Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 14 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anaphora | Brandom | I 438 Anaphora/Brandom: you do not describe a cat if you refer to it with "it". >Pronouns. I 438 Truth/Brandom Thesis: "true" functions I 423 Pronoun/Brandom: old: only linguistic, like bound variables (Co-Reference) - new: anaphora is more basal than Deixis! - Deixis assumes anaphora. - Anaphora without index words is possible, but not vice versa. >Pointing, >Ostension. I 627 Anaphora/Reference/Uniqueness/Unrepeatability/Brandom: substitution is of course not definable for unrepeatable tokenings - therefore it has to be referred to anaphorically. I 638 Deixis requires anaphora! No language can indicate if it does not have asymmetric, anaphoric constructions - the predecessor can even be a mere possible tokening: "refers to". I 639 Two possibilities: a) Type Recurrence: symmetrically acquired significance (e.g. proper names of certain descriptions) - 2. indexical, asymmetrical I 954 Anaphora/Rigidity/Brandom: anaphoric chains are rigid - but not "impure chains": Leibniz could have been called differently, so it is possible that the one referred to by "Leibniz" is not Leibniz - N.B.: in counterfactual situations expressions would belong to other token recurrence structures than actual. >Rigidity. I 684 Anaphoric chains/Evans/Brandom. Problem: if the predecessor is quantified: Example Hans has bought some donkeys and Heinz has vaccinated them (all or some of the some?) - Example few politicians came to the party but they had a good time (few of the few?).Cf. >Donkey sentences. I 686 Evans: Proposal: Note I 956 "An expression a c dominates an expression b exactly if the first branching node that dominates a also dominates b (and a and b do not dominate each other). |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Communication | Deacon | I 31 Communication/Human/Animal/Deacon: we underestimate the enormous complexity and subtlety of non-human communication(1). Animal signals: show only superficial resemblance to human language learning, reference and syntax (in that order). But no animal species has developed these facets into a rule-based system. Animal signals do not have what is equal to the noun/verb distinction,... I 32 ...neither do they differentiate between grammatical and ungrammatical connections, nor tense formation, nor do they differentiate between singular and plural. >Animals, >Animal language. Animal language/non-human language: what qualities should an animal language have? Whereupon do astronomers search the sky for extraterrestrial intelligences? I 466 Note Signal language: Some languages based on signs are not based on the human language, but differ considerably from it(2). >Signal language. 1) See Marc D. Hauser (1996). The evolution of communication. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Pp. xiii+760. (2) U. Bellugi und E.S. Klima (1982). From gesture to sign: Deixis in a visual gestural language in context. New York: John Wiley, 297-313. |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Deduction | Thiel | I 84 Deduction/Thiel: Ancient mathematics knew no deduction at all, only calculation rules. I 86 Schopenhauer polemicized against deduction, figure I 86 gives more than the Euclidean proof: insight into the matter and inner firm belief of every necessity and of the dependence of that quality on "right angles". >Proofs, >Provability, >Geometry. I 87 ThielVsSchopenhauer: Of course one will have to say that we do not recognize the state of affairs at a glance, but step by step, by mental rearranging. The figure itself also has generality, but not one that is detached or detachable from the figure, at most one that can be transferred to related figures, namely those constructed according to the same "principle". >Generalization, >Generality. >Principles. I 91 Apodeixis: "the necessary evidence" but also "representation". The Greeks had a method of "psephoi", the numerical figures layed with small stones. The joke is that the construction of the figure is independent of the number of stones. You do not need an induction conclusion. >Presentation, >Ancient Philosophy. |
T I Chr. Thiel Philosophie und Mathematik Darmstadt 1995 |
| Demonstratives | Demonstratives: E.g. this, that, that one. Problems in language use bcause of lack of clarity when referring back to prior description. - In logic missing expressibility of uniqueness. See also anaphora, deixis, relations, logical proper names, index words, indexicality, iota operator. |
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| Identification | Strawson | I 57 Identification/Strawson: if directly due to localization then without mentioning of other particulars - E.g. death depends on living things - e.g. but flash not from something flashing. >Dependence. I 64 Identification/Strawson: observable particulars can also be identified without mentioning their causes or the things on which they depend, - conceptual dependency does not matter - but one cannot always identify births without identifying them as the birth of a living being. I 65 Asymmetry: we do not need necessarily a term in language for births as particulars - but for living beings, because we are living beings ourselves. >Continuant, >Person, >Subject. I 66 Identifiability/particular/Strawson: minimum condition: they must be neither private nor unobservable. >Particulars/Strawson, >Language community, cf. >Private language, >Understanding, >Communication. I 87 Identificaion/Strawson: we cannot talk about private things when we cannot talk about public things. I 153 Identification/StrawsonVsLeibniz: identification requires a demonstrative element: that contradicts Leibniz monads for which there should be descriptions alone in general term. >General terms. Then, according to Leibniz, identification (individuation) is only possible for God: the "complete term" of an individual. That is at the same time a description of the entire universe (from a certain point, which guarantees the uniqueness). >Complete concept. I 245 Identification/Universal/names/particulars/Strawson: speaker/listener each must know a distinctive fact about Socrates. But it must not be the same - E.g. "That man there can lead you". Crucial: that someone stands there - N.B.: no part introduces a single thing, but the statement as a whole presents it. >Particulars/Strawson, >Introduction/Strawson. VII 124 Identification/reference/Strawson: E.g. "That man there has crossed the channel by swimming through it twice" - it has the (wrong!) appearances, that one "refers twice", a) once by stating nothing and consequently making no statement, or b) identifying the person with oneself and finding a trivial identity. StrawsonVs: this is the same error as to believe that the object would be the meaning of the expression. E.g. "Scott is Scott". >Waverley example. --- Tugendhat I 400-403 Identification/Strawson: a) pointing b) description, spacetime points. TugendhatVsStrawson: because he had accepted Russell's theory of direct relation unconsciously, he did not see that there are no two orders. Tugendhat like Brandom: demonstrative identification presupposes the spatiotemporal, non-demonstrative - (deixis presupposes anaphora). >Deixis/Brandom. Difference: specification/Tugendhat: "which of them all?" Identification: only kind: by spacetime points. |
Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf Frankfurt/M. 1993 Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
| Index Words | Index words: index words are words like “here”, “there”, “now”, “me”, etc. which require a closer determination, so that a sentence which includes them can be determined whether it is true or false. A sentence with index words is therefore context-dependent. Index words are not demonstratives. See also deixis, anaphora, context dependency, indexicality. |
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| Language Evolution | Gärdenfors | I 71 Language Evolution/Evolution/Language/Gärdenfors: Thesis: in early forms of communication the communicative act itself was more important than its expressive form. (See H. Clark, 1992(1), Winter, 1998(2), Gärdenfors, 2010(3)). Therefore, the pragmatics of natural language is evolutionary seen the fundamental. Later, when the communication acts become more diverse and independent of the immediate context, the semantics is brought to the fore. Syntax is needed when the communication becomes even more conventional later: markers are used to establish uniqueness. Then syntax is used only for the most subtle aspects of communication. VsGärdenfors: this is in contrast to most contemporary authors in linguistics. ChomskyVsGärdenfors: for Chomsky's school syntax is at the beginning of the investigation, semantic features are added only when grammar is not enough. GärdenforsVsChomsky. --- I 72 Pragmatics/GärdenforsVsChomsky/Gärdenfors: For Chomsky, the pragmatics is only the waste basket for the remains: context, deixis, etc.). Gärdenfors: for a theory of the evolution of language, we must proceed differently: pragmatics before semantics before syntax. --- I 73 Language formation/Gärdenfors: just as the money was later added to the exchange economy and made it more efficient, the language was added to the existing communication among humans. Analogy/linguistic communication/monetary economy/Gärdenfors: one can extend the analogy: just as the money allows a stable price system, a relatively stable system of meanings is formed by language. Game theoretical explanation/analogy: just as prices, linguistic meanings are also equilibrium points in a system. (> Meeting of minds). --- I 78 Langauge Formation/Communication/Gärdenfors: Thesis: growing semantic complexity is achieved by extending the domains in the shared conceptual space. One can understand the linking of different domains as the creation of product spaces. ((s) Product space: Cartesian coordinate system, where one axis corresponds to a conceptual dimension.) This is how domains are combined. 1. Clark, H. (1992). Arenas of language use. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2. Winter, S. (1998). Expectations and linguistic meaning. Lund University Cognitive Studies 71. Lund: Lund University. 3. Gärdenfors, P. (2010). Evolution and semantics. In P.C. Horgan (ed.) Cambridge encyclopedia of the language sciences (pp. 748-750). Cambridge: Cambridge University. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Ontology | Aristotle | Bubner I 118 Ontology/Aristotle: knows the real reasons of reality, from which the sciences apodictically infer. BubnerVsAristotle: the competence of the reasons of evidence remains indeterminate, placeless, and thus does not adequately cover the need to determine the empirical domain of apodeixis. >Proof/Aristotle, >Knowledge/Aristotle, >Science/Aristotle; cf. >Ultimate justification, >Justification, >Existence, >Foundation. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Pragmatics | Gärdenfors | I 72 Pragmatics/GärdenforsVsChomsky/Gärdenfors: For Chomsky, the pragmatics is only the waste basket for the remains: context, deixis, etc.). Gärdenfors: for a theory of the evolution of language, we must proceed differently: pragmatics before semantics before syntax. Gärdenfors: the pragmatics of a communication system will not determine the semantic structure. The meaning space can be divided in many different ways. Also, the semantics does not determine the syntax. However, the semantic structures will provide limitations on which syntactic structures are possible or likely. |
Gä I P. Gärdenfors The Geometry of Meaning Cambridge 2014 |
| Proofs | Aristotle | Bubner I 115 Proof/Science/Aristotle: Inference from reasons. Is only scientific when real reasons serve as a premise, and these principles satisfy certain extra-logical conditions. "Real reason". >Foundation. Requirement: "Responsibility": in the Apodeixis the right (appropriate) reasons must be named. >Reasons, >Premise, >Contradiction, >Conditions. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Quotation Marks | Brandom | I 438 Anaphora/Brandom: you cannot describe a cat by referring to it as "it". >Anaphora. I 438 Truth/Brandom thesis: "true" works anaphorically and not descriptively. >Truth predicate, >Description. I 423 Pronoun/Brandom: old: only linguistically, like bound variables (co-reference) - new: anaphora is more basal than deixis! - Deixis implies anaphora - anaphora possible without index words, but not vice versa. >Pronouns, >Ostension. I 627 Anaphora/Reference/Uniqueness/Unrepeatability/Brandom: Substitution is note definable for unrepeatable tokenings, of course - therefore anaphoric reference must be made to them. I 638 Deixis requires anaphora. No language can indicate if it does not possess asymmetric, anaphoric constructions - the predecessor may even be a merely possible Tokening: "refers to". I 639 Two options: a) Type recurrence: symmetrically acquired significance (e.g. proper names of specific descriptions) - 2) indexical, asymmetric. I 954 Anaphora/rigidity/Brandom: anaphoric chains are rigid - but not "impure chains": Leibniz could have had a different name, so it is possible that the person to which "Leibniz" refers is not Leibniz - N.B.: in counterfactual situations, expressions with different token recurrence structures would be considered factual. >Rigidity. I 684 Anaphoric chains/Evans/Brandom: Problem: if the predecessor is quantified: E.g. Hans bought some donkeys and Heinz vaccinated them (all or some of them?) - E.g. few politicians came to the party, but they enjoyed themselves a lot (few of the few?). I 686 Evans: Proposal: I 956 An expression a dominates an expression b then if and only if the first branch node that dominates a, also dominates b (and a and b do not dominate each other mutually). II 112 Distancing quotation marks/Brandom: one takes the responsibility for the claim - however, one attributes the responsibility that these words are appropriate to another - the exact reverse of de re attribution. >Attribution, cf. >Description levels. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
| Quote/Disquotation | Cresswell | I 99 Quote/possible world semantics/Cresswell: e.g. he told us that he was older than he was. This can be made true by "I am 50". >Truthmakers. Problem: but no connection to the sentence "He was older than he was". I 166 Quotation/Quote theory/Bigelow: Thesis: things themselves can be temporarily added to the language as a name in it. E.g. the (deictic) use of them is necessary if a certain woman is added to the language. >Deixis. Anaphora/Bigelow: thesis: whenever the context can make something, also be the anaphora can be added. ((s), if the clarification has already been done by the context.) E.g. "I, Claudius". > |
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 |
| Signals | Deacon | I 32 Signals/Sign language/Signal language/Non-human language/Deacon: Characteristics: a language-like signal should have a combinatorial structure with distinguishable elements, which in turn must be able to occur in new combinations. It should enable creative production of new outputs with little redundancy. Although there are a large number of possible combinations, most of these combinations would be excluded. Cf. >Language, >Words, >Signs, >Symbols, >Syntax, >Meaning. I 466 Note Signal language: Some languages based on signs are not based on the human language, but differ considerably from it (see Bellugi and Klima, 1982)(1). I 32 The correlations between signals and events and objects should not be a simple 1:1 mapping. >Reference, >Objects, >Events. I 33 These correlations should be radically but systematically different from case to case. These characteristics have a syntax, even if it is no syntax that corresponds to human language. Games, mathematics and even cultural habits have such characteristics. >Play. However, an extraterrestrial signal with such features would still not be decipherable. Animal signals: since they are isolated or little organised, they are described in summary rather than through formal rules. It is highly unlikely that an existing system would have been overlooked here, especially in the case of cosmic signals. Cf. >Language rules. Non-human communication/Deacon: Conclusion: it is not about the fact that human communication is somehow better, but about the fact that it is simply not comparable. >Communication. Social communication: does not simply replace words with gestures. >Gestures. 1. U. Bellugi und E.S. Klima (1982). From gesture to sign: Deixis in a visual gestural language in context. New York: John Wiley, 297-313 |
Dea I T. W. Deacon The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of language and the Brain New York 1998 Dea II Terrence W. Deacon Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter New York 2013 |
| Truth Functions | Tugendhat | I 286 Def truth-functional/Tugendhat: depends on other sentences, not on the situation - (contrast: deictic). - Brandom: inferential structure, >Deixis. I 315 Truth-functional/Tugendhat: "true" occurs several times. Contrast: predicative: "true" does not occur more than once. >Predicativity, >Impredicativity, >Circular reasoning. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aristotle | Bubner Vs Aristotle | I 118 Ontology/Aristotle: knows the real reasons of reality from which the sciences infer apodictically. BubnerVsAristotle: the competence of arguments remains undetermined, placeless, and therefore does not satisfactorily cover the need to determine the empirical scope of apodeixis. |
Bu I R. Bubner Antike Themen und ihre moderne Verwandlung Frankfurt 1992 |
| Kaplan, D. | Newen Vs Kaplan, D. | NS I 117 Index Words/Indicators/Direct Reference/Kaplan: Thesis: typical usage contexts: here. they must be treated according to an object theory (theory of direct reference) of meaning. Namely if they only have to fulfill the state of affairs adequacy (SA). NS I 118 E.g. (1) I am here today. Truth Conditions: are only given adequately here if the content of the sentence is recognized as true, but not necessary. a priori: the sentence is indeed a priori true, but not necessary! E.g. if Carina Silvester speaks the sentence in Bochum, it has the meaning that Carina is in Bochum that day, but Carina is not necessarily in Bochum. It is true because of the expression conditions. NS I 118 Index Words/Indicators/Kaplan: Thesis: indicators are referential expressions, i.e. the standard meaning is always the designated object. Newen/Schrenk: this is considered the common understanding after Kaplan. VsKaplan: Objection: we must not neglect the other types of adequacy. Cognitive adequacy and knowledge adequacy. E.g. Karl receives a threatening letter, "I will rob you someday". This is intuitively the contribution of "I" to the utterance content, not the person who wrote the letter, but the description associated by means of language competence. Then the content of "I" is: the writer of this incident. Here, knowledge adequacy is in the foreground. (Anonymous/Anonymity). Cognitive Adequacy: is paramount if our behavioral attitude is expressed. E.g. Ernst Mach after memory loss: "I'm hungry": This does not have the meaning of "The author of "Die Analyse der Empfindung" is hungry". Mach with amnesia would not have agreed to that. NS I 119 Likewise, it would be wrong to paraphrase. "Ernst Mach believes that Ernst Mach is hungry". EGO Mode/I/Terminology/Newen/Schrenk: some authors call this kind of immediate self-reference the EGO mode of givenness. (Immunity against misidentification). Point: this is about the subject of a thought and not about the speaker of an utterance. (He might be be irritated, e.g. by delay through headphones). Index Words/Indicators/Names/Newen/Schrenk: the situation is like with names: there are three modes of interpretation. The contribution of an indexical expression can be 1) the designated object 2) the description associated by means of language competence 3) cognitive way of givenness. Deictic expressions: applies for them accordingly. E.g. hallucination: here, the content is determined through language competence. Deixis/Cognitive Adequacy. The cognitive adequacy may also play a role: E.g. someone looks through two widely separated windows of his apartment at an extremely long ship, which is moored at the quay. He believes that there are two ships. "This is a Chinese and this is a Russian ship". NS I 120 The content of the statements can only reflect the cognitive situation if in each case the way of givenness of the ship is taken into account (front: Chinese lettering, rear: rusty stern). Index Words/Newen/Schrenk: the explanation interest chooses between the various explanations (interest, interpretation interest). Index Words/Names/Kaplan: according to his theory they are always referential expressions - i.e. the meaning is always the designated object. Then explanations must be shifted from the field of semantics to that of pragmatics (what the speaker means) in line with the knowledge adequacy (language competence) and cognitive adequacy. There is currently debate about whether this is legitimate. |
New II Albert Newen Analytische Philosophie zur Einführung Hamburg 2005 Newen I Albert Newen Markus Schrenk Einführung in die Sprachphilosophie Darmstadt 2008 |
| Strawson, P. F. | Tugendhat Vs Strawson, P. F. | Wolf II 20 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: he underestimates the importance of the space-time system for identification. Most basic statements: those with perception predicates. I 387/388 StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language. Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability). I 389 TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it. I 433 Learning: the child does not learn to attach labels to objects, but it is the demonstrative expressions that point beyond the situation! The demonstrative expressions are not names, one knows that it is to be replaced by other deictic expressions, if one refers from other situations to the same. (TugendhatVsRussell and StrawsonVsRussell). I 384 StrawsonVsRussell: Example "The present King of France is bald" (King-Example). It depends on what time such an assertion is made. So it is sometimes true. I 385 Example "The present king of France is bald" has a meaning, but no truth value itself. (>expression, >utterance): RussellVsStrawson: that would have nothing to do with the problem at all, one could have added a year. StrawsonVsRussell: if someone is of the opinion that the prerequisite for existence is wrong, he will not speak of truth or falsehood. RussellVsStrawson: it does not matter whether you say one or the other in colloquial language, moreover, there are enough examples that people speak more of falsity in colloquial language. I 386 TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not realize that he had already accepted Russell's theory. It is not about the difference between ideal language and colloquial language. This leads to the Oxford School with the ordinary language philosophy. It is not about nuances of colloquial language as fact, but, as with philosophy in general, about possibility. I 387/388 StrawsonVsRussell: logical proper names are only fictitious. "This" is not an ambiguous proper name but has a uniform meaning as a deictic expression and designates a different object depending on the situation of use. TugendhatVsStrawson: but you cannot oblige Russell to use this word as we use it in our natural language.) Russell fails because he does not take into account another peculiarity: the same object for which a deictic expression is used in the perceptual situation can be designated outside that situation by other expressions. (Substitutability). I 389 TugendhatVsStrawson: what StrawsonVsRussell argues does not actually contradict his theory, but seems to presuppose it. I 395 Identification/TugendhatVsStrawson: uses identification in the narrower sense. Tugendhat: my own term "specification" (which of all objects is meant) is superior to this term. "To pick put" is Strawson's expression. (Taken from Searle). (>Quine: "to specify"). I 397/398 TugendhatVsStrawson: example "The highest mountain" is no identification at all: which one is the highest? Something must be added, an ostension, or a name, or a location. For example, someone can be blindfolded and led to the highest mountain. He will also not know more. I 399 Identification/Strawson: distinguishes between two types of identification a) Direct pointing b) Description by marking. Space-time locations. Relative position to all other possible locations and all possible objects (in the world). I 400 TugendhatVsStrawson: he overlooked the fact that demonstrative identification in turn presupposes non-demonstrative, spatio-temporal identification. Therefore, there are no two steps. Strawson had accepted Russell's theory of the direct relation so far that he could not see it. ((s) > Brandom: Deixis presupposes anaphora.) I 415 TugendhatVsStrawson: he has overlooked the fact that the system of spatio-temporal relations is not only demonstratively perceptively anchored, but is also a system of possible positions of perception, and thus a system of demonstrative specifications. I 419 TugendhatVsStrawson: he did not ask how the meaning of singular terms is explained or how it is determined which object a singular term specifies. This is determined with different objects in very different ways, sometimes by going through all possible cases. |
Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 |
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