Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 8 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Explanation | Wright | I 182 Best Opinion/ethics/morality/Wright: we will see in Chapter 5 that moral issues do not occur in the best explanations of our moral beliefs. >Best Explanation/Wright. I 196f Best explanation/Wright: an explanation cannot be the best if it does not contain certain details. (But this is not supposed to be any naturalistic or scientific reductionist kind of explanation). An explanation will not be considered the best, as long as there is a competing equally good explanation, but which does not use the cognitive susceptibility. If such a declaration is actually equally good, it will explain why the (different) person in his community does not stand out. >Community, >Language community, >Convention. But then, the entire community can be considered deficient. The specific cognitive ability, thus becomes a fifth wheel. >D. Wiggins, >Cognitive Coercion, >Causal Role. I 240 Best explanation/Physics: should the best explanation not always be the same? Finally, the causal antecedents are, so to say, already in place, whatever the fate of the theory will be later. Why should the best explanation go beyond the statement of reasons and laws that precisely explain the forces that generate our beliefs? Wright: There is no reason why the best explanation should refer to any state of affairs which actually conveys truth to the theory, as we assume. Best explanation/Physics/Wright: should consist in scientific heritage, as well as in observations and certain psychological laws. >Explanation/Harman. ((s) So there is no mentioning of the facts.) Could the best explanation not always be "done better" , by always searching for a more fundamental level (for example: subatomic, etc.) If explanations are only best if they are valid, then they will always "overtake" their content. >Assertibility, >Superassertibility, >Ideal assertibility. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Justification | Wright | I 92 History/past/Wright: It is a peculiarity of evidence for the past, which can nothing guarantee, that the currently available evidence could not be misleading due to some unfortunate circumstances. Consequently, it applies to statements about objects and events in the present tense (present), that their justification may not be in general a reason for accepting that this will not be their fate. Justification/Super-assertibility/Wright: the justification is therefore no unlimited reason to regard a statement as super-assertible. >Superassertibility. Justification/Wright: thesis: the permission to state something requires the permission to look at something as super-assertible. >Assertibility. I 96 Justification/Wright: the belief that all evidence is not misleading, is not something for which a justification/permission must be acquired. It is an indispensable default assumption (Default: Absence (of evidence)). >Evidence, >Method. If that is correct, the following conditional applies: If P, then there is a favorable balance of available evidence relating to P, as long as it is finite. Although not a priori true, but a priori justified. Wright: that reaffirms the super-assertibility. I 211f Definition default relationship of the confirmation between experiences and statements. E.g. "That star is of yellowish color" is a default justification, insofar as it relates to the color. An appropriate justification by experience is revocable in the context of appropriate background beliefs, but otherwise presumably valid. Question: can one assume now cognitive deficiency with that? >Cognitive coercion. A theorist who accepts on-1, can do this either because of his ignorance of this support for Hn, or dispute the probative force while being biased. If there is now no other support for Hn, the adoption of Hn by the first theorists remains unjustified, and the denial in the right. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Meaning | Wright | I 285 Rule-following / Wright: shows that judgments about meanings and what meets these conditions,are removed form cognitive coercion - then the same must also be true about the truth of assertions. >Cognitive coercion. This intuitive reasoning is therefore not a trivial solipsism and the specter of a global minimalism (Boghossian) is still with us. >Minimalism, >Non-factualism, >Solipsism. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Morals | Wright | I 169 Comedy/morality/color/Wright: Extension is partially formed by best opinion (optimally formed judgment). >Best Explanation/Wright, >Judgments, >Extension, cf. >Intension. I 187 Morality/comedy/Wright: without Cognitive coercion - but certain opinions are required of us! >Cognitive coercion. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Objectivity | Wright | I 139 Subjective/objective/Wright: why do we not simply express all our "opinions about the strange with "I find .."? Answer: it is useful to have the objectified form of community, because often we can quite rightly accept a community response to the strange. ((s) otherwise the strange would not exist in the form in which we know it). >Language community, >Language behavior, >Language use, >Meaning, >Reference. I 139/40 There are terms that are too simple to argue about. E.g. the content of arithmetic assertions like "57 + 65 = 122" does not say anything about consensus and has therefore no logical consequences. >Arithmetics/Wittgenstein. But there would also be no standard of correctness to satisfy if not on every basal level could be a consensus presupposed. >Correctness/Wright. I 216 Representation/Wright: in contrast to that, the representative character of judgments e.g. on the forms of a children's puzzles has to do with: how very different we may be biologically constituted, or which natural laws would be effective, the variety of judgments must be seen as a symptom for cognitive dysfunction. >Cognitive coercion, >Judgments, >Knowledge, >Competence, >Laws of Nature. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Representation | Wright | I 139/40 There are terms that are too simple to argue about. E.g. the content of arithmetic assertions like "57 + 65 = 122" does not say anything about consensus and has therefore no logical consequences. >Arithmetics/Wittgenstein. I 216 Representation/Wright: ...in contrast, the representative character of judgments e.g. on the forms of a children's puzzles have to do with: how very different we may be biologically constituted, or which natural laws would be effective, the variety of judgments must be seen as a symptom for cognitive dysfunction. >Cognitive coercion, >Correctness/Wright. I 284 Understanding/representation/Wittgenstein: Understanding is rather to be explained by a "sense for" something than by representation of something, or through perception (Wright: e.g. humor). Wright: does the perhaps sub-cognitive not disappear if we formulate it metalinguistically? >Metalanguage. --- Rorty VI 41ff Representation/Wright: not merely permissible formulation but philosophically correct, two-digit approach of the truth predicate. >Truth predicate. (DavidsonVsScheme/contents (3. Dogma): "true" may not be two-digit). >Scheme/content/Davidson. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Rules | Wright | I 260f Rules only exist within a practice, which is maintained by the fact that the parties are in agreement. >Convention, >Community, >Language community. Rules/Wittgenstein/Wright: whatever Wittgenstein's dialectic exactly achieves it forces in any case some kind of restriction for a realistic idea of rules and meaning. >Realism. And therefore also for truth, because truth is a function of meaning. >Truth, >Meaning. Rule-following/Wright: shows that judgments about meanings and that what corresponds to these conditionally, are withdrawn from cognitive coercion. And then the same must also apply to claims about the truth of sentences. >Cognitive coercion, >Rule following. This intuitive reasoning is therefore not a trivial solipsism and the ghost of a global minimalism (Boghossian) is still among us. >Nonfactualism, >Minimalism/Wright. I 288 Rule-following/Wright: in the three other areas of discourse (without evidence transcendence as in mathematics) however, it appears that they are biased by considerations to rule consequences. These considerations may 1. prevent the formulation itself, and prevent that the problem appears solvable at all 2. discover misconceptions, presented jointly by the opponents, 3. affect the result from the outset in favor of minimalism. 4. Difficulty: how can we achieve the desired realism of objectivity, if our response to a problem will never be able to free itself from a dependence on skills and aptitudes to spontaneous reactions whose own state is drawn into doubt with respect to objectivity. >Objectivity. --- Rorty VI 55ff WrightVsDavidson: Cognitive bid, language, meaning, truth and knowledge would collapse if there is no offense in relation to what we call "addition". >Nonfactualism, >Cognitive coercion, >Quaddition, >Facts, >D. Davidson. --- II 225 Rules/Wright: not in the same language. >Metalanguage, >Object language. Exception: an expression of what someone understands when he understands "red": can be formulated in the same language. >Understanding. Chess: not from the inside/(s) otherwise learnable by observation - then never certain whether these are all rules, or if not in reality quite different rules. >Chess. Prevailing view/Wright: the prevailing view is that rules can be recognized from the inside out. WrightVs: that would demand that language use can be explained as an application of rules. - That excludes to see it at the same time as a game (as actually desired). II 226 Rules/vagueness/Wright: problem when applying predicates which should be guided by rules: then in the case of vagueness simultaneous application and non-application prescribed when overlapping. >Vagueness, >Predication, >Attribution. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Terminology | Wright | I 41 "Platitude"/Wright: "P" is true if and only if "P" corresponds with the facts correspondence platitude Correspondence platitude/CP/Wright: "P" is true if and only if things are as "P" says that they are - Deflationism/Wright: accepts (like us) following platitudes: claiming something means, representing something as true, any truth enabled content has a meaningful negation, to be true means to correspond with the facts, a statement can be justified without being true, and vice versa. I 60 Epistemic Constraint/EC: if P is true, then there is evidence for that -> enforces revision of logic, otherwise P cannot be true if there is no evidence. I 99 Platitudes: are called so because they are intended to help preventing a weighty metaphysical realm. I 108ff Definition evidence transcendence: the presence of decidable parameter does not have to ensure that the answer to the question is equally decidable. I 115 Error theory: Mackie (ethics), Field (mathematics). Everything would have to be traced back to a metaphysical realm to make it true. But there is no metaphysical realm. ad I 115ff Error theory/elsewhere: a theory that seeks to explain why our intuitions are different than the theory asserts. I 118ff Convergence 1: weak: only trend - more: Convergence 2: enforces convergence - Definition minimal capacity for truth: requires use of standards for assertibility and thus the existence of criteria - Vs "appropriate circumstances" unclear - VsWright: discourse about the strange: not minimal capable of truth. - WrightVs: there are no "permissive conditions" - Convergence platitude/representation platitude/Wright: divergent output can only be explained by divergent input - Definition cognitive coercion: a discourse enforces cognitive coercion if divergences can only be explained by divergent input - Tradition: moral discourse does not satisfy the criteria of cognitive coercion - Wright: but cognitive coercion is compatible with flexible standards, it is an additional condition for minimal truth-capable discourses. I 138 Wright pro convergence also in the discourse about the strange. I 150 Solidification/Wright: a solidification will change the modal status. Whether P is true, may be contingent, but if P is true, the statement is necessary that P is actually true. - Problem: this should not apply for the basic equation for shape - Another problem: "if S would be in the same circumstances, it would judge equally": if too much remains still valid in other possible worlds, the equation would be true in all possible worlds and the distinction gets questionable. |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Boghossian, Paul | Wright Vs Boghossian, Paul | I 270 Boghossian: let us consider a non factualism exclusively related to meaning (not truth): there is no property of the kind that a word means something, and consequently no such fact. Since now the truth condition of a proposition is a function of its meaning, non-factualism regarding meaning necessarily requires a non-factualism regarding truth conditions. Then it results: (5) For all S,P: "S has the truth condition P" is not truth conditional. after disquotation: (4) For each S: "S" is not truth conditional. "Fascinating consequence"/Boghossian: of a non-factualism of meaning: a global non-factualism. And this is precisely where a non-factualism of meaning differs from a non-factualism with reference to any other object... I 271 WrightVsBoghossian: many will protest against his implicit philosophy of truth, but there is nothing against the use of the word alone. Global Minimalism/WrightVsBoghossian: Problem: 1. Can the required notion of substantial truth be completely understandable if there are no examples of it at all? ((s) Because that is just denied by the thesis). 2. The status of the justification is even more difficult. Does an advocate not have to demand that the reasoning be valid? Such a justification, however, must at least show cognitive coercion and thus exceed minimalism. I 273 WrightVsBoghossian: with the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true, we can go over to it: (iv) It is not the case that S is true and then, by using (i) - the premise of reasoning - for S (v) It is not the case that (i) is true. From this follows the "disquotation properties": (vi) It is not the case that it is not the case that "S has the truth condition that P" has a truth condition. But is this a reductio ad absurdum of (i)? This is not a stupid question! If truth is understood as substantial, and contrasted with an inferior surrogate, then the denial of truth is not necessarily inconsistent with the assertion of its correctness. A correct reductio should show that (i) is not even correct. Boghossian is thus faced with a dilemma: a) if it is a reductio of (i), it shows that the minimalism of meaning is incoherent, I 274 b) if it is not reductio - if the negation in (vi) rejects a substantial truth and not merely negates correctness - then (iii) can no longer be an expression of global minimalism (meaning and truth), for (iii) is consistent with the correctness of the assertion that certain propositions possess substantial truth conditions. (iii) Can at most require that any statement that can only be correct cannot itself be considered correct. WrightVsBoghossian: the "fascinating consequence" is nowhere in sight. 1. Minimalism of meaning does not cancel itself out. 2. There is also not logically necessary a minimalism regarding the distinction between discourses that are suitable for substantial truth and those that are not. Problem: that Boghossian has to work with different truth predicates ("true" and "correct"). Of course, this is important for his differentiation, but it has a potential effect on the disquotation, which is so important for him. Wright: "strong need": a philosophy that distinguishes between the substantially true and the merely correct must itself be substantial. I 275 WrightVsBoghossian: the details: the move from (ii) to (iii) is a modus tollens on the right left section of the disquotation scheme (DS): (I) A > "A" is true. Question: can we safely assume that this principle is at least correct when both truth and correctness are involved? No: if A is just correct, the claim that "A" is true will at best reflect its status incorrectly! Decisive: for the transition from (ii) to (iii) is the relevant substitute for "A": "S" has the truth condition that "P" is a sentence which, according to minimalism of meaning, allows only correctness and not truth. Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposal actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense. A perfectly reasonable counterproposal, however, is that A should be much more complementary to the strict notion of the former negation. Then, in the event that A is merely correct, the assessment of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will generally be conservative. WrightVsVs: but now there are problems to be found elsewhere: the transition from (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only a sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional: (II) "A" is true > "A" has a truth condition I 276/277 And any conservative matrix for ""A" is true" jeopardizes this principle in the case where A is not truthful but correct. Because then the conservative matrix will rate ""a" is true" as correct. The consequence (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect. I 277/278 WrightVsBoghossian: Conclusion: If the matrix (truth table) for "true" is not conservative, then the citation scheme fails in the decisive direction for the transition from (ii) to (iii), If, on the other hand, the matrix is conservative, the principle that only a sentence with a truth condition is true fails in view of premise (i). (The sentence is incorrect). Finally, if premise (i) is not allowed, there is no argument at all. I 293 Deflationism: any significant sentence (i.e. a sentence with a truth condition) is suitable for deflationary truth or falsehood. But if truth is not deflationary, "true" must refer to a substantial property of statements. (Deflationism: Truth is not a property). WrightVsBoghossian: his problem is that he must reconcile both. Is the reasoning not simply a game of "refers to a property"? (to avoid truth as property.) |
WrightCr I Crispin Wright Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992 German Edition: Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001 WrightCr II Crispin Wright "Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Grice, P.H. | Quine Vs Grice, P.H. | Wright I 198 Disputational Supervenience/Wright: a discourse supervenes another one if disagreements in one depend on disagreements in the other. StrawsonVsQuine/GriceVsQuine: it is hopeless to deny that a discrimination exists when it is used not in a prearranged but in a mutually unifiable way within linguistic practice. QuineVsStrawson/QuineVsGrice: this is fully consistent with a cognitive psychology of the practical use of the distinction, which does not assume that we are responding to instantiations of distinctions. Strawson/Grice: E.g. our daily talk of analyticity is a sociological fact and therefore has enough discipline to be considered as minimally capable of truth. QuineVsGrice/QuineVsStrawson: this is far from proving that a sort of intuitive realism can be seen in it. Obstacle: it remains to be explained how modal judgments generally exert cognitive coercion. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| McDowell, J. | Wright Vs McDowell, J. | I 260 Def "Platonic Scylla" 1. Some justification must be found for something that, completely independent of human abilities, determines the real direction that a rule follows, 2. It must be explained how we are supposed to be in any cognitive connection with this "real direction" at all. This is the corresponding Def "rule-skeptical Charybdis": the view, according to which there are no objective requirements at all, which are produced by rules, but exclusively natural unrestricted human abilities. Thus no "general real objectivity". Solution/McDowell/Wright: the "fully satisfying intermediate position": insight that the only thing that is wrong with the Scylla is that objectivity must be assessed from an external perspective. Rules exist only within a practice that is maintained by the fact that the participants agree. I 261 Moral/Ethics/McDowellVsNon-Cognitivism: assumes an impure construction of ethical facts and objectivity (Scylla). As if the moral facts were "there" independently of the evaluative point of view. Fact/Wright: but also the appreciation of any fact requires a point of view! Realism/Anti-Realism/Wright: in this debate the realist represents the side of the Scylla, the anti-realist the side of the Charybdis. I 262 This debate is now being undermined by the "fully satisfying intermediate position". There has never been a debate, only a misunderstanding of what the interaction of our mind with an objective content requires. (In McDowell only implicitly). WrightVsMcDowell: this is not convincing at all: if the debate is to be undermined, the opponents must remain clearly tied to the horns. Realism must therefore always include supereobjectivation and the anti-realism must always be presented as an escape from it. But there is no solution in this way. For example, the question of whether cognitive coercion applies a priori has no essential connection to a hyperobjective concept of facts, and therefore no obligation to an external point of view. I 263 McDowellVsWright: one could reply that any distinction under the aegis of cognitive coercion would be our decision. Therefore, it would be a mistake to assume that opposites of objectivity could be "there" in a more solid way than, say, the requirements of addition. I 264 McDowell's Wittgenstein: wants to open escape routes from the debate. |
WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Wiggins, D. | Wright Vs Wiggins, D. | I 231 Wright: Proposal: the relevance of problems related to convergence is best interpreted for moral discourse under the heading of cognitive coercion. WigginsVsWright: sees relevance differently. Restrictive condition: If X is true, X will cause convergence under favorable circumstances and the best explanation of this convergence will require the actual truth of X. Wiggins: So not the fact that participants hold certain beliefs, but the fact of convergence is the explanandum. I 233 WrightVsWiggins: misguided weighting of causality: the belief that people believe that P because P, P is acceptable only if the facts that P plays a direct causal role! Wiggins: not direct causal role, but rather Def "acquittal explanation": an explanation that a subject is attached to a belief, according to the scheme: For this, that or other reason, there is actually nothing to think other than that P. Therefore, it is a fact that P. I 234 Therefore, given the circumstances, etc., it can come as no surprise that the subject believes that P. Example (i) Nothing else can be thought but that 5 + 7 = 12. (ii) The best explanation for the belief of my son and his classmates is that they follow a rule of calculation that shows that nothing else can be thought of. Wright: this involves two steps: the second involves a procedure! I 235 Moral/Ethics/Wiggins: For example slavery is wrong, nothing else can be thought of. Wright: one could soften the conditions as far as the opinions involved in the discourse at least sometimes fulfill them. The corresponding facts (about these opinions) could then still form a class, even if there is no tendency towards convergence. WrightVsWiggins: it is questionable, however, whether his "acquittal explanation" can fulfill what the Best Explanation is trying to do: Concerns arise when we realize that nothing of meaning is lost if we omit the words "so it is a fact that P"! Then it just says: I 235/236 "for this or that reason, as well as circumstances that do not allow other thoughts, the subject believes that P." Acquitting Explanation/Wiggins: Causal explanation, where causality does not refer between consciousness and values or consciousness and numbers. Wright: It is about the attentive use of appropriate rules. ((s) The causality takes place between the rules and the beliefs.). I 237 WrightVsWiggins: that does not get us any further than minimal anti-realism. Justification/Permissive/Wright: none of the discourses we consider are purely permissive with regard to the conditions: it is simply not true that absolutely everything can be found to be funny or disgusting in a permissible manner. Def Demonstration/Wright: any presentation of circumstances and considerations that require the acceptance of the statement according to the standards of assertibility when the standards are to be observed. I 238 Like "Chernobyl wasn't funny." No matter which discourse it is, some of his statements will allow a demonstration in this sense if the discourse is not purely permissive. According to Wiggin's acquittal explanation (nothing else is conceivable): (i) For one reason or another (here follows the demonstration), nothing else is conceivable. (ii) Since the parties act in accordance with the relevant beliefs, it is not surprising that they agree that P. Minimum Truth Capability/WrightVsWiggins: on condition that the discourse is not purely permissive, the minimum truth capability ensures the fulfillment of Wiggins condition. However, it does not guarantee that the reference to "the facts" in the correspondence platitude can carry the additional content that the game with the best explanation is supposed to secure. |
WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
| Wittgenstein | Evans Vs Wittgenstein | Frank I 504 EvansVsIdealism: our conception of ourselves is not idealistic: we can understand statements about ourselves that we cannot decide or even justify! ((s) "objective", given to ourselves "objectively"). Example "I have been breastfed". Example "I was unhappy on my first birthday" Example "I rolled around in my sleep last night" Example "I was dragged unconscious through the streets of Chicago" Example "I'm going to die" I.e. our thoughts about ourselves obey the generality clause. EvansVsWittgenstein: This idea is diametrically opposed to an idea by Wittgenstein: by asking us to consider psychological statements in the first person (Evans), because this enhances their similarity to the act of moaning in pain, i.e. exactly considering them to be unstructured responses to situations. Wittgenstein: was well aware that this would enable him not to think about certain issues. Frank I 515 Immunity/EvansVsWittgenstein: his E.g. "The wind tousles my hair" is precisely what leads to the widespread misconception Frank I 516 That immunity does not stretch to the self-attribution of physical phenomena. This is certainly the case. There is a way of knowing that the property of ξ’s hair of being tousled by the wind is currently instantiated. It does not make sense to ask: "The wind tousles someone’s hair, but is it mine?" ((s) Perhaps in this case it is?). EvansVsWittgenstein: does not acknowledge this fact sufficiently. Wittgenstein: the object use requires us to recognize a certain person (ourselves)) therefore, the possibility of error is "envisaged". EvansVsWittgenstein: 1) this can simply not be used correctly to weed out a category of statements that are identified only. Frank I 517 By means of the predicate contained therein, irrespective of the question of how to recognize that the predicate is instantiated. 2) The immunity against misidentification in this absolute sense cannot be invoked for mental self-attribution! E.g. "I see this and that" in cases where I have reason to believe that my tactile information could be misleading. E.g. "I feel a piece of cloth and see a number of outstretched hands in the mirror. Here it makes sense to say "Someone is touching the piece of cloth, but is it me"(Mental predicate) But what does that tell us? 3) Important: The influence of the relevant information on "I" thoughts is not based on a consideration or an identification, but is simply constitutive for the fact that we have an "I" image. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266 Wright I 257 Quietism/Truth/Wright: (pro Wittgenstein): it is a metaphysical hypostasis of concepts such as truth and assertion if their applicability is enshrined as a substantial part of a realistic view of its content. Discourses as different as science and film critics, however, are simple tries to determine what is true and do not need any metaphysical relining. But that’s not the end of the matter, of course there are relevant differences between language games. Wright: The realism/Anti-realism debate still remains and the problem of cognitive coercion. I 258 EvansVsWittgenstein: Considerations to follow the rules are themselves only metaphysical defeatism. (More quietist than Wittgenstein himself). |
EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 WrightGH I Georg Henrik von Wright Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971 German Edition: Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008 |
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