: we both agree to divide linguistic forms into meaningful and meaningless ones, but he constructs "meaningful" as "having an "abstract entity" like "a meaning", and I do not. Meanings are not entities. Better: a linguistic expression is meaningful or significant (designating). Meaning/Quine: generally, there is talk about two problems with it: 1) "Having" of meaning 2) synonymity or "meaning equality". VII (a) 12 Quine: we can best handle this with the study of behavior. But we need not speak of an entity called meaning. Tradition/McX: wonders at this point: is there nothing that commits us to universals then if we do not wish to welcome them? Quine: No, (see above) we have our bound variables instead. Example We can definitely say that this (bound variable) is something that red houses and sunsets have in common. Example or that there is "something" which is a prime number greater than a million. Ontology: but that (bound variable) is the only way to impose our ontological commitments. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| |||
The author or concept searched is found in the following 2 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Description | Russell, B. | Newen / Schrenk I 96 descriptions / Russell are syncategorematic for him - expressions that can not refer. |
|
| referential /attrib. | Russell, B. | Newen / Schrenk I 96 DonnellanVsRussell: he has clearly overlooked the referential use. He considers only the attributive. This is because Descriptions / Russell: Thesis: d. are syncategorematic for him. Expressions that can not refer themselves. |
|
| |||