Find counter arguments by entering NameVs… or …VsName.
The author or concept searched is found in the following 10 entries.
| Disputed term/author/ism | Author |
Entry |
Reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Causality | Causality: causality is the relation between two (separate) entities, whereby a state change of the one entity causes the state of the other entity to change. Nowadays it is assumed that an energy transfer is crucial for talking about a causal link. D. Hume was the first to consistently deny the observability of cause and effect. (David Hume: Eine Untersuchung über den menschlichen Verstand, Hamburg, 1993, p. 95). |
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| Causality | Quine | I 33 Causality sentences as responses to stimuli. Graeser I 173 Causality/opportunity sentences/Quine: opportunity sentences provide us with causal hypotheses. Quine VI 106 Causality/Quine: we have no concept of causality that is as clear as we would like it to be. When science is particularly strict, it is content with constant correlations. (>Causality/Hume). VI 107 Disposition/Quine: this term is similar to causality in that it tolerates the substitutability of identity but blocks the predicate calculus. V 20/21 Def Cause/Quine: cause is ultimately the effect of forces on particles which is energy transmission (>Causality/Vollmer.) Causality/Quine: I am not interested in the epistemological basis like Hume, but in the ontological nature as the subject of a scientific theory. Even if the difference between energy and matter has been shaken in modern physics, the concept of cause is not out of place here. On a more abstract level, it simply plays no role. V 22 Cause/Quine: the interest in partial causes is remarkably independent of the share of energy transfer. For example, we have weak sound waves during communication and strong waves during a shot. V 23 Everyday language: "because" does not speak at all of energy transfer, but is also applied to logical premises, purposes, disposition. Disposition: is therefore often a better term than causality. >Dispositions/Quine. XI 112 Causality/QuineVsRegularity/QuineVsHume/Lauener: For example, to what kind of events does the crying of geese on the Capitol belong and to what belongs the salvation of Rome? |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 |
| Causality | Vollmer | I 102 Causality/physics/theory/Vollmer: causality is not present in physical theories - neither cause nor causal principle nor necessity. Russell: function rather than causality. Carnap: totality of the premises a statement. I 104 Causality/Vollmer: necessary condition: energy transfer. I 105 But e.tr. is not a sufficient condition. - E.g. energetic process, which is not called causal: thunder and lightning. >Sufficiency, >Conditions, >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Necessity. I 108 The cause does not have to not provide the total energy: E.g. butterfly effect. >Causes, >Causation, >Effect. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Causation | Bigelow | I 276 Causation/Bigelow/Pargetter: we should understand it as a relation between events (in a broad sense). Speech of causation/causality/Davidson/Bigelow/Pargetter. We take over from Davidson (1980)(1): Problem: singular causal statements. E.g. "The short circuit caused the fire." >Causality, >Causes, >Observation sentences. Truth conditions: the statements can be true because the relation exists, even if it is clear that short circuits are neither sufficient nor necessary conditions for fire. >Truth conditions. Generalization: can be true, but only if we reword the sentence. >Generalization/Bigelow. Causal Relation/Davidson/Bigelow/Pargetter: exists, if and only iff there is a way of describing the events so that they can be brought under a general causal law. >Causal relation. BigelowVsDavidson: (see above) the causal relation is rather local than global. BigelowVsDavidson: the nature of the causal relation is not derived from the existence of an underlying law. >Laws. I 277 Bigelow/Pargetter pro Davidson: however, the truth conditions of a singular causal statement require the existence of a relation (but not under a description). Causal statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: some must be rewritten: E.g. "The stone caused the window pane to break." Must be rewritten to: "That the stone touched the window pane caused the window pane to break." E.g. "Becker's easy victory over Lendl surprised the commentators." Must be changed: "Becker's victory surprised ... and if it had not been easy, it would not have been surprising." Bigelow pro Davidson: So far his theory is convincing. Causality/causal statements/Bigelow/Pargetter: sometimes we must also make general causal statements: For this, we need types of events or properties of events. Causal statements: must then be counterfactual conditionals: E.g. "If Lendl's defeat had not been so clear, it would not have been surprising." E.g. "The antidote slowed the death of Protheros." This seems to require causal relations between characteristics of events (e.g. lightness, slowing). I 278 Universals: are sometimes used here. Sometimes it is about unique events, sometimes about characteristics of events. >Universals, >Events. Problem: why should the relations between such different entities be summarized? Why should they all be causal? Solution/Bigelow/Pargetter: we must assume that they all supervene on a basic causal relation. This can not be specified in modal terms. >Modalities. Causal Relation/Bigelow/Pargetter: is largely unknown to us. It is best to recognize it when it is encountered. I 279 Our task is now to figure out what it is. This is a metaphysical, not a semantic task. >Metaphysics, >Semantics. I 288 Causation/Explanation/Bigelow/Pargetter: Let's assume that we can close the gap between everyday forces and the fundamental forces. I 289 Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: how do we justify that we have chosen forces for the explanation? >Forces, >Forces/Bigelow. Explanation/David Fair/FairVsBigelow/Bigelow/Pargetter: (Fair 1979)(2): he selects instead of forces energy flow. ((s) >Energy transfer/Gerhard Vollmer). Forces/Bigelow/Pargetter: we take them because they occur in Newton's 3rd law. For us, there are two instances of causation then, because there are two forces. David Fair: for him it is an instance of energy flow and thus a causation. BigelowVsFair: his theory does not provide the right relations of higher levels between universals that we need. Energy flow/energy transfer/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: this term requires the identification of packages of energy in time. Energy/Cause/Effect/Fair/Bigelow/Pargetter: The energy present in the effect is numerically identical to the energy lost in the cause. Problem/BigelowVsFair: but there is also cause, where no energy is transmitted, but only impulse. Therefore, it needs a shared access. Then the causation is hardly a unifying element in any explanation. Problem: besides, there are cases where both energy and impulse are transmitted, and how should one choose then? The causation cannot be identified with both. ((s) also BigelowVsVollmer). >Single-case causation, >G.Vollmer. I 290 BigelowVsFair: besides, energy transmission and pulse transmission supervene on properties and relations. Therefore, according to Fair, there can be no Humean world, which coincides with a causal possible world in all properties of the 1st level. This should, however, be possible (see Chapter 5): a theory that allows this must also recognize causation as a relation of a higher level. Fair cannot do this. >Levels/order, >Description levels. 1. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on actions and and events. Oxford University Press. 2. Fair, D. (1979). Causation and the flow of energy. erkenntnis 14, pp. 219-50 |
Big I J. Bigelow, R. Pargetter Science and Necessity Cambridge 1990 |
| Causes | Quine | VI 106 Cause/Disposition/Quine: cause is not intensional but there is a problem: bringing nested sentences into play that are no longer dissolved by spelling. Instead of causality we assume today constant correlations and instead of dispositions one can speak also of symptoms (of fragility) - (symptom /(s): only if it is broken.) V 19 Cause/Regularity/QuineVsHume: Problem: one can also use the two single classes consisting of a and b for regularity. Then the fallacy post hoc ergo propter hoc is reached. See >Causality/Hume. Dispositions: there is the same problem here. V 20/21 Def Cause/Quine: lastly, there is the influence of forces on particles which is energy transmission. See Causality/Vollmer. V 22 Cause/Quine: the interest in partial causes is remarkably independent of the share of energy transfer. For example, we have weak sound waves during communication and strong sound waves during a shot. V 23 Everyday language: "because" does not speak at all of energy transfer, but is also applied to logical premises, purposes and dispositions. Disposition: is therefore often a better term than causality. >Dispositions/Quine. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg) München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
| Causes | Vollmer | II 44 Cause/Physics/Vollmer: is nowhere on in physics - only effect. - This indeed appears as a physical quantity, but very limited (energy multiplied by time). >Equations, >Effect, >Causality, >Why questions. Especially natural philosophy refrains from causes. - Without signaling no effect. Signal: thus energy is transferred. >Signals, >Energy. II 48 A definite cause is never necessary. - A cause can always be halved. - Therefore VsTradition: "cause and effects balance each other" is wrong. II 49 We also speak of a cause when no energy transfer takes place: - E.g. the elastic collision of two equally heavy and equally fast balls will transfer energy - both to keep their energy - There is only a momentum transfer. Solution: there a conserved quantity is transferred. >Conservation laws, >Quantities/Physics. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Coincidence | Vollmer | II 47 Def Random/Vollmer: post hoc event without energy transfer. >Causality, >Effect, >Cause, >Energy, >Events. II 66 Random/Vollmer: real accidents: e.g. that the disc of the moon exactly covers the disc of the sun. Independent causal chains; it would be pointless to look for an explanation. >Explanations, >Causal explanation. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Individual Causation | Vollmer | II 56 Uniqueness/Unique/explanation/uniqueness/unique items/Science/Vollmer: Pauli: the unique does not have to be less essential - uniqueness/Vollmer: only when something is in principle and necessary or proven unique the arguments can be applied VsExplanation. >Explanation, >Causal explanation, >Essence. II 57 E.g. cosmology: refers to the principle unique. II 58 Uniqueness/Unique/explanation/uniqueness/unique items/Science/Vollmer: Problem: then law of nature is indistinguishable from boundary conditions. >Natural laws, >Conditions. E.g. Why the gravitational constant G has the value G = 6.67 has 10 -8, does not follow from the whole classical physics - all the constants have random values. >Natural constants. Law of nature/Vollmer: also the laws of nature are random. >Contingency, >Random. II 63 Mistake: to assume that only the repeating is based on laws of nature, but not the unique - solution: causality as energy transfer. >Energy. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Meaning Change | Rorty | I 293f Meaning Change/Rorty: Question: Did the Greeks refer to prudence with the expression Sophrosyne? >Reference. Rorty: This question can be rejected with the hint that there is for expectation; in a completely different culture this expression would be implantable; no particular reason. We have to make ourselves familiar with the exotic language game. >Relativism, >Cultural relativism, >Context dependence. In the case of science, however, such an attitude seems unnatural. Here we want to say that out there is something, laws to which one should refer or at least one has referred to. Rorty: "whiggistic" winner perspective: tells us, Aristotle spoke in reality of gravity, when he spoke of a natural settling movement, sailors would have, when they spoke of unicorns, referred to the horns of narwhals in reality, "heat flow" is a misleading description of the energy transfer between dancing molecules. >Theory change. I 301 Meaning/truth/existence/Change of Theories/Meaning Change/Quine/Rorty: Quineans would say, the question, whether they meant the same back then, is not raised. - It's more about the truth values. >Truth values, >Speaker meaning, >Speaker intention, >Meaning/Intending, >Assertibility. Rorty: a) Aristotle said something wrong about movement, or b) He said something true, but that was not movemnt. RortyVsAyers: with this, one will not get far if one does no longer believe in concepts like intellectual property etc. Ayers exaggerates the contrast between our and his concepts. I 315 ff Semantic change/change of theory/reference/Rorty: solution: the functioning of an expression should be better seen as the picking out of objects, than as the description of reality. - So either a) reference as a basis, or b) also accepting reference as conventional. - Searle-trawson-Criterion: "What would make most of his opinions true." I 318 Solution: distinction reference: a) philosophical - b) "Speaking about" (common sense) - Rorty: it is only about existence. - Therefore, no criterion for reference possible. I 321 RortyVsReference Theory/Theory of Reference: 1. Semantic search for the objects is hopeless. - 2. Hopeless: to strive for an epistemological refutation of skepticism. >Skepticism. --- III 103 Meaning change: Adorno/Horkheimer/Rorty: pro - PutnamVs. --- IV 131 Term/Meaning change/Conceptual change/Change of theories/Rorty: terms that got a new twist through a thinker: E.g. Aristotle: ousia Descartes: res Hume: impression. Wittgenstein: game Einstein: simultaneity. Bohr: Atom. >Theory Change, >Incommensurability. --- VI 361 Interpretation/Rorty: in such approximation efforts, the procedure is obviously anachronistic. But when that happens consciously, there is no objection. |
Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 |
| Parameterization | Meteorology | Edwards I 393 Parameterization/meteorology/climatology/Edwards: far from expressing pure theory, analysis models are data-laden.(1) And the same can also be said of all forecast models and general circulation models. Stephen Schneider writes: . . . even our most sophisticated ‘first principles’ models contain ‘empirical statistical’ elements within the model structure. . . .We can describe the known physical laws mathematically, at least in principle. In practice, however, solving these equations in full, explicit detail is impossible. First, the possible scales of motion in the atmospheric and oceanic components range from the submolecular to the global. Second are the interactions of energy transfers among the different scales of motion. Finally, many scales of disturbance are inherently unstable; small disturbances, for example, grow rapidly in size if conditions are favorable.(2) Edwards: Hence the necessity of parameterization, much of which can be described as the integration of observationally derived approximations into the “model physics.” Schneider and others sometimes refer to parameters as “semi-empirical,” an apt description that highlights their fuzzy relationship with observational data. For the foreseeable future, all analysis models, forecast models, and climate models will contain many “semi-empirical” elements. >Wheather forecasting/Edwards, >Models/meteorology, cf. >Homogenization/climatology, >Reanalysis/climatology. Edwards I 465 Parameter: (…) the term is often used to distinguish, from dependent variables, quantities that may be more or less arbitrarily assigned values for purposes of the problem at hand” (emphasis added). So a parameter is a kind of proxy - a stand-in for something that cannot be modeled directly but can still be estimated, or at least guessed. Parameterization illustrates the interaction of computational friction with the limits of human knowledge. In an ideal climate model, the only fixed conditions would be the distribution and the altitude of continental surfaces. Virtually all other variables - sea-surface temperature, land-surface albedo (reflectance), cloud formation, etc. - would be generated internally by the model itself from the lower-level physical properties of air, water, and other basic elements of the climate system. Instead, most physical processes operating in the atmosphere require some degree of parameterization; these parameterized processes are known as the “model physics.” >Models/climatology. Parameter: (…) parameters represent a variable physical process rather than a fixed quantity. Edwards I 466 Parameterization/Example: A major parameterization in all climate models is radiative transfer. The atmosphere contains both gases (CO2, methane, nitrogen, ozone, oxygen, water vapor, etc.) and solids (particulate aerosols, ice clouds, etc.). Each one of these materials absorbs solar energy at particular frequencies. Each also emits radiation at other frequencies. Those emissions are then absorbed and re-radiated by other gases and solids. These radiative transfers play a huge role in governing the atmosphere’s temperature. Thus, models must somehow estimate how much radiation the atmosphere in a given grid box absorbs, reflects, and transmits, at every level and horizontal location. “Line-by-line models,” which combine databases of spectrographic measurements for the various gases with physical models, can carry out this summing.(3) Edwards I 469 Ad hoc parameter/example: An example of an ad hoc parameter is “flux adjustment” in coupled atmosphere-ocean circulation models (AOGCMs). The interface between the atmospheric model and the ocean model must represent exchanges of heat, momentum (wind and surface resistance), and water (precipitation, evaporation) between the atmosphere and the ocean. These fluxes - flows of energy and matter between atmosphere and ocean—are very difficult to measure empirically. Yet they profoundly affect model behavior. Modelers spoke of flux adjustments as “non-physical” parameterizations - i.e., ones not based on physical theory—but also sometimes characterized them as “empirically determined.”(4) Any given GCM’s model physics contains hundreds or even thousands of parameterizations. Edwards I 470 An entire subfield—climate model diagnosis - works out ways to isolate the origin of particular problems to specific parameterizations and their interactions. Tuning: “Tuning” means adjusting the values of coefficients and even, sometimes, reconstructing equations in order to produce a better overall model result. “Better” may mean that the result agrees more closely with observations, or that it corresponds more closely to the modeler’s expert judgment about what one modeler I interviewed called the “physical plausibility” of the change. >Models/climatology. 1. P. N. Edwards, “Global Climate Science, Uncertainty and Politics: Data-Laden Models, Model-Filtered Data,” Science as Culture 8, no. 4 (1999): 437–. 2. S. H. Schneider, “Introduction to Climate Modeling,” in Climate System Modeling, ed. K. E. Trenberth (Cambridge University Press, 1992). 3. J. T. Kiehl, “Atmospheric General Circulation Modeling,” in Climate System Modeling, ed. K. E. Trenberth (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 338. 4. 8. J. T. Houghton et al., Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 1996). |
Edwards I Paul N. Edwards A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming Cambridge 2013 |
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| Disputed term/author/ism | Author Vs Author |
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Reference |
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| Hume, D. | Vollmer Vs Hume, D. | I 103 Causality/VollmerVsHume: not a layperson, but also not a scientist feels comfortable with Hume's observation. Causality/Hume: attributes causality to an instinct that we have in common with animals. Causality/KantVsHume: Instincts can fail, the law of causality does not seem to fail. I 105 Causality/Regularity/VsHume: For example, although day and night follow each other regularly, we do not say that day is the cause for night. VollmerVsHume: has no convincing argument for it! Vollmer: no energy transfer from day to night, so one cannot be the cause of the other! I 106 Causality/Energy transfer/VollmerVsHume: the frequency is not decisive, how else could we explain the expansion of the universe (which by definition is unique) by the Big Bang? Energy conservation is relevant for our ontological interpretation of causality, not frequency. It is essential for the possibility of an effective energy transfer. I 107 However, in principle there could also be causal processes in which only half of the released energy is transferred, while the other half disappears in violation of the conservation law! Conversely, the "cause" does not need to provide the total energy for the effect. (butterfly effect). Vollmer: small cause - big effect? - Yes, but without a minimum of energy transfer there is no effect, no causality. II 47 Natural Law/Law/General Sentence/Vollmer: three classes of true, general sentences: 1. Randomly true - for example all balls in this box are red 2. Lawfully true without energy transfer: E.g. duration of oscillation = 2π √ (pendulum length multiplied by acceleration due to gravity). 3. Causal laws (with energy transfer) E.g. heating leads to expansion This does not imply that this causal "necessity" gives causal assertions any unassailable status. Here, too, the hypothetical character of all our knowledge remains. Causality/VollmerVsHume: nevertheless, causal assertions say more than mere subsequent assertions: their empirical content is greater. This, of course, makes them easier to refute. |
Vollmer I G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd. I Die Natur der Erkenntnis. Beiträge zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie Stuttgart 1988 Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
| Mackie, J. L. | Putnam Vs Mackie, J. L. | V 276 Ethics/Mackie thesis: the good is ontologically "strange": one cannot know that something is good, without having a "Pro" attitude with regard to this something. This boils down to that one presupposes the emotivism to prove it. It also presupposes that there is ONE TRUE THEORY. PutnamVsMackie: but that does not mean that the linguistic use is not correct, there are also cases of conscious infringement. Philippa Foot: you may even intend to be a bad person. V 277 The difference between prescriptive and descriptive use is not a bad feature of the vocabulary. From the fact that "good" is used for recommendations, it does not follow that it is not a property. V 278 Properties/Mackie: thesis: there is no property like "to be justified", but only "justification settings". PutnamVsMackie: thus we fall into total relativism. For the "dedicated physicalists" there is even the problem that the reference (reference) is "ontologically strange". There are simply too many "candidates" (relations) for this post. Namely endlessly many. Nature/Putnam: a priority would really be strange because we have built a certain neutrality, a certain blankness into our concept of nature. Nature should neither have interests nor intentions, nor a position. Would a physicalist property be identical with moral correctness, that would be really weird. As if nature itself had intentions of reference. V 279 Insofar, Moore was right. But that does not schow that the good, the right, etc. do not exist. It only shows that the monistic naturalism (or "physicalism") represents an inadequate theory. --- I (g) 201 Causality/Mackie: is something epistemic and nothing at all in the world. However, there can be "mechanical causality" next to it in the world. (> G. Vollmer: nowadays causality is traced back to energy transfer,). I (g) 202 PutnamVsMackie: but this is difficult to see without counterfactual sentences. E.g. Putnam: then my practical frictionless operation of a switch does not represent a "mechanical cause". PutnamVsMackie/PutnamVsVollmer: such a narrow term may be physically useful, but it is not useful for explaining reference. On the other hand, when the circuit is mechanical causality, how do we characterizes it then without the counterfactual sentence: "The current would not have flown through the wire if the switch had not been moved"? |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |
| Putnam, H. | Vollmer Vs Putnam, H. | I 285 Causality/Putnam: can be characterised 1. Regular sequences (purely physical, unsatisfactory) or 2. via the concept of explanation (not purely physical), or 3. via counterfactual conditions (this requires "normal conditions" or "worlds as similar as possible"). I 285 Def Reference/Lewis/Vollmer: functional property (not simply of a living being, but) of a living being with its environment. Causality/VollmerVsPutnam: overlooks the fourth possibility of characterizing causality: energy transfer. PutnamVsVollmer: if energy transfer is to play such a large role, then activating a light switch cannot be a cause! VollmerVsPutnam: this overlooks the fact that not all the energy has to be transferred, but only a minimum of any size. I 286 PutnamVsVollmer: if you admit this, the question is still how to characterize it without counterfactual formulation. VollmerVsPutnam: this is not necessary at all, because there is a physical characterization. Reference/VsEvolution Theory: (e.g. Putnam): it is not clear which reference physical terms have at all! VollmerVsVs: once you have a physical characterization of causal relationships (energy transfer), you can also physically explicate "reference". |
Vollmer II G. Vollmer Was können wir wissen? Bd II Die Erkenntnis der Natur. Beiträge zur modernen Naturphilosophie Stuttgart 1988 |
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