Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 127 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Acquaintance | Peacocke | I 180ff Acquaintance/Russell: via sense-data, resulting in complexes (aRb), immediate memory, universals. Objects are found as a component in thought. >Objects of thought, >Complexes, >Relation, >Picture theory, >Sense data, >Universals, >Memory. PeacockeVsRussell: we reinterpret that: the object specifies the type of the way of givennes. Objects appear intensionally in thought, not extensionally. >Objects (material things), >Thoughts, >Content, >Intensions, >Extensions, >Way of givenness. We think of objects as a characteristics of a type of a way of givenness in causal antecedents and consequences of thoughts. >Type/Token, >Causality, >Perception, >World/thinking. A descriptive explanation of action or a possible world requires no acquaintance. ((s) E.g. the winner has won the prize.) >Possible worlds, >Truth, >Logical knoledge. Demonstrative: requires acquaintance: ((s) The winner has a beard.) Aquaintance/Peacocke: Aquaintance is something quite different from identification between worlds. >Cross world identity, >Identification, >Individuation. |
Peacocke I Chr. R. Peacocke Sense and Content Oxford 1983 Peacocke II Christopher Peacocke "Truth Definitions and Actual Languges" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 |
| Actions | McGinn | I 147/48 The generation of decisions is very different from the generation of movement. Because decisions are made neither from antecedent desires nor other settings, nor of brain states. >Decision, >Act of will, >Brain state, >Will, >Weak will, >Motives. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Aggression | Psychological Theories | Slater I 178 Aggression/imitation/psychological theories: the idea that children learn through imitation is taken for granted and regarded as obvious today. [Anyway] this was by no means the case when the Bobo doll study was published in Bandura (1961)(1). >Bobo doll study/Bandura, >Aggression/Bandura. Notably, even today, several domains have generated fierce debate about whether children learn aggressive behavior through imitative processes. For example, in the case of children viewing violent television programs or playing violent video games, the entertainment industry has tried to argue that there is no evidence that exposure to violent media causes increases in children’s aggressive behavior (see Bushman & Anderson, 2001)(2). Slater I 179 While Bandura et al. did not yet have an adequate theory to describe the mechanisms underlying imitative learning, Anderson and Bushman (2001)(2) developed a General Aggression Model describes how individuals’ cognition, affect, and arousal are altered through repeated exposure to violent media, thereby contributing to aggressive behavior. According to the model, each exposure to violent media teaches individuals ways to aggress, influences beliefs and attitudes about aggression, primes aggressive perceptions and expectations, desensitizes individuals to aggression, and leads to higher levels of physiological arousal. These mediating variables then lead to more aggressive behavior. Although more aggressive children tend to seek out violent media, there is also convincing empirical evidence that even controlling for initial levels of aggression, exposure to violent media contributes to increases in aggressive behavior (Huesmann, Eron, Berkowitz, & Chafee, 1991)(3). >Aggression/Developmental psychology, >Aggression/Moffitt. Slater I 184 Some critics have questioned whether the Bobo doll study constitutes evidence regarding children’s imitation of aggression or merely behaviors the children regarded as play. This argument hinges on how aggression is defined. Contemporary researchers generally define aggression as an act perpetrated by one individual that is intended to cause physical, psychological, or social harm to another (Anderson & Bushman, 2002)(4). It is plausible that the intention to harm was missing from children’s imitative behaviors toward the Bobo doll, even if by their nature (e.g., kicking, hitting), they seem aggressive. Slater I 185 Forms of aggression: Some (…) advances in understanding aggression since the time of the Bobo doll studies have been in understanding different forms of aggression. Bandura et al. distinguished between physical and verbal aggression. Researchers today still make that distinction but have also added a distinction between direct aggression and indirect aggression (sometimes called social or relational aggression). Relational aggression: has been defined as harming others through purposeful manipulation and damage of their social relationships (Crick & Grotpeter, 1995)(5). Relational aggression can take many forms, such as spreading rumors about someone, saying mean things behind someone’s back, and excluding someone from a peer group. For differences between the sexes see >Aggression/Gender Studies. Forms of aggression: Researchers today also distinguish between proactive aggression and reactive aggression (Dodge & Coie, 1987)(6). Proactive aggression: is described as being unprovoked and goal-directed (Crick & Dodge, 1996)(7), and is predicted by having aggressive role models (Bandura, 1983)(8), friendships with other proactively aggressive children (Poulin & Boivin, 2000)(9), and physiological under arousal (Scarpa & Raine, 1997)(10). Reactive aggression: is described as being an angry retaliatory response to perceived provocation (Dodge & Coie, 1987)(6). Precursors of reactive aggression include a developmental history of physical abuse (Dodge, Lochman, Harnish, Bates, & Pettit, 1997)(11), peer rejection (Dodge et al., 1997)(11), more reactive temperament (Vitaro, Brendgen, & Tremblay, 2002)(12), and physiologic overarousal (Scarpa & Raine, 1997)(9). Proactive aggression is associated with evaluating aggression positively (Smithmyer et al., 2000)(13) and holding instrumental (e.g., obtaining a toy) rather than relational (e.g., becoming friends) goals in social interactions (Crick & Dodge, 1996)(7), whereas reactive aggression is associated with making inappropriate hostile attributions in the face of ambiguous or benign social stimuli (Dodge & Coie, 1987)(6). 1. Bandura, A., Ross, D., & Ross, S. A. (1961). Transmission of aggression through imitation of aggressive models. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63, 575—582. 2. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2001). Effects of violent video games on aggressive behavior, aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, physiological arousal, and prosocial behavior: A meta-analytic review of the scientific literature. Psychological Science, 12, 353—359. 3. Huesmann, L. R., Eron, L. D., Berkowitz, L., & Chafee, S. (1991). The effects of television violence on aggression: A reply to a skeptic. In P. Suedfeld & P. Tetlock (Eds), Psychology and social policy (pp. 19 2—200). New York: Hemisphere. 4. Anderson, C. A., & Bushman, B. J. (2002). Human aggression. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 27— 51. 5. Crick, N. R., & Grotpeter, J. K. (1995). Relational aggression, gender, and social-psychological adjustment. Child Development, 66, 710—722. 6. Dodge, K. A., & Coie, J. D. (1987). Social information processing factors in reactive and proactive aggression in children’s peer groups .Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 1146—1158. 7. Crick, N. R., & Dodge, K. A. (1996). Social information-processing mechanisms in reactive and proactive aggression. Chi id Development, 67, 993—1002. 8. Bandura, A. (1983). Psychological mechanisms of aggression. In R. Geen & E. Donnerstein(Eds), Aggression: Theoretical and empirical reviews, Vol. 1. Theoretical and methodological issues (pp. 1—40). New York: Academic Press. 9. Poulin, F., & Boivin, M. (2000). The role of proactive and reactive aggression in the formation and development of boys’ friendships. Developmental Psychology, 36, 233—240. 10. Scarpa, A., & Raine, A. (1997). Psychophysiology of anger and violent behavior. Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 20, 3 75—394. 11. Dodge, K. A., Lochman, J. E., Harnish, J. D., Bates, J. E., & Pettit, G. S. (1997). Reactive and proactive aggression in school children and psychiatrically impaired chronically assaultive youth. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106,37—51. 12. Vitaro, F., Brendgen, M., & Tremblay, R. E. (2002). Reactively and proactively aggressive children: Antecedent and subsequent characteristics. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 43,495—505. 13. Smithmyer, C. M., Hubbard, J. A., & Simons, R. F. (2000). Proactive and reactive aggression in delinquent adolescents: Relations to aggression outcome expectancies. Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 29, 86—93. Jenifer E. Lansford, “Aggression. Beyond Bandura’s Bobo Doll Studies“, in: Alan M. Slater and Paul C. Quinn (eds.) 2012. Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies. London: Sage Publications |
Slater I Alan M. Slater Paul C. Quinn Developmental Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2012 |
| Analogies | Cartwright | I 94 Analogy/Duhem/Cartwright: It is a raw fact that some things sometimes behave like certain other things - that gives us indications. Explanation/Duhem: provides a scheme for these indications. Unification: is fictitious - it is intended to simplify the theory. E.g. Maxwell treated light and electricity as the same. I 111 Analogy/RussellVsAnalogy: the principle "same cause, same effect" is futile - if the antecedent (the circumstances represents) is accurate enough, the same case will never happen again -> per >fundamental laws. >Effects, >Causes, >Causality, >Description levels, cf. >Singular Terms. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Arrow’s Theorem | D’Agostino | Gaus I 242 Arrow’s Theorem/pluralism/diversity/D’Agostino: Consider a collection of individuals, each of whom has well-behaved preferences (or judgements) over a domain of alternative social arrangements. The problem of collective choice is to specify a procedure, meeting (at least) minimal conditions of fairness, that will deliver a rating of these alternative arrangements, based on individuals' assessments, that is sufficiently determinate to warrant the selection of one of them as the collectively binding arrangement for this group. Arrow: What Arrow shows, and what much subsequent tinkering has confirmed, is that there is no formal procedure of amalgamation that can be relied on for this purpose (see Arrow, 1979(1); and, for helpful commentary, see Mueller, 1989(2), and Sen, 1970(3)). In so far as a procedure fairly recognizes the antecedent assessments of the various individuals, it will, on certain profiles of assessments, fail to achieve determinacy, and, hence, will fail to identify a collectively binding social arrangement. D’Agostino: I tried elsewhere (D' Agostino, 1996)(4) to show that this result provides a model for theorizing about ideals, such as 'public reason', that are, at least nowadays, directly associated with liberalism per se (see also Gaus, 1996(5); and D' Agostino and Gaus, 1998(6)). Democracy/diversity/procedures/Arrow/D’Agostino: the point of Arrow's Theorem is not that formal procedures never work, but rather that they don't always work. And this point is ethico-politically significant for two reasons. 2) When we apply a procedure in concrete circumstances, we typically will not be able to tell, antecedently, whether or not it will work in these circumstances. 2) Even if we can determine that it will not work in these circumstances, we have, according to Arrow's Theorem, no alternative procedure (of the same type) to use instead, except, of course, another that also will not work. Example: e.g., Three Individuals (A, B, C) Gaus I 243 and three possible social arrangements (S1 , S2, S3), and (...) individuals' assessments of these arrangements. Given [a specific problematic] 'profile' of preferences (or deliberative judgements) [chosen for the sake of the argument], no merely 'mechanical' procedure of combination will produce a non-arbitrary (and hence legitimately collectively binding) ranking of the alternative social arrangements: Table I of preferences S1: A 1st – B 3rd – C 2nd S2: A 2nd – B 1st – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 1st Procedures: S1/S2 then S3: Winner: S3 S1/S3 then S2: Winner: S2 S2/S3 then S1: Winner S1 Problem/D’Agostino: (...) it is clear that, on this profile of preferences, a collectively binding choice can be determined mechanically only on an ethico-politically arbitrary basis - e.g. by fixing the order in which alternatives are compared. (The alternative to such arbitrariness is simple indeterminacy: none of the options can be identified as the collectively binding best for the group.) Cf. >Chaos Theorem/Social Choice Theory. Elections/democracy/solutions: (...) once such diversity among individuals' assessments is 'managed', exactly the indeterminacy of such formal procedures as voting (and other modes of amalgamation) disappears. Suppose, for instance, that through some programme of socialization and education, individuals' assessments are sufficiently 'homogenized' that one of the alternative social arrangements that individuals are assessing is 'dominant' in the sense that it is best from all relevant points of view. In this case, we might have the configuration in Table II of preferences. Table II of preferences S1: A 1st – B 1st – C 1st S2: A 2nd – B 3rd – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 2nd Given this configuration, there would be no difficulty with collective choice, either statically or dynamically. There is a unique collectively best option whose identification as such is not dependent on arbitrary factors and whose selection as such cannot be destabilized (so long as individuals' assessments themselves remain constant). Value monism/pluralism//D‘Agostino: Of course, Arrow's Theorem, and its extensions, can be read as an argument for monism. Arrow courts chaos in providing, as pluralists would insist, for the recognition of diversity. (For D’Agostino’s solution see >Diversity/Liberalism.) 1. Arrow, Kenneth (1979) 'Values and collective decision making'. In Frank Hahn and Martin Hollis, eds, Philosophy and Economic Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Mueller, Dennis (1989) Public Choice 11. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 3. Sen, Amartya (1970) Collective Choice and Social Welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day. 4. D'Agostino, Fred (1996) Free Public Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 6. D' Agostino, Fred and Gerald Gaus, eds (1998) Public Reason. Aldershot: Dartmouth. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Arrow’s Theorem | Weale | Gaus I 243 Arrow’s theorem/Weale/D’Agostino: I [Fred D’Agostino] said that Arrow's Theorem might be considered a parable; that it might suggest something, vividly, for liberalism about the implications of diversity (and hence pluralism). ((s) For a presentation of the problems in relation to Arrow’s theorem see >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino). What, to this effect, does it actually show? Weale: Albert Weale (1992)(1) provides a helpful analysis whose upshot also applies to specifically liberal modalities of collective deliberation. He notes, in particular, that the conditions which Arrow imposes on formalistic procedures for collective choice should be understood as involving two distinct requirements - 'of coherence and Gaus I 244 representativeness', which, as he says, 'come into conflict'. He continues: 'Coherence requires decision-makers to know their own mind all things considered, but representativeness pushes towards the inclusion of considerations that may make knowing one's own mind impossible' (1992(1): 213). a) Representativeness, in other words, requires, of any approach to collective decision-making, that it make adequate provision for reasonable antecedent diversity of preferences or judgements. b) Coherence, on the other hand, requires of such an approach that it make adequate provision for the identification of collectively binding social arrangements. Arrow/Weale: What Arrow's Theorem itself shows is that the specifically formalistic approaches to collective decision-making that are illustrated, for instance, in systems of voting cannot, in fact, satisfy both these desider- ata reliably. D’Agostino: What, treated as a parable, Arrow's Theorem suggests is a conundrum: how can we reconcile the demand for coherence in social arrangements with the fact of evaluative diversity? 1. Weale, Albert (1992) 'Social choice'. In Shaun Hargreaves Heap, Martin Hollis, Bruce Lyons, Robert Sugden and Albert Weale, eds, The Theory of Choice: A Critical Guide. Oxford: Blackwell. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Assertibility | Lewis | V 139 Assertibility/conditional/semantics/: we assume assertibility instead of truth because of the probability. However, assertibility is best gained through truth conditions plus a sincerity condition. Adams: the other way around: there are truth conditions not for the entire conditional, but individually for antecedent and consequent "plus a rule that assertibility of the indicative conditional is possible with the conditional subjective probability of the consequent given by the antecedent. Lewis pro (>Adams Conditional). LewisVsAdams: means something different: he calls this "indicative conditional" what Lewis calls a "probability conditional". Adams: the probability of conditionals is not equal to the probability of truth. AdamsVsLewis: probability of conditionals does not obey the standard laws of probability. Solution/Lewis: if we do not mention truth, probability of conditionals obeys the standard laws. Then the indicative conditional has no truth value and no truth conditions, i.e. Boolean connections, but no truth-functional ones (not Truth Functional). V 142 Assertibility/conditional/Lewis: assertibility should correspond to the subjective probability (Lewis pro Grice). The assertibility is reduced by falsehood or trivial being-true. This leads to conditional probability. From this we have to deduct the measured assertibility from the probability of the truth of the truth-functional conditional (horseshoe, ⊃). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Assertions | Dummett | II 124 Assertion/Dummett: By asserting something, the speaker excludes certain possibilities. II 125 But he does not rule out the possibility that the antecedent of the conditional is false. - Thus, its falsity does not make the assert. >Paradox of implication, >Conditional. III (e) 203 Meaning/assertion/Dummett: In general, no specific response is associated with an assertion - how the listener responds will depend on indefinitely many things - FregeVsWittgenstein: hence the meaning cannot be determined in the context of non-linguistic activities. Cf. >Use Theory. Tugendhat I 253 Meaning/assertion/game/Dummett/Tugendhat: (benefit) new: on the other hand it is said: if the expression is used, which then are the conditions under which it is right - Tugendhat: this requires the following: 1) that the circumstances for the accuracy of the use don’t matter 2) that the conditions on which the accuracy depends are such that their fulfillment is guaranteed by the use of the expression itself. What the expression guarantees is that the conditions for its correctness (truth) are met - correctness is always implied (by the speaker). Listeners: separate the conditions and their presence. >Assertibility conditions. Tugendhat I 256f TugendhatVsDummett: 1) That does not state the truth conditions yet - possible solution: thruth conditions in turn by sentence - then a metalanguage is needed. >Metalanguage. TugendhatVsMeta language. Solution/Tugendhat: the explanation must lie in the usage rule of the first sentence. 2) Vs: Giving a guarantee in turn presumes the use of an assertive sentence (circular). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Assertions | Geach | I 256 Assertion/modus ponens/Ryle: "code style": misleading that p does not have to be asserted! - E.g. "if p, then q; but p, therefore q". Conditional/Ryle: Thesis: antecedent and consequent are no assertions. >Antecedent/consequent. Statements are neither needed nor mentioned in conditionals. >Conditional, >Statement. Ryle: here, the conditional is not a premise that coordinates with "p" as the "code style" suggests, but rather an "inference ticket", a "license for the inference": "p, therefore q". >Logical connectives, >Inference, cf. >Implication, >Conclusion. Solution/Geach: it is about propositions, not assertions. >Propositions. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Attribution | Perry | Frank I 451 f Proposition/propositional attitude/PerryVsFrege: The expressions in a report of what someone thinks, designate entities (not whole propositions) to which their antecedents refer. > Cresswell: structured meanings. John Perry (1983a): Castaneda on He and I, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed.) Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castaneda. Hackett (1983), 15-39 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Brain/Brain State | McGinn | I 146f Even if we have an idea of the neural equivalents of decisions, it does not provide us with a theory of the nature of the decision. The generation of decisions is something completely different from the generation of motion. Because decisions are neither put together by antecedent desires or other settings, nor by brain states. --- I 222 Brain/McGinn: It is now commonplace to interpret the brain as an information system (>Information Processing/Dennett) in whose interior most messages remain without a conscious counterpart. Many only concern the inner realities of the brain itself. --- I 223 Thesis: There has to be a silent internal theory of the brain, by the way also for the other organs. A theory which relates to the operation of the whole apparatus. Neural signals can only be interpreted when they are embedded in a representation of the brain and body functions. The brain must be a brain researcher, but unconsciously. It must contain a theory of itself. There must be some real property that distinguishes brains from other objects. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Causal Explanation | Fraassen | Schurz I 228 Causality/van Fraassen: Thesis: the concept of causal process is theory-dependent. Schurz: ditto. Schurz: (1990a(1), 277) Proposal: to explicate the causality relation by reference to the maximal complete causal model ; M(A, E I W). (W: knowledge of circumstances initial conditions, etc.). >Theory dependence. Event/explanation/Schurz: in a deductive-nomological event explanation must. (i) the general premises must be law-like (ii) the conjunction A of antecedent premises must be a cause of E acceptable in the epistemic background system W. >Deductive-nomological explanation. 1. Schurz, G. (1990a). "Was ist wissenschaftliches Verstehen?". In: Schurz (1990, ed.) 235-267. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Causality | Attachment Theory | Corr I 237 Causality/attachment theory/Shaver/Mikulincer: In the earliest studies of infant attachment, Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters and Wall (1978) identified several maternal behaviours during home observations of mother-child interactions that were associated with an infant’s attachment security in the Strange Situation. These behaviours included, for example, being responsive to the infant’s crying, timing of feeding, sensitivity to the infant’s signals and needs, psychological accessibility when the infant was distressed or signalled a need or desire for support and comfort. In subsequent decades, dozens of studies followed up Ainsworth et al.’s (1978)(1) findings and further linked infant attachment security with sensitive maternal behaviour and the quality of paternal care-giving (see Atkinson, Niccols, Paglia et al. 2000(2); De Wolff and van IJzendoorn 1997(3), for reviews and meta-analyses). Based on this solid evidence, van IJzendoorn and Bakermans-Kranenburg (2004(4), p. 248) concluded that ‘the causal role of maternal sensitivity in the formation of the infant-mother attachment relationship is a strongly corroborated finding. >About the Attachment theory, >M. Ainsworth. 1. Ainsworth, M. D. S., Blehar, M. C., Waters, E. and Wall, S. 1978. Patterns of attachment: assessed in the Strange Situation and at home. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum 2. Atkinson, L., Niccols, A., Paglia, A., Coolbear, J., Parker, K. C. H., Poulton, L., Guger, S. and Sitarenios, G. 2000. A meta-analysis of time between maternal sensitivity and attachment assessments: implications for internal working models in infancy/toddlerhood, Journal of Social and Personal Relationships 17: 791–810 3. De Wolff, M. and van IJzendoorn, M. H. 1997. Sensitivity and attachment: a meta-analysis on parental antecedents of infant attachment, Child Development 68: 571–91 4. van IJzendoorn, M. H. and Bakermans-Kranenburg, M. J. 2004. Maternal sensitivity and infant temperament in the formation of attachment, in G. Bremner and A. Slater (eds.), Theories of infant development, pp. 233–57. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Phillip R. Shaver and Mario Mikulincer, “Attachment theory: I. Motivational, individual-differences and structural aspects”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Causes | Bigelow | I 267 Cause/Bigelow/Pargetter: Thesis: a cause is neither sufficient nor necessary for an effect. Reason: there is a backup system that could have produced the same effect. I 268 If the updated system failed. E.g. you could have also eaten another slice of bread. Different food intake can have exactly the same effect. Blur/Imperfection/Bigelow/Pargetter: it is a characteristic feature of living systems. Nevertheless, this is not an intrinsic feature. >Effect, >Causation, >Causality, cf. >Anomalous monism. Cause/Lewis/Bigelow/Pargetter: Lewis allows that a cause is not a necessary condition for the effect. Nevertheless, he explains causation by necessity. Namely, through chains of necessary conditions. (1973b(1), 1986d(2), 1979(3)). >Necessity, >Conditions, >Sufficiency. Cause/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: he arrives at similar results like Lewis, but with strict conditionals. >Cause/Mackie. Cause/INUS/Mackie: (Mackie 1965)(4) Thesis: not a sufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. Cause/Lewis/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: both come from a chain of necessary conditions. They differ in how the links of the chain are to be connected. Lewis: through counterfactual conditioning Mackie: through strict conditionals. Their antecedents can be so complex that we cannot specify them in practice. Backup system/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above) would cause a counterfactual conditional to fail. Nevertheless, Lewis records the cause as a cause because it contributes to the chain. Mackie: dito, because the deviant cause is part of a sufficient condition. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsMackie: both theories have disadvantages. >Counterfactual conditional. 1.Lewis, D.K. (1973). Causation. Journal of Philosophy 70. pp.556-67. 2. Lewis, D.K. (1986d). Philosophical Papers, Vol. II, New York: Oxford University Press. 3. Lewis, D. K. (1979). Counterfactual dependence and time's arrow, Nous 13 pp.455-76. 4. Mackie, J. L. (1965). Causes and Conditions. American Philosophical Quarterly 2, pp.245-255. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Causes | Mackie | Bigelow I 268 Cause/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: he comes to similar results as Lewis, but with strict conditionals. C: is a conjunction of conditions c: cause e: effect. I 268 Counterfactual Conditional/Lewis: c would happen > e would happen c would not happen > e would not happen Mackie: strict conditionals: N(C applies and c happens > e happens) N(C applies and c does not happen > e does not happen). Cause/INUS/Mackie: (Mackie 1965)(1) Thesis: not sufficient but necessary part of an unnecessary but sufficient condition. Cause/Lewis/Mackie/Bigelow/Pargetter: both assume a chain of necessary conditions. They differ in how the links of the chain are to be connected. Lewis: through counterfactual conditionals Mackie: through strict conditionals. Their antecedents can be so complex that we cannot specify them in practice. Backup System/Bigelow/Pargetter: (see above) would cause a counterfactual conditional to fail. Nevertheless, Lewis will treat the cause as the cause because it contributes to the chain. Mackie: ditto, because the deviating cause is part of a sufficient condition. >Cause/Lewis. BigelowVsLewis/BigelowVsMackie: both theories have disadvantages. 1. J. L. Mackie (1965). Causes and Conditions, American Philosophical Quarterly2, pp. 245-55, 261-64. |
Macki I J. L. Mackie Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong 1977 Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Ceteris paribus | Schurz | I 91 ceteris paribus/CP/generalization/Schurz: (i) Comparative: increase in antecedent characteristic leads to increase in consequence characteristic, provided all other relevant characteristics are constant. (ii) Exclusive: no perturbations are allowed. >Method. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Chance | Lewis | V 65 Chance/Probability/Counterfactual Conditionals/Co.co./Possible Worlds/Po.wo./Lewis: It is legitimate to mention chances in the antecedent of the counterfactual conditional - because probabilities are an objective property of the world - then you can say that there is a certain chance for C, even though this chance is unfulfilled - this is a counterexample to the alleged incompatibility - Conclusion: we should say that there would have been a tiny chance for convergence (that the possible worlds looked like the real world), even if Nixon had pressed the button. >Probability/Lewis, >Probability conditional/Lewis, >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis, >Possible world/Lewis. V 91 Chance/Lewis: a) in relation to time: E.g. in a labyrinth: it depends on the location how long we still need b) timeless: E.g. radioactive decay. "Endpoint chance": time not mentioned - chance depends on possible worlds (where one stands inside the labyrinth). Chance: function of three arguments: Proposition, time, world. V 98 Definition chance/Jeffrey: (R. Jeffrey 1965(1)): is an objectified subjective probability. V 99 Definition objectification: (in terms of a partition of a given world): the probability distribution obtained from a belief function by conditionalising (forming the conditional) through the element of the partition - objectified belief: the belief conditional on the truth - (only so much truth as is covered by the element) - which element is valid, is contingent and does not depend on what we think - an element: is the equivalence class of worlds in terms of equality of facts until before t and the dependency of the opportunities on the prehistory - ((s) I.e. in all possible worlds in which this prehistory is true ... will be. V 130 Chance/Acceptable information/Lewis: problem: under the current analysis information about current opportunities is a disguised form of unacceptable information about future history. 1. Richard Jeffrey [1965]: The Logic of Decision. New York: McGraw-Hill |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Coextensive | Carnap | VI 43/4 Def Coextensive/Carnap: coextensive properties belong to the same class - pre-range: class of possible antecedents. Def homogenous: is a relation, if pre- and post-range are isogenous. Def constitute: reduce a concept to another one (reduction) - Problem: transformation rule. >Element relation, >Comprehension, >Sets, >Set theory, >Subsets. --- VI 48 Def Logical Complex/Carnap: if an object can be reduced to another one, we call it a complex of the other objects. Classes and relations are complexes. They do not consist of their elements. >Complex/Carnap. |
Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 |
| Complexes/Complexity | Geach | I 103 Compound Expressions/Complex Terms/Relative Clause/Geach: Problem: no merely simple predicate corresponds to the relative clause; - it is ambiguous to whom "someone", "he" or "anyone" refers. >Relative clause, >Clauses. Range: can be deceptive: E.g. A woman admired by all natives is beautiful/his wife. >Reference, >Identification/Geach, >Pronoun, >Anaphora, >Scope, Russell: a "denoting expression" must be radically paraphrased. - Geach ditto. >Denotation/Russell, >Denotation/Geach. I 106 Compound expressions/complex terms/relative clause/Geach: the relationship pronoun-antecedent is analogous to the relationship variable-operator - it is ambiguous. >Ambiguity, >Variables, >Operators. Solution: resolution by additional pronouns: "if", "and", etc. - ((s) It is not about unity, but about dissolving the unity.) Symbolic Language/Geach: (e.g. set theory): a symbolic language can dissolve unity by definition: E.g. "y belongs to the class of Ps": differs depending on whether with equal sign or epsilon: >"for a class x, y belongs to x, and if something belongs to x, it is P". E.g. wrong: "only a woman who has lost all sense of shame gets drunk". >Formal language, >Extensionality. Correct: a woman only gets ... when she..." otherwise it follows: "Men never get drunk." |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Conditional | Dummett | III (a) 19 Gap/Dummett: a gap does not occur in material conditional - but probably with bets that leave it unclear whether the antecedent is satisfied at all. III (a) 21/22 Statements/truth/Dummett: assuming simple language without counterfactual conditionals: then two types of conditionals are possible: 1) conditional statement a) if the antecedent is fulfilled, then like categorical statement b) if antecedent is not fulfilled: No statement! 2) as material conditional it is true if antecedent is false. III (a) 23 E.g. Indigenous people: then the behavior does not show which of the two statements is correct - then empty distinction - Conclusion: every sit in which nothing can be conceived as being false is one of being true. -> Truth value gap. - Analogy: Command: suspension of the test: no disobedience - conditional: no abuse possible. - The speaker implies that he precludes that the antecedent is true and the consequent is wrong - otherwise: > Atomic sentence. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Conditional | Fraassen | I 118 Conditional/truth value/Fraassen: the truth value of the conditional is partly context-dependent. >Truth values, >Context. But science does not imply that the context is either way somehow - therefore science implies counterfactual conditionals at most in the limiting case where a conditional has the same truth value in all contexts - in this case the theory plus antecedent (conditions) strictly implies the consequent. Then also the laws of attenuation and contraposition apply - but then they are useless for our task to provide an explanation. >Explanations. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
| Conditional | Jackson | Lewis V 153 Conditional/Grice/Lewis: if P (A > C) is high because P (A) is low (> ex falso quodlibet), what is then the meaning of "If A, then B"? Why should one not say the strongest: that it is almost as likely as not A? JacksonVsGrice/JacksonVsLewis: we often claim things that are much weaker than we could actually claim, and this for a good reason. I assume that your belief system is similar to mine, but not completely equal. E.g. Suppose you know something what seems to me very unlikely today, but I would like to say something useful anyway. So I say something weaker, so you can take me at any rate at the word. >Assertions, >Stronger/weaker. --- Lewis V 153 Definition robust/Jackson/Lewis: A is robust in relation to B, (with respect to one's subjective probability at a time) iff. the probability of A and the probability of A conditionally to B are close, and both are high,... >Probability, >Subjective probability, >Objective probability. --- V 154 ...so if one learns that B still considers A to be probable. Jackson: the weaker can then be more robust in terms of something that you think is more unlikely, but still do not want to ignore. If it is useless to say the weaker, how useless it is then to assert the weaker and the stronger together! And yet we do it! E.g. Lewis: "Bruce sleeps in the clothes box or elsewhere on the ground floor". Jackson: Explanation: it has the purpose to assert the stronger and the same purpose to assert the more robust. If both are different, we assert both. Robustness/indicative conditional/Lewis: an indicative conditional is a truth-functional conditional, which conventionally implies robustness with respect to the antecedent (conventional implicature). Therefore the probability P (A > C) and P (A > C) must both be high. This is the reason why the assertiveness of the indicative conditional is associated with the corresponding conditional probability. >Conditional probability, >Conditionals, >Truth functions. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Conditional | Lewis | V 145 Definition Stalnaker-conditional/Lewis: A>C (pointed) is true iff the least possible change that makes A true also makes C true - (least possible revision). Lewis: the probability of Stalnaker-conditionals are usually not equal to the conditional probability. V 146 Stalnaker-conditional/Truth conditions/Lewis: T(A>C)) WA(C) if A is possible. V 148 Conditional/Credibility/Belief/Stalnaker: in order to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1) add an antecedent to the set of beliefs - 2) minimal corrections for consistency - 3) decide whether the consequent is true - LewisVsStalnaker: that is just conditionalization and not representation. V 153 Indicative conditional/assertibility/probability/Jackson/Lewis: the discrepancy between the assertibility of P (C I A) and the probability of the truth of P (A>C) lies with one or the other Gricean >implicature. - The right of access to this implicature must depart from the premise that the conditional has the truth conditions of the (truth-functional) A ⊃ C (horseshoe). - (Lewis pro). - Implicature: E.g. "here you are right" (but mostly you are wrong). >Assertibility. V 154 Indicative conditional/Lewis: is a truth-functional conditional that conventionally implies robustness (insensitivity to new information) in terms of the antecedent - hence the probability of both conditionals must be high - therefore the assertibility of the indicative conditional comes with the corresponding conditional probability. - maxim: "assert the stronger one". |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Conditional | Logic Texts | II 112 Conditional/Hoyningen-Huene: belongs to the object language Conclusion: (logical implication): belongs to the meta level Conditional: is also called (material) implication. - It is a linking of statements. >>Conclusion, >Implication, >Meta language, >Object language. Read III 79 Given that Edmund is a coward, it follows that he is either a coward or - whatever you want. But just from the fact that he is a coward it does not follow that if he is not a coward - whatever you want. III 86f Conditional Clause/Conditional/Truth-Functional/Read: if a conditional clause is treated as truth-functional, there are problems. >paradox of implication. Then the whole sentence is true if the antecedent is false. Conversationalist Defense: such a sentence should not be asserted. >Assertibility. III 92 Jackson: in conditional clauses, the modus ponens comes into play. >modus ponens. III 93 Conditional clauses are not robust (insensitive to additional knowledge) with regard to the falsity of their rear parts. III 94 Assertibility: is applied to the sub-sentences, not only to the whole conditional clause! - If assertibility counts, conditional clauses are no longer truth functional. III 103 The analysis of the possible world deviates from the truth-functional one when the if-clause is false. The fact that Edmund is a coward did not automatically mean that the conditional clause is true. III 105 Similarity analysis: a number of logical principles that are classically valid fails here. E.g., the (Def) Counter-position: that "If B, then not-A" follows from "if A, then not-B". (inter alia IV 41) The similar world in which it rains may very well be one in which it rains only slightly. But the most similar world where it rains heavily cannot be one in which it does not rain. III 220 Conditional clauses: are statements. (Grice) No statements: Stalnaker's question: conditional clause truth-functional? Def truth-functional: 1 counter-example invalidates. >Truth function. Grice: Conditional clauses are statements. StalnakerVsGrice: conditional clauses are not statements. (Pretty radical). - The camps are about equally strong. III 220/21 Conditional Clauses/Conditional/Read: the assertion that they are truth-functional says that a counter-example for the falsity of the conditional clause is not only sufficient but also necessary. - If there is no counter-example, then it is true. - This leads us to believe in sharp cuts in Sorites. >Sorites. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Conditional | Quine | III 67 Implication/Conditional/Quine: Implication only exists if the conditional is true. III 68 Implication/Mention/Use/Quine: not sentences or schemata are implied, but their descriptions. For we cannot write "implies" between the sentences themselves, but only between their descriptions. So we mention the sentences by using their descriptions. We are thus talking about the sentences. ((s) implication is via the sentences. Different: Conditional/Quine: (">" or "if...then...") here we use the sentences or schemes themselves, we do not mention them. No reference is made to them. They appear only as parts of a longer sentence or schema. Example: If Cassius is not hungry, then he is not skinny and hungry. This mentions Cassius but it does not mention a sentence. It is the same with conjunction, negation and alternation. Implication/Quine/(s): only example "p implies q" but not "Cassius' skinniness implies..." III 72 "Only if....then"/Quine: is the sign for the hind leg! It also does not have the meaning of the whole "then and only then (biconditional). I 389/90 Conditional with a false antecedent/Quine: > truth value gaps. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Conditions | Dummett | Grice I, 436 Conditional assertions/Dummett: there are true conditional yes/no- questions, but no real conditional instructions (because the antecedent is unfulfilled). >Commands, cf. >Implication Paradox, >Counterfactual Conditionals. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Content | Dummett | Brandom I 509 Content/Dummett/Brandom: Dummett distinguishes between free-standing and embedded contents. >Subsententials, >Word meaning, >Sentence meaning. Truth value - Designatedness - freestanding content. Multiple value: embedded content. >Terminology/Brandom. I Brandom 510 The substitution mechanism is applied here to contents, not to forms. Dummett III (a) 42 Content/Dummett: Thesis: content is characterized by what would make an assertion appear to be misguided, not by what would prove it to be correct. - Someone who asserts a conditional will not exactly rule out the falsity of the antecedent. - Our concepts of right and wrong are asymmetrical. III (a) 43 Consequence of falsehood: withdrawal of the assertion - there are no clear consequence for correctness. >Correctness. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Conventions | Grice | I 2 Meaning/convention: it may be that someone who has changed a habit falls back into the old habit. Even in non-verbal cases. I 2 f Deviations/communication: deviations must have good reasons. Walker I 419 f Conventions (Walker, Grice Doc 10): you cannot find out whether a statement transmits a relationship between antecedent and consequent due to a special convention or whether this relationship is transmitted conversationally. >Implication, >Implicature, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Meaning (Intending). |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Walker I Ralph C. S. Walker "Conversational Inmplicatures", in: S. Blackburn (ed) Meaning, Reference, and Necessity, Cambridge 1975, pp. 133-181 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Conventions | Lewis | Walker I 464 Convention/Lewis/Walker: is present only when alternatives are also conventions - something is only not a c if the parties cannot imagine that other kinds of speech are possible - Convention/Walker: in individual cases you cannot figure out whether the context between antecedent and consequent is secured conventionally or conversationally. --- Lewis II 222 Convention/Lewis: not just assignment of meaning, but detour over action/expectation. A convention in the sense we have defined here is a regularity of conduct. (And belief). It is essential that the regularity on the part on others is a reason to behave yourself compliantly. VsLewis: Truthfulness and trust (here not in L) cannot be a convention. Which alternatives might be there to general truthfulness - untruthfulness perhaps? ((s) Background: Conventions must be contingent.) II 232 LewisVs: The Convention is not the regularity of truthfulness and trust absolutely. It is in a particular language. Its alternatives are regularities in other languages. II 233 Therefore a convention persists, because everyone has reason to stick to it if others do, that is the commitment. >Action/Lewis. --- Walker I 479 ff Definition conventions/Lewis: a practice is only a convention, if it has alternatives, which in turn are conventions. Something can only be no convention, if the parties cannot imagine that other, less natural ways of speaking are possible. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Walker I Ralph C. S. Walker "Conversational Inmplicatures", in: S. Blackburn (ed) Meaning, Reference, and Necessity, Cambridge 1975, pp. 133-181 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Correlation | Schurz | I 126 Correlation: is qualitative. Covariance: is the corresponding quantitative measure of correlation. Covariance between characteristics: Cov (A,K) = p(A u K) - p(K) times p(A). Covariance is numerically symmetric, i.e., Cov (A,K) = Cov(K,A). Correlation measure: on the other hand, is only qualitatively symmetric, i.e., Corr (A,K) > (<) 0, iff. Corr (K,A) > (<) 0. I 126 The correlation measure is usually not determined for individual characteristics but for the variables as a whole. Recently: Def Effect Strength/Statistics/Schurz: is a statistical correlation measure defined for individual characteristics. It assumes a binary antecedent variable A, ~A, and an arbitrarily scaled consequence characteristic, and is defined as the difference between the K mean in the A population and in the total population, divided by the K dispersion. Scale invariance: because effect size is scale-independent, it is popular in meta-analyses. Cf. >Covariance. I 146 Correlation/causality/statistics/Schurz: from high correlation one cannot conclude the existence of causality and also not the direction, if causality should be given. Correlation: is symmetrical, causality: asymmetrical. Hidden variables: that correlation exists without causality may be due to hidden variables. Ex. common cause. >Hidden variables. VsHume/(s): this one had temporal sequence assumed as condition or criterion of even substitute for causality). Ex Barometer: but its case is always temporally prior to the storm, without ever being the cause. Solution: common cause. >Causality, >Cause, >Causal relation, >Causal explanation. I 147 Common cause/correlation/Reichenbach/Schurz: solution: if the correlation of A and B is due to the common cause C, then the correlation A B must disappear with the values of the variable C held fixed. ("screening"). I 148 Shielding: direct causes shield indirect ones. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Counterfactual conditional: the counterfactual conditional is equivalent to unreal conditional sentences. Conditionals, in which a fact is mentioned in the antecedent, which is not expressly the case. If A were the case, B would have been the case. |
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| Counterfactual Conditionals | Dummett | II 90 Counterfactual Conditionals/co.co./Dummett: allow the construction of undecidable sentences. -> Intuitionism.- A counterfactual conditional can only be "simply" true if there is a logical necessity that either the Counterfactual Conditional or its opposite are true. Opposite of counterfactual conditionals: the same antecedent - contradictory consequent - but no one would assume that it is necessary that either the counterfactual conditional or its opposite is true. - E.g. "x learns languages easily" - x has never learned a foreign language. Three options: i) no determined answer. ii) objective structure of the brain, objective response. iii) no physiological feature, however neither true nor false. II 92 Allocation/Ability/Dummett: you cannot reduce the categorical sentence "he is good at …" to counterfactual conditionals. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Counterfactual Conditionals | Lewis | V 5 Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: variably strict conditional: if there are closer possible worlds, disregard the more distant ones. >Possible world/Lewis. V 5f Counterfactual conditionals/Negation/Lewis: from "would" through "could" (not): with logical antecedent and negated consequent - from "could": with "would" with the same A and negated consequent. V 10 Counterfactual conditionals: Analysis 0: A were>>would C is true in world i iff C is true every A-World, so that __". Analysis 1: A were>>would C is true in world i iff C is true in the (accessible) A-world closest to i if there is one. A were>>would C is true in the world i iff C i is true in every (accessible) A-World closest to i. Analysis 1 1/2: A were>>would C is true in the world i iff C is true in a specific, arbitrarily selected (accessible) A-World closest to i. Analysis 3: A were>>would C is true in the world i if a (accessible) AC-World is closer to i than any A~C-world. "Def A were>>could C is true in i iff for every (accessible) A~C-world there is an AC-world, which is at least as close to i, and if there are (accessible) A-worlds. V 8 Counterfactual conditionals/Negation: here: through "could" in the rear part - E.g. ~(A were>>would C) ↔ A were>>could ~C. ((s) could = not necessarily"). - That will do for Analysis 2: ... true in every next possible world ...- then Bizet/Verdi: not necessarily French and not necessarily non-French... etc. - "all true" false: not necessarily French-and-Italian...- that is ok. V 14 Definition counterfactual conditionals: = variably strict conditional; i.e. if there is a closer possible world, disregard the more distant ones. V 18 Counterfactual Conditional: I use it when the antecedent is probably wrong - Counterfactual Conditionals are more like the material conditional - with true antecedent are only true if the consequent is true - Problem: the Counterfactual Conditional with true antecedent are difficult to determine - they are in fact inappropriate! - Assuming someone unknowingly expressed such: - then both are convincing: a) A, ~C, ergo ~(A were>>would C: wrong, because A but not C, b) A, C, ergo A were>>would C.: true, because A and in fact C- Important argument: this depends on the adequacy of "because". Lewis: I think a) is more appropriate (should be assumend to be true) - Definition centering assumption: is thus weakened: every world is self-accessible and at least so similar to itself as any other world is with it - so a) is valid, but b) is invalid. Centering assumption: if it was violated, worlds which deviate in a neglected way would count the same as the actual world). Actual world/Counterfactual conditionals: if you want to distinguish the actual world in Counterfactual Conditionals, you can do that by expanding the comparative similarity of possible worlds so that they also include certain impossible worlds where not too impossible antecedents are true. Vs: but they are even worse than the impossible borderline worlds. >Truth value, >Impossible world/Lewis. V 25 Counterfactual conditionals/Axioms:.. system C1 the Counterfactual Conditional implies the implication "were A>>would B. >. A>B" (s) That is the Counterfactual Conditional is stronger than the implication - AB > were A>>would B. - that is, from the conjunction follows the counterfactual conditional. V 62 Counterfactual conditional: needs similarity between worlds to be comparable. Analysis 1/A1: (VsLewis) without similarity - counterfactual dependence/Lewis: always causal and thus consisting mostly in chronological order. V 62 Counterfactual conditional: antecedent normally assumed to be wrong - with assumed true antecedent. V 95/96 Counterfactual conditional: Advantage: not truth-functionally established - either both antecedent and consequent or neither applies in a possible world. V 179 Counterfactual conditional: are not transitive. - Therefore there is no specific course of increase or decrease of probability through a causal chain. V 284 Backwards/Counterfactual conditional: there is counterfactual dependence in the backward direction, but no causal dependency: false "if the effect had been different, the cause would have been something else". V 288 Probabilistic counterfactual conditional/Lewis: Form: if A were the case, there would be this and this chance for B. >Possible world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Counterfactual Dependence | Lewis | V 33 Counterfactual dependence/Time/Lewis: counterfactually dependent: assumptions about the future - not counterfactual dependence: assumptions about the past - but: if the present was very different, the past would have had to be different somehow! Lewis: Thesis: yet no strict asymmetry: E.g. A is not going to ask B for a favor after a dispute variant: a) if he asks him, there was no dispute b) there was definitely a fight. >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis, >Counterfactuals/Lewis. Backward causality/past: problem: counterfactual conditionals: are always vague. E.g. Caesar in the Korean War: would have a) detonated the nuclear bomb b) used a catapult. Solution: special form: if A should ask today, there would not have been a controversy yesterday - normal cases in contrast: here there is the asymmetry. V 39f Alternative/Counterfactual dependence/Causing/Lewis: Analysis 1: Problem: we have to assume a transition period when comparing alternatives. - Because we do not allow jumps - for this transition period the counterfactual dependence does not apply. - Solution: we need an assumption for a certain period of time and a standard solution for vagueness - Analysis 2: comparative similarity of possible worlds. >Similarity metrics/Lewis, >Identity across worlds. Def truth/Lewis: a Counterfactual Conditional is true if every world that makes the antecedent true also makes the consequent true without leaving the reality for no reason. V 165 Def counterfactual dependency/Lewis: if there is a family of As, A1, A2 and of Cs, C1, C2, ... and if all Counterfactual Conditionals - wA1>wC1, ... wA2>wC2, etc., then the Cs are counterfactually dependent on the As - typical: E.g. measurements and perceptions - E.g. conD, but not causal dependency. E.g. assumed changed laws of gravity with alternative planet movements - because there are no separated events. V 265 Causality/Causal dependency/separatedness/separation/Lewis: in general: causal dependence can only exist between separate entities.) >Causal dependence/Lewis. Solution: Instead, counterfactual dependence: if Socrates had not been conceived, his death would have been impossible. --- Schwarz I 136 Cause/Causing/Counterfactual dependence/Lewis/Schwarz: cD: B is happily cD when probability for B without the occurrence of A would have been significantly lower (relative to a time after the actual occurrence of A). - 137 transitivity: Problem: accident causes recovery - fragility: different standards for effect/Cause: Cause: robust: Later throwing also cause, but effect fragile: someone else throws: this would be a different breaking. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Counterfactuals | Logic Texts | Read III 84 Conditional rates/conditional/read: We treat e.g., If Aristotle wrote dialogues, they are not preserved. as assertions that are true or false. The entire conditional sentence is true if either the antecedent is false or the consequent is true. One can rephrase: Either Aristotle wrote no dialogue or it is not preserved. Cf. >Implication, >Paradox of implication, >Disjunction. III 85 Def truth-functional: Conjunction and disjunction are called truth-functional because their truth depends directly and immediately on the truth of their constituent parts. >Truth value tables, >Truth function. III 86 Problem: The treatment of conditional sentences as truth-functional leads to a number of problems. For example, suppose the pound is devalued, but the recession continues anyway. Is this enough to confirm the claim that the recession will continue if the pound is not devalued? According to the truth-functional representation, this should be the case. III 87 But the conditional theorem suggests a closer connection between the antecedent and the consequent. We now see, however, that such a connection may not even exist. Therefore, there are doubts whether the truth-functional representation is the last word in this matter. We may now wonder whether the connections are valid. Truth-functional: Argument for the truth-functionality of conditional propositions: Conditional propositions are used to express the dependence of an argument's conclusion on its premises. III 88 The classical representation of validity said that the conclusion is true under any interpretation of the letters, even if the premises are ("conditionality principle"). It follows from the standard representation of inference and the conditionality principle together that conditional clauses are truth-functional. Problems: arise in connection with additional knowledge and assertiveness instead of truth. >Validity. III 277 Anti-realism: understanding must be shown understanding must manifest itself - truth is not evidence-transcendent. VsTradition: understanding of counterfactual situations can not be manifested and not be communicated - consequently it can not be acquainted. |
Logic Texts Me I Albert Menne Folgerichtig Denken Darmstadt 1988 HH II Hoyningen-Huene Formale Logik, Stuttgart 1998 Re III Stephen Read Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Sal IV Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 - German: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sai V R.M.Sainsbury Paradoxes, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne 1995 - German: Paradoxien Stuttgart 2001 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Covariance | Nozick | II 54 Knowledge/Belief/Covariance/Nozick: the more a belief (co-)varies with the truth of what is believed, the better it is as knowledge. >Belief, >Truth. Def Knowledge/Nozick: knowledge is what we have when our belief varies subjunctively with the truth - but if there were beings with better knowledge (possible world), our attitude would not be in the best relation to what is believed, and would no longer be knowledge. ((s) Again this is depending on other things, extrinsic property). >Extrinsic, >Knowledge, >Possible worlds. II 175 Counterfactual condtional: shows covariance. II 175ff Covariance/Conditional/Counterfactual Conditional/Nozick: Conditional: provides only half of the covariance: if p were false, the person would not believe it - the conditional only varies with those cases where the antecedent is false. Problem: still missing: when p > S believes that p. II 220ff Knowledge/Connection/Covariance/Nozick: knowledge requires covariance with the facts; if they were different, I would believe other things - that is the connection (track). Covariance/(s): if yes, then yes, if no, then no. II 224f Method/Knowledge/Covariance/Nozick: I do not live in a world in which pain behavior e is given and must be kept constant! - Therefore, I can know h on the basis of e, which is variable! >Evidence, >Hypotheses. And because it does not vary, it shows me that h (he is in pain) is true. >Pain. VsSkepticism: in reality, it is not about the fact that h is not known, but non-(e and non-h). II 227 Openness of knowledge: means that knowledge varies with the facts, because it is in connection with them. >Covariance. II 283 Knowledge/Covariance/Nozick: there are different degrees of covariance of knowledge with the facts and degrees of sensitivity with respect to truth value. >Truth value. For evolution, it is not necessary that beings perceive all changes - let alone respond to them - our ability to develop beliefs is finer than the ability for perception - we can doubt perceptions. >Perception, >Belief, >World/thinking, >Sensory impressions, >Evolution. II 297 Constancy/Covariance/Nozick: E.g. suppose we want to recognize the content of preferences - Then preferences must at least sometimes be kept constant from situation to situation - form of thought, ((s) That is so, because otherwise you cannot be sure whether the preference belongs to the situation or the person.) >Preferences. Nozick: both people and situations must be able to share preferences - There must be independence. - Otherwise there is no trinity. >Situations, >Persons, >Independence. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Covariance | Schurz | I 126 Correlation: is qualitative. Covariance: is the corresponding quantitative measure of correlation. Covariance between characteristics: Kov (A,K) = p(A u K) - p(K) times p(A). Covariance is numerically symmetric, i.e., Kov (A,K) = Kov(K,A). Correlation measure: on the other hand, is only qualitatively symmetric, i.e., Corr (A,K) > (<) 0, iff. Corr (K,A) > (<) 0. I 126 The correlation measure is usually not determined for individual characteristics but for the variables as a whole. Recently: Def Effect Strength/Statistics/Schurz: is a statistical correlation measure defined for individual characteristics. It assumes a binary antecedent variable A, ~A, and an arbitrarily scaled consequence characteristic, and is defined as the difference between the K mean in the A population and in the total population, divided by the K dispersion. Scale invariance: because effect size is scale-independent, it is popular in meta-analyses. >Scales/Schurz, >Probability/Schurz, >Measurements. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Covering Laws | Dray | Schurz I 224 Covering law/Dray/Schurz: (Dray 1957)(1): simplest case of a deductive nomological explanation: here antecedent and explanandum are implicatively connected by a single law. logical form: (x)(Ax > Ex), Aa/Ea. HempelVsDray/HempelVscovering law: its own model includes more complex explanations e.g. planet positions explained from initial conditions plus laws of nature. >Models, >Theories, >Explanations. 1. Dray, W. (1957). Laws and Explanation in History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Dray I W. Dray Laws and Explanation in History Westport 1979 Dray I W. H. Dray Perspectives on History Sydney 1980 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Currency | Boyd | Rothbard II 166 Currency/convertibility/Walter Boyd/Rothbard: (…) according to Boyd(1), the depreciation of fiat paper in terms of other currencies would be reflected in a rise in the price of gold or silver bullion, and an appreciation of foreign currencies on the foreign exchange market. >Gold standard/Walter Boyd. This view (…) provides the germ of the purchasing-power-parity theory of exchange rates under inconvertible fiat currencies: „Specifically, Boyd contends that an increase in the supply of inconvertible paper money effects a general rise in domestic prices or, what is the same thing, a depreciation in the exchange value of the currency in terms of commodities which necessarily drives down the value of domestic currency in terms of foreign currencies whose exchange values have remained unchanged. This fall in the value of the inflated and depreciated domestic currency relative to foreign currencies is manifested in the depreciation of the exchange rate. Contained in Boyd's argument... is the seminal formulation of the purchasing-power-parity of exchange-rate determination which, of course, is the logical outcome of the application of the monetary approach to conditions of inconvertible paper currency.“(2) >Money/Walter Boyd. 1. Walter Boyd. 1800. A Letter to the Rt. Hon. William Pitt published in 1801. 2. Joseph Salerno. 1980. ‘The Doctrinal Antecedents of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments’ (doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, 1980), p 294. |
Boyd I Richard Boyd The Philosophy of Science Cambridge 1991 Boyd W I Walter Boyd Letter to the Right Honourable William Pitt on the Influence of the Stoppage of Issues in Specie at the Bank of England on the Prices of Provisions and other Commodities London 1801 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Deductive-nomological Explanation | Schurz | I 223 Deductive-nomological explanation/Hempel/Schurz: (Hempel 1942(1), Hempel/Oppenheim 1948(2), Vs: Stegmüller 1969(3), Salmon 1989(4)). Deductive-nomological: Explanans: set of premises: from strictly general propositions G and antecedent A (singular propositions). Explanandum: conclusion E. (sing proposition). Consequence condition: E is a deductive consequence of G and A. Ex G: All metals conduct electricity A: This vase is metallic E: Therefore it conducts electricity. Law: law premises are never definitely verifiable. Model: therefore the epistemic model version is more important. I.e. it is about acceptance and not about truth against a background knowledge. >Background, >Knowledge, >Models, >Model theory. I 224 Potential Explanation/Hempel: Here merely logical consistency of the premises is required. This is important when evaluating hypotheses in terms of their explanatory power. >Best explanation. I 224 Covering law/Dray/Schurz: (Dray 1957)(5): simplest case of a deductive nomological explanation: here antecedent and explanandum are implicatively connected by a single law. Logical form: (x)(Ax > Ex), Aa/Ea. >Covering laws. HempelVsDray/HempelVsCovering law: Hempel's own model includes more complex explanations. Ex. planetary positions explained from initial conditions plus laws of nature. I 228 Law/Explanation/Schurz: Deductive-nomological explanation of law by higher-level theories cannot be directly applied to the causality requirement. ((s) Schurz/(s): laws are explained by higher-level theories). Law of nature/problem/Schurz: A law is not a spatiotemporally localized fact and can therefore not be the subject of a causal relation. Law/causality/explanation/Schurz: Many laws are not causal: E.g. the laws of evolution are not causal. Also in physics: Explanation due to symmetry principles, Ex many explanations in quantum mechanics. >Explanation/Hempel, >Explanation/Hegel, >Explanation/Scriven, >Causality, >Causal explanations, >Laws, >Law-likeness, >Laws of nature. 1. Hempel, C. (1942). "The Function of General Laws in History". In: The Journal of Philosophy 39, (abgedruckt in ders. 1965, 221-243.) 2. Hempel, C. & Oppenheim, P. (1948). "Studies in the Logic of Explanation", >Philosophy of Science 39, 135-175. 3. Stegmüller, W. (1969). Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie. Band I:Wissenschaftliche Erklärung und Begründung. Berlin: Springer. 4. Salmon, W. (1989). Four Decades of Scientific Explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 5. Dray, W. (1957). Laws and Explanation in History. Oxford: Oxford University Press. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Deliberative Democracy | Dryzek | Gaus I 144 Deliberative democracy/Dryzek: Though democracy comes in many varieties, the dominant current in democratic theory is now a deliberative one. Indeed, it is accurate to say that around 1990 the theory of democracy took a deliberative turn. Thus different accounts of democracy can be appraised in terms of the content, strength, and significance of their relation to the deliberative turn - whether in support, opposition, capture, or qualification. With the deliberative turn, the core of democratic legitimacy became instead the right or ability of those subject to a public decision to participate in genuine deliberation (see Manin, 1987(1); Cohen, 1989(2); the term 'deliberative democracy' was first used by Bessette, 1980(3)). Gaus I 145 The deliberative turn in democratic theory occurred in the early 1990s. However, it does have antecedents, reaching back to Aristotle and the Athenian polis, and encompassing conservatives such as Edmund Burke (for whom deliberation connoted mature reflection as opposed to hasty action), as well as liberals such as John Stuart Mill and John Dewey (for a good history, see the introduction to Bohman and Rehg, 1997(4)). There are also continuities in emphasis with participatory democrats such as Carole Pateman (1970)(5) who were dissatisfied with the lack of opportunity for deep democratic experience in contemporary liberal democracies. >Participation/Pateman, >Democratic theory/Pateman. Benjamin Barber's (1984)(6) 'strong democracy' can be seen in retrospect as a bridge between participatory and deliberative democracy, given his emphasis on 'strong democratic talk'. >Participation/Barber, >Democratic theory/Barber. Authenticity: deliberation). The reflective aspect means that preferences, judgements and views that are taken as fixed in aggregative models are treated as amenable to change in deliberation. Authenticity is therefore a central concern: democratic control should ideally be substantive not symbolic, involving uncoerced communication among competent participants (...). The importance of the deliberative turn was confirmed in the 1990s by the announcements of the most important liberal theorist John Rawls, and critical theorist Jürgen Habermas, that they were deliberative democrats (Rawls, 1993(7); 1997(8): 771-2; Habermas, 1996(9)). Given the sheer number of democratic theorists who now sail under the deliberative flag, as well as the historically different schools of thought from which they come (conservatism, liberalism, and critical theory), there really ought to be substantial variety among deliberative democrats. But what is now striking is less the variety than the uniformity. The assimilation happened in three ways (see Dryzek, 2000(10): 10—17). First, a commitment to deliberative principles can be used to justify some (but not all) of the rights long cherished by liberals. Other theorists emphasize deliberation in courts rather than legislatures (for example, Rawls, 1993(7): 231). Gaus I 146 Liberalism/democracy: [e.g, in later Habermas] there is no recognition of any need to democratize the economy, the administrative state, or the legal system, all of which receive easy legitimacy. >Deliberative democracy/Habermas. Dryzek: However invigorating this assimilation of deliberative democracy might be for liberalism, it may be bad news for democracy. Some deliberative liberals are not especially democratic. Notably, Rawls in the end wants to entrust deliberation to experts in public reason such as Supreme Court justices, who only need to deliberate in the personal as opposed to the interactive sense of the word (see Goodin, 2000(11), for an explicit defence of personal as opposed to interactive deliberation). >Deliberative democracy/Rawls. VsDeliberative democracy: see >Democracy/Schumpeter. 1. Manin, Bernard (1987) 'On legitimacy and political deliberation'. Political Theory, 15: 338—68. 2. Cohen, Joshua (1989) 'Deliberation and democratic legitimacy'. In Alan Hamlin and Philip Pettit, eds, The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State. Oxford: Blackwell. 3. Bessette, Joseph M. (1980) 'Deliberative democracy: the majoritarian principle in republican government'. In Robert A. Goldwin and William A. Shambra, eds, How Democratic is the Constitution? Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. 4. Bohman, James and William Rehg (1997) Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 5. Pateman, Carole (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Barber, Benjamin (1984) Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 7. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 8. Rawls, John (1997) 'The idea of public reason revisited'. University ofChicago Law Review, 94: 765-807. 9. Habermas, Jürgen (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 10. Dryzek, John S. (2000) Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 11. Goodin, Robert E. (2000) 'Democratic deliberation within'. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 29: 81—109. Dryzek, John S. 2004. „Democratic Political Theory“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Demand for Money | Rothbard | Rothbard II 166 Demand for money/prices/Rothbard: (…) partial ‘real’ factors - such as government expenditures abroad, a sudden scarcity of food, or ‘a sudden diminution of the confidence of foreigners, in consequence of any great national disaster’ - could influence overall prices or the status of the pound in the foreign exchange market. But (…) such influences can only be trivial and temporary. The overriding causes of such price or exchange movements - not just in some remote ‘long run’ but a all times except temporary deviations - are monetary changes in the supply of and demand for money. Changes in ‘real’ factors can only have an important impact on exchange rates and general prices by altering the composition and the height of the demand for money on the market. But since market demands for money are neither homogeneous nor uniform nor do they ever change Rothbard II 167 equiproportionately, real changes will almost always have an impact on the demand for money. Salerno: ... since real disturbances are invariably attended by ‘distribution effects’, i.e. gains and losses of income and wealth by the affected market participants, it is most improbable that initially nonmonetary disturbances would not ultimately entail relative changes in the various national demands for money...[U]nder inconvertible conditions, the relative changes in the demands for the various national currencies, their quantities remaining unchanged, would be reflected in their long-run appreciation or depreciation on the foreign exchange market.(1) >Price theory/Rothbard. Rothbard III 756 Demand for money/Rothbard: The total demand for money on the market consists of two parts: Exchange demand: the exchange demand for money (by sellers of all other goods that wish to purchase money) and Reservation demand: the reservation demand for money (the demand for money to hold by those who already hold it). Because money is a commodity that permeates the market and is continually being supplied and demanded by everyone, and because the proportion which the existing stock of money bears to new production is high, it will be convenient to analyze the supply of and the demand for money in terms of the total demand-stock analysis (…). In contrast to other commodities, everyone on the market has both an exchange demand and a reservation demand for money. A. Exchange Demand Exchange demand: The exchange demand is his pre-income demand. As a seller of labor, land, capital goods, or consumers' goods, he must supply these goods and demand money in exchange to obtain a money income. >Production factors, >Income, >Goods, >Production. Demand: Aside from speculative considerations, the seller of ready-made goods will tend, (…) to have a perfectly inelastic (vertical) supply curve, since he has no reservation uses for the good. Rothbard III 757 Supply: But the supply curve of a good for money is equivalent to a (partial) demand curve for money in terms of the good to be supplied. Exchange demand: Therefore, the (exchange) demand curves for money in terms of land, capital goods, and consumers' goods will tend to be perfectly inelastic. >Elasticity/Rothbard. Labour: Some people might work a greater number of hours because they have a greater monetary inducement to sacrifice leisure for labor. Others may decide that the increased income permits them to sacrifice some money and take some of the increased earnings in greater leisure. In both cases, the man earns more money at the higher wage rate.(…) Therefore, a man’s backward-sloping supply curve will never be “backward” enough to make him earn less money at higher wage rates. Rothbard III 758 „Buying money“/market: Thus, a man will always earn more money at a higher wage rate, less money at a Iower. But what is earning money but another name for buying money? And that is precisely what is done. People buy money by selling goods and services that they possess or can create. Demand schedule for money: We are now attempting to arrive at the demand schedule for money in relation to various alternative purchasing powers or "exchange-values" of money. Exchange value of money: A Iower exchange-value of money is equivalent to higher goods-prices in terms of money. Conversely, a higher exchange-value of money is equivalent to Iower prices of goods. Labour/wages: In the labor market, a higher exchange-value of money is translated into Iower wage rates, and a Iower exchange-value of money into higher wage rates. Labour market: Hence, on the labor market, our law may be translated into the following terms: The higher the exchange-value of money, the Iower the quantity of money demanded; the Iower the exchange-value of money, the higher the quantity of money demanded (i.e., the Iower the wage rate, the less money earned; the higher the wage rate, the more money earned). Therefore, on the labor market, the demand-for-money schedule is not vertical, but falling, when the exchange-value of money increases, as in the case of any demand curve. Exchange demand for money: Adding the vertical demand curves for money in the other exchange markets to the falling demand curve in the labor market, we arrive at a falling exchange-demand curve for money. B. Reservation Demand Reservation demand: More important, because more volatile, in the total demand for money on the market is the reservation demand to hold money. This is everyone's post-income demand. After everyone has acquired his income, he must decide, between the allocation of his money assets in three directions: a) consumption spending, b) investment spending, and c) addition to his cash balance ("net hoarding"). Furthermore, he has the additional choice of subtraction from his cash balance ("net dishoarding"). How much he decides to retain in his cash balance is uniquely determined by the marginal utility of money in his cash balance on his value scale. >Cash balance/Rothbard. Reservation demand curve for money: (…) the higher the PPM (purchasing power of money; the exchange-value of money), the lower the quantity of money demanded in the cash balance. >Purchasing power/Rothbard. As a result, the reservation demand curve for money in the cash balance falls as the exchange-value of money increases. This falling demand curve, added to the falling exchange-demand curve for money, yields the market's total demand curvefor money - also falling in the familiar fashion for every commodity. Rothbard III 762 Equilibirum/purchasing power: Suppose (…) that the PPM (purchasing power of money) is slightly higher (…). The demand for money at that point will be less than the stock. People will become unwilling to hold money at that exchange-value and will be anxious to sell it for other goods. These sales will raise the prices of goods and Iower the PPM, until the equilibrium point is reached. On the other hand, suppose that the PPM is Iower (…). In that case, more people will demand money, in exchange or in reservation, than there is money stock available. The consequent excess of demand over supply will raise the PPM again (…). >Purchasing power parity/Rothbard. Rothbard III 766 Economic law: Every supply of money is always utilized to its maximum extent, and hence no social utility can be conferred by increasing the supply of money. >Money supply/Rothbard, >Money supply/David Hume. Economists have attempted mechanically to reduce the demand for money to various sources(2) RothbardVsKeynes: There is no such mechanical determination, however. Each individual decides for himself by his own standards his whole demand for cash balances, and we can only trace various influences which different catallactic events may have had on demand. >Speculative Demand, >Clearing/Rothbard. Rothbard III 772 Demand for money/Rothbard: Is the demand for money unlimited? A popular fallacy rejects the concept of "demand for money" because it is allegedly always unlimited. This idea misconceives the very nature of demand and confuses money with wealth or income. the form of holding back the good from being sold. (…) effective demand for money is not and cannot be unlimited; it is limited by the appraised value of the goods a person can sell in exchange and by the amount of that money which the individual wants to spend on goods rather than keep in his cash balance. Purchasing power: Furthermore, it is, of course, not "money" per se that he wants and demands, but money for its purchasing power, or "real" money, money in some way expressed in terms of what it will purchase. (This purchasing power of money (…) cannot be measured.) >Time preference/Rothbard, >Price/Rothbard. Rothbard III 775 Value of cash balances: The only necessary result (…) of a change in the demand-for-money schedule is precisely a change in the same direction of the proportion of total cash balances to total money income and in the real value of cash balances. Given the stock of money, an increased scramble for cash will simply Iower money incomes until the desired increase in real cash balances has been attained. If the demand for money falls, the reverse movement occurs. The desire to reduce cash balances causes an increase in money income. Total cash remains the same, but its proportion to incomes, as well as its real value, declines.(3) 1. Joseph Salerno. 1980. ‘The Doctrinal Antecedents of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments’ (doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, 1980), pp. 299-300. 2. J.M. Keynes’ Treatise on Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930) is a classic example of this type of analysis. 3. Strictly, the ceteris paribus condition will tend to be violated. An increased demand for money tends to Iower money prices and will therefore Iower money costs of gold mining. This will stimulate gold mining production until the interest return on mining is again the same as in other industries. Thus, the increased demand for money will also call forth new money to meet the demand. A decreased demand for money will raise money costs of gold mining and at least Iower the rate of new production. It will not actually decrease the total money stock unless the new production rate falls below the wear-and-tear rate. Cf. Jacques Rueff, "The Fallacies of Lord Keynes' General Theory" in Henry Hazlitt, ed., The Critics ofKeynesian Economics (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1960), pp. 238-63. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Denotation | Geach | I 28 Denotating expression/Russell/Geach: the denotating expression is a general term after the prefix the, one, every, all, some, etc. >Articles, >Quantifiers, >Quantification, >Demonstratives, >Index words, >Predication, >Attribution, >Sentence/Geach. I 93f Denotating expression/Geach: E.g. Robinson made a lot of money by selling it This is no sentence - "it" without antecedent is no denotating expression. But if a word chain does not have a logical role in a particular context, it does not mean that it never has one. - E.g. Jones has a car and Jones daughter drives it. "has a car" is not denotating: "p and Jones' daughter drives it". > Anaphora. Also not: "there is a car ..." for "p" then: p and that is driven by Jones' daughter. Wrong solution: to look for criteria for "real incidents": these can also be of the wrong kind. E.g. "the only one who ever stole a book from Snead ..." I 190f Denotation of sentences/Carnap/Geach: E.g. DES(English) "red" is red, DES(French) "l'eau" is water etc. - for all x, x is true in L ⇔ DES(L) x. Geach: this offers a definition of "true in L" in terms of "denotation in L"- if it is grammatically not a complete sentence, it is nevertheless in the logical sense. It means roughly: "mon crayon est noir" is true in French". Because "DES(English)"Chicago is a large city" is a complete sentence, "DES(English)" is not a relation sign. We cannot ask "what is it what it denotates," as we cannot ask, "what is it that it rains?" >Translation, >Designation. I 204 Denotation/naming/names of expressions/mention/use/Geach: E.g. A. or is a junctor. If this sentence is to be true, then only when the first word is used to denotate that of which the sentence says something. "Or" is only a junctor (E.g. "but" is a junctor or a verb") in special contexts. >Junctor. Therefore "or" is not used autonym in A (it does not denotate itself). The first word in A is no example here. It is a logical subject, so in the sentence it is no junctor, so the sentence A is wrong. ((s) With and without quotation marks that were saved here) - (s) Or can only be used as a connection, when it is mentioned, it is no longer a connection.) >Mention, >Use, >Mention/use, >Description level, >Level/Order. Mention/use/Geach: Is it wrong to say or is a connection? - No. - Is it wrong to say "or" is a connection? - Yes. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Depression | Neuroimaging | Corr I 312 Depression/Neuroimaging/Canli: whereas healthy controls’ amygdala response returned to baseline within ten seconds of stimulus presentation, depressed individuals’ amygdala response remained active and even lasted through the next (non-emotional) trial twenty-five seconds later. It is unknown whether this sustained activation represents a consequence of depression, or possibly an antecedent vulnerability marker. If it were the latter, and given that Neuroticism is a risk factor for depression (Martin 1985(1); Boyce, Parker, Barnett et al. 1991(2); Kendler, Neale, Kessler et al. 1993(3); Duggan, Shan, Lee et al. 1995(4)), then we would expect that Neuroticism would correlate positively with sustained amygdala reactivity to negative emotional stimuli. >Measurement, >Correlation, >Invariants, >Covariance, >Method. 1. Martin, M. 1985. Neuroticism as predisposition toward depression: a cognitive mechanism, Personality and Individual Differences 6: 353–65 2. Boyce, P., Parker, G., Barnett, B. et al. 1991. Personality as a vulnerability factor to depression, British Journal of Psychiatry 159: 106–14 3. Kendler, K. S., Neale, M. C. Kessler, R. C. et al. 1993. A longitudinal twin study of personality and major depression in women. Archives of General Psychiatry 50: 853–62 4. Duggan, C., Sham, P., Lee, A. et al. 1995. Neuroticism: a vulnerability marker for depression: evidence from a family study, Journal of Affective Disorders 35: 139–43 Turhan Canlı,“Neuroimaging of personality“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Distribution | Geach | Geach I 6 Distribution: an expression cannot occur in the conclusion, which has not occurred in the premises. >Syllogism, >Premises, >Conclusion, >Inference, >Antecedent/consequent, cf. >Conservativity. ad I 54: Salmon IV 106 Distribution/Salmon (external) : each categorical expression of a term of a syllogism must be distributed (refer to each individual in the domain). E.g. All whales are mammals does not say anything about any whale but about any mammal.(1) >Domain. 1. Wesley C. Salmon Logik, Stuttgart 1983, p. 106 Geach I 102/3 Distribution/distributed "any" instead of "all" (cumulative). >All/Geach. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Sal I Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 German Edition: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sal II W. Salmon The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967 SalN I N. Salmon Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007 |
| Diversity (Politics) | Liberalism | Gaus I 244 Diversity/Liberalism/D’Agostino: (...) if we tolerate 'too much' diversity in individuals' cognitive and evaluative attitudes, it cannot be ruled out that we will be unable to identify a collectively best system of social arrangements. Of course, neither pluralism nor representativeness requires the recognition of all empirically given diversity of attitudes (see, especially, Gaus, 1996(1)). ((s) For problems in relation to diversity see >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino.) Normalization: some attitudes can reasonably be 'filtered out' or normalized as part of any reasonable procedure for the identification of collectively binding social arrangements. If this can be done compatibly with specifically liberal principles, then liberalism can acknowledge diversity without abandoning a commitment to coherence in theory and in its institutional embodiments. (The idea of normalization is associated with Michel Foucault, 1977, (...). Nromalization/Rawls: John Rawls's original position (1973(2): ch. Ill) represents the most influential attempt to identify a device of normalization that meets specifically liberal requirements. Bruce Ackerman's (1980)(3) 'neutral dialogue' and Jürgen Habermas's (1990)(4) >ideal speech situation are other examples (...). Normalization/Rawls: Rawls addresses this problem by considering how diversity of individuals' antecedent judgements might be reduced compatibly with specifically liberal ideals and principles. His task is twofold: 1) to find a basis for reduction, and 2) to find a specifically liberal rationale for reduction. Without (1), the coherence requirement cannot be satisfied; there is 'too much' antecedent diversity for a collectively best structure to be identified. Without (2), representativeness is not adequately acknowledged, for, absent a rationale, any reduction will be arbitrary from an ethical point of view - i.e. will arbitrarily fail adequately to represent decision-relevant diversity of assessments. Rawls's solution is embodied, specifically, in the veil of ignorance. >Veil of ignorance/Rawls, >Veil of ignorance/D’Agostino. Arrow’s Theorem/problems/solutions: a problem of coherence results, in fact, precisely in so far as we demand, of a solution to the problem of collective choice, that it identify a particular option as one which will be binding on all the individuals involved. >Arrow’s Theorem/D’Agostino. Three Individuals (A, B, C) and three possible social arrangements (S1, S2, S3); Table I of preferences S1: A 1st – B 3rd – C 2nd S2: A 2nd – B 1st – C 3rd S 3: A 3rd – B 2nd - C 1st There is, however, another possibility, and it has been widely exploited in specifically liberal institutions. It is, in effect, to see the profile of preferences represented in Table I as the end-point, not the starting-point, of a process of collective deliberation. Perhaps the individuals involved agree to devolve decision-making about these options to the individual level. In so far as they do agree to this, we have a collective solution to a problem of choice. Each of the individuals agrees, with all the others, not about what preference should collectively be honoured, but rather that that distribution of preferences over individuals is to be preferred to any other in which each individual has the preferences which he antecedently has (or which he would have, subject to specifically liberal normalization of his attitudes). 1. Gaus, Gerald (1996) Justificatory Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2. Rawls, John (1973) A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Ackerman, Bruce (1980) Social Justice in the Liberal State. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 4. Habermas, Jürgen (1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhart and Shierry Weber Nicholson. Cambridge: Polity. D’Agostino, Fred 2004. „Pluralism and Liberalism“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Economy | Ricardo | Rothbard II 82 Economy/Ricardo/Rothbard: In contrast to Adam Smith, for whom the output, or wealth, of nations was of supreme importance, Ricardo neglected total output to place overriding emphasis on the alleged distribution of a given product into macro-classes. Specifically, into the three macro-classes of landlords, labourers and capitalists. Thus, in a letter to Malthus, who on this question at least was an orthodox Smithian, Ricardo made the distinction clear: ‘Political economy, you think, is an enquiry into the nature and causes of wealth; I think it should rather be called an enquiry into the laws which determine the division of the produce of industry amongst the classes who concur in its formation.’ Since entrepreneurship could not exist in Ricardo's world of long-run equilibrium, he was left with the classical triad of factors. His analysis was strictly holistic, in terms of allegedly homogeneous but actually varied and diverse classes. Ricardo avoided any Say-type emphasis on the individual, whether he be the consumer, worker, producer or businessman. SchumpeterVsRicardo: In Ricardo's world of verbal mathematics there were, as Schumpeter has astutely pointed out, four variables: total output or income, and shares of income to landlords, capitalists, and workers, i.e. rent, profits (long-run interest) and wages. Problem: [Ricardo] had four variables, but only one equation with which to solve them: Total output (or income) = rent + profits + wages. To solve, or rather pretend to solve, this equation, Ricardo had to ‘determine’ one or more of these entities from outside his equation, and in such a way as to leave others as residuals. >Wages/Ricardo, >Rent/Ricardo, >Land/Ricardo, >Marginal costs/Ricardo, >Ricardian economics. Rothbard II 195 Money/Prices/Rocardo/Rothbard: For money to be strictly neutral to everything except a general level of prices, Ricardo had to assert a strict, radical dichotomization between the monetary and the real worlds, with values, relative prices, production and incomes determined only in the 'real' sphere, while overall prices were set exclusively in the monetary sphere. >Bullionism. RothbardVsRicardo: And never the two spheres could meet. And here began the fateful and all-pervasive modern fallacy of a severe split between two hermetically sealed worlds: the 'micro' and the 'macro', each with its own determinants and laws. Furthermore, as Salerno(1) writes, fit was Ricardo's strong affrmation of the neutral-money doctrine in his bullionist writings that was to serve as the source of the classical conception of money as merely a "veil" hiding the "real" phenomena and processes of the economy".(1) In particular, if money is neutral, then value, or relative prices, had to have only 'real' determinants, which Ricardo discovered in embodied quantities of labour. 1. Joseph Salerno, 'The Doctrinal Antecedents of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments' (doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, 1980), p. 447. Salerno goes on to point out that Ricardo's strict, mechanistic split between the money and the real, leading to the doctrine that money is a 'veil', led also to the seeming paradox of Ricardo, in his Principles, flip-flopping to a highly misleading purely real, non-monetary, 'barter' analysis of the balance of payments. The paradox is only seeming, for a severe split enables someone to leap back and forth between the purely monetary and the purely real. It was the barter analysis of Ricardo's Principles, Salerno notes, 'which served as the foundation for the classical theory of the balance of payments'. Ibid., p. 449. |
EconRic I David Ricardo On the principles of political economy and taxation Indianapolis 2004 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Evolution | Fodor | IV 145 Evolution Theory/Dennett/Fodor/Lepore: Dennett sees evolution theory as an "element of interpretation". Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: but Dennett should not see something as a means of survival that you do not have. DretskeVsDennett/MillikanVsDennett: that is why most evolutionists are realists in terms of content. IV 146 Irrationality/belief/evolution/rationality/Dennett: thesis: we must not describe irrational mutations as a system of belief. A belief system that believes something wrong is a conceptual impossibility. Fodor/LeporeVsDennett: the theory of evolution can hardly act as the guarantor for the principle of truth. IV 149 Theory of Evolution/truth/Fodor/Lepore: if you use the theory of evolution to explain intentional attribution, it is rather an empirical than a conceptual question whether the principle of truth applies or not, but we do not agree with the antecedent anyway. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Explanation | Salmon | Fraassen I 122 Definition Explanation/W. Salmon: (new): consists in the demonstration of the relevant part of the causal network that leads to the events that have to be explained. Sometimes it is about investigating forwards and backwards in the network. E.g. Barometer: >Relevance - ->Common cause. Schurz I 234 Probability /Explanation/W.Salmon/Ontology/Schurz: (Salmon 1971(1), 63, 1984(2)): Ex If an improbable event occurs, the explanation must contain the statement of the low probability value! And this is then the reason! Ex In a Mendelian crossing experiment, the probability for red is 75% and for white 25%. Then the occurrence of white must be justified with the probability of 25 % (against 75 %)! Logical form: "p(white(x) I Ax) = 25 %, Ab// (0.25) white(b)". Although the antecedent here lowers the probability of the explanadum event! I 235 Salmon: Therefore, we may only require the antecedent to be positively or negatively relevant. Hempel/Schurz: The late Hempel was convinced that. >Explanation/Hempel. CartwrighVsSalmon: It is counterintuitive to say that the event occurred because some factor was present that made it improbable. Solution/Humphreys/Schurz: (Humphreys 1989(3),117) we refer to these as countercauses. (Schurz pro). We then say that the event occurred even though the antecedent occurred. >Explanation/Cartwright. 1. Salmon, W. et al. (1971). Statistical explanation and Statistical Relvance (with Contributions by R.C. Jeffrey and J.G. Greeno). London: University of Pittsburg Press. 2. Salmon, W. (1984) Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton University Press. 3. Humphreys, P. (1989). The Chances of Explanation. Princeton University Press. |
Sal I Wesley C. Salmon Logic, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 1973 German Edition: Logik Stuttgart 1983 Sal II W. Salmon The Foundations Of Scientific Inference 1967 SalN I N. Salmon Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers II 2007 Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Explanation | Schurz | I 30 Explanation/Schurz: Explanation concerns only facts that have already occurred. Otherwise it refers to a prediction. Both have the form of deductive or probabilistic arguments. >Facts, >States of affairs, >Prediction, >Probability, >Deduction. I 92 Notation: II- : "follows logically". Explanation scheme/logical form/explanation/Schurz: strict all proposition & singular proposition II- singular proposition. All A are K and a is A II- a is K. Falsification scheme/falsification/logical form/Schurz: FS I: singular proposition falsifies strict universal sentence. singular sentence II- negation of strict universal sentence a is A and not K II- not all A are K FS II: existence sentence falsifies strict all proposition There is an A that is not a K II- not all A are K. >Universal sentence. I 225 Explanation/law/Schurz: More important than explanation of events is explanation of laws by higher-level theories. Problem: irrelevance and redundancy. Therefore Hempel considered laws only implicitly. Logical form: "T U A / G" (U: union). T: is a set of laws or axioms of theories, all of which are essentially quantified and some of which are essentially general. A: (antecedent) is a (possibly empty) set of sing propositions or localized existential propositions. G: an essentially general proposition. Ex Theoretical explanation of planetary orbits Ex Theoretical explanation of Piaget's law of development. I 227 Causality/explanation/causal explanation/Schurz: problem: Ex "If A, then E will be the case": is L equivalent with its contraposition. "If Not E, then Not A was the case". Problem: "Not E" cannot be a cause of Not A! >Causal explanation/Schurz. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Explanation | Scriven | Wright I 156 Explanation/Scriven/Wright, G. H.: The arguments by Scriven and Dray are related to my criticism of the scheme, Scriven uses the successful wording that Hempel's approach "gives the individual case away". (Scriven, p. 467). Scriven: an event can move freely within a network of statistical laws, but is located within the "normic network" and explained by this localization. (Scriven(1), p. 467). >Events, >Statistics, >Laws. Schurz I 229 Explanation/Self-Explanation/Scriven: (Scriven 1959a(1), 468 469): Problem: It often happens that we explain an effect E by a real reason A, but our only reason for believing it is that we have observed the effect. >Causal explanation, >Effect, >Cause. "Self-confirming explanation/self-affirmation/self-justification/ Hempel: (1965(2),372): Ex red shift: is explained by the expansion of the universe, but the only reason to think the hypothesis of expansion is confirmed is the red shift itself. ((s) No "side perspective"). Solution/Schurz: a deductive nomological reason must have a prognostic function. There must be in knowledge W a set of evidences that confirm the antecedent without logically implying the event. This requirement is violated in Ex. Redshift. >Redshift. Chaos/explanation/short: it cannot be predicted when the avalanche will depart, but when it has departed, it can be accurately explained that there was a reduction in friction. ((s) post hoc, post festum). I 230 Relevance/explanation: solution to the problem of irrelevance: "irreducible representation" (without redundant elements). Any law premise must also satisfy the relevance condition. >Relevance. Law/explanation/Schurz/(s): if a law is needed for explanation, it is in the premise. 1. Scriven, M. (1959a). Truisms as Grounds for Historical Explanations. IN: P. Gardiner (ed.) Theories of History, New YOrk, The Free Press. 2. Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York: Free Press. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Explanation | Wright | I 182 Best Opinion/ethics/morality/Wright: we will see in Chapter 5 that moral issues do not occur in the best explanations of our moral beliefs. >Best Explanation/Wright. I 196f Best explanation/Wright: an explanation cannot be the best if it does not contain certain details. (But this is not supposed to be any naturalistic or scientific reductionist kind of explanation). An explanation will not be considered the best, as long as there is a competing equally good explanation, but which does not use the cognitive susceptibility. If such a declaration is actually equally good, it will explain why the (different) person in his community does not stand out. >Community, >Language community, >Convention. But then, the entire community can be considered deficient. The specific cognitive ability, thus becomes a fifth wheel. >D. Wiggins, >Cognitive Coercion, >Causal Role. I 240 Best explanation/Physics: should the best explanation not always be the same? Finally, the causal antecedents are, so to say, already in place, whatever the fate of the theory will be later. Why should the best explanation go beyond the statement of reasons and laws that precisely explain the forces that generate our beliefs? Wright: There is no reason why the best explanation should refer to any state of affairs which actually conveys truth to the theory, as we assume. Best explanation/Physics/Wright: should consist in scientific heritage, as well as in observations and certain psychological laws. >Explanation/Harman. ((s) So there is no mentioning of the facts.) Could the best explanation not always be "done better" , by always searching for a more fundamental level (for example: subatomic, etc.) If explanations are only best if they are valid, then they will always "overtake" their content. >Assertibility, >Superassertibility, >Ideal assertibility. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Future | Dummett | II 86 Real future/Dummett: sentences about the future, true or false, depending on what happens in the future. Improper future: sentences about current tendencies: whether true or false depends on the current assertability conditions. - If the present tense form is decidable, then the truth conditions are manifestable by the speaker. >Manifestation, >Assertibility. Compound sentences about the future: make distinction truth/assertibility necessary - e.g. antecedent in conditional -> Extension of the truth conditions by correctness/incorrectness. III (d) 167 Future/Law of the Excluded Middle/Dummett: the law applies here as well - otherwise one would have to deny real future and allow only improper future: only current tendencies. III (d) 175 Knowledge/Future/Dummett: There are two types of advance knowledge: 1) the prediction based on causal laws 2) Knowledge by intention. If I believe I can predict the non-happening of an event, I cannot also believe I can contribute something to bring it about without falling into contradictions. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Generalization | Bigelow | I 62 Generalization/Bigelow/Pargetter: one advantage of our relational theory (of the 3 levels) is that it allows generalizations and variations. >Relation theory/Bigelow. I 63 Vector: especially an easy explanation of vectors, with which other theories struggle. See Relation-Theory/Bigelow, here in the lexicon. >Vectors. I 218 Generalization/Bigelow/Pargetter: logical form, if without exception: (x) (Fx > Gx) if it has modal status natN (x)(Fx > Gx) But sometimes it is good enough to say Most F's are G's. Even such statements can have modal character, but beware: probably not of the form NatN (most F's are G's) But of the form Most F's are necessarily G's. Necessity: then only refers to consequence. For example, although not all living creatures necessarily have a mother, so surely our cat. >Range, >Operators. Modal Operator/Range/Bigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: even if it only refers to the consequence, it can be important, e.g. for justifying the explanation domain. >Modal operators. Logical form/Bigelow/Pargetter: one could think it should look like this: (most x)(Fx > natN Gx) I 219 But that does not cover the whole meaning. This would be equivalent to (most x)(~Fx v natNGx) and that is true when most things are not F. And that is not what is meant here! Wrong solution/Generalization/Bigelow/Pargetter: a counterfactual conditional would not help here: (most x)(Fx would be > would be natN Gx) >Counterfactual conditional. Problem: this could be true for the wrong reasons, for example Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: is trivially true if the antecedent Fx is not true in any possible world. >Possible worlds. Logical form/Generalization/Regularity/Law/Bigelow/Pargetter: of "most F's are necessarily G's" must allow the predicate F limits the range over which the quantifier "most" goes. i.e. it must be something like: ((Fx)(most x) natNGx. Language/Level/Bigelow/Pargetter: this is not possible with the languages we discussed in chapter 3. (Quantification 2. Level, higher level, logic 2. level). >Levels/order, >Description levels, >Second order logic. Generalisation/Regularity/Law/Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: we avoid formalisation and deal with the problem intuitively. Generalization/Bigelow/Pargetter: often we find such generalization in our daily life: they are not strictly true. Laws/Bigelow/Pargetter: 1. The characteristic feature is that they involve generalizations. 2. And that they often attribute a kind of necessity to generalization. I 220 That is, not every correlation should be considered a law. Necessity: For example, if it is a law that all things fall to the center of the earth, a) it must not be true that things move like this, but b) it must be true that they have to move in this way. >Necessity. Generalizations/Bigelow/Pargetter: a) some are only true because each of their instances is true. ((s) without necessity). Such generalizations without necessity are not laws. b) for other generalizations, the direction of explanation is reversed: the generalization is not true because their instances are true, but the instances are true because they are instances of generalization. Those are laws. >Laws. The law explains the instances. Instances explain a (non-necessary) generalization. >Explanation. |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Generalization | Schurz | I 89 Statistical generalization/statistics/Schurz: spatiotemporally unrestricted. Ex q % of all A's are C's (A: antecedent, C: consequent). Spatiotemporally bounded: Ex p(K I A) = r, (0 I 90 Generalization/Schurz: a) strict: all-propositions with implication (allimplication). Say something about each individual. b) non-strict: statistical generalization/Schurz: ex "q % of all As are Ks". Ex. conditional probability statements. These are not all propositions! They say nothing about an individual, but only about a class. >Universal sentence. I 92 Non-strict generalization/Inference/Schurz: There are no logically deductive inference relations between non-strict generalizations and singular propositions, but only statistical or epistemically inductive probability relations. Singular proposition: Singular propositions do not contain quantifiers. I 96 Qualitative statistical generalization/Schurz: "most". Comparative statistical generalization/Schurz: ""more likely". Very weak, as nothing is communicated about the level. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Geometry | Inhetveen | Thiel I 287 Geometry/Protogeometry/Inhetveen/Thiel: Often, an "operational" model of geometry is mentioned, whereby it must be taken into account that the properties thus acquired can only be realized if they are idealized. (> Accuracy). --- I 288 There is an attempt of a "protogeometry": "a circular-free method of size comparison" (Inhetveen) In order to satisfy the circular freedom, we have to deal without the need for recourse to geometrical "devices" in the production of forms on bodies. --- I 289 The simplest operation with two bodies K1 and K2 is to bring them into contact with each other. The relation of the touch is symmetrical. Two bodies each have at least one possible contact point. Further bodies K3 and K4 can then always be constructed, so that K3 contacts K1 at the point where K2 previously did this. "Imitation", "Replace". Inhetveen has called this the "weak transitivity". The subjungat requires three rather than two antecedents. Definition "weaker"/Thiel: weaker means in mathematics less prerequisite. --- I 289/290 We extend our regulations to the touching of two bodies, not only at individual points, but in all parts of a given surface part. The bodies (Definition) "fit" then in these pieces. These formulas are statements about bodies, but they are not sentences about bodies that we have before us in our body world. In this way, we make statements about the production targets we are pursuing. Inhetveen describes it as "aphairetic" (from drawing, taking away) criteria for the quality of a technical realization. They lie protogeometrically before the theory of geometric forms. --- I 290/291 Now there are the terms of the "fitting" as well as derived from that one of the original and imprint. Fit: "protogeometrically congruent". For technical purposes, however, one would not only like to be able to shape bodies in such a way that they fit one another, but also fit a third one. Or that each of them fits the other. Definition weak transitivity of the fitting: every body must match a copy of itself (since it cannot be brought to itself in a situation of fitting). Definition "copy stable": the definition says nothing about how a body is made to fit with any copy, and in fact it can happen in different ways .... + ... I 291 --- I 293 Folding axes, rotational symmetry, mirror symmetry are derived protogeometrically. Terms: "flat", "technical line" (=edge), "complementary", "supplementary wedges", "tipping", "edge". (...) The methods are considered. The transition from protogeometry to geometry takes place in two abstraction steps. We do not look at the methods and consider the results in geometry. --- I 299 No reference is made to tools. By the way, there are devices that are more effective than compasses and rulers: two "right-angle hooks" cannot only achieve all constructions that can be executed with compasses and rulers, but also those which lead analytically to equations of third and fourth degrees. The angle bisector can be constructed by means of a copy. ((s)Fitting/((s): Equality in forms does not lead to fit: E.g. plugs fit on sockets, but not sockets on sockets and not plugs on plugs.) --- I 300 Protogeometry defined, geometry proves. (> Proof). If geometry is to be the theory of constructible forms, then we have to take into account this independence (which can be described as "quantity invariance" (> measure)) and do so with the, in constructive science theory, so-called Form principle: If two additional points P', Q' are obtained by a construction extending from two points P, Q, then each figure obtained by means of a sequence K1... Kn of construction steps from P' zbd Q' is geometrically indistinguishable from the figure to which the same construction steps of P and Q lead. --- I 301 A whole series of important statements of classical geometry can only be proved by using this principle. For example, the squareness of the fourth angle in the Thales' theorem can be assured in a purely protogeometric manner just as little as the uniqueness of the parallels to a given straight line through a point outside. Only the Euclidean geometry knows forms in the explained sense in such a way that figures are equal in form if they cannot be distinguished and no application of the same consequences of further steps of construction makes them distinguishable. |
Inhet I Rüdiger Inhetveen Logik: Eine dialog-orientierte Einführung Leipzig 2003 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Geometry | Thiel | I 287 Geometry/Protogeometry/Inhetveen/Thiel: There is often talk of an "operative" model of geometry, whereby it must be borne in mind that the properties captured in this way can only be realized if they are idealized. >Accuracy. I 288 There is the attempt of a "protogeometry" "circle-free method of size comparison" (Inhetveen) In order to satisfy the requirement of freedom from circles, we have to do without any geometric "devices" when producing shapes on bodies. I 289 The simplest operation with two bodies K1 and K2 is to bring them into contact with each other. The relation of touching is symmetrical. Two bodies each have at least one possible point of contact. Then further bodies K3 and K4 can always be constructed, so that K3 touches K1 at the point where K2 used to do so. "Imitation" "Replace". Inhetveen has called this "weak transitivity" because the subject requires three antecedents instead of two. I 289 Def "Weaker"/Thiel: means less demanding in mathematics. I 289/290 We extend our determinations to touching two bodies not only at individual points, but at all points of a given surface piece. The body definitions then "fit" together in these pieces. These formulas are statements about bodies, but they are not sentences about bodies that we have in front of us in our body world. We thus make statements about the manufacturing goals we pursue. Inhetveen describes them as "aphaetic" criteria for the quality of a technical realization. They lie protogeometrically before the theory of geometric forms. I 290/291 Now there are the terms of "fitting" as well as the original and impression derived from them. Fitting: "protogeometrically congruent". For technical purposes, however, one would not only like to be able to shape bodies in such a way that they fit, but also to fit a third person. Or that each of them also fits on the other. Def Weak transitivity of fitting: each body must fit to a copy of itself (since it cannot be brought to itself in a situation of fitting). Def "impression stable": the definition says nothing about how a body is brought to fit with any copy, and in fact this can happen in different ways...+...I 291 I 293 Folding axes, rotational symmetry, mirror symmetry are derived protogeometrically. Terms: "flat", "technical straight line" (= edge), "complementary", "supplementary wedges", "tilting", "edge". (...) The procedures are considered, the transition from protogeometry to geometry takes place in two abstraction steps. We ignore the methods and consider the results in the geometry. I 299 No reference is made to tools at any point. By the way, there are devices that are more effective than compasses and rulers: two "right-angle hooks" can achieve not only all constructions that can be done with compasses and rulers, but also those that lead analytically described to third-degree and fourth-degree equations. The bisector can be constructed using a copy. I 300 Protogeometry defined, geometry proven. >Proof. If geometry is to be the theory of constructible forms, then we have to consider this independence (describable as "size invariance" (>measurements)) and do this with what is known as the Form principle: if two further places P', Q' are obtained by a construction starting from two further places P,Q, each figure obtained by a sequence K1...Kn from construction steps of P' zbd Q' is geometrically indistinguishable from the figure to which the same construction steps starting from P and Q lead. I 301 A whole series of important statements of classical geometry can only be proved by using this principle. For example, the perpendicularity of the fourth angle in the theorem of thalas cannot be determined purely protogeometrically, nor can the uniqueness of the parallels to a given straight line be determined by a point outside. >Measurement. Only Euclidean geometry knows forms in the explained sense, in such a way that figures are identical in form if they cannot be distinguished and no application of the same consequences of further construction steps makes them distinguishable. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Group Cohesion | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 192 Group cohesion/psychological theories: [in] an old experiment by Back (1951)(1) in which high (vs. low) levels of cohesion were manipulated in a variety of ways. In particular, researchers generated high cohesion by leading pairs of participants meeting for the first time to expect that they were similar and would like one another. Participants in this condition exhibited the strongest evidence for groupthink symptoms. A subsequent meta-analysis of similar lab studies further indicated that manipulations of cohesion based on personal attractiveness (but not cohesion based on task commitment or group pride) were associated with worse group decisions (Mullen et al., 1994)(2). >Group think/psychological theories, >Group behavior/psychological theories, >Social groups/psychological theories. Both the social identity maintenance (Turner and Pratkanis, 1998a;(3) >Group think/Pratkanis) and the social discomfort approach (McCauley, 1998(4)) include cohesion as a primary antecedent to groupthink.[anyway they differ in relation] to the nature of that cohesion. a) Turner and Pratkanis (1998a)(3) adopt a social identity approach and define cohesion in terms of members’ identification/self-categorization with a group b) McCauley (1998)(4), on the other hand, posits that a sense of commitment or group pride is less important than cohesion grounded in agreeable personal relations among members. Comparison of effects: Michael Hogg and Sarah Hains (1998)(5) manipulated types of cohesion in laboratory groups, varying whether it was based on personal attractiveness (i.e., prior friendship) or social attractiveness (i.e., grounded in a shared group identity). They also measured friendship and group identification. VsMcCauley: Their findings were mixed, but the overall pattern suggested – contrary to McCauley (1998)(4); Cf. >Group think/McCauley) – that cohesion grounded in personal relations was associated with fewer/weaker groupthink-like symptoms, whereas cohesion grounded in collective identity was associated with more/stronger symptoms (see also Haslam et al., 2006)(6). Difference between the studies of McCauley and Hogg/Hains: McCauley focused on people meeting for the first time while Hogg and Hains examined groups of existing friends. Friendship: Once friendly relations exist and can, at least to some extent, be taken for granted, disagreement and divergence may become more permissible (see also McKelvey and Kerr, 1988)(7). >Friendship. 1. Back, K. (1951) ‘Influence through social communications’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 46: 9–23. 2. Mullen, B., Anthony, T., Salas, E. and Driskell, J.E. (1994) ‘Group cohesiveness and quality of decision making: An integration of tests of the groupthink hypothesis’, Small Group Research, 25: 189–204. 3. Turner, M.E. and Pratkanis, A.R. (1998a) ‘A social identity maintenance model of groupthink’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 210–35. 4. McCauley, C. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in Janis’ theory of groupthink: Backward and forward’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 146–62. 5. Hogg, M.A. and Hains, S.C. (1998) ‘Friendship and group identification: A new look at the role of cohesiveness in groupthink’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 28: 323–41. 6. Haslam, S.A., Ryan, M.K., Postmes, T., Spears, R., Jetten, J. and Webley, P. (2006) ‘Sticking to our guns: Social identity as a basis for the maintenance of commitment to faltering organizational projects’, Journal of Organizational Behavior, 27: 607–28. 7. McKelvey, M. and Kerr, N.H. (1988) ‘Differences in conformity among friends and strangers’, Psychological Reports, 62: 759–62. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Groupthink | Baron | Haslam I 193 Groupthink/Group dynamics/Baron: Robert S. Baron: Baron (2005)(1) argued that groupthink-like dynamics, including conformity, suppression of dissent, polarization, self-censorship, illusions of consensus and intergroup bias are actually commonplace – meaning that they are ubiquitous to pretty much any meaningful group. >Groupthink, >Group behavior, >Conformity. Baron (2005)(1) further argued that failures to find strong or consistent evidence for the antecedent conditions of groupthink may actually reflect the fact that it is so common. In other words, there is little variation to detect because most groups exhibit groupthink-like symptoms and defective decision-making processes. Group think model/Baron: Baron (2005) proposed a ubiquity model of groupthink, arguing that many of the symptoms identified by Janis (1972(2), 1982(3)) are common in groups and arise from three interactive (again, not additive) antecedent factors. 1) At least a minimal degree of social identification (defined in social identity/self-categorization-like terms) is required. Identification with the group matters, in part, because it tends to increase both normative social influence (i.e., compliance), as well as informational social influence (i.e., internalization). 2) For social influence to occur and for identification to produce groupthink-like symptoms, the group must have a clear norm or set of norms for individuals to follow. 3) Social influence is more likely to the degree that individual group members possess low self-efficacy or confidence regarding their abilities to understand or uniquely contribute to decision-making. >Social influence, >Social identity, >Decision-making processes. 1. Baron, R.S. (2005) ‘So right it’s wrong: Groupthink and the ubiquitous nature of polarized group decision-making’, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 37: 219–253. 2. Janis, I.L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 3. Janis, I.L. (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Groupthink | Janis | Haslam I 182 Groupthink/Janis: Example: after the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion which had been planned by a group of highly intelligent people the question came up how this failure had been possible. Janis Thesis: Although Janis concluded that the CIA’s faulty planning and lack of effective communication was partially at fault for the Bay of Pigs fiasco, he diagnosed the primary problem as stemming from social psychological processes operating within the president’s core advisory group. (Janis; 1972(1), 1982(2)). Psychological tradition: Beginning of the 1970s theory and research on group and organizational decision-making were dominated by individualistic subjective utility theory (Kramer, 1998)(3), according to which a single person’s subjective evaluations of risk and reward affect their decision-making processes. JanisVsTradition: stressed the group dynamics underlying these decisions. In particular, he theorized Haslam I 183 that the cohesiveness of groups could motivate their members to prioritize group harmony and unanimity over careful deliberation when making decisions. Haslam I 184 Def Group think/Janis: ‘Groupthink’ [is] a quick and easy way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ striving for unanimity overrides their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action. (Janis, 1972(1): 9) Janis thesis: a specific set of antecedent conditions can lead the members of a group to seek consensus with one another instead of engaging in careful and deliberative decision-making. Group think model/Janis: a) the antecedent conditions expected to produce this consensus-seeking psychology, (b) a set of observable symptoms that should arise from it, which in turn result in (c) a set of defective decision-making processes. The model suggests that these defective processes tend, much of the time, to produce suboptimal collective decisions. Antecedent conditions: highly directive (e.g., charismatic or authoritarian) leaders, limited information search, and insulation of the group from outsiders with the necessary expertise to make sound decisions. Especially important: important: a strong sense of group cohesion (i.e., a strong collective bond of some sort) and a context of high stress or crisis, especially likely when confronting a complex and consequential decision. ^Haslam I 185 Groupthink symptoms: (Janis 1971)(3) Over-estimation of group worth: 1.Illusion of invulnerability 2. Belief in morality of ingroup Closed-mindedness: 3. Collective rationalization 4. Stereotypic views of outgroups Pressures toward uniformity: 5. Self-censorship 6. Illusion of unanimity 7. Pressure placed on deviants 8. Mindguarding Problems: decision-making objectives are inadequately discussed, only a few alternative Haslam I 186 solutions are entertained, originally preferred solutions are not critically examined, initially discarded solutions are not re-examined, experts are not consulted, advice is solicited in a selective and biased fashion, and the group fails to develop contingency plans. Solution/Janis: group leaders should encourage all group members to be ‘critical evaluators’ such that they are able to freely express doubts or objections. Additionally, group leaders should avoid stating their initial preferences at the onset of any decision-making venture(…). Janis advocated for the creation of several independent groups, each with their own leader, to solve the same problem. (…) group members’ opinions should be frequently challenged, either by allowing different external experts to attend meetings, or by designating select members to serve as temporary ‘devil’s advocates.’ Finally, Janis stressed the importance of ‘second-chance’ meetings in which group decisions could be reconsidered one last time before being settled or made public. Haslam I 187 Examples for groupthink: the invasion of North Korea, the Bay of Pigs, and the Vietnam War escalation. Examples not exhibiting groupthink: the Marshall Plan and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Haslam I 189 Groups/Janis: thesis: the only goal of decision-making groups is to engage in measured deliberation to make accurate and logical decisions. VsJanis: Groups may have other goals in mind, such as gaining ‘satisfaction with and commitment to the decision,’ ‘improved implementation by group members’, or even ‘diffused responsibility for poor decisions’ (McCauley, 1998(4): 148). >Group think/psychological theories. KramerVsJanis: Roderick Kramer (1998)(5) suggested that at least some of Janis’ case examples are better understood as flawed decisions arising from politicothink rather than groupthink. President Kennedy (…) sought to make accurate decisions regarding what was the best political decision (e.g., would be popular domestically) to the detriment of making the best possible military decision. In other words, careful appraisal of choices Haslam I 190 (i.e., non-groupthink symptoms) in one domain may produce apparent groupthink in another. FullerVsJanis/AldagVsJanis: Sally Fuller and Ramon Aldag (1998)(6) argue that the easy popularity of the model has distracted social psychologists. They claim that researchers have focused on testing the original parameters of the groupthink model at the expense of asking broader questions about group decision-making. (…) – ironically – some of the best evidence for the groupthink model emerges from examination of the way in which groupthink research has itself been conducted. >Group think/psychological theories. 1. Janis, I.L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 2. Janis, I.L. (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 3. Janis, I.L. (1971) ‘Groupthink’, Psychology Today, November, 43–6: 74–6. 4. McCauley, C. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in Janis’ theory of groupthink: Backward and forward’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 146–62. 5. Kramer, R.M. (1998) ‘Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam decisions 25 years later: How well has the groupthink hypothesis stood the test of time?’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 236–71. 6. Fuller, S.R. and Aldag, R.J. (1998) ‘Organizational Tonypandy: Lessons from a quarter century of the groupthink phenomenon’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 163–84. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| Groupthink | Psychological Theories | Haslam I 182 Groupthink/psychological theories: Example: after the failure of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion which had been planned by a group of highly intelligent people the question came up how this failure had been possible. >Group think/Janis. Psychological tradition: Beginning of the 1970s theory and research on group and organizational decision-making were dominated by individualistic subjective utility theory (Kramer, 1998)(1), according to which a single person’s subjective evaluations of risk and reward affect their decision-making processes. >Decision-making processes. JanisVsTradition: stressed the group dynamics underlying these decisions. In particular, he theorized Haslam I 183 that the cohesiveness of groups could motivate their members to prioritize group harmony and unanimity over careful deliberation when making decisions. >Group cohesion. Haslam I 187 Criticisms VsJanis: Philip Tetlock (1979)(2): Consistent with the groupthink model, public statements in groupthink cases were more simplistic and tended to make more ingroup-favouring references than public statements in non-groupthink cases. However, inconsistent with the model, public statements in groupthink cases were no more likely to make negative references to outgroups. Clark McCauley (1989)(3): three of [Janis’] cases (i.e., North Korea, Pearl Harbor, Watergate) indeed appeared to involve group members internalizing collective beliefs (i.e., privately agreeing with group decisions). However, he concluded that the Bay of Pigs invasion and Vietnam War escalation were better characterized as involving compliance – that is, members publicly expressed agreement with group positions without privately accepting them, presumably due to social pressures to conform. TetlockVsJanis: (Tetlock et al 1992)(4): The authors found some evidence consistent with the groupthink model: structural and procedural faults (e.g., directive leadership, decision-making procedures) predicted groupthink symptoms. However, in contrast to Janis’ original formulation, group cohesiveness and high stress conditions did not emerge as key antecedents to groupthink symptoms. Haslam I 188 PetersonVsJanis: (Peterson et al. 1998)(5) found support for the idea that decision-making styles and procedures have important implications for the success and failures of real corporations. However, there were some caveats: (…) ’unsuccessful groups’ identified by Peterson and colleagues did not resemble the sorts of groups likely to be plagued by groupthink as characterized by Janis; rather, they tended to have weaker leaders and less cohesion. In contrast, ‘successful groups’ were characterized by stronger leaders, greater willingness to take risks, and more optimism. Laboratory studies: have generally focused on manipulating groupthink antecedents (e.g., cohesion, decision-making procedures) to examine their effects on groupthink symptoms and decision quality. Cohesion has been manipulated in a variety of ways: giving false feedback regarding the compatibility of group members’ attitudes, offering rewards to Haslam I 189 successful groups, forming groups from friends vs. strangers, or highlighting shared group membership among individuals (for a review, see Esser, 1998(6): 127–133). Results: these laboratory studies have not found a consistent causal relationship between group cohesion and groupthink symptoms. However,(…) the inconsistency of these results may have much to do with inconsistency in the way cohesion has been defined and operationalized. VsJanis: although there are empirical observations that some of Janis’ (1972(7), 1982(8)) antecedents may produce certain groupthink symptoms, it seems fair to say that there is little or no evidence from either case or lab studies for a strict model in which all of Janis’ (1972(7), 1982(8)) antecedents must be present to elicit the symptoms of groupthink, or in which all groupthink symptoms necessarily co-occur. There is also little evidence for an additive model in which the accumulation of antecedents produces more or stronger symptoms (see Turner and Pratkanis, 1998b). Haslam I 193 Group dynamics: Robert S. Baron: Baron (2005)(9) argued that groupthink-like dynamics, including conformity, suppression of dissent, polarization, self-censorship, illusions of consensus and intergroup bias are actually commonplace – meaning that they are ubiquitous to pretty much any meaningful group. Baron (2005)(9) further argued that failures to find strong or consistent evidence for the antecedent conditions of groupthink may actually reflect the fact that it is so common. In other words, there is little variation to detect because most groups exhibit groupthink-like symptoms and defective decision-making processes. >Groupthink/Packer. 1. Kramer, R.M. (1998) ‘Revisiting the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam decisions 25 years later: How well has the groupthink hypothesis stood the test of time?’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 236–71. 2. Tetlock, P.E. (1979) ‘Identifying victims of groupthink’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37: 1314–24. 3. McCauley, C. (1989) ‘The nature of social influence in groupthink: Compliance and internalization’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57: 250–60. 4. Tetlock, P.E., Peterson, R.S., McGuire, C., Chang, S. and Feld, P. (1992) ‘Assessing political group dynamics: A test of the groupthink model’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63: 403–25. 5. Peterson, R.S., Owens, P.D., Tetlock, P.E., Fan, E.T. and Martorana, P. (1998) ‘Group dynamics in top management teams: Groupthink, vigilance, and alternative models of organizational failure and success’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 272–305. 6. Esser, J.K. (1998) ‘Alive and well after 25 years: A review of groupthink research’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 73: 116–41. 7. Janis, I.L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 8. Janis, I.L. (1982) Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 9. Baron, R.S. (2005) ‘So right it’s wrong: Groupthink and the ubiquitous nature of polarized group decision-making’, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 37: 219–253. Dominic J. Packer and Nick D. Ungson, „Group Decision-Making. Revisiting Janis’ groupthink studies“, in: Joanne R. Smith and S. Alexander Haslam (eds.) 2017. Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic studies. London: Sage Publications |
Haslam I S. Alexander Haslam Joanne R. Smith Social Psychology. Revisiting the Classic Studies London 2017 |
| He/ He himself | Perry | Frank I 432f "He*"/Perry: He* is not working without an antecedent: nonsense: E.g. "God knows that he* (Jones) is in the hospital." >Identification, >Indexicality, >Index words, >Levels/order, >Description levels. I 439f Extra-sense/Perry: possible solution: "s": variable that ranks above sense - E.g. Sheila thinks that an s exists so that s = Ego(Ivan) and Ivan believes that s is wanted on the telephone. Here Ivans extra sense i is not part of the proposition that Sheila believes but it is part of the proposition of which she believes that Ivan believes it. Extra-sense/PerryVsCastaneda: we do not need one. >H.-N. Castaneda, >Extra-sense/Castaneda. Frank I 441 "He*"/PerryVsCastaneda: He* does not seem to be so different from "he". "F-use", "he" as a placeholder of an aforementioned object (*). In attachment to an F-using it is limited* to the meaning area on special extra sense. Problem: that does not yet exclude believing in the evening star that it is the morning star (as long as X believes that evening star = evening star, a priori argument). >Identity, >Trivial identity, >Self-identity. Solution: E.g. "Albert wanted from Mary ... so he went over to her" must be "the woman on the corner" and not the one "he had seen last week". >Anaphora. Solution: it is not the "it/she" but the "that's why", which compels us to - "he*" not composed. - "*" Does not mean "itself". Frank I 446ff "He*"/Perry: not composed of "he" and "self": E.g. the dog Elwood bites himself/...bites Elwood. Difference: a) covered with wounds, b) broken teeth. Analog: a) believes of himself, to be rich b) thinks of Privatus that he is rich. Problem: e.g. the Dean was surprised to find out that he considered himself to be overpaid (according to other description). >Description, >Context, >Intension, >Extension. |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Hypotheses | Schurz | I 120 Qualitative law-hypothesis/Schurz: usually have this form: a conjunction of several antecedent factors A1x,A2x...implies a certain consequence feature Kx, either strictly or gives it a conditional probability. >Probability/Schurz, >Probability theory/Schurz, >Subjective probability/Schurz, >Laws. The conjunction of all antecedent conditions forms the complex antecedent predicate. >Conditions. I 131 Methodical induction/law hypotheses//Schurz: a) when testing a given strict hypothesis, one first tests for truth and then for relevance. b) if one searches for an unknown cause or law hypothesis for a given effect, one proceeds in reverse. >Review. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| I, Ego, Self | Castaneda | Frank I 159 ff I/Castaneda: "volatile egos": like "here", "now", irreducible. - They are entirely epistemological, only for re-presentation, not empirical. Limited identity: only consubstantiation (sameness between coexisting sets of characteristics): not diachronic (transsubstatiation), therefore not all properties are identical, no substitutability, no strict identity with person. "I" is criteria-less, content-neutral. - "I" can only be represented by the impersonal and situation independent quasi-indicator "he". I-design/Castaneda: Vs "I" as "Something". >Guise theory, >Quasi-Indicator. I 167ff I*/Castaneda: "I myself" in an episode of self-awareness one refers to oneself - (corresponding for he*). I 186 "I" is no demonstrative. >Demonstratives. I 170 Transcendent I/Castaneda: we experience ourselves as a not completely identical with the content of our experiencen and therefore associated to the world beyond experience. I 171 I/Self/Consciousness/Self-Awareness/SA/Logical Form/Hintikka/Castaneda: E.g. "The man who is actually a, knows that he is a". Wrong: "Ka (a = a). - Right: (Ex) (Ka (x = a)) -the individual variables occurring in "Ka (...)" are conceived as relating to a range of objects that a knows - "there is a person whom a knows, so that a knows that this person is a" - CastanedaVs: does not work with contingent assertions: "there is an object, so that a does not know it exists" - E.g. "the editor does not know that he is the editor" - (Ex) (Ka(x = a) & ~Ka(x = a))) was be a formal contradiction - better: (Exa)(Ka (x = a) & Ka (x = himself) (not expressible in Hintikka). I 226f I/Castaneda: no specific feature - different contrasts: opposites: this/that, I/she - I/he - I (meaning/acting person) - I/you - I/we -> Buber: I/it - I/you -> Saussure: network of contrasts (plural). Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 Frank I 378 I/hall of mirrors/Castaneda: seems to need two selves: one he speaks to, one he speaks about - but simple self as different from I and body not sufficient. I 430f I/Extra sense/Castaneda: psychological role that one associates with "I" - which explains mental states that do not explain proper names or descriptions: "I'm called for on the phone": spec. mental states - PerryVsCastaneda: not sufficient, you also need to know that it is the own It! - A proposition with "he*" itself says nothing about the meaning of this expression, therefore no identification - E.g. "heaviest man in Europe" could know this without a scale if "he*" could act independently without antecedent. Solution: intermediary extra sense for Sheila's beliefs about Ivan's extra-sense-i. Hector-Neri Castaneda (1987b): Self-Consciousness, Demonstrative Reference, and the Self-Ascription View of Believing, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed) (1987a): Critical Review of Myles Brand's "Intending and Acting", in: Nous 21 (1987), 45-55 James E. Tomberlin (ed.) (1986): Hector-Neri.Castaneda, (Profiles: An International Series on Contemporary Philosophers and Logicians, Vol. 6), Dordrecht 1986 I 470 I/Castaneda: Variable, not singular term, not singular reference: instead: i is the same as j and Stan believes of j... >Singular Terms, >Variables. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Icons | Peirce | Berka I 29 Icon/Peirce: degenerate relation between sign and object: mere similarity. I 30 Conclusion/Peirce: needs in addition to symbol (for truth) and index (both together (for sentence formation) the 3rd character: the icon: because inference consists in the observation that where certain relations exist, some other relations can be found. >Conclusion, >Symbols, >Icons, >Relations. These relations must be represented by an icon - e.g. the middle term of the syllogism must actually occur in both premises.(1) >Syllogisms, >Premises. I 35f Icon/logic/Peirce: Icons of logic: 1. Identity formula: x > y (implication) - second switch-over of antecedents (premises) - 3. transitivity of the copula (= modus barbara) -> copy of a final chain - ((s) icons/Peirce/(s): always have to do with representation and observability of similarity). I 37 Icons/logic/Peirce: 4. Icon: negation: b should be so that we can write, b > x whatever x may be, then b is wrong ((s) EFQM) - ..if from the truth of x the falsity of y follows, then, also conversely, from the truth of y follows the falsity of x - 5. Icon: law of excluded third. I 48 Icons/logic/Peirce: 9. Icon: every individual can be considered as a unit class - 10. Icon: complement - 11. Icon: Association - 12. Two distinct classes must differ in at least one element.(1). >Index/Peirce, >Symbol/Peirce, >Signs/Peirce. 1. Ch. S. Peirce, On the algebra of logic. A contribution to the philosophy of notation. American Journal of Mathematics 7 (1885), pp. 180-202 – Neudruck in: Peirce, Ch. S., Collected Papers ed. C. Hartstone/P. Weiss/A. W. Burks, Cambridge/MA 1931-1958, Vol. III, pp. 210-249 |
Peir I Ch. S. Peirce Philosophical Writings 2011 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
| Identification | Geach | I 139f Identification/Reference object/Intentionality/Geach: Problem: E.g.: "Someone made a derogatory remark about an unnamed person. Mrs. Supanich claims to be that person." E.g. "Ralph is the person x so that it was the will of the testator that x should inherit his business." Def Shakespearian context/Geach: is given if any name can be used ("A rose, whatever its name may be, would smell lovely.") Def non-Shakespearian context/Geach: is given if not every name can be used because of opacity. E.g. inheritance example: Shakespearian. E.g. "Ralph was (one person that) expressly from the testator..." - (here any name can be used). - Even non-extensional contexts can be Shakespearian: E.g. "It is logically and chronologically possible that Caesar was the father of Brutus." (But not when instead of "Caesar" a description is used). We also do not want quantification on "possible names". >Someone, >Reference, >Identification, >Name, >Description, >Context, >Quantification. I 145ff Intentionality/Identification/Intensional object/Geach: E.g. a fraudster buys a car under a wrong name: Problem: The correct name cannot be assigned. Solution: identification over time - then ad hoc name possible: "A" (Existential generalization, "Existence interoduction"). >Existential generalization, >Temporal identity. E.g., "Hutchinson" is not the same person as __ and the plaintiff believed that __ wanted to buy her car. - N.B.: wrong: "Hutchinson is the Person x and the plaintiff believed of x that he wanted to buy her car" (then the plaintiff would have lost). ((s) Identification not with "the buyer", then the purchase would have been achieved - but in case of misidentification: then there was no purchase.) I 148f Identity/Intentionality/Intensional objects/Geach: Problem: de re "in relation to someone .." - "... >de re. Hob and Nob believe that she is a witch". This presupposes that one and the same person is meant. - This is the same problem as "There is a horse that he owes me" (which horse?). >Intensional objects. The Cob-Hob-Nob case. To refer to indeterminate things often means to refer in an undefined way to something specific. - Problem: Quantification does not help: "Hob thinks a witch has blinded Bob's mare and Nob wonders if she (same witch) killed Cob's sow." The range of the quantified sentence part seems to be fully within the earlier dependent context, on the other hand it covers something of the later context. - This cannot be represented in a logical schema at all. Problem: Anaphora: "she" or "the same witch" is tied to an antecedent: "the only one ..." Best solution: Hob thinks that the (one and only) witch which is F, blinded Bob's mare, and Nob wonders if the witch who is F has killed Cob's sow. ((s) additional property F). N.B.: the sentence is true if a suitable interpretation of the property F is true. ((s) Otherwise the sentence is false because of the non-existence of witches.) >Non-existence, >Predication, >Attribution. cf. the logical definition of >"Exactly one". |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Implication | Jackson | Read III 92 Implication/Jackson/Def Robustness: (Jackson) a statement is robust if its assertiveness remains unaffected by the acquisition of information. III 93 The punch line for Jackson: the modus ponens comes into play for conditional sentences. Condition sets are not robust with respect to the falsity of their consequents. >modus ponens, >Conditional, >Implication paradox. III 94 Jackson: Assertiveness is measured by conditional probability. There is a specific convention about conditional propositions: namely, that they are robust with respect to their antecedents, and therefore cannot be claimed in circumstances where it is known that their antecedents are false. ReadVsJackson/ReadVsGrice: both are untenable. The problematic conditional sentences occur in embedded contexts. Example: Either if I was right, you were right, or if you were right, I was right. Assertion and assertiveness: are terms that are applied to complete statements, not to their parts! Conditional sentences are not truth functional. >Truth functions. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 |
| Implication | Quine | I 339 Material implication "p implies q" is not equal to p > q (> mention/use) - implicit and analytical are the best general terms. >General Term/Quine. X 46 Material Implication/Quine: occurs when the sense can be reproduced only with negation and conjunction. Normal implication: in addition to existential quantification. III 67 Implication/Conditional/Quine: Implication only exists if the conditional is true. I 68 Implication/Mention/Use/Quine: not sentences or schemata are implied, but their descriptions. For we cannot write "implies" between the sentences themselves, but only between their descriptions. So we mention the sentences by using their descriptions. We are talking about the sentences. ((s) implication is done via the sentences. Different: Conditional/Quine: (">" or "if...then...") here we use the sentences or schemes themselves, we do not mention them. No reference is made to them. They appear only as parts of a longer sentence or schema. Example: If Cassius is not hungry, then he is not skinny and hungry. This mentions Cassius but it does not mention a sentence. It is the same with conjunction, negation and alternation. Implication/Quine/(s): only example "p implies q" but not "Cassius' skinniness implies..." III 72 "Only if....then"/Quine: is the sign for the hind leg! It also does not have the meaning of the whole "then and only then" (biconditional). I 389/90 Conditional with a false antecedent/Quine: > truth value gap. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Implication | Russell | I 15 Implication/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell: is not a conclusion. I 18 Conclusion: a proposition "p" is claimed, and a proposition "p implies q" is claimed. Then the proposition "q" is claimed as a consequence. >Conclusion, >Inference, >Proposition. I 33 Formal implication/Principia Mathematica/Russell: E.g. "Socrates is a man" implies "Socrates is mortal"- here only the values that make the antecedent true are important. >Antecedent, >make true, >Material conditional. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 |
| Implication Paradox | Armstrong | III 19 Paradox of implication/solution/Armstrong: Univesal Quantifikation: says something about every thing: even if there is no Q: "either there or it is not an F that is a G (>Empty description). Problem: the term of a positive antecedent syntactically difficult to define. - Nevertheless e.g., "being a centaur": this is semantically and syntactically clear. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Implication Paradox | Wessel | I 129 C.I.Lewis VsParadoxes of the implication: "strict implication": modal: instead of "from contradiction any statement": "from impossible ..." >Implication, strict, >Modalities, >Modal logic. WesselVsLewis, C.I.: circular: modal terms only from logical entailment relationship - 2.Vs: strict Implication cannot occur in provable formulas of propositional calculus as an operator. >Consequence, >Operators. I 140ff Paradoxes of implication: strategy: avoid contradiction as antecedent and tautology as consequent. >Tautologies, >Antecedent, >Consequent. I 215 Paradoxes of implication/quantifier logic: Additional paradoxes: for individual variables x and y may no longer be used as any singular terms - otherwise from "all Earth's moons move around the earth" follows "Russell moves around the earth". Solution: Limiting the range: all individuals of the same area, for each subject must be clear: P (x) v ~ P (x) - that is, each predicate can be meant as a propositional function - Wessel: but that is all illogical. >Logic, >Domain. |
Wessel I H. Wessel Logik Berlin 1999 |
| Implicature | Cohen | Meggle I 410 Conversationals implicature/Grice/Cohen: according to Grice the conversation implicature is not erased if the logical constants are truth-functional. >Truth Functions/Cohen. The assumption of non-t-functional reasons is not conveyed here by the meaning, but by the implication generated by conversational assumptions. I 411 (1) If the government falls, there will be riots in the streets. Cohen: there is nothing to choose here (stronger or weaker). I 412 (2) If it is both the case that when the government falls there will be riots in the streets and that the government will not fall, the shopkeepers will be happy. Conversationalist hypothesis/Cohen: according to the conversationalist hypothesis, the implicature normally conveys that there are indirect reasons why the antecedent is true only if the consequence is also true. (...) Thus, the inclusion of (1) in the antecedent of (2) would be quite insignificant to know the truth value of the antecedent of (1). I 415 Disjunction/"or"/conversationalist hypothesis/Cohen: According to the conversational implicature, a disjunction usually carries with it an implicature of the content that there are indirect reasons for the disjunction, although in certain cases the implicature can be explicitly erased. Implication of the reasons for a disjunction can sometimes be explicitly erased: For example, the hidden object is in the house or garden but I won't say where. It is not part of the meaning of "or" that the speaker does not know what is true. >Logical constants/Cohen. |
Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Implicature | Walker | Meggle I 438 Counterfactual conditional/speech act/conversational implicature/Walker: the speaker takes the trouble to express a certain counterfactual conditional and not another - hence the wrong antecedent is not idle. >Contrafactual conditionals, >Presuppositions, >Antecedents. Meggle I 439 "Even if"/Walker: "even if p, q" - Mackie: proposes instead "And equally, p > q". Conversational implicature: in a context where casually ~ p > q can be assumed, a statement of "And equally, p > q" should suggest that this is (~ p > q), with which "p > q" should be connected. Meggle I 445 Conversational implicature: no matter what circumstances are present, we find: "~ (p > q)" significantly less clear than "p u ~ q". Meggle I 471 Conversational implicature/Walker: Conversational implicatures can harden into metaphors and thus make classes superfluous. >Metaphors. |
Walker I Ralph C. S. Walker "Conversational Inmplicatures", in: S. Blackburn (ed) Meaning, Reference, and Necessity, Cambridge 1975, pp. 133-181 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Index Words | Millikan | I 161 Index/Index word/Adaptor/Millikan: unlike other words, the adaptor for an index word is not simply another part of the sentence. It can lie outside the sentence. ((s) pointing, anaphora, etc.). >Ostension, >Pointing, >Anaphora. Adaptive Eigenfunction/Millikan: E.g. Chameleon: the color-producing units are adapted eigenfunctions. >Terminology/Millikan. I 162 Index/Index word/Millikan: E.g. Suppose a chameleon is suspended in the air and has no background on which to align its color pattern. Then there is no adapted eigenfunction. Sentence: every element of a sentence has a relational eigenfunction. Only with it, it is completely described as a sentence part. Individual words do not have an adapted eigenfunction. Index word: has two relations: a) to something within the sentence - b) in addition to something outside. "I"/Millikan: is translated by me into an "inner name". "He"/Millikan: if "he" has no antecedent ((s) no anaphora), then it has no adapted eigenfunction. But it has a relational eigenfunction: Relational Eigenfunction/Index word/Millikan: is the function to be translated into an inner name that has the same referent as the antecedent. E.g. chameleon: here the normal condition for the image must have two components: 1. There must be a background (existence, existence condition). 2. The color pattern must be more or less the same. (Mapping condition). >Predication, >He/He himself, >Identification, >Reference. I 164 Adaptor/index/index word/Millikan: if an index does not have an adaptor, it lacks the full meaning, not truth. I 165 There/Index word/Millikan: presupposes "this": "in this place". This/index words/Millikan: "this" is usually conventional, passed on from speaker to speaker. There may also be "improvised" methods of application. These are not conventional. Improvised techniques can be repeated without leading to reproductively determined families. I 166 Of course: there can be "natural" methods, these are also not conventional: e.g. gestures. >Gesture. "This": (other than "I" and "You") must be added, by specifying the nature of the object. "This" seems to be a special kind of a free variable. Referent/this/Millikan: the referent is largely determined by the rest of the sentence in which "this" occurs. Cf. >Demonstratives. |
Millikan I R. G. Millikan Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism Cambridge 1987 Millikan II Ruth Millikan "Varieties of Purposive Behavior", in: Anthropomorphism, Anecdotes, and Animals, R. W. Mitchell, N. S. Thomspon and H. L. Miles (Eds.) Albany 1997, pp. 189-1967 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
| Inference | Brandom | I 255 Inferential Structure/Brandom: Three Dimensions: 1) Determination and authorization to commitment. I 256 2) Differentiation of accompanying and communicative inheritance deontic status. I 257 3) Inferential structure: in a broader sense: authority, responsibility, authorizationty. I 284 Brandom: Keyword: Concluding combines semantic content and pragmatic significance. >Semantic content. I 496 Inference/Brandom: premises and conclusions: are complete sentences ("free-standing") - Opposite: Conditional: antecedent and consequent: are subsentential expressions ("embedded"). >Subsententials. I 650 Inference/Brandom: semantic significance of types - anaphora: semantic significance of tokenings - Inference: reporting use sentences - anaphora: deictic use of singular terms - conceptual structure is primarily inferential structure - the use of a demonstrative refers to an object and thus becomes a singular term - (other than "ouch") and can also play an anaphoric role. >Singular terms. --- II 9 Inference/Brandom: Priority of reference. >Reference II 35 Non-inferential/Brandom: E.g. perception of circumstances. >Circumstances II 70 Inference/Brandom: even non-inferential reports (perception reports) must be structured inferentially (Sellars and Hegel) - otherwise not distinguishable from RDRDs (reliable differential responsive dispositions) (machines) - Parrot: does not understand his own reactions - non-inferential concept: E.g. red - but: just like one acquires concepts through the mastery of other concepts, one needs inferential concepts to arrive at non-inferential ones. --- Newen I 164 Inferential Roles/Brandom/Newen/Schrenk: a) voice exit rule: actions are considered to be adequate practical conclusions E.g. "The pot is boiling over" > urges the action of taking it from the stove - b) entry rule: involves perceptions of both the environment and of one's own body conditions. This leads to perception reports. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Information | Lewis | V 94 Admissble information/Opportunity/Lewis: hypothetical assumptions about the experimental setup change nothing- that’s why they are allowed. >Hypotheses. Inadmissible: Information about future history - e.g. information about future opportunities. - can be smuggled in by truth functions. >Truth function. Accepted: antecedent about history - consequent about chance at a certain time - non-truth-functional conditionals. These conditionals say how the chance depends on the past - not how history proceeds. >Conditional/Lewis, >Chance/Lewis, >Probability/Lewis, >Probability conditional/Lewis. --- Schwarz I 178 Twin Earth/thought experiment/Lewis/Schwarz: you cannot find out contingent information about the world by mental arithmetic - e.g. about the use of "34" and "1156", even though 34 is the square root of 1156. - (s) Otherwise circular). >Circle. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Intentions | McGinn | I 147/48 The generation of decisions is something completely different than the generation of movement. For decisions are composed neither from antecedent desires or other settings, nor of brain states. >Intentionality, >Mind, >Brain, >Decision, >Action, >Act of will, >Free will, >Desire. |
McGinn I Colin McGinn Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993 German Edition: Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996 McGinn II C. McGinn The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999 German Edition: Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001 |
| Internalisation | Deci | Corr I 442 Internalization/Motivation/Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan: internalization is a developmental process through which external values and regulations can, to varying degrees, be taken in and integrated with one’s sense of self. Self-Determination Theory/SDT proposes that there is a natural developmental tendency for people to take in the values, behaviours and opinions they encounter in their lives and to move toward accepting them as their own. However, this process will function more or less effectively depending on the degree to which the person experiences basic psychological need satisfaction while that process is operating. >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan, >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Autonomy/Deci/Ryan. Corr I 447 Many studies have supported the hypothesizes that need supportive social contexts lead to fuller internalization of values and behavioural regulations (e.g., Niemiec, Lynch, Vansteenkiste et al. 2006(1); Williams and Deci 1996(2)). In one laboratory experiment (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick and Leone 1994)(3) found that three facilitating factors – namely, - providing a rationale for a requested behaviour, - acknowledging people’s feelings about the behaviour, and - highlighting choice rather than control all contributed to facilitating internalization of extrinsic motivation. 1. Niemiec, C. P., Lynch, M. F., Vansteenkiste, M., Bernstein, J., Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2006. The antecedents and consequences of autonomous self-regulation for college: a self-determination theory perspective 2. Williams, G. C. and Deci, E. L. 1996. Internalization of biopsychosocial values by medical students: a test of self-determination theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70: 767–79 3. Deci, E. L., Eghrari, H., Patrick, B. C. and Leone, D. R. 1994. Facilitating internalization: the self-determination theory perspective, Journal of Personality 62: 119–42 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Internalisation | Ryan | Corr I 442 Internalization/Motivation/Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan: internalization is a developmental process through which external values and regulations can, to varying degrees, be taken in and integrated with one’s sense of self. Self-Determination Theory/SDT proposes that there is a natural developmental tendency for people to take in the values, behaviours and opinions they encounter in their lives and to move toward accepting them as their own. However, this process will function more or less effectively depending on the degree to which the person experiences basic psychological need satisfaction while that process is operating. >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan, >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Autonomy/Deci/Ryan. Corr I 447 Many studies have supported the hypothesizes that need supportive social contexts lead to fuller internalization of values and behavioural regulations (e.g., Niemiec, Lynch, Vansteenkiste et al. 2006(1); Williams and Deci 1996(2)). In one laboratory experiment (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick and Leone 1994)(3) found that three facilitating factors – namely, - providing a rationale for a requested behaviour, - acknowledging people’s feelings about the behaviour, and - highlighting choice rather than control all contributed to facilitating internalization of extrinsic motivation. 1. Niemiec, C. P., Lynch, M. F., Vansteenkiste, M., Bernstein, J., Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2006. The antecedents and consequences of autonomous self-regulation for college: a self-determination theory perspective 2. Williams, G. C. and Deci, E. L. 1996. Internalization of biopsychosocial values by medical students: a test of self-determination theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70: 767–79 3. Deci, E. L., Eghrari, H., Patrick, B. C. and Leone, D. R. 1994. Facilitating internalization: the self-determination theory perspective, Journal of Personality 62: 119–42 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Internalisation | Self-Determination Theory | Corr I 442 Internalization/Motivation/Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan: internalization is a developmental process through which external values and regulations can, to varying degrees, be taken in and integrated with one’s sense of self. Self-Determination Theory/SDT proposes that there is a natural developmental tendency for people to take in the values, behaviours and opinions they encounter in their lives and to move toward accepting them as their own. However, this process will function more or less effectively depending on the degree to which the person experiences basic psychological need satisfaction while that process is operating. >Self-Determination Theory/Deci/Ryan, >Motivation/Deci/Ryan, >Autonomy/Deci/Ryan. Corr I 447 Many studies have supported the hypothesizes that need supportive social contexts lead to fuller internalization of values and behavioural regulations (e.g., Niemiec, Lynch, Vansteenkiste et al. 2006(1); Williams and Deci 1996(2)). In one laboratory experiment (Deci, Eghrari, Patrick and Leone 1994)(3) found that three facilitating factors – namely, - providing a rationale for a requested behaviour, - acknowledging people’s feelings about the behaviour, and - highlighting choice rather than control all contributed to facilitating internalization of extrinsic motivation. 1. Niemiec, C. P., Lynch, M. F., Vansteenkiste, M., Bernstein, J., Deci, E. L. and Ryan, R. M. 2006. The antecedents and consequences of autonomous self-regulation for college: a self-determination theory perspective 2. Williams, G. C. and Deci, E. L. 1996. Internalization of biopsychosocial values by medical students: a test of self-determination theory, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 70: 767–79 3. Deci, E. L., Eghrari, H., Patrick, B. C. and Leone, D. R. 1994. Facilitating internalization: the self-determination theory perspective, Journal of Personality 62: 119–42 Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, „Self-determination theory: a consideration of human motivational universals“, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Lemons Example | Bennett | I 190 Lemon-Example/Searle/Bennett: Grice: Conditional (intend p) > (mean p) SearleVsGrice: it is possible to (intend p) and ~(mean p). BennettVsSearle: Searle has not refuted Grice. - The antecedent is not satisfied. - S does not literally mean what he/she says. >Meaning, >Literal meaning, >Meaning/intending, >Reference, >Sense, >Utterances, >Speech acts, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention. |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Logic | Logic: logic is the doctrine of the admissibility or inadmissibility of relations between statements and thus the validity of the compositions of these statements. In particular, the question is whether conclusions can be obtained from certain presuppositions such as premises or antecedents. Logical formulas are not interpreted at first. Only the interpretation, i. e. the insertion of values, e.g. objects instead of the free variables, makes the question of their truth meaningful. |
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| Logic | Dummett | Brandom I 494 Logic/Dummett/Brandom: Dummett per wide view: the derivability relation is decisive, not theorems. >Derivability. Validity is based on antecedent sets of multi-values. >Multi-valued logic. I.e., synthetic, not analytic application of the apparatus. >Analyticity/syntheticity. Not informal assertional validity but formal inferential validity. >Validity. I 495 Brandom: per extension to material inferences. >Conditionals. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Mention | Ryle | Geach I 255 Conditional/Ryle: antecedent and consequent are no allegations. Statements are neither used nor mentioned in conditionals. >Mention/Use, >Use, >Conditional, >Assertion, >Statement, >Truth value. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Monotony | Schurz | I 55 Def Monotony/Schurz: A valid conclusion from premises P1...Pn to the conclusion K is called monotonic, gdw. if it remains valid even after adding arbitrary further premises. (New information does not change anything. All deductive inferences are monotonic, i.e. they satisfy the monotonicity rule: P1,..,Pn/K is valid >for any Q/P1...Pn/K is valid. >Validity, >Conclusions, >Logic, >Inference. Uncertain inferences: are not monotone. Notation: monotone inferences: "/" Non-monotonic: "II". Non-monotonic inferences: Here we are not talking about validity but correctness. A correct non-monotonic inference can become incorrect by new information. Even if the truth of the previous premises is not affected. A black swan does not make the previous observations of white swans wrong. So it always has only provisional validity. Non-monotonicity/probability theory: The probabilistic reason of non-monotonicity is: From the fact that the conditional probability of A under the assumption ("premise") B is high, it does not always follow that also the probability of A under the assumption of B plus a further assumption C is high. >Conditional probability, >Probability, >Bayesianism. I 154 Non-monotonic/single case probability/statistical/Schurz difference to strict (non-statistical) hypotheses: (when explaining single cases): Non-statistical: the conclusion Ka of a deductive inference with true premises (x)(Ax > Kx) and Aa may be split off at any time. I 155 One may infer the truth of the conclusion from the truth of the premises without knowing what else is true. Against: statistich: Bsp from the premise p(Kx I Ax) = 90 % and Aa, however, one may conclude Ga with subjective belief probability of 0.9 only if the condition of the closest reference class is guaranteed. The antecedent information A must include all statistically relevant information about a. >Hypotheses, >Probability, >Probability theory, >Verification, >Relevance. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Multi-valued Logic | Dummett | II 108 Trivalent Logic: if B is false but A neither true nor false: then "If A is true then B is true" comes true, although "If A, then B" is not true! Reason: it is only because we assume, as it cannot be denied, that the sentence "A is true" is false if A is neither true nor false. New predicate for trivial axioms: "A is true": shall have the same truth value as A (not always true). II 121 Neither true nor false/Dummett: this is useful only for parts of sentences (clauses)! -> multi-value logic - independently used sentences (not complex): for these only distinction between designated and not designated truth value important. >Truth values/Dummett. III (a) 27f Third truth value/indeterminate truth value/multi-valued logic/Dummett: The "wit" (purpose) is to be able to explain "not" truth-functionally. Truth table with w, f, X. - Difference: without truth value with conditional with a false antecedent: "X" (>designated truth value) - for e.g. unicorn: "Y" (not designated truth value). |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Nonfactualism | Adams | Field II 255 Definition "surface logic"/material conditional/paradoxes of implication/Field: the surface logic tells us which conclusions are acceptable. (This is just the logic of Adams offered by nonfactualism). >Conditional/Adams, >Acceptability. Def "depth logic"/material conditional/Field: the depths logic tells us which conclusions are truth maintaining. This is the standard logic for ">". >Truth transfer. Problem: does the depth logic do anything at all, even if our mental performance is explained by the surface logic? Solution/Field: Perhaps one can say that at the deepest level classical logic prevails and the special conventions of the assertion only come later. II 256 Factualism/Field: It must then distinguish between levels of total unacceptability (i.e., on the surface) and acceptability at a deep level (which only seems unacceptable by a superficial violation of the convention). Deflationism/Field: the deflationism between nonfactualism and factualism can be distinguished in the same way without using the terms "true" or "fact". >Deflationalism. Field II 256 Factualism/Conditional/Stalnaker/Field: (Stalnaker 1984)(1): (here, at first limited to non-embedded conditionals): here his approach provides the logic of Adams, i.e. Factualism is indistinguishable from nonfactualism in relation to which conclusions ("paradox of material implication") are considered correct. >Paradox of Implication. Deflationism/Field: can he differentiate between nonfactualism and factualism? One possibility is that if there are conditionals where the antecedent is logically and metaphysically possible, but not epistemically. Nonfactualism: thesis: in epistemic impossibility of the anteceding of a conditional, there is no question of acceptability. For the joke of conditionals consists in the assumption that their antecedents are possible epistemically. N.B.: then all conditionals with epistemically unacceptable antecedents are equally acceptable. FieldVsStalnaker: for him there is a fact due to which a conditional is true or false. And some conditionals with epistemically impossible antecedents will be true and others false! Factualism/Deflationism/Field: the test of whether someone adheres to this type of factualism is then whether he takes acceptability of such conditionals seriously. 1. R. Stalnaker (1984). Inquiry. Cambridge University Press. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Nonfactualism | Field | II 183 Fact/Nonfactualism/Field: E.g. relativistic mass or net weight in the Special Relativity Theory: - no fact decides which hypothesis is to be assumed. - The laws are, however, in some cases easier to formulate, depending on the choice. >Facts, >Relativity theory. II 224 Fact/discourse without facts/Nonfactualism/Field: 1. Questions of vagueness (Sorites): E.g. there is no fact, to which "bare" precisely refers. 2. assessment questions/morality/ethics. 3. sentences with indicators/index words. 4. Subjunctive conditional/counterfactual conditional >Counterfactual conditionals, >Index words, >Indexicality. >Vagueness, >Sorites. II 241 Nonfactualism/Factualism/Reference Framework/Relativity/Field: Nonfactualist: has a relativized T-predicate - but for him there is no "real" time order. Deflationism: distinguishes nonfactualism/factualism on the basis of accepted sentences. >Deflationism. Problem: also the factualist could have a relativized concept by introducing it as a basic concept. - E.g. "cosmically privileged framework". - Then one can no longer distinguish factualism and nonfactualism. Solution: to ask the factualist why his framework is privileged a) if he speaks of scientific exceptions, it is distinguishable from nonfactualism b) if unscientific, then indistinguishable. II 242 Nonfactualism/ethics: does not have to say that the sentences have no truth values. - It can say that the truth value ascriptions do not have the factual status, as the assertions themselves. >Truth values, >Ethics. Problem: if you only have the disquotation scheme, how should you state what is not entirely supported by facts? Solution: everyday language: also contains an (implicit) fact operator. >Everyday language. FieldVs: the rules for this are unclear. II 243 Nonfactualism/Ethics/non-deflationism/Gibbard/Field: (Gibbard 1990)(1): admits that evaluations have a factual component - factual and nonfactual must be connected in one and the same analysis. Sets of ordered pairs of possible worlds and standard systems, so that an utterance is true in this world according to this norm. Possible world: is here a complete specification of factual information. >Norms, >Possible worlds. II 244 But it does not contain any "normative facts". Complete norm: associates with each evaluative predicate a non-evaluative equivalent - E.g. "maximizes utility". >Utilitarianism. Nonfactualism: Thesis: the real world contains no "normative facts". N.B.: this non-existence is not a normative fact on its part. Otherwise, error theory: Thesis: "It is a fact that there are no facts". - Then: E.g.: "We should do this and that, according to norm N": is itself not norm-dependent but factual. II 254 Factualism/Field: Factualism does not postulate here a realm of facts, which the nonfactualist denies. Everything that the factualist asserts can be expressed by the nonfactualist by "~ A v B" (negation and disjunction). ((s) Then there is no antecedent that is made false by the absence of facts and thus creates a trivially true consequence.) 1. Gibbard, Alan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Nonfactualism | Stalnaker | Field II 256 Factualism/Stalnaker: Stalnaker is pro factualism. >Facts. Field: for Field it is a fact, whether a conditional is true or not. Then the same is true for some conditionals with epistemically impossible antecedents that are normally not assertible. >Assertibility, >Assertibility/Field, >Facts/Field, >Semantic facts/Field, >Nonfactualism/Field. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Overlapping Consensus | Rawls | Gaus I 93 Overlapping Consensus/Diversity/individualism/Rawls/Waldron: what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. (Rawls 1980(1): 518–19). >Justice/Rawls, >Principles/Rawls. Gaus I 94 Ethical and religious heterogeneity were no longer to be regarded as a feature that societies governed by justice might or might not have, or might have at one period but not at another. It was to be seen instead as a permanent feature of the societies, one that could not be expected soon to pass away. >Society/Walzer. RawlsVsRawls: By the beginning of the 1990s Rawls had become convinced that his approach in A Theory of Justice(2) was disqualified generally on this ground. >Individualism/Rawls. Diversity/inhomogeneity/society/Rawls: ‘[H]ow is it possible,’ Rawls asked, ‘for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?’ (1993(3): 4). In the introduction to Political Liberalism, he argued that this could no longer be achieved by convincing everyone of the ethical and philosophical premises on which a comprehensive liberal theory of justice might be founded. Instead Rawlsian justice would now have to be presented as something that could command support from a variety of ethical perspectives. Question: how many of the substantive principles and doctrines of A Theory of Justice would survive this new approach? Rawls described (...) diversity as a social fact - a permanent feature of modern society. Human life engages multiple values and it is natural that people will disagree about how to balance or prioritize them. Gaus I 95 Waldron: The key (...) is to insist that an acceptable theory of justice, T, must be such that, among whatever reasons there are for rejecting T or disagreeing with T, none turn on T’s commitment to a particular conception of value or other comprehensive philosophical conception. >Individualism/Rawls, >Rawls/Waldron. Problems: (...) there are further questions about how [a] threshold test should be understood. One possibility is that T represents an acceptable modus vivendi for the adherents of the various comprehensive conceptions {C1, C2, …, Cn }. Like a treaty that puts an end to conflict between previously hostile powers, T may be presented as the best that C1 can hope for in the way of a theory of justice given that it has to coexist with C2, …, Cn, and the best that C2 can hope for given that it has to coexist with C1 , C3 ,…, Cn , and so on. Rawls, however, regards this as unsatisfactory as a basis for a conception of justice. It leaves T vulnerable to demographic changes or other changes in the balance of power between rival comprehensive conceptions, a vulnerability that is quite at odds with the steadfast moral force that we usually associate with justice (1993(3): 148). Solution/Rawls: Instead Rawls develops the idea that T should represent an overlapping moral consensus among {C1 , C2 , … , Cn }. By this he means that T could be made acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C1 , and acceptable on moral grounds to the adherents of C2, and so on. Diversity/Toleration//Locke/Kant/Rawls/Waldron: Thus, for example, the proposition that religious toleration is required as a matter of justice may be affirmed by Christians on Lockean grounds having to do with each person’s individualized responsibility to God for his own religious beliefs, by secular Lockeans on the grounds of unamenability of belief to coercion, by Kantians on the grounds of the high ethical Gaus I 96 importance accorded to autonomy, by followers of John Stuart Mill on the basis of the importance of individuality and the free interplay of ideas, and so on. >Toleration/Locke. Waldron: Whether this actually works is an issue we considered when we discussed Ackerman’s approach to neutrality. >Neutrality/Waldron. Overlapping consensus/WaldronVsRawls: The idea of overlapping consensus assumes that there can be many routes to the same destination. Geographically the metaphor is plausible enough, but when the destination is a set of moral principles, and ‘routes’ is read as reasons for the acceptance of those principles, then the matter is less clear. Unlike legal rules, moral propositions are not just formulas. A principle is perhaps best understood as a normative proposition together with the reasons that are properly adduced in its support. On either of these accounts, the principle of toleration arrived at by the Christian route is different from the principle of toleration arrived at by Mill’s route. And this is a difference that may matter, for a theory of justice is not only supposed to provide a set of slogans for a society; it is also supposed to guide the members of that society through the disputes that may break out concerning how these slogans are to be understood and applied. >Justice/Liberalism, >Liberalism/Waldron. WaldronVsRawls: Social justice, after all, raises concerns that can hardly be dealt with by the strategy of vagueness or evasion associated with overlapping consensus – putting about a set of anodyne formulas that can mean all things to all people. Cf. >Abortion/Rawls. 1. Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72. 2. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 3. Rawls, John (1993) Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Paradoxes | Burge | Grover II 201 Paradoxies/Antinomies/Enhanced Liar/Burge/Grover: (Burge 1979(1), p. 178): II 202 In all variants we started with a) an incident with a liar-like sentence. b) then we argued that the sentence is pathological and concluded that it is not true in the wording of the pathological proposition. ((s) Here we are talking about "not true" and not "wrong"). Then we realized that this seems to come down to the following: c) that the sentence is true at the end! Burge: Thesis: there seems to be no change involved in the grammar or the linguistic meaning of the expressions. Grover: that suggests that the changes in evaluation occur in pragmatic terms. >Pragmatics. Burge: since the truth value changes without the meaning changing, an indexical element must be at work. >Indexicality, >Thruth values. Paradoxies/Parsons/Grover: similar: Thesis: the use of "true" and other semantic expressions related to paradoxes brings about a change of the range (the discourse range). >Domains. KripkeVsBurge/Grover: (Kripke 1975)(2): the changeover to b) takes place at a later point in the development of the natural language. >Kripkean fixed points. GroverVsBurge: there is actually a transition to be made, but if the prosentential approach (oro-sentence theory) is correct, the inference of Burge is not valid: Burge/Grover: the transition to b) has the form: "S" is pathological, hence "S" is not true. This should be justified by the following: If "S" is pathological, the sentence is not an assertion. and If "S" is not an assertion, then "S" is neither true nor false. because then: (14) If "S" is pathological, "S" is not true, and "S" is not false. >Prosentential theory. Problem/Grover: if "true" were property-attributive (truth was conceived as a property), namely the same property for "true" and "not true" ((s) the property is then attributed or denied) and a property for "false" and "not false", then we must be able to make the transition to "S" is not true". ((s) with "true" or "false" it would only be about attributing or denying a single property!) Grover: does not want any property, of course. Grover: regardless of whether "true" is property-attributive, if (14) is a necessary condition for an expression to be pathological, then it looks as if Burge was right. For then we could infer that "S" is not true. But: GroverVsBurge: Perhaps "true" and "false" are not property-attributive, and perhaps (14) is not a necessary condition for being pathological: II 203 Then we can argue instead If "S" is pathological, then "S" is not true, We just have something like Provided "S" is not pathological, either S or not S. Expressibility/Important Point/Grover: then we do not need the expressibility ((s) completeness) that we seemed to need. Paradoxies/Liar/GroverVsBurge: Thesis: we can conclude that liar-sentences are pathological, but that does not force us to assume that they are not true. GroverVsBurge: I did say that his conclusion was not valid, but I think that actually there is no conclusion here, neither valid nor invalid: because if "true" is prosential, then ""S"is not true" does not express any proposition! >Propositions. ((s) Has no antecedent from "S" and that stands for any sentence and therefore for no content "everthing he said"). >"Everything he said is true" 1. Tyler Burge: 1979. Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4: 73–121. 2. Saul Kripke. Outline of a Theory of Truth. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, No. 19. |
Burge I T. Burge Origins of Objectivity Oxford 2010 Burge II Tyler Burge "Two Kinds of Consciousness" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Grover I D. L. Grover Joseph L. Camp Nuel D. Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Particularization | Particularization: the conclusion on the existence of an object from the antecedent or from the premise of a predicate-logically formulated statement. The reverse is the generalization. |
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| Premises | Premises: premises are assumptions within logical conclusions. From them follows a conclusion. Premises are written in a separate line. This makes them different from implications written in one line that contain an antecedent with one or more conditions and a post-sentence. See also syllogisms. |
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| Price | Rothbard | Rothbard II 166 Prices/Demand for money/Rothbard: (…) partial ‘real’ factors - such as government expenditures abroad, a sudden scarcity of food, or ‘a sudden diminution of the confidence of foreigners, in consequence of any great national disaster’ - could influence overall prices or the status of the pound in the foreign exchange market. But (…) such influences can only be trivial and temporary. The overriding causes of such price or exchange movements - not just in some remote ‘long run’ but a all times except temporary deviations - are monetary changes in the supply of and demand for money. Changes in ‘real’ factors can only have an important impact on exchange rates and general prices by altering the composition and the height of the demand for money on the market. But since market demands for money are neither homogeneous nor uniform nor do they ever change Rothbard II 167 equiproportionately, real changes will almost always have an impact on the demand for money. Salerno: ... since real disturbances are invariably attended by ‘distribution effects’, i.e. gains and losses of income and wealth by the affected market participants, it is most improbable that initially nonmonetary disturbances would not ultimately entail relative changes in the various national demands for money...[U]nder inconvertible conditions, the relative changes in the demands for the various national currencies, their quantities remaining unchanged, would be reflected in their long-run appreciation or depreciation on the foreign exchange market.(1) >Price theory/Rothbard. 1. Joseph Salerno. 1980. ‘The Doctrinal Antecedents of the Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments’ (doctoral dissertation, Rutgers University, 1980), pp. 299-300. Rothbard III 105 Price/exchange/Rothbard: One of the most important problems in economic analysis is the question: What principles determine the formation of prices on the free market? What can be said by logical derivation from the fundamental assumption of human action in order to explain the determination of all prices in interpersonal exchanges, past, present, and future? >Exchange/Rothbard, >Terms of Trade/Rothbard, >Markets/Rothbard. Rothbard III 108 In order for an exchange to be made, then, the minimum selling price of the seller must be lower than the maximum buying price of the buyer for that good. (…) the price of the good in isolated exchange will be established somewhere between the maximum buying price and the minimum selling price (…). We cannot say at which point the price will be set. That depends on the data of each particular case, on the specific conditions prevailing. In particular, it will depend upon the bargaining skill (…). Rothbard III 110 Competition: [in this case] the price in the exchange will be high enough to exclude the “less capable” or “less urgent” buyer - the one whose value scale does not permit him to offer as high a price as the other, “more capable,” buyer. (…) the addition of another competing buyer for the product considerably narrows the zone of bargaining in determining the price that will be set. Rothbard III 111 The general rule still holds: The price will be between the maximum buying price of the most capable and that of the next most capable competitor, including the former and excluding the latter.(1) It is also evident that the narrowing of the bargaining zone has taken place in an upward direction, and to the advantage of the seller of the product. >Auctions. Rothbard III 112 Universal competition: (…) in a modern, complex economy based on an intricate network of exchanges [there is a] two-sided competition of buyers and sellers. Rothbard III 114 As the offering price rises, the disproportion between the amount offered for sale and the amount demanded for purchase at the given price diminishes, but as long as the latter is greater than the former, mutual overbidding of buyers will continue to raise the price. The amount offered for sale at each price is called the supply; the amount demanded for purchase at each price is called the demand. Rothbard III 115 As long as the demand exceeds the supply at any price, buyers will continue to overbid and the price will continue to rise. The converse occurs if the price begins near its highest point. Equilibrium price/supply/demand/Rothbard: If the overbidding of buyers will drive the price up whenever the quantity demanded is greater than the quantity supplied, and the underbidding of sellers drives the price down whenever supply is greater than demand, it is evident that the price of the good will find a resting point where the quantity demanded is equal to the quantity supplied (…). Rothbard III 116 Value/exchange/Rothbard: Evidently, the more capable or “more urgent,” buyers (and sellers) - the supramarginal (which includes the marginal) - obtain a psychic surplus in this exchange, for they are better off than they would have been if the price had been higher (or lower). However, since goods can be ranked only on each individual’s value scale, and no measurement of psychic gain can be made either for one individual or between different individuals, little of value can be said about this psychic gain except that it exists. Equilibrium: The specific feature of the “clearing of the market” performed by the equilibrium price is that, at this price alone, all those buyers and sellers who are willing to make exchanges can do so. >Market/Rothbard. Rothbard III 117 Market/Rothbard: It is important to realize that this process of overbidding of buyers and underbidding of sellers always takes place in the market, even if the surface aspects of the specific case make it appear that only the sellers (or buyers) are setting the price. ((s) see above, equilibirum price). Rothbard III 119 Once the market price is established, it is clear that one price must rule over the entire market. Rothbard III 120 Demand/supply: (…) as the price increases, new suppliers with higher minimum selling prices are brought into the market, while demanders with low maximum buying prices will begin to drop out. Equilibrium price: (…) once the zone of intersection of the supply and demand curves has been determined, it is the buyers and sellers at the margin - in the area of the equilibrium point - that determine what the equilibrium price and the quantity exchanged will be. Rothbard III 122 Now we can remove this restriction and complete our analysis of the real world of exchange by permitting suppliers and demanders to exchange any number of [goods] that they may desire.(…) the removal of our implicit restriction makes no substantial change in the analysis. Rothbard III 229 Price/Rothbard: it is obvious that man, in his capacity as a buyer of consumers’ goods with money, will seek to buy each particular good at the lowest money price possible. For a man who owns money and seeks to buy consumers’ goods, it is clear that the lower the money prices of the goods he seeks to buy, the greater is his psychic income; for the more goods he can buy, the more uses he can make with the same amount of his money. The buyer will therefore seek the lowest money prices for the goods he buys. Thus, ceteris paribus, the psychic income of man as a seller for money is maximized by selling the good at the highest money price obtainable; the psychic income of man as a buyer with money is maximized by buying the good for the lowest money price obtainable. >Cash balance, >Value, >Market, >Exchange/Rothbard, >Allocation/Rothbard, >Income/Rothbard, >Indirect exchange. Rothbard III 234 Indirect exchange: (…) with money being used for all exchanges, money prices serve as a common denominator of all exchange ratios. Rothbard III 235 Instead of a myriad of isolated markets for each good and every other good, each good exchanges for money, and the exchange ratios between every good and every other good can easily be estimated by observing their money prices. Barter: Here it must be emphasized that these exchange ratios are only hypothetical, and can be computed at all only because of the exchanges against money. It is only through the use of money that we can hypothetically estimate these “barter ratios,” and it is only by intermediate exchanges against money that one good can finally be exchanged for the other at the hypothetical ratio. >Demand/Rothbard, >Supply/Rothbard. Rothbard III 341 Price/production costs/Rothbard: (…) once the product has been made, "cost" has no influence on the price of the product. Past costs, being ephemeral, are irrelevant to present determination of prices. The agitation that often takes place over sales "below cost" is now placed in its proper perspective. It is obvious that, in the relevant sense of "cost," no such sales can take Place. The sale of an already produced good is likely to be costless, and if it is not, and price is below its costs, then the seller will hold on to the good rather than make the sale. That costs do have an influence in production is not denied by anyone. However, the influence is not directly on the price, but on the amount that will be produced or, more specifically, on the degree to which factors will be used. >Factors of production/Rothbard. Rothbard III 464 Marginal utility/price/Rothbard: The marginal utility of a unit of a good is determined by a man’s diminishing marginal utility schedule evaluating a certain supply or stock of that good. Similarly, the market’s establishment of the price of a consumers’ good is determined by the aggregate consumer demand schedules—diminishing—and their intersection with the given supply or stock of a good. >Factor market/Rothbard, >Marginal product/Rothbard. Rothbard III 774 Price/Time preference/demand for money/interest//Rothbard: Time Preference and the Individual's money stock: (…) an individual's money stock Iowers the effective time-preference rate along the time-preference schedule, and conversely a decrease raises the time-preference rate (see above). Demand for money/cash balance/interest: Why does this not apply here? Simply because we were dealing with each individual's money stock and assuming that the "real" exchange-value of each unit of money remained the same. Money units: In this case time-preference schedule relates to "real" monetary units, not simply to money itself. If the social stock of money changes or if the demand for money changes, the objective exchange-value of a monetary unit (the PPM; purchasing power of monetary unit) will change also. If the PPM falls, then more money in the hands of an individual may not necessarily Iower the time-preference rate on his schedule, for the more money may only just compensate him for the fall in the PPM, and his "real money stock" may therefore be the same as before. >Cash balance/Rothbard. This again demonstrates that the money relation (money supply and demand for money) is neutral to time preference and the pure rate of interest. Prices: An increased demand for money, then, tends to Iower prices all around without changing time preference or the pure rate of interest. Rothbard III 816 Price/goods/money/Rothbard: The price of goods-in-general will now be determined by the monetary demand for all goods (factor of increase) and the stock of all goods (factor of decrease). Demand: Now, when all goods are considered, the exchange demand for goods equals the stock of money minus the reservation demand for money. (In contrast to any specific good, there is no need to subtract people's expenditures on other goods.) The total demand for goods, then, equals the stock of money minus the reservation demand for money, plus the reservation demand for all goods. Goods: The ultimate determinants of the price of all goods are: the stock of money and the reservation demand for goods (factors of increase), and the stock of all goods and the reservation demand for money (factors of decrease). Purchasing power: Now let us consider the obverse Side: the PPM (purchasing power oft he monetary unit). The PPM (…) is determined by the demand for money (factor of increase) and the stock of money (factor of decrease). The exchange demand for money equals the stock of all goods minus the reservation demand for all goods. Therefore, the ultimate determinants of the PPM are: the stock of all goods and the reservation demand for money (factors of increase), and the stock of money and the reservation demand for goods (factors of decrease). Symmetry: We see that this is the exact obverse of the determinants of the price of all goods, which, in turn, is the reciprocal of the PPM. Barter/exchange: Thus, the analysis of the money side and the goods side of prices is completely harmonious. No longer is there need for an arbitrary division between a barter-type analysis of relative goods-prices and a holistic analysis of the PPM. >Economy/Rothbard. 1. Auction sales are examples of markets for one unit of a good with one seller and many buyers. Cf. Boulding, Economic Analysis, pp. 41-43. |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Probability | Schurz | Def Conditional probability/Schurz: the probability of A assuming that B exists: P( A I B) = p(A u B)/p(B). (pB) must be >0. B: conditional event, antecedent. A: conditional event, consequent. In the statistical case, p(A I B) coincides with the rel.frequ. of A in the finite set of all B's. Or with the limit of rel.frequ. in an infinite random sequence of B's. >Bayesianism. Non-monotonicity/non-monotonic/conditional probability /Schurz: conditional probabilities are non-monotonic: i.e. from p(A I B) = high does not follow that p(A I B u C) = high. >Monotony. Objective probability /type/predicate/Schurz: statistical probabilities always refer to a repeatable event type, expressed in a predicate or an open formula. Subjective probability: refers to an event token, expressed in a sentence. E.g. that it will rain tomorrow: tomorrow exists only once. >Subjective probability. Subjective/objective/probability /Reichenbach: Principle for the transfer from objective to subjective probability: I 101 Principle of narrowest reference class/Reichenbach: the subjective probability of a token Fa is determined as the (estimated) conditional probability p(Fx I Rx) of the corresponding type Fx, in the narrowest reference class Rx, where a is known to lie. (i.e. that Ra holds). E.g. Whether a person with certain characteristics follows a certain career path. These characteristics act as the closest reference class. Ex Weather development: closest reference class, the development of the last days. Total date/carnap: principle of: for confirmation, total knowledge. Subjective probability: main founders: Bayes, Ramsey, de Finetti. Logical probability theory/Carnap: many authors Vs. Mathematical probability theory/Schurz: ignores the difference subjective/objective probability, because the statistical laws are the same. I 102 Disjunctivity/ probability: objective. The extension of A u B is empty subjective: A u B is not made true by any admitted (extensional) interpretation of the language. Probability/axioms/Schurz: A1: for all A: p(A) > 0. (Non-negativity). A2: p(A v ~A) = 1. (Normalization to 1) A3: for disjoint A, B: p(A v B) = p(A) + p(B) (finite additivity). I.e. for disjoint events the probabilities add up. Def Probabilistic independence/Schurz: probabilistically independent are two events A, B. gdw. p(A u B) = p(A) times p(B) . Probabilistically dependent: if P(A I B) is not equal to p(A). >Conditional probability, >Subjective probability. I 109 Def exhaustive/exhaustive/Schurz: a) objective probability: a formula A with n free variables is called exhaustive, gdw. the extension of A comprises the set of all n tuples of individuals b) subjective: gdw. the set of all models making A true (=extensional interpretations) coincides with the set of all models of the language considered possible. I 110 Def Partition/Schurz: exhaustive disjunction. >Probability theory. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Probability Conditional | Lewis | V 133f Conditional/Probability/Lewis: thesis: the probability of conditionals is the conditional probability. - (VsStalnaker). Logical form: P(A->C) and P(C I A) - But not for the truth-functional conditional ⊃ (horseshoe). - Because here they are only sometimes equal. Therefore, the indicative conditional is not truth-functional. We call it probability conditional. Problem: then the probability of conditionals would hint at the relation of probability of non-conditionals. - That would be incorrect. >Conditional, >Probability/Lewis. Solution: assertibility is not possible with not absolute probability in the case of the indicative conditionals. >Assertibility. V 135 Conditionalisation/Lewis/(s): E.g. conditionalisation on B: P(A) becomes P(A I B) the probability A given B. Cf. >Bayesianism. V 135f Probability conditional/prob cond/Lewis: here the probability of the antecedent must be positive. - A probability conditional applies to a class of probability functions - universal probability conditional: applies to all probability functions (Vs). >Probability function. V 137 Right: C and ~ C can have both positive values: E.g. C: even number, A: 6 appears. - Then AC and A~C are both positive probabilities. - Important argument: A and C are independent of each other. - General: several assumptions can have any positive probability if they are incompatible in pairs. - The language must be strong enough to express this. - Otherwise it allows universal probability conditionals that are wrong. V 139 Indicative conditional/Probability/Conditional probability/Lewis: because some probability functions that represent possible belief systems are not trivial - (i.e. assigns positive probability values to more than two incompatible options). The indicative conditional is not probability conditional for all possible subjective probability functions. - But that does not mean that there is a guaranteed conditionalised probability for all possible subjective probability functions. - I.e. the assertibility of the indicative conditional is not compatible with absolute probability. Assertibility is normally associated with probability, because speakers are usually sincere. - But not with indicative conditionals. - Indicative conditional: has no truth value at all, no truth conditions and therefore no probability for truth. V 144 Conditional/Probability/Lewis/(s): the probability of conditionals is measurable - antecedent and consequent must be probabilistically independent. - Then e.g. if each has 0.9, then the whole thing has 0.912. V 148 Probability/conditional/Lewis: a) picture: the picture is created by shifting the original probability of every world W to WA, the nearest possible worlds - (Picture here: sum of the worlds with A(= 1) or non-A(= 0) - This is the minimum revision (no unprovoked shift). - In contrast, the reverse: b) conditionalisation: it does not distort the profile of probability relations (equality and inequality of sentences that imply A). - Both methods should achieve the same. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Probability Theory | Schurz | I 110 Probability theory/theorems/Schurz: a) unconditioned probability: (objective und subjective) (T1) p(~A) = 1 – p(A) (complementary probability) (T2) p(A) ≤ 1 (upper bound) (T3) p(A u ~A) = 0 (contradiction) (T4) p(A1 v A2) = p(A1) + p(A2) – p(A1 u A2) (general law of addition). b) conditioned probability (for formulas X in antecedens position) (PT1) If B > A is exhaustive, gilt p(A I B) = 1. The converse is not valid. (PT2) p(A u B) = p(A I B) mal p(B) (PT3) Für jede Partition B1,...Bn: p(A) = ∑ 1≤i≤n p(A I Bi) times p(Bi) (general law of multiplication) (PT4): Def Bayes-Theorem, 1st version: p(A I B) = p(B I A) times p(A)/p(B) (PT5) Def Bayes-Theorem, 2nd version: for each partition A1,...An: p(Ai I B) = p(B I Ai) times p (Ai) /∑ 1≤i≤n p(B I Ai) times p(Ai). (PT6) Symmetry of probabilistic dependence: p(A I B) > p(A) iff p(B I A) > p(B) iff p(B I A) > p(B I ~A) (analog for ≥). Def Partition/Schurz: exhaustive disjunction. I 110 Consequence relation/probability/consequence/probability theory/Schurz: the probability-theoretic inference relation can be characterized as follows: a probability statement A follows probabilistically from a set D of probability statements iff. A follows logically from D and the Kolmogorov axioms (plus mathematical definitions). >Probability. I 112 Probability theory/Schurz: still unsolved problems: (a) objective probability: definitional problems. Definition of statistical probability: problem: with one random experiment one can potentially produce infinitely many infinitely increasing sequences of results, Why should they all have the same frequency limit? Why should they have one at all? Problem: even worse: from a given sequence of results, one can always construct a sequence with an arbitrarily deviating frequency limit value by arbitrary rearrangement or place selection. I 113 Law of large numbers/Schurz: ("naive statistical theory"): is supposed to be a solution for this problem: the assertion "p(Fx) = r" does not say then that in all random sequences the frequency limit is r, but only that it is r with probability 1. StegmüllerVs/KutscheraVs: This is circular! In the definiens of the expression "the probability of Fx is r" the expression "with probability 1" occurs again. Thus the probability is not reduced to frequency limits, but again to probability. >Circularity. Rearrangement/(s): only a problem with infinite sets, not with finite ones. Mises/solution: "statistical collective". 1. every possible outcome E has a frequency threshold in g, identified with probability p(E), and 2. this is insensitive to job selection. From this follows the general product rule/statistic: the probability of a sum is equal to the product of the individual probabilities: p(Fx1 u Gx2) = p(Fx1) times p(Gx2). Probability /propensity//Mises: this result of Mises is empirical, not a priori! It is a substantive dispositional statement about the real nature of the random experiment (>Ontology/Statistics). The Mises probability is also called propensity. >Propensity. Singular Propensity/Single Case Probability/Single Probability/Popper: many Vs. Probability theory/Schurz: problem: what is the empirical content of a statistical hypothesis and how is it tested? There is no observational statement that logically follows from this hypothesis. >Verification. That a random sequence has a certain frequency limit r is compatible for any n, no matter how large, with any frequency value hn unequal to r reached up to that point. Bayes/Schurz: this is often raised as an objection by Bayesians, but it merely expresses the fact that no observational theorems follow from statistical hypotheses. I 115 Verification/Statistics/Schurz: Statistical hypotheses are not deductively testable, but they are probabilistically testable, by sampling. I 115 Principal Principle/PP/Statistics/Schurz: subjective probabilities, if objective probabilities are known, must be consistent with them. Lewis (1980): singular PP: subjectivist. Here "objective" singular propensities are simply postulated. >Propensities. SchurzVsPropensity/SchurzVsPopper: it remains unclear what property a singular propensity should correspond to in the first place. Solution/de Finetti: one can also accept the objective notion of probability at the same time. Conditionalization/Statistics/Schurz: on an arbitrary experience datum E(b1...bn) over other individuals b1,..bn is important to derive two further versions of PP: 1. PP for random samples, which is needed for the subjective justification of the statistical likelihood intuition. 2. the conditional PP, for the principle of the closest reference class and subject to the inductive statistical specialization inference. PP: w(Fa I p(Fx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r PP for random samples: w(hn(Fx) = k/n I p(Fx) = r) = (nk) rk times (1 r)n k. Conditional PP: w(Fa I Ga u p(Fx I Gx) = r u E(b1,...bn)) = r. Principal principle: is only meaningful for subjective a priori probability. I.e. degrees of belief of a subject who has not yet had any experience. Actual degree of belief: for him the principle does not apply in general: e.g. if the coin already shows heads, (=Fa) so the act. dgr. of belief of it is of course = 1, while one knows that p(Fx) = ½. a priori probability function: here all background knowledge W must be explicitly written into the antecedent of a conditional probability statement w( I W). Actual: = personalistic. Apriori probability: connection with actual probability: Strict conditionalization/Schurz: let w0 be the a priori probability or probability at t0 and let w1 be the actual probability I 116 Wt the knowledge acquired between t0 and t1. Then for any A holds: Wt(A) = w0(A I Wt). Closest reference class/principle/Schurz: can be justified in this way: For a given event Fa, individual a can belong to very many reference classes assigning very different probabilities to Fx. Then we would get contradictory predictions. Question: But why should the appropriate reference class be the closest one? Because we can prove that it maximizes the frequency threshold of accurate predictions. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Progress | Chalmers | I 55 Progress/Revisability/Science/Chalmers: a statement that once seemed conceptually true may turn out to be false. (Quine, 1951) (1). But this does not apply to supervenience conditionals, which we consider with the form: "If the facts of a lower level turn out to be so and so, the facts of a higher level will be that and that. >Supervenience, >Levels/order, >Description Levels. The facts specified in the antecedent include all relevant empirical factors. Empirical evidence may show that the antecedent is false, but not that the whole conditional is false. >Conditionals, >Facts, >Truth, >Relevance, >Evidence. 1. W. V. O. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosophical Review 60, 1951: pp.20-43. |
Cha I D. Chalmers The Conscious Mind Oxford New York 1996 Cha II D. Chalmers Constructing the World Oxford 2014 |
| Pronoun of Laziness | Pronoun of laziness: expression from Peter Geach for a pronoun (he, she, it ..,), that only repeats a part of an earlier statement (antecedent) as opposed to a quantified use which introduces an object. See also anaphora, indexicality, index words, identification, individuation, introduction. |
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| Pronoun of Laziness | Grover, D. L. | Horwich I 327 Pronoun/Prosentential Theory/Pronoun of Laziness/CGB/Camp, Grover, Belnap: A) Pronoun of Laziness: the pronoun of laziness had no reference, but the antecedent can itself be used. B) use as a quantifier: E.g. "If any car gets too hot, do not buy it." (It would be wrong to say: "Do not buy any car.") E.g. When 3 is an even number, just adding 1 gives an odd number - this is not an instance because 3 is not even. I 330 Everyday language: everyday language has shorter, but not generally available prosentences. Artificial: the operator "thatt" is artificial. See Anaphora, Pronouns, >Prosentential theory. |
Grover, D. L. Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992 Kamp/Grover/Belnap D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975) See external reference in the individual contributions. Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Propositional Attitudes | Perry | Frank I 451f Proposition / propositional stance / PerryVsFrege: the expressions embedded in a report of what someone thinks, designate entities (not whole propositions) to which their antecedents relate. > Cresswell: structured meanings, >Propositions, >Designation, >Objects, >Indexicality, >Index words, >Identification, >Belief Objects, >Thought Objects, >Reference. John Perry (1983a): Castaneda on He and I, in: James E. Tomberlin (ed.) Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castaneda. Hackett (1983), 15-39 |
Perr I J. R. Perry Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Proxy | Grover, D. L. | Horwich I 326/327 Stand for/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/(s): to stand for something is not the same as referring/reference. Reference: a proxy does not refer to the original! E.g. "you" is not used to refer to "Mary", but to Mary! E.g. >pronoun of laziness/Geach: the pronoun of laziness stands for its antecedent. E.g. Jane will go when they can afford it. But the grammatical category must not be changed. E.g. John visited us. It was a surprise. >Prosentential theory. |
Grover, D. L. Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992 Kamp/Grover/Belnap D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975) See external reference in the individual contributions. Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Quasi-Indicator | Castaneda | Frank I 163 ff Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: is the fundamental role of the I only at the moment of the speech act - must refer to a antecedent: Peter believes that "he" ... >Anaphora, >I, Ego, Self/Castaneda. I 165 Thesis: "He*", etc. cannot be replaced by indicators, nor as variables or deputy singular terms or (descriptions). Thesis: (Conclusion of "He"): the reference of "I" is a logically irreducible category, which can only be represented equivalently by the impersonal and trans-situational quasi-indicator "he" - I 321 Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: contradicts the classical theory of propositions: that propositional attitudes are related to propositions. >Propositions, >Propositional attitudes. ChisholmVs/LewisVs: mental states are not primarily based on propositions, but a relation between subject and a property that is attributed directly. CastanedaVsChisholm: attribution theory does not explain sufficiently the explicit self-awareness. >Reference, >Self-reference, >Self-identification. Hector-Neri Castaneda(1966b): "He": A Study on the Logic of Self-consciousness, in : Ratio 8 (Oxford 1966), 130-157 I 430ff Quasi-Indicator He/Castaneda/Perry: he* cannot be replaced by description or names that does not, in turn, contain a quasi-indicator. >Names, >Descriptions. PerryVsCastaneda: the other one can also think "he*, i.e. the other one..." I ~459ff Quasi-Indicator/Castaneda: represents the indexical reference, it does not carry it out. Not entirely deputy, included in reference. >Indexicality, >Index Words, >Proxy, cf. >Placeholders. |
Cast I H.-N. Castaneda Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness Bloomington 1999 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
| Rawls | Waldron | Gaus I 93 Rawls/Waldron: When it was first published in 1971, John Rawls’s book A Theory of Justice seemed to present itself as a set of more or less universal claims: it was supposed to tell us what justice was and what it required in any society which faced what Rawls called ‘the circumstances of justice’ – moderate scarcity, mutual disinterest of individuals in one another’s ends, and so on (1971(1): 126). Under these circumstances, Rawls seemed to be implying, it was appropriate for people to use the idea of the ‘Original Position’ – decision behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ – as a way of figuring out appropriate principles of justice. And he argued that anyone selecting principles from that perspective would adopt strong principles of equal basic liberty, equal opportunity, and a social framework oriented to the well-being of members of the worst-off group. He seemed prepared to argue for these conclusions and defend them against rival conceptions (like Nozick, 1974)(2) as a conception which could command the support of anyone interested in the subject. Later development: Through the 1980s, however, Rawls began to offer a more modest characterization than he had in 1971: „(...) what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. (1980(3): 518–19) >Society/Walzer, >Universalism/Rawls, >Individualism/Rawls, >Justice/Rawls. 1. Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2. Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia Oxford: Blackwell. 3. Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Relative Clauses | Geach | I 106 Complex terms/Relative Clause/Geach: the relation of pronoun-antecedent analog to the variable-operator is ambiguous - solution: resolution by an additional pronoun: "if", "and" etc. ((s) It is not about unity but about dissolving the unity.) Symbolic language/Geach: (e.g. quantum theory): can dissolve unity by definition: E.g. y belongs to the class of Ps: this can be different depending on whether with equality sign or epsilon: for a class x, y belongs to x and if something belongs to x, it is P. >Element relation, >Equality, >Equal sign, >Identity. E.g. wrong: "Only a woman who has lost any sense of shame is drunk". - Correct: "A woman will only become... if she .." otherwise it follows: Men never get drunk. I 120 Relative Clause/Geach: Difference: E.g.: "man who killed his brother"/"man, so that..." - "So that"/Principia Mathematica(1)/Russell/PM: "so that" is an undefined basic concept in Principia Mathematica(1). GeachVsQuine: this is equally unclear. Cf. >Lambda calculus, >Basic concept. Geach: "so that" cannot be distinguished from "and" in quantifier notation. E.g.: "The woman whom every Englishman appreciates is, above all, his mother": The relative clause here is not a general term: otherwise all appreciate the same mother! But in "... his queen ..." Solution/Geach: this has nothing to do with the relative-clause, but with the range of application expressions. >Latin prose theory: >Terminology. 1. Whitehead, A.N. and Russel, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. |
Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 |
| Russell’s Paradox | Frege | Thiel I 335 Logic/Frege/Thiel: Frege's concept of logic, on which he wanted to trace back the entire non-geometric mathematics, was a more broadly formulated one than that of today. For Frege, the formation of sets is a logical process, so that the transition from the statement that exactly the same objects fall under two terms A and B to the statement of equality of the conceptual scopes of A and B, is a law of logic for Frege. >Term scope. I 335/336 Today's view: conceptual scopes are nothing more than sets, therefore the law does not belong to logic, but to set theory. In traditional logic, the doctrine of conceptual extents was part of logic. Today it is part of set theory, while the doctrine of "conceptual content" remains in logic. This is quite weird. Russell's Antinomy/5th Basic Law/Frege: blamed the fifth of his "Basic Laws" (i. e. axioms) for inconsistency, according to which two concepts have the same extent if and only if each object falling under one of them also falls under the others. And, more generally, two functions have the same >"value progression" (artificial word coined by him), if and only if they result in exactly the same value for each argument. In his first analysis of the accident, Frege concluded that only the replacement of the arguments in the function terms by names for the equivalent conceptual scopes or value progressions themselves led to the contradiction. He changed his Basic Law V accordingly by demanding the diversity of all arguments that can be used from these special conceptual scopes or value progressions through an antecedent preceding the expression. He did not experience any more that this attempt ("Frege's way out") turned out to be unsuitable. Thiel I 337 Russell and Whitehead felt compelled to bury the logistical program again with their ramified type theory. The existence of an infinite domain of individuals had to be postulated by a separate axiom (since it could not be proven in the system itself), and an equally ad hoc introduced and otherwise unjustifiable "reduction axis" enabled type-independent general statements, e.g. about real numbers. When the second edition of Principia Mathematica appeared, it was obvious that the regression of mathematics to logic had failed. Thus, Russell's antinomy marks the unfortunate end of logicism. >Reducibility axiom, >Type theory. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Rylean Ancestors | Sellars | I 81ff Def Rylean ancestors/Sellars: language community with a primitive language, vocabulary for public properties of public objects, conjunction, disjunction, negation and quantification and especially the subjunctive conditional. Moreover, there is vagueness and openness. Intersubjectivity/SellarsVs: thesis: that an intersubjective language must be a Rylean language. >Intersubjectivity. Carnap: the resources for an intersubjective language can be known from the formal logic. SellarsVsCarnap. Sellars pro Ryle: thoughts are a short form for hypothetical and mixed categorical-hypothetical statements about behavior. >Terminology/Ryle. I 93 Def Rylean Language/Sellars: a behaviorist language that is limited to the non-theoretical vocabulary of a behaviorist psychology. - (s) So nothing unobservable). >Behaviorism. I 105f Rylean Language/Rylean ancestors/Sellars: actual declaration, new language - more than just code: conceptual framework of public objects in space and time. - Language of impressions: embodies the discovery that there are such things, but it is not specifically tailored to them. (Individual things have no antecedent objects of thought). Cf. >Thought objects. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Selection Function | Lewis | V 16 Def Selection Function/Stalnaker/Lewis: f, selects for each antecedent A and, for each i the set of all next (accessible) possible worlds for A-worlds with respect to i - were A >>would C in i iff C holds everywhere in the selected set f(A, i). Explanation/(s): "were A >>would C" means: If A were the case, C would be the case. >Counterfactual conditional/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Sensory Impressions | Sellars | McDowell I 168 Sensory Impressions/Sellars: distinguished from pieces of the given. No direct relationship with the knowledge. >Given/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Perception, >Perception/Sellars. Active receptivity. But the receptivity cannot cooperate itself in a rational manner with the spontaneity. (VsQuine). --- I IX Sellars: no renunciation of sensations in toto. (Unlike Quine). >Sensations/Quine. I XXIII Sensory Impressions/Quine: manifolds, which are to be structured through various theory drafts. (SellarsVs). I XXIII Sellars: Physical and mental are not in a causal relationship, but belong to different world views. >Physical/psychic. Only conveyed by structure of world views. (Vs above). The frames are related by their structure and not by content. It is simply a wrongly asked question how impressions and electromagnetic fields can tolerate each other. I XXIX The theory of sensory impressions does not speak of inner objects. >Inner objects. I XXXVII Sellars: sensory impressions only have causal consequences of external physical objects. A red sensation can also occur if the external object only seems to be red. Both concepts explain why the speaker always speaks of something red. Only, the sensation is according to Sellars no object of knowledge, and even the category of the object is questioned by Sellars. >Object/Sellars, >Knowledge/Sellars, >Sensation/Sellars. I XL First, however, these states are states of a person. Not of a brain. In any case, they are imperceptible. Sensory Impressions: neither they have a color, nor do they have a shape. (> Perception/Sellars). Impressions: that these are theoretical entities, is shown to us by how to characterize them in an intrinsic way: not only as descriptions: "entity as such, that looking at a red and triangular object under such and such circumstances has the standard cause." But rather as predicates. These are no abbreviations for descriptions of properties. Example if one says that molecules have a mass, then the word "mass" is not an abbreviation of a description of the form "the property that ...". I 101 "Impression of a red triangle" does not only mean "impression like he ... through red and triangular objects ...." although it is a truth, namely a logical truth about impressions of red triangles. I 103 Impressions need to be inter-subjective, not completely dissolvable impressions in behavioral symptoms: states (but not physiological) - impressions are not objects. I 106 Sellars: Rylean Language: actual explanation, is more than just a code: conceptual framework public objects in space and time. >Rylean ancestors. Language of impressions: embodies the discovery that there are such things, but it is not specifically tailored to them (individual things no antecedent objects of thinking). SellarsVsHume: because he does not clearly distinguish between thoughts and impressions, he can assume that a natural derivative corresponds not only to a logical but also a temporal sequence. His theory must be extended so that it also includes cases such as the above or backwards: Thunder now, before a moment of lightning. --- II 328 Hume does not see that the perception of a configuration is also the configuration of perceptions. >Perception/Hume, >Impression/Hume, >Thinking/Hume, >David Hume. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell |
| Similarity Metrics | Lewis | V 10 Similarity metric/Possible worlds/Po.wo./Similarity/Lewis: order assumption: weak order: whenever two worlds can be accessed from the the world i in question, either one or the other is more similar to world i. - Decreasing or increasing similarity is transitive. - In contrast, partial order: not all couples are distinguishable. >Possible world/Lewis. V 11 Compatibility/Possible world/Lewis: B is compatible with A in world i if an A world is closer to i than any non-B-world. - (Reversal of rather true) - then A were>>would C is true if C follows from A together with auxiliary hypotheses B1...Bn. - E.g. natural laws are compatible or completely incompatible with every assumption - thesis: then laws of nature are generalizations of what we consider to be particularly important. - Then conformity with Laws of Nature should be important for the similarity relation between possible worlds - (> Similarity metrics). V 12f Similarity metric/Possible worlds/Lewis: sphere/Similarity sphere: E.g. S sphere around the world i: exists, if any S world is accessible from i and closer than any ~ S world): admitting A: a sphere contains an A world. - Degree: spheres represent degrees (comparative, unlike neighborhood in topology). Compatibility/Compatible/(s): B is compatible with A if there is an A world in the B sphere. - Definition A were>>would C is true if A>C applies in an A permitting sphere around i, if such a sphere exists. >Implication. V 13 Definition Then were A>>would C would be true if AC applied in every A permitting sphere around i ((s) conjunction) - Definition A impossible worlds: >Impossible World. V 42 Similarity metric/Similarity/Possible world/Lewis: It is not about any particular similarity relation that you happen to have in mind. - Problem: if some aspects do not even count, the centering assumption would be violated. - I.e. worlds that differ in an unnoticed aspect, would be identical with the actual world. - Lewis: but such worlds do not exist.- Similarity relations: must be distinguished: a) for explicit judgments - b) for counterfactual judgments. V 150 Revision/Possible world/Similarity metrics/Stalnaker/Lewis: every revision will select the most similar antecedent world. --- Schwarz I 160 Lewis: E.g. a single particle changes its charge: then it behaves differently. - Because a possible world in which not only the charge but also the role were exchanged would be much less similar (> next world). |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Similarity Metrics | Nozick | II 174 Similarity Metrics/Similarity/Possible Worlds/Nozick: the measure for the next world must be: what if the antecedent is true. - E.g. alphabetical order on the shelf: is an explanatory, not merely a representative order. - Why are the things there? >Order, >Possible worlds, >Cross world identity, >Explanation. Variant: content arranged, but coincidentally the same order - then the alphabetical order is not an explanation. - ((s) Then the neighborhood is no next world, but an irrelevant world.) II 241 Closure/Nearest World/Similarity Metrics/Nozick: when the condition (3) (believe nothing wrong) Condition (3) "If p would be false, S would not believe it" was to be completed, then, if p implies q, the non-q-situation must not be further away from the actual world than the nearest non-p-world. >Closure, >Omniscience/Nozick, >Real world, >Actuality. NozickVsClosure under known implication: we do not have to know or believe all the consequences of our knowledge. II 242 Closure/knowledge/Skepticism/Nozick: if our knowledge were closed under known implication, then if p implies q, the non-q-situation must not be further from the actual world than the nearest non possible world. >Brains in a vat, >Skepticism. Problem: when this is a "non-tank" world, then the statement would demand that the world of the skeptic does not exist, that the tank-world is not further away from the actual world, than any other non possible world. Problem: we would believe p, even if it is wrong, then we do not know that p. >Belief, >Knowledge. All conditionals, which say that we believe nothing wrong, would be wrong. >Conditional. Closed: would be the concept of knowledge only if the world of the skeptic might exist, if p were not true. So when our concept of knowledge would be so strong, skepticism would be right. >Stronger/weaker, >Strength of theories, >Concepts. Nozick: but we do not have to accept that. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Somatic Diseases | Psychological Theories | Corr I 205 Somatic diseases/psychological theories/Elovainio/Kivimäki: (...) in the 1700s and 1800s, psychological explanations, including personality, were used mainly if there was no evident physiological mechanism found for a somatic disease (for a review see Ravaja 1996)(1)). Today, a large body of evidence suggests that psychological factors may have a role in many somatic health problems involving inflammatory and cardiovascular disease processes (Hemingway and Marmot 1999(2); Miller, Markides, Chiriboga and Ray 1996(3); Schneiderman 1987(4); Smith 1992(5)). The psychological factors were expected to be linked to somatic health without any complicated mechanisms and the psychosomatic diseases were proposed to be caused by specific psychological problems or conflicts, as defined for instance by psychodynamic theories (Lipowski 1984)(6). Later research suggests that this is clearly an oversimplified view. [The] growth of scientific activity has led, however, to a more and more fragmented picture of the field. Problems: First, although there is a growing consensus about the structure of personality traits at the higher-order level, as defined by the Big Five in adulthood or by temperament theories (Buss, Plomin and Willerman 1973(7); Cloninger, Svrakic and Przybeck 1993(8)) in childhood, much of the current research about personality and health focuses on single, lower-order traits (e.g., hostility) without examining those traits in relation to other traits. The second problem in the field relates to the lack of a conceptual model of the evidently complex interaction process between personality and health. Corr I 206 Thirdly, personality researchers have used a large number of measures and scales to describe individual differences between people in a wide variety of ways. This has contributed to a situation where coherent scientific evidence cumulates extremely slowly compared to the amount of scientific activity in the field. Finally, the fragmented picture of the scientific activities in psychosomatic research also reflects its background as a mixture of two different scientific traditions: medicine and behavioural sciences. Cf. >Stress/psychological theories. Corr I 209 An important set of theories is based on the idea that personality, as part of the emotional reaction or behaviour pattern, induces direct biological and physiological changes or reactions with potential pathophysiological pathophysiological consequences. >Personality, >Personality traits. A. Direct effect models: (Krantz and Manuck 1984(9); Schneiderman 1987)(10), (Besedovsky, del Rey, Klusman et al. 1991(11); Besedovsky, Herberman, Temoshok and Sendo 1996(12); Maier and Watkins 1998)(13); (e.g., Baum and Nesselhof 1988(14); Baum and Posluszny 1999(15); Cohen, Tyrrell and Smith 1991(16); Kiecolt-Glaser and Glaser 1999(17); Kiecolt-Glaser, Marucha, Malarkey et al. 1995)(18). According to the reactivity hypothesis, there are significant differences in physiological reactivity that are related to personality factors (Miller, Smith, Turner et al. 1996)(19). Structural weakness hypothesis: many of the personality-related features, such as shyness and hostility, share the same genetic or biological background with some physiological problems that are related to or even cause somatic health problems. (Cloninger, Svrakic and Przybeck 1993)(20) temperament theory or the theory of Buss, Plomin and Willerman (1973)(21). Corr I 211 B. Direct effect models: e.g. (Miller, Smith, Turner et al. 1996)(19). Health and disease are influenced by behaviours that convey risks or protect against them. Less studied and more controversial than those described above is the selection hypothesis proposing that psychological factors, such as personality, may be associated with selection of people to health risk environments or situations (Kivimäki, Virtanen, Elovainio and Vahtera 2006)(22). 1. Ravaja, N. 1996. Psychological antecedents of metabolic syndrome precursors in the young. Helsinki: Yliopistopaino 2. Hemingway, H. and Marmot, M. 1999. Evidence based cardiology: psychosocial factors in the aetiology and prognosis of coronary heart disease. Systematic review of prospective cohort studies, British Medical Journal 318: 1460–7 3. Miller, T. Q., Markides, K. S., Chiriboga, D. A. and Ray, L. A. 1995. A test of the psychosocial vulnerability and health behaviour models of hostility: results from an 11-year follow-up study of Mexican Americans, Psychosometric Medicine 57: 572–81 4. Schneiderman, M. A. 1987. Mortality experience of employees with occupational exposure to DBCP, Archives of Environmental Health 42: 245–7 5. Smith, T. W. (1992). Hostility and health: current status of a psychosomatic hypothesis, Health Psychology 11: 139–50 6. Lipowski, Z. J. 1984. What does the word ‘psychosomatic’ really mean? A historical and semantic inquiry, Psychosomatic Medicine 46: 153–71 7. Buss, A. H., Plomin, R. and Willerman, L. 1973. The inheritance of temperaments, Journal of Personality 41: 513–24 8. Cloninger, C. R., Svrakic, D. M. and Przybeck, T. R. 1993. A psychobiological model of temperament and character, Archives of General Psychiatry 50: 975–90 9. Krantz, D. S. and Manuck, S. B. 1984. Acute psychophysiologic reactivity and risk of cardiovascular disease: a review and methodologic critique, Psychological Bulletin 96: 435–64 10. Schneiderman, M. A. 1987. Mortality experience of employees with occupational exposure to DBCP, Archives of Environmental Health 42: 245–7 11. Besedovsky, H. O., del Rey, A., Klusman, I., Furukawa, H., Monge Arditi, G. and Kabiersch, A. 1991. Cytokines as modulators of the hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal axis, Journal of Steroid Biochemistry and Molecular Biology 40: 613–18 12. Besedovsky, H. O., Herberman, R. B., Temoshok, L. R. and Sendo, F. 1996. Psychoneuroimmunology and cancer: fifteenth Sapporo Cancer Seminar, Cancer Research 56: 4278–81 13. Maier, S. F. and Watkins, L. R. 1998. Cytokines for psychologists: implications of bidirectional immune-to-brain communication for understanding behaviour, mood, and cognition, Psychological Review 105: 83–107 14. Baum, A. and Nesselhof, S. E. 1988. Psychological research and the prevention, etiology, and treatment of AIDS, American Psychologist 43: 900–6 15. Baum, A. and Posluszny, D. M. 1999. Health psychology: mapping biobehavioural contributions to health and illness, Annual Review of Psychology 50: 137–63 16. Cohen, S., Tyrrell, D. A. and Smith, A. P. 1991. Psychological stress and susceptibility to the common cold, New England Journal of Medicine 325: 606–12 17. Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K. and Glaser, R. 1999. Chronic stress and mortality among older adults, Jama 282: 2259–60 18. Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K., Marucha, P. T., Malarkey, W. B., Mercado, A. M. and Glaser, R. 1995. Slowing of wound healing by psychological stress, Lancet 346: 1194–6 19. Miller, T. Q., Smith, T. W., Turner, C. W., Guijarro, M. L. and Hallet, A. J. 1996. A meta-analytic review of research on hostility and physical health, Psychological Bulletin 119: 322–48 20. Cloninger, C. R., Svrakic, D. M. and Przybeck, T. R. 1993. A psychobiological model of temperament and character, Archives of General Psychiatry 50: 975–90 21. Buss, A. H., Plomin, R. and Willerman, L. 1973. The inheritance of temperaments, Journal of Personality 41: 513–24 22. Kivimäki, M., Virtanen, M., Elovainio, M. and Vahtera, J. 2006. Personality, work, career and health, in L. Pulkkinen, J. Kaprio and R. J. Rose (eds.), Socioemotional Development and Health from Adolescence to Adulthood, pp. 328–42. New York: Cambridge University Press Marko Elovainio and Mika Kivimäki, “Models of personality and health”, in: Corr, Ph. J. & Matthews, G. (eds.) 2009. The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press |
Corr I Philip J. Corr Gerald Matthews The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology New York 2009 Corr II Philip J. Corr (Ed.) Personality and Individual Differences - Revisiting the classical studies Singapore, Washington DC, Melbourne 2018 |
| Speech Act Theory | Cohen | Meggle I 418ff CohenVsSpeech Act: fails in complex cases - e.g. questionable formulation in the antecedent of a conditional. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. L.Jonathan Cohen, Die logischen Partikel der natürlichen Sprache. In: Georg Meggle (Hrsg.) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt 1979 |
Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Grice: > Meg I G. Meggle (Hg) Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung Frankfurt/M 1979 |
| Speech Act Theory | Grice | IV 243f The speech act, not the sign, is the carrier of meaning. Cohen I 415f CohenVsSpeech Act (> Grice): the speech act fails in complex cases, e.g. in a questionable turn in the antecedent of a conditional. Cf. >Implication paradox. >Performance, >Competence, >Semantics, >Language, >Speaking, >Paul Grice, >Anita Avramides, >John Searle, >J.L.Austin, >Illocutionary acts, >Perlocutionary acts. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Strength of Theories | Nozick | II 207 stronger/weaker/Nozick: the negation of the consequent is much stronger than the negation of the antecedent. >Stronger/weaker. II 270 Stronger/weaker: the weaker the hypothesis, the stronger the negation. >Hypotheses, >Negation. II 271 Strongest form of an assertion: at the same time the most neneral. ((s) i.e. that it covers most cases, but not that it ascribes the most predicates.) >Predication, >Ascription, >Identification, >Generality, >Generalization. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Subjunctive Conditionals | Goodman | II 11 Subjunctive conditionals/counterfactual conditionals/Goodman: it is not the case that science could do without irreal conditional clauses. >Counterfactual conditionals. II 17 There are not only disposition predicates like "soluble" or "combustible" but also "red" and others. Ordinary predicates play a role. >Dispositions. II 18 As truth functions all subjunctive conditionals are true, of course, since their antecedents are false. If you wanted to check them empirically, they were not irrational anymore, since the antecedent would be made true. >Truth functions, >Truthmakers. II 35 Everything that was in my pocket on May 8 was made of silver. Law: although the supposed unifying principle is generally true and perhaps fully confirmed by observation of all cases, it cannot constitute a subjunctive conditional, because it describes a random fact and it is no law. >Laws, >Lawlikeness, >Observation. And apparently no purely syntactic criterion can be useful, because the most specific description of individual facts can be brought into a shape that has any desired degree of syntactic generality. >Criteria. |
G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 |
| Subjunctive Conditionals | Grice | Walker I 419 ff Subjunctive Conditionals/Counterfactual Conditionals/Walker: every material implication with a false antecedent is true, but usually we distinguish true and false unreal conditional clauses. A speaker makes an effort to express one certain subjunctive conditional clause and not another. Talking of a baby without a head is confusing in a way as it is not in a subjunctive conditional clause. >Counterfactual conditionals. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Walker I Ralph C. S. Walker "Conversational Inmplicatures", in: S. Blackburn (ed) Meaning, Reference, and Necessity, Cambridge 1975, pp. 133-181 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Terminology | Grice | II 36 Def M-intention/Grice: "that H intends to do this-and-that" instead of "that H does such-and-such." This is an intentional act. II 38 The candidate means that Waterloo was in 1815, but he does not intend that the teacher believes that II 44 Def #-psi/terminology/Grice: #-psi is a mode indicator that is correlated with the propositional attitude psi from a given range of propositional attitudes. H is to actively "psi" that p - Exceptions: "Do not go past the border": H himself should have the intention. III 102 R-correlation stands for: referential correlation. D-correlation stands for: denotational correlation. III 103 Difference reference/denotation: Peter's dog is an R-correlate of "Fido". Every thing with long fur is a D-correlate of "shaggy". Resulting method: for S "Fido is shaggy" means the same as "Peter’s dog has long fur". III 104 Problem: the "designated pair" between Fido/Peter's dog (not cat). What is the meaning of "designated"? III 105 The situation may be brought about accidentally where sentences mean something else - this complementary relationship can only be eliminated by the condition of the intention to make a difference. Cohen I 395 Def conversationalist hypothesis/CH/Grice: the meaning of the logical particles "~", "u", "v" and ">" is not different from the particles used in natural language. "And", "or", "if, then" and "not": where they appear inconsistent, this appearance is due to the different assumptions with which natural language utterances are usually understood. Cohen I 395ff Def semantic hypothesis (Cohen): many occurrences of logical particles in natural conversation differ from their meaning in formal contexts - although there are cases where they are consistent. Cohen I 402 Thesis: everyday languange meaning is richer than truth functional meaning. Cohen I 410 Image: "that is a tree". Assumption: it is a painted tree. Cohen I 412 Conversationalist hypothesis/Cohen: the conversationalist hypothesis assumes that the conversation implicature transmits that the antecedent is true only if the consequent is true. |
Grice I H. Paul Grice "Meaning", in: The Philosophical Review 66, 1957, pp. 377-388 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Megle Frankfurt/M. 1993 Grice II H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning and Intentions", in: The Philosophical Review, 78, 1969 pp. 147-177 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Grice III H. Paul Grice "Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning", in: Foundations of Language, 4, 1968, pp. 1-18 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Grice IV H. Paul Grice "Logic and Conversation", in: P. Cple/J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics, Vol 3, New York/San Francisco/London 1975 pp.41-58 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen I Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Some Remarks on Grice’s Views about the Logical Particals of Natural Languages", in: Y. Bar-Hillel (Ed), Pragmatics of Natural Languages, Dordrecht 1971, pp. 50-68 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Cohen II Laurence Jonathan Cohen "Mr. Strawson’s Analysis of Truth", Analysis 10 (1950) pp. 136-140 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Terminology | Grover, D. L. | Horwich I 323 Propositional Quantification/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB: problem: because "T" is a predicate (if it is read as "is true") and "Tp" is a sentence, "p" must be a term of the language, that means, it must occupy a nominal position. That, in turn, means that the quantifiers bind individual variables (of a certain type), and not variables via sentences. I 324 Problem: these are no longer the Ramsey variables. Ramsey variables are the ones that bind variables that occupy sentence positions. Sellars: this is right: relative pronouns can represent formulas with bound individual variables but not with propositional variables, because they have a sentence position. Solution: we need cross-reference. Cross-reference: cross-reference is made of a variable. The variable must be able to occupy the sentence position. -> Pronoun -> "Pro-verb": e.g. "do". I 331 "Generic"/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/(s): here: "generic" is dependent on the antecedent. I 332 "Thatt"/CGB: "thatt" is not a new term. It is only new grammar: e.g. Mary says: "It is hot". John says: "Thatt". There are no new feature ascribing predicates. I 334 English* (with asterisk): English* is used without a truth predicate, but with the Prosentence "It is true". "Is" cannot be modified (time, etc.), because the Prosentence cannot be split. Solution: e.g. "It-is-going-to-be-true" etc. Hyphen: the hyphen shows that the truth predicate in English* cannot be isolated. N.B.: English can be translated into English* without any sacrifices - that is enlightening. >Prosentential theory. |
Grover, D. L. Gro I D. Grover, A Prosentential Theory of Thruth, Princeton New Jersey 1992 Kamp/Grover/Belnap D. L. Grover, J L. Camp, N. D. Belnap Philosophical Studies 27 (1) 73 – 125 (1975) See external reference in the individual contributions. Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Terminology | Ryle | Geach I 94 Namely rider/Ryle/GeachVsRyle: the namely rider does not help if a sentence does not designate: e.g [The only one who has ever stolen a book of Snead] (namely Robinson) made a lot of money by selling it. We memorize from that: Robinson made a lot of money by selling it. Geach I 255 Assertion/modus ponens/Ryle: "code-style": it is misleading that p does not have to be alleged. E.g. "if p then q, but p, therefore q". Conditional/Ryle: antecedent and consequent are not statements. Statements are neither needed nor mentioned in conditionals. Ryle: here the conditional is not a premise that coordinates with "p", as the "code style" suggests, but rather a "final ticket", a "license for the conclusion": "p", therefore q. Solution/Geach: to take propositions, not allegations. --- Ryle I 58 E.g. semi disopsitional/semi episodicall: "careful", "unswerving", etc. do not have anything extra - they are a manner. I 93ff Voluntary/Ryle: the use of "voluntary" is too extended. Laughter cannot be intentional - "Voluntary" is not "responsible" for punctual schoolwork. I 97 Wrong: to define voluntariness as the child of voluntary acts. But being fully committed in the matter with the mind. I 174 f Success words: healing, proving, recognizing, knowledge, observation, can, win, solve, find - these cannot be performed incorrectly. The tendency to disease is different than habit - preference is unlike investment: (you would leave it if you would get the money like this). I 178 Belief/Ryle: belief is a motivational word. Corresponding predicates are: "stubborn", "naive" and "temporarily". These predicates are not extendable to the object but extendable to certain nouns: like e.g. "confidence", "instinct", "habit", "jealousy", "attachment" and "aversion". Knowledge: is an ability word. I 195 Mix-categorical/Ryle: e.g. act obediently, e.g. bird moves south. I 199ff Power words/task words: difference: travel/arrive - treat/heal - grab/hold - search/find - see/catch sight of - listen/hear - aim/meet - the performance here may be accidental. I 245ff Thoughtless speech/Ryle: is not frankness but that which we are most interested in. It is also not a self-explanation and does not contribute to our knowledge. I 248 One cannot answer "How do you know?". I 297 Mix-categorical: is usually partly general, partly hypothetical: e.g. pedantic appearance: many people look like him - not human + pedantry. --- Flor I 261 Definition mix-categorical/Ryle/Flor: statements about the mental states or acts of a person must be in the form of hypothetical sentences or a mixture of hypothetical and categorical sentences - hypothetical: if-then-categorical: reports on events and states. Flor I 267 Defintion theme-neutral/Flor: statements are theme-neutral in which words such as "anything" or "anyone", "someone", or "something" are used. --- Sellars I 53 Defintion mixed-categorical-hypothetical/mix-categorical/Ryle: mixed-categorical are manifestations of associative connections of the word object- and of the word-word type. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Gea I P.T. Geach Logic Matters Oxford 1972 Flor I Jan Riis Flor "Gilbert Ryle: Bewusstseinsphilosophie" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor II Jan Riis Flor "Karl Raimund Popper: Kritischer Rationalismus" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A.Hügli/P.Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Flor III J.R. Flor "Bertrand Russell: Politisches Engagement und logische Analyse" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg) Reinbek 1993 Flor IV Jan Riis Flor "Thomas S. Kuhn. Entwicklung durch Revolution" In Philosophie im 20. Jahrhundert, A. Hügli/P. Lübcke Reinbek 1993 Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Time | Rothbard | Rothbard II 167 Price Theory/time/Rothbard: Here we must emphasize a crucial distinction between the proper status of the ‘short run’ and the ‘long run’ in economic theory. In price theory proper, the short run should take precedence, because it is the real-world market price, while the long run is the remote, ultimate tendency that never occurs, and could only take place if all the data were frozen for several years. In sum, we could only live in the improbable if not impossible world of long-run general equilibrium – where all profits and losses are zero – if all values, technologies and resources were frozen for years. But in monetary theory, the order of precedence should be different. For in monetary theory, the impact of partial ‘real’ factors on the price level, exchange rates, and on the balance of payments, are all ephemera determined by the general factors: the supply of and demand for money. These monetary influences are not ‘long-run’ in the sense of far off and remote, but are underlying and dominant every day in the real world. The monetary influence corresponding to the long run of general equilibrium would be a condition where all price levels and all real wage levels in a gold standard world would be identical, or strictly proportionate to the relative currency weights of gold. In a freely fluctuating, fiat money world, this would be the situation where all price levels would be strictly proportionate to the currency ratios at the international market exchange rates. But dominant influences of the supply and demand for money on price levels and exchange rates occur in the real world all the time, and always predominate over the ephemera of ‘real’ specific price and expenditure changes. Hence real-world analysis, which must always predominate, comprises short-run price analysis and slightly longer-run (but still far from final equilibrium) monetary reasoning. To put it another way: in the real world, all prices are determined by the interaction of supply and demand. For individual prices, this means consumer valuations and consumer demands for a given stock: supply and demand in the real world. This is ‘short-run’ micro-analysis. For overall prices or the ‘price level’, the relevant supply and demand is the supply of and demand for money: the result of individual utility valuations of the given stock of money at any time. And while equally real and dominant in the Rothbard II 168 ‘macro-sphere’, this is determinant in a slightly longer run than the superficial ‘real’ factors stressed by anti-bullionists in all ages. >Money, >Money supply, >Demand for money, >Bullionism, >Inflation, >Central Banks. Rothbard III 277 Time/action/economy/Rothbard: It is convenient to distinguish the two vantage points by which an actor judges his action as ex ante and ex post. Ex ante: Ex ante is his position when he must decide on a course of action; it is the relevant and dominant consideration for human action. It is the actor considering his alternative courses and the consequences of each. Ex post: Ex post is his recorded observation of the results of his past action. It is the judging of his past actions and their results. Ex ante, then, he will always take the most advantageous course of action, and will always have a psychic profit, with revenue exceeding cost. Ex post, he may have profited or lost from a course of action. Revenue may or may not have exceeded cost, depending on how good an entrepreneur he has been in making his original action. It is clear that his ex post judgments are mainly useful to him in the weighing of his ex ante considerations for future action. Suppose that an ultimate consumer buys a product and then finds he was mistaken in this purchase and the good has little or no value to him. Thus, a man might buy a cake and find that he does not like it at all. Ex ante the (expected) utility of the cake was greater than the marginal utility of the money forgone in purchasing it; ex post he finds that he was in error and that if he had it to do over again, he would not have bought the cake. The purchase was the consumer’s responsibility, and he must bear the loss as well as the gain from his voluntary transaction. Of course, no one can relive the past, but he can use this knowledge, for example, to avoid purchasing such a cake again. It should be obvious that the cake, once purchased, may have little or no value even though the man originally paid several grains of gold for it. Cost: The cost of the cake was the forgone marginal utility of the three grains of gold paid for it. But this cost incurred in the past cannot confer any value on the cake now. This would seem obvious, and yet economics has always suffered from neglect of this truth, particularly during the nineteenth century, in the form of various “cost” theories of value. These cost theories asserted that the value of goods is conferred by the costs or sacrifices incurred in their acquisition in the past. On the contrary, it is clear that value can be conferred on a good only by individuals’ desires to use it directly in the present or in the present expectation of selling to such individuals in the future.(1) Rothbard III 378 Time/Rothbard: The pure capitalist (…) in performing a capital-advancing function in the productive system, plays a sort of intermediary role. He sells money (a present good) to factorowners in exchange for the services of their factors (prospective future goods). For „pure“ capitalist see >Evenly Rotating Economy/Rothbard; >Production/Rothbard, >Investment/Rothbard. He holds these goods and continues to hire work on them until they have been transformed into consumers’ goods (present goods), which are then sold to the public for money (a present good). The premium that he earns from the sale of present goods, compared to what he paid for future goods, is the rate of interest earned on the exchange. >Interest rate/Rothbard, >Capitalism/Rothbard, >Loans/Rothbard, >Credit/Rothbard. Production: The time market is therefore not restricted to the loan market. It permeates the entire production structure of the complex economy. All productive factors are future goods: they provide for their owner the expectation of being advanced toward the final goal of consumption, a goal which provides the raison d’être for the whole productive enterprise. It is a time market where the future goods sold do not constitute a credit transaction, as in the case of the loan market. The transaction is complete in itself and needs no further payment by either party. In this case, the buyer of the future goods - the capitalist - earns his income through transforming these goods into present goods, rather than through the presentation of an I.O.U. claim on the original seller of a future good. >Capitalism/Rothbard. Time market/Rothbard: The time market, the market where present goods exchange for future goods, is, then, an aggregate with several component parts. In one part of the market, capitalists exchange their money savings (present goods) for the services of numerous factors (future goods). This is one part, and the most important part, of the time market. Another is the consumers’ loan market, where savers lend their money in a credit transaction, in exchange for an I.O.U. of future money. Rothbard III 379 The savers are the suppliers of present money, the borrowers the suppliers of future money, in the form of I.O.U.’s. Rothbard III 388 The time-market schedules of all individuals are aggregated on the market to form market-supply and market-demand schedules for present goods in terms of future goods. The supply schedule will increase with an increase in the rate of interest, and the demand schedule will fall with the higher rates of interest. >Production structure/Rothbard, >Supply/Rothbard, >Demand/Rothbard. Rothbard III 404 Factors of production: The pure demanders of present goods on the time market are the various groups of laborers and landowners - the sellers of the services of original productive factors. Their price on the market (…) will be set equal to the marginal value product of their units, discounted by the prevailing rate of interest. The greater the rate of interest, the less will the price of their service be, or rather, the greater will be the discount from their marginal value product considered as the matured present good.(2) Rothbard III 420 The connection between the returns on investment and money loans to consumers is not an obvious one. But it is clear (…) that both are parts of one time market. 1. As Wicksteed states: “Efforts are regulated by anticipated values, but values are not controlled by antecedent efforts,” and The value of what you have got is not affected by the value of what you have relinquished or forgone in order to get it. But the measure of the advantages you are willing to forgo in order to get a thing is determined by the value that you expect it to have when you have got it. (Wicksteed, Common Sense of Political Economy, I, 93 and 89). 2. Cf. Böhm-Bawerk, Positive Theory of Capital, pp. 299–322, 329-38 |
Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Truth | Lewis | V 164 Definition Counterfactual Conditional/Truth/Lewis: a >counterfactual conditional is untrivially true if and only if it requires less deviation from actuality to make the consequent true along with the antecedent than it needs to make to the antecedent true without the consequent. In short: A w>>w C is true if C is true in all next A-worlds. Explanation/(s): "A w>>w C": "If A were the case, C would be the case". --- Schwarz I 64 Modal truth/Lewis/Schwarz: Thesis: unlike logical truths it is about specific objects and their properties. Cf. >Possible world/Lewis. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Truth Values | Dummett | I 11 f Def Truth Value/Frege/Dummett: of the sentence: the reference - the (Fregean) " Bedeutung" ("meaning") of the sentence. I 20f Dummett: E.g. assuming the condition for true/Fals would be stated, but the two truth values were only marked with A and B, then it would be impossible to figure out which one, A or B, stood for t. One would have to recognize at least in a sample sentence what weight the speakers assign to the assertoric statement of this sentence. II 112 Def Non-designated Truth Value/Dummett: the way in which a sentence can be wrong. Def Designated truth value/Dummett: the way in which a sentence can be true - this is irrelevant for atomic sentences, only relevant for the way they contribute to a complex sentence - i.e. what the condition for an designated truth value for a composite sentence is. The truth value of the whole sentence does not arise simply from the truth value of the sub-sentences - or the subsentences do not only contribute their own truth value - or if we had a meaning theory for the whole language, perhaps we might not be able to explain the meanings of the logical constants by verification of the subsentences. - (These are three formulations for the same fact). >Compositionality. III (a) 20 Truth Value/Dummett: not by property of statements, but by behavior. - Compared to bet/command: requires: the antecedent lies in the power of the receiver: II (a) 21 Gap: if the child does not go out, it cannot have forgotten the jacket. - "Unconditional command": = material conditional: here there is no gap. III (a) 20 Meaning/Truth Value/Bet/Command/Dummett: There is an asymmetry: disobedience clearly leads to the right of disapproval - obedience does not lead to the right of reward (gap). Consequence: truth values are more likely to be extracted from bets (win/lose) than from command/behavior. III (a) 28 Designated Truth Value/Dummett: true or conditional with false antecedent (EFQ, >ex falso quodlibet) Non-designated truth value: wrong or the object is nonexistent. Validity/Multi-valued logic: valid in multi-value logic are the formulas that have a designated truth value for each allocation. >Multi-valued logic. |
Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett Stuttgart 1982 |
| Universalism | Rawls | Gaus I 93 Universalism/Rawls/Waldron: : „(...) what justifies a conception of justice is not its being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that, given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us. (Rawls 1980(1): 518–19). Waldron: that amounted to a withdrawal from moral universalism in one direction: Rawlsian justice was not a theory for all societies, but a theory for societies like the United States. Gaus I 94 Ethical and religious heterogeneity were no longer to be regarded as a feature that societies governed by justice might or might not have, or might have at one period but not at another. It was to be seen instead as a permanent feature of the societies, one that could not be expected soon to pass away. >Society/Walzer. RawlsVsRawls: By the beginning of the 1990s Rawls had become convinced that his approach in A Theory of Justice(2) was disqualified generally on this ground. >Individualism/Rawls. (1) Rawls, John (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’. Journal of Philosophy, 77 (9): 515–72. (2) Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Waldron, Jeremy 2004. „Liberalism, Political and Comprehensive“. In: Gaus, Gerald F. & Kukathas, Chandran 2004. Handbook of Political Theory. SAGE Publications. |
Rawl I J. Rawls A Theory of Justice: Original Edition Oxford 2005 Gaus I Gerald F. Gaus Chandran Kukathas Handbook of Political Theory London 2004 |
| Value | Kendall | Rothbard II 131 Value/Kendall/Rothbard: Kendall went straight to the basics and examined the question of value per se. He begins by saying that there have been many erroneous explanations of value: labour expended, price, even demand. But, he points out, all these notions are erroneous. Things have value, not because they are produced by labor, nor because they are in general demand, nor because they will sell or exchange for a certain number of dollars, but simply because men desire to possess them. Desirableness is value. In exact proportion that a thing is desirable it is valuable. Kendall went on, in dismissing the ‘value paradox’, to say that water and air have little or no value because of their abundance: ‘Were meat and bread as common as air and light they would possess no more value; they would not create desire.’ In the Garden of Eden, land, being superabundant, possessed no value. Labour/Kendall: Labour( …)conferred no value, for: With regard to the produce of labor, value is generally antecedent to the labor of production. It springs from our desire to possess that which labor may produce. Were labor to fix value upon its products, everything on which much has been spent would be very valuable. This notoriously is not the fact... But labor could not make a thing valuable which was not desirable. Labor may be wasted. It may be applied to the production of that which nobody desires, which has no value. (…) Desire/Kendall: ‘Things do not become valuable because men spend labor upon them, but men spend their labor upon them because they are valuable.’ The demand for a product, furthermore, stems from men's desire to obtain it. The desire is primary: ‘Demand is not, therefore, the cause of value... A thing becomes desirable or valuable before there is a demand for it. The demand follows... But when the desire to possess it cease, it has value no longer, and is no longer in demand.’ The next step, for Kendall, is that desires, being subjective and evanescent, cannot be measured, and that therefore neither can value (…). Value: Tastes and desires are ever-changing, and so therefore is value; hence it can have no measure or standard. Kendall then concludes his devastating critique – one that we might wish Ricardo and his epigones had read and understood: Rothbard II 132 To make a standard of value you must first make every acre of ground, every bushel of wheat, and any given quantity of any other article, at all times, in all situations and under all circumstances, sell for precisely the same amount. There must be no such thing as profit or loss, or buying or selling. |
Kendall I Amos Kendall Letters on our Country’s Crisis Washington D.C. 1864 Rothbard II Murray N. Rothbard Classical Economics. An Austrian Perspective on the History of Economic Thought. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Cheltenham 1995 Rothbard III Murray N. Rothbard Man, Economy and State with Power and Market. Study Edition Auburn, Alabama 1962, 1970, 2009 Rothbard IV Murray N. Rothbard The Essential von Mises Auburn, Alabama 1988 Rothbard V Murray N. Rothbard Power and Market: Government and the Economy Kansas City 1977 |
| Variables | Frege | II 81 Variable/mathematics/logic/Frege: variables have nothing to do with change. Arithmetic: arithmetic has nothing to do with quantities like e.g. lengths - only with numbers. II 83 f Variable/Frege: a variable is not a name of an "indeterminate" or "variable" number. "X" has no properties (only in context). "Indeterminately": indeterminately is not an adjective but an adverb to the process of the calculation. "Universality": universality is not a meaning but a suggestion. Letters are rarely names of numbers: e.g. π, i and e are not variables but constants. >Indeterminacy. Solution: e.g. "n" is used in the antecedent of a conditional sentence. II 85 Number/Frege: e.g. "a variable takes a value": here, the number must play both roles: as an object it becomes a variable, as a property it is called value. >Numbers. II 87 Variable/designation/description/Frege: "x" designates nothing! X only hints at numbers. Therefore, e.g. "x² + 3x" designates nothing. The whole function only indicates. On the other hand, "sin" (sinus) is a sign that designates. But not a law yet. Law/Frege: e.g. "y = sin x". >Denotation. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 |
| Verification | Hempel | I 99 Verification/Natural Laws/Hempel: a general statement is checked by examining their singular consequences. Problem: each general statement specifies an infinite class of singular statements. Therefore, there is never a final verification. Conversely, no general law is derived formally from a finite set of singular statements. --- Bubner I 125 Confirmation/Hempel/Science Theory/Bubner: The relationship of logical inclusion of sentences avoids a crucial problem of induction. Both hypothetically valid laws or general statements as well as individual statements from observation are subject of logical consideration as sentences. Formal rules of derivation: Rehabilitation of deduction. With P. Oppenheim: D N Model: the deductive nomological explanation is a scientific explanation as a logical operation with sentences, i.e. the subsumption of sentences under sentences. The explanandum is subsumed under explanation reasons (explanas). The explanas disintegrates into antecedents conditions (C1, C2,... Ck) which describe an event and general law statements (L1, L2,... Lr) I 127 Deduction schema/Hempel: C1, C2,... Ck L1, L2,... Lr E (Description of the phenomenon) The laws are therefore subject to the premises. (Only significant innovation VsAristotle). GoodmanVsHempel: we need law-like statements instead of laws. Induction: the "new mystery of induction" does not concern the confirmation but the original creation of hypotheses. |
Hempel I Carl Hempel "On the Logical Positivist’s Theory of Truth" in: Analysis 2, pp. 49-59 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Hempel II Carl Hempel Problems and Changes in the Empirist Criterion of Meaning, in: Revue Internationale de Philosophie 11, 1950 German Edition: Probleme und Modifikationen des empiristischen Sinnkriteriums In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Hempel II (b) Carl Hempel The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration, in: Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 80, 1951 German Edition: Der Begriff der kognitiven Signifikanz: eine erneute Betrachtung In Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich München 1982 Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Analogy | Russell Vs Analogy | Cartwright I 111 Analogy/RussellVsAnalogy: the principle "same cause, same effect" is futile - if the antecedent (that represents the circumstances) is accurate enough, the same case will never happen again -> pro fundamental laws. |
Russell I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 Russell II B. Russell The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969 German Edition: Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 Russell IV B. Russell The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 German Edition: Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 Russell VI B. Russell "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202 German Edition: Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus In Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg) Frankfurt 1993 Russell VII B. Russell On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit" In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg) Frankfurt 1996 Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR I R. Cartwright A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Counterfactual Conditional | Schwarz Vs Counterfactual Conditional | Schwarz I 131 Similarity criteria/VsLewis: but even so a counterfactual dependence without causality would be possible: E.g. the halting problem would be solvable, were the PL decidable (because counterfactual conditionals with a false antecedent is always true with Lewis) but that one is not the cause of the other. Vs counterfactual conditional/Vs co.co: Problem: after the previous analysis every event would also cause itself: it would not happen, then it would not have happened! E.g. Jaegwon Kim (1973(1), 1974(2)): if Socrates had not died, Xanthippe would not have become a widow, e.g. had I not turned the window handle, I would not have opened the window, e.g. had I not written "rr", I would not have written "Larry". Everything counterfactual relations without causality. Solution/Lewis: we must limit the Relata A and B: they may neither be mathematical truths nor be identical to each other. Allowed are only contingent, non-overlapping single events. Overlapping/Schwarz: "Non-overlapping" is weaker than "not identical". ((s) "overlapping" can also be "not identical". This excludes that e.g. a football match caused its first half..) ((s)> Hume: Only between non-identical events causality can be effective). LewisVsKim: so also its examples are done: partly the entities Kim considered, are no events (e.g. Xanthippe) partly it is a single event, described by two identifiers (e.g. window), or two events that are not completely separated (E.g. Larry). (1981c(3), 124). 1. Jaegwon Kim [1973]: “Causes and Counterfactuals”. Journal of Philosophy, 70: 570–572 2. Jaegwon Kim [1974]: “Noncausal Connections”. Nous, 8: 41–52. In [Kim 1993] 3. David Lewis [1981c]: “Nachwort (1978) zu ‘Kausalität’ ”. In Güuter Posch (ed.), Kausalität: Neue Texte, Stuttgart: Reclam, 124–126 |
Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Covering Law | Hempel. Vs Covering Law | Schurz I 224 Potential Explanation/Hempel: here, merely the logical consistency of the premises is required. This is important when it comes to assessing hypotheses regarding their explanatory power (>best explanation). Covering Law/Dray/Schurz: (Dray 1957): Simplest case of a deductive-nomological explanation: here, antecedent and explanandum are implicatively connected by a single law. logical form: (x)(Ax › E.g.), Aa/Ea. HempelVsDray/HempelVsCovering Law: its own model includes more complex statements, one E.g. planetary positions, which can be explained by initial conditions plus natural laws. |
Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Dummett, M. | Stalnaker Vs Dummett, M. | II 1 "Linguistic image"/terminology/Stalnaker: Dummett's thesis that language goes before thinking. StalnakerVsDummett. II 2 The linguistic image even disturbed our understanding of the language. StalnakerVsDummett: I reverse Dummett's axiom: the philosophy of language can only be achieved through a philosophy of thinking. Def language/Grice/Stalnaker: is an instrument in order to achieve certain goals. (Stalnaker ditto) Stalnaker: we should distinguish means and purposes here. Def speaking/Stalnaker: is essentially a distinguishing of possibilities. Dummett also says so because to know under what truth conditions (tr.cond.) a proposition is true is to know which possibilities it excludes. II 74 Fatalism/Dummett: (Dummett "Bringing about the past"): either I will be killed in this attack or I will not be killed. Suppose I will. Then I would be killed even if I took precautions. Therefore, the precautions will be in vain. But suppose I will not be killed even if I did not take any precautions then precautions are not necessary. logic form/Stalnaker: K: I will be killed P: I take precautions Q precautions are useless R: precautions are unnecessary. 1. K v ~K - 2. K - 3.P >K - 4. Q - 5. ~K - 6.~P >~K - 7. R 8. Q v R Stalnaker: it is not sufficient to say that a particular step is not valid and leave it at that. Fatalism/DummettVsFatalism/Dummett: any sense of conditional making the step from 2 to 3 and from 5 to 6) valid must be too weak to make the conclusion of 3 to 4 valid. Therefore the whole argument cannot be valid no matter how the conditional is analyzed. Stalnaker: that is convincing but it would only be a complete solution if it also showed that there are at all in our language different senses (senses) of the conditional justifying each of these steps. StalnakerVsDummett: this will not work because the strength of his argument is based on a confusion between two senses (senses) of the conditional. (Semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning of the conditional). a) according to the semantic and pragmatic analysis (see above) there is a sense of the conditional, after the inference from II 75 2 to 3 is reasonable and also strong enough to justify the conclusion from 3 to 4. Fatalism/StalnakerVsDummett: the fallacy is not in what Dummett believes but both sub-arguments are good arguments. Namely, in the sense that anyone who is in a position to accept the premise, while it remains open whether the antecedent of the conditional is true, would be in a position to accept the conclusion. That means that if I were in a position to accept that I would be killed even if I had not yet decided whether I take precautions it would be reasonable to conclude that provisions are useless. ((s) before I decided: that means if the premise would be without truth values (tr.val.)). Accordingly, if I were in the position to know that I will not be killed. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the problem is the final step: a conclusion which seems to be of a valid form: the Constructive dilemma: has nothing substantial to do with conditionals. Step 8 is then justified like this: A v B; C follows from A, D follows from B So: C v D. Problem: this is not a reasonable inference even if one assumes that the subarguments are reasonable. Fatalism/Stalnaker: the subarguments are reasonable but not valid. Therefore, the whole argument fails. I 174 Reference/sense/Searle/Stalnaker: if a statement has no descriptive content there may be no connection to an object. Reference/Dummett/Stalnaker: ... the object must be somehow singled out. Stalnaker: so in both cases it is about skills, use, habits, practices or mental states. Searle/Dummett/Stalnaker: So both appear to take the view that a fundamental semantics (see above which fact makes that a statement has its semantic value) cannot be given satisfactorily. StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: but the two do not say that because they do not separate the two questions. a) what is the semantics e.g. for names b) what facts cause that this is our semantics. Stalnaker: if we separate them we can no longer rule out the possibility that any language could be a spoken language by us. Then the community can also speak a Mill's language. ((s) "Direct Reference": without intermediary sense, VsFrege). ((s) "Direct Reference": is an expression of Kaplan, it is here not used by Stalnaker). I 179 Propositional knowledge/StalnakerVsEvans/StalnakerVsSearle/StalnakerVsDummett: even if this is correct – what I do not believe – there is no reason to believe that it is impossible to know singular propositions. E.g. Suppose we concede that you cannot know of a certain individual x that it is F if you cannot identify for G ((s) a second property) x than that the G that is F. Furthermore suppose the fact that x knows of y that it is based on F and is included by the allegation that y knows that G is F. ((s) identification by specific description). That means that certain conditions are necessary and others sufficient to have knowledge of a certain kind. I 180 Content/knowledge/Stalnaker: but nothing follows from these conditions for knowledge for the content of knowledge. Mere knowledge/mere reference/mere knowing/Dummett/Stalnaker: if isolated knowledge is meant by that we can admit that it is impossible but that does not imply that knowledge of x that refers a to x is not knowledge of a particular proposition. singular proposition/StalnakerVsDummett: e.g. "a refers to x". Dummett did not show that it is not possible to know such a singular proposition (to have knowledge of it). StalnakerVsDummett: it is difficult to say what conditions must be fulfilled here but the specification of the contents of a ascription is not the same as to say what it is that this knowledge ascription is true. Solution/Stalnaker: both for the problem at the level of the philosophy of mind as well as the semantic problem. A causal theory. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Empiricism | Cartwright Vs Empiricism | I 39 Empiricism/Cartwright. makes two assumptions: 1) statements about probabilities (prob) are justified only in stable frequencies. There notorious problems with finite vs. infinite areas (ensembles). But this much is certain: Probability/Empiricism/Cartwright: which prob exist does not depend on metaphysical or causal considerations in any case. 2. Causal considerations can be completely reduced to probability considerations, although it takes more empirical facts in order to secure the necessary asymmetries. CartwrightVsEmpiricism: (here only Vs2): In order to close new causal laws, we need antecedent causal knowledge together with prob. Empiricism/Cartwright: pro: 1) We should maintain empiricism: probabilities and causality should be kept apart, because probabilities can serve so many other things. Prob/Karl Pearson: (Grammar of Science): Thesis: Prob should remain theory-free. Cartwright dito. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Geach, P. | Evans Vs Geach, P. | Klaus von Heusinger, donkey sentences and their horse feet Uni Konstanz Section Linguistics Working Paper 64; 1994 Heusinger I 5 Range/Quantifier/Conjunction/Geach/VsGeach/Heusinger: (4b) E.g. [man(x) & comes(x) & whistles(x)] VsGeach: Problem: the existential quantifier has a longer range than the "and", i.e. it is regarded as a text operator. Then compositionality is violated, because the first sentence is not independent of the second one. This has caused much criticism. EvansVsGeach: the plural shows that (4b) is still too strong and does not express the everyday language meaning: (ii) is too strong: - (ii) Some sheep are such that John owns them and Harry vaccinates them in spring. I 17 Anaphora/Variable/Labeling/Existential Quantification/E Type/E Type Pronoun/Evans/Heusinger: Thesis: Discourse anaphora not as bound variables, but as shortened (or disguised) descriptions. Representatives: Evans: semantic Cooper: pragmatic Neale: syntactic. Def E Type Pronoun/Evans/Heusinger: = specific descriptions: the pronoun denotes those objects that make the sentence true which contains the quantified antecedent ((s) antecedent of the anaphor). Anaphora/Pronoun/EvansVsGeach/Evans/Heusinger: Thesis: anaphoric pronouns must be interpreted as decriptions. |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |
| Grice, P.H. | Jackson Vs Grice, P.H. | Lewis V 153 Implicature/Conversational Implicature/Grice/Lewis: E.g. "This time you are right" Implicature: "Otherwise you are usually wrong." Conventional Implicature/Jackson: E.g. "She votes liberal, but she's not an idiot" - "Most liberals are idiots". Conditional/Grice/Lewis: if P(A>C) is high mainly because P(A) is low (E.g. falso quodlibet), then what sense does it make to say "If A, then B"? Why should you not say the stronger one: that it is almost as likely non-A?. JacksonVsGrice/JacksonVsLewis: we often assert things that are much weaker than we could actually assert, and for good reason. Hereby I suppose this that your belief system is similar to mine, but not identical. E.g. Assuming you know something that strikes me as highly unlikely today, but I still want to say something useful. So I say something weaker, so that you can definitely take my word. Def Robust/Jackson/Lewis: A is robust relative to B (in terms of one's subjective probability at a time), iff. the probability of A and probability of A conditional to B are close to each other and are both high. V 154 so that if one learns that B, they still consider A probable. Jackson: the weaker thing can then be more robust with respect to something that you think is more unlikely, but that you do not want to ignore. If it is now useless, the to say weaker thing, how useless is it then to say the weaker thing and the stronger thing together! And yet we do it! E.g. Lewis: "Bruce sleeps in the clothes chest, or elsewhere on the ground floor". Jackson: Explanation: it makes sense to assert the stronger thing, and just as much sense to assert the more robust thing. If they differ, we assert both. Robustness/Indicative Conditional/IC/Lewis: an IC is a truth functional conditional, that conventionally implies robustness (convention implicature) with respect to the antecedent. Therefore, the probabilities P(A>C) and P(A>C) must both be high. That is the reason why the BH of the IC comes with the corresponding conditional probability. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Instrumentalism | Fodor Vs Instrumentalism | IV 148 Theory of Evolution/Evolution/Dennett/Fodor/Lepore: e.g. assuming the function of the forest would be seen by us so that it should prevent soil erosion. So ecology will use such a concept, or it will not. If it does, it is a fact what the forest is good for, if it does not use the concept, we cannot improve the situation by assuming "intentional attitudes"! Of course we could tell a fairy tale about how "Father Erosion" wants to wash away the soil, and how the good forest wants to stop him. IV 149 But such a story by us cannot decide which biological functions exist or not. Fodor/LeporeVsInstrumentalism/VsDennett: look how God punishes instrumentalism: reject the distinction of theories against stories, and soon you will no longer be able to distinguish stories from theories. Evolution Theory/truth/Fodor/Lepore: if the evolution theory is used to explain intentional attribution, it is rather an empirical than a conceptual question whether the principle of truth applies. But we do not agree with the antecedent anyway. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |
| Inwagen, P. van | Lewis Vs Inwagen, P. van | V 195 Individuation/Redundant Causation/Peter van Inwagen: Thesis: An event, which actually happens as a product of several causes, could not have happened had if it had not been the product of these causes. The causes could also not have led to another event. Analogy to individuation of objects and humans because of their causal origins. LewisVsInwagen: 1. It would ruin my analysis to analyze causation in terms of counterfactual dependence. ((s) Any deviation would be a different event, not comparable, no counterfactual conditionals applicable.) 2. It is prima facie implausible: I am quite able to legitimately establish alternative hypotheses how an event (or an object or a human being) was caused. But then I postulate that it was one and the same event! Or that one and the same event could have had different effects. >Events/Lewis. (Even Inwagen postulates this.) Plan/LewisVsInwagen: implies even more impossibilities: Either all my plans or hypotheses are hidden impossibilities or they do not even deal with particular event. >Planning. V 296 Vs weak determinism/VsCompatibilism/van InwagenVsLewis: (against wD which I pretend to represent): e.g. Suppose of reductio that I could have lifted my left hand although determinism would be true. Then follows from four premises, which I cannot deny, that I could have created a wrong conjunction HL from a proposition H of a moment in time before my birth, and a certain proposition about a law L. Premise 5: If yes, I could have made L wrong. Premise 6: But I could not have made L wrong. (Contradiction.) LewisVInwagen: 5 and 6 are both not true. Which one of both is true depends on what Inwage calls "could have made wrong". However, not in everyday language, but in Inwagen's artificial language. But it does not matter as well what Inwagen means himself! What matters is whether we can actually give sense to it, which would make all premises valid without circularity. Inwagen: (oral) third meaning for "could have made wrong": only iff the actor could have arranged the things in such a way that both his action and the whole truth about the previous history would have implied the wrongness of the proposition. Then premise 6 states that I could not have arranged the things in such a way to make me predetermined to not arrange them. Lewis: But it is not instructive to see that compatibilism needs to reject premise 6 which is interpreted that way. V 297 Falsification/Action/Free Will/Lewis: provisory definition: An event falsifies a proposition only when it is necessary that the proposition is wrong when an event happens. But my action to throw a stone is not going to falsify the proposition that the window which is on the other end of the trajectory will not be broken. The truth is that my action creates a different event which would falsify the proposition. The action itself does not falsify a law. It would only falsify a conjunction of antecedent history and law. The truth is that my action precedes another action, the miracle, and the latter falsifies the law. feeble: let's say I could make a proposition wrong in a weak sense iff I do something. The proposition would be falsified (but not necessarily because of my action, and not necessarily because of an event which happened because of my action). (Lewis per "Weak Thesis". (Compatibilism)). strong: If the proposition is falsified, either because of my action or because of an event that was caused because of my action. Inwagen/Lewis: The first part of his thesis is strong, regardless of whether we advocate the strong or the weak thesis: Had I been able to lift my hand, although determinism is true and I have not done so, then it is both true - according to the weak and strong sense- that I could have made the conjunctions HL (propositions about the antecedent history and the laws of nature) wrong. But I could have made proposition L wrong in the weak sense, although I could not have done it wrong in the strong sense. Lewis: If we advocate the weak sense, I deny premise 6. If we advocate the strong sense, I deny premise 5. Inwagen: Advocates both position by contemplating analogous cases. LewisVsInwagen: I do believe that the cases are not analogous. They are cases in which the strong and the weak case do not diverge at all. Premise 6/Inwagen: He invites us to reject the idea that a physicist could accelerate a particle faster than light. LewisVsInwagen: But this does not contribute to support premise 6 in the weak sense. V 298 Since the rejected assumption is that the physicist could falsify a law of nature in the strong sense. Premise 5/Inwagen: We should reject the assumption here that a traveller could falsify a conjunction of propositions about the antecedent history and the history of his future travel differently than a falsification of the non-historic part. LewisVsInwagen: Reject the assumption as a whole if you would like to. It does not change anything: premise 5 is not supported in the strong sense. What would follow if a conjunction could be falsified in such a strong sense? Tht the non-historic part could be thus falsified in the strong sense? This is what would support premise 5 in the strong sense. Or would simply follow (what I believe) that the non-historic part can be rejected in the weak sense? The example of the traveller is not helpful here because a proposition of future travels can be falsified in both weak as strong sense. Schwarz I 28 Object/Lewis/Schwarz: Material things are accumulations or aggregates of such points. But not every collection of such points is a material object. Taken together they are neither constituting a cat nor any other object in the customary sense. e.g. The same is valid for the aggregate of parts of which I am constituted of, together with the parts which constituted Hubert Humphrey at the beginning of 1968. Thing: What is the difference between a thing in the normal sense and those aggregates? Sufficient conditions are difficult to find. Paradigmatic objects have no gaps, and holes are delimited from others, and fulfill a function. But not all things are of this nature, e.g. bikes have holes, bikinis and Saturn have disjointed parts. What we accept as a thing depends from our interests in our daily life. It depends on the context: e.g. whether we count the back wall or the stelae of the Holocaust Memorial or the screen or the keyboard as singly. But these things do also not disappear if we do not count them as singly! Object/Thing/van Inwagen: (1990b)(1) Thesis: Parts will constitute themselves to an object if the latter is a living being. So, there are humans, fishes, cats, but not computers, walls and bikinis. Object/Thing/Lewis: better answer: two questions: 1. Under what conditions parts will form themselves to a whole? Under all conditions! For random things there is always a thing which constitutes them. ((s) This is the definition of mereological Universalism). 2. Which of these aggregates do we call a singly thing in daily life? If certain aggregates are not viewed as daily things for us does not mean that they do not exist.(However, they go beyond the normal realms of our normal quantifiers.) But these restrictions vary from culture to culture. As such, it is not reality that is dependent on culture, but the respective observed part of reality (1986e(2), 211 213, 1991(3):79 81). LewisVsInwagen/Schwarz: If only living things can form objects, evolution could not have begun. ((s) But if it is not a problem to say that living beings originated from emergentism, it should also not be a problem to say "objects" instead.) LewisVsInwagen: no criteria for "living being" is so precise that it can clearly define. Schwarz I 30 Lewis: It is not a problem for him: Conventions of the German language do not determine with atomic precision for which aggregates "living being" is accurate. (1986e(2), 212) LewisVsvan Inwagen: This explanation is not at his disposal: For him the distinction between living being and not a living being is the distinction between existence and non-existence. If the definition of living being is vague, the same is valid for existence as well. Existence/Van Inwagen: (1990b(1). Kap.19) Thesis: some things are borderline cases of existence. LewisVsvan Inwagen: (1991(3),80f,1983e(2),212f): If one already said "there is", then one has lost already: if one says that "something exists to a lesser degree". Def Existence/Lewis: Simply means to be one of the things that exist.h Schwarz I 34 Temporal Parts/van Inwagen: (1981)(4) generally rejects temporal parts. SchwarzVsInwagen: Then he must strongly limit the mereological universalims or be a presentist. Schwarz I 227 Modality/LewisVsInwagen: There are no substantial modal facts: The existence of possibilities is not contingent. Information about this cannot be obtained. 1. Peter van Inwagen [1990b]: Material Beings. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press 2. D. Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 3. D. Lewis [1991]: Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell 4. P. van Inwagen [1981]: “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Karttunen, L. | Stalnaker Vs Karttunen, L. | II 56 Def factive verbs/Lauri Karttunen/Stalnaker: e.g. to know, to regret, to discover, to see. non-factive verbs: e.g. to assert, to believe, to intend, faktive verbs: if V is a factive verb then x' presupposes V-en that P (and I would say also includes (entails)) that P. factive verbs/Karttunen: a) Def fully factive: here it is not only the assertion or denial of the proposition x V-t that P requires the presupposition but also the assumption (supposition) of this proposition in an antecedent or the assertion that the proposition could be true. E.g. to regret, to forget, to resent. b) Def semi-factive/Karttunen: here it is only the assertion or the denial of the proposition that requires the presupposition. E.g. Sam regrets that he voted for Nixon. If Sam regrets that he voted for Nixon he is an idiot. (fully factive). E.g. to regret something: here is strongly presupposed E.g. semi-factive: to discover, to recognize: here the presupposition is not as strong. Def strong presupposition/Karttunen/Stalnaker: if P is made necessary II 57 By MQ and M~Q then Q strongly presupposes P. Def weak presupposition/Karttunen/Stalnaker: corresponds to the normal presupposition. Strong/weak presupposition/factive/semi-factive/StalnakerVsKarttunen: I deny the theoretical approach and the clarity of the examples. E.g. When Harry discovers that his wife is making out, he will be upset. If Harry had discovered that his wife making out, he would have been upset If Harry would understand.... Explanation/StalnakerVsKarttunen: surely here is always a presupposition in play. But difference: a) if the speaker strictly assumes something ((s) explicitly) then he does not presuppose it. b) if something is questionable for the speaker he cannot assume that he already knows it. E.g. Karttunen: Did you regret - understand - note that you did not tell the truth? II 58 Pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: here the restrictions on the presuppositions can be changed without the truth conditions (tr.cond.) changing so we can see differences between statements of the first and second person or between such of a third person and postulate questions without different semantic types of propositions. That means despite the differences we can say that the statements have the same semantic content. StalnakerVsSemantic approach: here we cannot say that. II 59 Compound propositions/complex sentence/presupposition/Stalnaker: how do the presuppositions behave that require a conditional to the presuppositions that are demanded by the parts of the conditional? Conjunction/conditional/presupposition/Karttunen: thesis: S be a proposition of the form A and B or of the form if A then B. a) Conjunction: S presupposes that C iff either A presupposes that C or B presupposes that C and A includes (entails) not semantically that C. That means the presuppositions of a conjunction are those that are required by one of the conjuncts minus any other presupposition that are semantically included by the other conjunct (entailment). ((s) Entailment: is truth-functional (truth-conditional)). b) Conditional: the presuppositions of the conditional are those that are either demanded by the antecedent or the consequent minus those that are required by the consequent while semantically being included by the antecedent (entails). E.g. "Harry is married and Harry's wife is a great cook". Conjunction: here the reversal of the order is not acceptable. Moreover, the second conjunct can also stand alone. Conjunction/Karttunen/Stalnaker: when we interpret his analysis semantically (truth-functional) then we have to say that this conjunction is not truth-functional because the truth values (tr.v.) depend on the entailment between the conjunction. This implicates that this "and" is not symmetrical. A and B may be wrong, while B and A is no truth value. StalnakerVsKarttunen: that would implicate more complicated rules. II 60 Solution/Stalnaker: pragmatically interpreted we need neither ad hoc semantics nor pragmatic rules Explanation: after a proposition was asserted the speaker can reasonably assume it for the rest of the conversation. That means after A has been pronounced it became part of the background before B was pronounced. Even if A was not initially presupposed, one can assert A and B, because at that time, when you come to B, the context has changed and thus A was presupposed. Conditional/pragmatic presupposition/Stalnaker: here we must distinguish explicit assumption (supposition) of presuppositions. If-proposition: is explicit. |
Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
| Lewis, D. | Field Vs Lewis, D. | I 233 Knowledge/Belief/Explanation/Mathematics/Lewis: consequently, since mathematics consists of necessary truths, there can be no explanation problem. FieldVsLewis: at least 4 points, why this does not exclude the epistemic concerns: 1) not all the facts about the realm of mathematical antities apply necessarily. But suppose it were so, then there are still facts about the mathematical and non-mathematical realm together! E.g. (A) 2 = the number of planets closer to the Sun than the Earth. (B) for a natural number n there is a function that depicts the natural numbers smaller than n on the set of all particles in the universe ((s) = there is a finite number of particles). (C) beyond all sp.t. points there is an open region, for which there is a 1: 1 differentiable representation. I 234 of this region on an open subset of R4 (space, quadruples of real numbers). (D) there is a differentiable function y of spatial points on real numbers, so that the gradient of y indicates the gravitational force on each object, as measured by the unit mass of that object. Field: these facts are all contingent. But they are partly about the mathematical realm (mathematical entities). Explanation/FieldVsLewis: There remains the problem of the explanation of such "mixed" statements. (Or the correlation of these with our beliefs). Solution: You can divide these statements: an a) purely mathematical component (without reference to physical theories, but rather on non-mathematical entities, E.g. quantities with basic elements, otherwise the condition would be too strong). Important argument: this component can then be regarded as "necessarily true". b) purely non-mathematical component (without reference to mathematics). I 235 2) FieldVsLewis: even with regard to purely mathematical facts, Lewis’ answer is too simple. Necessary Facts/Mathematics: to what extent should they be necessary in the realm of mathematics? They are not logically necessary! And they cannot be reduced to logical truths by definition. Of course they are mathematically necessary in the sense that they follow from the laws of mathematics. E.g. Similarly, the existence of electrons is physically necessary, because it follows from the laws of physics. FieldVsLewis: but in this physical case, Lewis would not speak of a pseudo-problem! But why should the fact that numbers exist mathematically necessary be a pseudo-problem?. Mathematical Necessity/Field: false solution: you could try to object that mathematical necessity is absolute necessity, while physical necessity is only a limited necessity. Metaphysical Necessity/Field: or you could say that mathematical statements. I 236 Are metaphysically necessary, but physical statements are not. FieldVs: It is impossible to give content to that. I 237 3) FieldVsLewis: he assumes a controversial relation between Counterfactual Conditional and necessity. It is certainly true that nothing meaningful can be said about E.g. what would be different if the number 17 did not exist. And that is so precisely because the antecedent gives us no indication of what alternative mathematics should be considered to be true in this case. I 238 4) FieldVsLewis: there is no reason to formulate the problem of the explanation of the reliability of our mathematical belief in modal or counterfactual expressions. II 197 Theoretical Terms/TT/Introduction/Field: TT are normally not introduced individually, but in a whole package. But that is no problem as long as the correlative indeterminacy is taken into account. One can say that the TT are introduced together as one "atom". E.g. "belief" and "desire" are introduced together. Assuming both are realized multiply in an organism: Belief: because of the relations B1 and B2 (between the organism and internal representations). Desired: because of D1 and D2. Now, while the pairs (B1, D1) and (B2, D2) have to realize the (term-introductory) theory. II 198 The pairs (B1, D2) and (B2, D1) do not have to do that. ((s) exchange of belief and desire: the subject believes that something else will fulfill its desire). FieldVsLewis: for this reason we cannot accept its solution. Partial Denotation/Solution/Field: we take the TT together as the "atom" which denotes partially as a whole. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Lewis, D. | Jackson Vs Lewis, D. | V 152 Indicative Conditional/IC/JacksonVsLewis: better theory (Lewis pro): both theories have the following in common: 1) The IC has the truth conditions of the truth-functional conditional A>C. 2) nevertheless, assertibility goes with the conditional subjective probability 3) there is a discrepancy between truth and assertibility-preserving inferences involving indicative conditionals. V 152/153 4) our intuition about valid inference with conditionals may be applied to the conditionals, but are also meager evidence of validity. 5) The discrepancy between the assertibility of P(C I A) and the probability of the truth of P(A > C) is due to one or the other Gricean implicature. 6) The right approach to do this implicature must depart from the premise that the conditional has the truth conditions of the (truth-functional) A ⊃ C . V 154 Lewis Thesis: "Assert the stronger" theory for conditional probability. Jackson Thesis: "Implicature of robustness": theory for conditional probability. Pro: JacksonVsLewis: E.g. "Fred will not study and even if he does, he will fail." If (according to Lewis) the conditional is only assertible if the antecedent cannot be denied, how can it be that yet both are asserted together? Explanation: the antecedent is added because of the robustness. Even if you believe that I am mistaken in thinking that Fred does not study, you can still believe like me that he will fail. Lewis pro. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 |
| Mackie, J. L. | Armstrong Vs Mackie, J. L. | Arm III 50 Induction/Counterfactual conditional/Co.co./Regularity theory/Mackie: if it is very likely that all Fs are Gs, and we look at an a of which we believe or know that it is not an F or that it does not exist: Assuming that a is an F, it is nevertheless inductively very likely that a is a G. Therefore we are entitled to the Counterfactual Conditional: if a were an F, it would be a G. Armstrong: that is neutral in itself and can now be used to show that Humeean uniformities could also support counterfactual conditionals. And that is simply because of induction. Then the Counterfactual conditional is justified. III 51 Vs: 1) then it must be possible to solve the problem of induction, even if assuming that the laws of nature (LoN) are mere LoN. But I believe that the reg. th. is committed to skepticism regarding induction (see above). Vs: 2) a) If law statements support Counterfactual Conditional, then they would also have to inherit the uncertainty of induction! E.g. assuming all Fs are Gs, but there are doubts as to whether that is a law. Then the evidence is likely, but not certain. The corresponding Counterfactual Conditional: if a were an F, it would be highly probable that it would be a G. The consequence of this Counterfactual Conditional would be a probability statement. ArmstrongVsMackie: but we would not establish this Counterfactual Conditional Either it is a law that Fs are Gs or it is not. If it is not, the Counterfactual conditional is simply wrong. b) it appears logically possible that a being could know the content of all laws, but this knowledge or belief are not acquired inductively. Couldn’t this being use GA just like us to support Counterfactual Conditional? That seems possible. Nevertheless: how would it be possible if the assertion of Counterfactual Conditional was based on an inductive inference from antecedent to consequent? (As demanded by Mackie). |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 |
| Mill, J. St. | Cartwright Vs Mill, J. St. | I 38 Objective probability/VsCartwright: It might be objected that the partitioning on irrelevant factors would do no damage, once all factors are fixed. "True prob"/Cartwright: = objective prob? Relative frequency/RelFreq/Cartwright: is not the same as objective prob. Simpson’s Paradox/Solution/VsCartwright: We can certainly always find a third factor, but normally we do are not dealing with finite frequencies, but with objective prob. Objective prob/VsCarwright: if you do not extract it from finite data, no apparent correlations will come about. I 60 Vector addition/Cartwright: according to this view, two forces (gravitational force, or electromagnetic force) are produced, but none of them exists. Composition of forces/Causes/MillVsCartwright: he would deny that both do not exist: According to him, both exist as part of the resulting effect. E.g. two forces in different directions. "Partial forces". CartwrightVsMill: there are no "partial forces". Events may have temporal parts, but there are no parts of the kind that Mill describes, e.g. one northwards and one eastwards, with the object not moving neither north nor east, but to the northeast. I 59 CartwrightVsMill: Problem: then it is vital for the laws to have the same form, regardless of whether they are inside or outside the composition. And that’s not possible! It is not possible if the laws are intended to describe the actual behavior of concrete object. I 70 Def Super-Law/Explanation/Law/Circumstances/Terminology/Mill/Cartwright: in the case of E.g. Coulomb’s law and the law of gravity, we can simply put an increasingly complex antecedent in front of it to grasp the situation and thus explain what is happening. Mill: that is possible in mechanics, but not in chemistry. This explains why chemistry is not a deductive or demonstrative discipline. This presupposes the covering-law approach. CartwrightVsSuper law/CartwrightVsMill: 1) Super laws are not always available; if we do not describe everything exactly, we lose our understanding of what is happening. And we explain without knowing super laws. We need a philosophical explanation for why these explanations are good. 2) Super laws may often not even be a good explanation. This is an old objection Vscovering laws. E.g. why does the quail in my garden shake its head? Because all quails do this. I 71 Equally E.g. "All carbon atoms have five energy levels" explains nothing. 3) Certainly, covering laws are explanatory for complex cases. In particular, if the antecedent of the law does not precisely grasp the components of the individual situation, but provides a more abstract description. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Modal Logic | Quine Vs Modal Logic | Chisholm II 185 QuineVsModal Logic: instead space time points as quadruples. Reason: permanent objects (continuants) seem to threaten the extensionality. SimonsVsQuine: the Achilles heel is that we must have doubts whether anyone could learn a language that refers not to permanent objects (continuants). --- Lewis IV 32 QuineVsModal Logic: which properties are necessary or accidental, is then dependent on the description. Definition essentialism/Aristotle: essential qualities are not dependent on description. QuineVs: that is as congenial as the whole modal logic. LewisVsQuine: that really is congenial. --- I 338 But modal logic has nothing to do with it. Here, totally impersonal. The modal logic, as we know it, begins with Clarence Lewis "A survey of Symbolic Logic" in 1918. His interpretation of the necessity that Carnap formulates even more sharply later is: Definition necessity/Carnap: A sentence that starts with "it is necessary that", is true if and only if the remaining sentence is analytic. Quine provisionally useful, despite our reservations about analyticity. --- I 339 (1) It is necessary that 9 > 4 it is then explained as follows: (2) "9 > 4" is analytically. It is questionable whether Lewis would ever have engaged in this matter, if not Russell and Whitehead (Frege following) had made the mistake, the philonic construction: "If p then q" as "~ (p and ~ q)" if they so designate this construction as a material implication instead of as a material conditional. C.I.Lewis: protested and said that such a defined material implication must not only be true, but must also be analytical, if you wanted to consider it rightly as an "implication". This led to his concept of "strict implication". Quine: It is best to view one "implies" and "is analytical" as general terms which are predicated by sentences by adding them predicatively to names (i.e. quotations) of sentences. Unlike "and", "not", "if so" which are not terms but operators. Whitehead and Russell, who took the distinction between use and mention lightly, wrote "p implies q" (in the material sense) as it was with "If p, then q" (in the material sense) interchangeable. --- I 339 Material implication "p implies q" not equal to "p > q" (>mention/>use) "implies" and "analytical" better most general terms than operators. Lewis did the same, he wrote "p strictly implies q" and explained it as "It is necessary that not (p and not q)". Hence it is that he developed a modal logic, in which "necessary" is sentence-related operator. If we explain (1) in the form of (2), then the question is why we need modal logic at all. --- I 340 An apparent advantage is the ability to quantify in modal positions. Because we know that we cannot quantify into quotes, and in (2) a quotation is used. This was also certainly Lewis' intention. But is it legitimate? --- I 341 It is safe that (1) is true at any plausible interpretation and the following is false: (3) It is necessary that the number of planets > 4 Since 9 = the number of planets, we can conclude that the position of "9" in (1) is not purely indicative and the necessity operator is therefore opaque. The recalcitrance of 9 is based on the fact that it can be specified in various ways, who lack the necessary equivalence. (E.g. as a number of planets, and the successor to the 8) so that at a specification various features follow necessarily (something "greater than 4 ") and not in the other. Postulate: Whenever any of two sentences determines the object x clearly, the two sentences in question are necessary equivalent. (4) If Fx and only x and Gx and exclusively x, it is necessary that (w)(Fw if and only if when Gw). --- I 342 (This makes any sentence p to a necessary sentence) However, this postulate nullifies modal distinctions: because we can derive the validity of "It is necessary that p" that it plays no role which true sentence we use for "p". Argument: "p" stands for any true sentence, y is any object, and x = y. Then what applies clearly is: (5) (p and x = y) and exclusively x as (6) x = y and x exclusively then we can conclude on the basis of (4) from (5) and (6): (7) It is necessary that (w) (p and w = y) if and only if w = y) However, the quantification in (7) implies in particular "(p and y = y) if and only if y = y" which in turn implies "p"; and so we conclude from (7) that it is necessary that p. --- I 343 The modal logic systems by Barcan and Fitch allow absolute quantification in modal contexts. How such a theory can be interpreted without the disastrous assumption (4), is far from clear. --- I 343 Modal Logic: Church/Frege: modal sentence = Proposition Church's system is structured differently: He restricts the quantification indirectly by reinterpreting variables and other symbols into modal positions. For him (as for Frege) a sentence designated then, to which a modal operator is superior, a proposition. The operator is a predicate that is applied to the proposition. If we treat the modalities like the propositional attitude before, then we could first (1) reinterpret (8) [9 > 4] is necessary (Brackets for class) and attach the opacity of intensional abstraction. One would therefore interpret propositions as that what is necessary and possible. --- I 344 Then we could pursue the model from § 35 and try to reproduce the modality selectively transparent, by passing selectively from propositions to properties: (9) x (x > 4) is necessary in terms 9. This is so far opposed to (8) as "9" here receives a purely designated position in one can quantify and in one can replace "9" by "the number of planets". This seemed to be worth in the case of en, as we e.g. wanted to be able to say (§ 31), there would be someone, of whom is believed, he was a spy (> II). But in the case of modal expressions something very amazing comes out. The manner of speaking of a difference of necessary and contingent properties of an object. E.g. One could say that mathematicians are necessarily rational and not necessarily two-legged, while cyclist are necessarily two-legged but not necessarily rational. But how can a bicycling mathematician be classified? Insofar as we are talking purely indicatively of the object, it is not even suggestively useful to speak of some of its properties as a contingent and of others as necessary. --- I 344 Properties/Quine: no necessary or contingent properties (VsModal Logic) only more or less important properties Of course, some of its properties are considered essential and others unimportant, some permanently and others temporary, but there are none which are necessary or contingent. Curiously, exactly this distinction has philosophical tradition. It lives on in the terms "nature" and "accident". One attributes this distinction to Aristotle. (Probably some scholars are going to protest, but that is the penalty for attributing something to Aristotle.) --- I 345 But however venerable this distinction may be, it certainly cannot be justified. And thus the construction (9) which carries out this distinction so elegantly, also fails. We cannot blame the analyticity the diverse infirmities of modality. There is no alternative yet for (1) and (2) that at least sets us a little on something like modal logic. We can define "P is necessary" as "P = ((x) (x = x))". Whether (8) thereby becomes true, or whether it is at all in accordance with the equation of (1) and (2), will depend on how closely we construct the propositions in terms of their identity. They cannot be constructed so tightly that they are appropriate to the propositional properties. But how particularly the definition may be, something will be the result that a modal logic without quantifiers is isomorphic. --- VI 41 Abstract objects/modal logic/Putnam/Parsons: modal operators can save abstract objects. QuineVsModal Logic: instead quantification (postulating of objects) thus we streamline the truth functions. Modal logic/Putnam/Parsons/Quine: Putnam and Charles Parsons have shown how abstract objects can be saved in the recourse to possibility operators. Quine: without modal operators: E.g. "Everything is such that unless it is a cat and eats spoiled fish, and it gets sick, will avoid fish in the future." ((s) logical form/(s): (x) ((Fx u Gx u Hx)> Vx). Thus, the postulation of objects can streamline our only loosely binding truth functions, without us having to resort to modal operators. --- VI 102 Necessity/opportunity/Quine: are insofar intensional, as they do not fit the substitutivity of identity. Again, vary between de re and de dicto. --- VI 103 Counterfactual conditionals, unreal conditionals/Quine: are true, if their consequent follows logically from the antecedent in conjunction with background assumptions. Necessity/Quine: by sentence constellations, which are accepted by groups. (Goes beyond the individual sentence). --- VI 104 QuineVsModal logic: its friends want to give the necessity an objective sense. --- XI 52 QuineVsModal Logic/Lauener: it is not clear here on what objects we are referring to. --- XI 53 Necessesity/Quine/Lauener: ("Three Grades of Modal Involvement"): 3 progressive usages: 1. as a predicate for names of sentences: E.g. "N "p"": "p is necessarily true". (N: = square, box). This is harmless, simply equate it with analyticity. 2. as an operator which extends to close sentence: E.g. "N p": "it is necessarily true that p" 3. as an operator, too, for open sentences: E.g. "N Fx": through existence generalization: "(Ex) N Fx". |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Neale, St. | Verschiedene Vs Neale, St. | Klaus von Heusinger, Eselssätze und ihre Pferdefüsse Uni Konstanz Fachgruppe Sprachwissenschaft Arbeitspapier 64; 1994 Heusinger I 19 E-Type-Analysis/Neale/Identifications/Unity Conditions/Heusinger: Recently Neale (1990) has given the E-Type-Analysis a boost by allowing the violation of the uniqueness condition. Solution/Neale: Def "numberless pronouns"/Neale: (1990, 235, (*8))= Pronouns as a certain description without uniqueness condition. "Whoever". Spelling: „whe“ (whoever) Here: as generalized quantifier in (31) as term-building operator in (32) (31) ‚[whe x: Fx] (Gx)’ is true iff I F-GI = 0 and I F I > 1. (32) G whe (x) Fx ⇔ (Ex)Fx & (x)(Fx > Gx) Chrysipp Sentence/Neale/Heusinger: this is how the pronoun in (30) receives universal power. And not by the indefinite NP, which is interpreted as the classical E-Quantifier, but by the number-less pronoun, which designates all objects that fulfill the antecedent theorem. (30e) If a man is in Athens, whoever is a man and is in Athens is not in Rhodes. (30f) (Ex) [Man (x) & Athens (x)] > ~ Rhodos (whe (x) [Man (x) & Athens (x)] ) (30g) (x) [Man (x) & Athens (x)] > ~Rhodos (x)]. Problem: this is only possible at the price of an ambiguity of the pronouns (ambiguous, whether as Iota expression or "whoever" expression). This cannot be seen in the sentence. VsNeale/Heusinger: This leaves open the questions of a system of strong or weak readings, the solution of the proportional paradox and a comparison of symmetrical and asymmetrical readings. I 20 E-Type Analysis/pragmatic/anaphora/pronouns/Cooper/Heim/Heusinger: Thesis: here the descriptions are formed by a characteristic that stands out in the context. ...Example ... Advantage: (VsNeale/CoopervsNeale): here you do not have to take all the material of the sentence containing the antecedent. |
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| Pragmatism | Brandom Vs Pragmatism | I 196 BrandomVsPragmatism: you can know what follows from an assertion, for example, that an act is immoral without having understood the claim. ((s) Overemphasis on the consequences). Horwich I 444 Truth/Pragmatism/Rorty: has no explanatory role. a) it has confirmatory (endorsing) use b) warning use: E.g. "Your belief is justified, but perhaps not true," I 445 c) disquotationale use: designed to meta-linguistically express "S is true iff. __ ". JamesVs b) and c). Relativism/Rorty: that is why pragmatism was equaled with relativism. Truth/Pragmatism/Davidson/Rorty: Davidson accepts all three, without the idea that usefulness of beliefs could be explained by truth. BrandomVsPrimitive pragmatism/Rorty: (truth = assertibility): is refuted by the use of "true" in the antecedent of conditionals. Brandom: an evolution of Frege and CGB (pro-sentence theory, Camp, Grover, Belnap) receives Dewey’s intentions. Pro-sentence theory/Brandom: receives the anti-descriptive approach of pragmatism ((s) truth not a property). Brandom/Rorty: shows how the pro-sentence theory can be reconciled with Davidson’s disquotationalism. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Ramsey, F. P. | Grover Vs Ramsey, F. P. | Horwich I 319 VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey/Camp, Grover, Belnap/CGB/Grover: the first two objections assume that the data base is too narrow, i.e. that there are cases that are not covered by the theory. (See Redundancy Theory). I 320 1) Index words: (Here: repetition of indices): (14) John: I’m greedy - Mary: That is true Problem: here no mere repetition, or else she would say "I am,..." Problem: there is no general scheme for such cases. 2) Modification: Here, a translation is absolutely impossible: (here with indirect reference and quantification): (15) Every thing that Mark said could be true Problem: there is no verb for "could". Similar: (16) Something that Charlie said is either true or not true. (17) Everything that Judith said was true then, but none of it is still true today. Of course you can try: (15’)(p) Mark said that p > It could be the case that p) or (15’)(p) (Mark said that p > that might p exist) Vs: "being the case" and "existing" are variations of "being true". This would make the redundancy theory a triviality. In this case, Ramsey’s "direct" theory would be wrong. CGBVsRamsey: we improve the redundancy theory by we let by not only allowing propositional quantification for the target language, but also an indeterminate field of links, such as M (for "might"), "P" (for past tense), "~" for negation, etc. I 321 The reader has likely already assumed that we have introduced the negation long ago. But that’s not true. Then: (16’)(p) (Mark said that p > Mp) (17’)(Ep) (Charlie said that p & (p v ~p)) (17’)(p) (Judith said that p > (Pp & ~p)) Redundancy Theory/Ramsey/CGB: it is this variant of the theory of Ramsey, enriched by the above links and propositional quantification, which we call redundancy theory (terminology) from now on. The thesis is that "true" thus becomes superfluous. Thesis this allows translations in Ramseyan sense to be found always. VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey: 3) "About"/Aboutness/Accuracy of the Translation/CGB: some authors: argue that "snow is white" is about snow, and "That snow is white, is true" is about the proposition. And that therefore the translation must fail. CGB: this involves the paradox of analysis. We do not directly touch upon it. ((s) Paradox of analysis, here: you’d have to act more stupid than you are in order not to realize that both sentences are about snow; to be able to name the problem at all (as the opponents do) you need to have it solved already.) 4) PragmatismVsRedundancy Theory: even if the translation preserves the alleged content, it neglects other features which should be preserved. Case of recurrence: E.g. (3) Mary: Snow is white. John: That is true. (3’) Mary: Snow is white. John: Snow is white. Is that supposed to be a good translation?. I 322 Strawson: "true" and "not true" have their own jobs to do!. Pro-Sentence/Pronoun/Anaphora/"True"/CGB: "that is true" presupposes that there is an antecedent. But that is not yet taken into account in Ramsey’s translation (3’). So Ramsey’s translation fails in pragmatic terms. VsPropositional Quantification/PQ/VsRedundancy Theory/VsRamsey/CGB: 4) redundancy: at what price? Propositional quantification is mysterious: it is not consistent with everyday language. It is not shown that "is true" is superfluous in German, but only in a curious ad hoc extension. 5) Grammar: (already anticipated by Ramsey): variables need predicates that are connected with them, even if these variables take sentence position. CGBVsRamsey: unfortunately, Ramsey’s response is not convincing. Ramsey: (see above) "p" already contains a (variable) verb. We can assume the general sentence form as aRb here, then. I 232 (a)(R)(b): If he says aRb, then aRb). Here,"is true" would be a superfluous addition. CGBVsRamsey: We must assume an infinite number of different sentence forms ((s)> language infinite). Redundancy Theory/CGB: But that does not need to worry us. 1) Propositional quantification can be set up formally and informally proper. 2) Variables which take sentences as substituents do not need a verb that is connected to them. That this was the case, is a natural mistake which goes something like this: E.g.(4’) (p)(John says p > p). If we use pronouns that simplify the connected variable: For each sentence, if John said it, it then it. Heidelberger: (1968): such sentences have no essential predicate!. Solution/Ramsey: (4’) For each sentence, if John said that it is true, then it is true. T-Predicate/CGB: "T": reads "is true". (4’) (p) (John said that Tp > Tp) Problem: because "T" is a predicate, and "Tp" is a sentence, "p" must be a term of the language, i.e. it must take a nominal position. I.e. the quantifiers bind individual variables (of a certain type), and not variables about sentences. I 335 Disappearance Cases/Pro-Sentence: some of them can be regarded as a translation in Ramsey language. Def Ramsey Language/CGB/(s): Language in which "true" is entirely superfluous. English*/CGBVsRamsey: for the purpose of better explanation. E.g. (26) It is true that snow is white, but in Pittsburgh it rarely looks white. (27) It is true that there was unwarranted violence by the IRA, but it is not true that none of their campaigns was justified. T-Predicate/CGB: used in (25) and (26) to concede a point in order to determine afterwards by "but" that not too much emphasis should be placed on it. English*. I 336: E.g. (26’) There was unwarranted violence by the IRA, that’s true, but it is not true that none of their campaigns was justified. These are all disappearance cases. I 342 VsProsentential Theory/Spurious Objections/CGB: I 343 Index Words: Laziness pro-sentences refer to their antecedent. Therefore, the theory must be refined further when it comes to indexical expressions. Otherwise E.g. John: "I’m lazy." Mary: "That’s true." Is not to say that Mary means "I (Mary) am lazy". CGB: but that’s a common problem which occurs not only when speaking about truth: E.g. John: My son has a wart on his nose. Bill: He is the spitting image of his father. E.g. Lucille: You dance well. Fred: That’s new to me. Pragmatics/CGBVsRamsey: our approach represents it correctly, in particular, because we exclude "plagiarism". Ramsey’s theory does not. I 344 Quote/VsPro-Sentence Theory/VsCGB: The pro-sentence theory is blamed to ignore cases where truth of quotes, i.e. names of sentences, is expressed. E.g. (27) "Snow is white" is true. CGB: We could say with Ramsey, that (27) simply means that snow is white. CGBVsRamsey: that obscures important pragmatic features of the example. They become more apparent when we use a foreign language translation. E.g. (28) If "snow is white" is true, then... Why (28) instead of If it’s true that snow is white, then or If snow is white, then... CGB: There are several possible reasons for this. It may be that we want to make clear that the original sentence was said in German. Or it is possible that there is no elegant translation, or we are not sufficiently familiar with German grammar. Or E.g. "snow is white" must be true, because Fritz said it, and everything Fritz says is true. I 345 Suppose, English* had a possibility to present a sentence formally: E.g. "consider __". (29) Consider: Snow is white. This is true. CGB: why should it not work just like "Snow is white is true" in normal English? VsCGB: it could be argued that this requires a reference on sentences or expressions, because quotation marks are name-forming functors. Quotation Marks/CGB: we depart from this representation! Quotation marks are not name-forming functors. I 353 Propositional Variable/Ramsey: Occupies sentence position. (Quantification over propositions). CGBVsRamsey: Such variables are of pro-sentential nature. Therefore, they should not be connected to a T-predicate. ((s) otherwise, "true" appears twice). T-Predicate/Ramsey/Redundancy Theory/CGB: this answers the old question of whether a Ramsey language has to contain a T-predicate: see below. Our strategy is to show how formulas can be read in English*, where there is no separable T-predicate. E.g. (4’) For each proposition, if John says it is true, then it is true. CGB: in this case,propositional variables and quantificational pro-sentences do the same job. Both take sentence position and have the cross-reference that is required of them. Important argument: (4’) is just the candidate for a normal English translation of (4’). Problem: this could lead to believing that a Ramsey language needs a T-predicate, as in (4’) (p)(John said that Tp > Tp). ((s) then, "true" implicitly appears twice). I 354 But since (4’) is perfect English, there is no reason to assume that the T-predicate is re-introduced by that. Or that it contains a separately bound "it" (them). |
Grover I D. L. Grover Joseph L. Camp Nuel D. Belnap, "A Prosentential Theory of Truth", Philosophical Studies, 27 (1975) pp. 73-125 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 |
| Reductionism | Avramides Vs Reductionism | Avra I 112 Avramides Reductionism: Reductionism/Avramides: can deny to be committed to attributing thinking without language to a being. Antireductionism/Avramides: might be uncomfortable with the implausible thesis (attribtuted to him) of having to deny thinking without language. Solution/Avramides: ontological asymmetry Vs ontological symmetry: Ontological asymmetry/Avramides: one could argue that my deep epistemic asymmetry (EA) contained ontological implications. If there is to be a deep EA, there would have to be an ontological one. This conditional could be interpreted as follows: Antireductionism: discards the antecedent and thus must reject the consequent. Therefore it is set to ontological symmetry. Reductionism: can assume ontological asymmetry. And with that he seems to be committed to epistemic asymmetry. AvramidesVs: that only seems like that! Because the controversy between ReductionismVsAntireductionism runs above that of ontological SymmetryVsAsymmetry. Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language. Antireductionism: must deny just that. AvramidesVs: but the flaws in these arguments are obvious. Antireductionism/Avramides: (formal errors aside) how can he accept thinking without language? What exactly is the relationship between epistemic and ontological asymmetry? We will now examine that. I 112 Reductionism/Avramides: must accept thinking without language - Antireductionism: must deny it. I 168 Reductionism/Grice/Epistemic/Ontological/Avramides: the controversy over reductionism or antireductionism is not about ontological but epistemological questions. The reductive follwer of Grice accepts deep epistemic asymmetry, Antireductionist: denies it. AvramidesVsReductionism: so he has nothing to do with interpretation and understanding anymore. |
Avr I A. Avramides Meaning and Mind Boston 1989 |
| Rousseau, J. J. | Cartwright Vs Rousseau, J. J. | I 21 Laws of Nature/Cartwright: There are at least two kinds: a) Laws of association/Association/Hume/Cartwright: they are the ones with which philosophy deals normally. They tell us how many times two qualities or quantities are co-associated. ((s) occur together?). This may be probabilistic or deterministic. This includes the equations of physics: E.g.: whenever the force on an object with the mass m is f, the acceleration is f/m. The laws of association may have a time index. E.g. the probabilistic Mendelian laws. Causality: does not matter here, instead: co-occurrence. b) Causal laws/Cartwright: E.g. Smoking causes cancer, e.g. force causes a change in movement. ((s) different from above!). Russell: Thesis: 1) there are only laws of association. 2) Causal principles cannot be derived from causally symmetric laws of association. Cartwright: Vs 1) pro 2) Causal principles/CartwrightVsRussell: Although they cannot be derived from laws of association, we cannot do without them. This has to do with our strategies. I 74 CartwrightVsRussell: I prefer causes rather than laws in science and explanation. I 111 Law/Cause/Effect/Analogy/Russell: (On the Notion of Cause, NY 1953 p 392): the principle of "same cause, same effect" is pointless. Once the antecedent (which represents the circumstances) is determined accurately enough to allow calculating the consequences, it becomes so complex that it is unlikely that the case ever occurs again! This would make science sterile. Fundamental laws/RussellVsCartwright: with that Russell pleads for fundamental laws. Fundamental laws/CartwrightVsRussell: the fundamental laws represent more the relations between properties than between individuals. But in practice the engineer wants functional laws, albeit only "with a certain accuracy". |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 |
| Ryle, G. | Sellars Vs Ryle, G. | I XXXIII Propositions/thoughts/RyleVs "category mistake": as beliefs, desires or motives thoughts are no space temporally localized events or states. Therefore, they cannot occur as antecedents or causes of actions. SellarsVsRyle: he suggested to understand mental predicates like "to be convinced", "to believe" etc. as expressions of dispositions but without acknowledging that again there is an explanation like in the way of the Freudian ego or super-ego . Belief/Ryle: to be convinced means to behave in a certain way. I XXXIII Disposition/explanation/to appear/Sellars: goes one step further than Ryle by asking how once can also explain the behavioral dispositions themselves. His tie seller John developed a kind of theory, which specifically refers to the language behavior of a community of Rylean ancestors. I 77 Inner episode/category mistake/SellarsVsRyle: inner episodes are by no means a category mistake, they can even be very well "speak" with the means of intersubjective discourse. And in fact through a critical examination of inner episodes of a different kind, namely with thoughts. I 79 Episode/tradition: modern empiricism: a) thoughts are verbal or linguistic episodes. SellarsVs: there is not enough language behavior to explain all thoughts. b) To think/tradition: be any form of "intelligent behavior" both linguistically not linguistically. RyleVs: actually no episodes but hypothetical or mixed-hypothetical-categorical facts about this or other behavior. ((s) This seems to be by Ryle, but Ryle is not explicitly mentioned here by Sellars). SellarsVs: Problem: whenever we refer to a component of non-habitual behavior as intelligent, we seem then to think it necessary to thereby refer to a thinking. (hidden circle. VsRyle). I 88 Category Mistake/Sellars: e.g. to assume that the combustibility of wood is so to say latent burning. SellarsVsRyle: nevertheless, not every non-observable episode is the consequence of category mistakes. |
Sellars I Wilfrid Sellars The Myth of the Given: Three Lectures on the Philosophy of Mind, University of London 1956 in: H. Feigl/M. Scriven (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1956 German Edition: Der Empirismus und die Philosophie des Geistes Paderborn 1999 Sellars II Wilfred Sellars Science, Perception, and Reality, London 1963 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 |
| Salmon, W.C. | Cartwright Vs Salmon, W.C. | Cartwright I 26 Example Uranium/Decay/Probability/Cartwright: here it is not the statistical law (which Salmon quotes): P(clicks I uranium) < P(clicks) but rather the causal law: "uranium causes radioactivity". Then - as desired - the probability function for decay grows in every test situation. I.e. uranium amplifies the probability in both cases: when polonium is present and when it is absent. Salmon: sees the probability decrease because he considers a causally not homogeneous situation. CartwrightVsSalmon, Probability: insisting on an increase in probability functions through all test situations not only gets all good cases, but also excludes bad explanations that Salmon must allow. Schurz I 234 Probability/Explanation/W.Salmon/Ontology/Schurz: (Salmon 1971, 63, 1984): for example, if an unlikely event occurs, the explanation must contain the low probability value! And this is then the reason! For example in a Mendel crossing experiment the probability for red is 75 % and for white 25 %. Then the occurrence of white must be justified with the probability of 25 % (against 75 %)! Logical form: "p(white(x) I Ax) = 25 %, Ab// (0,25) White(b)". Although the antecedence here lowers the probability of the Explanadum event! I 235 Salmon: therefore we can only demand from the antecedent that it is positively or negatively relevant. Hempel/Schurz: the late Hempel was convinced of this. CartwrightVsSalmon, probability: it is counterintuitive to say that the event occurred because a factor was present that makes it unlikely. Solution/Humphreys/Schurz: (Humphreys 1989,117) We refer to these as counter-causes. (Schurz pro). We then say that the event has occurred even though the antecedent has occurred. |
Car I N. Cartwright How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983 CartwrightR II R. Cartwright Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954 Schu I G. Schurz Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie Darmstadt 2006 |
| Searle, J.R. | Bennett Vs Searle, J.R. | 2. In unconventional situations, would Searle say that the primary speaker's intention is to create a belief? I 189 BennettVsSearle: the problem remains the same. If understanding involves grasping conventions, the primary speaker's intent cannot be to be understood. Searle: Lemon-Example: a story that has the following form: (intend p) and ~(to mean p). BennettVsSearle: I claim that it does not work. This is only relevant to Grice if the speaker intends the listeners to go exactly in the opposite direction, i.e. to infer their belief that the speaker is a German soldier from their understanding of the sentence. I 190 BennettVsSearle: he has not refuted Grice's conditional: (intend p) > (to mean p). He has not presented a story in which the antecedent is fulfilled. S does not mean literally what he says. He himself does not mean that he is a German soldier. Therefore the counter-example is not at all apt against Grice. I 192 BennettVsSearle: this is safer than his original lemon-example, but less clear. The conventional meaning is not just any other circumstance, but a much more effective one! |
Bennett I Jonathan Bennett "The Meaning-Nominalist Strategy" in: Foundations of Language, 10, 1973, pp. 141-168 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1979 |
| Skepticism | Kant Vs Skepticism | Stroud I 129 Skepticism/knowledge/KantVsDescartes: The relation between the philosophical question and our everyday or scientific knowledge is more indirect and complex than he thought. ((s) (see below): But for Kant the perception of external things is very direct). Descartes/Stroud: for him the skepticism is inevitable! Kant: would agree. That is why he developed another concept. "Scandal"/Kant: that a theory has never been developed in the history of philosophy that avoids skepticism. Knowledge/theory/Kant/Stroud: there are conditions to be met by any theory of knowledge: the theory must not be deny that there are external things. Suppose there were no external world, then Descartes’ skepticism would loose its sting! Then there would be no limit to my knowledge that I know nothing about the things except me, because there would be nothing after all. I 130 Def problematic idealism/Kant/Stroud: Thesis: that the world which is independent from us is unknowable. Or that the world is dubious or not reliable as other things that we know. That makes everything problematic. (B 274) KantVsIdealism: misinterprets our actual situation in the world. Knowledge/Kant/Stroud: whoever reads the proof, must know at the end that the example is a goldfinch or actually three typographical errors. Stroud: these are not really high standards. It seems that every access to knowledge needs to meet this standard. Problem: virtually no philosophical theory satisfies this condition! KantVsDescartes: (end of the 1. Meditation) does not meet this condition. KantVsSkepticism: therefore, any inferential approach must be avoided to avoid it. World/reality/Kant: the external things which we know need to have a "reality"((s) a particular property?) which does not allow to be inferred . (A 371). ((s) Kant here similar to Hume: direct perception of things)). immediate perception/= Awareness/Kant/Stroud: there is then a sufficient proof of the things’ (of this kind)reality! ((s)> proof of existence). (A 371). Stroud: so that we are in a daily situation where the (Kant), "external perception [provides] ... the direct evidence of something real in space". (A 375). DescartesVsKant: could say that Kant is actually not capable. Stroud: But this is not a matter which one of both gives the correct description of the situation. KantVsDescartes: its description cannot be correct. But he is not just giving a competing alternative. He rather gives conditions for the access to knowledge. I 132 At least such theories must take account of the traditional skepticism. E.g. if Descartes was right, we could not know anything about the outside world. That is the reason why Kant does not allow to infer knowledge of external things. Otherwise, skepticism is inevitable. Stroud: So it requires precisely the kind of knowledge that Moore gives! I 140 Def "Epistemic Priority"/terminology/Stroud: you could call Descartes’ thesis that sensory experience, perception, representations (which Descartes calls Ideas’) are epistemically placed before the perceived objects. I 141 Stroud: that means that epistemically subordinated things cannot be known without epistemically antecedent things being known. And not the other way around. That means that the latter are less knowable, so the outer world is less knowable than our sensory experiences. KantVsDescartes/KantVsEpistemic priority: this view needs to be rejected since it cannot explain how knowledge is actually possible! Perception/KantVsDescartes: we perceive things directly, without conclusion. Stroud: we understand Kant only when we understand Descartes. Realism/KantVsSkepticism/KantVsDescartes: these considerations which involve him are those which lead to the epistemic priority (priority of sensations (or "ideas") before the objects). I 142 We need to understand this in order to understand Kant’s version of realism. (VsMoores simple realism). That means the realism which explains how it is possible that we know something of the world? (Conditions of the possibility of knowledge). I 146 Knowledge/KantVsSkeptizismus/Stroud: when external perception (experience) is the condition for inner experience, and when external experience is immediate then we can know (in general) that there is an external reality which corresponds to our sensory experiences (sensations). I 147 Then there may be deception in individual cases, but no general skeptical questioning. KantVsSkeptizismus/KantVsDescartes: cannot be extended to all, it can only appear in individual cases. Perception/KantVsDescartes: N.B. if one could assume the skepticism at any rate, one would have to assume that our perception has come about not directly but indirectly, inferentially (via conclusion). KantVsDescartes: this does not go far enough and relies too heavily on the "testimonies" of our everyday expressions. I 148 Descartes should have examined the conditions that actually make experience possible. KantVsSkepticism: even the "inner experience" of Descartes are possible only if he firstly has outer experiences. Therefore, the skeptical conclusion violates the conditions of experience in general. Descartes position itself is impossible: no examination of our knowledge could show that we always perceive something other than the independent objects, which we believe exist around us. Skepticism/Kant/Stroud: Kant accepts at least the conditional force ((s)e.g. the premises) of the traditional skepticism. KantVsDescates: But he rejects the skeptical conclusion: they contradict every adequate philosophical theory of knowledge. Solution/Kant: what we know touches the phenomena. KantVsSkepticism/Stroud: The antecedent of the skeptical conclusion can only be true if the consequent is false. Knowledge/world/KantVsMoore/Stroud: Thus, he has a different understanding of the relationship between philosophical study of knowledge and the knowledge in daily life. I 159 Science/reality/everyday/knowledge/KantVsDescartes/Stroud: our everyday and scientific knowledge is invulnerable to skepticism. KantVsMoore: But there is no conclusion of our perceptions of knowledge about unrelated things. I 168 Knowledge/explanation/StroudVsKant: But we could not need an explanation: not because skepticism were true (and therefore there would be nothing that could be explained), but because the general philosophical question cannot be provided conclusively! (> Skepticism/Carnap). Kant/Stroud: Important argument: advocates in a manner for a limited ("deflationary") perspective, which corresponds to this criticism. ((s) "deflationary": here: not directed at the most comprehensive framework). KantVsDescartes: when his question could be provided coherently, skepticism would be the only answer. Therefore, the question is illegitimate. StroudVsKant: this does then not explain what Descartes was concerned about. |
I. Kant I Günter Schulte Kant Einführung (Campus) Frankfurt 1994 Externe Quellen. ZEIT-Artikel 11/02 (Ludger Heidbrink über Rawls) Volker Gerhard "Die Frucht der Freiheit" Plädoyer für die Stammzellforschung ZEIT 27.11.03 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 |
| Skepticism | Nozick Vs Skepticism | II 197 Skepticism/Nozick: we do not try to refute the skeptic. VsSkepticism: other authors: 1) when he argues against knowledge, he already presupposes that it exists. 2) to accept it would be unreasonable, because it is more likely that his extreme conclusions are wrong than that all its premises are true. NozickVs. We do not have to convince the skeptic. We want to explain how knowledge is possible, therefore it is good to find hypotheses which we ourselves find acceptable! II 198 Skepticism/Nozick: Common Variant: claims that someone could believe something even though it is wrong. Perhaps caused by a demon or because he is dreaming or because he is a brain in a vat. But how do these possibilities adopted by the skeptic show that I do not know p? (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p (as above). If (3) is a necessary condition for knowledge that shows the possibility of the skeptic that there is no knowledge. Strong variant: R: Even if p were false, S would still believe that p II 199 This conditional with the same antecedent as (3) and contradictory consequent is incompatible with (3). If (3) is true, R is false. But R is stronger than skepticism requires. Because if (3) were wrong, S could still believe that p. The following conditional is weaker than R, it is merely the negation of (3): T: Not (not p > not (S believes that p)). ((s) >Range: weaker: negation of the entire conditional stronger: the same antecedent, opposite of the consequent ((s) not necessarily negation of consequent) Here: stronger: ".... would have to believe ..." - weaker.. "... could ...") Nozick: While R does not simply deny (3), it asserts its own conditional instead. The truth of (3) is not incompatible with a possible situation (here not possible world) where the person believes p, although p is false. (3) does not cover all possibilities: (3) not p > not (S believes p) That does not mean that in all situations where not p is true, S does not believe that p. Asserting this would mean to say that not p entails not (S believes p) (or logical implication) ((s) >Entailment). But subjunction (conditional) differs from entailment: So the existence of a possible situation in which p is wrong and S still believes p does not show that (3) is false. (? LL). (3) can be true even if there is a possible situation where not p and S believes that p. (3) speaks of the situation in which p is false. Not every possible situation where p is false is the situation that would prevail if p were false. Possible World: (3) speaks of the ~p world closest to our actual world. It speaks of the non-p neighborhood. Skepticism/SK/Terminology/Nozick: SK stands for the "possibilities of the skeptic": II 200 We could dream of being misled by an evil demon or being brains in a vat. These are attempts to refute (3): (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p. But these only attempts succeed if one of these possibilities(dream, vat, demon) prevails when p is false. I.e. only in the next non-p worlds. Even if we were in the vat, (3) could be true, i.e. although - as described by skeptics - p is false and S believes p. ((s) E.g. p: "I am in the Café": false, if I'm in the vat. But I would not believe to be the vat. That is what the skeptic means. If I do not believe the truth (that I am in the vat) and do not know, then my belief is wrong. But then p means "I'm not in the vat."). NozickVsSkepticism: when the skeptic describes a situation SK that would not prevail (sic), even if p were wrong, then this situation SK (vat) does not show that (3) is wrong and does not undermine our knowledge. (see below) ((s) i.e. from the perspective VsSkepticism: the skeptic asserts that all beliefs are wrong, but that is not yet the situation that we are all in the tank). This is just the preliminary consideration, the expected one follows in the next paragraph). Condition C: to exclude skeptical hypothesis: C: not-p > SK (vat situation) does not exist ((s) That is what the skeptic denies!). That excludes every skeptical situation that fulfills C. ((s) it is only about n-p cases). Skepticism: for a vat situation to show that we do not know that p, it must be a situation that could exist if p did not exist, and thus satisfies the negation of C: Negation of C: -not (not p > SK (vat situation) does not exist) Although the vat situations of the skeptic seem to show that (3) is wrong, they do not show it: they satisfy condition C and are therefore excluded! SkepticismVs: could ask why we know that if p were wrong, SK (vat) would not exist. But usually it asks something stronger: do we know that the vat situation does not exist? And if we do not know that, how can we know that p? ((s) reverse order). This brings us to the second way in which the vat situatios could show that we do not know that p: Skeptical results Knowledge/Nozick: according to our approach, S knows that the vat situation does not exist iff II 201 (1) vat situation does not exist (2) S believes that vat situation does not exist (3) If the vat situation existed, then S would not believe that the vat situation did not(!) exist. (4) If the vat situation did not exist, then S would believe that it does not exist. (3) is the necessary condition for knowledge! It follows from it that we do not know that we are not in the vat! Skepticism/Nozick: that is what the skeptic says. But is it not what we say ourselves? It is actually a feature of our approach that it provides this result! Vat/Demon/Descartes/Nozick: Descartes would say that proof of the existence of a good God would not allow us to be in the vat. Literature then focused on whether Descartes would succeed to obtain such evidence. II 202 Nozick: could a good God not have reasons to deceive us? According to Descartes his motives are unknowable for us. Cogito/Nozick: can "I think" only be produced by something existing? Not perhaps also by Hamlet, could we not be dreamed by someone who inspires "I think" in us? Descartes asked how we knew that we were not dreaming, he could also have asked whether we were dreamed about by someone. Def Doxastically Identical/Terminology/Nozick: is a possible situation for S with the current situation, if S believed exactly the same things (Doxa) in the situation. II 203 Skepticism: describes doxastically identical situations where nearly all the believed things are wrong. (Vat). Such possible worlds are possible, because we possess our knowledge through mediation, not directly. It's amazing how different doxastically identical worlds can be. What else could the skeptic hope for? Nozick pro skepticism: we agree that we do not know that "not-vat". II 204 But that does not keep me from knowing that I'm writing this! It is true, I believe it and I would not believe it if it were not true, and if it were true, I would believe it. I.e. our approach does not lead to general skepticism. However, we must ensure that it seems that the skeptic is right and that we do not know that we are not in the vat. VsSkepticism: we must examine its "short step" to the conclusion that we do not know these things, because either this step is wrong or our approach is incoherent. Not seclusion II 204 Completed/Incompleteness/Knowledge/Nozick: Skepticism: (wrongly) assumes that our knowledge is complete under known logical implication: if we progress from something known to something entailed, we allegedly do not leave the realm of knowledge. The skeptic tries the other way around, of course: if you do not know that q, and you know that p entails q, then it should follow that you do not know that p. E.g. ((s) If you do not know that you are not in the vat, and sitting here implies not being in the vat, then you do not know that you're sitting here, if you know that the implication exists. (contraposition).) Terminology: Contraposition: knowledge that p >>: entails Then the (skeptical) principle of closure under known implication is: P: K(p >> q) & Kp > Kq. II 205 Nozick: E.g. if you know that two sentences are incompatible, and you know that the first one is true, then you know that the negation of the second one is true. Contraposition: because you do not know the second one, you do not know the first. (FN 48) Vs: you could pick on the details and come to an iteration: the person might have forgotten inferences etc. Finally you would come to KK(p >> q) & KKp Kq: amplifies the antecedent and is therefore not favorable for the skeptics. II 206 NozickVsSkepticism: the whole principle P is false. Not only in detail. Knowledge is not closed under known logical implication. (FN 49) S knows that p if it has a true belief and fulfills (3) and (4). (3) and (4) are themselves not closed under known implication. (3) if p were false, S would not believe that p. If S knows that p, then the belief is that p contingent on the truth of p. And that is described by (3). Now it may be that p implies q (and S knows that), that he also believes that q, but this belief that q is not subjunktivically dependent on the truth of q. Then he does not fulfill (3') if q were wrong, S would not believe q. The situation where q is wrong could be quite different from the one where p is wrong. E.g. the fact that they were born in a certain city implies that they were born on the earth, but not vice versa. II 207 And pondering the respective situations would also be very different. Thus the belief would also be very different. Stronger/Weaker: if p implies q (and not vice versa), then not-q (negation of consequent) is much stronger than not-p (negation of the antecedent). Assuming various strengths there is no reason to assume that the belief would be the same in both situations. (Doxastically identical). Not even would the beliefs in one be a proper subset of the other! E.g. p = I'm awake and sitting on a chair in Jerusalem q = I'm not in the vat. The first entails the second. p entails q. And I know that. If p were wrong, I could be standing or lying in the same city or in a nearby one. ((s) There are more ways you can be outside of a vat than there are ways you can be inside). If q were wrong, I would have to be in a vat. These are clearly two different situations, which should make a big difference in what I believe. If p were wrong, I would not believe that p. If q were wrong, I would nevertheless still believe that q! Even though I know that p implies q. The reason is that (3) is not closed under known implication. It may be that (3) is true of one statement, but not of another, which is implied by it. If p entails q and we truthfully believe that p, then we do not have a false belief that q. II 208 Knowledge: if you know something, you cannot a have false belief about it. Nevertheless, although p implies q, we can have a false belief that q (not in vat)! "Would not falsely believe that" is in fact not completed under known implication either. If knowledge were merely true belief, it would be closed under implication. (Assuming that both statements are believed). Because knowledge is more than belief, we need additional conditions of which at least one must be open (not completed) under implication. Knowledge: a belief is only knowledge when it covaries with the fact. (see above). Problem: This does not yet ensure the correct type of connection. Anyway, it depends on what happens in situations where p is false. Truth: is what remains under implication. But a condition that does not mention the possible falseness, does not provide us covariance. Belief: a belief that covaries with the facts is not complete. II 209 Knowledge: and because knowledge involves such a belief, it is not completed, either. NozickVsSkepticism: he cannot simply deny this, because his argument that we do not know that we are not in the vat uses the fact that knowledge needs the covariance. But he is in contradiction, because another part of his argument uses the assumption that there is no covariance! According to this second part he concludes that you know nothing at all if you do not know that they are not in the vat. But this completion can only exist if the variation (covariance) does not exist. Knowledge/Nozick: is an actual relation that includes a connection (tracking, traceable track). And the track to p is different from that to q! Even if p implies q. NozickVsSkepticism: skepticism is right in that we have no connections to some certain truths (we are not in the vat), but he is wrong in that we are not in the correct relation to many other facts (truths). Including such that imply the former (unconnected) truth that we believe, but do not know. Skepticism/Nozick: many skeptics profess that they cannot maintain their position, except in situations where they rationally infer. E.g. Hume: II 210 Hume: after having spent three or four hours with my friends, my studies appear to me cold and ridiculous. Skepticism/Nozick: the arguments of the skeptic show (but they also show only) that we do not know that we are not in the vat. He is right in that we are not in connection with a fact here. NozickVsSkepticism: it does not show that we do not know other facts (including those that imply "not vat"). II 211 We have a connection to these other facts (e.g. I'm sittin here, reading). II 224f Method/Knowledge/Covariance/Nozick: I do not live in a world where pain behavior e is given and must be kept constant! - I.e. I can know h on the basis of e, which is variable! - And because it does not vary, it shows me that h ("he is in pain") is true. VsSkepticism: in reality it is not a question that is h not known, but "not (e and not h)" II 247 NozickVsSkepticism: there is a limit for the iteration of the knowledge operator K. "knowing knowledge" is sometimes interpreted as certainly knowing, but that is not meant here. Point: Suppose a person knows exactly that they are located on the 3rd level of knowledge: K³p (= KKKp), but not k4p. Suppose also that the person knows that they are not located on the 4th level. KK³p & not k4p. But KK³p is precisely k4p which has already been presumed as wrong! Therefore, it should be expected that if we are on a finite level Knp, we do not know exactly at what level we are. |
No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 |
| Speech Act Theory | Verschiedene Vs Speech Act Theory | CohenVsspeech-act theory: failure in complex cases - e.g. questionable phrase in the antecedent of a conditional. |
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| Stalnaker, R. | Field Vs Stalnaker, R. | II 35 Proposition/Mathematics/Stalnaker: (1976, p 88): There are only two mathematical propositions, the necessarily true one and the necessarily false one. And we know that the first one is true and the second one is false. Problem: The functions that determine which of the two ((s) E.g. "This sentence is true", "this sentence is false"?) is expressed by a mathematical statement are just sufficiently complex to doubt which of the two is being expressed. Solution/Stalnaker: therefore the belief objects in mathematics should be considered as propositions about the relation between sentences and what they say. FieldVsStalnaker: it does not work. E.g. "the Banach-Tarski conditional" stands for the conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the set theory with the axiom of choice (AoC) and whose consequent is the Banach-Tarski theorem (BTT). Suppose a person doubts the BTT, but knows the rule of language which refers sentences of the language of the ML to propositions. By Stalnaker, this person would not really doubt the proposition expressed by the BT conditional, because it is a logical truth. Field: what he really doubts is the proposition that is expressed by the following: (i) the language rules connect the BT conditional with necessary truth. Problem: because the person is familiar with the language rules for the language of the ML, he can only doubt (i) even if he also doubted the proposition expressed by the following: (ii) the language rules __ refer the BT conditional to the necessary truth. wherein the voids must be filled with the language rules of the language. Important argument: FieldVsStalnaker: the proposition expressed by (ii) is a necessary truth itself! And because Stalnaker supposes coarse sets of possible worlds, he cannot distinguish by this if anyone believes them or not. ((s) because it makes no difference in the sets of possible worlds, because necessary truth is true in every possible world). FieldVsStalnaker: the rise of mathematical propositions to metalinguistic ones has lead to nothing. Proposition/FieldVsStalnaker: must be individuated more finely than amounts of possible worlds and Lewis shows us how: if we accept that the believing of a proposition involves an attitude towards sentences. E.g. Believing ML is roughly the same thing as believing* the conjunction of its axioms. The believed* sentences have several fine-grained meanings. Therefore (1) attributes different fine-grained propositions to the two different persons. II 45 Representation/Functionalism/Field: 1) Question: Does an adequate belief theory need to have assumptions about representations incorporated explicitly?. Functionalism/Field: does not offer an alternative to representations here. By that I mean more than the fact that functionalism is compatible with representations. Lewis and Stalnaker would admit that. Representation/Lewis/Stalnaker/Field: both would certainly admit that assuming one opened the head of a being and found a blackboard there on which several English sentence were written, and if, furthermore, one saw that this influenced the behavior in the right way, then we would have a strong assumption for representations. This shows that functionalism is compatible with representations. Representation/FieldVsStalnaker/FieldVsLewis: I’m hinting at something stronger that both would certainly reject: I think the two would say that without opening the head we have little reason to believe in representations. II 46 It would be unfounded neurophysiological speculation. S-Proposition/Stalnaker: 2 Advantages: 1) as a coarse-grained one it fits better into the pragmatic approach of intentional states (because of their ((s) more generous) identity conditions for contents). 2) this is the only way we can solve Brentano’s problem of the naturalistic explanation of mind states. II 82 Belief/Stalnaker: Relation between the cognitive state of an acting person and S-propositions. II 83 FieldVsStalnaker. Vs 1) and 2) 1) The whole idea of E.g. "the object of", "the contents of" should be treated with caution. In a very general sense they are useful to determine the equality of such contents. But this is highly context-dependent. II 84 2) Stalnaker does not only want to attribute entities to mind states as their content, but even. Def intrinsically representational entities/iR/Field: in them, it is already incorporated that they represent the real universe in a certain way. 3) Even if we attribute such intrinsically representational entities as content, it is not obvious that there could be only one type of such iR. Fine-grained/Coarse/FieldVsStalnaker: for him, there seems to be a clear separation; I believe it is not so clear. Therefore, it is also not clear for me whether his S-propositions are the right content, but I do not want to call them the "wrong" content, either. Field: Thesis: We will also need other types of "content-like" properties of mind states, both for the explanation of behavior and for the naturalistic access to content. Intentionality/Mind State/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker represents what he calls the pragmatic image and believes that it leads to the following: 1) the belief objects are coarse. Def Coarse/Stalnaker: are belief objects that cannot be logically different and at the same equivalent. 2) StalnakerVsMentalese/StalnakerVsLanguage of Thought. Mentalese/Language of Thought/Stalnaker/Field: apparently, Stalnaker believes that a thought language (which is more finely grained) would have to lead to a rejection of the pragmatic image. FieldVsStalnaker: this is misleading. Def Pragmatic Image/Intentionality/Stalnaker/Field: Stalnaker Thesis: representational mind states should be understood primarily in terms of the role they play in the characterization of actions. II 85 StalnakerVsLinguistic Image: Thesis: Speaking is only one type of action. It has no special status. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 |
| Stalnaker, R. | Lewis Vs Stalnaker, R. | Read III 101/102 Stalnaker equates the probability of the conditional clauses with the conditional probability. LewisVsStalnaker: there is no statement whose probability is measured by the conditional probability! (+ III 102) According to Lewis, based on Stalnaker's assumption, the odds of drawing cards are independent. But this is obviously wrong (as opposed to throwing dice). Thus, the probability of the conditional clause cannot be measured by the conditional probability. III 108 Example from Lewis If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italian. and If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet wouldn't be Italian. Stalnaker: one or the other must be true. Lewis: both are wrong. (Because only subjunctive conditional sentences are not truth functional). The indicative pieces would be entirely acceptable to those who do not know their nationality. Lewis IV 149 Action/Rationality/Stalnaker: Propositions are the suitable objects of settings here. LewisVsStalnaker: it turns out that he actually needs a theory of attitudes de se. Stalnaker: the rationally acting is someone who accepts various possible rational futures. The function of the wish is simple to subdivide these different event progressions into the desired and the rejected ones. Or to provide an order or measure of alternative possibilities in terms of desirability. Belief/Stalnaker: its function is simple to determine which the relevant alternative situations may be, or to arrange them in terms of their probability under different conditions. Objects of attitude/Objects of belief/Stalnaker: are identical if and only if they are functionally equivalent, and they are only if they do not differ in any alternative possible situation. Lewis: if these alternative situations are always alternative possible worlds, as Stalnaker assumes, then this is indeed an argument for propositions. ((s) Differentiation Situation/Possible world). Situation/Possible world/Possibility/LewisVsStalnaker: I think there can also be alternatives within a single possible world! For example, Lingens now knows almost enough to identify himself. He's reduced his options to two: a) he's on the 6th floor of the Stanford Library, then he'll have to go downstairs, or b) he is in the basement of the Widener College library and must go upstairs. The books tell him that there is exactly one person with memory loss in each of these places. And he found out that he must be one of them. His consideration provides 8 possibilities: The eight cases are spread over only four types of worlds! For example, 1 and 3 do not belong to different worlds but are 3000 miles away in the same world. In order to distinguish these you need qualities again, ((s) the propositions apply equally to both memory artists.) V 145 Conditionals/Probability/Stalnaker: (1968)(1) Notation: ">" (pointed, not horseshoe!) Def Stalnaker Conditional: a conditional A > C is true if and only if the least possible change that makes A true, also makes C true. (Revision). Stalnaker: assumes that P(A > C) and P(C I A) are adjusted if A is positive. The sentences, which are true however under Stalnaker's conditions, are then exactly those that have positive probabilities under his hypothesis about probabilities of conditionals. LewisVsStalnaker: this is probably true mostly, but not in certain modal contexts, where different interpretations of a language evaluate the same sentences differently. V 148 Conditional/Stalnaker: to decide whether to believe a conditional: 1. add the antecedent to your set of beliefs, 2. make the necessary corrections for the consistency 3. decide if the consequence is true. Lewis: that's right for a Stalnaker conditional if the fake revision is done by mapping. V 148/149 LewisVsStalnaker: the passage suggests that one should pretend the kind of revision that would take place if the antecedens were actually added to the belief attitudes. But that is wrong: then conditionalisation was needed. Schwarz I 60 Counterpart/c.p./counterpart theory/c.p.th./counterpart relation/c.p.r./StalnakerVsLewis: if you allow almost arbitrary relations as counterpart relations anyway, you could not use qualitative relations. (Stalnaker 1987a)(2): then you can reconcile counterpart with Haecceitism: if you come across the fact that Lewis (x)(y)(x = y > N(x = y) is wrong, (Lewis pro contingent identity, see above) you can also determine that a thing always has only one counter part per world. Stalnaker/Schwarz: this is not possible with qualitative counterpart relations, since it is always conceivable that several things - for example in a completely symmetrical world - are exactly the same as a third thing in another possible world. LewisVsStalnaker: VsNon qualitative counter part relation: all truths including modal truths should be based on what things exist (in the real world and possible worlds) and what (qualitative) properties they have (>"mosaic": >Humean World). Schwarz I 62 Mathematics/Truthmaking/Fact/Lewis/Schwarz: as with possible worlds, there is no real information: for example, that 34 is the root of 1156, tells us nothing about the world. ((s) That it applies in every possible world. Rules are not truthmakers). Schwarz: For example, that there is no one who shaves those who do not shave themselves is analogously no information about the world. ((s) So not that the world is qualitatively structured). Schwarz: maybe we'll learn more about sentences here. But it is a contingent truth (!) that sentences like "there is someone who shaves those who do not shave themselves" are inconsistent. Solution/Schwarz: the sentence could have meant something else and thus be consistent. Schwarz I 63 Seemingly analytical truth/Lewis/Schwarz: e.g. what do we learn when we learn that ophthalmologists are eye specialists? We already knew that ophthalmologists are ophthalmologists. We have experienced a contingent semantic fact. Modal logic/Modality/Modal knowledge/Stalnaker/Schwarz: Thesis: Modal knowledge could always be understood as semantic knowledge. For example, when we ask if cats are necessary animals, we ask how the terms "cat" and "animal" are to be used. (Stalnaker 1991(3),1996(4), Lewis 1986e(5):36). Knowledge/SchwarzVsStalnaker: that's not enough: to acquire contingent information, you always have to examine the world. (Contingent/Schwarz: empirical, non-semantic knowledge). Modal Truth/Schwarz: the joke about logical, mathematical and modal truths is that they can be known without contact with the world. Here we do not acquire any information. ((s) >making true: no empirical fact "in the world" makes that 2+2 = 4; Cf. >Nonfactualism; >Truthmakers). Schwarz I 207 "Secondary truth conditions"/truth conditions/tr.cond./semantic value/Lewis/Schwarz: contributing to the confusion is that the simple (see above, context-dependent, ((s) "indexical") and variable functions of worlds on truth values are often not only called "semantic values" but also as truth conditions. Important: these truth conditions (tr.cond.) must be distinguished from the normal truth conditions. Lewis: use truth conditions like this. 1986e(5),42 48: for primary, 1969(6), Chapter V: for secondary). Def Primary truth conditions/Schwarz: the conditions under which the sentence should be pronounced according to the conventions of the respective language community. Truth Conditions/Lewis/Schwarz: are the link between language use and formal semantics, their purpose is the purpose of grammar. Note: Def Diagonalization/Stalnaker/Lewis/Schwarz: the primary truth conditions are obtained by diagonalization, i.e. by using world parameters for the world of the respective situation (correspondingly as time parameter the point of time of the situation etc.). Def "diagonal proposition"/Terminology/Lewis: (according to Stalnaker, 1978(7)): primary truth conditions Def horizontal proposition/Lewis: secondary truth condition (1980a(8),38, 1994b(9),296f). Newer terminology: Def A-Intension/Primary Intension/1-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for primary truth conditions Def C-Intension/Secondary Intension/2-Intension/Terminology/Schwarz: for secondary truth conditions Def A-Proposition/1-Proposition/C-Proposition/2-Propsition/Terminology/Schwarz: correspondingly. (Jackson 1998a(10),2004(11), Lewis 2002b(12),Chalmers 1996b(13), 56,65) Def meaning1/Terminology/Lewis/Schwarz: (1975(14),173): secondary truth conditions. Def meaning2/Lewis/Schwarz: complex function of situations and worlds on truth values, "two-dimensional intention". Schwarz: Problem: this means very different things: Primary truth conditions/LewisVsStalnaker: in Lewis not determined by meta-linguistic diagonalization like Stalnaker's diagonal proposition. Not even about a priori implication as with Chalmer's primary propositions. Schwarz I 227 A posteriori necessity/Metaphysics/Lewis/Schwarz: normal cases are not cases of strong necessity. One can find out for example that Blair is premier or e.g. evening star = morning star. LewisVsInwagen/LewisVsStalnaker: there are no other cases (which cannot be empirically determined). LewisVs Strong Need: has no place in its modal logic. LewisVs telescope theory: possible worlds are not like distant planets where you can find out which ones exist. 1. Robert C. Stalnaker [1968]: “A Theory of Conditionals”. In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112 2.Robert C. Stalnaker [1987a]: “Counterparts and Identity”. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 121–140. In [Stalnaker 2003] 3. Robert C. Stalnaker [1991]: “The Problem of Logical Omniscience I”. Synthese, 89. In [Stalnaker 1999a] 4. Robert C. Stalnaker — [1996]: “On What Possible Worlds Could Not Be”. In Adam Morton und Stephen P. Stich (Hg.) Benacerraf and his Critics, Cambridge (Mass.): Blackwell. In [Stalnaker 2003] 5. David Lewis [1986e]: On the Plurality of Worlds. Malden (Mass.): Blackwell 6. David Lewis[1969a]: Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press 7. Robert C. Stalnaker [1978]: “Assertion”. In P. Cole (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 9, New York: Academic Press, 315–332, und in [Stalnaker 1999a] 8. David Lewis [1980a]: “Index, Context, and Content”. In S. Kanger und S. ¨Ohmann (ed.), Philosophy and Grammar, Dordrecht: Reidel, und in [Lewis 1998a] 9. David Lewis [1994b]: “Reduction of Mind”. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell, 412–431, und in [Lewis 1999a] 10. Frank Jackson [1998a]: From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford: Clarendon Press 11. Frank Jackson [2004]: “Why We Need A-Intensions”. Philosophical Studies, 118: 257–277 12. David Lewis [2002b]: “Tharp’s Third Theorem”. Analysis, 62: 95–97 13. David Chalmers [1996b]: The Conscious Mind. New York: Oxford University Press 14. David Lewis [1975]: “Languages and Language”. In [Gunderson 1975], 3–35. And in [Lewis 1983d] |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 Re III St. Read Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic. 1995 Oxford University Press German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Hamburg 1997 Schw I W. Schwarz David Lewis Bielefeld 2005 |
| Various Authors | Quine Vs Various Authors | II 111ff QuineVsSemantic Theory: there is a lack of a general definition of meaning QuineVsUse Theory of Meaning: definition of meaning through use too vague! (Demarcation of what is detectable under the "circumstances") (QuineVsWittgenstein). III 272 Singular Term/QuineVsSingular Terms: the whole category of singular terms is logically superfluous and should be abolished! ((s) Instead: variable). V 58 Language Learning/Language Acquisition/Quine: E.g. the child learns that "red" is applied to blood, tomatoes, ripe apples, etc. The idea associated with that may be whatever it likes! Language bypasses the idea and focuses on the object. ((s) reference/(s): goes to the object, not an idea, which is in this case unnecessary.) Stimulus/Quine: has nothing mysterious in language learning. V 60 Problem: in progressive learning sentences are formed which have less to do with stimuli. E.g. about past and future. Quine: philosophers have great difficulty to specify accurately and in detail which connections it is about. QuineVsSupranaturalism. V 61 We only need orientation by external circumstances. Internal mechanisms are only insofar positive as we can hope that they will be clarified by neurophysiology. IX 199 Individuals/QuineVsFraenkel: we cannot follow him to simply waive individuals, because under TT this would exclude infinite classes and also the classical number theory. (Chapter 39). Solution: (from Chapter 4): the identification of individuals with their One classes. IX 199/200 But then we would have to make an exception in the interpretation: if x is an individual, then "x ε x" should count as true. (Above, "x ε y" became false if neither were objects of sequential type). Now (1) and (2) reduce to: (4) Ey∀x(x ε y (Tnx u Fx)), (5) (∀w(w ε x w ε y) u x ε z) > y ε z. Moreover, the definition of "Tnx" needs to be revised to make it match the new idea of the individual: " x VT y" by way of merging we can define (6) "T0x" stands for "∀y (y ε x y = x)" ((S) "all parts of individuals are identical with this one".) "T n + 1 x" stands for "∀y(y ε x > Tny)" ((s) "The set x is always one type higher than its elements y".) IX 237 Set Theory/QuineVsAckermann: (like ML and NB) but unlike ZF: does not fully guarantee the existence of finite classes. Additional concept "M". II 129 QuineVsZettsky: Zettsky: properties are identical if the classes to which they belong are the identical... but when are such classes identical? II 130 We cannot rely on the identity of the elements here (as with physical objects), as we simply have no antecedent principle of individuation for the properties (as elements of classes) here. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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The author or concept searched is found in the following 4 theses of the more related field of specialization.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conditional | Adams, R. | Lewis V 133 Indicative Conditional/Probability/Adams (1965): Thesis: Here, assertibility rather seems to be linked with the conditional (contingent) subjective probability of the consequent when the antecedent is given. Lewis: Adams convinced me: Thesis: The indicative conditional A -> C is closely associated with the subjective probability P (C I A). But why? Why not rather the absolute probability P(A ->C)? Explanation: ultimately, assertibility is indeed linked to absolute probability, indicative conditionals are no exception to this. But precisely the same way also P (C I A) is possible, because the meaning of "->" is to guarantee that P(A -> C) and P(C I A) are always the equal (if the latter is defined). Short: Probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 |
| Content | Dummett, M. | III 42 Content / Dummett: is characterized by what would make an assertion appear as misguided, not by what would prove to be correct. Reason: someone who claims a conditional, does not exclude the falsity of the antecedent. Singular statement (atomic sentence): here the speaker, does not take into account the absence of the object ((s) otherwise he would use a conditional.) Thesis: our ideas of right and wrong are as in actions - asymmetrical. It is the seemingly negative term, which has priority. |
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| Non-Factualism | Field, Hartry | I 21 Field: thesis: the most natural conclusion is that topological spaces, numbers, ordered pairs and functions neither are definitely sets nor definitely no sets. There is no fact that decides! II 243 Nonfactualism: Thesis: the actual world contains no "normative facts". II 256 Nonfactualism: thesis in case of an epistemic impossibility of the antecedent of a conditional there is no question of acceptability ((s) > assertibility?). |
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| Cond. Prblty | Jackson, F. | Lewis V 154 Jackson Thesis: "Implicature-of-Robustness" theory for the conditional probability. Pro: JacksonVsLewis: Example "Fred will not learn and even if he does, he will fail". If (according to Lewis) here the conditional is only claimable, if the antecedence cannot be denied, then how can it be that nevertheless both are claimed together? Explanation: the antecedent is added because of its robustness. Even if you think I am wrong, if I think Fred doesn't learn, you can still believe like me that he will fail. Lewis pro. |
Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 |
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